nishida and heidegger
DESCRIPTION
Article by Curtis RigsbyTRANSCRIPT
-
Nishida on Heidegger
Curtis A. Rigsby
Published online: 29 January 2010
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract Heidegger and East-Asian thought have traditionally been stronglycorrelated. However, although still largely unrecognized, significant differences
between the political and metaphysical stance of Heidegger and his perceived
counterparts in East-Asia most certainly exist. One of the most dramatic disconti-
nuities between East-Asian thought and Heidegger is revealed through an
investigation of Kitaro Nishidas own vigorous criticism of Heidegger. Ironically,
more than one study of Heidegger and East-Asian thought has submitted that
Nishida is that representative of East-Asian thought whose philosophy most closely
resembles Heideggerian thought. In words that then and now resound discordantly
within the enshrined, established view of Heideggers relationship to East-Asian
* Note the superscript system I have devised to aid in translation. The precision of Japanese
philosophical vocabulary does not always translate easily into English. One English term with multiple
meanings, is often expressible by two or more Japanese terms with exactly one meaning each. I have
added superscripts to clarify the original Japanese term where appropriate, as follows: [EXPERIENCE]
experience (generic) []; experiencet (intensified with possible bodily manifestation) [].
[HISTORY] historyg (as in the theological history of faith, cf Bultmannian theology) (Geschichte);historyh (as in the factual history discernible by science) (Historie). [IDEALISM] idealismr (versusrealism) []; idealismb (versus materialism/realism) []; idealismm (versus materialism)
[]; idealismp or optimism (versus pessimism) []. [MATTER] materialismm [];
matterh (as opposed to form) []. [OBJECT] objecte (epistemological) []; objectx (existential)
[]; object (determinate, standing against) []. [REAL] real (generic) []; realj (especially,
philosophically, as a substance) []. [SPIRIT] spiritg (as in German Geist) []; spiritr (asanimating force) []. [SUBJECT] subjecte (epistemological) []; subjectx (existential, active) []; subjectg (grammatical-logical) []; subject matter []; all translations, unless otherwise
indicated, are the authors.
C. A. Rigsby (&)Philosophy Department of Saint Lawrence University, Canton, NY, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
C. A. Rigsby
Japan Committee of the Society of Christian Philosophers (International)
URL: http://www.societyofchristianphilosophers.com/
123
Cont Philos Rev (2010) 42:511553
DOI 10.1007/s11007-009-9119-8
-
thought, Nishida stated uninhibitedly his own view of Heidegger in the noteworthy
statement: Heidegger is not worth your time Hedoes not recognize that which
is indispensible and decisive, namely, God. This present study lays out for the first
time in English, the significant differences between the metaphysical and political
stances of Nishida and Heidegger, Nishidas own critique of Heidegger, and
Heideggers own rather dismal assessment of non-Western philosophy, all of which
demonstrate a remarkable, hitherto unrecognized discontinuity between Heidegger
and East-Asian thought.
Keywords Heidegger Nishida Kyoto School Nothingness God Karl Barth Ethnocentrism Nazism East-Asian philosophy
Comparative philosophy
1 Introduction
In the still emerging encounter between Heideggerian philosophy, Japanese
thinkers, and Western comparative thought, the general consensus has traditionally
been that a strong continuity exists between Heidegger and East-Asian thought.
Even in the wake of the critical shock waves generated by Victor Faras 1987 book
Heidegger and Nazism, and in the consequent scrutiny focused on the politicalthought of the Kyoto School of Modern Japanese philosophy in studies such as the
1994 anthology Rude Awakenings, the perceived continuity between Heidegger andEast-Asian thought continues to persist. However, although still largely unrecog-
nized, significant differences between the political and metaphysical stance of
Heidegger and his perceived counterparts in East-Asia, most certainly exist. One of
the most dramatic discontinuities between East-Asian thought and Heidegger is
revealed through an investigation of Kitaro Nishidas own vigorous criticism of
Heidegger. Ironically, more than one study of Heidegger and East-Asian thought
has submitted that Nishida is that representative of East-Asian thought whose
philosophy most closely resembles Heideggerian thought. In words that then and
now resound discordantly within the enshrined, established view of Heideggers
relationship to East-Asian thought, Nishida stated uninhibitedly his own view of
Heidegger in the noteworthy statement: Heidegger is not worth your time.1 This
statement was a strong impetus for Nishidas student, Katsumi Takizawa, to first
reevaluate Heideggerian philosophy, and then the Nishida Philosophy itself, from
1 Takizawa recorded this statement three times, in TKC 1:441, TKC 2:5212, and Inquiring of Religion(1976), p. 87, (the last source being reprinted in Sakaguchis Katsumi Takizawa Timline p. 164). Cfendnote in [3], just before [3.1], for full statement.
*TKC = The Collected Works of Katsumi Takizawa [] (abbreviated TKC). (19711975) Kyoto: Hozokan [] (all except the first printing of vol. 1, by Sogensha): vol. 1 (by Sogensha,1971), vol. 4, 5, 7 (1973), vol. 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 (1974), vol. 1 (originally publ. 1971 by Sogensha but
republished by Hozo in 1975), 2 (1975).
*Inquiring of Religion [] (first ed, 1976). Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo [].*Sakaguchi, Hiroshi [], ed. (1989) Katsumi Takizawa: Timeline of Selected Works [:]. Fukuoka: Sogensha [].
512 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
the standpoint that Nishida claimed Heidegger fatally lacked, namelythe
standpoint which recognizes the indispensable and decisive reality of God.2
2 Asian thought & enthusiasm for Heidegger
From the beginning of Heideggers career up until the present, the Japanese have
shown an enthusiasm for his thought, matched by a corresponding enthusiasm in
Western comparative studies of Heidegger and East-Asian thought, and modern
Japanese Philosophy in particular. Heidegger himself appears to have exhibited a
marked appreciation of East-Asian thought and culture.
2.1 Heideggers enthusiasm for Asia
In a letter to the organizers of the 1969 conference in Hawaii, Heidegger encouraged
hopes that his philosophy may stimulate a deeper understanding and fruitful
encounter between East and West, when he wrote:
Again and again it has seemed urgent to me that a dialogue take place with the
thinkers of what is to us the Eastern world.3
Heidegger himself had already dialogued at length with various Japanese thinkers,
including Nishidas student, Takizawa, in 1965.4 In 1954, Heidegger issued the
essay A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer, which is a
fictional reconstruction of a real discussion he had in the same year with Tomio
Tezuka, a Japanese scholar of German literature from Tokyo University. In this
1954 essay, Heidegger references Nishida, Hajime Tanabe, and especially Shuzo
Kuki,5 and recalls fondly various stimulating encounters Heidegger had with
Japanese thinkers. In this essay, which is written in the form of a dialogue between
Heidegger and a Japanese interlocutor, Heidegger exhibits an interest in Japanese
culture, and ponderously considers the prospects for intercultural dialogue. He
undertakes philosophically motivated definitions of the Japanese words for chic
(iki []) and word/language (kotoba []).6 He claims that his essay What isMetaphysics? and its leitmotif of Nothing (das Nichts) was understoodimmediately by the Japanese because of their sensitivity to East-Asian Emptiness,7
2 ibid.3 Philosophy East and West, vol. 20, No. 3, July, 1970, p. 221; Parkes,Heidegger and Asian Thought, p. 7.*Heidegger, (1970) 1969 letter printed in Introduction to the Symposium and Reading of a Letter from
Martin Heidegger, by Winfield E. Nagley, in Philosophy East and West, vol. 20, no. 3, July*Parkes, Graham, ed. (1987) Heidegger and Asian Thought. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.4 Sakaguchi, Timeline, p. 148.5 Heidegger, in On the Way to Language, references Nishida (p. 1), Tanabe (p. 5, 37), and Kuki(throughout A Dialogue on Language).
*Heidegger (1971b). On the Way to Language. [Grn: Unterwegs zur Sprache (1959)] as translated byPeter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row.6 Heidegger, ibid, p. 43ff.7 Heidegger, ibid, p. 19. Cf also Parkes in May, p. 98.
Nishida on Heidegger 513
123
-
and further claims that the Japanese have an innate understanding regarding the
reserve which respects the mystery of language, and which is necessary to
prevent unwarranted conceptualization.8 Heidegger praises his Japanese dialogue
companion, stating: you are nearer to the reality of language than all our
[European] concepts.9 Heidegger even said of D. T. Suzukis work:
If I understand this man correctly, this is what I have been trying to say in all
my writings.10
Noting Heideggers considerable interest in Asian thought,11 Graham Parkes
claims that the extent of his knowledge of Asian philosophy is not yet widely
appreciated.12 Parkes goes so far as to suggest that Heideggers notions of
Nothing and death correspond closely to the philosophy of modern Japanese
thought, even warranting the possibility that Heidegger himself was influenced by
the so-called Kyoto School which formed around Nishidas thought.13 Indeed,
Heidegger did maintain a correspondence with Nishidas colleague D. T. Suzuki,
and Nishidas student Keiji Nishitani, a correspondence wherein Heidegger
pursued an inquiry into East Asian thought.14 Nishitani was convinced that
Heidegger pursued this inquiry for the purpose of uncovering what the history of
metaphysics has concealed, as Nishitani stated in 1976 on the occasion of
Heideggers death:
With respect to metaphysics Heidegger wanted to go a step further and inquire
into what lies beneath it. It became clear that this attempt made direct contact
Footnote 7 continued
*Parkes, Graham (1996) Rising Sun over Black Forest, in Reinhard May (ed.), Heideggers HiddenSources: Some East Asian Influences on His Work. London: Routledge (Mays work was first published in1989 in German. The 1996 publication was translated with a complementary essay, by Graham Parkes).
