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Nigeria’s Foreign Policyafter the Cold War: Domestic,

Regional and External Influences

International Peace Academy

University of Oxford

Rapporteur: Rosemary Nuamah

JULY 2003 ■ OXFORD, UNITED KINGDOM

Acknowledgements

The International Peace Academy (IPA) gratefully acknowledges the support of the governments of Denmark,G e r m a n y, and the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID),which made publication of this report possible. Oxford University’s Centre for International Studies (CIS)gratefully acknowledges the generous financial contribution of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthurFoundation which sponsored the holding of the seminar in Oxford, on which this report is based, in July 2003.

About IPA’s Africa Program

IPA launched its Africa Program in 1992 with the broad objective of helping to enhance indigenous Africancapacities to prevent and manage local conflicts. To that end, the Africa Program worked closely with theOrganization of African Unity (OAU) between 1992 and 1998 to conceptualize and operationalize itsMechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. In the second phase of its work, betweenJuly 2000 and June 2003, the Africa Program consolidated its efforts at assisting sub-regional organiza-tions to develop, establish and operationalize their security mechanisms through the project on DevelopingAfrica’s Regional and Sub-Regional Security Mechanisms. The Program also strengthened its unique role ofpolicy development at the United Nations (UN) and involving the UN community in New York in Africanconflict issues through the project on Peacebuilding in Africa. IPA’s Africa Program continues to serve as abridge between institutions and actors in Africa and the UN, and has carved out a unique niche by givingvoice to, and working closely with, institutions and individuals from Africa.

About Oxford University’s Centre for International Studies

The Centre for International Studies at Oxford University was established in 1992 with two purposes: first,to act as the main focus for organizing and coordinating the teaching of International Relations in theUniversity; and second, to organize and provide facilities for externally-funded projects, for Visiting Scholarsat the University, and for other activities such as conferences and seminars. It is located within theDepartment of Politics and International Relations.

About Oxford University’s Centre for African Studies

The study of Africa has flourished at Oxford University, particularly at St. Antony’s College, for more thanforty years. In particular, the College has had a commitment to training African graduates who now work,teach and undertake research throughout the world. The wealth of resources in the other St. Antony’scenters - Latin American, Middle Eastern, Asian and European - offer the possibility for rich interactive andcomparative study within the College. Joint and co-operative projects have been encouraged. The student-run Africa Society meets weekly in the College and offers a program of talks, debates and social events.

About the Rapporteur

Ms. Rosemary Nuamah was former International Policy Officer at the Labour Party in the United Kingdom.

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1. Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Theory, History and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3The “Concentric Circles”: Domestic, Regional and External Influenceson Nigeria’s Foreign PolicyA History of Nigeria’s Foreign PolicyNigeria’s Foreign Policy: Alternative Futures of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

2. The Domestic Context: Discordant Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy FormulationNigeria: Nationhood, Identity and Foreign Policy

3. The Domestic Context: Institutions and the Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Institutions, Processes and Policy FormulationMilitary and Security Issues in the Development of Foreign Policy

4. The Domestic Context: Oil and Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Oil-rich “Minority” Areas, Shell and International NGOs

5. The Regional Context: Diplomacy and Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Nigeria and Its NeighborsInformal Economic Networks and Regional Integration in West Africa

6. The Regional Context: Security, Conflict and Hegemonic Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Nigeria’s Military Interventions: Hegemony on a ShoestringNigeria and South Africa: Constructing the AU and NEPADNigeria and Cameroon: The Bakassi Dispute

7. The External Context: Key Multilateral and Bilateral Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Nigeria’s Major Multilateral Relations: The Commonwealth, the EU and the UNThe Switchback and the Fallback: Nigeria-British RelationsA Tale of Two Giants: Nigeria-US Relations

8. The External Context: The French Factor and Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Nigeria, France and AfricaJapan, Africa and Nigeria

”NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR: DOMESTIC, REGIONAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES”

Table of Contents

Contents


9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Annex I: Dinner Address: “The Nigerian Revolution Reconsidered,” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Chief Allison A. Ayida, Former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service, Nigeria

Annex II: Agenda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Annex III: List of Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Contents

Executive Summary

Oxford University’s Centre for International Studies andits Centre for African Studies held a seminar on thedomestic, regional and external dimensions of Nigeria’sforeign policy after the Cold Wa r. The seminar took placeat St. Antony’s College, Oxford, from 11 to 12 July 2003,and featured about forty participants, mostly scholarsand practitioners, with many of them based in Nigeria.

• At the heart of this conference on Nigeria’s foreignpolicy in the post-Cold War era was the question ofwhether a relatively resourceful and ambitiouscountry like Nigeria can be a force for stability anddemocratization in Africa. This is an importantquestion, given the enormity of Africa’s problemsand the limited interest and commitment of manyexternal actors to the continent following the end ofthe Cold Wa r. The theoretical and practical aspectsof Nigeria’s foreign policy, the institutions andprocesses of policy formulation, and the “c o n c e n t r i ccircles” of domestic, regional and externalinfluences on Nigeria’s foreign policy were thereforethe major issues discussed during the conference.

• The end of the Cold War has resulted in afundamental change in the dynamics of contempo-rary international politics. Developing countries,l i ke Nigeria, with oil wealth, a large army and alarge pool of well-educated citizens are now able toplay a leadership role in Africa, due to the reducedstrategic significance of the continent for majorexternal powers. However, while policymakers ande xecutors of Nigeria’s foreign policy appear to becommitted to responding to demands, pressures andinfluences from the external environment tocontribute to regional peacekeeping, they also needto respond appropriately to domestic pressures andinfluences, especially those derived from popularpublic opinion. A civilian regime, unlike militarygovernments, also faces pressure from the parlia-ment and the press.

• While Nigeria’s immense potential is clearly basedon its demographic size of over 100 million people,its multiethnic population, its vast oil reserves andits reservoir of highly skilled and educated people,

the majority of its people remain poor with a percapita income of less than $500. Likewise, whileNigeria has played a vital role in internationalp e a c e keeping both under the auspices of theUnited Nations (UN), as well as ECOMOG (theEconomic Community of West African StatesCeasefire Monitoring Group), Nigeria itself hasbeen immersed in conflict, either at the level ofintra-elite struggles for power or conflicts withinthe context of its troubled federal experiment.Thus, while Nigeria possesses the necessarypotential as well as institutional structures neededto formulate a vibrant foreign policy, itsconstraints lie in domestic factors, namely, thenature of the foreign policy elite and Nigeria’seconomic dependence and vulnerability.

• R e g i o n a l l y, Nigeria has seen itself and beenperceived by others, as a global player on the worldstage, from its role in the African liberation struggleand its leadership of the Economic Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS) during the Cold Wa rera to more recent peacekeeping operations inLiberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s approach to bothAfrica and its immediate neighbors is based on apolicy of decolonization, non-interference, respectfor inherited borders, economic integration andcommitment to practical policies that promoteAfrican unity.

• E x t e r n a l l y, since its independence in 1960, Nigeriahas sought to play a full and active role in theinternational community. Its leaders have attachedeven greater importance to this role because Nigeriahas felt a special responsibility, as Africa’s mostpopulous nation, to act as an unofficial spoke s p e r s o nfor Africa and for all black people in internationalfora. Some have defined this as a Pax Nigeriana, aneffort to achieve hegemonic leadership in Africa bya country that accounts for over half of West Africa’spopulation and economic strength and has a 94,000-strong army that dwarfs the combined strength ofthose of its fourteen ECOWAS neighbors. Examiningthe ways in which Nigeria has pursued its foreignpolicy objectives through an extensive network ofmultilateral relations and the impact of externalfactors in its foreign policy formulation is a criticaldimension in the study of Nigeria’s foreign policy


Executive Summary 1


after the Cold Wa r. Likewise, an analysis of Nigeria’skey bilateral relationships with South Africa,Cameroon, France, Britain, the United States (US)and Japan is also critical to understanding Nigeria’spost-Cold War foreign policy.

Three of the key observations that emerged from theOxford conference included the following:

• First, in order to understand how Nigeria’s foreignpolicy has developed in the post-Cold War era, ananalysis of the history of Nigeria’s foreign policyshould take a longer historical perspective,examining the problems that developed in the post-colonial period and the legacy this has bequeathedto Nigeria’s contemporary foreign policy.

• Second, linked to the historical perspective, thecontinuing crisis of legitimacy of the Nigerianstate needs to be addressed, a theme whichrecurred throughout the conference.

• Finally, understanding the impact of globalization,and in particular the communications revolution,was raised by several participants as being acritical subject, due to the way in which it hasaffected the context and nature of Nigeria’s foreignpolicy formulation. Linking these factors andassessing their impact on Nigeria’s foreign policywas a crucial goal of this conference.

Participants underscored the fact that the future ofNigeria’s foreign policy will depend on astute “e c o n o m i cdiplomacy” that tackles effectively issues like debt relief,foreign investment and promoting the New Pa r t n e r s h i pfor Africa’s Development (NEPAD). It is thereforenecessary that the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairsbe strengthened if it is to be effective in executing thisp o l i c y. Nigeria’s diplomats must be better trained and itsforeign missions better funded. In practical terms, sixkey policy recommendations were put forward, focusedon the need for Nigeria’s foreign policy to be guided bycarefully crafted policies and actions. These include:

1. Nigeria should pursue goals of democracy, goodgovernance and respect for human rights at home toensure its leadership role is credible abroad. It shoulddo this through the African Union (AU), ECOWA S ,

N E PAD and the Conference on Security, Stability,Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA).

2. Nigeria must promote regional and pan-Africaneconomic integration building on the lead it hastaken in fast-tracking the integration process inE C OWAS. Nigeria must strongly support thebuilding of a common market in West Africa andthe creation of a common currency.

3. Pan-African integration, based on self-reliance andself-sustained development, should be a toppriority for Nigeria’s development and should besustained together with its strategic alliances withSouth Africa, Ghana, and possibly Egypt.

4. Nigeria must share its peacekeeping experienceswith other regional and sub-regional organizationssuch as the African Union, the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC), the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),the Economic Community of Central African States(ECCASS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). Itmust also support the effective functioning of theECOWAS security mechanism of 1999 and ensurethat the UN shares the burden of peacekeepingmore equitably.

5. Nigeria should help to ensure the full establish-ment of the institutions of the African Union,ensuring particularly that the AU has adequatepowers and funds to carry out its mandate andhelping to strengthen its work in the areas ofpeace, security, governance and economic integra-tion and development.

6. Finally, Nigeria must pursue an active agenda inthe World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations.In particular, it should support the decision at theWTO Ministerial Conference in Doha to launch a“development” trade round and work to secureagreements in the areas of market access for theagricultural and other goods of developingcountries and trade-related intellectual propertyrights (TRIPS), particularly, in allowing developingcountries the time to decide whether or not togrant patent protection in such vital areas aspharmaceuticals, food and other areas.

2 Executive Summary


1. Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Theory,History and Practice

Examining the domestic, regional and externalinfluences on Nigeria’s foreign policy after the ColdWar was the key objective of a conference which washeld at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, from 11 to 12 July2003. The conference, organized jointly by OxfordUniversity’s Centre for International Studies and itsCentre for African Studies, brought together amultidisciplinary and diverse group of internationalscholars who, having written papers on a wide range oftopics on Nigeria’s foreign policy, convened to presenttheir papers and to receive critical comments fromparticipants.

Though Nigerian scholars were the main contributorsof papers, nearly half of the researchers came fromoutside Nigeria: Ghana, South Africa, the UnitedKingdom, Canada, France and the United States (US).Three of the authors were themselves scholar-diplomats with intimate knowledge of Nigeria’s foreignpolicymaking process, including a former ForeignMinister of Nigeria, Professor Ibrahim Gambari. Withhigh-level practitioners present at this conference,including the High Commissioner of Nigeria to theUnited Kingdom (UK), Ambassador Christopher Kolade,two members of the Nigerian Presidential AdvisoryCouncil on International Relations, AmbassadorAkinjide Osuntokun (a former Nigerian ambassador toGermany), Professor Joy Ogwu (Director-General of theNigerian Institute of International Affairs [NIIA]) and adeputy-director in the UK’s Department forInternational Development (DFID), Mr. Brian Thomson,the conference ensured that the results of the discus-sions on Nigeria’s foreign policy were communicatedto relevant policymakers.

