ngo counterplan for debate

ngo counterplan page 1 of 98zag scholars

NGO COUNTERPLAN and indexNGO COUNTERPLAN and index................... 1

NGO CP Shell...................................................... 5

***NGO Solvency............................................................................................................................ 7

NGO’s Solve..................................................................................................................................... 8Uganda proves, NGOs reach the poor far better than the government or private organizations...............8NGOs are uniquely effective advocates for disempowered groups............................................................8NGO’s solve better than military forces – NGO’s build neutral relationships that better solve forpeace..............................................................................................................................................................9NGO’s solvency..........................................................................................................................................10NGO’s create a broader system of peace and are the only actor that can do so.......................................11NGO’s solve better because of autonomy from the state..........................................................................12NGO’s solve from a bottom-up approach..................................................................................................13Peacekeeping missions can’t solve without NGO’s..................................................................................14NGO’s need independent credibility to solve............................................................................................15NGOs solve war and other stuff.................................................................................................................16NGOs solve best .........................................................................................................................................17Local people-level connections make NGO solvency superior ................................................................17

NGOs solve the economy.............................................................................................................. 18Economic instability can be ameliorated by NGO gap-filling..................................................................18

Activism solvency .......................................................................................................................... 19NGOs empower individual activism..........................................................................................................19

Human rights solvency ................................................................................................................. 20Human rights are an ideal organizing principle for NGOs .......................................................................20Human rights are a primary NGO focus....................................................................................................20NGOs inspired wide-scale human rights monitoring................................................................................21NGO’s are critical to the human rights movement....................................................................................21

NGOs are key to civil society ....................................................................................................... 23NGOs are key to civil society ....................................................................................................................23

Most NGOs are gap-fillers ........................................................................................................... 24Most NGOs are gap-fillers .........................................................................................................................24

NGOs gap-filling solves ................................................................................................................ 25NGOs are critical to fill gaps in government social service provision .....................................................25

NGOs solve fundability................................................................................................................. 26Aid to governments will be misused, it should be given directly to NGOs .............................................26

NGOs decrease regime corruption.............................................................................................. 27NGOs are effective political watchdogs ....................................................................................................27IFIs use NGOs as tools for political pressure on regimes receiving aid...................................................27

*** Solve Specific Areas/Things.................................................................................................. 28

NGO’s Solve Congo ...................................................................................................................... 29Private military firms should be deployed to the Congo...........................................................................29

A.I.D.S. solvency............................................................................................................................ 30NGOs are implementing successful programs to stop HIV......................................................................30

NGO solve democratization ......................................................................................................... 31


NGOs are a force for democratization and economic liberalization ........................................................31NGOs are schools for democracy ..............................................................................................................31

Environment solvency .................................................................................................................. 32NGOs in the Horn solve environmental issues better than the governments ...........................................32

NGOs solve feminism.................................................................................................................... 33Women’s NGOs are inclusive and more effective than government organizations ................................33

NGOs solve poverty ...................................................................................................................... 34In poverty alleviation programs, NGOs are superior to government action ............................................34

***Private Corporations Solvency.............................................................................................. 35

Private Corporations Solve.......................................................................................................... 36Private corporations solve – empirically proven .......................................................................................36Private corporations solve – international support ....................................................................................36Private corporations solve strategically unimportant conflicts .................................................................36Private corporations solve better than UNPKO’s......................................................................................37Private corporations solve humanitarian aid..............................................................................................37Private corporations solve rapid reaction force .........................................................................................38Private corporations solve genocide ..........................................................................................................39Private corporations solve genocide ..........................................................................................................39Private forces solve the lack of commitment to solving genocide............................................................39Private corporations solve failed states......................................................................................................40Private forces solve conflict in Africa .......................................................................................................41Private security companies are key to avoid over-extension of armies and executing optimizedpeacekeeping operations.............................................................................................................................42Private peacekeeping avoids the downfalls of U.N. intervention and effective peacekeeping. ..............43

***Answers to UN solves.............................................................................................................. 44UN forces further conflicts – NGO’s are neutral ......................................................................................45

***Answers to the Perm............................................................................................................... 46Cooperation between states and NGO’s lead to state control of the organization...................................46NGO’s can only work independently ........................................................................................................46Cooperation leads to cooption....................................................................................................................47Cooperation between states and NGO’s lead to state control of the organization...................................48UN and private corporation’s forces can’t cooperate together .................................................................48Private forces/NGO’s avoid politics ..........................................................................................................49Governments will attempt to intervene with NGO independence. ...........................................................49

***NGO’s better than the UN ..................................................................................................... 50NGO’s are oriented towards conflict resolution and not towards politics ...............................................50NGO’s have more legitimacy than traditional peacekeepers....................................................................50NGO’s mediate conflicts better than states ...............................................................................................51Private forces have been training than UN forces .....................................................................................51Private forces save money..........................................................................................................................52

*** UN Peacekeepers Bad............................................................................................................ 53Government sponsored peacekeeping is based on a form of coercion and zero-sum interests ...............53Formalized peacekeeping doesn’t represent the interests of the people...................................................54State actors (the UN) can’t compromise with warring parties – peacekeeping fails ...............................55

***Answers To............................................................................................................................... 56

Answers to: No accountability..................................................................................................... 57Market forces keep the firms in line ..........................................................................................................57Private forces will not comply with illegal operations..............................................................................57


AT: Aid dependence bad.............................................................................................................. 58Aid is key to keep NGOs independent from corrupting market forces ....................................................58Market reliance decreases NGO community empowerment ....................................................................60

******AFF ANSWERS................................................................................................................ 61

NGOs bad....................................................................................................................................... 611. NGOs can’t solve: 9 reasons .................................................................................................................612. Giving development assistance to NGOs causes aid pathology; increased poverty and publicrejection result.............................................................................................................................................613. Ending aid to NGOs will force the government to provide for social services, or face political andsocial upheaval............................................................................................................................................62

Aid Dependence DA.......................................... 63Aid will continue to decrease in coming decades. NGOs must become independent. ...........................63

Aid Dependence DA.......................................... 64Despite short-term problems, cutting aid now will improve the transition to aid independence ............64

Decreased aid good ........................................... 65Decreasing aid to NGOs allows them to focus on political empowerment..............................................65Decreasing aid is good. NGOs are structurally incapable of large-scale social programs .....................65

Decreased aid good ........................................... 66Decreasing aid leads to NGO grassroots political empowerment ............................................................66

Aid => dependence ........................................... 67Turn: Aid to NGOs causes dependence, not empowerment .....................................................................67Aid dependency is caused by funneling through NGOs. They lose focus on their real agenda.............67

Aid => competition (kills cooperation) .......... 69Foreign aid causes NGO competition for funds, preventing crucial cooperation....................................69Competition for funds ruins NGO solvency..............................................................................................69

NGOs can’t solve............................................... 70NGOs are ineffective: four reasons............................................................................................................70(not identifying the poorest groups, addressing poverty’s symptoms not causes, educational bias,sexism) ........................................................................................................................................................70Voluntary and Grassroots NGOs (VOs and POs) can’t solve, even with financial support....................70There are intrinsic limits to NGO solvency...............................................................................................70Decreasing aid to NGOs is good, six reasons............................................................................................72

NGO’s can’t solve crises .................................. 74Failure of NGOs in the Rwanda demonstrate their inability to manage genocide...................................74

NGO gap-filling excuses government inaction75NGO gap-filling is bad. Government should be responsible for poverty and social progams...............75NGOs should not be gap-fillers..................................................................................................................75

NGOs get co-opted by corrupt regimes ......... 76Apolitical NGOs get co-opted by corrupt regimes....................................................................................76

NGOs hurt gov legitimacy and => instability77Successful NGOs demonstrate the government’s faults and undercut political stability ........................77

No solvency: bad communication ................... 78Poor communication systems undermine African NGOs .........................................................................78

No solvency: bad coordination........................ 79Lack of regulation makes NGOs a dangerous place to send money ........................................................79Poor coordination prevents NGO success .................................................................................................79

No solvency: factionalism ................................ 80


Aiding through NGOs only supports factionalism and indeterminacy in actual assistance....................80

No solvency: internal corruption.................... 81Financial corruption destroys NGO effectiveness.....................................................................................81Desire for self-perpetuation corrupts NGOs..............................................................................................81NGOs are populated by a professional elite. Their radical policies have faded .....................................81

No solvency: masks capitalism........................ 82NGOs just put a smiley face on capitalism and neo-liberalism................................................................82

No solvency: democratization ......................... 83NGOs are structurally incapable of promoting democratzation ...............................................................83

Private Peacekeeping Bad................................ 84Private peacekeeping is bad – 12 reasons..................................................................................................84Private peacekeeping fails – several reasons. ............................................................................................85Taulbee, 2003, (Associate Prof. of Poly. Sci. @ Emory, Fall, Emory International Law Review, 17Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1109, p. l/n)................................................................................................................85Private peacekeeping is unaccountable, prolongs wars, and causes neo-colonialism. ............................86

Private Pecaekeeping = no accountability ..... 87Private peacekeeping is unaccountable......................................................................................................87Private corporations have no accountability..............................................................................................87Private peacekeepers violate international law..........................................................................................88Private corporations fall outside rule of international law........................................................................88Private forces don’t have any accountability/Private forces don’t fall into the trap of statism...............89Private forces don’t have any accountability – Balkans proves ...............................................................89

Private Peacekeeping -> Conflict.................... 90Private peacekeeping causes corruption and promotes conflict. ..............................................................90

Peacekeeping can’t solve long-term ............... 91Private corporations don’t solve the long-term causes of violence ..........................................................91

Private peacekeeping = no training................ 92Private corporations are unable to handle the things UN peacekeepers are trained for...........................92

Peacekeeping = prone to market failure........ 93Market failures -> peacekeeping failures...................................................................................................93Private corporations are controlled by market forces – not humanitarian need.......................................93

Private peacekeeping = same problems as standing army 94

Perm Solvency................................................... 95The perm solves – the UN can use it’s own peacekeepers in coordination with private corporations ...95NGO’s have to collaborate with regional governments ............................................................................95

Answers to: NGO’s solve human rights......... 96NGO’s are constrained by local governments...........................................................................................96


NGO CP Shell

Observation 1: Text – All relevant NGO’s will <do plan>

Observation 2: Competition – the counterplan competes via the net benefits ofbetter solvency, politics, and <other disads that link to US/UN action>

Observation 3: Solvency

First, NGO’s can solve conflictsCollins, 1995[U.N. CHAOS-FIXING FAILURE IS NGO CHALLENGE , Carole, NationalCatholic Reporter. 00278939, 3/24/95, Vol. 31, Issue 21]NGOs and international groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross seem tailor-made for this purpose. While not new actors in humanitarian crises, they are more likely to work inwar-torn areas even when the United Nations and its member governments evacuate their troops anddiplomats, as they did yet again in early March in Somalia. NGOs have generally proved moreeffective in grassroots outreach and more sensitive to local cultural sensitivities and economic andpolitical variations. They usually form the primary source for U.N., donor and media information onthe scope and extent of needs in a humanitarian emergency as they are often the only outsidepresence in communities isolated by war. And many, though not all, deliver emergency relief morecheaply than governments do. Many also have significant expertise in tasks traditionally undertakenby governments. Groups such as Atlanta-based CARE have undertaken complex projects to lowerexcessively high food prices in war-torn areas via market-based mechanisms. Others haveundertaken to demobilize soldiers and remove land mines from farmers' fields. Still others -- such asthe Mennonites and Quakers have launched efforts in Somalia, southern Sudan and elsewhere tomediate ethnic or clan disputes, working to help build a peace process from below rather than coaxor impose it from above, as is the case in more traditional diplomacy.


Second, independent NGO action is key to maintaining legitimacyOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.Because of their unique access NGOs can support and stimulate an effective response, andcontribute to a multi-level and multi-dimensional peacemaking and/ or building operation. NGOshave a vital role to play both in these operations and also in building up a consensus about whythese operations are required, through their ability to network and lobby, filling the gap betweencivil society and global society, exploiting cross-cutting cleavages. This requires that NGOs havegreater access to governments and regional and international organizations. However, NGOs need toincrease their credibility at these levels, including in areas pertaining to their legitimacy, efficiency,effectiveness, and conduct. Much more work needs to be done on the practical choices, and thepolitical and ethical choices that confront NGOs, relating to their roles and impartiality, and thepossible knock-on effects of their activities. As with any activity that brings new resources into aconflict environment, there is the possibility that some of these resources may become part of theconflict itself. This danger is exacerbated by the fact that there is often a lack of internationalconsensus amongst dominant state actors about what should be done and how far they areresponsible to intervene to bring about a sustainable peace, particularly in conflict zones beyond oftheir own direct interests.

Third, NGO’s solve area/action<insert specific card>


***NGO Solvency


NGO’s SolveUganda proves, NGOs reach the poor far better than the government or privateorganizationsSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 126-7

There is little dispute about the importance of NGOs from the perspective of serviceprovision, poverty alleviation and emergency services in Uganda. In general NGOs havebeen praised for their ability to reach the poorest of the poor, and indeed, they havepenetrated areas in Uganda that the state has not even been able to, and where privateenterprise has been either incapable or uninterested in becoming involved. And they haveplayed a crucial role in poverty-alleviation and service provision. The bankrupt andcorruption-ridden public sector and the nascent private sector could never have achievedthe same de gree of effectiveness or efficiency that NGOs have. As Brett (1993) argues, . .. NGO performance is usually though not always, excellent, with staff often being willingto work exceptional hours in environments involving high degrees of discomfort and risk.The expatriate personnel in these cases were all highly qualified people who would haveno difficulty in obtaining well paid and less disruptive work in the West. . . Local staffwere better paid than they would have been in most other jobs, but there was so muchcompetition for NGO posts that they were for the most part highly qualified andmotivated. It is difficult to imagine that an equivalent service could have been provided byeither public or private agencies. (Brett, 1993, p. 297)

NGOs are uniquely effective advocates for disempowered groupsSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 12-13

Linked to their educative role is the advocacy role of NGOs. NGOs may help to provide citizens withan alternative or supplement to political parties which may not fully represent their interests (Brown andKorten, 1991, p. 53; Diamond, 1994, p. 8). These organizations can then help to channel the interestsand demands of their members to government. This is particularly the case with traditionallydisadvantaged groups such as women, youth or other minorities. NGOs can bring together individualsof a similar ethnic group or community or different ethnicities together under the banner of commonissues or concerns. This is especially important where political parties represent factional politics ratherthan competing ideologies, as is the case in Uganda. NGOs can serve the political role of '...supplementing] political parties as mechanisms through which citizens define and articulate a broadrange of interests and make demands on government' (Brown and Korten, 1991, p. 53). NGOs thusbecome important sources of alternative policy ideas (Korten, 1991, p. 31). NGOs can also becomeadvocates for social change, organize to create power centres outside of the state which can pressure forstructural change, and provide leadership development of third world leaders who can leave the NGOsector and move to government. NGOs are capable of pluralizing the institutional environment and ofthus providing '... alternative structures to the monopolies of the state' (van de Walle, 1990, p. 1 16).


NGO’s Solve

NGO’s solve better than military forces – NGO’s build neutral relationships thatbetter solve for peaceRufini 1995[THE POTENTIAL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS INPEACEKEEPING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION Giovanni. Peacekeeping &International Relations, 11873485, May/Jun95, Vol. 24, Issue 3]

A good NGO, which has been able to perform well in the local community or has brought assistanceto an affected population, enjoys respect and consideration. This may be the ideal position forsolving controversies. "NGOs build relationships at many levels within a community where, asoutsiders, they are often looked to as disinterested observers better able to fairly weigh a situation.These relationships that NGOs have, particularly in the midst of overt conflict, are seldom exploitedfor bridge-building potential. . . . [w]ithout betraying familiarity or trust, relationships can be usedcreatively by NGOs to raise new issues, recall old ones, suggest an unpopular option, or lendsupport to an uncertain iniative which reaches for peace."[5] In the scope of the New PeacekeepingPartnership". a better synergy between NGOs and the local populace is a necessary phase of peacebuilding. When focusing on conciliation and conflict resolution, this synergy is instrumental tobuilding a durable peace. Peacebuilding "may take the form of concrete cooperative projects whichlink two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that cannot only contribute toeconomic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace


NGO’s Solve

NGO’s solvencyOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.What conflict resolution offers is a plethora of theoretical and practical approaches to developingpeace in conflict environments, and which can be exploited at several levels in order to channelglobal and regional norms of interdependence, human security and democratization into unstablelocal environments. It is here that the contribution of NGOs to the process of conflict resolution incivil society may be critical. NGOs can play an important role in facilitating a linkage between aglobal and civil society and thus resolving one of the most serious problems of the conflictresolution genre related to the trickle-up (and down) effect; this can also contribute to the diplomaticprocess of peacemaking in the realms of official diplomacy. NGOs that conduct humanitarian,developmental, human rights, and conflict resolution activities contribute to the objectives thatsecond generation approaches have delineated. Indeed, conflict resolution has always beenundertaken by NGO-type, independent, actors. Conflict resolution approaches also provide amethodology for NGO activity; it identifies the post Westphalian space they fill and in which theyoperate.


NGO’s Solve

NGO’s create a broader system of peace and are the only actor that can do soOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. Universityof St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.

This has partly been because NGOs alone tend to have access and the ability to address the sociallevel of international social conflicts, but also because they have been perceived to provide agenerally ethical perspective of politics and can, through undertaking low level, inexpensive, andunobtrusive peace-building efforts, contribute to a broader peace. It is clear that there currentlyexists a possibility in the current and changing environment of globalization and fragmentation forthe involvement of IGOs, NGOs, non-state and state actors, to facilitate the development of 'ethicalactors' and 'ethical regimes' in local stabilization projects (though agreement on what constitutes the‘ethical’ is still a major barrier). This may occur in the context of the shifts which are emerging vis-à-vis sovereignty, non- intervention and human rights. As some actors in the internationalcommunity move to strengthen human rights regimes through the creation of institutions which dealwith human and minority rights, sovereignty and its associated regime of non-intervention haveslowly lost its pre-eminence. It is in this context that a new generation of peace-building activity canemerge to which NGOs can make contributions. This is in the context of the attempt to attain post-Westphalian norms based on the dominance of human security and needs over, or in parallel with,state security, sovereignty, global and regional integration, reducing isolationism and particularism.Though this is a grand project, if it is to be undertaken at all, the role of NGOs is clearly vital asthey are the only actors able to operate within societies torn by conflict on a broad range of socialand economic issues that may be part of the overall conflict environment.


NGO’s Solve

NGO’s solve better because of autonomy from the stateOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.The emergence of numerous centres of power ranging from the civil to the global has in partprompted this turn,[29] particularly as NGOs have access to local civil societies and their authoritystructures. This has prompted the international community and the UN to try to develop the role ofNGOs in preventing, managing and resolving conflict.[30] In some cases, NGOs may nowsubstitute for local government, and encourage the development of civil society in a postWestphalian context, through conflict resolution techniques.[31] The increasing legitimization ofNGOs at the local, state, regional and global level, means that their agendas are more widelypropagated; it also means that civil society has a linkage with global civil society as NGOs arelegitimized in international organizations like the UN. NGOs are relatively unencumbered bysovereign concerns and therefore are themselves relatively free of claims to sovereignty, enablingthem to work in normative frameworks that may not be tainted by official and systemic interests.NGOs tend to have the advantage of familiarity with the local conflict environment and closecontacts with grassroots movements and therefore have been ascribed with the ability to play apreventive role. They can also play an important role through the gathering of supplementaryinformation in areas of tension pertaining to human rights and their abuses. This is part of theirpeace-building role of strengthening civil society and the social system through the ability for small-scale projects (the training of local leaders, etc.). This means that NGOs are able to aid in thecreation of the general conditions that enhance peace-building, promoting peace constituencies,which include cross-cutting segments of different sectors of civil society involved in thedevelopment of sustainable peace.


NGO’s Solve

NGO’s solve from a bottom-up approachOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.This perspective on conflict, and the methodology which is derived from it for solving conflict, isthought to remove the critical difficulties inherent in first generation peacemaking where thecommon argument is made that involvement is crippled by the intensity of the dispute, the resourcesor lack of that the third party has access to, and the type of issues at stake for the disputants.[15] It isin this context that the international system dictates that third parties must view their role as one ofconflict management as opposed to resolution in order to bring about compromise through bilateraland trilateral negotiations. As the logic of the Westphalian international system is believed at thislevel to be zero sum, the relationships between disputants and third party are similarly based and asMitchell has pointed out, intervention is crippled by its own logic.[16] This knot can, according tothe conflict resolution perspective be untied by a bottom up approach in which individuals who havecertain influential positions in the conflict environment are provided with an alternative andpositive-sum understanding of their conflict, which through a trickle-up effect, will eventually playa role in the official peacemaking process. This brief analysis of the basis of the conflict resolutiondebate illustrates an important critique of first generation approaches to peacemaking which mayreplicate conflict, rather than manage it; the shift towards a post Westphalian world seems to bepartly derived from this understanding.


