NGOs and Civil Society: Where We've Been, Where We Are, Where We're Going Eglantina Gjermeni

Lori Amy Abstract We want to situate a discussion of the role of the NGO sector in developing civil society within the larger conflicts about the role of the state in the post cold war era. Rapid decentralization in the formerly communist countries of Southeastern Europe poses particular problems with democratization in the sociopolitical transition to free markets. In Albania, the NGO sector has been, by and large, responsible for addressing social sector problems resulting from the large-scale dis-investment in the public sphere under the dictates of privatization. Especially in the realm of social services, the state has been virtually invisible. Assisted by the international agencies structuring development aid, the NGO sector has been responsible for defining and addressing the many social problems accompanying transition – domestic and family crises of internal migration and displacement, violence against women and childern, human rights abuses, sexual violence and trafficking, and the increased insecurity of the individual and family in states of emergency such as Albania’s 1997 economic collapse and resulting civil crisis and the 1999 Kosovo War.

* * *

We want to focus our analysis of the role of NGOs in developing civil society in Albania through

the immediacy of political crisis. According to the USAID sustainability index, democratic development in Albania has in fact declined over the last two years in several key areas (including in the electoral process, national and local governance, and independent media1). Where it has not outright declined, it has remained stagnant, leading the European Commission in its 2010 opinion on Albania's progress towards EU membership to cite serious deficiencies in the »stability of institutions guaranteeing dmocracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities« (Gjipali 50).

Indeed, the current moment is precarious. The Socialist Party boycott of Parliament for two years following the contested 2009 general elections has left the country with no viable opposition, deadlocked in a struggle for power that offers no checks on the rampant corruption pervading every sector of society (including ruling and opposition party power structures). In a July 2011 interview citing the »sorry state of the public sector after 20 years of international efforts,« Danish Ambassador, Karsten Ankjaer Jensen, chastises the power elite and warns that «there is little or no chance that Albania will qualify for EU-membership, perhaps even candidate status in the short to medium term,« without finding a way to »break with the 'clientele' mentality« of the communist regime and »focus on skills, accomplishments and merit« ( ).

Albania's backsliding and current state of political crisis foreground the limits of democracy promotion strategies that target civil society as the main actor in the socio-political transition of a country. While a small group of the Albanian NGO sector (where “civil society” remains a concept strictly correlated to “NGO” and largely inapplicable to the rest of the culture) has made important strides in advancing human rights and providing social services, the NGO sector remains weak2 and has had little impact on the public sector. As Ambassador Jensen notes, after twenty years of transition, and »despite the many years of international aid, the Albanian public sector is in a position where it may lay claim to the world record for turnover of personnel » ( ). After every election, the winning political party purges opposition party members from positions and fills them with party loyalists, family

1 Cite source 2 GTZ report

Formatted: English (U.S.)

members, friends.3 In many cases, qualified and experienced people are fired and replaced by unqualified, inexperienced people whose mission is to gain power for a specific party or person(s). This »winner take all« attitude and notion that you »have to destroy your opponent in order to win« -- a notion «quite unique to the Albanian political class« -- leaves only 5% of public sector employees »part of the permanent professional set up ensuring consistency, quality and stability« ( ). Public administration thus lacks professionalism and efficiency as well as the institutional memory so crucial for stable democratic structures.

This political situation forces the question: after the enormous amounts of money poured into the country – »for the EU as an institution alone 40 million Euro’s« – to help Albania build a well functioning public sector ( ), how is it that we are left with a highly polarized political sphere in which each party perceives itself as locked in a fight to the death with the opposition, conceived of, literally, as the »enemy.« At the same time, clientelism and corruption are so pervasive that ordinary citizens are forced to align with a political party in order to secure the basic life needs – educational opportunities for their children, jobs, preference in land disputes, opportunities for professional advancement. Indeed, a recent study shows that »Albanian citizens are faced with bribery three times more often than the populations of neighboring states« (Gjipali 52). History and context of NGO Development – Communism through Early Transition Explanations of the problems plaguing the political sphere in Albania typically refer to the extreme isolationism of the communist regime – a regime that was arguably the most brutal in the former communist bloc, with the highest percentage of executions, imprisonment, and political exile. Indeed, 18% of the total population was imprisoned or exiled, and harsh repressive measures were used to subdue the population. The degree of state terror exercised virtually eliminated the formation of a viable dissident movement.4 But to understand the vulnerability of the population under communism, we have to look further back, to the agonizingly slow dissolution of the Ottomon Empire in Albania, the enduring political structures of Ottoman rule in the country, and the lack of a democratic period between World Wars I and II. Albania did not declare its independence until 1912, and shortly thereafter, like the rest of Europe and the Balkans, it lost years to the ravages of WWI, although neutral itself. In the interwar years, Albania experienced a short period of growth under King Zog – a former Ottoman functionary who, with the support of Italy, inaugurated a brief period of authoritarian rule in Albania. Added to the fact that there was little industrial development in the interwar years, there was no development of forms of democratization, labor or community-based organization, or of a middle class.5 The final blow to prospects for Albanian development came through the consolidation of Partisan power during WWII. In the interests of inciting insurrections against German and Italian occupiers, British and American special forces armed and trained the three primary factions battling for control of the country – the two nationalist movements, the Balle Kombetar (define) and the Loyalists supporting King Zog, and the communist Partisans. Battles that were, for allied forces, fights against axis powers were, inside of Albania, as much about winning power inside of the country as expelling the occupiers. The end result of WWII in Albania is that the Partisans won control inside of the country and effectively wiped out all viable opposition, both during the War itself and in brutal purges after the War ended. This lack of a democratric period between WW I and II and the elimination of any possible political opposition after the war were among the factors that generated a unique communist mentality in Albania. In the first place, without a dissident community or a legacy of democratic intellectual and

3 As a case in point, after the »last general election, the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI), headed by Ilir Meta, demanded and got 20% of most important public positions. Many qualified and experienced people had to leave their jobs to make room, in many cases for less qualified militants« ( ). 4 Cite Krasniqi 5 Krasniqi

