newsletter - wordpress.com...design and layout: anne read printing: mid-atlantic printing ltd....

N E W S L E T T E R

Volume 47 � Summer 2010

issued by the Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

Nobel Peace Prize 1995

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

PugwashVolume 47 � Summer 2010

Editor:Jeffrey Boutwell

Senior Program Coordinator: Sandy Ionno Butcher

Design and Layout: Anne Read

Printing: Mid-Atlantic Printing Ltd.Washington, DC

Cover photo:Pugwash Secretary General PaoloCotta-Ramusino and PresidentJayantha Dhanapala meet with WhiteHouse Science Advisor John Holdren,April 2009

TO THE PUGWASH COMMUNITY: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SPECIAL SECTION: Pugwash and the 2010 NPT Review Conference, May 2010

Pugwash Milan Document, 29 January 2010, Milan, Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Pugwash NPT Consultations, May 8 and May 15, 2010, New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7NPT Review Conference Statement by Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Publication of Pugwash Briefing Book and Issue Brief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Pugwash Proposal for a Middle East WMD-Free Zone, May 28, 2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

REPORTS ON RECENT PUGWASH WORKSHOPS AND CONSULTATIONS

Pugwash meeting no. 353: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Pugwash ConsultationIssues Related to the NPT Review Conference, with a Special Focus on the GreaterMiddle EastLondon, UK, 6 October 2009

Pugwash Meeting No. 354: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Pugwash ConsultationThe Status of the CTBT and Prospects for its Entry into ForceNew York, NY, 12 October 2009

Pugwash meeting no. 355: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Pugwash Pakistan Delegation meetings and consultationsWashington, DC, 18-23 October 2009

Pugwash meeting no. 356: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Pugwash WorkshopStrengthening the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Ensuring a Successful NPT Review Conference in 2010Beijing, China, 20-21 November 2009

Pugwash Meeting no. 357: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4530th Pugwash CBW Workshop: Preparing for the Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011Geneva, Switzerland, 5-6 December 2009

Pugwash Meeting no. 358: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Roundtable on Nuclear Weapons Policies and the NATO Strategic Concept ReviewLondon, UK, 13 January 2010

Pugwash Meeting no. 359: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Pugwash Roundtable, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: What role might Europe play in light of the upcoming NPT Review Conference?Milan, Italy, 29 January 2010

Pugwash Meetings no. 360 and 361: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58Pugwash Delegation of Senior European Ministers, meetings and consultationsWashington, DC, 1-5 March 2010 • Moscow, Russia, 24-28 April 2010

Asteroid Named for Sir Joseph Rotblat, December 2009

OBITUARIES: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

H. Marcovich, C. Kaysen, A. Sissakian, N. Tavkhelidze, A. Pikayaev

Members of the Pugwash Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Calendar of Future Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inside back cover

To the Pugwash Community

issue of Middle East weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

capabilities, in a region beset by continued violence and

deep-seated hatreds, could threaten the entire nuclear non-

proliferation regime and international efforts to ensure

that WMD capabilities will not be acquired by those

willing to use them. At the NPT Review Conference, it

took a sustained effort, especially by the US government,

to convince Egypt and the Arab states to support a

compromise on the issue of a Middle East-WMD-Free

Zone (ME-WMD-FZ) that kept intact international

support for the NPT regime.

However, the clock is ticking on whether that support can

be maintained. The Final Document of the NPT Review

Conference called for the appointment of a special Facili-

tator, followed by an international conference in 2012, in

order to make progress on the ME-WMD-FZ issue. There

is thus a two to three year window for demonstrating

results, above all to the Arab states who in 1995 agreed to

support an indefinite extension of the NPT in return for

efforts – supported by the US, UK, and Russia – to make

progress toward the goal of a Middle East free of nuclear,

biological and chemical weapons.

Admittedly, proposals for a

ME-WMD-FZ

have

The NPT, Nuclear Weapons and the Middle East

The international system faces many formidable chal-

lenges in the years ahead, but perhaps none more pressing

than the incendiary mix of regional violence, religious

extremism and international terrorism—combined with

the specter of nuclear and WMD proliferation—to be

found in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.

Continuing problems in the region, including the failure to

reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, continued

Israeli-Arab hostility, Sunni-Shi’a schisms within the

Islamic world, and uncertainty over the regional ambitions

of Iran, would themselves be dangerous enough to global

security. Added to this volatile mix, of course, are the exis-

tence of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabil-

ities in the region, plus concerns with the nuclear ambi-

tions of Iran and possibly other, new proliferators, as well

as the interest expressed by many states in the Middle East

and Persian Gulf for acquiring civilian nuclear technolo-

gies that could all too easily provide break-out capabilities

for nuclear weapons.

As was evident during the month-long NPT Review

Conference held in New York from

May 3-28, 2010, the

unresolved

JEFFREY BOUTWELL, Editor

Acknowledgments

For their continued support of the Pugwash Conferences,

the international Pugwash community expresses its deep

gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, The

Connect US Fund, Cyrus Eaton Foundation, Ford Founda-

tion (Beijing), Heathside Charitable Trust, ML Resources

Vision, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The

Plougshares Fund, and the UK Foreign and Common-

wealth Office.

*****************

This is my final issue as Editor of the Pugwash Newsletter,

as I am moving on to new pursuits after almost 30 years

spent with Pugwash, as both Executive Director and previ-

ously as Associate Executive Officer at the American

Academy of Arts and Sciences. I have enjoyed tremen-

dously my association and friendship with countless

members of the international Pugwash community,

meeting in so many venues and under so many different

circumstances around the world. I will always treasure the

insights and wisdom I gained from working with them on

fundamental issues of conflict, peace, and the future of

humanity.

been on the agenda for decades, with little chance of real-

ization as long as there was no comprehensive resolution

of deep-seated conflicts in the region. Nonetheless, anxi-

eties about Iran’s nuclear program and understandable

Arab frustration at having agreed in 1995 to an NPT

bargain that has had no payoff for them in 15 years, has

put the ME-WMD-FZ back on the bargaining table.

In the coming months, Pugwash will be actively involved

in supporting efforts to discuss the feasibility of a Middle

East free of WMD, through involvement with the special

Facilitator appointed by the UN Secretary General and the

convening of an international conference in 2012. The

Pugwash community can help this process by rigorously

evaluating and discussing the components of a ME-WMD-

FZ to see how various norms and practices might be intro-

duced into the region so as to strengthen WMD non-

proliferation and transparency of activities. Even if a

formal treaty is not politically feasible in the near term

because of the non-resolution of outstanding conflicts,

every effort should be made see what policy tools are

available to reduce as much as possible the risk of cata-

strophic conflict in the region using WMD, or the possible

terrorist use of such weapons anywhere in the world.