The “Concentric Circles”: Domestic, Regional andExternal Influences on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Nigeria is often described as the “Giant of Africa.” Itsforeign policy is best understood and assessed in thecontext of its regional and continental ambitions

which have been demonstrated over the course of thecountry’s 43-year history. Nigeria’s leaders of allpolitical persuasions have come to see their country asthe “natural leader” of the African continent. Thisaspiration to continental leadership, manifest since thecountry’s independence in 1960, is central tounderstanding some of the principal features ofNigeria’s foreign policy. It is clear from a historicalexamination of Nigeria’s foreign relations that itshegemonic ambitions have not, however, necessarilyled to relevant, coherent and effective policies.Examining both the theoretical and practical aspects ofNigeria’s foreign policy is therefore key tounderstanding the country’s foreign policy.

The theory of Nigeria’s foreign policy has often beenexplained by Nigerian diplomats and scholars in termsof four “concentric circles” of national interest. Theinnermost circle represents Nigeria’s own security,independence and prosperity and is centered on itsimmediate neighbours - Benin, Cameroon, Chad andNiger; the second circle revolves around Nigeria’srelations with its West African neighbors; the thirdcircle focuses on continental African issues of peace,development and democratization; and the fourthcircle involves Nigeria’s relations with organizations,institutions and states outside Africa.1 This concept stillguides Nigeria’s foreign policy priorities. Participantsat the Oxford conference examined these four “concen-tric circles,” starting with domestic security issues,focusing on the Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS) and the West African sub-region,assessing key bilateral relations with South Africa andCameroon, and finally, analyzing Nigeria’s relationswith key bilateral (France, Britain, the US and Japan)and multilateral actors and organizations outsideAfrica (the UN, the European Union [EU] and theCommonwealth).

In practical terms, examining the interplay of domesticforces and the external environment in the formulationof foreign policy in Nigeria is essential tounderstanding the intertwined factors that haveinfluenced the country’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Domestically, the importance of issues

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Theory, History and Practice 3

1 See Ibrahim A. Gambari, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria After the Second Republic (Atlantic Highlands, NewJersey: Humanities Press International, 1989), p.21.


4 Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Theory, History and Practice

such as human security was felt by many participantsto be an important dimension in the study of thedomestic influences on Nigeria’s foreign policy. Otherinternal considerations such as the impact of a reputa-tion for corruption on Nigeria’s foreign relations, wasalso seen as a key issue affecting Nigeria’s foreignpolicy. Indeed on this issue, a strong recommendationemerging from the conference was a call for theNigerian government to examine urgently why corrup-tion is such a major problem in society, since this notonly affects Nigeria’s international image, but also itsability to attract foreign investment to Nigeria.Corruption in Nigeria constrains the country’seconomic development and consequently its economicand political reach regionally and internationally.

The role of personalities on Nigerian foreign policyformulation was also discussed. Several participantsargued that there has been no continuity in Nigeria’sforeign policy because each leader has implemented hisown ideas, making it difficult to define Nigeria’snational interest. The example of the current president,Olusegun Obasanjo, was cited in support of this point,with a few participants accusing him of wanting to behis own foreign minister. Questions surroundingNigeria’s approach to Zimbabwe and Liberia were alsoraised in the context of personalities and the implica-tions of a personality-driven approach on democraticaccountability in Nigerian foreign policymaking.Others disagreed with these views, arguing instead thatforeign policy in any state is by its very nature elite-driven. They took issue with the assertion that Nigeria’sforeign policy was inconsistent and lacked direction,arguing instead that while the tone and style ofNigeria’s foreign policy may have changed with eachsucceeding regime, the substance of the policy and itsfocus on Africa as its centerpiece has remained consis-tent since 1960.

At the external level, the end of the Cold War hasresulted in a fundamental change in the dynamics ofcontemporary international politics. Developingcountries like Nigeria with oil wealth, a large army anda large pool of well-educated citizens are now able toplay a leadership role in Africa, due to the reducedstrategic significance of the continent for majorexternal powers. The potential for developing countries

like Nigeria to exercise power and influence in aninternational system that is no longer dominated bythe bi-polar conflict of the superpowers, lies at theheart of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

Key policy recommendations in this area include: first,the need for Nigeria’s foreign policy to be built aroundcore national interests based on the promotion of peaceand security, as well as development and democratiza-tion at home and abroad. Second, Nigeria’s Ministry ofForeign Affairs needs reshaping and strengthening,with foreign policy objectives translated into morespecific national interests and a program of actiondesigned to respond in a timely manner to changes inthe external environment. Finally, Nigeria, having ledefforts to create ECOWAS in 1975, should be at theforefront of efforts to build viable and effectiveeconomic communities in Africa. Along with SouthAfrica, Nigeria should champion the building of theNew Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)and the African Union (AU).

A History of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Analyzing the history of Nigeria’s foreign policy, howit has shaped events in Nigeria’s external relations, andhow this history is manifested in the country’s contem-porary foreign relations, was an essential dimension ofthis conference. An examination of the institutions,psychological variables, and significant issues like oil,the military, ethnicity and religion that make Nigeria’sforeign policy distinct, is vital to understandingNigeria’s foreign policy. Many of these issues are inter-connected. All of them have shaped and continue toshape Nigeria’s foreign policy in complex ways.

While there is an instinctive tendency to view Nigeria’sforeign policy as starting from 1960, Nigeria had notabula rasa, but rather brought with it a century-oldcolonial relationship with Britain, the ramifications ofwhich continue to be manifested in its foreign policytoday. The enduring impact of the heavy Britishinfluence on Nigeria’s foreign policy and its ruling elitecontinued until the late 1960s when the lessons of theNigerian civil war of 1967 – 1970 compelled Nigeria’sforeign policy elite to reappraise its stand towardsexternal actors. The impact of the civil war on Nigeria’s


The Domestic Context: Discordant Notes 5

foreign policy was significant, causing Nigeria’sleaders to draw five major lessons from the experience:first, that the country’s survival as a sovereign statecould not be taken for granted; second, that, based onFrance sending arms to secessionist Biafra throughGabon and Côte d’Ivoire, there was a compelling needto have friendly governments in neighboring countries– a reality which partly explains why Nigeria in theaftermath of the civil war spearheaded the creation ofECOWAS; third, that the existence of minority white-owned regimes in Southern Africa, which backedBiafran secessionists during Nigeria’s civil war, was athreat to Nigeria’s security; fourth, that it wasdangerous to depend disproportionately on one powerbloc for the supply of arms required to maintaininternal security (Britain had been slow in providingarms to the Nigerian government which turned to theSoviet Union for arms); and fifth, that publicity andpropaganda were vital in the conduct of externalrelations.

Other specific factors which have contributed to givingNigeria its current foreign policy profile include oil, themilitary and the Nigerian Institute of InternationalAffairs. The issue of oil as a key domestic factorinfluencing Nigeria’s foreign policy was raised byseveral participants and is a subject that recurredthroughout the seminar. Indeed, the serious implica-tions of the impact of oil on the very future of Nigeriawas raised from the outset. According to this view,Nigeria’s oil wealth has thrown up centrifugalsubnational forces and separatist groups which, if nothandled properly, could result in the disintegration ofthe Nigerian state. The view that Nigeria’s oil is adivisive and disintegrating force was contested bysome participants who argued that oil can be seen tohave been a unifying and integrating force in Nigeria,since oil revenues have from the early 1970 scontributed about 80 percent of government revenue,half of which is then distributed to local and regionalgovernments.

Alternative Futures of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Oil is just one of the domestic factors influencingNigeria’s foreign policy. A key message emerging fromthe Oxford conference was the way in which Nigeria’s

foreign policy is inextricably linked to its domesticpolicy: foreign policy cannot be considered in isolationfrom domestic issues such as oil and other economicand social factors. As a result of domestic factors, therehas been a significant narrowing of the choices whichNigeria faces in conducting its foreign policy. The stateof Nigeria’s economy and its social conditions whichare characterized by mass poverty, insecurity and adilapidated infrastructure, have created an environmentwhich has the potential of galvanizing negative forcesunder the umbrella of marginalization, ethnicity andreligion. These forces could, if not shrewdly managed,undermine the integrity of the Nigerian state. Nigeria’spotential as an industrializing and military poweraspiring to middle-power status is undermined by thesenegative tendencies. Continuing calls for “true”federalism and for the convening of a “SovereignNational Conference” to renegotiate the very basis ofthe Nigerian federation, demonstrate that the Nigerianpolity remains fragile. The future of Nigeria’s foreignpolicy will therefore depend on astute “e c o n o m i cdiplomacy” that tackles effectively issues like debtrelief, foreign investment and promoting NEPAD. It istherefore necessary that the country’s Ministry ofForeign Affairs be strengthened if it is to be effective ine xecuting this policy. Nigeria’s diplomats must be bettertrained and its foreign missions better funded.

2. The Domestic Context:Discordant Notes

Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy Formulation

Having examined the theoretical and conceptual issuesof foreign policy formulation and the interplaybetween changing domestic demands and varyingexternal circumstances, a thorough analysis of thespecific internal factors affecting the formulation ofNigeria’s foreign policy is necessary. It is important tobegin by understanding the context in which Nigeria’sforeign policy has been shaped. Nigeria’s 43 years asan independent country have been characterized bytwo main phases of either authoritarian military rule ordemocratic transitional civilian rule, with all theattendant characteristics and contradictions that thisinvolves.

Three major domestic factors were identified as beingkey determinants in Nigeria’s foreign policy formula-tion: first, the country’s ravaged and weak economy;second, the personality and character of Nigeria’sleaders and their perceptions of how to nurse andrevive the economy; and third, the issue of ethno-religious diversity in a federal context, which moreoften than not makes consensus on national issuesdifficult to achieve. While other domestic factors suchas historical traditions, domestic environmentalfactors, organized vested interests and public opinionhave impacted on Nigeria’s foreign policy, it can besaid that the three major factors identified above aremore decisive in the Nigerian context.

An in-depth examination of foreign policy formulationduring Nigeria’s First Republic (1960-1966); during thefirst phase of military rule (1966-1979); during itsSecond Republic (1979-1983); during the second phaseof military rule (1983-1998); and in the current periodof democratic transition (1999-2003), demonstrates,according to several participants, how successiveNigerian regimes have, in general, shown a lack ofsensitivity and responsiveness to popular pressures andinput into the foreign policy formulation process. As aresult, foreign policy in Nigeria tends to be elite andgovernment-driven. Significantly, this has beencomplicated by the phenomenon of prolonged militaryrule and the pervasive legacies of this past, which stillcondition and temper the current transition todemocratic governance. Many participants raised theissue of the “crisis of rising expectations,” withNigeria’s masses expecting that as democracy inNigeria develops, so too should consultation and theinvolvement of civil society in the country’s foreignpolicy process. How Nigeria’s leaders manage theseexpectations will continue to be fundamental to thesuccess of its future foreign policy. Some participantsalso raised the need to examine the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nigeria in moredetail, since many of them tend to be externally-funded, and are often accused by the government ofpursuing foreign agendas.

While policymakers and executors of Nigeria’s foreignpolicy appear to be committed to responding todemands, pressures and influences from the externalenvironment, particularly in the context of the

challenges posed by globalization, they also need torespond appropriately to domestic pressures andinfluences, especially those derived from popularpublic opinion. The move away from parliament andpublic opinion in Nigeria’s foreign policymakingtowards research institutes, which are intrinsicallymore exclusive and narrow, was said by several partic-ipants at the conference to have obstructed a moreresponsive and democratic foreign policymakingprocess in Nigeria. Thus, the fundamental challengethat Nigeria’s leaders face is to nurture a culture ofopenness, consultation and consensus-building in thecountry’s foreign policymaking, while continuing tobenefit from the views of experts.

Discussion at the Oxford conference also focused onthe extent to which personalities and characters haveinfluenced foreign policy formulation. One view wasthat Nigeria’s leaders since independence have had atendency to improvise in the conduct of foreign policy.This view was challenged by other participants whoargued that Nigeria’s foreign policy has been pursuedconsistently since 1960 within established parameters.The placing of Africa at the center of Nigeria’s foreignpolicy and the pursuit of policies such as “economicdiplomacy” by successive regimes was said todemonstrate a level of continuity in the country’sforeign policy that has been evident since the 1960s.