Comment [l1]: Get data for numbers exiled/

imprisoned – Krasniqi cites 18%, but Imholz says

much larger percentage subject to »harsh repressive

measures« -- define clearly and cite data

cultural production inside the country6, there was little possibility for effective civil opposition to the emerging state apparatus during the formative years of the communist regime. A 1946 law forbade the establishment of any organization independent of the party (where, in the one- party system, the communist party was the only instrument of government). Laws also forbade the formation of any contracts or economic cooperation with other states as well as the free movement both inside of the country and between countries. In 1967, as part of a broad-ranging “cultural revolution“ parallel to the cultural revolution of Albania's then-ally, Communist China, religious communities were outlawed, a series of purges against the clergy carried out, and all religious institutions closed. This effectively shut down any possibility of the churches functioning as a site for social organization outside of governmental frameworks.7 As this history indicates, the notion of »civil society« did not exist as a concept in Albania. In a country in which military service was mandatory for all of the people, »civilian« meant only one who was not in the army, and the state laws criminalized the independent action of citizens in the public sphere. In fact, then, the very concept of »civil society« was crimianal, and people initiating what we understand as civil society initiatives risked imprisonment --or worse--as enemies of the state.8 After the 1985 death of Albania's dictator, Enver Hoxha, criminal prosecutions relaxed somewhat under the government of Ramiz Alia, and, by the early 90's, student groups and a small cadre of the political elite rode the wave of the changes sweeping through the Soviet bloc and forced the the government to accept political pluralism.9 However, with no conceptual frameworks and completely lacking any of the material or intellectual infrastructure with which to develop a civil society sector, there was a great deal of emotional as well as intellectual opposition to shifting from a one-party totalitarian state to a political and economic system of pluralism and free markets. As Eglantina Gjermeni, formerly the Executive Director of the Gender Alliance for Development Center and currently a Member of Parliament for the Socialist Party, describes the situation:

There was no basis from which civil society could develop. We started from scratch. The political parties were established on the same models of centralized power and control as the communist model – this is what the men organizing the new party system were trained in and it is what they repeated. Even the civil society organizations were not free from this – they had to establish from scratch something that did not exist before and they had few resources for establishing new ways of thinking, feeling, behaving. They were in the dilemma of trying to meet the new demands of the Internationals who were providing money, training, and offering Western models of political economy, but trapped in the mentality of the communist past.

After the fall of communism, the government quickly withdrew from public and individual life. The large-scale dis-investment in the public sphere under the dictates of privatization, especially in the realm of social services, left an enormous gap in which no institution or organization assumed responsibility for defining or addressing the many social problems accompanying transition – domestic and family crises of internal migration and displacement, violence against women and children, human rights abuses, sexual violence and trafficking, the increased insecurity of the individual and family in states of emergency (the Kosova war, the economic collapse and resulting civil crisis). Women were the primary actors entering the public sphere to fill the void left by the withdrawal of the state from private life. In part, women filled this gap in relation to the devastating economic changes accompanying the political upheavals of transition. Most of the big factories that were administered by the

6 Cite Krasniqi for internal development of communist mentality – note that, outside of the country, Albanians

fleeing doing extremely well – significant Albanian intellectual and cultural production outside of the country, but country’s problems compounded by the fact that the Albanian diaspora maintains ambivalent attitudes towards

Albania – attitudes corresponding to high degrees of traumatic experience inside of Albania coupled with a despair

of ever changing anything inside of Albania. 7 Cite krasniqi

8 Cite krasniqi 9 More krasniqi

communist state and closed in transition had employed women.10 Correspodingly, the sectors that dominated the new economy – construction, __ finish __ excluded women. Added to the exculsionary forces of the emerging market economy, women lost the childcare facilities formerly provided by the state as well as the educational infrastructure necessary for them and their children. Doubly disadvantaged by changes in the economic and political spheres, women were increasingly isolated in the home, responsible for the survival of children and families, with no access to training to enter the new markets. They quickly lost their positions in the public sphere, which was marked by increasing insecurity at every level, from the emergence of criminal networks and the trafficking of women and children to the health and safety risks of rapid urbanization (such as problems with sanitation, clean water supply, and unregulated traffic that are the inevitable consequence of no urban planning). These changes placed tremendous burdens on individuals and families, who had few resources for meeting either the immediate needs of survival in a cut-throat economy or the long-standing needs of family members traumatized by the human rights abuses of the communist regime.11

The Helsinki Committee was among the first International bodies to be represented in the country, through a local affiliate established in 1991. The NGO sector emerged, initially, through the women's and human rights organizations trying to provide emergency and crisis relief to those who had suffered the worst human rights violations under communism as well as to the populations most vulnerable to the economic ravages of transition. While the men were forming the political parties, women, who were responsible for the continuity of life, used the NGO sector to benefit and contribute to the developent of society and culture. Assisted by the international agencies structuring development aid, the NGOs assumed primary responsibility for basic social services, health, and welfare resulting from the government's withdrawal from the public sphere. From the point of view of the newly evolvling political parties focused on business, profit, and dominated by men who were vying for power positions in the new economic and political spheres, the NGO and civil society sector were not important. It was thus in the context of a political economy dominated by men and a market economy that brought massive unemployment with few opportunities for reeducation that women became key actors in the emerging NGO sector. Hence, there was a parallel development of political parties and NGOs: whereas the political parties were dominated by men, intricately bound to international trade and linked, therefore, to the organized crime networks so integral to the emerging political economy, the NGOs were dominated by women.

NGO development was, however, obstructed by the same problems facing the whole of society. In the early years, International organizations expended considerable time and money training NGO Directors and staff in models and practices that had, until 1991, been not only alien to the culture but, in some cases, criminal. Still struggling to adapt to a new order, NGO Directors and staff were not well equipped to advertise the importance of their work to local commuties, much less to the evolving political parties. Added to this, an extremely poor communications infrastructure (internet, telephone, fax) impeded their ability to effectively network or disseminat information, so that neither the population nor the government had a clear idea of what NGOs were operating in the country or what they were doing (Gj 16).