2 Pugwash Newsletter, Summer 2010

should begin soon and hopefully yield some concreteproposals before the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

In the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference it will beextremely important, in order to prevent decay and break-down of the world-wide nuclear non-proliferation regime,to show that concrete progress is being made towards thatfinal goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and to reassurethe world’s public opinion that such progress will bestrongly sustained in the future. In particular, in order tosupport concrete steps in the direction of nuclear disarma-ment, the 13 practical steps approved by the 2000 NPTReview Conference should be restated by the 2010 NPTReview Conference with the necessary updates.

Reinforce the (political and legal) commitments tonuclear disarmament. Drastically decrease thenumbers of weapons

1. The present number of intact nuclear weapons (report-edly over 23000) should be drastically reduced. Thelargest weapons reductions should of course be made bythe two major nuclear weapon States (US and Russia)

that possess about95% of the world’scombined nucleararsenal. An effec-tive ladder forscaling down thenumber of nuclearweapons of themost nuclear-armed nationsshould be clearlydefined. As a firststep, Russia andthe US areexpected to bringto successful

Below are some considerations coming out of a meeting inMilan organized by Pugwash and the University of Milan(Universita’ degli Studi di Milano), 29 January 2010, withan eye to the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference.The meeting involved more than 40 participants from 13countries, including former defense and foreign ministers,current and former international disarmament diplomatsand other scientific and policy experts.

While this document represents fairly the discussions held,it is the sole responsibility of Pugwash Secretary GeneralPaolo Cotta-Ramusino, Professor of Physics, Universita’degli Studi di Milano and Pugwash President JayanthaDhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General forDisarmament Affairs.

The upcoming Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)Review Conference (May 2010, New York) willexamine the treaty implementation and, in partic-

ular, the status of the three NPT basic pillars (disarma-ment, non proliferation and access to nuclear energy forpeaceful uses by NPT members). It is an important oppor-tunity to call theworld’s attention tothe serious risksassociated withnuclear weapons,and the ultimateneed to eliminatesuch weapons and towork towards alegally-binding docu-ment (such as aconvention) banningthe possession ofsuch weapons. Workfor such a legallybinding document

Pugwash and the 2010 NPT Review ConferenceMay 2010

Milan Document on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

29 January 2010

S P E C I A L S E C T I O N

Pugwash Newsletter, Summer 2010 3

Iran President Ahmadenijad at the NPT Review Conference.

Wa'el Al'Assad of the Arab League and other NPT Delegates. Jayantha Dhanapala addresses the NPTReview Conference.

The German Delegation.


stored separately from delivery systems. Fissile materialfrom dismantled weapons should be made accessible tothe IAEA for inspection. Effective procedures for veri-fying weapon dismantlement should be activelypursued.

3. Active promotion of nuclear disarmament is the respon-sibility of all the members of NPT (in fact of all coun-tries, even if nuclear-weapons states have a special

conclusion, before the NPT Review Conference, theiron-going negotiations, aimed at developing a successortreaty to their recently expired START 1 agreement.

2. Reductions of longer-range and shorter-range nuclearweapons should be vigorously pursued in nuclear nego-tiations. As in the past, unilateral actions can signifi-cantly contribute to this process. Decommissionednuclear weapons should be dismantled and not only


7. Possession of nuclear weapons is not an instrument forenhancing regional or global influence or political andeconomic leverage. This statement should be clearlyunderstood and stated explicitly whenever useful. Thisnotion, contrary to some conventional wisdom of thepast, applies specifically to the major nuclear weaponsstates, where the possession of nuclear weapons ismanifestly not of any help in dealing with military,political or economic crises.

8. Both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states shouldnevertheless exercise maximum restraint in the develop-ment of military applications of science and technology,such as ballistic missile defense, that could create poten-tially destabilizing situations, both in the regional andglobal context, thus complicating the task of reducingthe reliance on nuclear weapons.

9. Nuclear-weapons states should develop internal struc-tures, agencies, legislation, budget allocations and thelike, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in defensedoctrines, and eventually to eliminate such weaponsfrom national arsenals. “Modernization” and otherforms of technical improvement and expansion of capa-bilities of existing arsenals should be prevented in allpossible ways.

Promote nuclear disarmament: involve the statesthat are not parties to the NPT

10. States that are not parties to the NPT should beinduced in all possible ways to eliminate their nuclearweapons and join the NPT. In the meantime theyshould be encouraged to support the general goals ofthe NPT by taking concrete steps in the direction ofreducing their nuclear arsenals, preventing nuclearproliferation, opening up their nuclear facilities toIAEA inspections and monitoring, respecting nuclearweapons-free-zones, and joining all possible other armscontrol treaties such as the CWC, BWC, CTBT, etc.

Promote nuclear disarmament: make progress in theestablishment of a zone free of weapons of massdestruction in the Middle East (ME) and particularlyof a nuclear weapons-free zone

11. The idea of establishing a zone free of weapons ofmass destruction in the Middle East was an integralpart of the success of the 1995 Review and ExtensionConference. It has also been at various times and with

responsibility in this regard). This implies that stateswith relatively smaller arsenals should do their share ofthe disarmament work. Also non-nuclear weaponscountries hosting nuclear weapons belonging to othercountries should send these weapons back to the ownerand request their dismantlement. Finally all non-nuclearweapons states should pursue the elimination of nuclearweapons from their territories, not even allowing themin transit, by promoting nuclear-weapons-free zones.Extending nuclear-weapons-free zones can be seen as acomplementary avenue to achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world.

Reinforce the political and legal commitments tonuclear disarmament: decrease the military role andthe political influence of nuclear arsenals

4. The stated aim of nuclear weapons possession bynuclear-weapons states should be no more than to deterthe use of nuclear weapons by others. There isabsolutely no need to keep any nuclear weapon at ahigh alert status. A high alert status entails a serious riskof a nuclear launch by mistake even now, 20 years afterthe end of the cold war.

5. Concepts like extended deterrence (meant in variousways as nuclear defense against non nuclear attacks orthe planning of the use of nuclear weapons to compen-sate conventional inferiority or to protect allies againstpossible nuclear or even chemical or biologicalweapons attacks) have shown to be of very limitedvalue during the cold war and should be phased out.They should be replaced by a generalized no-first useposture by states possessing nuclear weapons. More-over no-first use policies should be made even moreexplicit by extending security guarantees to states thatdo not possess nuclear weapons. Pending the completeelimination of nuclear weapons, the latter should beguaranteed that they will never be attacked withnuclear weapons.

6. Extended deterrence in no way should require thestationing of nuclear weapons on other countries’ terri-tories. An international norm should be developed,forbidding such extraterritorial deployments. Europeancountries have a clear role to play in this respect andshould take an active approach to fulfill their ownresponsibilities.


various characterizations pushed forward by the mainMiddle Eastern states. It is important that the 2010NPT Review Conference states unequivocally thatconcrete progress should be made in the creation ofsuch a zone. Consultations should be organizedinvolving all the Middle Eastern states aimed atdefining an “agenda of progress” for a ME zone freeof weapons of mass destruction. A UN-sponsoredinternational conference should be called for, todiscuss the implementation of the ME zone free ofweapons of mass destruction and particularly of anuclear-weapons free zone. The UN could appoint acoordinator to help the process of establishing a zonefree of weapons of mass destructions and particularlya nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East.