Nigeria: Nationhood, Identity and Foreign Policy

While much attention has been paid to the formalaspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation - theworld inhabited by diplomats, technocrats and nationalinstitutions - two other distinct aspects or “faces” alsofeed into the outcomes of Nigeria’s foreign policyprocess. One aspect is the way in which Nigeria’s“fractured” nationhood has impinged on the foreignpolicy process; and the second is the impact ofNigeria’s global reputation or “identity” for corruptionon its foreign policy. Both of these factors directlyaffect the costs of realizing Nigeria’s foreign policyobjectives.

While the formal institutions of Nigeria’s foreignpolicy are not directly responsible for the limited legiti-macy of the state or the widespread perception ofNigeria and Nigerians as corrupt, the task of articu-


6 The Domestic Context: Discordant Notes

lating a national interest and representing this interesteffectively to the outside world has been seriouslyaffected by both problems. In terms of Nigeria’sfractured nationhood, key policy recommendationsthat emerged from the Oxford conference included:the need for Nigeria’s foreign policy establishment toenhance its own sectoral legitimacy by consultingmore widely in the country and by adopting a pro-active stance of explaining its fundamental objectivesto the wider Nigerian society. On the issue of corrup-tion and criminal activity, it was suggested that activeefforts must be made, in conjunction with Nigerian andforeign policy agencies, to apprehend, punish and detercriminal elements who persist in giving Nigeria a badreputation. While it may not be possible to end suchcrimes, changing the way in which Nigeria is perceivedis possible and must be done if the efforts of its formalforeign policy are to achieve maximum results.

The subject of corruption in Nigeria and its impact onhow the country is perceived abroad triggered muchdebate and discussion among participants. On the issueof criminality, one participant set out the broadercontext of the factors contributing to criminality inNigeria and its impact on Nigeria’s internationalreputation, citing the repercussions of citizens nothaving the necessary channels to realize their talentsand ambitions in Nigeria, which has contributed tocriminality within Nigerian society. How should theNigerian government address the issue of freedomfrom fear and want for both Nigerians at home andabroad and thus tackle the underlying causes ofcorruption? Some participants felt that the problem ofapprehending and punishing Nigerians guilty ofcorruption was already being tackled and that the realproblem was how the international media reports onthis issue. According to one participant, groups likeTransparency International publish “studies” onpeople’s perception of Nigeria by asking leadingquestions such as: “How corrupt do you think Nigeriais on a scale of one to ten?” Other participantssuggested that the Nigerian government and itsoverseas diplomatic missions could do more toexamine how the country could best access the

international media to tell their own story.Organizations such as Africans Without Borders couldalso play a central role in facilitating this dialogue.Several participants suggested that the Nigerian mediacould be given a greater role in mobilizing andmotivating the domestic public on critical foreignpolicy issues.

3. The Domestic Context:Institutions and the Military

Institutions, Processes and Policy Formation

Following Nigeria’s holding of elections in 1999 and2003, international expectations about Nigeria’s role asa regional power in Africa and beyond have increased.It is therefore particularly important to re-examine theinterface between domestic issues and foreign policy inassessing the possibilities and challenges that Nigeriafaces in the post-Cold War era. In analyzing the role ofthe key institutions involved in Nigeria’s foreign policyformulation, specifically the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairsand the Presidential Advisory Council on InternationalRelations, it is clear that the institutions and processesof Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation cannot beseparated from the country’s political economy, thecharacter of the state or the worldview of its rulingelite. It is therefore necessary to address the issue of thefundamental nature of the Nigerian state and itsconnections with the wider society.

While Nigeria’s immense potential is clearly based onits demographic size of over 100 million people, itsmultiethnic population, its vast oil reserves and itsreservoir of highly skilled and educated people, themajority of its people remain poor with a per capitaincome of less than $500.2 Likewise, while Nigeria hasplayed an important role in international peacekeepingboth under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), aswell as ECOMOG (the Economic Community of WestAfrican States Ceasefire Monitoring Group), Nigeriaitself has been immersed in conflict, either at the level


The Domestic Context: Institutions and the Military 7

2 “World Bank Operational Policies: Countries Ranked by Per Capita Income,” The World Bank Operational Manual (Washington,D.C.: The World Bank, July 2003) [Available from http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/WBOPCS/preports/Report_annex_D1.asp].

of intra-elite power struggles or identity conflictswithin the context of its troubled federal experiment.Thus, while Nigeria possesses the necessary potential aswell as institutional structures needed to formulate avibrant foreign policy, its constraints lie in domesticfactors, namely, the nature of the foreign policy eliteand Nigeria’s economic dependence and vulnerability.Eghosa Osaghae’s description of Nigeria as a “crippledgiant” is perhaps most pertinent in this regard.3

An examination of the domestic constraints onNigeria’s foreign policy reveals the ways in which thecountry’s foreign policy has been characterized byreactive and uncoordinated policies in the post-ColdWar era. Since the 1990s, the Nigerian state has had tocontend with multiple crises including the fall in globaloil prices and a crisis in the very legitimacy of thestate, as a result of the disintegration of the “socialcontract” arising from the erosion of previous welfaregains fueled by the oil boom of the 1970s. Aconsequence of diminishing resources produced by thestate has led some Nigerians to withdraw into ethniclaagers in order to capture resources or press for thedecentralization of federal power and end the federalgovernment’s monopoly over the distribution of oilresources. Following the return to civilian rule in 1999,and in the context of the return to democracy in the1990s, previously pent-up grievances and demandshave been unleashed to devastating effect and resultedin communal violence across Nigeria that has resulted,along with religious-based violence, in an estimated10,000 deaths. While many of these conflicts haveerupted over issues such as contested boundaries andsharing of resources, other conflicts have also involvedmatters relating to “settlers” versus “indigenes” or “oilproducing communities” versus “oil multinationals,”all of which have fuelled instability and led to aquestioning of a national Nigerian identity.

In addition to these domestic factors, there is also asense in which aspects of Nigeria’s domestic base havebeen “globalized.” This has been evident particularly inthe Niger Delta where global oil giants such as Shell,ExxonMobil and Chevron-Texaco – as partners of the“Nigerian petro-state” - have become entrenched and

“localized.” The blurring of the domestic/globalboundary is yet another conceptual challenge thatanalysts of Nigeria’s foreign policy must come to termswith.

One of the conclusions drawn as a result of thisexamination of the domestic interface of Nigeria’sforeign policy, and specifically the role of Nigeria’sinstitutions in foreign policy formulation, are that,once unfettered by its domestic contradictions andwith a committed and visionary leadership, Nigeriacould become the key to fulfilling the dreams of theunfinished project of Pan-Africanism: the political andeconomic integration of Africa as a united bloc. Thesuccess of such a venture will ultimately depend onresolving Nigeria’s multiple contradictions through ademocratic project that has a firm national-socialanchor which emphasizes equity and the well-being ofall Nigerian citizens.

Regarding the institutions responsible for the formula-tion of Nigeria’s foreign policy, many participants atthe Oxford conference agreed on the importance ofstrengthening Nigeria’s Foreign Service by addressingissues such as the training of diplomats and thefunding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A compar-ative analysis of foreign policy formulation in parlia-mentary democracies vis-à-vis presidential forms ofgovernment was also suggested by one participant.

Military and Security Issues in the Development ofForeign Policy

The role of military and security issues in Nigeria’sforeign policy has not received the critical scholarlyattention that it deserves. Addressing the dearth ofstudies on Nigeria’s national security, as well as thetraditional silence on this issue at government level, istherefore an essential dimension in any comprehensivestudy of Nigeria’s foreign policy after the Cold War.This includes an examination of both individualsecurity issues such as the Bakassi border disputebetween Nigeria and Cameroon; Nigeria/Chad borderskirmishes; Libya’s role in Chad; and the securitysituation in potentially oil-rich Equatorial Guinea.


8 The Domestic Context: Institutions and the Military

3 Eghosa Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence (London: Hurst and Company, 1998).

Such a study also needs to focus on internal threats tonational security, namely religious and ethnic tensions.

It is important to adopt an integrated approach toexamining the military and security issues that Nigeriafaces, addressing issues such as the maintenance of thecountry’s territorial integrity; security from internalarmed subversion; the viability of the political system;economic and resource security; and the security oflives and property of Nigerians in general. Otherimportant issues include: the threat posed by intra-state conflicts in West Africa; the proliferation of smallarms and light weapons; the phenomenon of childsoldiers; and the trans-border activities of armed rebelsand mercenaries. The most potent threat to Nigeria’ssecurity comes from the vulnerability of Nigeria’smajor oil installations, and its leaders must take urgentaction to address this problem.

The view that military and security issues in Nigeria’sforeign policy have not been properly harmonized wasa central concern of the Oxford conference. Thisdeficiency is said to be reflected in the naïveté ofsuccessive civilian and military administrations inNigeria, which have failed to conceptualize the inextri-cable link between national security and foreign policy.However, some participants felt that the problem oflack of synergy between foreign policy and nationalsecurity had substantially changed over the last twoyears (2001-2003), as demonstrated by the drawing upof a government document on National Security andForeign Policy.

Perhaps the most pertinent question on the study ofmilitary and security issues is whether the Nigeriangovernment has sufficiently understood the gravesituation that the country faces in terms of bothinternal and external security threats. Are the nation’sarmed forces adequately prepared to meet thechallenges of the post-Cold War era in terms of theirstrength, orientation, training and weapons inventory?One participant urged the current administration toembark on a proper modernization of its military andsecurity infrastructure to reposition itself for thechallenges and uncertainties the country faces in a newera. These reforms should include the updating ofNigeria’s weapons inventory and the retraining and

reorientation of officers and foot soldiers so that theyare able to meet the challenges of sub-regionalpeacekeeping. In addition, the navy’s pivotal role in thedefense of the nation’s economy, particularly its oilinstallations, must be recognized, while the role of theair force in the defense of the nation’s airspace must bestrengthened.

With regard to the harmonization of military/securityissues and foreign policy, it was suggested that thecurrent regime of Olusegun Obasanjo focus on theNigerian Foreign Defence Council and the JointIntelligence Agency, as well as the 1986 decreecreating the National Securities Act. It was alsosuggested that the role of the Office of NationalSecurity Adviser be assessed to be able to contributemore effectively to foreign policy formulation. Someparticipants further felt that the Obasanjo regimeshould analyze the impact of the events of 11September 2001 and the current US war againstterrorism on how Nigeria has positioned itself strategi-cally in the post-Cold War era.

4. The Domestic Context: Oil andForeign Policy

Oil-rich “Minority” Areas, Shell and InternationalNGOs

The role that oil plays in Nigeria’s foreign policycannot be underestimated. One can argue that inexamining the actions and motivations of RoyalDutch/Shell, international NGOs, and Nigeria’s oil-producing “minority” groups, each in its own wayquestions the very idea of “Nigeria” as it is presentlyconstituted. Ethnic “minorities” in oil-producing statesdemand a more inclusive democratic society foundedon fiscal federalism as a way of reclaiming the rewardsof full citizenship from what they regard, particularlyunder military regimes, as a parasitic state. Nigeria’selite have often interpreted this view as a challenge totheir dominance and control of the state and itsstrategic resources. They have thus often fought thedemands of these groups through violence. Accordingto one participant, foreign oil companies yearn for areturn of a “golden age” in which political authoritar-


The Domestic Context: Oil and Foreign Policy 9

ianism and regular military expeditions to the NigerDelta ensured the uninterrupted supply of cheap oil.International NGOs continue to speak of “goodgovernance” and “civil society” when the issue is notso much what form the state takes, as the nature of thestate itself. As a result, these three players underminethe building of a cohesive and self-sustaining politicalorder without which Nigeria’s regional and continentalambitions cannot be realized.

Using the example of the relationship between theOgoni people, Nigeria’s elite and Shell as a case study,it can be argued that the inability of Nigeria’s elite totackle successfully the deep-rooted problems of statel e g i t i m a c y, national citizenship, democracy anddevelopment — which the murder of Ken Saro-Wiwaand eight Ogoni activists in November 1995dramatized so powerfully — means that Nigeria’sefforts to build a united nation, as well as its regionalambitions, will not be realized without resolving itsinternal problems.