Routledge, USA: Canada.8 Heidegger, ibid, p. 50.9 Heidegger, ibid, p. 27.10 William Barrett, p. xi in Zen for the West, the Introduction to Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings, byDaisetz T. Suzuki. Barretts entire statement is as follows:
A German friend of Heidegger told me that one day when he visited Heidegger he found him reading
one of Suzukis books; If I understand this man correctly, Heidegger remarked, this is what I have
been trying to say in all my writings. This remark may be the slightly exaggerated enthusiasm of a man
under the impact of a book in which he recognizes some of his own thoughts; certainly Heideggers
philosophy in its tone and temper and sources is Western to its core, and there is much in him that is not in
Zen, but also very much more in Zen that is not in Heidegger; and yet the points of correspondence
between the two, despite their disparate sources, are startling enough. For what, after all, is Heideggers
final message but that Western philosophy is a great error, the result of the dichotomizing intellect that
has cut man off from unity with Being itself and from his own Being.
*Barrett, William (1956) Zen for the West in the Introduction (pp. iiixx) of Zen Buddhism: SelectedWritings, by Daisetz T. Suzuki. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.11 Parkes, p. 6.12 Parkes, p. 5.13 Parkes in May, Heideggers Hidden Sources, p. 81.14 Parkes in May, pp. 99102.
514 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
with Eastern insights, such as those of Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Zen Buddhism.
For this reason Heidegger used to question me about Zen Buddhism.15
In regards to Heideggers more general interests in East-Asian thought, it should be
noted that in 1946 he began a translation of Laozis Daodejing with the ChineseChristian thinker Paul Shih-yi Hsiao. Parkes claims that such encounters by
Heidegger with Laozi and Zhuangzi influenced both the style and content of
Heideggers post Being and Time thought, so as to move toward a greaterappreciation of the poetic.16
2.2 Japanese enthusiasm for Heidegger
Parkes has also noted that:
Heideggers interest in Asian thought has generated considerable reciprocal
interest in his work on the part of the Oriental philosophical world.17
Indeed, Japanese enthusiasm for Heideggers thought has roots as early as the
1920s. Kyoto School associates Hajime Tanabewho was personally tutored by
Heideggerand Kiyoshi Miki, had interacted with the young Heidegger in
Germany in 1923, and soon after began to comment about his thought in their own
writings. Because the last page or two of Heideggers summer lecture, Ontology:
Hermeneutics of Facticity, were lost, for 65 years, the sole source for Heideggers
first words on the topic of death were Tanabes lecture notes.18 Indeed, Tanabes
October 1924 A New Turn in Phenomenology19 is the first substantial
commentary on Heideggers thought in any language. Kitaro Nishida himself
immediately commented on Tanabes article, stating in an October 2, 1924
letter to Tanabe that Heidegger will contribute to cultural studies from the
phenomenological standpoint.20 The first translation of Heideggers work in
Japanese, What is Metpaphysics?, appeared in 1930, just one year after its
publication in Germany.21 Miki Kiyoshi published essays on Heidegger in 1930 and
15 Nishitani, Keiji. The Deep Sense of Crisis in Contemporary Culture [],Yomiuri Shinbun 27 May 1976; trnsl. By Elmar Weinbayr as Ein tiefes Gefuhl fur die Krise dermodernen Zivilisation, in Buchners Japan und Heidegger, pp. 1934. Translated into English andquoted by Parkes, in May, p. 101.
*Buchner, Hartmut, ed (1989) Japan und Heidegger. Messkirch: Jan Thorbecke Verlag Sigmaringen.16 Parkes in May, p. 98.17 Parkes, p. 6.18 Parkes in May, p. 82.19 [] in Shiso [] 36 Oct 1924; THZ 4:1724.20 NKZ 19:582, letter #2470, October 2, 1927. As quoted in Yusa, p. 198, footnote 38. Nishida received
from his student Risaku Mutai, a copy of Heideggers Being and Time in 1927, the same year as itspublication in Germany (NKZ 18:327, letter #447 to Risaku Mutai (in Freiburg), June 17, 1927; cf also
NKZ 19:600, letter #2516 to Hajime Tanabe, June 20, 1927).
*NKZ = Nishida, Kitaro (1965) The Complete Works of Kitaro Nishida [](abbreviated NKZ). Iwanami Shotenkan [].21 Seinosuke Yuasa, who studied with Heidegger in 1929, translated Heideggers What is Metaphys-
ics? for publication in Japan in 1930.
Nishida on Heidegger 515
123
-
1933.22 Shuzo Kuki, who had interacted with Heidegger in 1926 and 1927, and who
was the first to introduce Jean-Paul SartreKukis French tutor at the time23to
Heideggers thought, released the 1933 work, Heideggers Philosophy, which wasthe first book length work on Heideggers philosophy in any language. In the same
year, Tanabe summed up the thoughts of many in the Japanese intellectual
community when he stated:
Among contemporary German philosophers, no one has recently attracted
greater attention in Japan than Martin Heidegger. In what can only be
described as the German equivalent of the Japanese descent from heaven,
this comparatively young scholarHeidegger at 44 has just entered his prime
was given a post normally reserved for the most senior of academic
veterans. Obviously, in these exceptional times, the man is the object of
enormous expectations not only at Freiburg but also throughout the German
academic community.24
Tetsuro Watsujis Climate, which was soon to be published in 1935, althoughlargely a critique of Heideggers thought, still exhibited its indebtedness to
Heideggers brand of phenomenology and etymological speculation. Japanese
enthusiasm for Heidegger continued after WWII as well, as was illustrated by the
work Is Heidegger a Nihilist?,25 by Kyoto School associate Masaaki Kosaka. Moresecondary literature on Heidegger has appeared in Japanese than in any other
language, including German and French. Between 1939 and 1960, no less than six
different translations of Heideggers Being and Time appeared in Japanese.26
Heideggers association with the Kyoto School is especially worthy of note, as he
was not only studied carefully by several of its associates, but also developed close
relationships with Nishidas close friend D. T. Suzuki, and with Keiji Nishitani, who
was the successor to Nishida and Tanabe as the generally accepted head of the
Kyoto School.27
Given the deep interest that Heideggers philosophy was causing among Japanese
intellectuals, it is not surprising that Heideggers philosophy played a major role in
Takizawas own graduation thesis in 1931. Takizawa also wrote a critical essay
about Heidegger in 1933, shortly before meeting Nishida in person for the first time.
22 Heideggers Ontology (1930) & Heidegger and the Destiny of Philosophy (1933).23 Yuasa in Parkes, p. 158. Cf also Williams, p. 81.
* Williams, David (2004) Defending Japans Pacific War. New York: Routledge.24 Williams translation, p. 181, from THZ 8:39 A Philosophy of Crisis or a Crisis of Philosophy? [
]*THZ = Tanabe, Hajime (19631964) The Complete Works of Hajime Tanabe ()
(abbreviated THZ). 15 vols. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo ().
Tanabe, Hajime. 19631964. The Complete Works of Hajime Tanabe () (abbreviated THZ).15 vols. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo ().25 Piovesana, p. 201, footnote 2.
*Piovesana, Gino K., S. J. (1997). Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought 18621996. Richmond:Japan Library (Curzon Press Ltd).26 Williams, p. 82.27 Cf Yuasa in Parkes, and Parkes in May, for a good historical overview.
516 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
It is clear that during this meeting, Heidegger was an important part of the
conversation, and also evident that Takizawa himself expected to study with
Heidegger, as so many of Nishidas other colleagues and students had already done.
2.3 The Western expectation that Heidegger is a key to Japanese Philosophy
Interest in Heideggers thought has not been limited to Japan. Western students of
Heidegger and EastWest comparative studies have also looked to Heidegger with
great expectations as an auspicious case of a Westerner doing philosophy in a way
that is especially commensurate with East-Asian thought. This is attested to by
numerous publications,28 and particularly, by a symposium on Heidegger and
Eastern Thought that was held at the University of Hawaii in 1969 to celebrate his
eightieth birthday.29 The essays presented at this conference were anthologized in
1987, with an introduction which states that although the vocabulary of traditional
(Platonic/Christian) metaphysics and contemporary analytic philosophy threaten
to subject East-Asian texts to gross distortion, the language of Heideggerian
philosophy is especially suited to dealing with the Asian tradition, as Parkes states:
The realization has dawned recently, however, that the European Continental
traditionand existentialism and phenomenology in particularhas devel-
oped philosophical terminologies that are far more in harmony with many
strains of Asian thought than are those of Anglo-American philosophy.30
Regarding Heideggers significance for comparative philosophical studies and East
West dialogue, Elmar Weinmayr concurred in 1989, stating:
Heideggers thought isone of the few (philosophical) European advances to
the place in which East Asia and Europe can creatively encounter one
another.31
28 Examples of such publications setting up Heidegger as especially compatible with Eastern philosophy
include:
*Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen, by Steven Heine, 1985.*Thinking in transition: Nishida Kitaro and Martin Heidegger, Weinmayr, Elmar; Krummel,
John W. M.; Berger, Douglas, in Philosophy East and West April, 2005.*Heideggers Hidden Sources by Reinhard May.*Heidegger and Asian Thought, a (1987) anthology ed. by Graham Parkes et al.*Heidegger figures prominently in The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism and Religion and Nothingness by
Keiji Nishitani, and also in Zen and Western Thought by Abe Masao.*Japan und Heidegger (in German), (1989) ed. by Buchner von Hartmut.*Japanese publications include: ( )
2002, (;:).29 Parkes, Heidegger and Asian Thought, p. 7.30 Parkes, p. 6.31 Weinmayr, p. 248.