NGO’s Solve

Peacekeeping missions can’t solve without NGO’sOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. Universityof St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.

Despite this, NGOs offer the flexibility, expertise, rapid responses, and commitment in localenvironments to respond rapidly to emerging signs of trouble. In such situations they provideessential services, aid, and have the capacity to inform the public both at the national and globallevel in order to mobilize opinion.[33] While the erosion of regional and local self-help capacities,and state sovereignty, and the possibility that NGOs may actually aid one of the disputantsindirectly have been put forward as criticisms of NGO activity in complex emergencies,[34] the roleof NGOs in conflict resolution and prevention is undeniably vital to the emerging practices ofpeacemaking in intractable conflict. NGOs can try to empower parties to deal with conflictconstructively, monitor and lobby for human rights and the protection of minorities, and enactcapacity-building and protective measurements for disadvantaged or endangered groups. NGOs,consequently, can play an important role in the creation of ‘peace-constituencies’.[35] HumanitarianNGOs may be open to manipulation in conflict environments by disputants, as Abiew and Keatinghave recently argued;[36] yet this is an indirect offshoot of their concern with normative issues likejustice and human freedoms and rights. This, I would argue, is far less likely to be colored byinterests which overlook such rights than state-centric activities and this is why NGOs carryextraordinary local and global levels of legitimacy particularly with citizen groups. While states maystill dominate the legal sphere, this entails a certain amount of cynicism that NGOs are lesssusceptible to. The problem is to retain the advantages of their unofficial status without incurring thewrath of sovereign actors that fear interventionary practices becoming institutionalized upon theirterritory, while guarding against the corruption of NGOs themselves. Thus, linkages betweentransnational organizations (which are themselves torn between normative concerns and the state-centric interests of the international system) and NGOs are highly significant with respect topeacemaking in contemporary world politics. NGOs contribute to the process of conflict resolutionby addressing aspects of conflict which official actors cannot reach; this is also supported by theirrole in humanitarian, developmental, media, and education issues in which NGOs contribute to thestabilization of civil society through identifying and acting upon the human needs frameworks, thecommunicational, and psychological, deep-rooted aspects of conflict. Citizen diplomacy can alsobecome NGO diplomacy in which multi-dimensional efforts address the local, civil, regional andglobal aspects of the conflict, incorporating both an understanding of global norms and global civilsociety, the traditional international system of Westphalian states, and local identity, civil, andrepresentational needs in the wider context of political and economic interdependence,regionalization and globalization.


NGO’s Solve

NGO’s need independent credibility to solveOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.It is therefore important to consider the links between local and international actors and theirrelationship with NGOs, particularly as their work in the field of peacemaking and peace-buildingimpinges upon the sphere of influence of states and international organizations. NGOs which arededicated to monitoring specific laws or specific institutions, lobbying, peace-building and earlywarning, play a valuable role, which needs to be expanded in order to curtail the credibility gap oftraditional tools and methods of peacemaking, and to increase the effectiveness of the internationalsystem and community in responding to conflict.


NGO’s Solve

NGOs solve war and other stuff.Cranston, author of A Return to Peace, 1999 (Alan, Boston Review)http://www.bostonreview.net/BR24.1/cranston.html

The other absolutely essential ingredient is the deep and total involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This, too, was demonstrated in the case of land minesin the historic collaboration between the Canadian government and the InternationalCampaign to Ban Land Mines, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The most importantcontribution of Global Action, I believe, is the suggestion that the many different anddiverse NGOs-movements and individuals concentrating today on one or another of themost obvious causes of war, most horrific characteristics of war, or most hopeful andpromising preventatives of conflict-form a coalition to push a comprehensive approach toridding us of war itself.Those working to banish trade in small arms, for example, would of course carry on theircrusade, as would advocates of banning nuclear weapons and proponents of mediation andjudicial processes. But they would also all be invited and urged to work together in acooperative effort that should strengthen each cause as advances are achieved, as well asenhance prospects for progress toward the more general goal. As Jonathan Dean put it in aletter he wrote to me just over a year ago, "Despite remarkable progress on nucleardisarmament, without more movement towards ending conventional wars, it will bedifficult to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. I also doubt that, unless it is imbeddedin a broader program to stop wars, the . . . initiative on restricting arms sales can succeed."NGOs are fulfilling a rapidly increasing role in international affairs in and about the UnitedNations and just about everywhere else. Witness the impact of Amnesty International onhuman rights in the world. Witness the global focus on the issue of abolition of nuclearweapons that hundreds upon hundreds of NGOs are bringing about. Witness that inBangladesh countless NGOs have actually achieved a form of power-sharing with thegovernment. Witness the emergence even in China of a new force known as GONGOs-Government Organized Non Government Organizations!Randall, Jonathan, and Saul have now proposed a new and historic mission for these evermore significant instruments of civil society.


NGO’s Solve

NGOs solve bestPaula Hoy, Interfaith Hunger Appeal Associate Director, Players And Issues InInternational Aid, 1998, p. 99

NGOs' Strengths: The proliferation of NGOs and the growing support from governmental andmultilateral sources are a testament to their excellent reputations as providers of assistance to thepoor. It is broadly acknowledged that NGOs are in a better position than the larger, multilateralagencies to reach the poor and work at the grassroots level. Whereas NGOs used to promise toreach the poorest of the poor, they now admit that they fail to reach the poorest 5 to 10 percent,but this is still a significant accomplishment, given that, according to UNDP estimates, officialand multilateral aid fails to reach the poorest 20 percent.' Additionally, NGOs' comparativelysmall size makes them less bureaucratic, cheaper, and more cost-effective. Because NGOs arenot hampered by political motivations and constraints, as governments are, they have the abilityto reach a broader recipient audience, including countries that are deemed hostile and from whichofficial aid is withheld. Ironically, NGOs working in such blacklisted countries often report thatthose are the few countries where the local governments are not working against broadbaseddevelopment.'' U.S. NGOs also escape the strategic and corporate interests that tend to guidemuch of U.S. foreign policy and aid, furthering their scope and independence.

Local people-level connections make NGO solvency superiorPaula Hoy, Interfaith Hunger Appeal Associate Director, Players And Issues InInternational Aid, 1998, p. 101-2

NGOs also have the on-the-ground advantage-they typically have more staff people workingpermanently in the field (not just during emergencies), especially in rural areas, where the poorestpopulations live, than do the large multilateral agencies. Relationships with local communities aremore easily fostered with staff people living and sharing daily routines, which provides NGOs withperhaps their greatest advantage of all: access to local knowledge. As it becomes increasingly clearthat the key to sustainable development (which, for aid donors, equates to money well spent) is localparticipation in all stages, it is obvious that NGOs that know and listen to local populations are inthe best position to help achieve it. They can collaborate with local organizations and assist withinstitution building, training, and staff development and in the process, be a part of development thatfar outlives their presence. Their in-country presence also strategically places them in a position toconduct preventive action and implement early warning systems in the increasingly commonoccurrence of natural and man-made emergencies


NGOs solve the economyEconomic instability can be ameliorated by NGO gap-fillingSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 14

NGOs play a key role in this new approach. This is reflected in the New Policy Agenda (NPA).Although the agenda is not monolithic, the marriage of neo-liberal economics and liberal democratictheory provide the ideological backdrop for aid policies and the role of non-state actors (Hulme andEdwards, 1997, p. 5). The NPA is donor-driven, with an emphasis on, '... the central importance offree markets, efficient use of limited government resources, a reduced role for the state and the needfor good governance in low iNGOme countries' (Commins, 1997, p. 141). Within this agenda,NGOs are viewed as '...the preferred channel for service-provision in deliberate substitution for thestate' (Hulme and Edwards, 1997, p. 6). But this is not the sole role of NGOs. NGOs and GrassrootsOrganisations (GROs) '... are seen as the vehicles for "democratisation" and essential components ofa thriving "civil society", which in turn are seen as essential to the success of the Agenda's economicdimension' (Moore, 1993, quoted in Hulme and Edwards, 1997, p. 6). They thus help mitigate the '. .- social shock of economic adjustment programs by delivering services and promoting andsupporting coping mechanisms' (Nelson, 1995, p. 45). In addition they also help to . . . increasediversity of opportunity in society, a prerequisite for the success of market-oriented policies whichstress competition and freedom of choice and action. . . And generally, NGOs and POs broadenchannels through which resources or benefits reach groups that may otherwise feel disenfranchised,with consequent discontent and instability which may threaten investment. (Fowler, 1991, p. 56)


Activism solvencyNGOs empower individual activismSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 11-12

The greatest potential of NGOs lies in their capacity to generate self-help initiative. It is in this vein that NGOs are viewed as vehicles for development and democracy,and more specifically as vehicles for 'democratising development' (dark, 1991). indigenous NGOshave the potential of giving voice to popular demands which may subsequently empower like-minded members to '.., articulate a collective interest and take collective action' (Bratton, 1990b, p.104). NGOs have the potential to be significant vehicles of empowerment because of their ability toreach the grassroots. Empowerment is thus ', . . a multifaceted process..., [which]. . . involvestransforming the economic, social, psychological, political and legal circumstances of the currentlypowerless' (Sandbrook, 1993, p. 2). There are several levels at which an individual, community orsociety can be empowered. However, two key components of empowerment are the development ofa sense of efficacy in the individual and a group's ability to influence political and personneldecisions of government or powerful institutions. Empowerment can be measured by such indicatorsas the amount of political clout (Bratton, 1990, p. 93) that the organization has acquired, by theability of the collective to alter conditions (social, economic, political or cultural) that it Findsintolerable, by its success at an educative role (if applicable), and its ability to voice/address popularconcerns/interests. Whether there is a general feeling of constructive change among the memberscan also be used as a measure (albeit an imprecise one) of whether the NGO has been able toempower its constituents. Certain indicators can be used to measure the degree to which individualsor communities are politically or economically empowered. Economic empowerment can bepartially gauged by visible improvements in the standard of living directly related to the activities ofthe NGO as well as attempts to educate and therefore empower individuals to help themselveseconomically and politically to achieve greater self-sufficiency. On the political level, whether anNGO or association has helped to empower an individual or community can be gauged bydetermining whether the constituency has more political voice in affecting their destiny throughactions (direct or indirect) of the NGO, and whether people have greater access to policy-makersand policy formulation and decision-making because of NGO activities. As Halfani intimates,'[T]o change power relations entails equipping communities not only to develop themselves butalso to become effective participants in public policy formulation (which at present is a soleprerogative of the state)' (1993b, pp. 202-3). NGOs are thought to '. . . enhance the access of thepoor to public services and augment their political power through organization' (Paul, 1991, p. 2).Even though NGOs might not have specific political agendas, they strengthen political pluralism intwo ways: '... they can provide finance for village level public goods that are not controlled by thestate and thus create the possibility of an alternative political project at the local level', and they can'. . . strengthen pluralism in the classic sense of enhancing the power of given groups of people vis-à-vis the state' (Van de Walle, 1990, p. 116). They may not be a panacea, but they are a '. . . First,imperfect step in the empowerment of the weakest political actors in . . . [the] political systems'(Van de Walle, 1990, p. 1 18)


Human rights solvencyHuman rights are an ideal organizing principle for NGOsPeter van Tuijl, Senior Policy Advisor with the Netherlands Organisation forInternational Cooperation and a member of Oxfam International, Third World Quarterly,vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 618

A first simple response to the question posed above is an observation that, while emerging globalmarkets do not create a global social order, in a world with no aid there will still be human rights.The function of human rights as a normative instrument to shape and form the political and humanquality of globalisation cannot he underestimated. Human rights offer the opportunity to undo thepresent inclination of NGO discourse to claim the moral high ground or to promise too much,precisely because human rights are concrete and hound to enforcement mechanisms—some strong,others weak. Moreover, the claim on the universality of human rights is increasingly supported by amuch clearer and stronger legal, political, social and cultural global rooting. NGOS deserve creditfor having contributed to this global culture of human rights (Van Tuiji, 1999). However, it isnecessary to expand upon these achievements, in particular by further turning human rights into amore applicable concept and rooting it deeper in new relationships and shared institutions. This nextstep will offer a solid foundation for NGOS to engage-with and give shared meaning toglobalisation.

Human rights are a primary NGO focusPeter van Tuijl, Senior Policy Advisor with the Netherlands Organisation forInternational Cooperation and a member of Oxfam International, Third World Quarterly,vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 621-2

Some NGOS have a long-standing engagement with human rights. However, what often started outas a single-issue human rights agency has meanwhile taken on a much broader significance amongthe NGO community. A commitment to human rights is no longer limited to the 'human rightsmovement'. Generally, human rights language has become a centrepiece of NGO mission statementsand global NGO relationships. Classic human rights organisations have gradually come to realisethat they can only function as a part of larger transnational networks, including a variety of otherNGOS. At the same time, and in line with the debate on the indivisibility of human rights, what usedto be known as 'development NGOS', or NGDOS, ie those working on social service delivery, havecome to appreciate the virtues of 'advocacy NGOS', in promoting human rights (Van Tuiji, 1999).By now there will be few (international) NGOS left without a human rights policy, or at least areference to human rights in one of their principle statements.


Human Rights Solvency

NGOs inspired wide-scale human rights monitoringPeter van Tuijl, Senior Policy Advisor with the Netherlands Organisation forInternational Cooperation and a member of Oxfam International, Third World Quarterly,vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 623

The function of NGOS in monitoring human rights violations is widely acclaimed. NGOS, andparticularly transnational NC.O networks, have constructed large webs of relationships andinformation exchange on human rights, capable of reaching out and calling upon the responsibilityof governments even in remote corners of the world. The capacity to collect and publicise credibleinformation on human rights violations is among the most important contributions of NGOS toestablishing a global culture of human rights. For the time being, this will remain a significant areaof NGO activity. But with the greater acceptance of human rights and partly in response to thesuccess of NOO human rights lobbies, new actors involved in monitoring and reporting on humanrights abuses have appeared. Many countries with a poor human rights record have established aNational Human Rights Commission. Although these Commissions differ in mandate, compositionand political clout, they have generally entered a terrain of human rights monitoring which used tobe covered by NGOS alone. Some National Human Rights Commissions have even beenestablished with the clear purpose of breaking the monopoly of NGOS on credible human rightsinformation. For example, before establishing the National Human Rights Commission of India, theHome Minister stated that the purpose of the commission would be to 'counter the false andpolitically motivated propaganda by foreign and Indian civil rights agencies'. (International Councilon Human Rights Policy, 1999: 56). Interestingly, most of these Commissions often take on a life oftheir own and eventually do not hesitate to criticise the authorities that established them, as in Togo.Even if a Commission is ineffective, it may still help to open up space for NGOS to talk moreopenly about human rights, as has happened in Nigeria.

NGO’s are critical to the human rights movementSchnabel and Horowitz 2002[Albrecht and Shale. International Network. “NGOs critical role in advancing human rights in transition societies”.http://www.tolerance-net.org/news/podium/podium071.html]

Human rights NGOs and their individual and organizational supporters are key to a moreeffective functioning of the international human rights regime. NGOs are largelyunconstrained by national interests. Although they have their own ideological biases,competition among them produces a large and relatively objective stream of informationabout human rights practices around the world. Just as importantly, NGOs are engaged inongoing efforts to popularize and advance the whole panoply of human rights causesaround the world. These informational and advocacy functions can potentially havesignificant impacts on elite and public opinion, fertilizing and organizing local humanrights traditions and movements to the point where they become prominent and influentialin domestic culture and politics. This slow, decentralized process of building human rightsawareness through local contacts is probably the international human rights regime’s mostpowerful and consistent force for positive change.


Human Rights Solvency

NGO’s solve all human rights abuse regimesSchnabel and Horowitz 2002[Albrecht and Shale. International Network. “NGOs critical role in advancing human rights in transition societies”.http://www.tolerance-net.org/news/podium/podium071.html]

Careful analyses of the international human rights regime, and of country and regional case studies,show that the creation of international human rights norms and decentralized propagation of thesenorms by NGOs have a greater impact than actions taken by states – whether individually throughtheir own foreign policies or collectively through decisions of IGOs.1) This is because state policiesreflect state interests and, even under the best of circumstances, are inconsistent and of limitedscope. In large part thanks to the work of local and international NGOs, even for the most repressiveregimes human rights norms have become difficult to ignore. It is a victory for the human rightscause that such regimes feel compelled to make up excuses for their abuses, thus implicitlyadmitting fault and accepting the need for remedial action.


NGOs are key to civil societyNGOs are key to civil societySusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 9-10

The dominant discourse of pluralism and neo-liberalism suggest that the existence of a plurality ofautonomous associations is crucial to the development of civil society and democratization. Pluralisttheory insists that there is a need for autonomous organizations to constitute independent centres ofpower to check abuses of central or local authority and thus procure greater accountability from theregime. The state is thought to mediate between sectoral interests, rather than to represent collectiveinterests, consequently compromising between the demands of various associations and classes.NGOs play an important role in this model, in that NGOs are viewed as being capable of pluralizingthe institutional environment and of thus providing '... alternative structures to the monopolies of thestate' (Bratton, 1990a. p. 104). By building independent organizations at the community, regional,and national level. NGOs in Africa have already begun to populate and pluralize the institutionallandscape. As such they are having an impact not only on economic growth and social welfare, butare also strengthening the civil society. (Baldwin, 1990, p. 97) Since state society relations in Africaare now at a crossroads, pluralist theory suggests that the retreat of the state will '. . .create enlargedpolitical spaces within which associational life can occur' (Bratton, 19S9. p. 412). Under theseconditions, '...groups within civil society will enjoy greater opportunities to attract a following,develop a bureaucratic form and formulate policy alternatives' (Bratton, 1989, p. 412)


Most NGOs are gap-fillersMost NGOs are gap-fillersSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 124-6

With economic liberalization, the state is retreating from its responsibilities to provide basic socialservices such as health care, education, sanitation and basic security, leaving this space open forother actors to occupy. Indigenous and international NGOs have been some of the other actors thathave attempted to Fill these spaces. Over the past several years, the number of indigenous andinternational NGOs in Uganda has skyrocketed," and in fact some suggest that foreign andindigenous NGOs have invaded Uganda since the UPDF stormed into Kampala in 19136.4 Thisinvasion has affected almost every sector of Ugandan life and every region of Uganda, althoughsome districts such as Rakai (badly hit by the AIDS virus), Luwero and Kampala have higherconcentrations of NGOs reflecting certain service provision needs as well as NGO preferences(Table 5.1). No complete record of all NGOs is available, but it is estimated that there are between700 and 1000 registered NGOs operating in Uganda, both foreign and indigenous (Kwesiga andRatter, 1993, p. 10; Gariyo, 1996, p. 165). Many NGOs are in fact unregistered, grassroots self-helporganizations. A 1993 study commissioned by the Ugandan Ministry of Finance and EconomicPlanning, and funded by the World Bank, found that out of 703 organizations that had applied forregistration by December 1992, 15 had 'relief as their primary main activity, 430 had 'development',and 258 had some 'other' activity. Of the 258 'others', 248 had evangelism as the primary subsidiaryactivity (Kwesiga and Ratter, 1993, p. 10). This does not include the possible hundreds if notthousands of indigenous grassroots associations that have not registered with the NGO RegistrationBoard" (see Appendices I and II). My own research based on a list of registered NGOs compiled bythe Ministry of Internal Affairs (NGO Registration Board) suggests a similar conclusion. There areseveral types of NGOs in Uganda including religious, development-oriented, charity, human rights,'briefcase' NGOs, self-help, grassroots organizations," and women's organizations. These can moregenerally be classified into three main categories according to what they actually do and who theydo it for: 'gap-fillers'. people's organizations and voluntary organizations. " These categories are notexclusive, however; a particular NGO may embody characteristics from any of the categories whilebelonging predominantly to one category. Of a total of 434 indigenous NGOs, religiousorganizations comprised 40.3 per cent; the gap-fillers (not including religious organizations)comprised 40.8 per cent; voluntary organizations, 14.1 per cent; people's organizations only 1.2 percent, and the other category (including networking NGOs) comprised some 3.4 per cent of the totalregistered indigenous NGOs in Uganda. Since most religious NGOs engage not only in evangelismbut also in service-provision, many can be classified in the gap-filler category. Even assuming that15 per cent of these religious NGOs are involved in development work, almost 65 per cent ofindigenous NGOs in Uganda focus mainly on reliefer service-provision work.'" Similarly,approximately 40 per cent of foreign NGOs fell within the category of gap-fillers or relief provision;28 per cent could be considered VOs, 28 per cent were strictly religious organizations, andapproximately 4 per cent represented the other category, including environmental and networkorganizations.