Oil lies at the heart of persistent policy failures inNigeria. Where once colonialism thrived on theexpropriation of the resources of local people andmanaged power with the help of a complicit “indige-nous” elite, in post-independence Nigeria, relationsbetween federal governments and oil companies arestill structured in ways that help the government tomaintain a firm grip on strategic resources. This is,according to one participant, a replication of colonialpower relations in new forms. Powerful multinationalcorporations such as Shell have taken the place of theBritish imperial power. However, a converse viewstrongly advanced by another participant, suggestedthat rather than oil being the obstacle to the realizationof Nigeria’s leadership ambitions, oil has actuallytested the resilience of Nigerian society, and thecountry has been able to absorb much of this pressure.This resilience provides some hope for the future.

It is clear that in the post-Cold war era, and moreimportantly, in the era of America’s war on terrorism,Nigeria’s position as the world’s eighth largest oil-producer means that the country must now alsocontend with the coming realignment of forces in WestAfrica driven by American and other Western oil

interests. This is the central challenge that Nigerianpolicymakers will have to grapple with: securingNigeria’s borders and natural resources whilecontaining predatory external forces.

The issue of the accountability of foreign oil firms wasraised by a number of participants who questionedwhether Nigerians sufficiently hold their governmentsto account for the money they receive from oilrevenues and how these funds are disbursed. The caseof the recent initiative by the British government – the“Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative” – whichNigeria has signed up to, was raised by one participantas a potential means through which this issue can beaddressed. While this “publish what you pay” agenda isa sensitive one and requires a careful approach, it wascited as a step in the right direction that needs to beencouraged. Other participants questioned whether thisnon-binding approach could really be effective inresolving such deep-rooted problems.

Some participants questioned the likely consequence ofShell withdrawing from Nigeria. Several people feltthat such a development would be a negative step sinceoil production would not stop, but would probably behanded over to a firm or firms with even less concernfor human rights than Shell. Others asked that thediscussion be broadened beyond Shell, to examine therole of other foreign companies such as Chevron-Texaco, Elf and ExxonMobil. On the issue of“ownership” of Nigeria’s oil, one participant wonderedhow oil-producing African states such as Nigeria canestablish a common framework to regulate foreign oilfirms and other global investors. This participantsuggested that this issue be put on the agendas of theAfrican Union and NEPAD.

5. The Regional Context:Diplomacy and Trade

Nigeria and Its Neighbors

Nigeria has always looked beyond its borders. WhileAfrica has been the cornerstone of its foreign policy,Nigeria has seen itself and been perceived by others, asa global player on the world stage, from its role in the


10 The Regional Context: Diplomacy and Trade

African liberation struggle to its recent peacekeepingoperations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. While Nigeria’sforeign policy appeared to tilt towards the capitalistWest during the Cold War era (largely because of itshistorical economic ties), Nigeria has often acted inwhat it considered to be its national interest. This canbe seen in the way that Nigeria played significant rolesin the creation of the Organization of African Unity( OAU) in 1963, and used the arena of theCommonwealth and in particular, the United Nations,to advance national, as well as African interests.

Nigeria’s approach to both Africa and its immediateneighbors has been based on a policy of decoloniza-tion, non-interference, respect for inherited borders,economic integration and a commitment to practicalpolicies that promote African unity. During the 1960s,Nigeria’s foreign policy towards its neighbors wascharacterized by regional co-operation. Nigeriaestablished functional bodies to exploit commonresources for economic development, as seen in thecreation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1965;and the setting up of the Niger River Basin Commissionand subsequent Nigeria-Benin and Nigeria-Niger jointcommissions in 1973. The Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 brought a fundamental shift to Nigeria’s relationswith its neighbors, changing its policy of “benignneglect” towards its neighbors. The establishment ofECOWAS, an initiative led by Nigeria in 1975, sought,among other goals, to provide an institutionalframework for managing relations with its We s tAfrican neighbors, as well as attempting to reduce theirdependence on France.

One participant suggested that, as the dynamics of LaFrancophonie in West Africa changes, Nigeria needs toexploit the fundamental cultural affinities that existacross its borders by harmonizing its interests withthose of its neighbors through regional organizationsand mechanisms like ECOWAS, the Lake Chad BasinCommission and the newly-formed Gulf of GuineaCommission. In assessing Nigeria’s relations with itsneighbors, conference participants discussed the issueof Africa’s arbitrary colonial divisions and its contin-uing impact on Nigeria’s relations with its neighbors.Some participants focused on ways in which thefundamental commonalities, as seen in traditional

kingdoms straddling borders, could better contribute toNigeria’s foreign policy formulation in the regionalcontext: Benin and Cameroon have broached the ideaof “cultural diplomacy” in this regard, with traditionalrulers on both sides of the border visiting each otherand strengthening ties between communities on bothsides of the border. The impact of shared indigenouslanguages on Nigeria’s foreign policy was alsodiscussed, with an emphasis on the role that commonlocal languages have played, and could play, in unitingWest Africa. Nigeria and Benin share the Yorubalanguage, while Nigeria and Niger share the Hausalanguage.

Informal Economic Networks and RegionalIntegration in West Africa

In addition to the formal state-to-state relationshipsbetween Nigeria and its neighbors, an analysis of theinformal relationships, in particular Nigeria’s informalcross-border economic networks, provides dynamicinsights to the regional dimensions of Nigeria’s foreignpolicy. The focus on both the formal and informalaspects of diplomacy and trade led to questions aboutwhether modern state structures can adapt to today’sglobal economic realities in the same way that organic,traditional networks appear to have done.

The Oxford seminar assessed the impact of Nigeria’sinformal economic networks and the opportunitiesthey present for regional integration and the economicdevelopment of West Africa, based on Nigeria’s role asthe region’s largest economy and home to the largestand most sophisticated informal financial and tradingnetworks. As a consequence of the poor performanceof official regionalist institutions such as ECOWAS,new approaches to regional integration havedeveloped, known as the “new regionalism,” which, inthe context of economic liberalization and globaliza-tion, have seen a growing range of regional networksoperating outside the purview of formal policy initia-tives, driven by bilateral, private and even popularforces. One view favors these developments, seeing thenew regionalism as a structured response to thetransformations that globalization has brought about.The new regionalism is thus hailed, in this perspective,as everything that the old regionalism was not:


The Regional Context: Diplomacy and Trade 11

outward looking, shaped by real economic processesfrom “below” and within and driven by a range of stateand non-state actors. A second view on the newregionalism offers a far more negative picture in whichWest Africa’s informal networks are viewed as beingforces for economic disorder, criminality and violentconflict.

It can be argued that informal cross-border trade hastended to undermine productive investment andimpeded effective regionalism in West Africa. Far fromproviding a hegemonic force for regionalism, Nigeria’sdominant role in informal regional trade has weakenedregionalism from all sides. In conjunction with thestructural adjustment programs of the World Bank andthe International Monetary Fund (IMF), informal tradehas intensified a rent-seeking rather than productivelogic accumulation, both within the state and in theprivate sector. These developments have also facilitatedthe withdrawal of popular forces into identity-basedpatronage networks as alternative sources of access toincomes and social welfare collapse. This volatilesituation has been further compounded by thecontinued fiscal strangulation of the Nigerian state,which, starved of revenue by the informalization ofexternal and internal trade, is increasingly less able toprovide an alternative and more politically stable basisof social incorporation.

While Nigeria is not destined inevitably to be a forcefor regional chaos and “ungovernance,” the productivedeployment of Nigeria’s dynamic and sophisticatedinformal economy for national as well as regionaldevelopment, must involve more than simplyunleashing these formidable economic and socialforces on the rest of the subregion. Successful regionalintegration depends on strengthening the capacity ofthe state to provide an effective framework to regulateeconomic interaction in the wider public interest, bothnationally and regionally.

Other contributions from participants on Nigeria’sinformal economic networks included suggestions thatit is important to explore early examples of the “newregionalism,” for example, the situation in Ghana inthe 1950s where cheap goods were exported tofrancophone countries such as Togo and Côte d’Ivoire.The only losers then were the French colonial adminis-

trators. Therefore, in assessing the impact of informaleconomic networks on regional integration, it isnecessary to assess who benefits from informal tradingnetworks and who loses. The varying impact ofinformal cross-border trade was also said to be animportant consideration that requires more attention,as differences between sectors can mean that informaltrade may be a source of integration in some sectorsand of disintegration in others. For example, thepositive benefits of cross-border trade in foodstuffs inthe 1970s when cash crops were distorting foodsupplies, was cited. Some participants also suggestedthat the role of ECOWAS must be addressed in greaterdetail, examining why the organization has failed sofar to cope with informal trade networks. At the statelevel, one participant also suggested that, while manyof the actors involved in informal cross-border tradeare known to government officials, not least throughthe semi-official trade associations that exist, thecapacity of formal institutions to organize parallelorganizations is often lacking.

6. The Regional Context: Security,Conflict and HegemonicCo-operation

Nigeria’s Military Interventions: Hegemony on aShoestring

In examining the role of Nigeria’s military interventionsafter the Cold Wa r, specifically in Liberia and SierraLeone in the 1990s, it is necessary to begin by placingit in context. Since independence, Nigeria has aspired tohegemonic leadership in Africa, an enduring ambition,described by some as Pax Nigeriana. This aspiration tocontinental leadership is central to understanding someof the principal features of Nigeria’s foreign policy suchas the breaking of diplomatic relations with France in1 9 61 over the issue of nuclear testing in the Sahara; thecreation of ECOWAS in 1975; Nigeria’s membership ofthe “Frontline States” in the struggle against Rhodesiaand apartheid South Africa; its long-term chairmanshipof the UN Special Committee against Apartheid; and itsleadership of peacekeeping missions in Chad (1979-1982), Liberia (1990-1998) and Sierra Leone (1997-2 0 0 0 ) .


12 The Regional Context: Security, Conflict andHegemonic Co-operation

West Africa is one of the world’s most unstable regions,being at the epicentre of many of the world’s contem-porary civil conflicts. In the last decade, Liberia, SierraLeone, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal have all experi-enced some form of civil conflict, while Côte d’Ivoire,formerly a model of stability, has recently experiencedits own civil war. Nigerian-led interventions intoLiberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s lasted elevenyears, resulted in over 1,000 Nigerian fatalities, andcost the Nigerian treasury billions of dollars (althoughsome of these funds were embezzled by some ofNigeria’s corrupt military leaders). Although Nigeriawas itself enmeshed in its own political, financial andmilitary difficulties, these interventions were the firstin the post-Cold War era to be launched by a sub-regional organization, ECOWAS, and the Liberiamission between 1993 and 1997 was the first time thatthe UN had deployed peacekeepers alongside anexisting sub-regional organization. The failure of theECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau (involving Benin,Gambia, Niger and Togo) in 1999, to which Nigeria didnot contribute troops, further demonstrated theindispensable role of Nigeria to sub-regionalpeacekeeping efforts.

While there is no real question about Nigeria’s leader-ship role in maintaining peace and security in theregion, many questions have been raised about itsunilateral style. As a pivotal state in the region, Nigeriamust learn to treat its neighbors with respect and avoidthe perception that it is pursuing a policy of arrogantunilateralism. Nigeria must also insist on burden-sharing within the ECOWAS security mechanism of1999, as well as supporting democratic governance andefforts at preventing unconstitutional changes ofregime through the mechanisms of the African Unionand NEPAD. The role of the UN in accepting primaryresponsibility for maintaining global peace andsecurity should also be stressed when discussingregional capabilities. The UN must work out a properdivision of labor with ECOWAS. UNAMSIL (the UNMission in Sierra Leone) could serve as a potentialmodel, with the mission being based on a Nigerian-ledcore of regional peacekeepers of about 5,000 troops,

while 15,000 other troops came from outside WestAfrica. Finally, returning to a theme that ran throughthe conference, it is clear that in discussing Nigeria’srole in peace and security in the region, if Nigeria doesnot deal with its domestic problems, it cannot be acredible intervener abroad. Nigeria must provide notjust the military muscle for regional peacekeeping, butneeds domestic political stability and a sound economyfor its leadership ambitions to be taken seriously byothers.