10

Textile kombinat in Tirana, Berat – only women working there – making fabric, textiles – for use in Albania –

small factories such as metallurgic kombinat in elbasan – big changes that excluded women from the labor force –

while men as break winners should go and look for work – construction industry employs a lot of men but women

cannot get in –whereas women stayed home, isolated, no access to training (re) to enter into the market – lost their

position in the public space, taking care of children, also loss of childcare services formerly provided by state and

educational infrastructure – increasing insecurity – after 90s grandparents have to remain close to schools, waiting

for children, fears of trafficking in humans, the increasing numbers of cars on the streets and growing urban dangers = increased burden on the family – all combine for large disinvestment of women in the economic and political

spheres

11

Note about numbers of people released from prisons, need to integrate former political prisoners, the persectured

and tortured – new burdens also of the revelation of the extent of violent repression and how to confront this when

survival had, heretofore, relied upon denial . . .

Between 1991 and 1997 --numbers of NGOs developed – . By 1997, when the economy collapsed in the aftermath of the failed pyramid schemes and widespread violence besieged the country, the focus of international aid shifted from __ name __ to __ name__. Similarly, in 1999 when the war in Kosova was flooding neighboring countries with refugees, NGO development responded to the increased emphsis on __ name_ and cite data. Over 100 new NGOs were registered following the war, in partnership with internationals to address humanitarian needs, including refugees and camp management, special needs of women and children, human rights violations, and de-mining. Interestingly, the Kosovo war also expanded the reach of NGOs beyond the urban center of Tirana and into smaller towns and villages. This rapid development and expansion of NGOs to respond to war and crisis allowed the more established NGOs to benefit from the influx of international money to broaden their impact and reach and consolidate; as a consequence, they developed institutional and bueracratic structures, including fiscal management and accountability, that were still seriously lacking in government.12

Crucially, performing this work required developing intellectual capacity and administrative structures necessary to the functioning of a state but that the political parties, having abandoned the public sphere, ignored. In the early years of transition, a group of professionals – admittedly small and not, unfortunately, characteristic of the NGO movement as a whole -- were, with the help of the International organizations providing training and resources, creating the infrastructure with which to address serious social problems. Given that women formed the backbone of the early NGO movement, several smart, active women were key players in this field. By 2002, International organizations began shifting their emphasis to policy and analysis and pressuring the government to begin capitilizing on the intellectual and human capital of the NGO sector. In 2002, the World Bank and DfiD implemented a Social Services and Delivery Project, designed as a »joint initiative between local government and NGOs. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affiars was the goverment institution responsible for the project, via the General Agency of Social Services.« Gj 22 – 23) At the same time, Citizens Advocacy Office (CAO)13 was established, and, in 2003, Mjaft, formed by the first group of young people educated outside of the country, brought new practices of community mobilizing and consciousness raising to civil society development.14

During this period – defined as the Post-Crisis and NGO Maturation period by the HDPC report, and as the third phase of civil society development by Krasniqi – there were, for the first time, coalitions for electoral monitoring, hearing sessions with NGOs in Parliament, initiatives to partner government and civil society and include the intellectual capital from the NGO sector in drafting laws. Some of the key NGOs shifted work from primarly seminars and training to concrete actions with participation of interest groups involving the general citizenry.15 In 2004, for the first time, a Government official was forced to resign in the wake of public protest against his use of violence against a journalist.16

Significantly, during this time key personnel from the NGO community were involved in task forces and working groups responsible for designing new laws as well as improving existing laws. Indeed, legislation on reproductive health, the law on NGO developent, the family code, and the laws on domestic violence and gender equality were largely the result of NGOs and ministries working collaboratively (cite data from GTZ report on this).17 The NGO sector has also been largely responsible for training (of policy makers, lawyers, advocates, media representatives, local government staff), media campaigns, and raising public awareness about the new laws. NGO-led public awareness campaigns have been especially important in mobilizing community pressure on the government. For example, -year - for the first time in Albania, NGOs circulated a petition in support of the law on domestic violence; they gathered 20,000 signatures, and the petition was presented to the Albanian

12

Cite krasniqi 13 At the time, the CAO – define what it did. Now, it operates primarily as a watch dog organization, particulary for

corruption in the judiciary (GJ 24). 14 Explain relation between Mjaft and Office for Protection of Citizens 1515

Krasniqi, GJ, and GTZ report, and HD report -- cite 16 Details of this case 17 Krasniqi, GTZ

Comment [l2]: we should mention somwhere that

last years NGO-s have been more involved in

desinging national stratgies, their implem,entation

and monitoring.. it is a result of international donros

and organizations requirements, level of

development of civil society, its expertise, etc, as

well as willinges of state structures to see Ngos as

partners..

parliament.18 In 2005, the Network of Open Society in Albania was established, and the sector seemed poised to make a genuine contribution to civil society and the political sphere.

As important as these gains are, they have been hard-won and fragile. The HDPC report defines 2005 as the beginning of the NGO slippage period, and it is this slippage with which we are especially concerned here. Both historical and contextual factors impact the deterioration of the sector. Historically, the political sphere and the NGO sector evolved simultaneously on non-intersecting, parallel trajectories characterized by opposition and distrust. From the beginning, the government saw NGOs as opposition – they were getting funding from International Organizations, and the funding was frequently for addressing issues – such as human rights abuses and corruption in the political sphere – that directly challenged the functioning of the government. Added to that, in the first years of transition, NGO Directors and staff, funded according to the wage and benefits policies of International organizations, initially had better salaries than government officials.19 From the other direction, NGOs have been – and continue to be – critical of failures in the government's responsibility to civil society. This distrust and animosity is futher complicated by perceptions of corruption on both sides. All sectors of society perceive both government and NGO personnel to be stealing and/ or misusing funds, using their positions for personal gain, and accomplishing nothing on behalf of the people for whom they purport to work20. This adverserial relationship has made it difficult for the governemnt to see NGOs as partners or to capitilize on the intellectual capital of the NGO sector.