*Weinmayr, Elmar (2005). Thinking in Transition: Nishida Kitaro and Martin Heidegger. (translated
from the original essay in the anthology, Japan und Heidegger. Sigmaringen: Jan thorbecke Verlag,1989). Philosophy East & West. Vol. 55, No. 2, April, pp. 232256.
Nishida on Heidegger 517
123
-
In investigating how Heideggers wartime thought and political life might clarify
the meaning and value of the wartime Kyoto School, David Williams even stated in
2004, that Martin Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of our time.32
2.4 The Heidegger studies crisis & Japanese Philosophy
The destinies of Heideggerian philosophy and modern Japanese Philosophy have
been closely intertwined, not only for the good, but also for the bad. When Victor
Faras 1987 book Heidegger and Nazism provoked a scandal throughout the worldof Heidegger scholarshipa scandal aggravated by a study of the same year which
exposed the anti-Semitic editorials of deconstructionist critic Paul de Man33the
resulting shock waves led to the 1994 anthology, Rude Awakenings, whichreevaluated the wartime political ideology and activity of the Kyoto School, of
which Nishida was a leading figure. Thus whereas since the 1960s, Western studies
of Kyoto School thought and Zen Buddhism had focused primarily on religious and
ontological themes, Faras work led to a new political vantage point in the 1990s,
whereby previously positive receptions transformed into highly critical assessments.
James Heisig and John Maraldo note:
If there is one factor we can point to as having brought the political aspect to
the fore, it is the case of Martin Heidegger. In the light of new revelations of
Heideggers associations with the German Nazi Party, affections for
Heideggerian thought underwent a sea of change, and in the process, the
consciousness of a generation was awakened as never before to the political
consequences of supposedly apolitical philosophers and scholars. It was only a
matter of time before this rude awakening was transmitted to those attracted to
the philosophy of the Kyoto School, not to mention Zen Buddhism.34
Williams concurs regarding this wave of Japan critique (Grn: Japanokritik),stating:
The global debate that had erupted in the 1980s over Heideggers politicsthe
so-called Faras Affairdealt a severe blow to the reputation of Kyoto
School philosophy in the West.35
Indeed, Williams notes that The ricochet of the Faras Affair damaged the Western
commitmentmoral, aesthetic, religious, and metaphysicalto Kyoto thought.36
Somberly keeping in view the central question of FarasIs there anything in
32 Williams, p. 29.33 Williams, p. 147.34 Heisig and Maraldo, Rude Awakenings, pp. viiviii. Cf Williams p. 144. Cf also Maraldo, TheProblem of World Culture, 1995, pp. 183, 189.
*Heisig, James and John Maraldo (1995) Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question ofNationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.*Maraldo, John C. (1995) The Problem of World Culture: Towards an Appropriation of Nishidas
Philosophy of Nation and Culture. The Eastern Buddhist. Volume 28, number 2, Autumn, pp. 183197.35 Williams, p. 129.36 Williams, p. 141.
518 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
Heideggers philosophy that would have made his involvement with the Nazis
impossible?Jan Van Bragt, concluded in 1994 that, in a very general sense,
Kyoto School philosophy is intrinsically nationalistic, and that further reflection
upon the ramifications of this hitherto unconsidered aspect of modern Japanese
thought are in order.37 Williams went onto argue in 2004 that the corresponding
post-Faras Affair question which has generated the current critical stance against
modern Japanese philosophy is: Is there anything in Nishidas philosophy that
would have kept him from becoming an ultra-nationalist?38
Indeed, there is a sense in which Heidegger and the members of the Kyoto School
were nationalists who, in the face of opposition and competition, supported the
standpoint of their respective politispheres and cultures. Although this has been
perceived as a deficit by many Western scholars who take a critical stance toward
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Williams has defended the Kyoto School
precisely in terms of its political objectives, calling it an adventure in post-White
thinking which defined the future of Asian resurgence.39 The very title of
Williams work of 2004Defending Japans Pacific Warresoundingly proclaimsthis provocative thesis. Williams not only thus portrays the Kyoto School as a
corrective to Western ethnocentrism, but also appeals to the commonly perceived
continuity between Heidegger and East-Asian thought in order to defend Heideg-
gerian philosophy from the aftershocks of the Faras Affair, as Williams states:
If a German problem (Heideggers politics) has provoked this Japanese
problem (the rediscovery of the true politics of the wartime Kyoto School), the
reverse may also be true: a Japanese solution may offer a cure for our German
problem.40
Thus, in summary, Williams argues on the assumption of a significant continuity
between Heidegger and the Kyoto School, that restoring the reputation of the Kyoto
School should correspondingly restore Heideggers reputation. The implication is that
if there is no such continuity betweenHeidegger and the Kyoto School, then themerits
of the Kyoto School cannot be appealed to in order to salvage Heideggers reputation.
3 The purported continuity between Heidegger & Nishida
Any claim that there is a general continuity of thought between Heidegger and the
East-Asian traditions quickly becomes suspect upon investigation of the vast
diversity representing East-Asian thought and culture. Even when purported
continuities with Heidegger are limited to the Kyoto School alone, the vast
differences between its members and associates militate against any purported
essential similarity. For example, Shinichi Hisamatsu was a Zen Buddhist, Seiichi
Hatano was a Christian, Hajime Tanabe and Masaaki Kosaka were nationalists,
37 Jan Van Bragt, in Heisig & Maraldo, Rude Awakenings, p. 243. Cf Williams, p. 141.38 Williams, p. 141.39 Williams, p. 91.40 Williams, p. 130.
Nishida on Heidegger 519
123
-
Kiyoshi Miki and Jun Tosaka were Marxists and Keiji Nishitani was an
existentialist of sorts. Given the vast range of options in modern Japanese
philosophy, more than one study of Heidegger has narrowed the field by proposing
Nishidas life and thought as exhibiting the strongest parallels with Heidegger.
However, some such studies, such as Arthur R. Luthers (1982) comparison between
the two thinkers, argue for a parallel between them based partly on an insufficiently
clear account of Nishidas thought.41 Given a clearer picture, in terms of both
political and metaphysical stance, strong discontinuities between the two thinkers
can be discerned if the comparison focuses on the early, pre-turn Heidegger.
3.1 Discontinuity between Heidegger & Nishidas political stance
In terms of the political stance of the two thinkers, Williams argues that for Nishida,
The analogy with Heidegger is close,42 in that both thinkers were objectivists,
prioritizing a standpoint transcending the historical creation and political activism
of humanism and subjectivism. Thus Williams distances Nishida and Heidegger
from subjectivists like Hajime Tanabe and the Kyoto School gang of four
Masaaki Kosaka, Shigetaka Suzuki, Iwao Koyama, and Keiji Nishitaniwho
stressed the rational self-mastery and effective agency, which is to say,
subjectivityt (shutaisei []),43 of human beings acting as subjectst.44 Notonly did Tanabe criticize Nishida for characterizing reality as determined by a trans-
historical principle that did not do justice to the actual movements of history,45 but
41 Arthur R. Luthers stimulating comparison of Heidegger and Nishida in terms of an original coming
into appearanceimmediately and directly experienced (p. 345, my italics) may characterize Nishidain more phenomenological terms than Nishida himself would have felt comfortable with. Luthers most
questionable characterizations of Nishida appear in terms of a conflation of Nishidas thought with
Buddhism. Luther concludes that for Nishida, all sentient existents are essentially empty or void of own-
being (p. 353), karma is integral to cosmic processes (p. 354), and as in Hua-yan (Kegon) Buddhism,
the dependent coorigination of all factors of existence is inclusive of infinite past as well as infinite
future (p. 354). To my knowledge, Nishida himself neither adopts the concepts nor utilizes the
corresponding Buddhist terms, void of own-being (nisvabhava) or karma as integral to his system.However, as Luther correctly notes, self-negation (jiko hitei []) is indeed integral to the NishidaPhilosophy, although not necessarily in a Buddhist manner; indeed, Nishidas notion of negation often
reminds me more of Hegelian negation and Christian self-denial than Buddhist voidness of own being.
Further, although Hajime Tanabes disciple Yoshinori Takeuchi (in 1963) portrayed Nishidas philosophy
of time as basically a Hua-yan Buddhist past to future/future to past mutual penetration and Western
scholars such as Steve Odin (in 1982) have likewise followed this interpretation, Nishida himself in both
1932 (NKZ 6:183) and 1945 (NKZ 11:375), emphasized the irreversible structure of time.
*Luther, Arthur R. 1982. Original Emergence in Heidegger and Nishida. Philosophy Today. VolumeXXVI, Number 4/4, Winter.42 Williams, p. 145.43 Williams, p. 68.44 Williams, p. 110. The French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre would define subjectivism as pointing to
the fact that man has a greater dignity than a stone, and as having two meanings, namely, that an
individual chooses andmakes himself; andthat it is impossible for man to transcend human subjectivity.
The Humanism of Existentialism (1945), in the context of Sartres explanation of Atheistic
existentialism.45 Maraldo, The Problem of World Culture: Towards an Appropriation of Nishidas Philosophy of
Nation and Culture, p. 185.