Promote nuclear disarmament: ensure CTBT entryinto force, push forward the FMCT

12. The CTBT should be signed and ratified immediatelyby all those states that are bound by other treaties oragreements not to test nuclear weapons or thatdeclared that they do not intend to test in the future.To do otherwise would just be a continuation of thepractice of holding arms control treaties hostage topolitical pressures, irrespective of their actual valueand merit. If some states continue to block entry intoforce of the CTBT, they will have to justify that posi-tion to the international community. Permanentlyending nuclear testing for all and hence impeding newnuclear weapons developments and stopping theproduction of fissile materials for weapons purposesare all important elements supporting the goal ofglobal nuclear disarmament. Regardless of the timingof the entry into force of the CTBT, the CTBT Organi-zation in Vienna, should be strengthened.

Prevent nuclear proliferation: strengthen the IAEAand the international monitoring & control regime

13. In light of the present spread of nuclear activities forcivilian purposes, it is clearly in the collective interestthat all such activities be properly monitored andcontrolled by the competent international organiza-tion, namely the IAEA. The IAEA itself should bestrengthened both in its workforce and in its ability tooperate. The (model) additional protocol should beconsidered as the new norm, in terms of the relationsbetween the agency and the member states. All

members of the NPT should be encouraged to sign andratify the (model) additional protocol.

14. Work should be pursued to develop improved prolifer-ation-resistant technologies in all stages of the nuclearpower production process.

15. Nuclear fuel production should be soon international-ized, without prejudice to the inalienable right recog-nized in Article IV of the treaty. International consor-tiums for enriching uranium and for the production ofnuclear fuel should be encouraged and the monitoringof these international consortiums should be firmly inthe hands of the IAEA. Phasing-out of reprocessing infavor of interim storage should also be encouraged1.

16. Efforts should be made to improve the monitoringcapabilities of the IAEA beyond the additional proto -col. A critical analysis of the problems, gaps and short-comings of the monitoring systems should be made inthe spirit of objective and constructive criticism.

Prevent nuclear proliferation. Strengthen andharmonize national legislation to prevent illicittraffic of nuclear material and of technical devicesthat could be used in building nuclear weapons

17. The effectiveness of resolution 1540 should be thor-oughly examined. Countries should be encouraged toinclude in their legislation provisions to control, inter-cept and punish the illicit transfer of nuclear material(particularly of fissile material). The legislation shouldguarantee the possibility of intercepting illicit traffic ofmaterials and technologies that could be used tomanufacture nuclear weapons or nuclear explosivedevices. Dual-use materials and technologies shouldattract particular attention, and their transfer shouldbe regulated by national legislation and internationalagreements. Because the availability of HighlyEnriched Uranium (HEU) provides the most ‘easy’avenue for manufacturing nuclear explosive devices bypossible non-state actors, countries should be encour-aged and helped to progressively phase out reactorsusing HEU and to replace them with reactors usingLow Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel. The huge existingstocks of HEU, as well as the large amounts that willbe obtained from nuclear disarmament, should bedown-blended as quickly and as completely as possibleto LEU (to be then employed as fuel for energy-producing nuclear reactors).

1Currently the world is dealing inadequately with 250 tons of already separated plutonium and the 70 tons of weapon-grade pluto-nium that Russia and U.S. have declared excess. Reprocessing costs more than interim storage and complicates radioactive wastemanagement. For a non-nuclear state, it can provide a civilian pretext for creating a nuclear-weapon option.

8 T H N P T R E V I E W C O N F E R E N C E

Pugwash Consultation on the 2010 NPT Review Conference 8 May 2010, New York City

Promoting a Successful NPT Review Conference

Pugwash convened a private consultation involving 20current and former diplomats, UN officials andleading NGO experts from 15 countries for a general

exchange of views on issues related to the current ReviewConference. The meeting was chaired by Pugwash Presi-dent Jayantha Dhanapala and Pugwash Secretary GeneralPaolo Cotta-Ramusino. Each participant took part in hisor her personal capacity, under Pugwash/Chatham Houserules. The purpose of the meeting was to contribute acreative atmosphere in which items related to the NPTReview Conference could be discussed in a more holisticway among key participants, drawing upon the extensiveexperience of former practitioners.

This report highlights areas which might serve as a cata-lyst for a successful conclusion of the Review Conference.As with all Pugwash meetings, there was no attempt toachieve consensus and this report is the rapporteur’ssummary of some of the main topics raised. No viewpointexpressed in this report should be attributed to anyspecific participant. Rather we encourage further discus-sion among delegates, officials, and the NGO communityon some of the topics raised during the course of theconsultation.

General

The more relaxed atmosphere at this Review Conferenceas compared to the 2005 Review Conference waswelcomed. There was a recognition on all sides of thewindow of opportunity provided by President Obama’srepeated commitment to create conditions for a nuclearweapons free world. The urgency of seeking ways to oper-ationalize that commitment equally was underscored.

Areas of discussion focused on five categories: trans-parency, verification, doctrines, disarmament and proce-dural issues.

Transparency

Transparency is primarily a declaratory confidencebuilding exercise. It can contribute to an environmentmore conducive to more predictable cooperative security.The dramatic US announcement of the numbers of itsnuclear arsenal has set the stage at this Review Conferencefor further discussion of transparency.

• Transparency may provide a useful theme to explore inthe Review Conference and could be important todiscuss in the final document.

20. Assisting the development of national nuclear energyprograms of NPT member states should include alsoadvising member states of all the risks and problemsinvolved with civilian nuclear programs. Referenceshould be made to problems related with economicsustainability, with environmental concerns (includingall the serious problems related to waste disposal),with the control and the training of technicians, withthe organization of emergency responses in case ofserious technical problems. This should happen ofcourse without prejudice to the inalienable right guar-anteed by article IV of the NPT.

Ensure the right of all NPT member-states to developnuclear activities for civilian purposes

18. The right of NPT parties to develop, research and usenuclear energy for peaceful purposes is recognizedunder the treaty and should not be subject toconstraints or limitations. This right should be exer-cised in accordance with the obligations prescribed bythe treaty.

19. Assistance to civilian nuclear programs of memberstates should be guaranteed to all parties to the NPTwithout prejudice, while enforcing all the applicablecontrol and monitoring activities.



discussions on this issue at the Review Conference. Someconcern was expressed that the NPR did not explicitlystate that the ‘sole’ purpose of nuclear weapons is to deterother nuclear weapons. It was noted, however, that forthe first time the US has set this as a goal.