Perhaps more crucially, though, a convergence of situational factors drastically impacted NGO development after 2005. Many of the activist and watchdog NGO leaders from the 2002 – 2005 growth period »became members of parliament or took high government positions, including ministerial positions« (HPDC page #).21 This shift created the dual problems of, on the one hand, leaving a void in NGO leadership, and, on the other, allowing newly minted government officials to use their former NGOs22 as tools for their poltical parties and ambitions. Simultaneously, »important NGO financial supporters cut their funding,« including key Danish and Dutch organizations (list these). The World Bank SSDP ended, and USAID shiftied its funding priorities to goverment anti-corruption reforms. At the same time, the UNDP, the umbrella organization for funding in the country, faced funding deficiences from the limited number of bilateral donors operating in the country, and the EU, »the largest development donor in Albania, did not fill the gap because of a diministed focus on civil society services« Finally the OSFA funds decreased substantially as part of OSFA strategy for the region (HDPC 27).23

By 2005, then, the number of member organizations in the ACAD dropped by 70%; what began as a __ define __ turned into an essentially nonfunctioning body with nothing more than a Steering Committee. Similarly, severe friction in the ACCA – define – dissolved that organization, the Citizens' Advocacy Offices CAO cut activity and shifted focus to research (28), and the pervasive problems of »corruption, bad governance, unemployment, [and] poverty« left the state »incapable of providing solutions« (citation) to any of the problems on which civil society organizations had been working. Parallel to all of this, the potential for research from the emerging think tanks was undercut by the appropriation of think tanks into party politics. Roughly 70% of the research and policy NGOs were established between 1997 – 2001. Many of the men engaged in the post-communist formation of

18 Gjermeni 19

The salary disparity was quickly closed as the restructuring of public administration in __get dates and cite source

_ increased salaries for the political class, especially in the ministries. 20 Cite corruption studies and add: ghost NGOs, NGOs as political party tools, NGOs created and funded in 24

hours 21 This issue of civil society leaders moving into government is extremely fraught in Albania. The international

community, who perceived the move of Western-educated civil society actors into the formal governmental

structures as a positive development, failed to understand the pervasive legacy of the one-party, authoritarian regime on cultural and political psychology in Albania: the demand for party loyalty; the degree to which civil

society organizations operated on the same principles of authoritarian power exercised by an un-challenged

charismatic leader that characterized the former regime; the – finish points -- 2222

Indeed, it is quite common for political officials moving from civil society into politics to retain their salaries,

positions, and control over NGOs that they started. 23 Define this shift in strategy

political parties left (or were forced out of) public administration because of »the pressure on elected politicians to public servants, the poor quality of officials entereing government institutions, the increased presense of militants in the state apparatus, and the frequent change of civil servants« (__ source 22). Many of them went on to found think tank institutes« ( 22), which, today, comprise 90% of Albania's total research and policy institutions.

These shifts were extremely detrimental to processes of democratization in Albania. Think Tanks became, in effect, an extension of party politics: the research and analysis produced by think tanks is not only not independent and not available for public debate, but rather part of the propoganda machinery of the highly contentious political sphere. Indeed, »the open affiliation of many think tank leaders to political parties and their involvement in government bodies in 2005 was considered a contributing factor towards the weakening of the third sector in Albania« (sources page). Endemic structural problems – systemic, political, psychological factors

The legacy of distrust and animosity thwarting the relationship between the NGO sector and the political sphere is further complicated by the problems of donor dependency. Currently, there are 11 multilateral donars (accounting for 58% of foregin aid) and 23 bilateral donors operating in Albania. The European Union and the World Bank are the two largest multilateral donors, and Italy, Germany, Japan, the United States and the Netherlands are the five largest bilateral donors(GTZ 8). With the help of International donors, NGOs have seeded human rights, media, and research initiatives (8), but donor dependency makes NGOs adapt projects to »objectives of donors rather than the priorities and needs fo the country« (GTZ 7). Donor dependent and donor driven, the NGO sector »remains weak and unorganised«.

It is important to note the international complicty in the structural, systemic, organizational problems within NGO operations and obstructing NGO impact on civil society. Because activities remain donor driven, those NGOs that are in fact working on behalf of development (and not as an arm of a political party) are forced to respond to requests for proposals, to understand international funding priorities and country agendas, and to shape projects that fit the agendas of specific donating organizations. In fact, International organizations invested substantial money in the early 90s socializing an[?] NGO elite in these agendas. An analysis of the yearly reports of the Gender Alliance for Development Center24, for example, reveals that the first two years of its work focused on what are in effect socialization functions, i.e., learning the discourse, genres, and norms of the European Union. From 1995 – 1997, a substantial portion of the Center's work inlcuded English-language training, translating documents, teaching aspiring civil-sector workers the genres and norms for writing grant proposals, and providing workshops on the mechanisms of funding (including explaining donors' country missions and priorities, defining projects and matching projects to funding entitities, training in project proposal development and grant writing). From 1995 – 1997, we see the Center staff mastering the language of development and adopting its genres, discourses, and norms to such an extent that the Center becomes a primary locus for socializing emerging institutions and entities. In 1997, NGO Management was added to the Center's list of activities, and staff began to offer the country's first trainings for NGO boards and steering committees. While the socialization has the substantial advantage of developing intellectual capacity and international standards, it stymies the creative intellectual force of the very elites on whom so much money and energy has been expended. As noted earlier with the examples of funding priorities for trafficking, refugees, and corruption, NGOs capable of targeting the current fashion in funding receive more project grants and grow an institutional capacity centered around donor-funded projects rather than their own project design. Instead of being able to use their understanding of social issues and intervention strategies to define problems, design projects, grow coalitions, and evolve sustainable long-term projects, they are forced to use all of their energy in a perpetual cycle of writing grants to fund short-term projects (generally, product-oriented projects are funded for only one – two years), and writing annual reports justifying thier use of donor money.

24 What is now known as the GADC was founded in 1995 ast[?] The Women's Center.

Comment [l3]: check accuracy and cite source

Comment [l4]: many times there are short

terms...

I think we should mention Soros Foudnation Open

society Institute, Albania who has signifcanlty has

supported civil society establishment and

development in Albania...