NGOs gap-filling solvesNGOs are critical to fill gaps in government social service provisionSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.102-3

Because of state withdrawal from the provision of basic services, and the consequent economy ofsurvival that has developed, many NGOs are being pressured into dealing with poverty alleviationand :he provision of basic social services like primary health care, education and sanitation insteadof empowerment and advocacy. These are lot mutually exclusive pursuits, but they do serve todivert NGOs to a more apolitical focus. The willingness of the NRM regime to allow NGOs tomultiply, especially NGOs that are engaged in poverty-alleviation and service provision, suggeststhat it is an indirect beneficiary of NGO activities as well. Although state-NGO relations can beconflictual or consensual, NGOs acting as alternative service providers operating in an environmentof political and economic survival often serve to give the regime added legitimacy and help Fill inthe gaps where state-initiated service provision has lapsed (if it even existed in the First place). Thisis particularly the case in Northern Uganda where the state is only minimally present andregional/ethnic animosities still exist. The state has thus come to rely on the service-provision andpoverty alleviation offered by foreign and indigenous NGOs, and has increasingly attempted tointegrate NGOs into its national development program- 13 Many NGOs, therefore, tend to have acomplementary relationship with the LCs. This is perhaps due, as one observer suggests, to asituation where one-third of indigenous NGOs are within the LC system.'4444 In fact many NRMofficials I interviewed were in some way involved with NGOs. 15 In addition, LCs often askassistance of NGOs because of their resource constraints; the LC will identify a problem andsuggest a policy, and the NGO will help to implement it.'"


NGOs solve fundabilityAid to governments will be misused, it should be given directly to NGOsBrett D. Schaefer, Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Center forInternational Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation, “The Keys to an African EconomicRenaissance,” May 10, 2000, http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1369.html

Aid is not necessary for development, but if policymakers insist on giving development assistance,they should require aid recipients to institute measures that prevent it from being misused or stolen.To avoid funding unintended projects or programs and reduce the possibility of funds being pilferedby corruption or used for political patronage, loans and grants should not be funneled throughgovernment agencies. They should be awarded to the non-governmental organizations (NGOs),agencies, or businesses involved in delivering the programs after having competitively bid on aproject and won the contract. Third-party auditors should evaluate the loans and grants to provideimpartial oversight and guard against corruption.


NGOs decrease regime corruptionNGOs are effective political watchdogsSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 13-14

Closely linked to their advocacy role, NGOs also perform a watchdog role, usually in connectionwith other political actors such as political parties, lawyers' associations and the media. NGOs canhelp put checks on the '. .. powerful tendency of the state to centralize power and evadeaccountability and control' (Brown and Korten, 1991, p. 53). The proliferation of associations at alllevels, rural and urban and in a variety of forms and types, is a powerful factor constraining abusivecentral government authorities and the predatory conduct of dominant elites. By empowering groupsthroughout society to both voice their concerns and take direct action to achieve their ends, the trendis strongly in favour of more participatory politics, greater public accountability, and hence basicdemocracy. (Landell-Mills, 1992, p. 563) The most powerful mechanism available to NGOs in thisregard is to subject the government to public scrutiny, and disseminate information to the generalpublic (Diamond, 1994, p. 10). Intermediary associations, such as political parties, and the mediaplay a key role in linking indigenous NGOs and the wider civil society with the state. They help loarticulate, negotiate and foster the interests of civil society (Lewis, 1992, p. 39), and are thus vital tobringing societal interests and issues into the political arena.

IFIs use NGOs as tools for political pressure on regimes receiving aidSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 16

NGOs, both indigenous and international and the World Bank have a love-hate relationship. TheWorld Bank espouses an apolitical, logical and rational approach to the problems of Africandevelopment, whereas NGOs are often viewed as having a politicized nature and values-orientationwhich may '. . . threaten the apolitical expertise on which the World Bank's fundamental myths arebased' (Nelson. 1995, p. 130), Thus. NGOs are useful as '. . .agents of project participation, privateservice delivery, and local "civic culture", not as agents for wider democratic change' (Schmitz,1995. p. 74). The World Bank's view of the importance of NGOs in democratization is summed upby the following: NGOs [as] intermediaries have an important role to play; they can create linksboth upward and downward in society and voice local concerns - . . In doing this they can bring abroader spectrum of ideas and values to bear on policy making. They can also exert pressure onpublic officials for better performance and greater accountability. (World Bank, 1989, p. 61) NGOsplay a very limited, and well-defined role in the World Bank and the IMF's vision of developmentand democracy: they are crucial in Filling in the gaps left by state withdrawal from the provision ofsocial services, and they are central for democracy by acting as watch-dogs and providing for amore plural institutional setting.


*** Solve Specific Areas/Things


NGO’s Solve CongoPrivate military firms should be deployed to the Congo

Singer, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]More recently, a consortium of military firms, interestingly entitled the "International PeaceOperations Association," has proposed that it be hired to work on behalf of the largely ineffectualmonuc peacekeeping operations in the Eastern Congo. The private military firms, which range fromaerial surveillance operators to a company of Gurkha veterans, have offered to create a "SecurityCurtain" (50 km demilitarized zone) in one of the most lawless areas on the African continent. Theipoa's charge would be between $100-200 million, dependent on the scale of the operation. So far, ithas found no takers, but the level of violence in the area continues to escalate


A.I.D.S. solvencyNGOs are implementing successful programs to stop HIVKenya Broadcasting Corporation TV, Nairobi, BBC, August 15, 2000, p.ln

Reeling under years of condemnation as HIV/AIDS high risk areas, beach communities along theshores of Lake Victoria have now taken up awareness campaigns with unmatched vigour. They aregradually abandoning their old ways of pairing fishermen with women fish traders with the help ofPlan International, a nongovernmental organization. Beach communities have formed guidance andcounselling groups. Reporter This fireplace was last utilized when mourners attended the burialof Mzee honorific Vitalis' bogus son and daughter-in-law. The couple died of AIDS leaving behindsix orphans. The home has since been declared closed, like many other homesteads along the shoresof Lake Victoria. The beaches are considered high risk areas. Women who came to the beach in thepast to work or trade were paired off with men to avoid jealousies among men - a sure recipe for therapid spread of HIV/AIDS. Passage omitted: local women speak about how they began prostitutionGradually, however, the beach community is coming to terms with the reality and has enforcedrather stringent regulations. (?Asat) Beach, for example, is a no-go zone for single women. If theyhave to visit they are restricted to two days. They are, however, silent over what measures apply tosingle men. Asat Beach has fishermen and fishmongers from Uganda, Tanzania and over 3,000neighbouring community members who fish and return to their homes. In an effort to sensitize thelocals on HIV/AIDS, Plan International has forged a working relation with the Asat beachcommunity. Passage omitted: NGO worker speaks about cooperation .


NGO solve democratizationNGOs are a force for democratization and economic liberalizationSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 2-3

NGOs, civil society and the market have become the panacea for the failures of the African state inthe post-cold war neo-liberal climate. NGOs have thus caused much hype and enthusiasm within thedominant neo-liberal paradigm (Bratton. 1989; Diamond, 1994). NGOs are certainly not new to theAfrican continent, or to the Third World for that matter.2 But now, in addition to their previousimportance as poverty alleviators. emergency and humanitarian aid providers, NGOs are beingheralded as important vehicles for empowerment, democratization and economic development.Surely, a tall order for any actor to fulfill They allegedly play a key role in creating a civic culture.pluralizing the political, economic and social arena and bridging the gap between the masses and thestate. NGOs and wider civil society thus act as intermediaries between the unorganized masses andthe state (Macdonald. 1994, p. 271).

NGOs are schools for democracySusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 12

In addition to their empowering potential, NGOs are heralded for their ability to 'provide traininggrounds for democracy' (Brown and Korten, 1991, p. 53; Bratton, 1990b. p. 104; Korten, 1990, p.99). More broadly, civil society can be characterized as a key arena for the development ofdemocratic virtues such as '. . . tolerance, moderation, willingness to compromise and respect foropposing viewpoints' (Diamond. 1994, p. 8). Because many NGOs are formed along interest-basedissues rather than vertical cleavages based on ethnicity, regionalism or ethnicity, they help to 'cross-cut the principal polarities of political conflict' (Diamond, 1994. p. 9). Assuming that NGOsempower their constituency (or membership) and the wider community, the existence of a pluralityof NGOs also helps to stimulate political participation, elevate the skills of democratic citizens, andpromote an '. . . appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship'(Diamond, 1994, pp. 7-8). These organizations therefore act as 'schools of democracy' where leaderswithin the organization learn how to organize and motivate people, debate issues (Diamond, 1994.p. 9) and become accountable to their membership, while the membership in turn learns how to keepits leadership accountable and how, therefore, eventually to pressure the state for accountability andresponsiveness.


Environment solvencyNGOs in the Horn solve environmental issues better than the governmentsEmmanuel Koro, African Eye News Service (South Africa), Africa News, August 25,2000, p.ln

Washington DC - African environmental groups have joined forces with a Washington- basedorganisation to force governments on the continent to curb what they call rampant "state-drivennatural resource abuses". Led by east African non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the groupsclaim that many African governments come down hard on lobbies that demand environmentalaccountability. "Political space for environmental advocacy in Africa is very weak and thegovernments de-register NGOs," Peter Veit, World Resources Institute (WRI) senior associate andregional director for Africa, said. "Environmental information is stamped 'confidential' and courtcases challenging the environmental performance of governments and politically connected privatesector business operations are thrown out on technicalities," he added. WRI is a Washington-based independent center for research on global environmental and development issues. Theorganisation provides partners with methods, tools and analysis for alternative environmentalgovernance. It will now work with African NGOs such as Kenya's African Center forTechnology Studies (ACTS), Tanzania's Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT) andUganda's Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) to push forenvironmental accountability on the continent. Veit cited a recent case in which the Tanzaniangovernment tried to de-register an NGO called Bawata because it had become "too political" in itsadvocacy work. A court of law ruled in favour of the NGO in an ensuing legal action, but thegovernment has appealed against the ruling. Veit said the Ugandan government initially tried tofrustrate the registration of ACODE. However, ACODE is now operating smoothly. GodberTumushabe, ACODE executive director, said the organisation recently succeeded in halting thetabling of a draft policy on fisheries, until public consultations were held. "A good example ofstate-driven natural resources abuses in Uganda is mismanagement in the forestry department,which is alleged to have given one of the biggest sugar companies in Uganda, Madhivani's, chunksof several reserves for sugar cane growing," he said. "Cases of political pressure on forestrydepartment staff to allow this to happen have been cited and the issue is being investigated byparliament," he added.


NGOs solve feminismWomen’s NGOs are inclusive and more effective than government organizationsMaria Nzomo, lecturer at the Institute for Diplomacy and International Studies at the Universityof Nairobi, 1999, African Foreign Policies, p. 194

The return to pluralism has at least created some political space for articulating genderinterests and lobbying for gender-sensitive democratic development and foreign relations.Until the mid-1980s, Tanzanian women had only marginally participated in this kind ofactivism, despite the UN women's decade. The situation has changed significantly since1992. With the reemergence and redynamization of civil society groups, new forms ofwomen's organizations are emerging. They seek to transcend class, religious, racial,ethnic, and other social divides and focus on issues that unite, such as the impact of SAPson women, gender violence, and women's marginalization in strategic decisionmakingpositions. An example of these new forms of organization is the national women's NGOknown as Baraza Ya Wanawake wa Tanzania (BAWATA), launched in May 1995 tocoordinate and promote women's rights in the emerging democratic environment. Althoughit is still too early to predict its performance, it would seem that BAWATA has thepotential to galvanize Tanzanian women to become influential actors in futuredevelopment and foreign relations. Pluralism has also energized a number of longer-established women's organizations, such as the Tanzania Media Women's Association(TAMWA), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Tanzanian Women'sLawyers Association, and university women research groups. At a global level, Tanzanianwomen have already made an impact: For example, Gertrude Mongolia served as theTanzanian secretary-general for the 1995 Women's Beijing conference. As internationaldonors become disenchanted with the Tanzanian state, they are increasingly turning towomen NGOs as more reliable actors for promoting development and democracy. Thisnew partnership puts women among the most significant "new" actors in Tanzania's foreignrelations.


NGOs solve povertyIn poverty alleviation programs, NGOs are superior to government actionSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.123-4

NGOs and civil society have become increasingly important in Africa over the last two decades.How and why they are important is controversial, not whether they have become important. Asdiscussed in previous chapters the dominant discourse of neo-liberalism views NGOs as significantharbingers of democratization and economic liberalization, but as Fowler (1993) argues, AfricanNGOs tend to be '. . . organizational weak, seldom truly indigenous or rooted within the mass of thepopulation'. In addition they are often used by the political and bureaucratic elite to '. . . sustainthemselves by providing a needed diversification of patronage resources' (Fowler, 1993, p. 334). So,how influential and effective can they be in a transition to democracy? As the case study of Ugandaillustrates, NGOs have a limited impact on the political arena, focusing more on gap-filling, service-provision roles. What impact have NGOs had on their target groups and the wider community interms of political empowerment, given their own organizational constraints? There is little disputeabout the importance of NGOs in helping to alleviate poverty and in helping to rebuild Uganda;however, to what degree do NGOs help to empower individuals and provide the foundation for ademocratic society and polity? What hope do they offer for the democratization of Uganda, giventheir contextual limitations as outlined in Chapter 4 and their internal weaknesses? NGOs in generalhave been more-or-less efficient in addressing service-provision and poverty alleviation needs. Alabour-intensive approach, a focus on community participation, a non-hierarchical decision-makingstructure, as well as a flexibility and adaptiveness to the locale they are operating in, often makeNGOs more cost-effective and responsive to community needs than government (see Kwesiga andRatter, 1992, p. 13). But according to the dominant discourse, NGOs have also been identified asone of the key vehicles of empowerment, the development of a vibrant democratic civil society anddemocratization. NGOs are thus viewed as being capable of providing independent centres of powerto check abuses of central and local authority and therefore procure a greater accountability from theregime (Bratton, 1989; Korten, 1990); of pluralizing the institutional environment and giving voiceto popular demands; and helping to promote a popular culture (Chazan, 1993, p. 282). In otherwords, NGOs have a significant empowerment, political, watchdog and educative role to play inpressing for democratization.


***Private Corporations Solvency


Private Corporations SolvePrivate corporations solve – empirically proven

Singer, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]At the same time, there is growing global trade in private military services for hire, better known asthe privatized military industry. These companies range from small consulting firms, formed byretired generals, to transnational corporations that offer battalions of commandos for hire. Oftenoperating out of public sight, such firms have been players in a number of conflicts over the pastdecade, ranging from Angola to what was Zaire. Even the U.S. military has become one of theprime clients of the industry, with private firms now providing the logistics of every major U.S.military deployment, maintaining such strategic weapons systems as the b-2 stealth bomber andGlobal Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, and taking over the rotc programs in over 200 Americanuniversities. Indeed, from 1994 to 2002, the U.S. Defense Department entered into over 3,000contracts with U.S.-based military firms, estimated at a value of more than $300 billion. Their rolein supporting the Iraq war will only see these numbers grow.

Private corporations solve – international supportSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]As a result, over the past several years, many have begun to call for a twenty-first-century businesssolution to the world’s twenty-first-century security problems. If everything from prisons to welfarehas been privatized, why not try turning peacekeeping over to the private market? Proponents ofexploring this idea obviously include the companies who stand to profit from it. But they have alsoexpanded well beyond, to include not only the British government, which just issued a “GreenPaper” exploring the issue, but also many traditional supporters of U.N. peacekeeping, includingeven former U.N. Under Secretary Sir Brian Urquart, who is considered the founding father ofpeacekeeping. As a U.N. officer summed up his feelings on the firms in an interview with theOttawa Citizen (April 6, 1998), “In a perfect world we don’t need them or want them. But the worldisn’t perfect.” Privatized peacekeeping offers both promise and peril, and the time has come for theinternational community to face up to some hard choices — before the next disaster forces an evenworse dilemma.

Private corporations solve strategically unimportant conflictsSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]The industry began its boom roughly a decade ago. The opening of a market for private militaryservices was the result of a synergy between three powerful forces. The immediate catalyst was amassive disruption in the supply and demand of capable military forces since the end of the ColdWar. Not only did global military downsizing create a new labor pool of over 6 million recentlyretired soldiers, but at the same time there was an increase in violent, but less strategicallysignificant, conflicts around the world. With the great powers less willing to intervene or prop uplocal allies, the outcome was a gap in the market of security, which private firms found themselvesable to fill.


Private Corporations Solve

Private corporations solve better than UNPKO’sSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]The contrasting experiences in Sierra Leone between the military provider firm Executive Outcomesand the U.N.’s peacekeeping operation are the most often cited example of privatization’s promise.In 1995, the Sierra Leone government was near defeat from the ruf, a nefarious rebel group whosehabit of chopping off the arms of civilians as a terror tactic made it one of the most truly evil groupsof the late twentieth century. Supported by multinational mining interests, the government hired theprivate military firm, made up of veterans from the South African apartheid regime’s elite forces, tohelp rescue it. Deploying a battalion-sized unit of assault infantry (numbering in the low hundreds),who were supported by firm-manned combat helicopters, light artillery, and a few armored vehicles,Executive Outcomes was able to defeat the ruf in a span of weeks. Its victory brought enoughstability to allow Sierra Leone to hold its first election in over a decade. After its contracttermination, however, the war restarted. In 1999 the U.N. was sent in. Despite having a budget andpersonnel size nearly 20 times that of the private firm, the U.N. force took several years ofoperations, and a rescue by the British military, to come close to the same results.

Private corporations solve humanitarian aidSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]There are three potential scenarios for the privatization of peacekeeping forces. The first isprivatized protection. The problem of security for relief operations is widespread and pervasive. Infact, more Red Cross workers were killed in action in the 1990s than U.S. Army personnel. Thus,while the ability of humanitarian actors to create a consensual environment themselves is severelylimited, military provider firms might be able to provide site and convoy protection to aid groups.This would allow much more effective aid actions in areas where the local government hascollapsed. Besides the direct benefit to the workers on the ground, better protection might alsoprevent local insurgents from gaining control of supplies and lessen the pressure on outsidegovernments to become involved in messy situations, including scenarios like the 1992 Somaliaoperation. Humanitarian organizations still operating in dangerous places such as Mogadishualready contract for protection with local warlords, so the more formal business alternative might bepreferable. In fact, this scenario is not all that unlikely, given that several U.N. agencies already usesuch firms to provide security for their own offices



Private corporations solve rapid reaction forceSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]The second possibility is hired units constituted as a “Rapid Reaction Force” within an overallpeacekeeping operation. Whenever recalcitrant local parties break peace agreements or threaten theoperation, military firms would be hired to offer the muscle that blue helmets are unable orunwilling to provide. The quick insertion of a more combat-minded force, even a relatively smallprivate one, could be critical in deterring local adversaries and stiffening the back of the overallpeace operation. Paid firms might thus provide the short-term coercion necessary at criticaljunctures in the operation.



Private corporations solve genocideSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]The final, and most contentious, scenario is the complete outsourcing of the operation. When agenocide or humanitarian crisis occurs and no state is willing to step forward to send its own troops,the intervention itself might be turned over to private firms. Upon their hire (by the U.N. or anyoneelse willing to pay), the firm would deploy to a new area, defeat any local opposition, set upinfrastructures for protecting and supporting refugees, and then, once the situation was stabilized,potentially hand over control to regular troops. This idea may sound quite incredible but actuallywas an option considered by policymakers behind closed doors during the refugee crisis that tookplace in eastern Zaire in 1996. Both the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping and the U.S. NationalSecurity Council discussed the idea that, in lieu of U.N. peacekeepers, a private firm be hired tocreate a secure humanitarian corridor. The plan was dismissed when the question of who wouldactually foot the bill was raised.

Private corporations solve genocideSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]The second front is perhaps even more difficult than U.N. reform. The decision towatch genocide and do nothing not only is morally unacceptable, but also is likelyuntenable in a world of ever-present media attention. So, if the internationalcommunity is unwilling to pay the costs of providing its own capable peacekeepingforces, then it is better that it now begin finding ways to mitigate the underlyingconcerns with contracting out humanitarian intervention. This is preferable to an adhoc response at the point of crisis.

Private forces solve the lack of commitment to solving genocideHukill 2004[Traci “Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as ‘privatized peacekeeping’”. TheProgress Report. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]Avoiding new genocides is frequently invoked as a reason to use mercenaries, who, for the rightprice, could be deployed quickly in a crisis. But mercenaries are talked about for less direpeacekeeping missions as well. Doug Brooks sees involving the better private firms -- those withproven records of good service and behavior -- in U.N. peacekeeping operations as an opportunity todo the right thing."The reality is, the West has pretty much abrogated its responsibility forsupporting U.N. operations with boots on the ground in places they don't care about. So in Congo,Liberia, you're not going to see many Western troops getting involved, and that's a shame," he says."If the biggest, richest, best-equipped militaries do not participate, it's really ridiculous to expect amission to succeed."