• There was some discussion of the continued role ofextended deterrence, and recognition of the pressuresthis can create for non-nuclear weapons states which arenot part of a nuclear alliance or protected by the ‘nuclearumbrella.’ Some felt this damaged the principle of equalsecurity for all.

• The continuing impact of the US-India nuclear deal wasexplored. There was some concern expressed that theNuclear Suppliers Group and others did not express crit-icism in a strong and timely manner. Assurance thatthere won’t be more deals like this in the future will beimportant. There was hope that there might be discus-sion in Main Committees 2 and perhaps 3 on this issue.Without singling out the US-India deal, there was a hopethat there will be a block on future deals. Without suchaction, non-nuclear weapons states concerns may inten-sify in the future.

Disarmament

The importance of the need for further disarmamentprogress was underscored by many and there was anexpectation that disarmament will be discussed in detail,as at every Review Conference.

• It was suggested that Main Committee 1 might put thevarious offers/displays of recent related measures thathave been taken on disarmament into a form that isreadily accessible. For example, it might includesummary of efforts taken to close production facilities,unilateral and bilateral reductions, and highlightingareas that states already intend to do in future.

• There was some discussion about the P5 statement to‘carry on’ the commitments of 1995 and 2000, whichsome interpret as being a weaker statement than a firmrecommitment. Others pointed out the intent of thephrase was to show a very active commitment.

• There was dialogue on the pros and cons of the questionof setting deadlines for both short and long-term disar-mament goals. Setting such a timeline might indeedprove an historic breakthrough for this Review Confer-ence. However it was also noted that setting timelines, asin the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, mightbe problematic if those benchmarks are not met, even if

• Transparency issues must be addressed not only in termsof disarmament, but also in the areas of non-prolifera-tion and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

• It might be useful to probe the question and furtherelucidate why it is important to seek transparency. Therealso is a need to better define transparency and to setconsistent benchmarks, possibly in the context of afuture Pugwash meeting.

• The P5 should be encouraged to promote transparencyin their statements and positions.

Verification

Verification is legally binding. It plays a role in providinggreater confidence in the serious intent of transparencydeclarations.

• Verification issues are relevant to all three pillars of theNPT, and there was a recognition on all sides of the needto have agreed shared understandings of verificationsystems and norms.

• There was hope that there will be a sharing with the restof the Conference of information provided by the UK-Norway experience, as this might encourage futureinitiatives by other countries.

• It was proposed to extend the role of the IAEA toinclude verifying disarmament.

• It might prove a positive step to establish a Track 2 orTrack 11⁄2 process for verification and inspection of theNew START treaty. This could involve influential non-governmental public figures, an idea Pugwash has raisedwith former European defense and foreign affairs minis-ters, based on the model of parallel public inspectionsconducted in the years of the implementation of the INFTreaty (the Intermediate and Shorter Range nuclearForces Treaty).

Doctrines

Nuclear doctrines are important to consider, since theissue of possession of nuclear weapons arises from nucleardeterrence doctrines.

• The way in which discussion of doctrine is handled inthe Review Conference final document will be veryimportant. Coming at a time when NATO’s StrategicConcept review is underway, it may send an importantmessage that might help inform the NATO deliberations.

• Despite differing opinions on the US Nuclear PostureReview, the NPR can serve as a point of departure for

Procedural/structural issues

The positive role and personal involvement of the UNSecretary General was widely appreciated. The Presidentof the Conference also has taken welcome steps to try toensure coordination amongst the committees, and thatMain Committees are coordinating their work plans.

• Strengthening the institutional mechanism for linkagebetween the three pillars might prove a useful exercise,for example in possibly identifying a more holistic actionplan for the next five years that might be adopted as aconsensus document. Even if this were only one agreedparagraph it might prove very useful.

• The example of the mechanism used in 1985 mightprove useful, in which the chair called meetings twotimes per week, to coordinate information exchange,and to provide the chapeau for the final document, andimportantly to identify early-on possible choke points.

• Support was expressed for the innovative idea for acommon template for Main Committee and subcom-mittee reports, each reviewing the past and highlightingfuture oriented action plans.

• There was an idea however that perhaps in the 4thweek

the President of the Conference might have a specialsession in which delegates could be given the opportu-nity to address this issue.

• The importance of ongoing discussions on disarmamentwas emphasized, via the Conference on Disarmament,the First Committee, and other fora.

• The idea for a President’s Group, to carry forwardprogress from the Review Conference in the 5 yearinterval, was discussed.

In general our discussions were guided by a sense ofcommon purpose in the urgency of seizing the opportuni-ties made possible by many recent developments. A failurefor the Review Conference to live up to this potentialcould have profound, widespread, and damaging impact.There was goodwill expressed in our discussions forexploring in creative settings options for progress and forinjecting such perspectives into the Review Conferenceprocesses. Pugwash acknowledged with deep thanks theparticipation of such a knowledgeable and committedgroup of people during this busy time.

This rapporteur’s report was prepared by Sandra IonnoButcher, and is the sole responsibility of the rapporteur.

the party is acting in good faith. It was noted that evenwith the CWC, however, this process has been beneficialin drawing focus to the issue due to the missed deadline.

• The importance of not allowing deadlines to become animpediment to consensus was noted.

• If there is not the ability for a general consensus on atimeline, perhaps the P5 might issue a collective state-ment about a timeline for disarmament.

• At the very least there needs to be a collective appeal forprogress by 2015, though there is a need to better definewhat this might mean.

• There was discussion on setting a possible timeline forwork on or conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

• It was noted that the question of further reductions oftactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons is an area inwhich progress might have a profound impact on otherissues.

• In this context, establishing a principle that nuclearweapons should not be based on foreign soil would beimportant progress. Removal of US nuclear weaponsfrom Europe to US territory, following the post-Sovietexample, is seen as a potentially very powerful step interms of both disarmament and doctrinal issues.

• There was recognition of the US decision to submitprotocols of two Nuclear Weapons Free Zones to the USSenate. Other nuclear weapons states could be encour-aged to take similar action. Such a step, worthy in and ofitself, may in turn help reinforce prospects for the USprocess.

• There will be a separate Pugwash consultation on theMiddle East on May 15, but the importance of definingsome criteria for success on the Middle East resolutionwas noted. Setting an agenda for progress, hopefullyincluding some timelines, will be needed to overcome thenegative impact of the lack of progress in this area.

• The possibility of extending the INF treaty to other partsof the world was noted.

• The need for progress on the package of initiatives at theConference on Disarmament was highlighted. Theseinclude the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the nuclearweapons convention, negative security assurances andpreventing an arms race in outer space.




Pugwash Consultation on the 2010 NPT Review Conference 15 May 2010, New York City

several earlier proposals, and seeks to package them insuch a way that allows the maximum flexibility needed tohave some real forward movement to break the currentinertia. It has been pointed out very clearly that in order tohave progress on the situation of WMD in the MiddleEast, all states in the Middle East should be engaged, withno exception.