Also dutch donors like NOVIB and Cordaid have

supported signifcanlty women and human rights

organizations and toehter organziations and hasve

encourgaed networking..

This problem of being stuck at the level of report-writing is crucial. In addition to the fact that projects are not sustainable, both because of limitations on what kinds of services and activities can be funded and because funding is for short periods of time – the report-writing genre traps NGOs into reciting data and outcomes for the donating agency. In other words, knowledge production is severely circumscribed: data reporting, outcomes, and conclusions are written primarily for the funding agency, circulated primarily through project-specific conferences, workshops, and training venues. There is no culture of knowledge production through which large-scale or long-term analysis of related projects can yield sophisticated analysis and intepretation; consequently, the ability of NGO staff to function as analysts and researchers able to define and design long-term, sustainable projects is severely limited (and, as already noted, those NGOs founded as think tanks are by and large in the service of party politics).

This limitation is exacerbated by the related problems of lack of donor coordination and the fierce competition for limited funds. Effectively coordinatig multi- and bilateral project funding requires that analysts within donating organizations know the history of funded projects in their priority areas, design funding priorities that build off of prior successful projects so as to grow long-term, sustainable iniatives that evolve from »projects« to effective structures, systems, and practices, and cooperate amongst themselves to share information, analyze effectiveness, and strategically evolve the NGO sector from donor-dependency to institionalized and autonomous entities. Currently, such practices are not in place. What's more, turf battles and ideological splits between donating organizations often result in project overlap and redundancy as well as gaps in identifying needed projects—cite source for this, give examples. Finally, donor dependency pits NGOs against each other in a battle to win projects. Because NGOs exist only by virtue of winning funding, they have to closely guard ideas (otherwise they risk giving fundable ideas to other organizations and so lose in the project competition). Hence, in addition to projects being short-term and hence not sustainable, the intellectual resources of the NGO sector remain divided and not able to effectively collaborate. Once a project is funded, it is extremely difficult to collaborate as the funding formulas do not pay for the overhead of collaboration costs. Given that international aid has already started drying up in Albania, these problems are becoming worse, not better.25

The end result of this nexus of donor-dependent problems, on the one hand, and NGOs appropriated into the political machinery of the state, on the other, is a »fragile NGO landscape« that deals primarily in awareness campaigns and capacity developent« (GTZ 7). Of the 800 registered NGOs in Albania, only 450 are functionally operational, and of those, only a few have sound financial management plans (GTZ 7). There are no mechanisms for helping even the best-functioning of NGOs to build sustainability (with, for example, training in forming partnerships with businesses, seeking alternative funding sources, or seriously faciliting the governmental and nongovernmental cooperations that would bring the expertise, best practices, and intellectual capital of the NGO sector to the governmental sector.2627

In a first serious attempt to intervene in this situation, in November 2006 the German {? IT'S NOT ALBANIAN] Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) started its project “Strengthening Civil Society and Democratic Structures in Albania.” Implemented by GTZ, the project aimed to assist the government in building »an institutional and legal framework in order to promote and strengthen active political involvement of civil society« (GTZ #). Following a top-down rather than a bottom-up approach, the CoM, in October 2006, sent a draft law to Parliament on this subject; in March 2009 »the Parliament approved the law and its by-laws which institutionalize the establishment of the Civil Soceity Agency under the CoM, as the responsible party for the administration of the Fund« (17)

The Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Civil Society Support Agency (CSSA) is a first attempt to address the difficulties inhibiting the development of a proactive civil society sector. A

25 Sum up this history of withdrawal 26

http://www.tacso.org/doc/Newsletter,%20Volume%201,%20Issue%202,%20Albania.pdf 27 USAID, NGO Sustainability Index 2008 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 2009, page 46 – from GTZ report

Comment [l5]: Cut this – very redundant . ..

Comment [la6]: :

fundamental aim of the CSSA is “to encourage the sustainable development of civil society and the creation of favourable conditions for civic initiatives for the good of and in the interest of the public.”28 For accomplishing its mission, the CSSA offers financial assistance for programmes that encourage and strengthen the sustainability of non-profit organisations, inter-sector and international cooperation, civic initiatives, philanthropy, volunteerism and democratic institutions of society as well as other programmes that facilitate the fulfilment of its mission. The history leading up to this law and the current state of functioning crystallizes the obstacles confronting efforts to promote democratization in Albania through third sector routes. While the law was passed in 2008, it did not go into effect for several years because the government lacked the necessary structures to implement it. While the law itself did define the necessary implementing structures, it took two years to put these in place. Cite official law number and date and read this. In 2010, the Agency for the Support of Civil Society (ASCS) became operational and launched the first call for proposals, completing the first selection process in the fall. . . . In the first round of funding, several NGOs receiving funding were supported or directed by board members of the ASCS; the organization receiving the largest grant was founded and formerly directed by the current ASCS head« (jNIT-2011 Albania; Nations in Transition by Gledis Gjipali 10)29.

It’s not just that the current instantiation of this law lacks teeth, then, it is also that, like almost everything else in Albania, it is subject to party politicization, clientelism, and outright corruption.30 Some of the most pressing immediate problems include: lack of a clear funding mechanism or criteria by which proposed projects will be solicited, evaluated, monitored, and assessed; lack of clear relationship between governmental and nongovernmental institutions, agendas, and goals. Interestingly, during the GTZ project implementation, NGO participants defined these needs and worked hard to develop a plan to address them. __Tina – describe consultant that GTZ brought in and the work you did with focus groups __. The team conceptualized the Charter of Civil Society, which would “outline the duties and responsibilities for NGOs, the obligations of the state towards NGOs and how NGOs should operate. It would also determie the relationshp between NGOs and government and between NGOs themselves as well as define the legal and administrative requirements that should be in place for NGOs to receive state funding« (citatition). In its conceptualization, this »charter would be a prelude for the law of the civil Society Fund and would complement the law in that it would provide a basis for establishing good practice and strengthen governance. . . the development of a charter of the civil society was identified as an important step in regulating the tasks of NGOs and in creatiing a framework for establishing relations between state and civil society« (citation).