Nigeria and South Africa: Constructing the AU andNEPAD

Nigeria and South Africa have undoubtedly played anindispensable role in the construction of the AfricanUnion and NEPAD. One could even go so far as to saythat, without the leadership role of South Africa andNigeria, the creation of the AU and NEPAD would havebeen more difficult, if not impossible. Even if NEPADand the AU had been created without the involvementof Abuja and Pretoria, their nature, purpose andtiming, would likely have been very different andmuch slower in coming about.4

Over the past four years, it is clear that the level ofactivity, discourse and diplomacy between presidentsOlusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, as well as theirgovernments and respective diplomatic corps, meansthat it is accurate to speak of an evolving strategicalliance between Nigeria and South Africa, the fulcrumof which have been their efforts to build the AfricanUnion and promote NEPAD. While some critics regardthis alliance as presumptuous on the part of SouthAfrica and Nigeria, in order to turn their relationshipinto a strategic partnership for the advancement ofAfrica, advocates of a strategic partnership betweenAbuja and Pretoria have argued that there are anumber of rationales that underscore the need for, andimportance of, such a partnership.

First, in some public and scholarly circles, the twocountries are often equated with “giantism”, and thetwo countries are seen as Africa’s political, military


The Regional Context: Security, Conflict andHegemonic Co-operation

13

4 See Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, “Nigeria and South Africa as Regional Hegemons,” in Mwesiga Baregu and ChrisLandsberg (eds.) From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,2003).

and economic giants. Some analysts go so far as tosuggest that the future of the entire continent rests onthese two countries. The impact of high-profile USforeign policy actors like secretary of state, ColinPowell, emphasizing the strategic importance of thesetwo countries and their collective role in Africa, hasalso contributed to the view that as potentialhegemons, Nigeria and South Africa have a vital roleto play in Africa. One should not underestimate thepersonal dimensions of the role of presidents Mbekiand Obasanjo in the construction of the AU andNEPAD, nor the importance of their own bilateralrelationship. Finally, the fact that the two leaders arealso attempting to play a global role as spokesmen forAfrica in fora like the Group of Eight (G8) is alsoimportant in understanding the “the diplomacy ofgiantism.” Thus, despite their own enormous domesticchallenges and problems, both Nigeria and SouthAfrica continue to try to act as Africa’s giants on thecontinent and on the world stage.

While the two African giants have taken the idea ofpartnership to unprecedented levels over the last fouryears and established a binational commission (BNC)for bilateral cooperation, it would be premature toexaggerate the potential of this bilateral relationshipto alleviate Africa’s political and socio-economicproblems based on the strength of democracy in thetwo countries. Both countries continue to experiencesignificant stresses and strains on the domestic frontwhich may impact negatively on the role that Nigeriaand South Africa can play in leading Africa’sr e c o v e r y. Several participants, however, noted thatboth countries would do well to stress the importanceof partnership with other African states. Theycautioned against romanticizing the alliance, andnoted that there could still be tensions between bothcountries, especially in dealing with matters such asconflict management and the promotion ofdemocracy in Africa. Even beyond Africa, there is stilla lingering debate about the future of a reformed UNSecurity Council, with both Nigeria and South Africavying for a permanent African seat on a reconstitutedcouncil.

In relation to the role of the two countries in theconstruction and development of the AU and NEPAD,the impact of the personalities of the leaders of bothcountries will be important to the future survival ofthese initiatives. It was noted that the relationshipbetween Nigeria and South Africa will need to beinstitutionalized. Several participants also noted thediscomfort of some Nigerian analysts that Obasanjoappears to have ceded intellectual leadership of NEPADto Mbeki.

Nigeria and Cameroon: The Bakassi Dispute

The Bakassi case before the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) is deeply rooted in the legacy of inheritedcolonial boundaries and questions of self-determina-tion and identity. The dispute revolved around thedelimitation and demarcation of the land boundaryfrom Lake Chad to the Bakassi region and the maritimeboundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. Cameroonclaimed sovereignty over the Lake Chad and Bakassipeninsula areas on the basis of its inherited title andclaim of ownership. Its claim relied on border demarca-tions drawn up under the respective colonial rules ofGermany, France and Britain between 1913 to 1931.Nigeria contested Cameroon’s ownership, andgrounded its defense and counter-claims on historicalconsolidation of title and peaceful possession ofcertain Lake Chad and Bakassi areas. Abuja furtherargued that it held sovereignty over the disputedterritories based on its post-colonial administration.5

The ICJ examined the claims of both parties anddelivered a judgment in October 2002 which waslargely in favor of Cameroon. In reference to the landboundary in the Lake Chad and Bakassi peninsula, theWorld Court rejected Nigeria’s claim of sovereigntyover areas in Lake Chad, stating that there was noevidence that Cameroon had acquiesced its title infavor of Nigeria. Furthermore, and most importantly,the Court did not recognize Nigeria’s claim over theBakassi peninsula, and accepted the Anglo-GermanAgreement which delimited the boundary betweenCameroon and Nigeria in Bakassi in 1913.


14 The Regional Context: Security, Conflict andHegemonic Co-operation

5 See the International Court of Justice decision of 10 October 2002 in the case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary betweenCameroon and Nigeria.

Critics have suggested that this bilateral dispute is acase that highlights the way in which those chargedwith the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy have oftenacted before thinking, often foregoing any thoroughanalysis of what is in the best interests of the country.It could be argued that Cameroon was more consistentin its approach to the boundary dispute, ratifying theVienna Convention on Law of Treaties in 1991 andaccepting the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1994, nodoubt in anticipation of its government bringingNigeria before the World Court. According to oneparticipant, this case should serve as a lesson toNigeria’s policymakers, that they should always takeseriously the instruments that they ratify and examinetheir legal, economic and political ramifications. IfNigeria considers itself a major player in African andworld affairs and wants to be viewed as a major actorinternationally, it must also respect established normsand standards of international law. It should not becompelled to observe and enforce ICJ judgments, butcomply with agreements it has agreed beforehand to bebinding.

7. The External Context: KeyMultilateral and Bilateral Relations

Nigeria’s Major Multilateral Relations: TheCommonwealth, the EU and the UN

Since independence, Nigeria has sought to play a fulland active role in the international community. Thecountry has attached even greater importance to thisrole because it has felt a special responsibility asAfrica’s most populous nation, in acting as an unoffi-cial spokesperson for Africa and black people in theDiaspora. Examining the ways in which Nigeria haspursued its foreign policy objectives through anextensive network of multilateral relations and theimpact of external factors in its foreign policyformulation, is therefore a critical dimension in anystudy of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Nigeria’s diplomaticrelations with three major multilateral organizations,namely, the UN, the Commonwealth and the EuropeanUnion (EU), were also analyzed at the Oxford confer-ence. Nigeria’s ties with these three organizations areamong its oldest, most diverse and most enduring.

Relations with these three organizations have beenlargely determined by three considerations: first, theextent to which the programs and objectives of theseorganizations have met the specific objectives andpurposes of Nigeria’s foreign policy; second, theprevailing domestic situation in Nigeria, given theinherent asymmetry between the domestic situationand foreign policy projection and performance; andthird, the prevailing global political environment.Despite the occasional upheavals within multilateralrelations, the ties between Nigeria and these threeorganizations can be said to have been mutuallybeneficial over the last four decades. Nigeria’s long-term interests are therefore best served by sustainingand reinforcing these ties.

It is important that Nigeria enhances and maximises itsrelations with the UN, the Commonwealth and the EUby firstly, wherever possible, working in collaborationand cooperation with other countries willing to shareexperiences, and secondly, by strengthening thecountry’s economic base to increase its capacity for anenhanced relationship with these key multilateralinstitutions. Some conference participants alsosuggested that, in examining relations between Nigeriaand the EU, it is important to consider the role ofBritain and France in harmonizing EU policy towardAfrica.

The Switchback and the Fallback: Nigeria-BritishRelations

Turning to Nigeria’s relations with Britain, thedynamics of Nigeria’s relationship with its formercolonial power has been described as a complex historyof the circumstantial and the continuous. On the onehand, as a result of instinctive responses in times ofcrisis, Nigeria’s forty-three years of independence haveoften looked like a switchback ride, moving from thereasonably cordial, to degrees of tension and animositywhich has often led to an impression of a relationshipof incoherent variables. These ups and downs havehowever mainly been at the government-to-govern-ment level. On the other hand, the long-term reality ofthe bilateral relationship between Abuja and Londonbelies this view, as evidenced by a continuousframework which underpins these relations. This


The External Context: Key Multilateral and Bilateral Relations 15

framework can be described as the “fallback” positionwhere traditional ties have meant that there were awhole range of relationships already in existencewhich often facilitated smooth ties between bothcountries. The importance of traditional bilateral ties isunderlined by the people-to-people connections whichshould not be excluded when examining the nature ofNigeria-British relations. While there will always be anundercurrent of suspicion and resentment as a result ofthe colonial legacy, there is also something of anacceptance by Nigeria of the connection that existswith Britain. This connection has helped to defineNigeria’s identity, and since it cannot be wished away,it can at least be used for the mutual benefit of thebilateral relationship.

In examining key periods in the bilateral relationshipfrom Nigeria’s independence to the present as well asthe impact of the underlying currents of the coloniallegacy on the relationship, it is clear that Nigeria-British relations are no longer primarily focused ongovernment-to-government relations, but are far moremultifarious, operating at a number of levels andimpacting upon the foreign policy of governments inboth countries. The relations between Abuja andLondon have mutated and become a question of therelations of peoples as well as governments. Theincreasing importance of people-to-people links is seenin the demographics, with some estimates putting thenumber of Nigerians in Britain at around one million.The significance of the relationship is particularlyevident in the impact that the new generation ofBritish-Nigerians is having on British society; andmembers of this group are increasingly represented inmany sectors of British life including business, the artsand culture.

In assessing the history of this relationship, someparticipants raised the issue of Britain’s position duringthe Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, when the Britishgovernment only belatedly supported the federalgovernment and many Britons openly supported theBiafran secession. The fact that the Nigerian civil warwas the first to have been extensively covered by

television was also said to have had an enduringimpact on the way in which Nigeria has been perceivedin Britain. One participant suggested that an assess-ment should be made of the current British policytowards Africa, examining what its interests actuallyare. Is trade now the defining issue of British policytowards Africa, and Nigeria in particular? The exampleof Britain’s rationale for intervening in Sierra Leone in1999 was raised as a case study that could be examinedin more detail.

A Tale of Two Giants: Nigeria-US Relations

Another important bilateral relationship involvesNigeria’s relations with the world’s sole superpower:the United States. A number of recent events havemeant that Washington has been challenged to take afresh look at its relations with Abuja. Nigeria was inthe forefront of African countries that publiclyopposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The growinginfluence of Islam in northern Nigeria has also been acause of concern to some policymakers in Washington,particularly in light of America’s war on terrorism. It ishowever important that Nigeria-US relations should beset within a broader context of more than the events ofthe last decade. There are a plethora of cultural, histor-ical and political reasons why Nigeria has beenimportant to the US from cultural aspects, which seeNigeria’s one-thousand year history earn it a place inAmerican art galleries rivalled only by Egyptian-Nubian art of the pharaonic period, to Nigeria’spopulation, oil resources and economic and militarydynamics, which make the country clearly one of thetwo regional giants on the African continent, alongwith South Africa.

Following the end of military rule with presidentialelections in 1999, the US reinvigorated diplomaticrelations with Nigeria and stressed that its overarchingnational interest in Africa was to promote democracy,and that “Nigeria’s successful transformation is key toanchoring the climate of peace and rapid developmentthat our citizens hope to see throughout Africa.”6

Economic assistance from the US also increased after


16 The External Context: Key Multilateral and Bilateral Relations

6 Ambassador Howard Jeter, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Testimony before the House International RelationsCommittee’s Subcommittee on Africa, 3 August 1999.

the democratic transition in Nigeria, rising to $78.5million in 2000 from $23.6 million in 1999.7 In 2003,US economic assistance to Nigeria is estimated at $65.2million. Before 11 September 2001, the Americanchallenge in its policy towards Nigeria was toformulate a substantive bilateral partnership with thisoil-rich country that provides 8 percent of America’soil needs.