520 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
in early Autumn of 1933, Tanabe also similarly criticized Heideggers Freiburg
Rectoral address of May 3 of the same year. Thus in 1933, Tanabe claimed
critically, that for Heidegger:
knowing is a creature born out of powerlessness. This is why the Greeks
called it theora Armed only with the awareness of the powerlessness ofknowledge, is it possible to establish, positively, with this principle alone, the
foundations for a metaphysics of the nation-state?46
That is, Tanabe felt that Heideggers Aristotelean commitment to a philosophical
methodology of mere theoradisengaged and disinterested contemplation
which during the Middle Ages degenerated into the handmaiden of theology, is
incapable of the Platonic invocation to historical awareness and political action.
Thus by way of Tanabes critique, both Heidegger and Nishida are united as
adherents to political objectivism, which is to say, a standpoint whereby individual
human beings are objects grounded in a reality greater than the effective agency of
historical production, and are thereby maximally distanced from the political
engagement demanded by subjectivism. Tanabes critiques of the objectivism he
detected in Heidegger and Nishida thus lend considerable support to the thesis of a
continuity between the two thinkers.47
However, despite the continuity between the two thinkers as perceived by Tanabe
and Williams, there are also significant differences between Heidegger and Nishida.
The differences between them were greatest in 1933, which is the year that Nishida
sent off his student Takizawa to Germany, and the differences remained strong until
the year of Nishidas death in 1945, which is one year before the culmination of
Heideggers turn (Kehre) represented by the 1946 essay Letter on Humanism,wherein he locates the error of Western philosophy in a metaphysics of presence
dominated by the will to power of active subjects seeking planetary domination
of technique. Although the later Heidegger clearly prioritized the letting go
(Gelassenheit) of self-assertion, the Heidegger of the 1927 work Being and Timeand the 1933 Rektoratsredewhich is to say, the Heidegger most familiar toNishidahad strong subjectivist tendencies. On the one hand, the later Heideggerwould warn of the inauthenticity of self-assertion aimed at future-oriented
progress and technology, and would correspondingly affirm the authenticity
of the subtle disclosure of truth (aletheia) as given in the past and cultivated byGreek thought. However, on the other hand, the early Heidegger conversely warnedof the inauthenticity of the past-oriented thrownness (Geworfenheit) of theThey (das Man), who in making no attempt to face the future and its implicationsof authenticity, constantly threaten to rob human beings (Dasein) of their self-autonomy, responsibility, and choice. Heideggers early subjectivism reverberates
46 Williams, pp. 182183. Tanabes article on Heidegger, Philosophy of Crisis, or a Crisis of
Philosophy?, appeared in a three-part series printed in the Asahi Newspaper in early Autumn of 1933.Tanabe had recently issued a similar critique of Nishidas philosophy in May, 1930, in the article,
Looking Up to Nishidas Teachings.47 Williams characterizes Tanabes critique of Nishida as a criticism against objectivism (cf Williams,
p. 116), and indeed characterizes both Heidegger and Nishida as objectivists (pp. 130, 135, 146).
Nishida on Heidegger 521
123
-
clearly in a statement he made in 1933a statement which exhibits his choice-
oriented and future-oriented philosophical terminology of the period:
The German people must choose its future, and this future is bound to the
Fuhrer There is only one will to the full existence (Dasein) of the State. TheFuhrer has awakened this will in the entire people48
Evidently, from Nishidas 1931 essay History onward, culminating in his notion
of active-intuition, Nishida himself became increasingly interested in the
concrete, socio-political creation of history. However, in both theory and practice,
Nishida never exhibited the same degree of subjectivist activism as Heidegger. Even
more significantly, from the beginning to the end of his career, Nishida maintained a
rather detached stance toward political matters which later commentators would call
resistive cooperation (hantaiseiteki kyoryoku []).49 Although thisstance worked indirectly to affirm the official policies of wartime Japan, it is not
comparable to Heideggers vigorous participation in political affairs and enthusi-
astic support for the Nazi party in 1933, the year of his Rectorship at Freiburg
University and the year of Takizawas study in Germany. Indeed, in private, Nishida
was highly critical of the political regime of wartime Japan.50
Although Williams argues for a strong continuity between Heidegger and
Nishida, he does not carefully note the difference between the early and the later
Heidegger. Further, Williams location of a continuity between the two thinkers
seems to assume the position of the later Heidegger. However, it is precisely thephilosophical subjectivism and political activity of the early Heidegger that led tocritical reassessment of his life and thought, and consequently, to a critical
reassessment of the Kyoto School. Indeed, it is precisely this subjectivist strain of
the early Heidegger that has led many to make a distinction between his political life
and his philosophy, thus affirming only the value of the latter in an attempt to
salvage it. Although Williams claims that distinguishing the man from the ideas,
the politics from the philosophy, does not work as philosophy,51 and that to make
this distinction is the hoariest cliche in the entire controversy over Heidegger,52
Williams himself nevertheless appears to resort to this cliche by claiming that the
ethicalpolitical critics of Heidegger often seem to have lost sight of the
metaphysical horizon and that This appears to be equally true of the political
48 Heidegger. German Men and Women!, Freiburger Studentenzeitung, 10 Nov (1933).49 Cooperative resistance (hantaiseiteki kyoryoku []) is Ryosuke Ohashis term for thewartime political stance taken by several members of the Kyoto School, including Nishida, a stance
characterized by negotiating a reorientation by means of immanent critique or cooperative correction.
I would like to acknowledge Bret Davis for making this information available online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/. Cf also Ohashi, Ryosuke. The Kyoto School and theJapanese Navy [], Kyoto: PHP Shinsho, 2001, p. 20ff.50 Cf Michiko Yusas biography of Nishida.
*Yusa, Michiko (2002) Zen & Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitaro. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press.51 Williams, p. 150.52 Williams, p. 156.
522 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
critics of the wartime Kyoto School.53 Indeed, Williams himself praises the ability
to draw a firm distinction between the philosophic discourse proper and the realm
of political opinion,54 and thus even Williams takes the stance of distinguishing
the man from the ideas, the politics from the philosophy. Whether or not Williams
is correct in his claim that metaphysics is not about moral backbone,55 he has not
provided a satisfactory account of the continuity between the wartime political
philosophies of Heidegger and Nishida. If the wartime political thought of
Heidegger and Nishida does not exhibit significant continuity, then perhaps a
stronger continuity can be located in their ontological explorations on the
metaphysical horizon.
3.2 Discontinuity between Heidegger & Nishidas metaphysical stance
In terms of the metaphysical stance of the two thinkers, Elmar Weinmayr noted in
1989:
Nishida and Heidegger bothpoint to the derivativeness of the subjecthood of
man as well as the objecthood of things from a prior openness of reality as a
whole, that is to say, the subject-object relation is embedded in a deep.
structure embracing them and initially making their relation possible.56
Thus, Nishidas all-encompassing Place or Topos (basho []) exhibits significantsimilarities with Heideggers Being (Sein), which is manifest as an openness(Offenheit) and acts as a clearing (Lichtung) for the beings within it, thusproviding light (Licht) for human beings (Dasein) to encounter the emerging truth(aletheia) of Being. Nishidas account of the relationship between the infinite Toposand the finite individuals situated within it (oite aru mono []), alsoexhibits significant similarities with Heideggers account of the ontological
difference between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes), whereby on the one hand,Being enables a genuine encounter between beings and elicits a sense of care
(Sorge) among them, and on the other hand, beings themselves derive theirsignificance from Being. Indeed, Nishidas account of the relationship between the
Absolute Topos of Nothingness and the individuals situated within it, as a
contradictory self-identity (mujunteki jikodoitsu []), and hisaccount of the manifestation of Nothingness as a transcendence and-yet
immanence (naizai soku choetsu []), exhibits significant similaritieswith Heideggers characterization of the manifestation of Being as a simultaneous
absence and yet presence.
Heideggers preoccupation with the question of Being (das Seinsfrage), whichextended from the beginning to the end of his career, indicates that what the term
Being represents, was of paramount importance for him, and the same was true of
the notion of Topos or Nothingness for Nishida. Nishida often characterized his
53 Williams, p. 137.54 Williams, p. 161.55 Williams, p. 146.56 Weinmayr, p. 234.
Nishida on Heidegger 523
123
-
understanding of the referent of terms such as Topos, Nothingness, and the
Absolute, as God. Heidegger was less inclined to characterize Being as
God, and indeed rarely touched upon the issue of God. Just as with Nishidas
view of God, there is a lack of consensus and clarity regarding Heideggers own
view of God. Of course, it has been noted that Heideggers ontological difference
between Being and beings shares affinities with the theistic difference between God
and creatures, and also that Heideggers aim to rid philosophy of all metaphysicaltheology does not necessitate the rejection of God, but may actually clear the way
for a genuine encounter with God.57 In the late 1950s, Heidegger implied this by
distinguishing the divine God (der gottlicher Gott) from the god of philosophy.58
However, although Heidegger himself references God and the holy in his own
work without rejecting such notions, his lack of clarity regarding the notion of God
has commonly led to the appellation of his position as agnostic. Indeed, in printed
translations of Heideggers notion of Sein or Being, some scholars do not use acapital B in order to avoid making Sein sound like some absolute ormetaphysical principle that rules over other beings.59 Emphasizing the difference
between Heideggers b-eing and the theistic God, Weinmayr emphasizes that
Heidegger is not interested in some:
law standing above all beings, for example a highest conjoining
(Verfugung) of a universally destined transience to which beings aresubjugated.60
Weinmayr explains that to seek such an all-encompassing trans-historical law is a
symptom of the modern problem of the oblivion of Being (Seinsvergessenheit)whereby The modern subject desires that which fits (fugt) the highest and mostuniversal being, because it is unconjoined (unverfugten) and not conjoinable(unverfugbaren)61 Heideggers discontinuity with Nishida comes clearly intoview here, because Nishidas Topos is easily characterized as the highest and most
universal reality, fully absolute as the Topos of Absolute Nothingness or God.