The GTZ project »supported the task force in appointing a working group with representatives of civil society and goverment to draft such a charter . . . the draft of the charter of the civil society was finally presented in a round Table for representatives of the government on national level, civil society and the donor community in December 2009« (citation). Tina's comments then edit this GTZ quote: . . . it is still unclear how ciivl society will ratify the charter as there is still no ubrella organization acting on behalf of the overall civil society. However, representatives from civil society recommended in the meeting that the document should be finally approved by the parliament« (18). Tina's comments – disappeared and nobody knows anything about it now.

Current state of affairs and directions for the future

28 For brief background on this see the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Albania adopts law to create

Agency for Supporting Civil Society,: http://www.icnl.org/KNOWLEDGE/news/2009/04-03.htm; Need a citation

for this law 29

Rumors suggest that the funds were politically distributed for NGO-s that were used for local

elections of 2011 and the board elected members were supportes of Berisha and the democratic

party (get other evidence) 30

From p. 58 – support for the fact that arbitrary investigation, auditing, taxing, and threats = climate of extreme fear and subject to coercion . . .

As important as the Civil Society Agency and the Law on the Functioning of Civil Society are, we have to ask how much faith we can have in a “political committment” when the political sphere is marked by corruption, rhetorical (and sometimes physical) violence, and clientelism? What are the realistic possibilities for the Charter of Civil society in a highly politicized environment in which the bribing of public officials, abuse of tenders, purchasing of positions, formation of monopolies on basic goods, discriminatary application of laws and taxes against competitors, illegal funding of poltical parties, and outright theft of state property and revenue?« (GTZ 8). High Officials, including ministers and judges, have immunity against prosecution, therefore no investigation or prosecution of high level corruption has been possible; lifing immunity would require constitutional changes, an unlikely (citation).

Krasniqi, in his otherwise superb analysis of the development of civil society in Albania, argues that Albania is in the third phase of civil society development. These developmental phases common to the transitional processes in the formerly communist countries of Southeastern Europe and the Balkans include a first phase in which civil society is understood as individual and group initiatives critical towards the government; a second phase in which civil society agents play important roles in the political sphere (where, not part of party politics, they are not trapped in the polarization and divisiveness of the politcal terrain); and a third phase in which civil society assumes a (admittedly utopian) role of linking the governmental and private spheres.31 While it is certainly true, as Ambassador Jensen says, that, after more than 20 years of democracy, »Albania can no longer claim to be in transition,« (Citation), the country is nowhere near developing the poltical or economic stability that would characterize the third phase of civil society development. Most crucially, the absence of a rule of law leaves actors in both the governmental and the nongovernmental sector subject to highly destructive arbitrary actions. Two of the most immediate examples of this include changing election laws (briefly summarize) and the still un-investigated killings of 4 demonstrators in the January 2011 opposition protests against corruption in the _ briefly summarize_. These are but two of the most pressing cases of a generalized lawlessness that inludues:

Politicians trying to interfere in the Public Prosecutor’s activities; judges being scrutinized according to political criteria in Parliament, leading to less qualified judges being appointed; the legal system being notoriously known for corruption and thus “strange” verdicts; the President being chosen by the majority in Parliament, and not by the public; there are numerous examples of the powers that be, trying to pressure institutions, even publicly, that are supposed to be independent; “the fourth power”, the press, is pressured both openly and in subtle ways and the editorial content is exposed to economic interest. Lastly, but not least: positions that should be professional and neutral are held by political militants, etc. (Check accuracy of quote and cite Danish Ambassador's interview) As Raner and Ule note in their analysis of nationalism and gender in post-socialist societies,

given the “long-term lack of a civil society and of a modern, relatively autonomous, private and public sphere in socialist societies, we cannot expect that in the few years since socialism began to collapse a modern civil society . . . would emerge” (123). Nevertheless, Albania's development lags significantly behind their neighbors.32 The devastating consequences of problems with privatization specific to Albania cannot be overstated, and these problems are significant obstacles to developing civil society and make it extremely difficult for intellectual capital of the civil society sector to have any real impact on the government.33 As noted, however, in the Human Development and Promotion Center Study

31 Cite Krasniqi – Eglantina, can you provide a translation of key points of this argument and cite page #? 32 that period Estonia moved from extreme disparity to being a full-fledged and prosperous member of the EU. Why not Albania? – sum up progress of others – link Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro in comparative analysis here 33 And, while trafficking (in humans as well as goods) and endemic corruption (most notably in the construction industries WHY NOTABLY IN THE CONTRUCTION INDUSTRIES? IT IS ACTUALLY NOT AS BAD IN CONSTRUCTION AS ELESWHERE] are regional problems, the uncontrolled construction in Albania –

Commissioned by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Albania is more approrpiately defined as in a period of slippage, a fourth phase of that marks, not advancement, but decline »characterized by poor relations with the government, weak governing structures within NGOs, low financial sustainability, lack of training and low volunteering rates, and poor knowledge of EU systems.34

As we are moving from an international-aid funded NGO structure to the evolution of a non-profit sector, we need to be strategizing structures and mechanisms for coordinating governmental, private enterprise, and individual initiatives for a common public good. This requires a sustained, systematic re-evaluation of the differences between NGO structures as they have existed over the last twenty years and the role that the non-profit sector needs to evolve over the next decade of Albania’s development. Our crucial questions include: 1. What is the relationship among state, municipality, private enterprise, and the nonprofit sector? 2. How do we evolve structural alignments in each of these sectors that work together to advance

health, welfare, and economic development? 3. How do we define standards, enact quality assurance and accountability measures, and asses and

evaluate initiatives? 4. How do we develop protocols that are transferable and consistent in quality of service? Without these things, we risk an unregulated grocery-store model of social services, where we can pull anything off the shelf, what is available from one day to the next changes, and some products are vastly inferior to others.