Initially, the George W. Bush administration’s policytowards Africa continued to be dominated by threetraditional factors: bilateral economic affairs, regionalsecurity and governance. The events of 11 September,however, resulted in a shift of American focus towardsgiving priority to homeland security, which has had asignificant impact on Nigeria-US relations. The centralquestion now is whether Washington will continue toprovide the policy focus and foreign assistance thatcan help Nigeria to address its “democracy-develop-ment” problems, or whether it will cut back onassistance in the face of other security challenges.Some participants suggested that Nigeria needs to beconcerned about US involvement in Nigeria’s religiousaffairs based on the threat of growing Islamicmilitancy in northern Nigeria, while others felt thatAmerican involvement in this area was legitimate andlimited to support for inter-faith dialogue through thefunding of Nigerian NGOs working on these issues.

According to one participant, policy analysts agreedthat the following five recommendations should formthe basis of a coherent US policy towards Nigeria:

• First, greater consistency in the US-Nigeriamilitary-security relationship. Washington shouldrecognize that its national interest is best served ifNigeria is able to be a force for democracy andstability in the region. Military and security collab-oration between the two countries, and in Africagenerally, can only increase given the threat ofterrorism worldwide;

• Second, increasing America’s diplomatic reachwithin Nigeria by establishing arenas for US

exchanges with critical areas, such as its oil-producing areas in the Niger Delta and in northernNigeria where the US closed down consular offices.Such diplomatic reach could help the US to makea contribution to conflict management in Nigeria;

• Third, developing a strategy for an economicaction agenda in Nigeria, which must involvebusiness and government actors in the US andNigeria, as well as inviting input from the non-governmental sector. Such a strategy should focuson three priorities: first, an acknowledgement ofthe business community’s responsibility to be aconstructive player in Nigeria’s economic anddemocratic transition; second, a focus on restruc-turing the extractive industry to curb corruption;and third, a focus on restoring agriculturalindustries to help alleviate rural poverty, curbrural-urban pressures and strengthen trade andexport;

• Fourth, eliminating debt overhang and investing ineducation, health and human development; and

• Fifth, strengthening democratic institutions andgovernance structures which involves supportingdemocratic dialogue across the political spectrum,as well as assisting in training for elections andparliamentary and political party development.

8. The External Context: TheFrench Factor and Japan

Nigeria, France and Africa

Examining relations between Nigeria and France in thecontext of evolving relations between the twocountries reveals a complex and ever-evolvingsituation. While political relations between Abuja andParis have been characterized from the outset bydistrust, hostility and conflict, strong economicrelations appear to have developed almost independ-ently of the political context. This is demonstrated by


The External Context: The French Factor and Japan 17

7 United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations July 1,1945 - September 30, 2001, p. 56 (Electronic Version).

the fact that Nigeria has historically been among thetop three African economic partners of France, wellahead of francophone African countries.

The term Françafrique has been used to describe thenegative nature of Franco-African relations, based onFrench support for African dictators and the covert useof violence and corruption. The term has also beenused in a more analytical and comprehensive way toexplain the enduring system of Franco-Africanrelations. More recently a more neutral interpretationof the term has been employed to describe thepermanent and organic system of the privilegedrelations.

The rationale for the political frictions that haveexisted between Nigeria and France can be said toderive from Nigeria’s role as the “Giant of Africa,”coupled with its geo-political position as a countrysurrounded by four former French colonies: Cameroon,Chad, Niger and Benin. Because of the “specialrelationship” that France established with its formercolonies, Paris has been seen as being the mainobstacle to the fulfillment of Nigeria’s regionalambitions. For France, Nigeria has been the mostpotent threat to extending its influence in the region.Since francophone African colonies obtained theirformal independence from France in the early 1960s,relations between Paris and La Francophonie have beentransformed. The French presence and influence inAfrica has declined since the 1990s, and France can nolonger be seen as the threat to Nigeria’s regionalambition that it once was. But Nigeria has alsochanged because of the fragility of its domesticeconomic and political problems, which haveprevented it from achieving its regional ambitions.Hence, it can be argued that France is no longer theproblem for Nigeria, and vice-versa.

France’s waning influence in Africa and the normal-ization of its relations with francophone states shouldtherefore facilitate normalization of bilateral ties withNigeria. In the post-Cold War era, the priority forFrance should no longer be about which country willbe the leading power in West Africa, but rather abouthow to prevent the sub-region’s zone of turmoil andinsecurity escalating or spreading further. In this

regard, what should therefore be more worrying forFrance, Nigeria’s neighbors, and other actors, is thecontinuing economic and political instability inNigeria.

Some participants suggested the need for greateranalysis of the French response to shifts in British andAmerican policy toward Africa. They also called formore analysis of the disparate nature of Frenchgovernment policy towards Africa, and Nigeria inparticular, to focus on the approach that the Quaid’Orsay (the Foreign Ministry), the Matignon (the Officeof the Prime Minister) and the Elysée (Presidency) havetaken towards Africa, and the role of personal ties ininfluencing French policy towards Africa.

Japan, Africa and Nigeria

In explaining why Japan was included in discussionsat the Oxford conference, it was noted that because ofthe colonial legacy and other factors, Africa is stillobsessed with Europe and the West when othercountries such as Japan have substantial capital flowsinto Africa, a fact that is likely to increase in the future.Japan has in fact become the world’s second largest aiddonor and has, over the last decade, taken an activeinterest in Africa.

This has not, of course historically always been thecase. It is clear that from the early 1960s to the early1970s, Japan’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa wascharacterized by a profound vacuity proudly justifiedby Japanese policymakers as being the result ofJapan’s non-involvement in Africa’s colonial history.The lack of “historical guilt,” as its policymakersviewed it, thus exempted Tokyo from assistingsubstantially in Africa’s economic development.

Since the early 1990s, however, Japan reassessed itsrelations with Africa and appears to have decided toadopt a more pro-active approach towards thecontinent, a policy which has been orchestratedthrough the Tokyo International Conference on AfricanDevelopment (TICAD). According to one participant,TICAD, which began in 1993, represented a major shiftin Japan’s attitude towards Africa and the region’sdevelopmental problems. (Another TICAD meeting was


18 The External Context: The French Factor and Japan

held in October 2003, at which Japan pledged $1billion to Africa’s development over five years). At theheart of this change in attitude lie economic interestsbrought about by Japan wanting to correct its owndecade-long economic stagnation by helping tosupport Africa’s economic development, as Tokyo hadearlier done in Southeast Asia. Another factor whichhas often been put forward to explain Japan’s engage-ment with Africa in the last decade includes Japan’sinterest in having a permanent seat on the UN SecurityCouncil, which it is suggested, requires Africansupport.

Japan’s new approach towards Africa includes engage-ment with a Nigerian civilian government, which in1999 saw the first economic trade mission from Japanto Nigeria, while January 2001 saw the first visit by aJapanese prime minister, Yoshiro Mori, to Africa. ThisAfrica visit included Nigeria as one of the threecountries visited: a recognition of Nigeria’s leadershiprole in Africa by Japan. The Japanese prime ministeralso visited South Africa and Kenya. In May 2001,Nigeria’s president Obasanjo, visited Japan andsomething of a “special partnership” between Abujaand Tokyo may be evolving.

At the heart of this bilateral relationship lie economicissues. Once again, the impact of domestic issues onNigeria’s foreign relations can be seen in the way inwhich Japanese investment in Nigeria is constrainedby inadequate infrastructure, corruption, and unreli-able institutional structures. Despite Nigeria’senormous economic potential, Japan has focused 70percent of its African investments on South Africa andhas been hesitant about investing in Nigeria.

9. Conclusions

• At the heart of this conference on Nigeria’s foreignpolicy in the post-Cold War era was the question ofwhether a relatively resourceful and ambitiouscountry like Nigeria can be a force for stability anddemocratization in Africa. This is an importantquestion, given the enormity of Africa’s problemsand the limited interest and commitment of manyexternal actors to the continent following the end

of the Cold War. The theoretical and practicalaspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the institutionsand processes of policy formulation, and the“concentric circles” of domestic, regional andexternal influences on Nigeria’s foreign policywere therefore the major issues discussed duringthe conference.

• The end of the Cold War has resulted in afundamental change in the dynamics of contempo-rary international politics. Developing countries,like Nigeria, with oil wealth, a large army and alarge pool of well-educated citizens are now ableto play a leadership role in Africa, due to thereduced strategic significance of the continent formajor external powers. However, while policy-makers and executors of Nigeria’s foreign policyappear to be committed to responding to demands,pressures and influences from the externalenvironment to contribute to regionalpeacekeeping, they also need to respond appropri-ately to domestic pressures and influences,especially those derived from popular publicopinion. A civilian regime, unlike military govern-ments, also faces pressure from the parliament andthe press.

• While Nigeria’s immense potential is clearly basedon its demographic size of over 100 million people,its multiethnic population, its vast oil reserves andits reservoir of highly skilled and educated people,the majority of its people remain poor with a percapita income of less than $500. Likewise, whileNigeria has played a vital role in internationalp e a c e keeping both under the auspices of theUnited Nations, as well as the EconomicCommunity of West African States CeasefireMonitoring Group, Nigeria itself has beenimmersed in conflict, either at the level of intra-elite struggles for power or conflicts within thecontext of its troubled federal experiment. Thus,while Nigeria possesses the necessary potential aswell as institutional structures needed to formulatea vibrant foreign policy, its constraints lie indomestic factors, namely, the nature of the foreignpolicy elite and Nigeria’s economic dependenceand vulnerability.


Conclusions 19

• R e g i o n a l l y, Nigeria has seen itself and beenperceived by others, as a global player on theworld stage, from its role in the African liberationstruggle and its leadership of the EconomicCommunity of West African States during the ColdWar era to more recent peacekeeping operations inLiberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s approach toboth Africa and its immediate neighbors is basedon a policy of decolonization, non-interference,respect for inherited borders, economic integrationand commitment to practical policies that promoteAfrican unity.

• E x t e r n a l l y, since its independence in 1960,Nigeria has sought to play a full and active rolein the international community. Its leaders haveattached even greater importance to this rolebecause Nigeria has felt a special responsibility,as Africa’s most populous nation, to act as anunofficial spokesperson for Africa and for allblack people in international fora. Some havedefined this as a Pax Nigeriana, an effort toachieve hegemonic leadership in Africa by acountry that accounts for over half of We s tAfrica’s population and economic strength andhas a 94,000-strong army that dwarfs thecombined strength of those of its fourteenE C OWAS neighbors. Examining the ways inwhich Nigeria has pursued its foreign policyobjectives through an extensive network ofmultilateral relations and the impact of externalfactors in its foreign policy formulation is acritical dimension in the study of Nigeria’sforeign policy after the Cold Wa r. Likewise, ananalysis of Nigeria’s key bilateral relationshipswith South Africa, Cameroon, France, Britain, theUnited States and Japan is also critical tounderstanding Nigeria’s post-Cold War foreignp o l i c y.

Three of the key observations that emerged from theOxford conference included the following:

• First, in order to understand how Nigeria’s foreignpolicy has developed in the post-Cold War era, ananalysis of the history of Nigeria’s foreign policyshould take a longer historical perspective,

examining the problems that developed in thepost-colonial period and the legacy this hasbequeathed to Nigeria’s contemporary foreignpolicy.

• Second, linked to the historical perspective, thecontinuing crisis of legitimacy of the Nigerianstate needs to be addressed, a theme whichrecurred throughout the conference.

• Finally, understanding the impact of globalization,and in particular the communications revolution,was raised by several participants as being acritical subject, due to the way in which it hasaffected the context and nature of Nigeria’s foreignpolicy formulation. Linking these factors andassessing their impact on Nigeria’s foreign policywas a crucial goal of this conference.