Private corporations solve failed statesSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]The scenarios illustrate how the concept of the private sector taking over peace operations couldradically transform the very nature of peacekeeping, opening up all sorts of new possibilities. Forexample, firm executives have proposed that they could be paid to take back cities such asMogadishu, which have been lost to warlords and lawlessness. The firms would stabilize them andthen turn the cities over to local or U.N. administration, thus perhaps allowing failed states to rejointhe international system. Similarly, the aforementioned Executive Outcomes performed a businessexploration of whether it would have had the capacity to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. Internalplans claim that the company could have had armed troops on the ground within 14 days of its hireand been fully deployed with over 1,500 of its own soldiers, along with air and fire support (roughlythe equivalent of the U.S. Marine force that first deployed into Afghanistan), within six weeks. Thecost for a six-month operation to provide protected safe havens from the genocide was estimated at$150 million (around $600,000 a day). This private option compares quite favorably with theeventual U.N. relief operation, which deployed only after the killings. The U.N. operation ended upcosting $3 million a day (and did nothing to save hundreds of thousands of lives).



Private forces solve conflict in AfricaSchulhofer-Wohl 2000[Jonah, May 12, Washington Post]With the United Nations' mission to Sierra Leone floundering, and Western nations even morereluctant to contribute troops, there is a need for some alternative way to undertake peacekeeping inAfrica. One such solution may be found in the role that the South Africa-based private militarycompany Executive Outcomes (EO) played in Sierra Leone from May 1995 to January 1997. The United Nations does not like to discuss companies such as EO, shunning them as mercenaries."But it would be wise to examine their activities in Africa more closely. Indeed, EO's operations inSierra Leone stand in stark contrast to those of the United Nations. The status of the current mission,UNAMSIL, is being seriously questioned after the deaths of at least four U.N. peacekeepers and thecapture of hundreds more. At an estimated cost of $260 million over six months, UNAMSIL is avery expensive mission gone wrong. EO's actions in Sierra Leone could not be more different fromthe United Nations'. In the 21 months that it was in Sierra Leone, EO's costs were just $35 million.In that same time period, EO was able to drive back Revolutionary United Front (RUF) troops fromaround the capital, Freetown, retake key mines from the RUF and destroy the RUF's headquarters.This final act brought Foday Sankoh to the negotiating table; he signed a peace agreement inNovember 1996 that enabled elections to take place. To be sure, the fundamental natures of EO andUNAMSIL are diametrically opposed, the latter being an international peacekeeping force, theformer a military company hired to fight for the Sierra Leonean government. And EO, in fulfillingits contract with the government, no doubt had a good deal more leeway to do as it saw fit to subduethe RUF than U.N. troops do now. But its success may also be attributed to its general approach inSierra Leone. Involvement in Angola in 1993 and 1994 gave EO experience in the kind of "lowintensity" conflict that was going on in Sierra Leone. EO used the kamajors, local hunters, ingathering intelligence for its operations, and then used them to occupy captured RUF bases. EO alsocooperated with the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in many of its operations. Thiscoordination allowed EO's small force to overwhelm the far more numerous RUF.



Private security companies are key to avoid over-extension of armies and executingoptimized peacekeeping operations.Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard LawSchool, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Int’l L. 75, p. l/n)

There are many more SCs throughout the world, generated in the militarily advancedcountries and employed by regimes in need of military expertise. Unlike roguemercenaries, SCs provide military training and services in a quasi-official capacity,although their home states are likely to disavow their "private" activities.The modern notion of the mercenary is that of "an international blight in their perpetrationof acts of violence which ruin human lives, create material losses, hamper economicactivity and extend terrorist attacks that have touched off or aggravated conflicts, withoften catastrophic results for those affected." 263 SCs, on the contrary, work withrecognized states to professionalize militaries and restore a semblance of public order.Since they are registered companies, SCs are constrained not only by their employingstates but by the legal obligations and reporting requirements of their home states, as wellas by the desire to remain in the good graces of their home states. Market forces, incombination with the extensive media attention SCs receive, require that they maintain aprofessional reputation respectful of human rights and of their limited mandates.Furthermore, SCs are reluctant to enter arenas in which their governmental employers'legitimacy is unclear and where there is a likelihood of many casualties. In short, to theextent that SCs actually engage in offensive maneuvers, they do not represent the samethreats that mercenaries do. Where SCs have entered conflicts, the ill-disciplined andvengeful national factions fighting for control of resources have been greater threats to thesafety and economic well-being of the population. [*116] SCs fill a void by providing military aid in an age when governments do not havethe resources or political will to enter internal skirmishes or civil wars on behalf ofrecognized regimes. At the same time, poor countries are susceptible to low-level guerrillawars waged by bandits or disaffected members of society because of the countries' lack ofmilitary preparedness and public order. 264 These regimes cannot create well-trainedstanding militaries or modernize antiquated forces because of high costs and the potentialfor military coups by existing military institutions.In this geopolitical context, SCs supply military professionalism, modernization, andexpertise to countries wracked by violence and plagued by social disorder. Given theinternational opprobrium facing foreigners who contribute directly to internal civil wars orunrest in other countries, SCs legitimate their activities and ensure the survival of theirpersonnel by limiting their involvement to military training. In addition to geopoliticalconstraints, SCs are controlled by market forces which make it too costly in pecuniaryterms to enter conflicts in which they might appear to destabilize governments or aggravatemilitary conflicts. In general, the emergence of SCs represents a new form of state agencywhich will persist as long as governments need military aid.



Private peacekeeping avoids the downfalls of U.N. intervention and effectivepeacekeeping.Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard LawSchool, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Int’l L. 75, p. l/n)

SCs fulfill an important role in international peace and security - a role which has beenabdicated by states in many cases. SCs professionalize militaries and restructure officercorps, training them to function within democratic, civilian regimes and to fight underinternationally accepted principles of engagement. Such training makes human rightsabuses by native forces less likely. The training also diminishes the need for outsideintervention in future conflicts since it makes the national forces self-sufficient. SCs allowsmall, struggling states to obtain quick and effective military expertise when other statesare unwilling to devote their national forces or resources to aid besieged governments intheir internal conflicts. Rather than being a threat to small states as mercenaries were in thepast, SCs give small states a degree of independence from large state support or reliance onregional or international intervention. In part, this explains the attempt by the Papua NewGuinea government to hire Sandline International to provide military training and guidanceagainst the BRA. In addition, SCs give governments the military capability to bargain froma position of strength and bring an opposition movement to the negotiating table. 461 Theexpense of SCs' [*151] services forces rulers to make cost-benefit determinations as to thevalue of continuing to fight versus negotiating settlements. 462Though SCs have economic stakes in the outcome of conflicts, they tend to be objectiveand apolitical since they are not personally entangled in the internal conflicts fueling thebattles. Since most of the professional soldiers and trainers have other jobs and are paidwell by SCs directly, they do not volunteer in order to maraud or plunder the countryside.In a situation of social chaos, as appeared in Sierra Leone, such dispassionate agents maybe the only way of restoring order.Low-scale civil conflicts represent a mixture of banditry and civil war fought for control ofeconomic resources. They easily disintegrate into social chaos and spill over intoneighboring countries, as seen in the Great Lakes region, West Africa, and the Sudan-Uganda border region. SCs provide the stabilizing, objective internal force that the UnitedNations and the OAU (among other regional organizations) cannot offer. 463 In addition,these companies protect humanitarian aid agencies and regional organizations, as seen withEO in Sierra Leone and with MPRI in the former Soviet Republics. EO's effectiveness inproviding stability and security has prompted the OAU to consider contracting with EO forcontinent-wide peacekeeping. 464In sum, the SC market has developed because there is a need for such services in the world.465 SCs provide valuable services in restoring order and preventing internal conflicts frombecoming international in scope in countries often ignored by the rest of the world. Yet,SCs have no role in countries with strong, consensual political and social institutions - onereason why EO's presence in PNG was rejected. 466 SCs professionalize militaries,promoting jus in bello principles and preserving the rights of noncombatants.For exporting states, SCs are a means of aiding a regime or ally without committingnational forces or compromising neutrality. Also, the SC gives ex-military officers, whocould be a threat to their home [*152] states, a professional outlet for their services. SCsare an efficient tool for smoothing trouble spots in the international community, and can bevanguards for peace and stability.


***Answers to UN solves


UN doesn’t solve

UN forces further conflicts – NGO’s are neutralCollins, 1995

[U.N. CHAOS-FIXING FAILURE IS NGO CHALLENGE , Carole, National CatholicReporter. 00278939, 3/24/95, Vol. 31, Issue 21]

Many critics overlook the fact that the United Nations has saved many lives in Bosnia and Somalia.But it has largely failed to develop effective strategies and tools for defusing the central conflictsthere. These conflicts are still generating horrific anti-civilian violence and disrupting economicactivities to the point of famine. In Somalia and Bosnia, cases can be made that U.N. presence hasinadvertently served to fuel further conflict. Many Somalis and others believe that Egyptian U.N.Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the United States came to clearly favor Ali Mahdi'sclan-based militia forces over those of Gen. Mohammed Aideed, eroding their credibility as honestbrokers or disinterested mediators. By constantly attacking Aideed's I forces in mid-1993, theUnited States became -- as several observers noted at the time -- little more than another clan factionfighting for supremacy. Indeed, the military and financial massiveness of the U.S.-initiated andU.N.-sustained humanitarian intervention may have prolonged clan conflict. Clans intensified theircompetition for aid resources, the only significant source of income and wealth amid the shatteredruins of Somalia's economy.


***Answers to the PermCooperation between states and NGO’s lead to state control of the organizationCollins, 1995[U.N. CHAOS-FIXING FAILURE IS NGO CHALLENGE , Carole, National CatholicReporter. 00278939, 3/24/95, Vol. 31, Issue 21]

Significant government funding of NGO humanitarian intervention also carries unique moraldilemmas. Some NGOs that accept major government funding and coordinate extensively withmilitary forces become virtual extensions of the state. Some lose credibility as NGOs when, as inSomalia, they become overly dependent on the often controversial presence of foreign troops fortheir safety.

NGO’s can only work independentlyhttp://www.earthsummit2002.org/toolkits/women/un-doku/un-conf/ag21chap27.htm RioEarth Summit 2002 Agenda 21 Chapter 27

Non-governmental organizations play a vital role in the shaping and implementation ofparticipatory democracy. Their credibility lies in the responsible and constructive role they play insociety. Formal and informal organizations, as well as grass-roots movements, should berecognized as partners in the implementation of Agenda 21. The nature of the independent roleplayed by non-governmental organizations within a society calls for real participation; therefore,independence is a major attribute of non-governmental organizations and is the precondition of realparticipation.


Answers to Perm

Cooperation leads to cooptionOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.However, one difficulty lies in the fact that while NGOs can play a vital role in building civil andtherefore global civil society, if their legitimacy and resources are enhanced by increased co-operation with states and international or regional organizations, they may either be forced to takeon board the interests of states in the traditional diplomatic system or states may withdraw theirsupport. An important question, therefore, relates to whether NGOs can help states and internationalorganizations iron out difficulties in the peacemaking apparatus of the international systempertaining to intractable conflict, or whether states and NGOs are on a collision course with eachother.


Answers to Perm

Cooperation between states and NGO’s lead to state control of the organizationCollins, 1995[U.N. CHAOS-FIXING FAILURE IS NGO CHALLENGE , Carole, NationalCatholic Reporter. 00278939, 3/24/95, Vol. 31, Issue 21]Significant government funding of NGO humanitarian intervention also carries unique moraldilemmas. Some NGOs that accept major government funding and coordinate extensively withmilitary forces become virtual extensions of the state. Some lose credibility as NGOs when, as inSomalia, they become overly dependent on the often controversial presence of foreign troops fortheir safety.

UN and private corporation’s forces can’t cooperate togetherSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]Similar concerns also occur at the operational level. In the rapid reaction force scenario, forexample, there will likely be difficulties of integrating a better-paid private force within a largerU.N. peacekeeping force. The probable resentment between the two forces could jeopardizeoperational cohesion. Likewise, it is difficult to determine who should be in operational command.Few military firms are willing to accept outside commanders of their units, particularly from theU.N., while clients would obviously prefer to have their own people at the top. In lieu of this, somefirms have expressed a willingness to allow outside observers to be present during their operations.The exact powers of these observers, though, are also unsettled. For example, who will providethem and ensure their independence? Will they be like rapporteurs, just providing independentreporting on the operations, or like referees, with the ability to veto certain actions or suspendoperations in mid-course?


Answers to perm

Private forces/NGO’s avoid politicsSchulhofer-Wohl 2000[Jonah, May 12, Washington Post] Yet they could present a remedy to the recent refusals by France, Britain and the United States tosend troops to bolster UNAMSIL's forces. These refusals stem in part from the experience inSomalia. No country wishes to embark on a peacekeeping mission and find its troop contributionbeing sent home in coffins. But the deaths of the soldiers of a private military company, to be blunt,would not cause the same political problem that the deaths of a country's nationals do.

Governments will attempt to intervene with NGO independence.Mayhew and Ambegaokar, Centre for Population Studies, 2002 (Susannah and Maia,“Health NGOs and the State: Conflict, control or collaboration?”)http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/cps/dfid/2002_88.htm

Over the past two decades a ‘new policy agenda’ has emerged in the health anddevelopment sector, favouring donor support for non-government organisations overcentralised government hegemony for implementing health services in developingcountries. NGOs are deemed to have a number of comparative advantages overgovernment sectors such as reaching the hardest-to-reach segments to providing services inareas of government weakness or apathy. The increasing attention being given, particularlyto southern NGOs and notably in the field of reproductive health and rights, has sparkedincreased attention – not necessarily benign – from developing country governments. Whatemerge are diverse State legislative responses to NGOs reflecting fluctuating ideologicalboundaries between control and collaboration.Drawing on recent qualitative policy research in Asia, this paper details a spectrum oflegislation and relationships which are influenced by prevailing power-bases andideologies with governments typically perceiving NGOs as a threat to their hegemony andNGOs being wary of government intervention threatening their independence. Vietnam forexample fiercely safeguards its ideological supremacy, controlling rather than regulatingand enabling its NGO sector; Cambodia meanwhile has no formal policies on the NGOsector. Notably, in countries with long-established local NGO sectors (Bangladesh andNepal), the NGOs themselves may call for quality regulations and clarity of Government-NGO relations. The paper calls for a spectrum of collaboration to be forged between NGOsand governments if a mutually acceptable balance is to be achieved between thehegemonies of public and NGO sectors and between control and regulation. Without thisequilibrium the improvement of health and health services will be impaired.


***NGO’s better than the UNNGO’s are oriented towards conflict resolution and not towards politics

Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.Increasingly, peacemaking, humanitarian and peace-building tasks are being delegated by states andintergovernmental organizations to NGOs that have humanitarian, developmental, human rights,educational, and conflict resolution orientations. These actors are forming a vital role in thedevelopment of new approaches to ending conflict, particularly in the context of their growing linkswith transnational organizations and their professed interests in human security issues. Theseinterests appear to be constituted by their civic nature both at the local and international level; andthough they may express partisan interests the amelioration of the root causes of conflict appears tobe their over-riding objective.

NGO’s have more legitimacy than traditional peacekeepersOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.This paper argues that it is in this late Westphalian context, via their focus on human securityderived from a world view provided by conflict resolution approaches, that NGOs derive increasinglevels of legitimacy, at both the local and global level. This legitimacy is also the basis on whichthey gain access to areas in conflict zones that would normally be marginalized or denied toformally constituted peacemaking actors. As the UN Secretary General has pointed out, NGOspromote and provide access to a global civil society. Understanding in particular the role of NGOsin constituting global civil society may enable peace-building approaches to tap into the relativesuccess that NGOs have had in micro-political environments, and the macro-political changes whichare also occurring.


NGO’s Better than UN

NGO’s mediate conflicts better than statesOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.Human rights abuses by states, the oppression of minorities, and the suppression of their claims forrepresentation, democratization, education and development tend to be highly politicized in localenvironments and therefore need to be addressed at a level at which states are marginalized. This isparticularly so if states themselves cannot find a consensus on what should be done and committhemselves to facilitate its achievement. Given that states control the majority of the world'sresources this is extremely difficult, but it may well be easier to mediate the interests of thoseengaged in intractable conflict via NGOs (directly or indirectly) and regional and internationalorganizations, with state actors and interests remaining indirectly involved. This would ultimatelyaid in the channelling of norms of an ethical nature for peace, representation, democratization anddevelopment into local environments.

Private forces have been training than UN forcesSchulhofer-Wohl 2000[Jonah, May 12, Washington Post] Add to this the fact that military companies still in business (EO closed in 1998), such as theBritish-based Sandline International, have experience in Africa, and they become a more attractiveoption. The capabilities of military companies go beyond the provision of combat troops. Sandlineis registered with the United Nations' Common Supply Database, and Military ProfessionalResources was used in the former Yugoslavia in 1994, furnishing 45 border monitors in a contractwith the State Department.


NGO’s Better than UN

Private forces save moneyHukill 2004[Traci “Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as ‘privatized peacekeeping’”. TheProgress Report. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]This most likely represents significant savings. Although the United Nations has issued no costestimate for a Sudan mission, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has proposed spending $418million on a 5,600-man mission to Burundi, a small Central African nation about the size ofMaryland. "The practical reality is, the United Nations is probably going to try and do Sudan itselfwithout using as much private support as we'd like to provide," Brooks says. But he is obliged to try.As president of the Arlington, Va.-based International Peace Operations Association, a consortiumof 10 military mercenary firms available for hire, it's his job to drum up business. Lately, that meanstrying to persuade the United Nations to give mercenaries -- "privatized peacekeeping" -- a chance.The United Nations is facing a peacekeeping crisis. The Department of Peacekeeping Operationsbegan emitting distress signals months ago about the number of blue berets and blue helmets it willbe expected to muster this year -- up to 20,000 for missions in Ivory Coast, Haiti, and possiblyBurundi and Sudan, and all at a time when troop-contributing countries are under pressure fromWashington to send soldiers to Iraq. If the Burundi and Sudan missions become reality, the U.N.will have 45,000 peacekeepers deployed, the highest number since the mid-1990s


*** UN Peacekeepers BadGovernment sponsored peacekeeping is based on a form of coercion and zero-suminterestsOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. Universityof St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.

First generation approaches are based upon the tradition, norms, and culture of western diplomacyand operate at the level of the state in the context of an assumed Westphalian international system.As such, first generation peacekeeping operations (like UNFICYP, for example) are based on stateinterests while international mediation and negotiation represent stylized and formal communicationbetween official and sovereign representatives, based upon zero-sum interests. Such interests can bemanipulated and coordinated, but only through the use of coercion, in the presence of ripe moments,mainly engendered by hurting stalemates of the external provision of large incentives, of which thesettlement of the Egypt Israel conflict at Camp David, or the more recent settlement at Dayton, aregood examples.

Formalized peacekeeping ignores ethnic groups and unofficial actorrsOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.In this high level process there is little room for unofficial actors, whose separate legitimacy tends tobe unrecognized and subsumed by officialdom. Thus, it is an inflexible process best suited to state-centric types of conflicts that seem to have declined. The very obvious weaknesses of firstgeneration approaches have been highlighted by the emergence of ethnic actors, identity claims,humanitarian and development issues, all of which are now often components of conflict andcomplex emergencies. First generation traditional peacemaking activities therefore attempt tooperate in the realms of traditional diplomacy in which the state holds [a somewhat contested]thrall.[4] International mediation therefore aims at outcomes based on the intricacies of potentiallyfragile status quos. Mandell has argued that mediation could influence the creation andinternalization of new norms for conflict management,[5] but this is unlikely if such norms arelimited to the local and are not derived from a global or regional dialogue.


UN Peacekeepers bad

Formalized peacekeeping doesn’t represent the interests of the peopleOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01Power-based mediation, because of its mono-dimensional nature, can do little more that manageshort-term strategic interactions, particularly given the fact that under the auspices of a statesponsor, or of the UN, it must observe the norms of international law and international society.Thus, it often falls victim to the tensions between the two. Because mediation is constructed as amono-dimensional activity it lacks co-ordination with other peacemaking activities at other levels,and falls victim to the ethical void that traditional diplomacy depicts the Westphalian internationalsystem as being indicative of. It is merely assumed that citizen interests will trickle up to form thenational interest, which will influence the formation of foreign policy. Clearly, such assumptions donot accurately mirror the issues and actors engaged in intractable conflict or complex emergencies,and therefore the whole process of diplomacy tends to become ensnared upon the need for officiallegitimacy, recognition, and the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Often the role of thethird party becomes one of mediating between two [partly ambiguously] legitimate sets of principlesinherent in a flawed international system- for example, self-determination and sovereignty and thecontinuing controversies over the issue of legitimate intervention, which draw on differentapproaches to international law and ethics. First generation approaches to ending conflict tend to beoverpowered by the tension between the relative interests and leverage of sponsor-states, third partystates and actors and the disputants themselves, situating the practice firmly in the realm oftraditional diplomacy and power politics. It is this stumbling block that the international communityhas attempted to address since the end of the Cold War.