The picture is not simply doom and gloom, though. Albania has, in fact, been developing an extensive knowledge base and institutional capacity for democratic structures. Using the GADC as a case study representative of the kinds of work NGOs have been doing to build civil society, we see that the NGO sector, with the backing of the International community, has been developing the capacities necessary for formal governmental structures in a democracy to work. Mapping the shift in the scope and nature of the Center's work from its inception in 1995, we see the processes by which the Center has developed evaluation and assessment strategies, protocols for rigorous research methodology and analysis, effective and efficient project implementation, an insistence on standards and measurable results, and quality monitoring, evaluation, and assessment of projects. As an institution conducting comprehensive research, analysis, and education/training initiatives, it provides a model of self-governing structures, domestic and international outreach and collaboration strategies, rigorous standards, and practices of transparency and accountability. Its emphasis on policy, strategy, and analysis, with an emphasis on future-oriented activism, particulary relating to the EU integration process, and cooperative work across political divides (working, for example, with the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities on the national strategy and action plan against domestic violence).

1. How, given the problems outlined in the political sphere, do we bring the intellectual capital of the NGO sector to the our formal governmental structures? [EGLANTINA'S INSIGHTS WOULD CERTAINLY BE INTERESTING HERE!]

2. How can the Agency for the Support of Civil Society, given its limitations, facilitate this transfer of knowledge and practice from the NGO sector to the formal governmental structures?

and with it, the impossibility of developing sound urban planning, including for basic services such as sewage treatment, sanitation, and clean water supply) is quickly ruining Albania's coastline and prospects for the tourist industy that might have been so valuable for its economy. 34

From »Third Sector Development in Albania: Challenges and Opportunities.« Prepared by the Human Development Promotion Centre, Lead Authors Dr. Lindita Xhillari and Dr. Ylli Çabiri, Survey Lead Expert

Armand Frangu. Prepared within the framework of the Project »Building from Within: Reuniting Europe by

Strengthening and Connecting its third sector. Financed by thhe Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and

implemented by Euclid Network ad its partners in Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro. NEED DATE The report

defines 1991 – 1996, Crisis years 1997 – 2001, Post Crisis and NGOs Maturation Period 2002 – 2005, and a

slippage period degenerating from 2005 through the current period. P.5

At its most basic level, we are asking: what kind of a state can form when we have a fundamental and unresolved contradiction between the old communist and evolving market paradigms? A corollary set of questions for us, then is:

1. How can state and non-state actors (private enterprise, individual-family-community, private foundations) build effective partnerships? How can these be structured?

2. How do we understand all of the above in terms of development of state infrastructure (sanitation, water supply, food quality and assurance, telecommunications, education, health, social services, “soft” services for children, minorities, “protection”)

USAID NGO Sustainability Index http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/ European Commission Country Progress Reports http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm The british survey couldn't get NGOs to answer questions about donors as competition for donors is so high . . . p. 8 For brief background on this see the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Albania adopts law to create Agency for Supporting Civil Society,: http://www.icnl.org/KNOWLEDGE/news/2009/04-03.htm; Need a citation for this law Appendix I Timeline

1995 Legally registered in 1995 as The Women's Center Objective: Social, legal, health problems

Outreach to villages

Address changed reality of young girls and women

Reproductive health

Training of NGO sector for developing projects, raising funds, dealing with social, legal, and health issues

Focus on legal and health groups

1996 Continued with missions and objectives of 1995

Added Women in Balkans Project

Added Women in Business 1997 Continued with objectives and Mission of 95 and 96

Shows clear signs of Insitutionalization:

First self reflective history

Program Structure: o Documentation and Information Center (library, gender statistics

database, NGO database, media monitoring, publications [brochures, leaflets, newsletters, posters, reports])

o Project Implementation Center o Coordination and Assistance to Women's NGOs o Gender oriented observation and survey center

NGO movement grows to such an extent that a training was organized for the boards / steering committees of NGOs -- first of its kind ever conducted

Adds NGO management to the list of activities

Translatioin assistance for NGO project proposals

Strengthened cooperation of the Womends Center with Educational Institutions Crisis refocused the mission of the Women's Center on Human Rights

Increased participation of women in conflict resolution: o Contribution that women as wives, mothers and sisters could make for

the voluntary hand over of arms o Increased international work – working with groups in Poland and Italy,

inter-Balkan conference on legal strategies related to violence against women, building bridges among women in the Balkans

1998 An increased focus on influencing the development of social policies on women's issues:

developing alternatives for community involvement, and

establishing institutional links and dialogues with legislative and educational institutions

Center staff and partners receive training on gender issues Sees a more sophisticated understanding of relationship between corporate structures, enviroment, sustainability and violence

Increased international work with Kosovar women and peace initiatives First training for the establishment of state mechanisms for Women (MPs, members of government)

Set up working groups with the Albanian government on new family code

Defined the need for state investment in services to victims of family violence – becomes a new emphasis of the Women's center

1999 Kosova crisis prominent:

Establish regional training center, counseling and trauma services, Kosovar camp assistance, training programs for women of Kosova, emergency relief projects

Adds refugee rights and protection and rape as a war crime to Center Objectives

Center staff and partners continue receiving training on gender issues

2000 Continuation of 97 – 99 objectives

Adds Addressing Acute issues in society to mission

Regional Training Center continues in Albania and establishes additional Center in Kosova

Begins first trainings on gender, utililizing knowledge base achieved from 98 and 99 staff and partner trainings

2001 Mission and the Center Goals become standardized

Provides training for trainers on gender issues (includes advanced training of trainers)

Extends international networks: Practical access to democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – 2 year project

Begins strengthening institutions – Albanian network against gender violence, global strategies, Southeast European leadership initiative Begins first anti-trafficking projects

2002 Focuses on International Standards and self assessment and evaluation Develops an internet presence

2003 Increased emphasis on developing assessment and evaluation measures

Focus on Public Administration and Training Courses

Increased emphasis on increasing women's participation in the political sphere Collaborates with the Albanian Center on the Education of Peace and Disarmament on sensitizing training courses in Gramsch and Shkodra

2004 10th year of operation Changes name to Gender Alliance for Development Center *AHA! SO “as” IS THE RIGHT WORD ABOVE]

Focuses on importance of methodology of research, analysis, and project implementation

Strong emphasis on standards, measurable results, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, professionalism, and international standards, effectiveness and efficiency