Participants underscored the fact that the future ofNigeria’s foreign policy will depend on astute“economic diplomacy” that tackles effectively issueslike debt relief, foreign investment and promotingNEPAD. It is therefore necessary that the country’sMinistry of Foreign Affairs be strengthened if it is to beeffective in executing this policy. Nigeria’s diplomatsmust be better trained and its foreign missions betterfunded. In practical terms, six key policy recommenda-tions were put forward, focused on the need forNigeria’s foreign policy to be guided by carefullycrafted policies and actions. These include:

1. Nigeria should pursue goals of democracy, goodgovernance and respect for human rights at hometo ensure its leadership role is credible abroad. Itshould do this through the AU, ECOWAS, NEPADand CSSDCA.

2. Nigeria must promote regional and pan-Africaneconomic integration building on the lead Nigeriahas taken in fast-tracking the integration processin ECOWAS. Nigeria must strongly support thebuilding of a common market in West Africa andthe creation of a common currency.

3. Pan-African integration, based on self-reliance andself-sustained development, should be a top

20 Conclusions


priority for Nigeria’s development, and should besustained together with its strategic alliances withSouth Africa, Ghana, and possibly Egypt.

4. Nigeria must share its conflict management experi-ences with other regional and sub-regional organi-zations such as the AU, the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC), theIntergovernmental Authority on Development(IGAD), the Economic Community of CentralAfrican States (ECCAS) and the Arab MaghrebUnion (UMA). It must also support the effectivefunctioning of the ECOWAS security mechanism of1999 and ensure that the UN shares the burden ofpeacekeeping more equitably.

5. Nigeria should help to ensure the full establish-ment of the institutions of the African Union,

ensuring particularly that the AU has adequatepowers and funds to carry out its mandate andhelping to strengthen its work in the areas ofpeace, security, governance and economic integra-tion and development.

6. Finally, Nigeria must pursue an active agenda inthe World Trade Organization negotiations. Inparticular, it should support the decision at theWTO Ministerial Conference in Doha to launch a“development” trade round and work to secureagreements in the areas of market access for theagricultural and other goods of developingcountries and trade-related intellectual propertyrights, particularly, in allowing developingcountries the time to decide whether or not togrant patent protection in such vital areas aspharmaceuticals, food and other areas.

Conclusions 21


Introduction

The reconsideration of my book, The NigerianRevolution 1966-1976, is a Herculean task. With thebenefit of hindsight, it is an uphill task. However, it canbe accomplished. With my head bowed and subdued, Ican say with little hesitation that the NigerianRevolution never took place. Alternatively, it did takeplace, but in the wrong direction.

There have been revolutionary changes. However,the resultant effect of the changes has been negativeand we are yet to see the positive changes. A cursoryreview of the changes shows that, like all revolu-tions, the early victims were the leaders – the sonsand daughters of the revolution. The militaryleaders, the top civil servants and university dons allfell by the wayside. In this case, the political classwas a major casualty and many left the country ine x i l e .

After some deep reflection, I have decided to sharesome of my inner thoughts on the past, present andfuture of Nigeria with you, by analyzing the social andeconomic forces that have determined the course ofevents in this country since 1966.

Part of the thesis of this address is the contentionthat there have been many complex factors at playin Nigeria since the attainment of independence,and that since 1966, the method and organizationof the Nigerian society has undergone somefundamental changes, which if not arrested, couldqualify as the beginning of a national revolution.U n f o r t u n a t e l y, the Nigerian Revolution is a revolu-tion without a vanguard. The prediction is thatunless a vanguard can be evolved to provide theleadership and the impetus for the revolutionaryforces at work, the Nigerian revolution is bound toprove abortive.

Some Benchmarks of the Military Revolution

We are concerned at this stage with fundamentalchanges introduced by the advent of the military –changes that could not easily have occurred under therivalry and the rigidities of party politics. The distribu-tion of economic power and the public patronageamong individuals and ethnic and rural groups, is oneof the main issues of our recent experience. Otherequally important issues include the creation of states,the distribution of resources, and the incorporation ofcivilian advisers by the military.

Indigenization of the Economy

O r t h o d ox economics cannot explain the currentcrusade of indigenization of certain expatriatebusinesses if we were preoccupied with efficiency andeconomic growth. Just as most of us would not havebecome permanent secretaries, general managers ofpublic corporations, high-ranking military officers andeven university professors, if the expatriate holders ofsuch posts did not surrender their jobs to us atindependence, political necessity dictated that theprivate sector adopt strategies and yardsticks similar tothose that necessitated the Nigerianization of thepublic sector at independence. The program of indige-nization of the economy may turn out to be one of themost important landmarks of the military. There istherefore no need for the authorities to continue toadopt an apologetic stance in a matter of historicalnecessity and national pride. It should be pointed outthat the program of indigenization began in earnestwith the introduction of the famous Part 10 of theCompanies Decree of 1968 that compelled all alienenterprises to register as Nigerian entities. Theprogram also includes the current commitment of thefederal government to assume “the commandingheights of the economy” through effective participa-tion in the strategic sectors of the economy, notably in

22 Annex I: Dinner Address


ANNEX I: Dinner Address

The Nigerian Revolution Reconsidered (summarized version)

Chief Allison A. Ayida, Former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service

the petroleum, banking, commerce and agricultureindustries.

The Creation of States

A second landmark development under military rulewas the creation of states. The official pronouncementby General Yakubu Gowon, head of the Federal MilitaryGovernment between 1966-1975, outlined five criteriafor state formation. First, no one state can dominatea n o t h e r. Second, each state must conform to ageographical area. Third, states could form on the basisof administrative convenience, history and the people’swishes. Fourth, states must be administratively viable.Fifth, new states must be created at the same time.

Although this is not the place to give a detailedaccount of how the states came to be established on 27May 1967, I wish to mention four aspects of thecreation of states that may be relevant in the future, asthe country may consider the creation of more states.First, the criteria laid down demonstrate that thenumber twelve is of no strategic value as such. Second,the linguistic principles were conspicuously set aside orsubsumed when using “the facts of history” as acriterion. Third, the most sensitive potential threat tothe stability of the Nigerian federation was andremains a North-South confrontation. It was of greatstrategic importance that the number of states in the“northern” parts of the country should be seen to beequal to the number of “southern” states (this was animportant consideration which could not be madeexplicit in the days of “the gathering storm” in early1967). Fourth, there had to be a Lagos state withoutsplitting the Yoruba heartland, as part of the strategyof containing the former conditional secessionists inthe then Western region, who were convinced that, ifthe Nigerian federation disintegrated through thebreakaway of the Eastern region, Lagos wouldautomatically become part of the new “Republic ofOduduwa.”

Despite the use of federalism as a stabilization tool, thenext threat to the continued existence of Nigeria willnot come from the East. The next crisis is most likelyto have its origins in basic economic issues and socialconflict – the equitable allocation and proper manage-

ment of the disposable resources of the federation andthe familiar class conflict between the haves and thehave-nots. What Nigeria lacked most in the past (andone can add, the present), has been a national sense ofpurpose, particularly in economic matters. The federalgovernment must therefore occupy the commandingheights of the economy in the quest for purposefulnational development and provide the leadership andhonest administration necessary for the attainment ofa national sense of purpose. Government interventionin economic matters, designed primarily to protect andpromote the public interest, is therefore fully justified.

Distribution of Resources

The establishment of the new states and the issue ofequitable geographical distribution of availableresources led to the appointment by the federalgovernment of the Interim Revenue Allocation ReviewCommittee in July 1968 under the chairmanship of thelate Chief I. O. Dina. The Dina Committee was to “lookinto and suggest any change in the existing system ofrevenue allocation as a whole as well as new revenuesources.” In its conclusion, the Committee declaredthat “fiscal arrangements in the country should reflectthe new spirit of unity to which the nation isdedicated….[A]ll the sources of revenue of this country[are] to be used for executing the kinds of programmeswhich can maintain this unity.”

Many of the Committee’s most controversialrecommendations were implemented, with suitableamendments where necessary. Two importantrecommendations from the Dina Interim Fiscal ReviewCommittee Report relate to its recommendation on theformula for allocating revenue among the states andthe issue of offshore oil revenues. The former generatedso much heated debate among the states that theSupreme Military Council adopted a “compromise”formula based on 50 per cent equality and 50 per centpopulation. The proportions due to each state on theapplication of these two factors were quantified in thereport. The Dina report also recommended thatoffshore oil revenue should be shared through the newDistributable Joint Accounts, which allocated 60 percent of oil revenues to the federal government and 40per cent to the states. But a subsequent decision

Annex I: Dinner Address 23



provided the federal government with 100 per cent ofoil revenues. It was the first time in the country’s fiscalhistory that the regions lost a major revenue source tothe center, since the introduction of fiscal federalism in1954. The previous situation had placed the country ata crossroads: the more revenue the federal governmentlost to the states, the weaker its capacity to assistpoorer states; the states could not eat their cake andhave it, too.

Civil Advisers to the Military

The last benchmark of the military revolution is therole of civilian advisers under the military. Of the manyadvisers and pressure groups, two groups are notable:1) the senior civil servants and university dons; and 2)civil commissioners. Civilian advisers were to assist themilitary to govern by interpreting the wishes of thepeople to the military and vice-versa. Unfortunately,although civil advisers appointed to the FederalExecutive Council in June 1968 had full ministerialpowers, the military was in power, and not politicalparties. Thus, if civil commissioners appeared sidelined,it is because commissioners were not appointed to runthe government as political masters, but as servants ofthe military, the new political masters.

Nonetheless, it is erroneous to conclude that themilitary marginalized civilian advisers for threereasons. First, between 15 January 1966, when themilitary came to power, and 12 June 1967, federalpermanent secretaries headed ministries withoutministers until commissioners were appointed on alater date. It is not generally realized that during thisperiod, all ministerial powers were vested in theFederal Executive Council and not in individualpermanent secretaries. When the military first seizedpower, one of their first suggestions was to drawmembers of the federal cabinet from the military, theuniversities and some federal permanent secretaries.We declined to serve and preferred to retain ourtraditional role as advisers. Second, during the civilwar, some civil commissioners were called upon todefend the government, leading some to conclude thatcivil commissioners had lost their independence. Last,while senior civil servants are called upon to serve onthe boards of public corporations and other statutory

agencies, they may not be visible. However, it is notoften realized that because a permanent secretary maybe scheduled to sit on many boards, he oftendesignates a representative to serve in his place.

Those who are anxious to criticize the so-called new roleof senior officials under the military should rememberthat the military administration is a “corrective” orrevolutionary regime of all the talents drawn from theuniversities and other walks of life. My personal impres-sion is that the military rulers are very receptive to newideas, provided they are well articulated. What thecountry suffers from is the poverty of new ideas andwell-thought-out policy reform proposals based on a fullknowledge of the workings of the system.

Aims of the Revolution

While the motivations behind the coup d’état of 15January 1966 died with its plotters, there is enoughevidence to indicate that the event of 29 July 1966 wasplanned mainly as a revenge coup, with no politicalprogram on what was to follow. The original aim of themilitary administration was very limited: to restoreorder and return the country to civil rule in six months.By 30 November 1966, the picture had changeddramatically. The ad hoc committee on the constitutionwas dissolved and the military rulers assumed fullresponsibility for political decisions and for keepingthe country together. The mandate and the positions ofthe regional delegates to the ad hoc ConstitutionalConference differed considerably. Unable to achieveany positive results, they had to be disbanded. As such,by the time the Aburi decisions were reached in 1967,the military leaders were no longer on the samewavelength; even the words used in Aburi haddifferent meanings for the various participants. Thismuch was clear to the group of federal permanentsecretaries who had gone on a pilgrimage to StateHouse, Enugu, in November 1966 to plead with theformer military governor, Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, notto carry out his secession threat.

The real difficulty with Aburi, which was never madepublic at the time, was that the military leaders agreedin a private session, which was not recorded at therequest of Colonel Ojukwu, that Colonel Ya k u b u



Gowon was to become the Commander-in-Chief (inplace of the title of Supreme Commander) and Ojukwuagreed to serve under him in the spirit of Aburi. We areall familiar with the tragic pattern of events thatfollowed the press charges and counter-charges of badfaith.