UN Peacekeepers bad

State actors (the UN) can’t compromise with warring parties – peacekeeping failsOliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs.University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. MartinInstitute, 2001-01-01.In response to the inadequacies of first generation approaches, it has been argued that settlementsneed to be based upon just political orders which promotes democracy and human rights, newnorms, participatory governance structures, civil society, international tribunals, and truthcommissions. Disarming, repatriating refugees, building a consensus for peace under the auspices ofthe UN, and moderate local political leadership play a role in this method.[21] This is based onconflict resolution perspectives of conflict, and requires deep access into local environments,something that requires grassroots processes rather than top down approaches. NGOs can oftenprovide this because of their unofficial and human security oriented focus. State centric approachescannot operate at this level. What this means is that first generation approaches fail in manyconflicts because the structural asymmetry between state and non-state actors make compromiseunlikely.


***Answers To


Answers to: No accountabilityMarket forces keep the firms in lineHukill 2004[Traci “Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as ‘privatized peacekeeping’”. The ProgressReport. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]

The incident goes to the heart of the accountability issue. Brooks maintains that market forces keepfirms in line, because no one wants to hire a company with black marks on its behavior orperformance record. This is a reasonable argument and may prove right in the long run, but in theshort term, DynCorp does not appear to have suffered much from the Bosnia scandal. The companydropped a court appeal against the whistle-blower only after it was awarded a $50 million contractlast year for work in Iraq. In the meantime, Brooks is advocating for greater transparency amongprivate mercenary firms. His association has a code of conduct for its members, and Brooks saysthat his firms would welcome impartial observers to monitor their employees' behavior.

Private forces will not comply with illegal operationsHukill 2004[Traci “Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as ‘privatized peacekeeping’”. The ProgressReport. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]

In their place are private military companies (PMCs), staffed by former special forces and front-linesoldiers who find no call for their services in the civilian world but dislike the term mercenaries."Weare not mercenaries. Northbridge is a legitimate private military company that only works fordemocratically elected national governments or recognized agencies," said Andrew Williams of theAnglo-American company Northbridge Services Group. "Our people are contracted to us, notdirectly to any government or other organization. We have been approached for other work butrejected it because it was illegal," he said in an interview.


AT: Aid dependence badAid is key to keep NGOs independent from corrupting market forcesAlan Fowler, co-founder of the International NGO Training and Research Centre basedin Oxford, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 642-3There arc a number of worrying issues associated with a trend from civic topublic legitimacy. First is the vulnerability that official aid brings. While the proportion of tax-derived aid to NGDOS is currently climbing, overall levels of aid are rapidly decreasing. It isapparent that, in the eyes of policy makers, aid is loosing its value for global development and asan instrument with which to pursue foreign interests. When growth in official Finance to NGDOSeventually collides with diminishing levels of aid, the situation for many of them will he perilous.Hence, one interpretation of the official concern with NGDO capacity building and of theemphasis on their sustainability is that, at its core, this is part of a long-term reduction andwithdrawal strategy for international aid. Some aid will probably remain, channelled to the mostimpoverished countries, especially to those whose stability is fragile, posing a threat to regionaland global security. But open trade and foreign direct investment are taking over as the preferredmode for allocating development capital and accelerating economic growth based on competitionfor individual gain. The negative impact of such a shift on equity, sustainability and justice arealready to be seen. Second, and more importantly, because of a deeper association with officialaid, a large proportion of NGDOS are being compromised in their motivation and ability to thinkabout, let alone promote, alternative ideas, language and paths for developing sustainablesocieties. One example is the apparent uncritical acceptance of the convergence of alldevelopment endeavours around 'partnership'. Presently, with a few exceptions, NGDO evolutionin thinking and practice is being strongly conditioned by a questionable paradigm of civic'partnership' with states and markets. The original 1970s NGDO concept of partnership waspremised on moral and political solidarity. The concept has subsequently been usurped by all andsundry within and beyond the aid system, such that the term is, in itself, empty without acomplementary explanation by the user of what exactly is meant (Fowler, 1998). The attractionof 'partnership' as a framework for international development is that it provides an innocuouscover for a systematic push to reconfigure relations within all developing societies into thesame mould. Partnership as articulated by donors corresponds to the 'social contracts'arrangements prevalent in Western Europe and Canada. Such an agenda is informed by the beliefthat this model is the best way to deal with dysfunction and limits to competitive growth in amarket economy (Group of Lisbon, 1995). This 'one measure fits all' approach is patently wrongas a development framework because it downplays or discounts the individual historicaltrajectory, relative strength and interplay of forces in other societies. It flies in the face of pastlessons of development experience, which clearly demonstrate the importance of local specificityin selecting policies and interventions (Adieman & Morris, 1997). It also ignores the fact that theconditions within which European social contracts evolved no longer apply in Europe itself, letalone elsewhere in the world." Simply put, it cannot be assumed, a priori, that a harmonic modelwith aligned interests between state, capital, labour and civic forces is appropriate or desirable atthis moment in time for (ill societies. Such an assumption ignores the importance of contention inthe evolution of Northern societies. Working through conflict and dissent in their own historicalprocesses has resulted in different emphases in the socioeconomic configurations and conventionsthey have produced. Of critical importance, however, is that each configuration and set ofconventions is institutionalised in an 'organic' way. In other words, they are not artificiallysupported or falsely legalised patterns of social and economic relations but enjoy broad publicsupport because they are home-grown and home-owned. An organic process produces a basicstability and shapes the unique character of a nation and society. Partnership policy, on the otherhand, opportunistically presupposes that, with judicious applications of foreign aid. any society


can circumvent the internal struggles required to balance forces in ways that lead to an organicconfiguration of relations along social contract or other lines. There is no foundation for thisassumption, but its uniformity is both convenient and politically correct. With a few notedexceptions, such as NGDO agitation at the 1998 and 1999 meetings of the World TradeOrganization, the mainstream of NGDOS appears to be buying into this type of partnershipagenda (Madeley, 1998; Jenkins, 1998). There are few examples of a reasoned rejection ofpartnership as the basis of NGDO relations with other actors in the aid system or for howdevelopment needs to proceed in a particular context. This further implies a shift of NGDOdevelopment frameworks and interpretations from civic to public. A growing association withand dependency on official aid brings with it the danger that NGDOS act as conspirators, ratherthan partners, in a questionable approach to development and to promoting the interests of (pooror excluded) civic groups. Retaining a civic stance is also being hampered because many NGDOSappear to find it difficult to articulate alternatives or to criticise the prevailing orthodoxy in termsof its fundamentals as opposed to its operations. One reason is that the necessary concepts andlanguage are not there or a common currency. Consequently, today much NGDO discourse isframed in market terms. A few examples. The task of NGDOS is to generate value-added, not tocreate reform. NGDOS do not produce social benefits, but services. They are working for 'clients'with needs, not constituencies with interests. Generally speaking, the NGDO community has atworst not recognised, or at best lagged behind, the conscious long-term investment made byextreme pro-market forces to steer the thinking and language of debate about society anddevelopment. (And the terminology used in this paper reflects the problem.) In Moving a PublicAgenda (Covington, 1997), Sally Covington shows how 12 right-wing think tanks worked overmany years to fund NGOS to change the language of politics. Their (successful?) goal was basedon making the world free for unfettered global capitalism, dismantling public services andwelfare states and promoting the rights of individuals over that of community (Knight, 1988).Without a similar effort to construct a language of alternatives with other values and propositions,NGDOS will be less able to understand and express their identity in their own terms. They willalso be ill-equipped to get a distinctive grip on the debate.


AT: Aid dependence bad

Market reliance decreases NGO community empowermentAlan Fowler, co-founder of the International NGO Training and Research Centre basedin Oxford, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 644-5

Overall, the past 80 years have seen an interesting evolution in motivation and legitimacy forNGDO action. In terms of inspirations, we now have a complex mix of spiritual calling, secularhuman compassion, political ideologies and their imperatives, and people's anger about particularissues. NGDO legitimacy has also become more complicated because of varying amalgamationsbetween broadly and deeply civic, highly individual and status-based, and public-domain support.'However, it can be argued that past trends are an insecure guide to NGDOS in the future. Why?Because the global context signals a discontinuity or turning point in the world's structure and themanagement of its affairs. Aided by technology, the turning point has pivoted on the adoption of asingle global economic model of free trade-based, market capitalism. Paradoxically, while themodel may be the best we know so far for generating economic wealth, Asia has already seen that itcan destroy wealth just as easily. Consequently, the scenario before us is one where NGDOS' pastcomplex motivations and legitimacy are coming to an end in favour of a market discourse and itsvalues. It would appear that NGDOS are about to succumb to the homogenising forces of economicglobalisation in favour of a market-inspired model of NGDO identity and behaviour. Such a modelgives highest merit to values of individualism, competition, extraction, accumulation, exploitationand rivalry as the normative mode for relations between people and between people and nature. Thenegative social effects are manifest and manifold: for example, destabilising social relations, erodingsocial capital and undermining virtuous values, such as trust, reciprocity, mutuality, co-operationand tolerance of difference. There are also unwelcome political effects in the accumulation of powerwithin a few corporations whose practical accountability to and through shareholders to society atlarge is grossly overstated (Korten. 1995). An additional perspective is that there is nothing intrinsicto the dominant model that will produce or secure many of the basic rights that people, through theirgovernments, have determined to be part and parcel of a reasonable human existence. To generatesuch rights, the model must be guided and bound by civic influence and choice. If, as seems likely,governments continue to adopt and apply this model for economy, society and development, a'turning point' issue for NGDOS whose legitimacy comes from 'public association' is to fall into lineor decline. Responding to this possibility contains both moral and practical dimensions. The moraldimension relates to the values on which NGDOS operate. Are they to be derived by allying withthe public sector or with the civic groups and constituencies whose interests NODOS say they taketo heart? In practical terms, this means strategising and organising for zero or minimumvulnerability to decisions about allocating public finance. The search, therefore, is for an alternativedevelopment framework or paradigm that delivers on two fronts. First, to ensure the propagation ofcivic values and legitimacy. Second to provide the freedom to explore and pursue alternatives to theprevailing development model and its Financing. To what extent does social entrepreneurship orcivic innovation satisfy these requirements?


******AFF ANSWERS

NGOs bad1. NGOs can’t solve: 9 reasonsSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.159

In general, indigenous NGOs are hampered by several shortcomings. They are not well coordinated,they often vigorously compete for scarce resources, and for the most part they avoid conflicts withthe regime by remaining apolitical. In fact many LC officials and bureaucrats head or are involvedin NGOs. NGOs are mostly headquartered in Kampala, whereas the population is predominantlyrural, with most decisions emanating from the top down. Because they are heavily reliant on foreigndonors, NGOs are often more accountable to those donors then they are to their constituents, withthe recipients of aid disenfranchised and limited in the contributions they can make to their owndevelopment. And NGOs are increasingly headed by bureaucrats and members of the middle class,reflecting an understanding by many Ugandans that the way to make money is to set up your ownNGO. Consequently, indigenous NGOs in Uganda are often cynically viewed as being part of the'pajero culture' which suggests that they are helping few besides themselves.

2. Giving development assistance to NGOs causes aid pathology; increased povertyand public rejection result.Alan Fowler, co-founder of the International NGO Training and Research Centre basedin Oxford, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 591-2

These two examples of change in NGDO behaviour because of a greater reliance on official aid are,in fact, the tip of a more substantial iceberg of the danger of public mistrust by association. By tyingthemselves more closely to official aid and its excessive, dysfunctionally 'projectised' way ofworking (Fowler, 1997: 16-18), NGDOS embrace the risk of being tarred with the same brush ofpoor performance and of being smitten by the same pathologies. A recent estimate is that aid-fundedinterventions are only sustainable in some 15% of cases (Cox & Healy, 1998).'" Moreover, thenumber of poor people in the world has not diminished, but increased. After 30 years of effort, thisresult does not inspire public confidence. What, one might naturally ask, has caused thisdisappointing level of achievement? One answer is that the aid system has evolved to embody anumber of deep-seated illnesses or pathological traits that create perverse incentives, debilitatingand corrupt behaviours and a 'suspended' layer of southern NGDOS. These factors combine to workagainst best practice, a high level of achievement and gaining public trust. For example, in Russiaand countries newly independent of the Soviet Union, NGDOS are too often perceived as covers for organisedcrime (see, eg CAF, 1999). In Pakistan and Bangladesh some NGDOS are seen to serve as fronts forexternally funded fundamentalist causes, while in Central Asia they are utilised as platforms forfailed politicians. Simply put, nowhere in the world can the growth of NGDOS be equated withpubic recognition or trust in who they are or what they do. However, the structural nature of aidpathology is actually more worrying for NGDOS than such 'transitional' problems of post-SovietEurope and public scepticism elsewhere.


NGOs bad

3. Ending aid to NGOs will force the government to provide for social services, orface political and social upheaval.Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 661

Equally if not more importantly, it should also force governments and international multilateral andfinancial institutions to take the fulfilment of their core obligations to citizens (eg povertyeradication, universal, free basic social service provision) more seriously and urgently than theycurrently do. This is because they know that in the current 'moral hazard' system they can remainrelatively complacent because they are inevitably bailed out by willing but surrogate NGO socialservice deliverers. In a world with much reduced NGO aid, such service delivery substitution willobviously not be feasible for NGOS for purely financial reasons, either in terms of the overall needor even the scale that is currently implemented by them. Consequently, governments and theinternational civil service community will be under much more pressure to deliver on their coreroles and responsibilities. If they do not do so. the risks of social and political upheaval and thesystemic failure of the globalised laissez-faire market economy will be significantly higher than it isat present or is likely to remain in the prevailing system, notwithstanding the current crisis in keyaspects of globalisation. This is because, even in the existing crisis, the ladles in the global soupkitchen' role of most NGOS has remained intact. In fact, it has been enhanced, once againcushioning what would otherwise have been a much more severe social impact than that currentlybeing felt by the most affected population groups. Such cushioning will clearly be less possible in aworld of greatly diminished aid! It can only be hoped that a future with greatly diminished aid willforce many governments and NGOS to revert to what their main role should be. It should remindboth sets of actors that there are core or 'universal' roles and duties of states and governments totheir citizens that should not vary over time in different societies at the same stage of development(see van Tuiji in this issue). This should also be the fundamental and overarching premise andframework that guides the determination of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of NGOs.


Aid Dependence DA

Aid will continue to decrease in coming decades. NGOs must become independent.Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 656-7

Against this scenario, a future without aid would clearly be a welcome development if this was aresult of developing countries making the transition from their current condition of absolute orrelative poverty to its total eradication. After all, conceptually, aid has always been viewed as atransitionary but necessary evil until poverty is removed. It is clearly not desirable as a permanentstate of affairs! Unfortunately, though, the future without aid or, more accurately, the future withvastly diminished aid that we are contemplating in this issue is not happening because poverty hasdeclined and there is no need for aid. Instead, a beyond-aid scenario is under discussion bothbecause the richer industrialised countries of the world have chosen to diminish their flow ofconcessionary assistance to developing countries and because, intentionally, private capital flows todeveloping countries in this decade have all but eclipsed it. Indeed, the current dominant processesof globalisation are led by the forces of market economics and borderless international finance.These processes have had and continue to have an overarching, overwhelming and pre-eminent rolein both stimulating and determining many of the dramatic trends described earlier. They have aparticular impact on trade, investment and other financial and economic flows and arrangements thatare predominant among current global and regional trends. As a direct result of the current dominantprocesses of economic globalisation under way, total private capital flows (eg foreign directinvestment, portfolio equity) to developing countries increased more than six-fold from US$41.9billion to US$256 billion in less than a decade, ie between 1990 and 1997.' Of this amount, portfolioequity capital, which is relatively footloose and volatile. reached close to $46 billion in 1996 (a 14-fold increase over 1990) before falling to $32.5 billion in 1997 in the wake of the Asian-led globalfinancial crisis. Such flows to Asia are now in the process of gradually recovering. Global officialdevelopment finance or ODA, on the other hand, declined to $44.2 billion in 1997 from $56.4billion in 1990. This amount represents just slightly more than private capital flows to one Asiancountry in 1996, namely the PRCY, which received a record $42.3 billion that year (World Bank,1998). The astonishing increase in the magnitude of foreign private capital inflows (outside OF.CDcountries) has resulted in a ratio of almost 6:1 in favour of private capital flows in 1997. This is adramatic reversal from the ratio of less than 0.75:1 in favour of QUA less than a decade ago. Such areversal has far-reaching implications, not least of which has been the dramatically changeddynamic in both the relationships between the market and the state and between those who canactively participate in the former versus those who remain primarily dependent on the latter. Thepoor and already vulnerable who have largely depended on ODA flows through the state have, notsurprisingly, been among the major losers in this new scenario of greatly diminishing ODA. In thiscontext, NGOS that have largely depended on their governments or multilateral agencies for theirfunding (eg in Canada) have also had to contemplate a future without aid, or at least with greatlydiminished aid. While it is true that many governments and multilateral donors are placing anincreasing proportion of their shrinking ODA resources through NGOS, the overall magnitude ofthe cuts to the aid budget in many industrialised countries has nevertheless resulted in diminishedcontributions to NGOS in these countries. Moreover, many northern bilateral donors arcincreasingly channelling their diminished ODA directly to Southern NGOS, bypassing NorthernNGOS in many instances. Development education centres run in the North that have, in manysituations, been totally dependent on ODA, have also often suffered most, with many of themclosing forever. Coupled with increased market pressures is competition for the private donor dollar.For the context of shrinking states forces a proliferation of overseas-focused NGOS to compete withdomestically focused charities and social welfare organisations that face increasing demands fromwithin the industrialised North itself. Many Northern development NGOS, especially those withoutsolid and committed constituencies or tried and tested marketing and fundraising strategies, havefound that their non-ODA private funding base has significantly shrunk at the same time that theirODA contributions have reduced. While not universally applicable, a reduction in the funding baseof many northern NGOS appears to have been a general trend cutting across most industrialisedcountries during the mid to late 1990s—a trend that remains true today.


Aid Dependence DA

Despite short-term problems, cutting aid now will improve the transition to aidindependenceKamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 667

The metamorphosis in roles and responsibilities suggested in the preceding pages, especially for thecurrent major NGO service providers, will neither be easy or without pain. It will require majorinstitutional surgery that is always more painful when forced (as in an NGO future without aid)compared with when it comes voluntarily. It will also require NGOS to 'compete' with citizens'social movements and other groups in both North and South that have never entered the aid resourcetransfer paradigm hut historically have instead chosen, since their very inception, to play the role ofsocietal watchdogs and activists. Despite the obvious difficulties and challenges, it is stillworthwhile and necessary to stimulate a global movement for social change and against poverty thatis not premised on the old aid paradigm of resource transfer. Indeed, only then will we be able tomove closer to the desirable vision of 'a more global view of development problems built uponalliances of competent agencies having wide experience and bringing complementary resources andskill to bear—such alliances must be made up of a wide variety of non-governmental agencies,people's organisations, women's movements, environmental groups as well as those human rights,peace and lobbying organisations who are dealing with the broader issues.' (Roche, 1998). Indeed,this is the brave new unfamiliar world that many currently large NGOS will find themselves forcedinto for survival for the first time in a future without aid or with vastly diminished aid. This willrequire both rapid and significant institutional downsizing and a fast learning curve all at once ifsuch NGOS are to survive and build or retain their relevance and credibility with their erstwhile ornew partners in the new millennium we have just entered.


Decreased aid good

Decreasing aid to NGOs allows them to focus on political empowermentKamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 665-6

As part of their seriousness in pursing this outcome, NGOS need to help politically committedgovernments to build a socially cohesive and integrated national, regional and global constituencyfor such a social agenda. An emphasis on long-term development education of the kind alreadydiscussed will make an important contribution to this objective. NGOS are clearly better placed thangovernments and intergovernmental organisations to play such roles. All of the above implies that inan NGO future without aid, such organisations can be and, hopefully, are more likely to direct theirlimited resources and energies to campaigning, advocacy and other policy influencing strategiesaimed at ensuring that states and intergovernmental organisations fulfil their core responsibilitiesand nationally and internationally agreed commitments. Indeed, such tasks will be increasinglyattractive thanks to their cost-effectiveness as well as their civic appropriateness! Policy influencingshould be directed at the major national, regional and global power holders, including but notlimited to governments. Such a task also implies an NGO commitment to monitoring theperformance of official organisations against commitments made by them (eg Social Watch) orpioneering process and content alternatives to the dominant mainstream policies of the internationalfinancial institutions (eg as the Structural Adjustment Paiticipatory Review Initiative (SAI'RI) andthe broader network, SAPRIN, are attempting to do). Notwithstanding a changed emphasisprioritising 'non-funding' roles over funding and service delivery and even in an environment ofdiminished aid, NGOS should, through their grassroots-level initiatives, he able to continue tostrengthen those aspects of government policies and services which contribute to the realisation ofthe latter's core responsibilities. This is best achieved through practical, innovative, grassroots,community-based NGO programmes of action, grammes of action, (sic) which politicallycommitted governments can replicate andscale up (Famngton & Bebbington, 1993).