Need for creative approach to dialogue

Many felt there is a need for a mechanism for ongoingdiscussions. Some felt that limiting these discussions, forexample, to a single conference, would have only limitedability to address the range of issues involved.

Ideas were discussed about seeing the movement of theMiddle East as two trains moving on two parallel tracks.One ‘track’ might explore broader regional security issuesand another might explore the establishment of a WMDfree zone. There would be interaction among the twoprocesses, and a hope that they would both reach theirdestinations simultaneously as the end stages will requirethat serious steps have been taken in both areas.

The above two ‘tracks,’ combined with the engagement ofan interrelated unofficial (so-called Track 2) process,might create the needed flexibility to ensure all parties canengage in the process, even in the earliest phases. Theremay be need for some exploration with all parties toensure that this would be suitably flexible. Some withexperience in the ACRS process felt that de-linking to anextent the regional security issues from the arms controlprocess may help avoid some of the pitfalls encountered.

The majority of discussion focused on the NWFZ (orWMDFZ) strand. Some felt this could start with apreparatory committee, discussing the terms of reference(participation, goals, intermediate steps, timing). Asmentioned, many felt it would be important to ensure thatthe conference is not a one-time event, but that it mightfor example start in 2011 and proceed annually, with theparticipation of the P5 (and recognizing the special role ofthe NPT depository states: Russia, the UK and the US).Alternately, the process could be organized as series ofseparate events, and ad hoc topical meetings.

Nuclear Weapons and WMD in the Middle East

On 15 May 2010, Pugwash convened a privateconsultation in New York City, involving 16current and former diplomats, UN officials and

leading NGO experts from 10 countries for a generalexchange of views on issues related to the current NPTReview Conference1. The meeting was chaired by PugwashPresident Jayantha Dhanapala and Pugwash SecretaryGeneral Paolo Cotta-Ramusino. Each participant tookpart in his or her personal capacity, under thePugwash/Chatham House rule.

The purpose of this meeting was to explore options forpromoting progress on the 1995 Middle East resolution. Itwas recognized that given the lack of forward movementon this issue in the past 15 years, it is imperative that thisReview Conference should make proposals for furtheractions beyond a general statement of goodwill. The situa-tion of regional insecurity is serious. Pugwash maintainsthat the presence of any weapons of mass destructionposes a grave risk to all countries, and it is in that spirit ofseeking to ensure greater stability and security for all thatthis meeting was convened.

As with all Pugwash meetings, there was no attempt toachieve consensus, and this report is the rapporteur’s2

summary of some of the main topics raised. No viewpointexpressed in this report should be attributed to anyspecific participant. Rather we encourage further discus-sion among delegates, officials, and the expert NGOcommunity on some of the topics raised during the courseof the consultation. While discussions included a range oftopics involving well-known challenges among regionalplayers, and without discounting the seriousness of theseissues, this report focuses on discussions related topossible forward movement on the 1995 Middle Eastresolution.

Proposal for progress on the Middle East resolution

The proposal under discussion (see attachment 1) links therole of a UN-appointed special representative with ideasfor ongoing conferences and Track II meetings on the1995 Middle East resolution. It takes the main elements of

Benefits of including Track 2 (or Track 1.5)

Most highlighted the strong advantage of the overlapbetween the Track 1 (official) and 2 (unofficial) initiatives,having some discussions at the official level and some at amixed level, or “Track 1.5.” This allows people to sittogether without the requirements of the official level.This is especially useful for those issues that are not quiteready for Track 1 negotiations, but which can be discussedin a Track 1.5 setting. With a careful and creativeapproach these Track 1.5 discussions could be more inclu-sive than might otherwise be possible, and leading NGOscould be called upon to help prepare the meetings. As oneparticipant said, “Everything in the Middle East startssomehow with a secret meeting.”

In addition, the Track 2 (or 1.5) setting may help to facili-tate interaction between the two strands. This potentialfor cross-fertilization of ideas could help to address someinstitutional limitations in various governmental struc-tures, where for example, the arms control desks and theregional desks have very little interaction. The lessons ofthe Cold War were highlighted, in which Track 2 meetingsamong scientists promoted arms control measures andother related incremental steps which helped build confi-dence that made possible the later bold and decisive stepstoward peace.

Realistic expectations

Most felt this comprehensive approach toward progresson the ME resolution has great potential, and encouragedfurther discussion and dialogue about this idea amongdelegates and governments. It was recognized thatpatience may be needed, as this has been a long process inother regions that have successfully established nuclearweapons free zones. The need for goodwill among allparties is significant, since if states want to tie up thisprocess, they obviously will be able do so in this frame-work as well. However, if all parties approach this in theright frame of mind, it has the potential to get someforward movement in the region, which is sorely lackingat present.

While not all participants were unanimously supportive ofthe ideas discussed, there was nevertheless unanimousappreciation of the willingness of all sides to engage inopen-minded interactions on these urgent and importantissues. Pugwash acknowledged with deep appreciation thecreative input and involvement of the participants, who

Scope

A balance will have to be found whether it is better todiscuss a nuclear weapons free zone or a weapons of massdestruction free zone. It was recognized that any agree-ment in addition to limiting/eliminating the weaponsthemselves, should provide long-term security assurancesto the parties. The point has been made, with the strongsupport of the participants, that any process or negotia-tion for a WMD (NW) free zone in the Middle East shouldbe all inclusive and not discriminate against any country.

Given the historical experience of Egypt and others joiningthe NPT, while Israel stayed outside the regime, there issensitivity to the pressure some in the region may feel tohaving to sign and ratify some of the treaties and measuresthat currently address these issues (Comprehensive nuclearTest Ban Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biolog-ical Weapons Convention, Additional Protocol, etc). Somefelt strongly that the primary way to address the problemis for Israel to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weaponstate. Others pointed out the need to extend all the WMDagreements to the entire region. It was pointed out thatthere is a common norm against the use of WMD in theregion, and there is a hope for codifying this non-usepolicy. A composite document summarizing this common-ality might prove an interesting exercise. Some feltstrongly that issues of compliance would have to behandled outside this strand, under the IAEA or other orga-nizations.

Role of a possible UN-appointed special representative(or advisor) and standing committee

To ensure implementation of these ideas proceeds in atimely manner, there was a discussion of the need for aspecial representative or advisor, appointed by the UNSecretary General, who would work with an advisorybody or standing committee which has authority stem-ming from the UN Secretary General. It was recognizedthat the UN umbrella would enable maximal participa-tion. This person must assume neutrality, and have credi-bility, and trust. Engaging a special representative (oradvisor) also might allow for more expert study andreview of issues than was possible, for example, during theACRS experience.