Of course, Nishidas etymological appeal to relevant Sino-Japanese morphemes in
order to characterize the Absolute (zettai []) as that which has severed (zet-[]) all opposition (-tai []),62 implies a radical immanence and continuity of theAbsolute with all finite things and thus contrasts with the radical transcendence
implied by the corresponding Indo-European morphemes (Ltn: ab-solvere),
57 Kovacs, pp. 2021, 24.
*Kovacs, George (1990) The Question of God in Heideggers Phenomenology. (Part of theNorthwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, ed. James M. Edie).
Illinois: Northwestern University Press.58 Heidegger, Identitat und Differenz (Identity and Difference) (1957), p. 71, my translation.
*Heidegger (1971a) Identity and Difference. [translation by Joan Stambaugh from Identitat undDifferenz (19551957)]. New York: Harper & Row.59 Krummel and Berger in Weinmayr, p. 251, footnote 6.60 Weinmayr, p. 237. For ease of comprehension, I replaced the singular generic a being with the plural
beings.61 Weinmayr, p. 238.62 NKZ 11:396.
524 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
which indicate a setting free (solvere) from (ab) or an unconjoinability(Unverfugbarkeit) with all finite things. However, both Sino-Japanese and Indo-European morphemes can generate the same end result in that maximal universality is
achieved in both cases, whether through the Sino-Japanese immanence in all finite
things or through the Indo-European transcendence from all finite things.
It is important to note that Heideggers account of Being, which is perhaps that
notion in his thought that most closely approximates the notion of God, changes
throughout the course of Heideggers career. Thus Heideggers later account of
Being more closely parallels the traditional notion of God than Heideggers early
account of Being, as Michael Inwood explains:
In [Heideggers 1927 work,] Being and Time, Being is only in theunderstanding [of individual beings]. If there were no Dasein [i.e. human
beings], there would be no Being, but there would be beings Later [in the
development of Heideggers thought]Beinghas becomemore like
God[in that] what human beings do depends on Being itself Being does
not depend on human beings, as in Being and Time, but creates human beingsas its abode.63
Tokiyuki Nobuhara correspondingly noted in 1992, that for the post-turn Heidegger,
Daseins authentic existence began to be coterminous with Daseins devotion or
correspondence (Entsprechung) to the ultimate reality as the verifying truth (dieWahrung der Wahrheit).64 Rolf von Eckartsberg and Ronald S. Valle, in 1981, inthe context of a comparison between Heideggerian philosophy and the major
Eastern spiritual traditions, have even identified Heideggers Being with a higher,
transpersonal God- or theo-dimension which is the source of legitimation and
validation of our activities.65 Thus whereas for the early Heidegger, human beings
are a precondition for Being, for the later Heidegger, the reverse is the case.
Therefore, it can be said that in the early Heideggerthe Heidegger of whom
Nishida was most familiarthe notion of God is maximally absent.
63 Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, pp. 7273. Man changed to human beings.*Inwood, Michael (1999) The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries: A Heidegger Dictionary.
Massachusetts: Blackwell.64 Nobuhara, Portraying Authentic Existence, part I, pp. 6162.
*Nobuhara, Tokiyuki (19921993) Portraying Authentic Existence by the Method of Analogy:
Toward the Creative Uses of the Analogy of Attribution Duorum Ad Tertium for Comparative Philosophy
of Religion. Bulletin of Keiwa College. Part I No. 1 Feb 28, 1992 (pp. 6182); Part II No. 2 February 28,1993 (pp. 2750); Part III No. 3 Feb 28, 1994 (pp. 119).65 Von Eckartsberg and Valle (1981) p. 289:
There has been emerging among consciousness-oriented psychologists an increasing recognition that
our personal and collective relationship to the world (man-world-relationships) has to be lived under the
inspiration and auspices of some higher, transpersonal power of divinity, of ultimate Being, as the source
of legitimation and validation of our activities. This higher, transpersonal God- or theo-dimension is
variously spoken of and conceptualized in different traditions. We want to select and compare
Heideggers work on the Western philosophical tradition of metaphysics and ontology with the major
Eastern spiritual traditions, because they bear some striking similarities in their emphasis on a
transcendent dimension, the theo-dimension, in human consciousness.
*Von Eckhartsberg, Rolf, & Ronald S. Valle. 1981. Heideggerian Thinking and the Eastern Mind.
(chapter 14, pp. 287311) Metaphors of Consciousness. New York & London: Plenum Press.
Nishida on Heidegger 525
123
-
4 Nishidas negative assessment of Heidegger
Whatever positive evaluations of Heidegger might have been suggested by
Nishidas favorable 1924 remark to TanabeHeidegger will contribute to cultural
studies from the phenomenological standpoint66and by the strong interest that
Nishidas associates such as Miki, Tanabe, and Kuki had shown in the great German
philosopher, Nishidas overall assessment of Heidegger was not as Weinmayr
suggests, just an ambivalent posture expressed in a few places wherein
Appreciation and critical distance are mixed.67 To the contrary, Nishidas overall
assessment of Heidegger was overwhelmingly negative.68 Indeed, given a broader
picture of Nishidas view of Heidegger, it can be said that Nishidas overall
assessment of Heidegger can be summarized bluntly in the uninhibited statement
made by the father of the Kyoto School to the young Takizawa in October 1933:
Heidegger is not worth your time.69 In the same year of 1933, Nishida repeated
his negative assessment of Heideggeralthough in a much more restrained manner
in a December 19 letter to Goichi Miyake, who had studied with Heidegger at
Freiburg from 1929 to 1931. Politely assuring Miyake of the value of his study in
Germany, Nishida stated:
I respect Heideggers work, but it cannot answer the deep problems of
substance (jittai []) and life (jinsei []).70
In his statement to Takizawa, Nishida explained clearly what does provide the
solution to the problems of substance and lifea solution lacking in Heidegger, at
least in early Heideggerian philosophy. Thus Nishida expressed his solution and
also his reason for rejecting Heideggers thought, in the following words:
Heideggerfocuses only on such themes as Angst and death, and
although he often relies upon Pascal and Kierkegaard, he does not recognize
that which is indispensable and decisive, namely, God.71
66 NKZ 19:582, letter #2470, October 2, 1927. As quoted in Yusa, p. 198, footnote 38.67 Weinmayr, p. 233. The full statement reads:
Nishida himself played hardly any role in the direct and immediate dissemination and reception of
Heideggerian philosophy in Japan. Indeed, only a few publications of Heideggers works are found in his
library, but nothing can be said of any reference to Heidegger. Appreciation and critical distance are
mixed in the few places where Nishida talks about Heidegger.68 Even the statements by Nishida about Heidegger, which Weinmayr himself examines, are all negative,
pp. 233234.69 Takizawa recorded this statement three times, in TKC 1:441, TKC 2:5212, and Inquiring of Religion(1976), p. 87, (the last source being reprinted in Sakaguchis Katsumi Takizawa Timline p. 164).70 NKZ 18:489, letter #824, December 19, 1933. (trns. Rigsby) Referenced by Yusa, p. 257. Nishidas
term substance (jittai []) can be understood in a colloquial sense or in a philosophically nuancedsense. If Nishida has the philosophical sense in mindwhich is to say, substance as the unifier and
organizer of various propertiesthen this statement may be a criticism of Heideggers account of Being
and its insufficiencies in portraying the universal, all-encompassing Absolute which Nishida embraced.
Nishidas Absolutethe Topos of Absolute Nothingnessunifies and determines all concrete individuals
and the properties they exhibit.71 Takizawa makes this statement three times, in TKC 1:441, TKC 2:5212, and Inquiring of Religion(1976), p. 87, (the last source being reprinted in Sakaguchis Katsumi Takizawa Timeline p. 164).
526 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
Given that the later Heidegger would himself propose formulations of Being which
are closer to the traditional notion of God, and also given that the later Heidegger
would also adhere more solidly to socio-political objectivism in the manner of the
Nishida Philosophy, Nishidas 1933 assessment of Heidegger most likely applies
only to pre-turn Heideggerian thought. At the same time, just as the pre-turn
Heideggerian standpoint, which tended to be restricted to a political and
phenomenological subjectivism, worked toward breaking the continuity of his
thought with Nishida, Nishidas own negative assessment of Heidegger suggests a
significant discontinuity between the two thinkers. In Nishidas own words, the
decisive deficit in Heideggers thought is failure to recognize Godthe
ultimate Reality which Nishida interchangeably calls the Absolute, the absolute
Place or Topos, and Nothingness. Thus Nishidas criticism of Heidegger is
conversely constituted and motivated by Nishidas account of Gods essential
character, which can be summarized in the following six points: (1) first, Gods
transcendence which provides a ground for mathematics and a standpoint which is
not affected by the vicissitudes of contingent phenomena, (2) second, Gods
prevention of ethno-centrism, (3) third, Gods affirmation of individual and cultural
autonomy, (4) fourth, Gods immanence which affirms the significance of socio-
historical life, (5) fifth, Gods prevention of Nihilism, and (6) sixth, the clear
recognition of the reality of God provided by Christian thought.