Decreasing aid is good. NGOs are structurally incapable of large-scale socialprogramsKamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 665

The appropriate framework for determining desirable NGOS functions needs to consciouslyconsider areas in which they have a distinct potential or a demonstrated comparative advantage vis-à-vis the state and the market (Korten, 1990). Here again, NGO strengths do not lie in the large-scale service delivery that is necessary to make a significant dent in either poverty or inequalityreduction, employment creation or even social integration. Only governments andintergovernmental multilateral institutions are equipped to operate on the scale that is necessary ifpoverty eradication, full employment and social integration are to be achieved in a sustainablemanner. Assigning such roles to NGOS instead of to governments and intergovernmentalorganisations whose main duty this should be is, therefore, both inappropriate andcounterproductive, especially in the long run. An NGO future without aid should make such rolesless possible and frequent. This change would increase the chance that more appropriate roles,which require significantly fewer Financial resources than surrogate service delivery, will receive ahigher priority from most NGOS than they have been accorded so far. As argued above, potentialfunctions should primarily be in the 'watchdog' areas of monitoring, advocacy and policyinfluencing to ensure that an enabling environment is created and sustained by states andintergovernmental organisations.


Decreased aid good

Decreasing aid leads to NGO grassroots political empowermentKamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 666

NGOS should also concentrate more on finding strategic ways in which such micro practical workcan directly influence broader macro-policy alternatives which are better suited to achieving thecore responsibilities and commitments of states to the poor and vulnerable in society. This willclearly require a range of negotiating and advocacy skills that most NGOS have not demonstratedeither an interest, willingness or capability of developing so far. However, this is slowly hut surelychanging as more NGOS realise that their objectives will remain Utopian without linking suchmicro-macro issues. An NGU future of greatly diminished aid should surely give an impetus to suchprogrammes that require relatively little financial input, especially in relation to their strategic valueand potential impact and 'multiplier' outcomes. Other appropriate functions that NGOS may be morewilling to take up in a future without aid (not least because they will or should be less worried thatbilateral sources will reduce their financial resources) include: (a) Effectively challenging theauthoritarian roles and tendencies of governments, while simultaneously attempting to identifyand strengthen the enabling and activist role that the state has also played in the erstwhile 'economicmiracle' and aspiring miracle countries of East and Southeast Asia. This is particularly important innon-democratic states where it is hard to see how NGOS can work in partnership orcollaboration with their governments and where, therefore, putting continuous pressure on suchgovernments for change in appropriate ways may be the primary enabling environment role thatNGOS should prioritise and play, if this is realistic. (b) Helping lo build transparent andaccountable states and governments with the political will, capacity and ability to guard, stronglyregulate and enforce legislation and other appropriate action against the excesses of both anunregulated market and civil society on behalf of and in favour of poor, vulnerable and marginalizedpeople all over the world. This is an increasingly urgent but challenging task in the current globaland regional environment. It is nevertheless essential for the achievement of the core duties andcommitments of states. (c) Devising an appropriate and effective response to the major andincreasing service delivery gaps being created by the dominance of macrocconomic neoliberalism,which is simultaneously causing the roll-back of the state and the growing asymmetrical power ofthe market, especially big business, over both governments and civil society. It is crucial thatNGOS find ways of doing this without themselves becoming mere ladles in the global soupkitchen'. While this does not imply that NGOS should never be involved in direct poverty reductionor employment expansion programmes, it does imply (hat their state substitution roles in scaled-updirect service delivery should be limited to situations of short-term crisis and humanitarian responseas far as possible.


Aid => dependence

Turn: Aid to NGOs causes dependence, not empowermentSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs inAfrica, 1998, p.161

Indigenous NGOs, in general, are consequently on shaky ground and have far to go in order to builda strong and supportive constituency within the wider community. As long as the general publicperceives them cynically as money-making fronts and forums for personal enrichment, their abilityto command a strong following or empowering role is limited. A study of Luwero found that 'peoplewant assistance which meets immediate needs' (Kwesiga and Ratter, 1993, p. 47). Another studyfound that approximately 20 out of 56 NGOs operating in Luwero have left no impact, according tothe District Administrator Francis Wanyina (The Monitor, 11-14 May 1993). Increasingly, manyNGOs are becoming like middle-men in the dispensation of aid, creating a growing ruraldependency on NGOs. This reflects the climate of aid provision. Economic liberalization haspressured NGOs to focus their efforts on service-provision and tangible results rather than focusingon intangibles such as empowerment. A heavy reliance on foreign donors for continued survivaloften places NGOs in a position where they are more accountable to their donors then they are totheir own constituency and participants. Many intermediate-level NGOs therefore become virtualmiddle-brokers in the facilitation of aid money between foreign donors and grassroots groups. Thisdoes not help to empower people, but often serves to create a new dependency on foreign aidFiltered through NGOs. 57 It also weakens the NGOs because this dependence creates long-terminstability and lack of continuity in programme planning. NGOs are becoming more rather than lessdependent on donor funding, decreasing the prospects for short-term if not long-term self-sufficiency.

Aid dependency is caused by funneling through NGOs. They lose focus on their realagendaAlex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disaster relief industry inAfrica, 1997, p. 141

From the early 1980s, more and more NGOs have taken more and more government money forrelief programmes and become what David Korten calls 'public service contractors'. At first thesignificance of this passed almost unnoticed, perhaps because emergency work was considered adistraction from the main task of 'development', and emergencies occasioned a partial suspension ofcritical faculties as well as a readiness to bend the normal operating rules. For example. Oxfam put aceiling on the proportion of income it could receive from governments for 'development' work, butmade an exception for relief. Three-quarters of UK food aid is now handled by NGOs, and themajor US relief agencies - CARE, Catholic Relief Services and World Vision - regularly undertakemajor food aid programmes funded in large part or even wholly by USAID. The creation and rapidexpansion of the European Commission Humanitarian Office has led to some European agencyprogrammes being wholly reliant on EU funding. Even Christian Aid, a non-operational agencyexplicitly dedicated to a high level of quality control in its grant-giving, has taken high levels ofgovernment money, chiefly for its emergency programmes. The proportion of its income from theBritish Government rose from zero in 1975 to 35 per cent by 1989/90 (Ondine Smerdon pers.comm.). The donors are making no compromise by engaging NGOs: for twenty years the neo-liberal paradigm has been to contract out public services to the independent sector. When they firstmade a strategic alliance with governmental donors, NGOs recognized that they might forfeit someindependence in policy-making. Most NGOs would claim that they have gained from the deal: theirprogrammes are much bigger and more secure, and they still criticize governments over (forexample) slowness in sending troops to Rwanda, unwillingness to ban land mines, and cuts in aidbudgets. Most private agencies have not become agents of government. But there have been more


subtle changes. Cases of NGOs taking consistent stands against official relief policy in specificcoun- tries are extremely rare. The cool and even hostile relations between NGOs and donorgovernments' embassies that characterized the situation in Ethiopia in 1983—4, let alone Biafra andCambodia, are now consigned to the past. The criticism of the French military intervention inRwanda by MSF-France was merely a hiccup in an otherwise cosy relationship. NGOs may havegained influence at the margin in ministries of development co-operation, but they have lost thecapacity to set themselves against the entire system.


Aid => competition (kills cooperation)

Foreign aid causes NGO competition for funds, preventing crucial cooperationSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 28-29

A heavy reliance on foreign aid also induces a tendency toward competition rather than co-operation. NGOs may be capable of empowering their individual constituencies without muchinteraction with other organizations, but in order to achieve broader empowerment of the widercommunity and the development of civil society, they must work together (Sandbrook and Halfani,1993, p. 168). Thus, umbrella organizations play key roles in linking various NGOs together, but inUganda there are few such effective organizations. This is partially due to the relative youth andweakness of the NGO sector, as well as the competitive disposition of many indigenous NGOs.Because of a primary reliance on scarce foreign funding, many NGOs in Uganda tend to competefor this funding rather than pool their resources and efforts. Many of the above factors examined areintimately connected. For example, indigenous NGO dependence on foreign aid is intimately linkedto the lack of domestic funding available due to a general level of poverty in Uganda. In many cases,a paucity of finances helps precipitate competition rather than co-operation among NGOs. Similarly,a lack of accountability to the NGO constituency and a lack of democratic decision-making can betraced to greater accountability to foreign donors than to recipients or NGO members.

Competition for funds ruins NGO solvencySusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.166

The heavy reliance on foreign donors often instills a spirit of competition rather than co-operationamong the NGOs, and many NGOs end up competing for scarce donor funds rather thancoordinating efforts to make the greatest impact. This, for example, is the case with some women'sNGOs like ACFODE (Action for Development) and FIDA (Association of Women Lawyers-Uganda) which have similar programmes in legal networking, but do not work together. The actingexecutive secretary of FIDA, when asked about co-ordination efforts between FIDA and ACFODEstated that, 'if ACFODE has a legal program in one district, we do not interfere. . (76 Even thoughNGOs may not officially co-ordinate their activities, there is a substantial degree of individualoverlap in organizations. For example several FIDA members were also ACFODE members, whileone was even a member of FIDA, ACFODE and the Director of the Uganda Law Society Legal AidProject J" Kwesiga and Ratter found that NGO competitiveness and lack of co-ordination wascharacterized by NGOs being '. . . too competitive and insufficiently cooperative one with another.They compete for funding, for recognition for status, and this contributes to their insularity andreluctance to provide and share information about themselves and their activities' (1993, p. 24).


NGOs can’t solve

NGOs are ineffective: four reasons(not identifying the poorest groups, addressing poverty’s symptoms not causes,educational bias, sexism)Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 127

The NGO record in poverty alleviation and service provision, however, has not been flawless. A1992 study on Ugandan NGOs argues that, in fact, many NGOs have failed to undertake detailedanalyses which would identify the poorest-of-the-poor group and help to cure the causes of theirpoverty rather than just address the symptoms (de Coninck, 1992, p. 107). In addition de Coninckfound that '...most programmes with an "economic focus" were characterised by the lack of attentiongiven to the issue of Social differentiation. . .', resulting in some of the most needy being effectivelyby-passed (de Coninck, 1992, p. 107). Similarly, another study found that the more educated theindividual or group, the more likely it was that the NGO would consult them. Men were alsoconsulted 67.6 per cent of the time more than women (Kwesiga and Ratter, 1993, p. 43). This lastpoint is somewhat disturbing given that there are 8,203,300 women in comparison with only7,869,200 men in Uganda (World Bank, 1993, p. 158), with more women in the rural areas as wellas more being involved in actual production and work in Uganda than men.

Voluntary and Grassroots NGOs (VOs and POs) can’t solve, even with financialsupportSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 8

POs are closely related to VOs. Like VOs, POs give voice to popular demands and engage incollective action. They differ from VOs in the sense that they are usually more narrowly focused ona particular constituency, like women, and aim to empower not only their membership but also thewider community. They are often driven by strong values and member interests, usually geared,among other things, toward empowering communities that have been traditionally disempowered.Although this type of NGO is perceived to be the most likely to help develop a stronger civil societyand ultimately a more democratic polity (Korten, 1991, Bratton. 1Y89)'" it is the least prevalent inAfrica. This type of NGO provides important forums for civic education or schools of democracy aswell as for public policy advocacy. The case study of ACFODE (Action for Development), awomens' NGO, illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the PO in Uganda. Although VOs andPOs have the greatest potential for empowerment and pressuring the regime for democratictransition, there are not enough of them to effect any significant change. However, even if there wasa flood of PO development in Africa, the current political economy of liberalization tends to relegatethese NGOs to service-provision or gap-filling roles. This has negative implications for thedevelopment of a democratic civil society and polity. Along with the flood of external funding toNGOs, there has been the rapid development of a fourth type of NGO: the Briefcase NGO.

There are intrinsic limits to NGO solvencySusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.172

NGOs in Uganda are also hampered by several intrinsic limitations. There are numerous small-scale, self-help grassroots organizations, but these tend to be unorganized, locally-focused andissue-oriented. The indigenous intermediate NGOs, which have more potential to engender politicalempowerment and impact on democratization in Uganda, are also handicapped by internaldeficiencies. Most NGOs in Uganda are gap-fillers or service-provision oriented NGOs. They focuson the provision of basic services, often buttressing the national development plan of the NRM. Thefew NGOs that can be considered pressure-group or advocacy-oriented are often hesitant to adopt anovertly political or critical agenda, through fear of regime intolerance and/or co-optation. Inaddition, most of these organizations lack internal democracy and beneficiary participation in


decision-making, and have an external accountability to foreign donors. Because of this externalfocus many are prone to competition rather than co-operation and co-ordination of activities. Some,in fact, increasingly assume the image of brief-case NGOs.


NGOs can’t solve

Decreasing aid to NGOs is good, six reasonsKamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 662-4

While money is not always determining in a relationship, control over such an essential resourcecertainly provides a large part of the power over any development situation. A future without aid orwith greatly diminished aid can significantly reduce the power that funding has conferred on NNGOS.Consequently, such a new scenario should make the following desirable outcomes more possible: 1.De-operationalisntion of Northern NGOS from the South. This will apply to operational NNGOS andshould increase the emphasis on capacity building of SNGOS and people's organisations to take overroles traditionally played by many NNGOS. 2. Embracing mutual transparency and accountabilitymechanisms. Such mechanisms have primarily been one-way rather than mutual (eg SNGOS toNNGOS). This remains a major arena for change. Desirable transformations in this area are more likelyto happen in an NGO future with vastly diminished aid because of a subordination of currentimperatives, which priorities financial accountability to Northern donors. Boards and CharityCommissions (eg in the UK). Instead, accountability will be linked to a broader vision and goals ofbuilding a global movement for social change which is based on mutual trust, respect and co-responsibility among its members, regardless of whether they are from the South or North. 3.Redefining the NNGO policy role. This is more likely to happen because of the change in the balance ofpower between NNGOS and SNGOS in favour of the latter. It will involve modifying, and in manycases, reducing the current typical NNGO role of speaking on behalf of their Southern partners. NNGOSwill also be less able to conduct direct policy research in the South. Instead, they are more likely to be forced to redefine theirinstitutional role in policy advocacy and lobbying in the South. The task will be to focus much more than they currently do onmobilising, synthesising and disseminating information (which is often much more readily available in the North) rapidly and inrelevant popular form to people's organisations, SNGOS and Southern support NGOS (SSNGOS). This should also result inSouthern organisations and other groups being forced to do more of their own policy research in the South. NNGOS, on the otherhand, will be called upon to facilitate and enable much more direct advocacy and lobbying by SNGOS in Washington DC,Brussels and other traditional Northern centres of power. 4. Working in the North. A lack of aid-based financialresources may lead NNGOS to place an increased emphasis on social justice and development work intheir own countries. One reason is that fewer financial resources are necessary to do this compared with the implementationof surrogate service delivery in the South. This should enable NNGOS to truly become part of a South-North alliance oforganisations working on similar issues in their respective countries. This step should enhance NNGO credibility with many oftheir Southern partners. Why? Because it is increasingly clear that. whether NNGOS like it or not, legitimacy in partnershiprelationships with SNGOS and SSNGOS who are most credible in their home countries will only be possible if NNGOS areseriously and more substantially engaged with the poverty and social justice problems of their own countries, especially as thesecontinue to escalate and become more explicit and visible (eg in the USA and UK). Such engagements can be achieved in avariety of ways. They do not necessarily imply starting a direct project-based poverty alleviation programme in the UK, USA orCanada requiring significant financial resources. Nevertheless, the onus of demonstrating a more intense, appropriate andeffective engagement with traditional Northern publics and policy makers will increasingly rest with NNGOS. Domesticinitiatives should, at the very least, involve a more substantial element of development education, mobilisation andconscientisation of Northern publics about international development problems and issues, their lifestyles and their roles incontributing to global poverty and injustice. While these arc politically and personally sensitive issues, often difficult to raisewith Northern publics, they involve activities which require relatively small amounts of finance for the potentially significantlevel of strategic impact or outcomes that can be achieved. Such engagement in the North should also lead to strategic alliancesbetween NNGOS and workers, women's and other groups in their own countries at relatively little cost compared with thefinance-intensive social service delivery programmes that many NGOS are currently involved with. 5. Educating domesticconstituencies. A greater emphasis can be placed on development education and awareness raising ofthe unemployed, the working underclass and other discriminated-against publics, for example politicaland economic migrants and refugees, the victims of jobless economic growth and unemployment, theurban poor, farmers and the socially excluded. The key focus of such desirable programmes should be oninterpreting the work of Southern partners and broader 'global South' development issues to these groups with theview of raising awareness leading to action and subsequent changes in the latter's attitudes. This should alsoresult in new welcome alliances between groups in the North and South who are being similarlyaffected by newly emerging global instruments for a rule-based world order (eg the World TradeOrganization (wto)). 6. Building domestic constituencies. Related to and based on the above, there isan urgent need for NNGOS to build or enlarge their organised constituencies in their home countriesand enable their active and direct participation in a global movement for social justice and change. Asolid, educated and aware constituency from different societal strata in both the 'global south' and 'north'


of the traditional North will be the best guarantor of the longevity and sustainahility of a globalmovement for social justice in the richer industrialised countries. Again, ironically, this may have a higher chance ofbecoming a reality in an NGO future with diminished aid than in an era with large amounts of it. Few NNGOS currently prioritiseor emphasise the desirable roles described above. In fact, because of a concern for institutional survival, many appear to haveconsciously de-emphasised these possibilities for change. Ironically, such reforms may have a much higher chance of becoming areality in an NGO future with diminished aid than in the prevailing resource transfer paradigm.


NGO’s can’t solve crises

Failure of NGOs in the Rwanda demonstrate their inability to manage genocideAlex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disasterrelief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 197-8

For the humanitarian international and its donors, the 'refugees' obscured the genocide andjustice. After the mass exodus, the issues of genocide and justice slipped down Oxfam'sagenda: an immediate humanitarian response for the 'refugees' became its priority (both inlobbying and in its own operations). This could be interpreted cynically; Oxfam needed towork in the camps because it was an unmissable fund-raising opportunity, and aprogramme for 'refugees' entailed not offending their extremist political leadership. A moregenerous reading is that the genocide was now over (in fact it was not), and that theagency's urgent priority was saving the lives of 'refugees'. Oxfam's policy adviser wrote:'Oxfam believes in the indivisibility of all rights: the right to relief, for example, is neithergreater nor less than the right to protection from physical attack'. (Cairns, 1995: 8). Thisstate- ment is perhaps more revealing than its author intended: it is in fact an elevation ofthe 'right to relief to the same level as fundamental rights such as protection from executionor genocide — a legal innovation. 22 Moreover, the work of relief agencies' is basedprecisely on the separation of the 'right to relief from other rights. Agencies deliver on the'right to relief where other rights are not enforced. Their advocacy concentrates on it.Given the de facto separability of these rights, Oxfam's argument implies that it can bejustifiable to compromise other basic rights in order to fulfil the 'right to relief. This isprecisely what happened in Rwanda: the 'right to relief took priority over the search forjustice. The agencies fulfilled the charitable imperative but violated the spirit ofinternational lawJ This episode illustrates how an aid agency's portrayal of a situation cannot be divorced from its institutional interests. Ironically, Oxfam is a substantial target forcriticism precisely because it went further than other agencies in developing a political andethical approach to the genocide. If it had confined itself simply to service delivery andignored human rights issues, it would have avoided much of the criticism. But it could notescape from its institutional (including legal and fund-raising) constraints, and thecontradiction was exposed. The contradictions matter so much because the Western mediaand Western governments thrust the humanitarian agencies into such an exposed position.The agencies can argue with some justification that they were betrayed or manipulated byhigher powers: they were used to cover the nakedness of Western policy. But this veryprominence (wanted or not) indicates the humanitarians' political significance.


NGO gap-filling excuses government inaction

NGO gap-filling is bad. Government should be responsible for poverty and socialprogamsKamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 662

NGO roles and responsibilities in a beyond-aid framework should prioritise the societal watchdograther than the surrogate service deliverer function. Why? Because NGO outreach to thepoor—estimated to be. at best, 15-20% of the world's total of 1.2 billion people living on a dollar aday or less—will always be modest. While obviously morally just, it remains a 'gap filling' andsurrogate approach that does not get to the structural heart of poverty as a product of human actionthat is amenable to human resolution (Sogge, 1996). If people, directly and through theirgovernments, really want to eradicate poverty they have the means to do so. The NGO task is tokeep this agenda on the table by holding both government and society to account for the growinggap between anti-poverty rhetoric and practice. As far as North-South NGO relationships areconcerned, ideally funding should only be one (preferably small) part of the overall organisationalrelationship if it is necessary at all (as, realistically, it will be for Southern and some NorthernNGOS for some time to come!). This is because building strong relationships between differentorganisations (especially but not restricted to those between Northern and Southern ones) is usuallyfraught with problems, dilemmas and inequities. Examples of such problems include significantunequal access to information and to the centres of global power and decision making amongSouthern organisations. Adding a funding dimension worsens what is an already difficultrelationship between Northern and Southern organisations. Building genuine partnershiprelationships requires bridging gaps and creating a basis of trust that can often take years. Whenfunding is introduced as a major variable in this equation (as it is in most current situations),achieving genuine partnership becomes more complex and is often unattainable (Malena, 1995).