One could speak at length on the tragic events of thewar and their impact on the post-war situation. But onthis occasion, our interest is in the post-war situationand the probable course of events around 1976. In thisrespect, the so-called Nine-Point Program is important.Seven out of the nine points are major social reformmeasures. Specifically, the Nine-Point Programproposes the re-organization of the armed forces; therepair of the damage and neglect of the war; theeradication of corruption in our national life; thesettlement of the question of the creation of morestates; the introduction of a new revenue allocationformula; the conducting of a national populationcensus; and the reorganization of genuinely nationalparties. The other two points, preparation and adoptionof a new constitution and the organization of electionsfor the installation of popular governments at the stateand the central levels, can be regarded as steps on theroad to civilian rule.

One of the main tasks facing the Armed Forces, that ofre-organizing itself, is indeed a difficult one in thepost-war situation. Reform was hindered by the army’srapid expansion coupled with the undefined role ofsecurity forces in peace time. Moreover, soldiers whofought to “protect civilians” expected an enhancedstatus in peace time. Notwithstanding such difficulties,the military administration embarked on an ambitiousprogram of social reforms and legislation. Policy initia-tives spanned policies from the abortive price controlmeasures, to rent control decrees, to the lawsgoverning divorce.

Institutional Reforms

By 1976, it was evident that nothing had changed afterten years of military rule. Critical issues in need ofresolution then and now include the nature of politicalparties, the management of the economy and ensuringthe de-politicization of the civil service.

Nature of Political Parties

Ten years after the onset of military rule, strategies hadyet to be developed that would encourage theformation of parties with a national outlook. Thecountry has no mechanism to judge the degree ofnationalism in each party’s platform. Moreover, whilea party can have support in more than one state, itdoes not guarantee that it will be genuinely “national”in outlook. The country could pursue two possiblepaths. Under one approach, the military administrationcould declare party politics open and leave democraticforces to settle the issue of national leadership. Inpursuing this route, understanding the causes of thefailure of the 1966 ad hoc constitutional conferencewould be important. Alternatively, the military couldsponsor a national movement outside the country towhich no serious opposition would be allowed. Yet,this alternative would have very serious implications –namely, it risks the politicization of the military.

Military rule without the total mobilization andinvolvement of the people is an aberration and isbasically unstable. On the other hand, in light of ourrecent history, there is equally convincing evidence todemonstrate that a national leadership acceptable tothe country as a whole did not emerge after 1976through an autonomous election. In mobilizing people,organizing parties on state or ethnic bases should beavoided at all costs. It could lead to a return of themilitary, probably without any clearly defined purposeor sense of mission. Instead, the federal constitutioncould provide for statutory grants to all officiallyrecognized parties to reduce their dependence on theunofficial “contribution by patronage” of theirmembers in office in the states or at the center.Although, this creates a dangerous potential for a“one-party state.”

Management of the Economy

A second critical area, economic management, shouldencompass institutional reforms that create a supremeNational Economic Council. Such a national economiccouncil would have decision-making power overnational planning, development projects, and revenueallocation. The central planning office in the ministry

Annex I: Dinner Address 25


of economic development should serve the proposednational economic council. In turn, the ministry should,with the enhanced developmental and coordinatingpower of the federal government, eventually attain thestatus of a national planning commission. Equallyimportant, government must carefully navigate theopening of the economy to the free market, whileprotecting small and medium size companies from theeffects of globalization. Indeed, even with privatizationas an end, the government may have to provide theseed money for starting new projects and promotingindigenization – strong proof that the governmentcannot abandon all responsibility for economic growth.

Politicization of the Civil Service

Under no circumstances should the civil services of thiscountry be politicized. Federal civil service personnel

should, in the interest of national stability, continue tobe recruited from all parts of the country. Additionally,while insisting on reasonable standards, the civilservice should not institute a quota system. A non-political civil service, adequately staffed to give non-partisan and competent advice without fear or favor,remains the best guarantee of a modern and stableadministration in this country. Is it totally unrealisticto expect the same of the military after 27 years inpower? Assessments differ.

From 1976, succeeding governments have been worsethan previous governments in matters of resourcemisallocation and abuse of office. The best that thecurrent administration of Olusegun Obasanjo can do isto stop the rot. We are yet to see the upturn. When wedo, that will mark the turning point and the rebirth ofthe Nigerian Revolution.



Annex II: Agenda 27

ANNEX II: Agenda

Friday 11 July 2003

9:30 am – 10:00 am Welcoming Remarks

Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Queen Elizabeth House and St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, United Kingdom

Dr. Yuen Foong Khong, Director, Centre for International Studies,Oxford University, United Kingdom

10:00 am –11:20 am Panel I: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Theory, History and Practice

Chair: Dr. Christopher Kolade, High Commissioner of Nigeria to theUnited Kingdom

Professor Ibrahim Gambari, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-Generalon Africa and former Nigerian Foreign Minister, “The Theory and Practiceof Nigeria’s Foreign Policy”(Tabled Paper)

Professor Kayode Soremekun, Department of International Relations,Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, “A History of Nigeria’sForeign Policy”

Professor Joy Ogwu, Director-General, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,Lagos, Nigeria, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Alternative Futures”

11:20 am – 12:50 pm Panel II: The Domestic Context: Discordant Notes

Chair: Ms. Joy Ezeilo, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Nigeria

Professor Attahiru Jega, Director, Mambayya House, Bayero University,Kano, Nigeria, “Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy Formulation”

Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Queen Elizabeth House and St. Antony’s College,Oxford University, United Kingdom, “Nigeria: Nationhood, Identityand Foreign Policy”

2:00 pm – 3:45 pm Panel III: The Domestic Context: Institutions and the Military

Chair: Chief Allison A. Ayida, Former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service, Nigeria

Dr. Cyril Obi, Senior Research Fellow, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,Lagos, Nigeria, “The Domestic Interface of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Institutions,Processes and Policy Formulation”

Dr. William Fawole, Senior Lecturer, Department of International Relations,Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, “Military and Security Issuesin the Development of Foreign Policy”

4:00 pm – 5:00 pm Panel IV: The Domestic Context: Oil and Foreign Policy

Chair: Professor Douglas Rimmer, Birmingham University, United Kingdom

Dr. Ike Okonta, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of California, Berkeley, California,United States, “The Disease of Elephants: Oil-rich ‘Minority’ Areas, Shell,and International NGOs”

6:30 pm – 9:30 pm Dinner and Special Presentation

Chair: Dr. Haroun Al-Rashid Adamu, Adamu and Associates, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria

Chief Allison A. Ayida, Former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service, Nigeria,“The Nigerian Revolution Reconsidered”

Saturday 12 July 2003

9:30 am –10:45 am Panel V: The Regional Context: Diplomacy and Trade

Chair: Professor Gwendolyn Mikell, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

Professor Akinjide Osuntokun, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria,“Nigeria and Her Neighbors”

Ms. Kate Meagher, Nuffield College, Oxford University, United Kingdom,“New Regionalism or Loose Cannon? Informal Cross-Border Trade andRegional Integration in West Africa”

11:00 am – 12:50 am Panel VI: The Regional Context: Security, Conflict and Hegemonic Cooperation

Chair: Mr. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Emeritus Fellow, St. Antony’s College,Oxford University, United Kingdom

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy“Nigeria’s Military Interventions: Hegemony on a Shoestring”

Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg,South Africa, “The Diplomacy of Giantism? South Africa and Nigeria’sConstruction of the AU and NEPAD”

Ms. Joy Ezeilo, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Nigeria,“Nigeria and Cameroon: The Bakassi Dispute”


28 Annex II: Agenda

2:15 pm – 3:15 pm Panel VII: The External Context: Key Multilateral and Bilateral Relations

Chair: Dr. Yuen Foong Khong, Director, Centre for International Studies,Oxford University, United Kingdom

Dr. Martin Uhomoibhi, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Nigeria, Addis Ababa,Ethiopia, “Nigeria’s Major Multilateral Relations: The Commonwealth,the EU & the UN”. (Paper presented by Dr. Abiodun Alao, King’s College,London, United Kingdom)

M r. Kaye Whiteman, Former Editor, West Africa Magazine¸ London, United Kingdom“The Switchback and the Fallback: Perspectives of Nigeria-UK Relations,1960-2003”

Professor Gwendolyn Mikell, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. “Nigeria-US Relations”

3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Panel VIII: The External Context: The French Factor and Japan

Chair: Professor Joy Ogwu, Director-General, Nigerian Institute ofInternational Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria

Professor Jean-Francois Medard, CEAN, Institut d’Etudes Politiques,University of Bordeaux, Montesquieu, France,“Nigeria, France and Africa”

Dr. Kweku Ampiah, Sterling University, Scotland, “Japan, Africa and Nigeria”

4:30 pm –5:30 pm Discussion: Publication of the conference report and producing a policy-relevantedited book on the conference.

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy

5:30 pm – 7:00 pm Closing Remarks

Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Queen Elizabeth House and St. Antony’s College,Oxford University, United Kingdom

7:00 pm Closing Dinner Courtesy of African Studies

Welcome by Professor William Beinart, Chair of Race Relations,St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, United Kingdom


Annex II: Agenda 29

1. Dr. Haroun AdamuAdamu & AssociatesAbuja, Nigeria

2. Dr. Adekeye AdebajoInternational Peace AcademyNew York, New York

3. Mr. Richard AdejolaNigerian High CommissionLondon, United Kingdom

4. Dr. Abiodun AlaoKing’s CollegeLondon, United Kingdom

5. Dr. Kweku AmpiahSterling UniversityScotland, United Kingdom

6. Chief Allison A. AyidaFormer Head of the Nigerian Civil ServiceLagos, Nigeria

7. Mr. Usman BarayaNigerian High CommissionLondon, United Kingdom

8. Mr. Craig DowlerInter-Faith Coalition on AfricaToronto, Canada

9. Ms. Joy EzeiloUniversity of NigeriaNsukka, Nigeria

10. Dr. William FawoleObafemi Awolowo UniversityIle-Ife, Nigeria

11. Professor Attahiru JegaDirectorMambayya HouseBayero UniversityKano, Nigeria

12. H.E. Dr. Christopher KoladeNigerian High CommissionerLondon, United Kingdom

13. Mr. Yomi KristiloluUniversity of EssexEssex, United Kingdom

14. Dr. Christopher LandsbergDirectorCentre for Policy StudiesParktown, South Africa

15. Professor Jean-Francois MedardUniversity of BordeauxMontesquieu, France

16. Professor Gwendolyn MikellGeorgetown UniversityWashington, D.C.

17. Ms. Rosemary NuamahInternational Policy Officer, Labour PartyLondon, United Kingdom

18. Dr. Cyril ObiNigerian Institute of International AffairsLagos, Nigeria

19. Professor Joy OgwuDirector-GeneralNigerian Institute of International AffairsLagos, Nigeria

20. Mr. Ayo OkeNigerian High CommissionLondon, United Kingdom

21. Dr. Ike OkontaUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeley, California

22. Professor Akinjide OsuntokunUniversity of LagosLagos, Nigeria


30 Annex III: List of Participants

ANNEX III: List of Participants

23. Mr. Olly OwenLondon, United Kingdom

24. Mr. Dapo OyewoleCentre for Democracy and DevelopmentLondon, United Kingdom

25. Professor Douglas RimmerUniversity of BirminghamBirmingham, United Kingdom

26. Professor Kayode SoremekunObafemi Awolowo UniversityIle-Ife, Nigeria

27. Professor Elliot SkinnerColumbia UniversityNew York, New York

28. Ms. Nicole StremlauSchool of Oriental and African StudiesLondon, United Kingdom

29. Mr. Olukayode ThomasThe Guardian NewspaperLagos, Nigeria

30. Mr. Brian ThomsonDepartment for International DevelopmentLondon, United Kingdom

31. Mr. Kaye WhitemanFormer editorWest Africa MagazineLondon, United Kingdom

Oxford UniversityOxford, United Kingdom

32. Dr. Patrick DaviesSt. Antony’s College

33. Dr. Georg DeutschSt. Cross College

34. Dr. Yuen Foong Khong, Nuffield College

35. Mr. A.H.M. Kirk-GreeneSt. Antony’s College

36. Ms. Kate MeagherNuffield College

37. Dr. Abdul Raufu MustaphaQueen Elizabeth House and St. Antony’s College

38. Ms Kathryn NwajiakuNuffield College

39. Mr. Gavin WilliamsSt. Peter’s College


Annex III: List of Participants 31

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