4.1 Gods trans-historical, universal, & necessary character
From the beginning to the end of his career, Nishida attempted to attain a standpoint
locating that necessary ground upon which contingent, historical actuality is
dependent. According to Nishida, this ground is not only given in immediate
experience, but is the a priori basis for all the varied forms of experience.
Consequently, it was clear to him that certain formal and metaphysical truths do not
change, no matter the current historical time or cultural space. Nishida understood
these unchanging truths to be grounded in God and not in any one finite socio-
historical subject. For Nishida, phenomenology, whether Heideggerian or Husser-
lian, cannot provide an all-encompassing, stable standpoint, because it is restricted
to the contingent finitude of human subjects. Nishida stressed the trans-historical
character of his standpoint in a letter of September 22, 1940, to Takizawa, stating:
Footnote 71 continued
I propose the following harmony of Takizawas three accounts, avoiding repetition and yet providing all
of the information which he records of Nishidas statement:
Lately, Heidegger is famous in Japan. However, Heidegger is not worth your time (tsumaranu monoda). He focuses only on such themes as Angst and death, and although he often relies upon Pascaland Kierkegaard, he does not recognize that which is indispensable (kanjin no []) and decisive(ketteiteki na nanika []), namely, God (goddo/kami []). There is no philosopher inGermany now that I would recommend, as it appears that there is currently no philosopher of import
there. However, in Germany, recently, the theologians are vastly more interesting than the philosophers.
There are theologians such as Barth, Brunner, and Gogarten, but the most solid among them is Barth. It
would be good to study under him if you can. However, unfortunately, it appears as if he may have been
expelled by the Nazis and is no longer in Germany.
Nishida on Heidegger 527
123
-
I argue from a more basic standpoint than so-called social science
(shakaikagaku []). I think there is a lot of truth in social science.However, rather than believe this standpoint so easily as is done nowadays,
shouldnt we reflect and examine even more deeply?72
Nishida stressed in a letter of July 2, 1934, to the young Heideggerian Goichi
Miyake, that a properly philosophical standpoint must account for the trans-
historical character of mathematical truths, and thus stated:
It is interesting to apply a current Heideggerian view to mathematics and so
on, thus taking a historical viewpoint. However, can this method really
provide a philosophical rationale (Begrundung) for mathematics?73
Indeed, it would appear that if there is any field of inquiry not affected by historical
contingencies, and which is even manifest of necessity within historical contin-
gencies, mathematics would present a prime candidate for such a field of inquiry.
This is certainly a conviction held by many philosophers from Plato to Spinoza to
Russell. Nishidas own view is that Mathematics is extremely universal as the self-
determination of pure thought.74 Nishidas own conviction that mathematics
cannot be reduced to historical contingency remained strong to the end of his career,
as is exhibited in his 1945 essay The Philosophical Foundation of Mathematics
wherein he states: I propose that numbers exist by themselves and act by
themselves.75 It seems that the young Miyake took Nishidas stern rejection of the
historicization of mathematics seriously, as the mature Miyake went onto follow the
mathematical thought of Bertrand Russell.76
Nishida had more in mind than just mathematics in his appeal to the young
Miyake to locate a standpoint grounded upon what is universal and necessary. In
contrast to a standpoint grounded in the contingencies of the philosophy of history
then popular in the Kyoto School itself, Nishida strongly urged Miyake to consider
the standpoint of the all-encompassing Absolute Place or Topos that is the core of
Nishida Philosophy, as Nishida wrote to Miyake on March 20, 1942:
The philosophy of history has engulfed many people, but so few have
endeavored to consider my topological logic (toposuteki ronri []) I truly hope you also will consider this endeavor. I think you also carry a
heavy responsibility.77
72 NKZ 19:128; letter#1488; September 22, 1940.73 NKZ 18:497; letter #846, July 2, 1934. Yusa suggests that this letter should be dated 1933, p. 385,
footnote 53.74 NKZ 7:400. Cf Dilworths translation on p. 218.
*Nishida, Kitaro. 1987. Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview (trnsl. By DavidA. Dilworth), Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.75 NKZ 11:237; Nishida also states herein that All logic exists by itself and acts by itself Nishidas
essay: [], first appeared in [345,1945] (NKZ 11:237ff).76 Piovesana, p. 221.77 NKZ 19: 189190, letter #1648, March 20, 1942.
528 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
In 1969, the mature Takizawa would himself write a critique of Miyakes
Heideggerian stance of historicist phenomenology. According to Takizawa, Miyake
claims that by pursuing a phenomenological reflection (genshogakuteki hansei []) of human beings, a viewpoint can be attained by which the self can
be rid of all inauthenticity (giman []).78 Claiming that Miyakes viewpointgrounds itself in the historical contingent and fallible conditions of human existence
which themselves prevent authenticity, Takizawa argues that in order to improve
real society and its way of life, including the nation and its politicians, a viewpoint
which recognizes the necessary Base (dodai []) grounding the contingentfeatures of human existence must be attained.79 Indeed, in this critique of Miyake,
Takizawa notes the failure of the early Heideggerand even Nishidato clearly
locate this Base which transcends human subjectivity and historical existence, and
which by its transcendence provides a viewpoint that makes the critique of human
existence possible.80
Takizawas mature philosophy agreed with Nishida in locating a universal and
necessary Base upon which all contingent phenomena are dependent. Just as the
mature Takizawa would do, Nishida identified this all-encompassing Base or
Nothingness as God. As early as 1927, in a letter to Risaku Mutai who was
studying under Heidegger in Freiburg, Nishida opposed Heideggerian philosophy by
characterizing this ultimate reality in personalistic terms, stating:
I do not particularly object if you opt to consider Heideggers Being (On) asbeing situated within the noetic dimension of my self-realization of
Nothingness. However, rather than characterizing [Nothingness] as what is
expressed (Ausdruck), it must be characterized as what expresses (ausdrucken)the self. In other words, Being (On) should completely have the character ofan I (Ich).81
For Nishida, ultimate Realitywhether called Nothingness or Beingis not
primarily what is expressed within human subjects in the manner of early
Heideggerian phenomenology, but is rather the creative Power that expresses and
forms human beings in the first place. This trans-historical and trans-subjective
Power is what Nishida calls God. Following in this trajectory of the Nishida
Philosophy, the mature Takizawa also stressed the same unmanipulatability (Grn:
Unverfugbarkeit, Jpn: hishudansei []) of Absolute reality by claiming thatno matter how human beings may try, they are unable to alter the nature of
Gods relationship with contingent phenomena. Further, following in the trajectory
of Nishida Philosophy to characterize God in terms of mathematical truths,
Takizawa refers to the Divine-human relationship as the Archimedean Point
78 Takizawa, from Phenomenology and Dialectics: Regarding Goichi Miyakes book, HumanExistence, a 1969 essay later printed in (1987) The Decoding Coordinates, p. 136.Takizawa, Katsumi (1987) The Decoding Coordinates: Philosophy, Literature, Education [:]. Japan: Sogensha [].79 Takizawa, ibid, p. 148.80 Takizawa, ibid, p. 135.81 NKZ 18:321, letter #432, January 30, 1927, to Risaku Mutai (in Freiburg).
Nishida on Heidegger 529
123
-
(arukimedesuteki itten []), the Fulcrum (shiten []), and thevanishing Point of all forms (issai no keizo no vanishingu pointo []).82 Evidently, in terms of Nishidas criticism of Heidegger, Godstrans-historical, universal, and necessary character suggests the negative ramificationthat all ethno-centrisms and ethno-exclusivismsmust be rejected, and correspondingly
the positive ramification that the autonomy of all finite individuals and groups isaffirmed.
4.2 God prevents Ethno-centrism and Ethno-exclusivism
Nishidas characterization of God as a trans-historical Nothingness works to prevent
the absolutization of any finite individuals or special interest groups, which are inevitably
finite and distinctively formed beings clearly distinguishable from the all-encompass-
ing formless Nothingness of ultimate Reality. Thus Nishidas philosophy consists of a
stancewhich rejects the ethno-centric and ethno-exclusive undercurrents that represented
Heideggers political activism of 1933. This year was not only the year in which Nishida
sharedhis negative assessment ofHeideggerian philosophywith theyoungTakizawa, but
was also the year in which Heideggger enthusiastically supported the Nazi Party in his
position as Rector of Freiburg University. Unfortunate highlights of this period of
Heideggers life include his refusal to protest the nation-wide burning of books with
un-German ideas, his silence in the face of the ill-treatment of his former mentor
Husserl due solely to Husserls Jewish ancestry, Heideggers furnishing of economic
support to ethnocentric military groups such as the SS and SA and corresponding
termination of all such support to Jewish students, and finally his premeditated success in
destroying the careers of the pacifist chemist Hermann Staundinger, the Catholic anti-
Nazi philosopher Max Muller, and the student of American philosophy, Eduard
Baumgarten. Although Heidegger did not hold to the official anti-Jewish Nazi policy
based on biological racism, he clearly held to an ethnocentrism and ethno-exclusivism
privileging German language, culture, and rootedness (Bodenstandigkeit) in the soil ofMiddle-Europe (Mitteleuropa), thus condemning the Jews for their rootless (bodenlos)self-identity based on diaspora andmigration.83 Evidently sensing sufficient kinshipwith
Nazi ideology to make its general ethno-centric and ethno-exclusive focus his own,
Heidegger nearly absolutized the place of German culture by closely associating it with
his own version of absolute reality, stating: the Fatherland is Being [Seyn] itself.84
82 These semi-mathematical expressions can be found, respectively, in #1 Thelle, p. 73; Ulrich & Yagi,
p. 157; #2 TKC 7:322; #3 TKC 7:324.