NGOs should not be gap-fillersKamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 664

A future without significant aid implies that NGOS will not be engaged in large-scale socialprogrammes that perpetuate a surrogate role and in the perception that this is their primary value tosociety. If this is the case, NGOS should be better able to select functions and interface with thestate, governments and intergovernmental organisations in a wider variety of ways. The definition ofwhat constitutes appropriate NGO roles, functions and tasks should be considered against a likely21st century context in many poor countries. Here, the core social, economic, political and culturalresponsibilities and commitments of governments to their citizens, especially those who are alreadypoor or vulnerable, will be increasingly difficult to meet from within a dominant framework ofneoliberal macroeconomics policy, financial globalisation, structural adjustment programmes andtrade liberalisation. This context, however likely, is not a good rationale to justify NGOS becomingsubstitutes for the state in service delivery in areas where the latter has a primary and legitimate role(eg health, education, water, power, roads and other public infrastructure). Nevertheless, it is thecontext in which more suitable NGO roles need to be analysed.


NGOs get co-opted by corrupt regimes

Apolitical NGOs get co-opted by corrupt regimesSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 18-19

The pluralist and neo-liberal models also tend to ignore the political and social reality that exists inmany sub-Saharan African countries. For example, many NGOs hesitate to become politicallyactive. They often adopt what one analyst has phrased as a by-pass strategy. ... they eschew anyrelations with political parties, in particular opposition groups. They operate in non-controversialareas building schools, providing water and health care, and extending services, credit, andinformation to the poor and needy. In these activities, they are often backed by the state which seesthem as supplementing their efforts and often takes the credit for those services. In such ways,NGOs can prop up weak and discredited governments and actually act to disempower people.(Manuh. 1993, p. 125) These NGOs get co-opted (consciously or uNGOnsciously) by the regimewhich uses them for legitimacy building and social service gap-filling. This 'by-pass strategy'creates NGOs that become akin to gap-filler NGOs. Governments use NGOs as their agents to '. . .undertake those grassroots humanitarian, welfare or development activities that governments cannotor will not do' (Anina, 1993, p. 140). Because they do not challenge the state, because they do notgo beyond simple service provision and because they apply a band-aid solution to the problemrather than petitioning for reform, their ability to link the empowerment of the powerless with thedevelopment of a democratic society and polity is limited, since their role becomes increasinglyrelegated to service provision and regime support. Sometimes, NGOs have to camouflage theiractual intent to make it acceptable to state interests (Fowler, 1993, p. 335). This highlights theparadox of civil society, that is, '. .. a real democracy depends on a strong civil society, while at thesame time, civil society depends on an effective, democratic environment' (Foley and Edwards,1996, p. 47).


NGOs hurt gov legitimacy and => instability

Successful NGOs demonstrate the government’s faults and undercut politicalstabilityAlex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disasterrelief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 136-7

The situation is more complicated if relief is distributed by foreign agencies. A tightlyregulated NGO programme can be identical to a government distribution, and in mostcases (such as the Sudanese example above) NGO programmes use local intermediaries.Even the most independent programme brings financial benefits to the exchequer in termsof hard currency. Often, the creation of parallel structures by relief agencies has been seento undermine the ability of host governments to deliver services. This is a variant on thetheme of empowering the powerful, not a refutation of it: it is the more accountable andwelfare-oriented sections of government that generally suffer, and the more authoritarianand security-oriented sections that gain in power when government capacity isundermined. The strategy followed by Mobutli Sese Seko in Zaire is an extreme instance:he deliberately set out to destroy any institutions other than the Presidency and its securitynetworks (with almost $900m. of US aid). Perhaps the most common subversive impact offoreign-run relief programmes is that they invite favourable comparison with thegovernment's own efforts, thus undermining the legitimacy of government.


No solvency: bad communication

Poor communication systems undermine African NGOsSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 26

African countries provide a hostile environment for NGOs. Several factors account for thisincluding the overall poor economic performance of many African states, the limited legitimacy thatmany African states have and the cultural heterogeneity present in most African states (see Halfani.1993, p. 34; and Nyerere, 1993, p. 18). These conditions make the African state suspicious of NGOactivity and political participation. In the case of Africa, the structural conditions fosterfragmentation and isolation among community and civil associations. Poor communication systems,a history of social divisiveness and hostility, and competition for scarce resources undermine thepotential for united action among these groups. (Sandbrook and Halfani, 1993, p. 169)


No solvency: bad coordination

Lack of regulation makes NGOs a dangerous place to send moneyAlex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disasterrelief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 81

NGOs spurn adopting professional standards or self-regulation. It might appear to be in the interestsof the more reputable NGOs to negotiate a set of minimum standards with host governments anddonors - in effect placing restrictions on entry to the select club of bona fide relief NGOs. But eventhe NGOs that pride themselves on having the highest standards refuse to do this. It may be aninstinctive aversion to any form of regulation (though independence has already been ceded in moreinsidious ways, through accepting government funding), or a fear that their own emergencyoperations might not always meet the minimum standards. One result is that there are no formalbarriers to entry to the relief NGO sector: literally anyone can start an NGO, obtain funds by publicappeal or other means, and try their hand at running feeding centres, clinics or orphanages, (Andthey do.) The lack of regulation leaves the NGO sector open to manipulation. Donor govern- mentsare increasingly undertaking their own evaluations of NGO programmes that they support. Butwithout agreed standards these evaluations become subjective, widen in scope to cover the entireagency rather than just the programme under consideration, and become a tool for the donor toexercise power over the NGO (Smillie. 1995: 158)

Poor coordination prevents NGO successSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 29

Weak co-ordination of NGOs is also linked to the relative youth of indigenous, intermediate NGOsin Uganda, and to the impact of years of civil war and repression. A plethora of NGOs and localself-help groups exist in Uganda, but are seldom interconnected. This is partially due to theunwillingness of many NGOs and self-help groups to engage the regime directly. In fact, post-colonial Uganda has a history of societal disengagement from the state, which Chapter 2 willillustrate. Similarly, as the case of NOCEM will illustrate in Chapters 4 and 5, when attempts aremade to co-ordinate NGOs for democratic initiatives they often fail to mitigate ethno-religiousdifferences and objectives. In short, civil society is weak in Uganda. It is weak in the sense that itdoes not provide a democratic challenge to the state. Contrary to pluralist theory, the empiricalevidence in Uganda suggests that NGOs will only have limited impact on the prospects fordemocratic transition in Uganda.


No solvency: factionalism

Aiding through NGOs only supports factionalism and indeterminacy in actualassistanceAlex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disasterrelief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 142-3

Understandably, most large NGOs prefer not to have to make such a stark choice. Instead,they manage on an ad hoc basis, while anxiously examining what principles might makeinstitutional sense. (Intermin- able institutional reorganization is one symptom of this lackof confidence.) The idea has been put forward that it is the very ambiguity of NGOs'position that is their strength: their adaptiveness and qualities of 'partnership' with localorganizations and communities, rather than their adoption of the 'right' model of work(ibid.: 224-7). In theory, being both a 'third' and a 'first force' should strengthen both.Debate at headquarters and public action should help bring vitality to field programmes,while field experience brings credibility to lobbying and advocacy, and substance toresearch. For some single-issue organizations with strong leadership, this formula hasworked well. Examples include the advocacy of children's charities on child labour andprostitution and the involvement of mines clearance organizations in the campaign to banland mines. A key reason for this success is that the agencies concerned can make asubstantial contribution to achieving these goals in full: child labour can be outlawed andland mines banned. (Enforcing such prohibitions will require a different kind oforganization.) For generalist organizations, including the mainstream relief NGOs, theformula does not work. Taking on a much broader cause, such as the conquest of poverty,injustice or famine across the world, is a wholly different matter. Claiming that 'such-and-such an agency is on the side of the poor and oppressed' is mere rhetoric. Humanitarianagencies simply cannot make a comparable contribution to conquering famine. In themeantime, the ambiguity is an obstacle to fighting famine. A vigorous debate within anagency is ipso fonto a good thing, but it does not necessarily lead to the required results.For a start, an agency busy talking to itself may find it difficult to listen and respond towhat its 'recipients' want. The issues are being problematized inside a Western institution,not in public, and even less in disaster-vulnerable countries. Secondly, the absence of aclear philosophy gives more leeway to fund-raising departments and 'can-do' emergencyofficers - the principal engines of 'debasement'. Most importantly, such an ambiguousstatus reinforces the indeterminacy of aid negotiations and the opacity of the humanitarianlanguage (see below), and in general the mystique and lack of accountability of thehumanitarian business. The humanitarian Gresham's Law militates against supporting localpolitical contracts. In their role as subcontracted service providers, foreign NGOs couldwork within such contracts, provided the regulatory framework were subject to some formof popular accountability. Radical independent agencies can also support progressivepolitical contracts. But in their current unclear situation, subject to powerful pressures toadopt a high media profile, it is extremely difficult for international NGOs to play aprogressive political role in recipient countries.


No solvency: internal corruption

Financial corruption destroys NGO effectivenessSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 128

Many intermediate NGOs are composed of elites, often bureaucrats or professionals who havediscovered NGOs as an alternative and lucrative source of iNGOme. Many civil servants are unableto make even a living wage at their government jobs, and given the flood of donor money somehave turned to the NGO sector for personal profit. Since the private sector is still very weak, andbecause the state has lost its former lucrative offerings, many have switched to NGOs instead tofurther their ambitions. The extent to which NGOs are characterized by self-interest and greedvaries, although the number operating almost strictly on the basis of personal gain is increasing.Examples of NGOs that have engaged in questionable activities can be found in

Desire for self-perpetuation corrupts NGOsPeter van Tuijl, Senior Policy Advisor with the Netherlands Organisation forInternational Cooperation and a member of Oxfam International, Third World Quarterly,vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 617

Today's critical discourse on NGOS seems to highlight how they are caught in their own trap.Instead of helping the poor. NGOS tend to become self-perpetuating (Cameron, in this issue).NGOS talk a lot about partnership but turn it into a 'something-nothing' word (Malhotra, 1997).NGOS intend to be innovative, flexible and participatory, but a closer look at the reality of theirwork shows that many of their supposedly 'unique selling points' are often overstated and feeble.NGOS do not hesitate to question the legitimacy or conduct of everyone else in the world, but haveno adequate answer if their own accountability is questioned. In short, NGOS promise much buthave too little to show (Edwards et al, 1999).

NGOs are populated by a professional elite. Their radical policies have fadedAlex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disasterrelief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 65-6

One is the 'humanitarian international' - the international elite of the staff of internationalrelief agencies, academics, consultants, specialist journalists, lobbyists and also, to anincreasing extent, 'conflict resolution' specialists and human rights workers. It is a sub-group of the larger aid and development industry. A generation ago, this group did notexist: governments, UN agencies and NGOs were staffed by different kinds of people whomore often disputed common assumptions than shared them. Since 1980 there has been amarked convergence towards a common culture. One consequence of this is the ease withwhich individuals can move between different institutions. How can so many well-educated, cosmopolitan and to a fair degree well-intentioned people work withininstitutions with such noble goals, to such little effect? 'Actually existing humanitarianism"is a disappointment.


No solvency: masks capitalism

NGOs just put a smiley face on capitalism and neo-liberalismAlex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disasterrelief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 66

The second concept is the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' humanitarian interests. Thisis an elementary point but it is obscured with astonishing regularity in the writings ofinternational humanitarians. 'Soft' humanitarian interests can be defined as the stated aimsof humanitarian institutions: succouring the poor and vulnerable, protecting human rights,preventing war, etc. 'Hard' humanitarian interests are the institutional demands of theorganizations themselves and their staff: for institutional expansion, career security,prestige, a sense of job satisfaction, etc. Clearly there is an overlap between the two: onlyrelief organizations in good financial health can deliver the goods. But relief agencies havea powerful tendency to go much further and conflate their own interests with those of thepeople they avow to help. The central contention of this and the following chapters is thatthe expansion of internationalized humanitarianism in the 1980s and 1990s reflects aretreat from accountability, akin to the dominance of neo- liberalism. This is nocoincidence: the internationalization of social welfare is closely linked to the decline ofstate authority, which is central to the neo-liberal project. The humanitarian internationalmay he the 'human face' of neo-liberalism. but it is a charitable face with littleaccountability. Moreover, both neo-liberalism and international humanitarianism arejustifications for foreign institutions to intrude into the domestic politics of Africancountries. Usually, they have intruded when things were going badly wrong, but evenwhen the intrusions have succeeded on their own terms, they have rarely supportedprogressive political contracts.


No solvency: democratization

NGOs are structurally incapable of promoting democratzationSusan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The ElusivePromise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 3-4

Drawing upon evidence mainly from Uganda, I argue that as currently structured. NGOs are notviable vehicles for African democratization. Their democratic promise is impeded by inhospitablestructural conditions, historical legacies, regime restrictions and internal (NGO) limitations. Thecurrent political economy of neo-liberalism in Africa, which eNGOurages privatization, and thesupremacy of the market, significantly undermines the empowerment function of NGOs. NGOs areincreasingly relegated to service-provision and gap-filling activities by the retreating state, but thosesupportive functions are not matched with increased political efficacy. As Fowler argues, the endresult is that '. . . African NGOs [become] aid-dependent unofficial parastatals rather thandevelopment organizations co-existing alongside governments, but distinct from and not simplysubstituting for them' (Fowler. 1991, p. 70). These current structural impediments reinforcelingering historical legacies such as the weak development of political parties and the ethnic,regional and religious divisions that often characterize African societies. NGOs are alsofundamentally constrained by regime impediments and the current political-economy ofdevelopment. NGOs are allowed to function as gap-fillers, but are often discouraged fromperforming more politically sensitive advocacy or empowerment roles by the regime as well as theInternational Financial Institutions (IFIs). These constraints reinforce internal NGO shortcomingsincluding a heavy reliance on foreign aid, a tendency toward competition rather than co-operationbetween NGOs, weak co-ordination, relative youth, a lack of democratic decision-making, and apaucity of finances which in turn leads to external dependence. For the most part, NGOs fail toempower their constituencies or wider community, and fail to provide a stable source of pressure onthe regime for democratic transition and consolidation. Given the rapid economic restructuringoccurring in Uganda, and the influx of NGOs since the 1986 National Resistance Movement (NRM)take-over, Uganda offers an ideal case for examining the actual and potential role that NGOs play inempowering their constituencies and the wider community and the implications that this has for thedevelopment of a democratic civil society and polity. Because of its largely successful and eagerimplementation of SAPs, Uganda has become the golden child of the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and World Bank. But democratization has not simultaneously occurred. The core findings ofthis study, based on Field research in Uganda from 19923, suggest that NGOs are not the panaceathat they have been made out to be. If unchecked, the various constraints facing NGOs are severeenough to undermine their long-term democratic potential. The combination of internal and externalconstraints mainly facing indigenous NGOs, plus the weak development and state limitation ofintermediary actors such as political parties and the media significantly limits the overall potentialfor the development of a democratic civil society and polity.' Thus, this study challenges thedominant discourse of neo-liberalism which tends to uncritically view NGOs as important buildingblocks for civil society and the transition to, and more long-term consolidation of, democracy.


Private Peacekeeping Bad

Private peacekeeping is bad – 12 reasons.Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard LawSchool, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Int’l L. 75, p. l/n)

There are several potential negative consequences from the emergence of SCs. To the SpecialRapporteur, EO presents the best example of the new threats posed by SCs. First, EO is notaccountable to any state since it has no formal connections with the South African government. 439

Second, EO is comprised of ex-members of the most notorious and ruthless commando units of theapartheid regime, used in "mercenary" fashion to attack the sovereignty of southern Africancountries. 440 In the past, these individuals acted without concerns of accountability or human rights.441 Third, the company engages in actual combat, raising questions of accountability in the field,undue influence on the internal conflicts of a state, and potential human rights abuses. EO'sinvolvement in the field also raises the possibility that it will act solely for its own benefit against allactors (including EO's employers) in the conflict, much as Denard and Schramme led their infamousmercenary revolt in the Congo in 1967. [*147] Fourth, EO and other SCs are closely tied to other companies with diverse economicinterests, such as arms dealers, energy and mining companies, and construction firms. As a result,EO and other companies appear to be engaging in African and other conflicts solely as a means ofobtaining concessions and related contracts for their corporate brethren. By aiding strugglingregimes willing to grant valuable concessions, EO and its parent SRC could then gain hegemonicpower in the countries, leading a vanguard for the "neocolonialism of the twenty-first century." 442

Not only does this type of corporate association represent an amalgam of concentrated economicand military power reminiscent of the mercantile companies of the eighteenth century, but it createsthe opportunity for greater corruption and influence on the internal dynamics of the employingstates. 443

Fifth, SCs could fuse their power with that of arms traffickers, drug dealers, and terrorist groups,thereby creating an unholy alliance of non-state agents with the economic, military, and politicalpower to overwhelm states and the state system in general. 444 They could also assist rogue statesunable to receive military aid through the international state system. Sixth, SCs could switch sides inan ongoing conflict based on the highest bidder. 445 Seventh, SCs could turn on their home state andrepresent a challenge to the legitimate use of force in that society. 446 In the least, SCs arecompetitors for the best military talent in the home state. 447 Eighth, SCs could aggravate conflictsand give military life to illegitimate regimes that would otherwise have to settle their conflictspeacefully. 448 In this sense, SCs could be agents of the status quo, aiding only those governmentswith enough money to retain power while suppressing potentially legitimate resistance movements.Ninth, the supply of SCs gives incumbent regimes an incentive not to prepare their defense forcesproperly and to cede their internal security duties to private agents.Tenth, SCs could fight each other or their own countries' national forces in third-party countries.Even if this scenario does not appear likely, there is the possibility that SCs could drag their homestates into conflicts or force them to come to the SCs' assistance with national [*148] militarypower. Also, former clients could use the skills learned from SCs against SCs' home states. 449

Eleventh, SCs may allow countries to supersede public debate about involvement in foreigncountries by subcontracting their foreign policy to private companies. Twelfth, SCs also could beused as covert agents. Finally, SCs simply legitimate the profession of mercenarism, therebyunleashing the dangerous threat of mercenaries in general. All of these negative effects represent apotential challenge to the nation-state system and the traditional powers of the state.


Private peacekeeping Bad

Private peacekeeping fails – several reasons.Taulbee, 2003, (Associate Prof. of Poly. Sci. @ Emory, Fall, Emory International LawReview, 17 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1109, p. l/n)

Gerson and Colletta summarize the positives and negatives of using private forces. 36 However, theirsubsequent discussion skirts the issues, focusing on technical rather than broader political issues.First, privatization as normally put forward presumes a movement from the neutrality ofpeacekeeping to an active peace enforcement/imposition strategy. The problem of peacekeeping hasalways been that one cannot keep a "peace" that doesn't have substance - that is, one cannot keep apeace if there is no peace to be kept. Second, their analysis underplays the aversion of manyhumanitarian NGOs based upon a perception that private military companies/private securitycompanies are merely the latest incarnation of the mercenary plague that has infected Africa (andelsewhere) since the 1960s. Third, they do not address the tension between many human rights andhumanitarian NGOs and any military action. These organizations have often sought to claim the"moral high ground" which by definition precludes any cooperation with the military. 37

On the obverse side, both the United Nations and the NGO community have begun to engageprivate security/private military firms 38 to fill the logistics and organizational gap left by greatpower disengagement and disinterest. At one point, many humanitarian and human rights NGOsexpected that their neutrality and impartiality would suffice. In contemporary conflicts, this hasproved problematic. As NGOs move from impartiality to activism, [*1125] the need for securitywill increase. The acceptance of private security firms in support roles should not be extrapolatedtoo far. The move from support, relatively low profile tasks, to the relatively high profile active"enforcement/peace-building" missions forms a major psychological barrier. Curiously, one detectslittle enthusiasm among the influential western states for privatizing the military part ofpeacekeeping, let alone the more daunting task of peacebuilding.