Focus on accounting and auditing —transparency

Emphasis on cultivating human resources Training of teachers – begins gender integration in educational systems; training methodology focuses on interactive, collaborative, project-based, active and action-oriented techniques, flexible and adaptive, adult learners Gender integration in public policies and focus on increasing women's participation in politics

First report in Albania on gender and agriculture

Focues on identifyzing new strategies for eliminating domestic violence, understanding scope of sexual abuse of children

Continues anti-trafficking work

Emphasizes national, regional, and international networks

Focus on consolidation of network of interest groups

Regional seminar on minority issues Email becomes an information dissemination medium

2005 Licenced June 30 by Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs as a resource center on gender issues

Introduces gender equality in relation to European integration '—reviewed national strategies from gender perspective (migration, employment and vocational training, social insurance and social services, pre-university education strategy)

National Reports with recommendtion for government and EU – monitoring equal opportunity and monitoring legal framework on gender equality (regional project)

Continue women in leadership and decision making (includes all political parties)

Consolidates tradition of 16 Days of activities to stop violence against women Nov. 25 – Dec. 10

Begins gender analysis of elementary school textbooks

2006 Increasing emphasis on EU integration

Study on Representation and the Quality of Democracy in Albania – a gender perspective

Launches GAIA – magazine on gender issues that establishes and supports a network of journalists, sociologists, and activists engaged in gender mainstreaming

Gender resource package for future teachers (elementary schools)

Evolves empowerment of students through information and training programs to enter labor market successfully

Launch the national strategy and action plan against domestic violence

Project creating economic opportunities for women in Albania: a strategy to prevent trafficking

2007 Summer school: Gender Equality and European Integration Continues Empowering Women and Girls- information and training

Call for papers – publishes To Be a Woman in Albania . . . After 90s Focus on transparency of NGO and public trust

Gender and Budgeting – Best practices

As part of the Albanian Network Against Gender Violence, launches the 2 year project “Making it Real: Implementing the Law Against Domestic Violence in Albania”

Addresses violence as a public health issue 2008 Implements mainstreaming Gender Equality into SDC programs in Albania

Continues gender-sensitive elementary and secondary school training Implements Making it Real – works with public, private, and nonprofic sectors to pilot domestic violence referral services

Endrit: this was my understanding as of May 2010 – update me please!! For accomplishing its mission, the CSSA [OR ASCS, IF THE USE THE INITIALS AS YOU SPELL OUT THE NAME ABOVE\35 offers financial assistance for programmes that encourage and strengthen the sustainability of non-profit organisations, inter-sector and international cooperation, civic initiatives, philanthropy, volunteerism and democratic institutions of society as well as other programmes that facilitate the fulfilment of its mission. While important in concept, the current instantiation of the law lacks teeth. For example, it does not define a funding mechanism or criteria by which proposed projects will be solicited, evaluated, monitored, and assessed, nor does it define a clear relationship between governmental and nongovernmental institutions, agendas, and goals. As we are moving from an international-aid funded NGO structure to the evolution of a non-profit sector, we need to be strategizing structures and mechanisms for coordinating governmental, private enterprise, and individual initiatives for a common public good.

o How staffed? o How is it tasked to operate? o What is the hierarchy – under what ministry? Reporting to whom? o With what kind of support? o Explain the procedures for applying to external funding bodies, the procedures

according to which the government is to match funds, o the vision for what will be funded and to what end/ with what effec/t impact – o when is the first RFP from this agency anticipated to go out? -- how will the priorities

for funding/ theme of call be determined? o who sits on a review board, how are project proposals to be evaluated?

35

For brief background on this see the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Albania adopts law to create

Agency for Supporting Civil Society,: http://www.icnl.org/KNOWLEDGE/news/2009/04-03.htm; Need a citation

for this law [I HAVE IT, BUT NOT HERE IN THE US, SORRY! AND I THINK IT'S A VERY BAD LAW...]]

o guarantees of transparancy -- risks of clientelism/ corruption? o Information on the Charter of Civil Society --

GDP growth 2000 – 2008 = 4.6 Billion euro/ 2001 to 8.7 billion #uro 2008; 2008 ration of external assistance to GDP was 3.65% (8)

Largest donor in media and civil society sector = USAID, the EU, Germany, Swededn, and Netherlands; (9)

Albania's National Strategy for Development and Integration 2007 – 2012 is a 'second generation PRSP«

2011 rank on the Human develoment index? 2009 = 70 (6)

65% of journalists work in black market with no contract . . . example = district court of Tirana fined Top Channel 400,000 Euro for »violating the privacy of former Minister of Culture Ylli Pango after the TV outlet caused a scandal by airing a tape in which the minister requested sexual favors« (60)

I want to trace for a moment one specific example of the impotence of civil society in the face of corruption intertwining government, private enterprise, and international players. _ Sum up World Bank scandal from last year where World Bank guy and Berisha's son illegally developing Jal __. In a matter as crucial to the civil society sector as the devastation of individuals' homes and lives, the destruction of coastal zones, environmental contamination, and __finish my rant __, what agency can the »citizen« exercise against the combined forces of the World Bank and the Prime Minister's family? [BUT THE WORLD BANK FELT VERY BAD ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AND AT LEAST THEY HIRED LAWThis is but one example of many in which politicians not only fail to take responsibility for the stewardship of the country, but, in fact, are primary actors in the »wholesale destruction of Albania’s best treasures. It is really very, very sad to watch« (Danish Ambassador).

Most donor countries are facing huge financial problems and have had to take a very, very hard look at how money is spent. Albania can no longer claim to be a transitional country. Albania had its best chance. Unfortunately, its political class too often did not use it wisely. The brutal reality is that it is more than ever up to the Albanians themselves to catch up. study the interaction between civil society and the political forces operating at different levels of a state. In this respect this issue aims at re-charting the relationships between civil society, international donors and the state in order to explore two questions: 1) what are the limits of democracy promotion strategies that target civil society as the main actor in the socio-political transition of a country? 2) what are the factors that allow civil society to play a role in effective pluralisation and democratization of a country ?