*Luz, Ulrich and Yagi, Seiichi, ed. (1973) Gott in Japan: Anstosse zum Gesprach mit japanischenPhilosophen, Theologen, Schriftstellern. Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag.* Thelle, Notto R (1975) A Barthian Thinker Between Buddhism And Christianity: Takizawa
Katsumi. Japanese Religions. Vol. 8, October, pp. 5486.83 Bambach, p. 53.
*Bambach, Charles (2003) Heideggers Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks. Ithacaand London: Cornell University Press.84 Heidegger. Holderlins Hymnen Germanien und Der Rhein. Winter Semester 1934/35; Ed. BySusanne Ziegler. 1989. Cf Bambach, p. 55.
530 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
This dimension ofHeideggers life and thought did not go unnoticed byNishida and
his Japanese associates.85 Indeed, Nishidas 1933 condemnation of Heidegger as
shared with the young Takizawa, makes it clear that Nishida was keenly aware of the
forceful measures taken by the Nazis in order to subdue all those who did not share
their vision. Nishidas knowledge about Karl Barths strong resistance to National
Socialism is apparent in Nishidas words: unfortunately, it appears as if Barth may
have been expelled by the Nazis and is no longer in Germany.86 Nishidas strong
affirmation of Barthian theology in the same train of thoughtBarth is vastly more
interesting that the current philosophers in Germanymay very well be intricately
related to Nishidas own opposition to the Nazis. Although Nishida was generally
aloof from political issues and controversya posture exemplified in what later
commentators called resistive cooperation (hantaiseiteki kyoryoku [])87he did speak out against German National Socialism. In an interview printedin the May 28 1933 issue of the Yomiuri Newspaper, Nishida spoke of the dangerousworldwide phenomenon of totalitarian rule which threatened to crush high culture.
Nishida pointed out in this interview the irony of Nazi anti-Semitism, noting that the
twomost influential ideological forces of the contemporary world had been developed
by Jews: capitalism by David Ricardo and communism by Karl Marx. In particular,
Nishida noted how impoverished the world would be without great Jewish scholars
such as Bergson and Einstein.88 Just four months after Heideggers inaugural address,
Nishidas successor Tanabe responded by writing an article dated September 5 and
published in the October 46, 1933 issues of the Asahi Newspaper. NotingHeideggers recent entrance into the Nazi party and the dismissal of Jewish scholars
from teaching posts, Tanabes article, Is it a Philosophy of Crisis or a Crisis of
Philosophy?,89 mirrored Nishidas displeasure by hinting at Heideggers champi-
oning [of] the racial significance of German academia.90 The Kyoto School associate
Kiyoshi Miki in particular became sharply critical of Heidegger after Heideggers
rectoral address.91 Miki also joined leading Japanese journalists and intellectuals in
writing letters to the press in order to condemn the May 10, 1933 Nazi celebration of
85 Yuasa in Parkes, p. 254.86 This quote is my own harmony of three statements made by Takizawa, found in TKC 1:441, TKC
2:5212, and Inquiring of Religion (1976), p. 87, (the last source being reprinted in Sakaguchis KatsumiTakizawa Timline p. 164).87 Cooperative resistance (hantaiseiteki kyoryoku []) is Ryosuke Ohashis term for thewartime political stance taken by several members of the Kyoto School, including Nishida, a stance
characterized by negotiating a reorientation by means of immanent critique or cooperative correction.
I would like to acknowledge Bret Davis for making this information available online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/. Cf also Ohashi, Ryosuke. The Kyoto School and theJapanese Navy [], Kyoto: PHP Shinsho, 2001, p. 20ff.88 Yomiuri Newspaper [] May 28, 1933, reprinted in Asami Hiroshi, Fukkoku sanpen
pp. 13940. Referenced in Yusa, Biography, p. 255, footnote 34.89 THZ 8:39 []. Cf Yusa p. 254. Cf Williams, p. 113.90 Parkes in May, p. 109, footnote 13; German translation in Buchnors Japan und Heidegger pp.139145 by Elmar Weinbayr. Cf also Williams translation pp. 181183.91 Parkes in May, p. 81.
Nishida on Heidegger 531
123
-
the burning of un-German books.92 Thus Miki also criticized the ethno-centric and
ethno-exclusive undercurrents in Heidegger by writing:
Heidegger seems to be seeking a principle for the nationalistic unity of
Germany in blood, earth and destinyin the realm of pathos, in which there is
no discernable objective principle.93
What Miki refers to in this statement as objective principle and elsewhere as
Logos,94 Nishida seems to equate with God. Nishidas own characterization of
God as the formless all-encompassing Place or Topos correspondingly works
against its conflation with any particular blood and soil. Of course, as wartime
pressures began to mount in Japan, Nishida himself closely associated the ultimate
reality of Nothingness with Japanese or Eastern cultureeven to the point of
conveying a chauvinististic outlook95but Nishidas broader socio-historical
metaphysics of global-world formationism (sekaiteki sekai keiseishugi []) also suggests that he was able to avoid the degree of ethno-centrism
and ethno-exclusivism conveyed by Heidegger.
4.3 Gods affirmation of philosophical and cultural autonomy
Nishida apparently held that if the all-encompassing God which grounds all life and
unifies all phenomena does notby way of its transcendence and formlessnessimpose any specific form upon those finite, personal individuals situated within it,
then they consequently should enjoy a freedom from regulation and a marked
autonomy. In the same letter of December 19, 1933 to the young Heideggerian
Goichi Miyake, in which Nishida had disparaged Heideggers philosophy with the
wordsHeideggers workcannot answer the deep problems of substance and
lifeNishida also stressed the need for the Japanese to think for themselves, as he
stated:
Japanese scholars devour books by German thinkers, borrow their methods,
and use them skillfully, without, however, being truly sustained by their
serious philosophical reflections. If this continues to be the practice, the
Japanese will forever remain emulators. How could we expect to see a
philosophical system that is born out of the depth of our own lives? Japanese
thinkers need to engage in the mutual exchange of their views, read what their
colleagues write, and establish a Publikum, a public forum. A philosophical
tradition is not something that is established by the work of one single
individual, but it takes a community of thinkers.96
92 Yusa, Biography, p. 254.93 Quoted by Yuasa in Parkes, pp. 161162.94 Yuasa in Parkes, p. 163.95 Cf Dilworths discussion, Nishidas Logic of the East in Last Writings, p. 129.96 NKZ 18:489, letter #824, December 19, 1933. As translated by Yusa, pp. 2578. Days later, on New
Years Day 1934, Nishida drove this same point home by composing a famous waka poem: People are
people; I am I; Unperturbed; I go on the path; which I take (NKZ 17:496: Hito wa hito, ware wa warenari, tonikaku ni, ware yuku michi wo, ware wa yuku nari).
532 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
The fact that Nishidas demand for the autonomy of Japanese thinkers and a
warning against a philosophy that is established by the work of one single
individual, occurred in the same context as his rejection of Heideggerian
philosophy, warrants careful consideration. Indeed, Heidegger, in his inaugural
address at Freiburg Universityalso in 1933enthusiastically proclaimed the end
of the much celebrated academic freedom amidst the flames of state-sanctioned
book burnings. Nishida once again wrote to Miyake on July 2, 1934 stressing the
importance that Japanese people think for themselves.97 Nishida also commiserated
with Takizawa in letters of 1940, regarding the importance of philosophical
autonomy and how rare its successful exercise seemed to be in Japan.98
Heideggers own account of the history of philosophy as a progressive oblivion
of Being (Seinsvergessenheit) suggests prima facie that because Western thinkershave lost touch with the rootedness (Bodenstandigkeit) of human existence (Dasein)in its home (Heimat) of Being (Sein), perhaps non-Western thinkers can aid inrevealing the truth (Grk: aletheia) that has been forgotten in the West. In 1955,Heidegger himself suggested as much, in what Elmar Weinmayr has called one of
the few passages wherein Heidegger expresses himself explicitly in the direction of
an intercultural conversation.99 Thus Heidegger notes that the greatness of the
challenge facing the modern age suggests that the West is not able on its own to
achieve the planetary thinking necessary for building according to a more
originary calling which overcomes nihilism, as Heidegger states:
[P]lanetary building will encounter issues to which those involved are today
nowhere equal. This is equally true for both the language of Europe and that of
East Asia, and it is true above all for the realm of possible dialogue between
them. Neither is able on its own to open or to found this realm.100
Indeed, in 1954, Heidegger branded the successes of [European] rationality[a]
delusion,101 and wondered whether it is necessary and rightful for Eastasians to
chase after the European conceptual systems.102 Heidegger was puzzled as to why
East Asian thinkers did not call back to mind the venerable beginnings of their
own thinking, instead of chasing ever more greedily after the latest novelties in
European philosophy.103 Statements such as these, together with Heideggers
statements that Japanese readers immediately understood his thought, would seem
to indicate that Heidegger considered Japanese thinkers to be fully qualified for the
purpose forming what Nishida had called a community of thinkers in full and
97 NKZ 18:, letter #846, July 2, 1934. Yusa suggests that this letter should be dated 1933, p. 385, footnote
53.98 NKZ 19:160; letter #1570; April 23, 1941. NKZ 19:161; letter #1572; May 3, 1941.99 Weinmayr, p. 248.100 Heidegger, On the Question of Being (1955), from the English language anthology, Pathmarks,p. 321. Heidegger wrote this essay in honor of, and addressed to, his friend Ernst Junger.