Private Peacekeeping Bad

Private peacekeeping is unaccountable, prolongs wars, and causes neo-colonialism.Howe, 1998 (Prof. African Politics @ Georgetown, Fletcher Forum of World AffairsJournal, 22 Fletcher F. World Aff. 1, p. l/n)

Critics have generally labeled private security companies as threats to global securitybecause of alleged nonaccountability, including a disrespect for human rights, theirpossible use by neo-colonial forces and a tendency to alienate the local military. Finally,some critics charge soldiers or companies of fortune with incompetence, perhaps lookingto prolong the war and thus their contracts. Accountability Machiavelli cautioned his Princethat competent mercenaries could threaten their state employer, and the Trojan Horse andRogue Warrior metaphors arise often in mercenary literature. Critics assume that moneydrives mercenaries' actions and that greed will quickly shred any accountability or loyalty.Private security companies may have several masters: their own government, theemploying government, and possibly a private business. The Angolan and then Sierra Leoneangovernments hired the South African-based Executive Outcomes which had exceptionally close links to Branch Minerals andHeritage Oil and Gas. Once inside the country and its defense establishment, a private firm could exert powerful leverageupon the state. Private security's coupling with powerful multinational companies dramatically increases the foreigners'

power within a beleaguered state. Enforcement of norms is lacking; no effective international sanctions exist. 9 Thehiring government or insurgency may have little control over the powerful foreign forceand could hesitate to discipline its presumed allies at a time of need. Mercenaries oftenmove unimpeded and unrecorded through immigration, thus lessening chances for futureinvestigations into alleged misbehavior. 10 These implicit licenses for illegal behaviorencouraged past mercenary groups to engage in serious violations of human right. TheCongolese during the 1960's labeled mercenaries as les affreux for often despicable behavior. More recently, Carlos Castano,a leader of a right-wing paramilitary force in Columbia, has been accused of brutal mercenary activities. Foreign military

personnel [*4] often show little knowledge of or sensitivity to local customs and institutions. 11 As Westerngovernments increasingly work with private firms, some critics worry that suchcooperation may circumvent public oversight and enforcement. The U.S. government in1995 reportedly sidestepped a United Nations embargo that proscribed state supplying ofmilitary equipment to Rwanda by hiring Ronco, a private de-mining company, to providearmored transport vehicles and explosives. Last Gasp of Colonialism? Africans especiallydistrust private security groupings, although numerous states and insurgencies have hiredthem. Accusations of white neo-colonial, mercenary muscle gaining cheap mineralconcessions and thus threatening self-determination have some basis in fact, especially inAfrica. During the 1960s, mercenaries often received financing from Western businessesand fought against African governments. Bob Denard, an aging Frenchman, has attemptedto overthrow several governments over the past thirty years. Chief R.O.A. Akinjide of theInternational Law Commission notes that: The crime of mercenarism is particularlyobnoxious within the African context. In Africa, the mercenary is seen as the representativeof colonialism and racial oppression -- an assassin hired to kill freedom fighters in wars ofnational liberation and wars against racial oppression. 12

Relations With National MilitariesPrivate foreign personnel -- especially combat units -- may foment bitterness, and perhapsrevolt, within the national army. The hiring of private personnel is an ipso facto judgementby the government of its own military. The foreigner's often vaunted military background,their often superior weaponry, and their higher salaries may further anger the government'smilitary. Foreigners in various African conflicts, such as Congo, Biafra and Sierra Leone as well as Papua New Guineahave embittered various local officers. Papua New Guinea officers mutinied in 1997 against the introduction of the British-based Sandline military force and forced Prime Minister Julian Chan to step down.


Private Pecaekeeping = no accountability

Private peacekeeping is unaccountable.Riza, 2003 (Chef de Cabinet to the UN Secretary-General, Winter/Spring, 27 Fletcher F.World Aff. 39, p. l/n)

RIZA: There has been talk, but no serious consideration, and I do not see it happening. TheUN is an intergovernmental organization. Governments have assumed obligations andresponsibilities, one of which is to provide troops for United Nations operations and moneyto buy troops.There is the question of responsibility. Obviously, troops that are sent out from a particularcountry remain responsible not only to the United Nations but also to their owngovernment. That would not be the case in private operations. It would be very difficult tocontrol private personnel who did not keep to the rules or infringed limits, and so on. Rightnow, if this happens with personnel that come from a government, that government isresponsible for trying them. Can that arrangement be worked out nationality-by-nationalitywith private personnel? I doubt it. It would be very difficult, so I do not see this assomething that is likely to happen.

Private corporations have no accountabilitySinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]

Second, privatization also raises certain risks stemming from problems of adverse selectionand a lessening of accountability. Military provider firms are not always looking for themost congenial workforce, but instead, understandably enough, recruit those known fortheir effectiveness. For example, many former members of the most notorious and ruthlessunits of the Soviet and apartheid regimes have found employment in the industry. Theseindividuals acted without concern for human rights in the past and certainly could do soagain. In either case, the industry cannot be described as imbued with a culture ofpeacekeeping. Even if the firms are scrupulous in screening their hires (which is hard toaccomplish, given that few prospective employees would think to include an “atrocitiescommitted” section on their resumes), it is still difficult for them to monitor their troops inthe field. Furthermore, if employees do commit violations, there is little incentive for afirm to turn them over to any local authorities. To do so risks scaring off both clients andother prospective employees. This turned out to be the case recently in the Balkans.Employees of Dyncorp, who had been contracted to perform police duties for the U.N. andaircraft maintenance for the U.S. Army, were later implicated in child prostitution rings.Dyncorp’s Bosnia site supervisor even filmed himself raping two women. Theseemployees were transferred out of the country, and none were ever criminally prosecuted.


Private peacekeeping = no accountability

Private peacekeepers violate international law.Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard LawSchool, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Int’l L. 75, p. l/n)

The existence of SCs calls into question their legality. International law on mercenaries, as capturedin U.N. resolutions and state action, has failed to crystallize. To the extent that such law can beidentified, it provides little guidance regarding the services SCs provide, whether training or actualcombat. 20 First, there is the question of how to define [*79] a "mercenary." Recent codification hastried to define a mercenary, in contradistinction to an international volunteer, by his motivations. 21

In general, a mercenary is defined as a soldier-for-hire, primarily motivated by pecuniary interests,who has no national or territorial stake in a conflict and is paid a salary above the average for othersof his rank. 22 This definition has faced criticism from most of the members of the United Nationsbecause of the ambiguity of "motivation." 23 To many countries there remain subtle, if not artificial, distinctionsbetween a mercenary and other types of combatants, such as "freedom fighters" motivated by ideology or foreigners enlistedin a national army, like the Gurkhas in the British Army or members of the French Foreign Legion.International attention focused initially on the problem of mercenaries during the 1960s post-colonial era in Africa. Shortlyafter the Congo gained independence, the United Nations deployed a "peace-keeping" force, United Nations Operation in theCongo (ONUC), to suppress the Katangan secession, which was being aided by European mercenaries. 24 Since that period,mercenaries have been involved in numerous tumultuous episodes in Africa in which they have tried to depose establishedregimes or otherwise fuel insurrection. 25 These incidents have caused concern that colonial powers or thoseloyal to them were utilizing mercenaries to regain power in particular countries or to destabilizeregimes that were seen by European countries as uncooperative.As a result, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) galvanized a movement opposing the use ofmercenaries, ultimately resulting in U.N. Security Council resolutions banning the recruitment, use,and training of mercenaries for the purpose of destabilizing nascent regimes or supporting nationalliberation movements. Because the resolutions ban only these particular uses of mercenaries, it isunclear whether the use of mercenaries to protect legitimate governments or "recognized" nationalliberation movements is illegal under international norms. Although the law against mercenariesseems absolute regardless of their employers or the purpose for which they are employed, thedevelopment of this body of law in the wake of African independence from colonial rule calls intoquestion whether certain types of mercenaries may be legally acceptable depending on thelegitimacy of the employer and the nature of the service provided. 26 [*80]

Private corporations fall outside rule of international lawSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]

Industry executives counter that U.N. peacekeepers have certainly been involved in crimes of theirown in the past, so the risks of human rights violations occurring during peace operations arenothing new. The difference with privatization, though, is that while soldiers in U.N. missions areultimately held responsible under their national military code of justice, contracted peacekeepers aresubject only to the laws of the market. Current international law has been found inapplicable to theactions of the industry, as the firms fall outside of the outdated legal conventions that deal only withindividual mercenaries. The only possible regulation must then come either from the law of the statein which the operation is taking place or the law of the state in which the firm is based. Since thecollapse of the rule of law is what tends to create the conditions for hiring firms in the first place, thefirst alternative is almost never an option. The transnational nature of the industry makes the secondoption of home-state regulation difficult as well. Besides the fact that extraterritorial monitoring(i.e., of firms operating outside national boundaries) is very difficult, any time a firm finds theregulation too onerous, it can simply transfer to more friendly environs. Moreover, even amongfirms that stay based in the few countries with the ability and will to regulate, the jurisdiction is stillproblematic. For example, U.S. criminal law does not apply outside of U.S. territorial and specialmaritime jurisdictions, so that if an employee of an American military firm commits an offenseabroad, the likelihood of prosecution is extremely low. Consequently, other than nonrenewal ofcontract, there are no real checks and balances on military firms that will ensure full accountability.


Private Peacekeeping = No accountability

Private forces don’t have any accountability/Private forces don’t fall into the trap ofstatismHukill 2004[Traci “Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as ‘privatized peacekeeping’”. The ProgressReport. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]

For the United Nations, bringing private military firms into peacekeeping is anything but a trouble-free solution. The involvement of two CACI International employees in the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal in Iraq is an exclamation point at the end of a long list of problems with privatemilitary firms: They undermine the principle that the state should have a monopoly on organizedviolence; they lure away, with high salaries, special forces in whom the military has investedheavily; they operate beyond the public's field of vision; and they're functionally accountable to noone. The U.N. would have no guarantee that the firms would stay in a situation that gets messy orruns over budget, and if a firm's employees misbehave, the U.N. would have little recourse

Private forces don’t have any accountability – Balkans provesHukill 2004[Traci “Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as ‘privatized peacekeeping’”. The ProgressReport. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]

DynCorp's presence in the Balkans became infamous three years ago, when a DynCorp employee inBosnia reported that several of her fellow employees were running a child-prostitution ring. Theaccused were transferred out of Bosnia, but they never faced charges. The whistle-blower,meanwhile, was fired by the company (and was later awarded $173,000 in damages by a Britishcourt).


Private Peacekeeping -> Conflict

Private peacekeeping causes corruption and promotes conflict.Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard LawSchool, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Int’l L. 75, p. l/n)

Concern about these SCs, like concern about mercenaries, pirates, and terrorists, stems from theinherent violence of their profession combined with a lack of control over and accountability fortheir actions. 14 Since these are private companies, countries which recommend or export themarguably can disavow any connection to SCs' activities. Potentially, this allows exportinggovernments to use SCs as political pawns to affect the internal affairs of a country or region whileretaining their official neutrality in such conflicts. Such "SC expor- [*78] tation" seems like aconvenient way for exporting countries to intervene with impunity in foreign wars.Meanwhile, countries importing SCs gain quick access, with seemingly no political strings attached,to needed military expertise during a crisis. 15 The contracting country can use and dispose of theseservices readily without concern for the company's political ambitions or for political favors whichmay need to be repaid. This "clean hands" approach to foreign policy appears dangerous to thosewho see transparent nation-state accountability as essential to controlling human rights violationsand the type and quality of military activity throughout the world.


Peacekeeping can’t solve long-term

Private corporations don’t solve the long-term causes of violenceSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]The third challenge of privatization is its long-term implications for local parties. The key to any durablepeace is the restoration of legitimacy. In particular, this requires the return of control over organizedviolence to public authorities. Unfortunately, if peacekeeping is privatized, the companies may become atemporary mechanism for preserving peace but still do little to address the underlying causes of unrest andviolence.


Private peacekeeping = no training

Private corporations are unable to handle the things UN peacekeepers are trainedforSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]

In the view of many, most importantly the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping (which may have avested bureaucratic interest in opposing the privatization of forces), the act of becoming apeacekeeper is about more than just changing the color of one’s helmet or beret. Peacekeepers’ rolesand responsibilities differ markedly from regular military operations. They require an entirely newcultural outlook focused on humanitarian concerns, which at times can duel with or shackle normalmilitary instincts. Not only must peacekeepers operate under very different rules of engagement, butthe most important directive is a guiding ethic of neutrality, the act of not taking sides. Thus, themost successful peacekeeping operations (such as experiences in Mozambique, Namibia, andGuatemala) are not simply about placing third-party troops on the ground. Instead, they include awide variety of “peacebuilding” activities designed to restore torn social fabrics and fostercooperation among local parties. These range from cease-fire monitoring and troop disarmamentand demobilization to reconstruction and election monitoring. Thus, U.N. operations are often sounwieldy for the very reason that they must also carry on these essential activities. Private militaryfirms, untrained or uninterested in the culture of peacekeeping, might be ill-equipped to handlethem. Moreover, reliance on an outside private force does little to reestablish the local socialcontract. Instead, it appears more likely to reinforce the idea that power belongs only to those withthe ability to afford it.


Peacekeeping = prone to market failure

Market failures -> peacekeeping failuresSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]

The first issue is the contractual dilemmas that arise with privatization. There are obvious marketincentives for firms to act in their clients’ interests. Any company that does otherwise risks notbeing hired again. The problem is that market constraints are always imperfect and tend to workonly over the long term. In actuality, the security goals of clients are often in tension with the firms’aim of profit maximization. The result is that considerations of the good of the private company arenot always identical with the public good. For privatized peacekeeping, the ensuing dangers includeall the problems one has in standard contracting and business outsourcing. The hired firms haveincentives to overcharge, pad their personnel lists, hide failures, not perform to their peak capacity,and so on. The worry, though, is that these are all now transferred into the security realm, wherepeople’s lives are at stake.

Private corporations are controlled by market forces – not humanitarian needSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]The most worrisome contractual dilemma, however, is that outsourcing also entails turning over control ofthe actual provision of service. For peacekeeping, this means the troops in the field are not part of nationalarmies, but private citizens hired off the market, working for private firms. Security is now at the mercy ofany change in market costs and incentives. One example of the resulting danger derives from the nastyhabit humanitarian interventions have of becoming more complex over time. A firm hired to establish asafe haven might later find the situation more difficult than it originally expected. The operation mightbecome unprofitable or, due to any increase in local opposition, more dangerous than anticipated. Thus, thecompany could find it in its corporate interest to pull out. Or, even if the company is kept in line by marketconstraints, its employees might decide that the personal risks they face in sticking it out in an operation aretoo high relative to their pay. Not bound by military law, they can simply break their contracts without fearof punishment and find safer, better paying work elsewhere. In either case, the result is the same: theabandonment of those who were dependent on private protection without consideration for the politicalcosts or the client’s ability to quickly replace them.


Private peacekeeping = same problems as standing army

The same problems with a standing army apply to a private corporation –Singer, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]Finally, the nitty-gritty details of implementation often bedevil privatization’s promise in regulargovernment contracting and general industry; they likely will do so with peacekeeping as well. Forexample, there is no clear answer to the question of who should have the power to hire private militaryfirms. The first scenario of contracted protection not only challenges norms of aid group neutrality, but alsoperhaps hazardously expands the powers of these outside organizations, which are responsible only to theirdonors. The presence of such protection forces entails a further multiplication of armed forces on theground, hardly the best thing in the midst of a complex operation. Likewise, if the power to hire militaryfirms for peacekeeping is restricted to the U.N., it is still unclear what body of the institution should decide.The decision-making process of the General Assembly is certainly unwieldy and also biased against certainstates. Limiting authority to the Security Council, however, leaves the developing world — the very placewhere the privatized deployments are likely to occur — underrepresented. The result is that many of thesame arguments that have been made against the U.N.’s having its own standing army also apply to ithaving its own contracted force.


Perm Solvency

The perm solves – the UN can use it’s own peacekeepers in coordination withprivate corporationsSinger, 2003[Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]

The U.N. should also seriously explore the possibility of using the private market to get a betterbang for its buck out of existing peacekeeping units. Military support firms already provide thetransport, communications, and logistics of operations for many militaries from well-off states. Forexample, Brown & Root Services provides such support to U.S. forces deployed in the Balkans,Central Asia, and the Gulf. Units from the developing world, which make up the majority of U.N.forces, are glaringly weak in performing these functions. By outsourcing these services andstandardizing them over the whole U.N. peacekeeping system, a synergy of public troops andprivate support might become possible. Similarly, military consultant firms might be able to providetraining and assistance that would improve U.N. operational output.

NGO’s have to collaborate with regional governmentsSchnabel and Horowitz 2002[Albrecht and Shale. International Network. “NGOs critical role in advancing human rights in transition societies”.http://www.tolerance-net.org/news/podium/podium071.html]

NGOs must collaborate with regional organizations and the UN in advocating and promoting goodhuman rights practices, and in monitoring human rights improvements. They need to curb turf fightsand, instead, coordinate efforts with other NGOs. Moreover, international NGOs need to train andbuild capacities of domestic NGOs. More than at present, civil society actors must engage issuesheavily affected by relativism. In this context, they need to play a critical role in social dialogue andpersuasion, and search for constructive joint positions with traditional subgroups on issues of basichuman rights. In collaboration with states and IGOs, they should give more attention to an evolvinguniversalist consensus that does not incorporate all human rights, but distinguishes a rational corethat reaches civil, economic and social rights.


Answers to: NGO’s solve human rights

NGO’s are constrained by local governmentsSchnabel and Horowitz 2002[Albrecht and Shale. International Network. “NGOs critical role in advancing human rights in transition societies”.http://www.tolerance-net.org/news/podium/podium071.html]

Yet human rights NGOs and their supporters are strongly constrained by local conditions.Most importantly, ruling regimes may impose strong restrictions against organized humanrights advocacy, to the point of imposing arbitrary, draconian punishments on all thosewho try. There are also other types of barriers. Based on past national and localexperiences, human rights NGOs may be associated with undesirable imposition of alienstandards and policies. And even when the will is there, more pressing needs and threats –such as poverty, economic instability and civil conflict – necessarily limit locally availableaudiences and resources.


Misc.

CATEGORY OF "WOMEN" IS USEFUL - THEORETICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY,OUTWEIGHS ESSENTIALISM

Hilary Charlesworth, & Christine Chinkin, Professors of Law at University of Adelaide and University ofSouth Hampton, The boundaries of international law: a feminist analysis, 2000, p. 55The category of "women" has powerful theoretical and political potential in scrutinizing international law.It has theoretical force in the sense that it is using a patriarchal tool against patriarchy, removing womenfrom the category of the particular to which they are usually assigned. And it has political implications inits ability to mobilize. Feminist analysis must negotiate a strategic path between theoretical purity andpolitical principle. Gayarit Spivak has explained the dilemma well: You pick up the universal that will giveyou the power to fight against the other side and what you are throwing away by doing that is yourtheoretical purity. Whereas the great custodians of the anti-universal are obliged therefore simply to act inthe interest of a great narrative, the narrative of exploitation, while they keep themselves clean by notcommitting themselves to anything.

FEMINISTS NO LONGER ESSENTIALIZE MEN

Terrell Carver, Professor of Political Theory, University of Bristol, et al., REVIEW OFINTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 1998, p.284.It is these ontological debates, and the questioning of essentialist perspectives, which have motivated thetransition from working on women to theorizing gender. Echoing developments in feminist theory, the1980s witnessed a growing concern about, and literature on, the shifting nature of men's lives. As LynneSegal notes, 'books researching fatherhood, men's violence against women and children, male identities andmale mythologies now interrogate men, as a sex, in a way until recently reserved for women -- as aproblem'. It is now becoming common to speak of 'masculinities' in the plural and to explore the fluctuatingconstitution of hegemonic and subordinate forms of masculinity. Far from assuming the polarized analysesof some forms of early second-wave feminism in which 'all men' oppressed 'all women', sexual politicscurrently takes as its focus the transgression of all existing gender boundaries.

FEMINIST KRITIK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NOT A "WESTERN FEMINIST" GOAL - SHAREDBY THIRD WORLD FEMINISTS AS WELL

Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelley Wright, University of Melbourne Law School andUniversity of Sydney Law School, October 1991, The American Journal International Law, 85 A.J.I.L.613, p. 621Despite differences in history and culture, feminists from all worlds share a central concern: theirdomination by men. Birgit Brock-Utne writes: "Though patriarchy is hierarchical and men of differentclasses, races or ethnic groups have different places in the patriarchy, they are united in their sharedrelationship of dominance over their women. And, despite their unequal resources, they are dependent oneach other to maintain that domination." <=56> n55 Issues raised by Third World feminists, however,require a reorientation of feminism to deal with the problems of the most oppressed women, rather thanthose of the most privileged. Nevertheless, the constant theme in both western and Third World feminism isthe challenge to structures that permit male domination, although the form of the challenge and the malestructures may differ from society to society. An international feminist perspective on international law willhave as its goal the rethinking and revision of those structures and principles which exclude most women'svoices.


WORKING THROUGH THE MALE DOMINATED LEGAL SYSTEM COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TOADVANCING WOMEN'S CONCERNS

Martti Koskenniemi, University of Helsinki, January, 1995, The American Journal International Law, 89A.J.I.L. 227, p. 227 (HARVOC2154)Traditional feminism, in law as elsewhere, sought to "put women on the agenda" -- for example, to makeviolence against women a violation of international human rights. While first-wave feminism concentratedon legal reform, the second wave has lost faith. Reform has often been ineffectual or led to transformation,rather than eradication, of male dominance. Sometimes, "using" law may have seemed to be a fatalconcession. For the law and legal method may themselves, with their adversarial style and obsession withauthority and rationality, be bastions of stereotypical masculinity-hence, of male domination. This appliesalso to the rhetoric of liberal rights ("men's rights," Shelley Wright, p. 120). While "rights," like reformism,may have played a beneficial role in early feminist struggles, they have also proved counterproductive.They oversimplify complex power relations (within the family, for instance); they are individualistic,indeterminate, conflictual and easily appropriated to enhance domination (as the right of free speech is usedto defend pornography).

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