The progress reports, done at least every six months,would be a mechanism for feedback into the appropriatechannels, including the NPT processes.



1 This meeting follows an earlier meeting, held 5 May 2010. The report of that meeting is available online at www.pugwash.org. 2 This rapporteur’s report was written by Sandra Ionno Butcher.

4 Preparing a larger UN Conference aimed at defining thegeneral negotiating pattern for the establishment of aMiddle Eastern zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruc-tion and of Nuclear Weapons in particular

5 Facilitating negotiations aimed at implementing anyinterim practical steps.

The Special Representative (or Advisor) should establish aCommittee (alternatives: Advisory Board, Commission)composed of officials and experts from Middle Easterncountries and relevant international organizations, such asthe League of Arab States and the African Union besidesthe UN, and also from the P5 and other countries asappropriate. This Committee should work in a coopera-tive way to help the Special Representative (or Advisor) inperforming the above defined mandate. The SpecialRepresentative (or Advisor) should also be in position toorganize specific technical meetings, possibly with theassistance of such international organization as the IAEA,the CTBTO, the OPCW, etc.

The Special Representative (or Advisor) and theCommittee should in particular understand the concernsand collect the suggestions of individual States andconcerned institutions from the civil societies of MiddleEastern countries. It is recommended that all countriesthat participate in the Committee facilitate the entry of themembers of the Committee in their territory for the saidpurpose of understanding the concerns and collect thesuggestions of each individual State.

The Special Representative (or Advisor) shall submit atleast every six months progress reports on his or her activi-ties, on the work of the Committee and on the relevantfindings to the UN Secretary General. These reportsshould be made available to the interested States and theNPT Preparatory Committees. The Special Representative(or Advisor) shall be assisted by a small, but highly quali-fied staff. For the financial support of the activity of the SpecialRepresentative (or Advisor) and the Committee, it isproposed the establishment of a UN administered fundsupported by member states, on a voluntary basis.

spent several hours contributing their expertise andinsights into this discussion despite the many demands ontheir time.

Attachment 1: Draft Pugwash Proposal, revised 15 May(based on above discussions)

Making Concrete Steps Towards a Middle-East Free ofNuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of MassDestruction: Role of a Un-Nominated Representative (orAdvisor)

Several countries at different times proposed the creationin the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons andother weapons of mass destruction. The first initiative inthis sense was the initiative of Iran in 1974, followed byEgypt, promoting a nuclear weapons free zone. TheMubarak Initiative of 1990 expanded the concept to aWMD free zone. In the 1995 NPT Review Conference aspecific Middle East resolution was approved and the finaldocument of the 2000 NPT Review Conference referred tothis resolution. All countries of the region have supportedresolutions in the UN General Assembly on the creation ofa zone free of weapons of mass destructions. The conceptwas explored in subsequent studies by the UN andUNIDIR. However up to now there has been no progressin the direction of creating such a zone.

It is recommended that, after the NPT Review Conference,a Special Representative (or Advisor) be appointed by theUN Secretary General [as recommended by the NPTReview Conference of States Parties], to be supported by a[committee, advisory board, commission], for the problemof establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and otherweapons of mass destruction in the Middle East with themandate of:

1 Defining the framework and understanding the condi-tions under which concrete progress and practical stepstowards the establishment of such a zone could be made.

2 Proposing the sequence of the necessary steps towardsthe establishment of such a zone.

2 Proposing a series of meetings and conferences aimed atdefining precisely such practical steps. In this the SpecialRepresentative (or Advisor) could also facilitate asynergy between the so called Track-2 discussions andsubsequent official negotiations.


Statement of Jayantha Dhanapala* NGO Session, 7th May 2010

each within seven years of the new START entering intoforce. Another NPT nuclear weapon state is on the vergeof renewing its Trident nuclear weapon programme.

In 1995, we had the certain prospect of negotiating aCTBT, which we finally achieved only to find, today, thatits entry into force is blocked by two NPT nuclear weaponstates and six others. A FMCT that was also envisaged inDecision II of the 1995 package was first obstructed by aNPT nuclear weapon state and is now blocked by oneoutside the NPT because existing stockpiles are notaddressed in the negotiating mandate.

Implementing Decision I of the 1995 Package tostrengthen the review process has been a hard struggle. Onother elements of the package as well, commitments madein the 2000 Review Conference were rejected in 2005. Allstates experience changes of government either throughdemocratic elections or through other means but the prin-ciple of state succession should apply not only in respect oftreaties but also in respect of conference commitmentsmade in consequence of Treaty obligations. There can beno ‘exceptionalism’ in this respect. Unless states partiesagree on this principle they will continue to engage inmutual recrimination over fulfilling past commitments.Decision I enjoined all “to look forward as well as back-ward” at review conferences but when there is no confi-dence that past commitments are the basis for futureaction, states parties will be condemned to operate withrear view mirrors only.

Review Conferences, Mr.President, are not rituals. Theyare intended as honest five yearly stocktaking exercises ina process of rigorous accountability holding states partiesto their obligations in the past and recalibrating objectivesfor the future in a cumulative process. That assuredpredictability in the future course of this treaty will dispelany suspense as to whether review conferences would besuccesses or failures and how much further the tensilestrength of the NPT will be tested.

I am aware that many recipes and action plans – includingthe Milan Document of Pugwash—have been prepared to

Mr. President, Excellencies, Distinguished delegates,

My name is Jayantha Dhanapala and I am President of thePugwash Conferences on Science & World Affairs whichwas awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995.

But this is a personal statement in my current capacity as amember of civil society based on my 25-year-old associa-tion with the NPT. I thank all concerned for accommo-dating me.

I am aware I speak to a multicultural audience—butShakespeare belongs to world literature. The ghosts inShakespeare’s plays serve the purpose of pricking theconscience of the main characters. I speak, therefore, as aghost from the 1995 Review and Extension Conferencewhere the nuclear weapon states and their allies assured usall that an indefinite extension of the NPT was vital forpredictability so that nuclear disarmament could beachieved. All delegations worked hard, consequently, toadopt a package of three decisions and a Resolution onthe Middle East to enable the NPT to be extended indefi-nitely without a vote. It was quite clearly not an unequiv-ocal and unqualified extension. But the ink was scarcelydry on the package when we witnessed with dismay thedisregard for the commitments made on many of theelements of the package.

Mr.President,

in 1995 -we had 5 nuclear weapon states and one outsidethe NPT. Today, we have 9 nuclear weapon states – 4 ofthem outside the NPT one of which is being given specialprivileges by the entire Nuclear Suppliers Group in viola-tion of Article I of the treaty and paragraph 12 of DecisionII in the 1995 package. Another will soon receive twopower reactors from a nuclear weapon state within theNPT.