*Heidegger (1998) Pathmarks. [translation of Wegmarken. Frankfurt/M.: V. Klostermann, 1976].New York: Cambridge University Press.101 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 16.102 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 3. (Cf the original Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 87).103 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 37. (Cf the original Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 131).
Nishida on Heidegger 533
123
-
equal cooperation with the West, with the aim of jointly overcoming the oblivion of
Being in philosophy.
However, Heidegger made it clear in a September 23, 1966 interviewpublished
in 1976 in Der Spiegel, posthumously at his request104that the problem facing theWest and purportedly portrayed so vividly by Nietzsche105 would not beameliorated by the aid of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the
world. As Heidegger states:
Theconflict between the dionysian and the apollonian, the holy passion and
the sober account [as described by Nietzsche], is a concealed stylistic law of
the historical destiny of the Germans With this conflictNietzsche [has] set
a question mark before the Germans task to find their essence historically
I am convinced that a [solution] can only be prepared from the same place in the
worldwhere themodern technologicalworld originated. It cannot come about by
the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world.106
In fact, Heidegger not only thus claims negatively that East Asian thought is
incapable of addressing the problem of the modern technological world, butclaims positively that the only tradition fully capable of addressing this problem is
the German tradition. Noting that the modern technological world must betranscended (aufgehoben), Heidegger claims that the Germans have a specialqualification for this change by way of the special inner relationship between the
German language and the thinking of the Greeks. Heidegger goes onto state
confidently:
This has been confirmed to me again and again today by the French. When
they begin to think they speak German. They insist that they could not get
through with their own language [even with] all of their rationality when they
are attempting to understand it in the origin of its essence It would be good
if thiswould be taken seriously on a large scale and if it would finally be
104 Sheehan, Heidegger and the Nazis, p. 42.
*Sheehan, Thomas (1998) Heidegger and the Nazis. The New York Review of Books, vol. 35, no. 10,June 16, pp. 3847.105 It is ironic that Heidegger invokes Nietzsche here to support the threefold thesis that only the
Germans are specially qualified for philosophy, that this qualification is due to the special relationship
between the Germans and the Greeks, and that the special philosophical mission of the Graeco-German
trajectory was fatally violated by Latin influence. Nietzsche was adamant that the Greeks were not a
single race, nor the first originary culture, nor the only truly earth-bound humans. For him, this
interpretive approach is based on an utterly castrated and mendacious study of the classical world
(Arrowsmith, p. 329/Nietzsche 8:19; Cf Bambach, p. 218). Rather, according to Nietzsche, Greek culture
was the product of synthesis between various Asian, Near Eastern, and Hellenic influences, as Nietzsche
states:
Earliest inhabiting of Greek soil: people of Mongolian origin, worshippers of trees and snakes. A fringe
of Semites along the coast. Thracians here and there. The Greeks took all of these elements into their own
bloodstream, along with gods and myths (several of the Odysseus stories are Mongolian) What are
racially pure Greeks? Cant we simply suppose that Italic peoples, mixed with Thracian and Semitic
elements, became Greek? (Arrowsmith, p. 387/Nietzsche 8:96; Cf Bambach, p. 218).106 Neske & Kettering, Martin Heidegger and National Socialism (1990), pp. 6263.
*Neske, Gunther & Kettering, Emil (eds). 1990. Martin Heidegger and National Socialism.(Translated from the original German by Lisa Harries). New York: Paragon House.
534 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
considered what a momentous transformation Greek thinking suffered when it
was translated into Roman Latin, an event that still bars our way today to
sufficient reflection on the fundamental words of Greek thinking.107
If the problem of the modern technological world is indeed a global problem, and
if as Heidegger suggests, this problem can only be addressed by a Graeco-German
primal language (die Ursprache)108 and the philosophical tradition embodied by it,then what room is left for non-Western developments to contribute to a global
philosophical discussion? If those within philosophical traditions embodied in
Romance languagesthe French tradition given here by Heidegger being just one
exampleare unable with all of their rationality to address the problem of the
modern technological world, and if they must even speak German themselves as
Heidegger claims, in order to begin to think, then it comes as no surprise that
Heidegger excluded Eastern experiences of the world from the project of
transcending the problema project which for him is the specific destiny of the
Germans. Heidegger thus carried on the trajectory of his nationalistic predecessor,
Johann G. Fichte, who stated: other races [which is to say, non-German races,]
speak a language which has movement only on the surface but is dead at the
root.109
Premonitions of this ethnocentric conclusion of 1966 may even be seen in
Heideggers 1954 A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,
wherein Heidegger, conspicuously noting the affinity of the Greek and German
languages, states to his fictional Japanese interlocutor: Our thinking today is
charged with the task to think what the Greeks have thought in an even more Greek
manner.110 In this same context, Heideggers statement that the nature of
language remains something altogether different for the East Asian and for the
European peoples,111 appears prima facie to warn of the danger of too easily
107 Neske and Kettering, Martin Heidegger and National Socialism (1990), p. 63.108 As early as 1955, in a lecture on November 18, Heidegger proposed that the precondition of the
inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world can be nothing other than a dialogue with the Greek
thinkers and their language (Science and Reflection in The Question Concerning Technology andOther Essays, p. 158; cf p x for lecture date). Nishida was also intensely sensitive to the significance ofthe German and Greek cultures. He wrote large sections of his diary in German. In his 1934 Sequel to theBasic Problems of Philosophy, Nishida even stated: I believe that our Japanese culture has featureswhich especially resemble the Greek cultural form (NKZ 7:443). Nishida associates the Japanese and
Greek cultures because they both have an immanent worldview and both prioritize the aesthetic.
However, Nishida qualifies the correspondence between the Japanese and Greek cultures by noting that
Buddhism, which constitutes an important part of Japanese culture, adheres to a transcendent
worldview as does Christianity (NKZ 7:442; Dilworths translation p. 247).
*Heidegger (1977) The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper &Row.109 Johann G. Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation (Addresses to the German Nation) [1808] (Hamburg:Meiner, 1978), p. 72; Quoted and explained in Bambach p. 55.110 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 39. Heideggers identification of Greek and German languageoccurs on p. 46, where he suggests etymological affinities between Greek charis (grace) on the onehand, and Greek tiktousa and German dichten (versify, but meaning bring forward according toHeidegger) on the other hand.111 Heidegger, ibid, p. 23; cf also p. 5, where Heidegger claims that Europeans and Eastasians dwell in
different houses of Being.
Nishida on Heidegger 535
123
-
conflating Japanese and Western experiences and interpretations of the world.
However, Heideggers strict distinction between East Asian and European
reflections of reality, and especially his identification of German language with
the philosophical language of the Greeks, more likely threatens to prevent full
recognition of the capability of non-Western thinkers to autonomously participate in
a genuine project of philosophy. Thus, what on the surface may look like respect for
non-Western traditions may actually have the converse effect of ethnic exclusion, as
is suggested by Heideggers statement:
The name aesthetics and what it names grow out of European thinking, out
of philosophy. Consequently, aesthetic consideration must ultimately remainalien to East-Asian thinking.112
In 1973, just three years before his death, Heidegger claimed even more clearly that
the only philosophy is European philosophy, stating that there is no other, neither a
Chinese nor an Indian philosophy.113
Heideggers equation of European thinking and philosophy is often repeated
performatively even today in Japan, where on the one hand, it is common to apply
the term tetsugaku [], or philosophy, only to European philosophy andoccasionally to modern Japanese philosophy, and on the other hand, the term
shiso [], or thought, to pre-modern Japanese intellectual history, which isto say, Japanese thought before Western contact. In this context of contrastive use,
the term tetsugaku tends to suggest greater rigor and seriousness than shiso.Nishida always referred to his own project as tetsugaku, and stressed that
Japanese thinkers must develop tetsugaku autonomously. It is worthy of note thatNishida himself had written the article for the heading Philosophy (tetsugaku) inthe voluminous 1912 edition of the Iwanami Dictionary of Philosophy (iwanamitetsugaku jiten []). Although Nishida in this article explicitlyexamines by name the philosophical ideas of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicurus,
Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Locke, Wilhelm Windelband, Bergson, and other
Western thinkers, Nishida nevertheless proposes a definition of philosophy in terms
of the unification of the sciences and the unifying power of the True, the Good, and
the Beautiful, in the language of his own 1911 masterwork, An Inquiry Into theGood.114 Nishida challenged the Heideggerian Miyake in a letter of July 2, 1934,stating, if we do not attempt to alter conventional thinking at its base, then we
cannot develop a new philosophy (tetsugaku).115 Even while noting the differencesin rhetoric and trajectory between Western philosophy and Japanese philosophy,
Nishida still stressed a solid base uniting all philosophical projects, as he stated in
1940:
112 Heidegger, ibid, p. 2. My italics.113 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, p. 224. (Cf the original Was heisst Denken?, p. 136).
*(1968) What is Called Thinking? [Grn: Was heisst Denken? (1973)]. New York: Harper and Row.114 Kitaro Nishida: article under the heading Philosophy in the 1912 Iwanami Dictionary of Philosophy[], pp. 667668.115 NKZ 18:497498, letter #846, July 2, 1934. Yusa suggests that this letter should be dated 1933,
p. 385, footnote 53,but I have followed the NKZ format.
536 C. A. Rigsby
123
-
I am not saying that there are two kinds (nishu []) of logic (ronri []),Western and Eastern. There must be only one logic.116
European leanings toward ethnocentrism and ethno-exclusivism as exemplified by
Heidegger, did not go unnoticed by Nishida and his ass