In 1970, we had a total of 38,153 nuclear warheads whenthe NPT entered into force. Today, 40 years later, we have23,300 – just 11,853 less—with over 8000 on deployedstatus and the promise by the two main nuclear weaponstates to reduce their deployed arsenals by 30% to 1550



Jayantha Dhanapala address to the NGO Session of the NPT Review Conference, May 7, 2010.

The continued modernization of nuclear weapon arsenalsand their delivery systems; the limited reductions achievedby new START; the troubling ambiguities over the use ofnuclear weapons and negative security assurances in theUS Nuclear Posture Review; and the persistence of nucleardeterrence in the doctrines of nuclear weapon states showthat we have progressed very little. Whether it is the pres-sures of domestic politics and well-entrenched interestgroups or a perceived inferiority in conventional weapons,it does not seem as if nuclear weapon states are ready toeliminate all their weapons even in a phased programme.Even disarmament commissions and some coalitions fornuclear abolition have set their target dates very far intothe distant future building artificial base camps on the wayto the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The focus onthe DPRK and Iran—and on nuclear terrorism—alsoserves to distract attention from the inherent dangers ofnuclear weapons themselves. It has been stated andrestated that if there were no nuclear weapons under averifiable nuclear disarmament regime there can be noproliferation or nuclear terrorism. How do we exerciseour responsibility to protect the goal of a nuclear weaponfree world?

ensure the success of this Review Conference. But diplo-matic phraseology however adroit can no longer paperover fundamental differences permanently.

At the end of the 1995 conference I said from the chair—“The permanence of the treaty does not represent apermanence of unbalanced obligations, nor does it repre-sent the permanence of nuclear apartheid between nuclearhaves and have-nots.” The regrettable exit of the DPRKfrom the NPT and its subsequent nuclear testing; thewelcome return to compliance of Iraq and Libya; andcontinuing questions over Iran are some of the experienceswe have had to go through since 1995. The nonprolifera-tion norm can be strengthened by encouraging the multi-lateralization of the fuel cycle and the universalization ofthe Additional Protocol as voluntary options. Basicallythough, the failure to implement nonproliferation anddisarmament simulataneously is unsustainable. The year2010 dawned with the promise of being a tipping pointfor nuclear disarmament after the global surge of publicopinion in favour of a nuclear weapon free world. Indeedone year after the Prague speech of President Obama wehave seen many events collectively hailed as a “PragueSpring”. But will that ‘spring’ blossom into a “summer”?

weapons, we need to begin the process of outlawingnuclear weapons.

Mr. President, I conclude by congratulating you as the firstfellow Asian to take the chair of a NPT Review Confer-ence after 1995 and wish you all success.

* Jayantha Dhanapala is a former Ambassador of SriLanka who chaired Main Committee I at the 1985NPT Review Conference and was President of the 1995NPT Review & Extension Conference. He was UNUnder-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs from1998-2003 and is currently President of the PugwashConferences on Science & World Affairs. These are hispersonal views.

The only credible alternative appears to be the proposalfor a Nuclear Weapon Convention on which negotiationsmust begin immediately. We already have in the NPT oneinternational compact, which was an agreement betweennuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states fora transitional period when the former would join the latterin a nuclear weapon free world. That has not happenedfor forty years. The hedging in the statements setting anuclear weapon free world as an objective undermines thedetermination to reach that goal.

We do need a radical change. In the same manner as wehave outlawed biological and chemical weapons amongweapons of mass destruction; and, anti-personnel land-mines and cluster weapons as inhumane conventional


Publication of Pugwash Briefing Book and Issue Brief

1. The Importance of 2010

It is the season. Every five years, since

1970, a multilateral treaty viewed by so

me

as flawed and discriminatory and by ma

ny

as, at best, controversial, attracts global

attention.

In 1995, when the Treaty for the Non-

proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

had to be extended under its unusual pr

ovi-

sions, the NPT received heightened atten

-

tion. In other years, preparations and p

re-

dictions about the NPT Review

Conferences are almost ritualistically the

subject of discussions among nation stat

es,

scholars, the media and civil society.

After each Review Conference is over,

analyses of its perceived success or failu

re,

engage the attention of the same circles

briefly, and then, all is forgotten until th

e

eve of the next Review Conference. Thi

s rite

has begun as we approach the May 2010

NPT’s Eighth Review Conference. The

battle cry of King Henry V may not be a

n

entirely inappropriate quote.

Nevertheless, the opportunity to arrive

at a constructive consensus among the pa

r-

ties of the NPT on its future is being rep

eat-

ed this year. So are the exhortations for

a

success so vital for the survival of the N

PT

as the lynchpin of international nuclear

non-proliferation and disarmament effor

ts.

A consensus among the parties to the N

PT

is thus crucial in both the nuclear nonp

rolif-

eration and nuclear disarmament discou

rse

internationally.

There is, however, a difference this time

round. The 2005 Review Conference he

ld

during the second term of US President

George W. Bush was an undisguised failure

which left many states disappointed and

even angry. It was followed by the failur

e of

the 60th United Nations General Assem

bly

(UNGA) Summit to agree on the nuclea

r

disarmament sections of the Declaration

that was finally adopted without them.

2005 thus, was not only a bad year, but

also

signified the nadir of multilateral diplom

acy

in the area of nuclear disarmament and

nuclear non-proliferation.

The election of the first African-Ameri-

can as President of the United States of

America on a platform that included the

reaffirmation of multilateralism and the

vision of a nuclear weapon-free world ha

s

led to great expectations. These expecta

-

tions can either be fulfilled (even partial

ly)

or betrayed before the Review Conferen

ce.

They can also receive a boost or a blow

by the outcome of the conference. Secur

ity

Council Resolution 1887 of 24 Septemb

er

PugwashI S S U E B R I E F

Planning for the 2010 NPT Review Conference:

A Practitioner’s Overview

BY JAYANTHA DHANAPALA

“Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more”

—King Henry V, Act 3, Scene I, Shakespeare

Pugwash Issue Briefs

highlight important issues

which lie at the inter section

of science, technol ogy and

public policy.

Intended for wide circulation

to policy makers and

analysts, the media, NGOs,

the academic and research

communities, as well as the

Pugwash community,

Pugwash Issue Briefs will

contain articles, commen -

taries and conclusions that

emanate from the broad

range of Pugwash workshops

and conferences held each

year.

Perspectives and recom -

mendations contained in the

Issue Briefs represent those

of the individual authors, not

of the Pugwash Conferences

or its funders. This Pugwash

Issue Brief has been funded

in part by the Carnegie

Corporation of New York and

the Ploughshares Fund.

Volume 6, Number 1

March 2010

Editor:Jeffrey Boutwell

Senior Program Coordinator:

Sandra Ionno Butcher

Design and Layout:

Anne Read

Printing:

Mid-Atlantic Printing Ltd.

Washington, DC

Issued by the Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

Nobel Peace Prize 1995

In preparation for the 2010 NPT Review Conference

held in New York at the United Nations from May 3-28,

the Pugwash Conferences published an Issue Brief by

Pugwash President Jayantha Dhanapala, Planning for the

2010 NPT Review Conference: A Practitioner’s Overview, and

a Briefing Book, Perspectives for Progress: Options for the

2010 NPT Review Conference, with contributions from more

than 20 eminent international security and arms control

experts.

Pugwash is grateful to the following supporters for making

these publications possible: Carnegie Corporation of New

York, Ford Foundation (Beijing), Heathside Charitable

Trust, ML Resources Social Vision, The Norwegian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ploughshares Fund, and

the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Draft Pugwash Proposal, 15 May 2010

Making Concrete Steps Towards a Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons and OtherWeapons of Mass Destruction: Role of a UN-Nominated Representative (or Advisor)

5. Facilitating negotiations aimed at implementing anyinterim practical steps.

The Special Representative (or Advisor) should establish aCommittee (alternatives: Advisory Board, Commission)composed of officials and experts from Middle Easterncountries and relevant international organizations, such asthe League of Arab States and the African Union besidesthe UN, and also from the P5 and other countries asappropriate. This Committee should work in a coopera-tive way to help the Special Representative (or Advisor) inperforming the above defined mandate. The SpecialRepresentative (or Advisor) should also be in position toorganize specific technical meetings, possibly with theassistance of such international organization as the IAEA,the CTBTO, the OPCW, etc.

The Special Representative (or Advisor) and theCommittee should in particular understand the concernsand collect the suggestions of individual States andconcerned institutions from the civil societies of MiddleEastern countries. It is recommended that all countriesthat participate in the Committee facilitate the entry of themembers of the Committee in their territory for the saidpurpose of understanding the concerns and collect thesuggestions of each individual State.

The Special Representative (or Advisor) shall submit atleast every six months progress reports on his or her activi-ties, on the work of the Committee and on the relevantfindings to the UN Secretary General. These reportsshould be made available to the interested States and theNPT Preparatory Committees. The Special Representative(or Advisor) shall be assisted by a small, but highly quali-fied staff.

For the financial support of the activity of the SpecialRepresentative (or Advisor) and the Committee, it isproposed the establishment of a UN administered fundsupported by member states, on a voluntary basis

Several countries at different times proposed thecreation in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclearweapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The first initiative in this sense was the initiative of Iran in1974, followed by Egypt, promoting a nuclear weaponsfree zone. The Mubarak Initiative of 1990 expanded theconcept to a WMD free zone. In the 1995 NPT ReviewConference a specific Middle East resolution wasapproved and the final document of the 2000 NPT ReviewConference referred to this resolution. All countries of theregion have supported resolutions in the UN GeneralAssembly on the creation of a zone free of weapons ofmass destructions. The concept was explored in subse-quent studies by the UN and UNIDIR. However up tonow there has been no progress in the direction of creatingsuch a zone.

It is recommended that, after the NPT Review Conference,a Special Representative (or Advisor) be appointed by theUN Secretary General [as recommended by the NPTReview Conference of States Parties], to be supported by a[committee, advisory board, commission], for the problemof establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and otherweapons of mass destruction in the Middle East with themandate of:

1. Defining the framework and understanding the condi-tions under which concrete progress and practical stepstowards the establishment of such a zone could be made.

2. Proposing the sequence of the necessary steps towardsthe establishment of such a zone.

3. Proposing a series of meetings and conferences aimed atdefining precisely such practical steps. In this the SpecialRepresentative (or Advisor) could also facilitate a synergybetween the so called Track-2 discussions and subsequentofficial negotiations.

4. Preparing a larger UN Conference aimed at defining thegeneral negotiating pattern for the establishment of aMiddle Eastern zone free of Weapons of Mass Destructionand of Nuclear Weapons in particular

Dr. Dana H. Allin, Editor, Survival;Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy andTransatlantic Affairs, The InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, UK

Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein, Deputy Head ofMission of Egypt to the UK, Egypt

Amb. Wa’el N. Al-Assad, Director,Multilateral Relations, League of ArabStates, Cairo, Egypt

Ambassador Adel Babaseel, Head ofMission, League of Arab States, London.

The Rt. Hon. Des Browne MP, Memberof Parliament for Kilmarnock andLoudoun, UK

Mr. Martin Butcher, Global SecurityConsultant, UK

Ms. Sandra Ionno Butcher, SeniorProgram Coordinator, London PugwashOffice, UK,

Prof. Malcolm Chalmers, ProfessorialFellow, Royal United Services Institute,UK

Mr. Poul-Erik Christiansen, ResearchAssistant, School of Oriental and AfricanStudies, UK

Rear Admiral Charles-Edouard deCoriolis, Defence Attaché, FrenchEmbassy, France.

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences onScience and World Affairs; Professor ofMathematical Physics, University ofMilan, Italy

Sir Richard Dalton, Associate Fellow,Middle East and North AfricaProgramme, Chatham House, UK

Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, President,Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, Sri Lanka

Prof. John Finney, Professor of Physics,Dept. of Physics and Astronomy,University College London, UK

Mr. Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow forNon-Proliferation, International Institutefor Strategic Studies (IISS), UK

Mr. Mike Gapes MP, Chairman of theHouse of Commons Foreign AffairsSelect Committee, UK

Ms. Judith Gough, Deputy Head,Security Policy Group, FCO, UK.

Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Director, OliveTree Scholarship Programme, andVisiting Professor, City UniversityLondon, UK

Dr. Rebecca E. Johnson, ExecutiveDirector, The Acronym Institute forDisarmament Diplomacy, London, UK

Mr. Ben Jones, Senior Adviser onForeign Affairs & Defence,Parliamentary Office of the LiberalDemocrats

Dr. Peter Jones, Associate Professor,Graduate School of Public andInternational Affairs, University ofOttawa, Ontario, Canada

Dr Ian Kearns, Senior Fellow, RoyalUnited Services Institute for Defence andSecurity Studies, UK.

Anne Lazar Sury, Political, MilitaryIssues, French Embassy, France.

Mr. Simon Manley, Director, Defenceand Strategic Threats, FCO, UK.

Mr. Andreas Persbo, Acting ExecutiveDirector, The Verification Research,Training and Information Centre(VERTIC), UK

Ms. Shata Shetty, Researcher to the TopLevel Group of UK Parliamentarians for

Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament andNon-Proliferation, UK

Prof. John Simpson, Professor ofInternational Relations, MountbattenCentre for International Studies, UK

Richard Tauwhare, CommunicationsManager, Counter ProliferationDepartment, Foreign andCommonwealth Office, UK

Ms Katie Taylor, PhD Candidate,Cambridge University, UK

Dr. Christopher Watson, SeniorConsultant Nuclear Industry andTechnology Development,

Professor Nicholas J. Wheeler,ESRC/AHRC Fellow under RCUK’s‘Global Uncertainities: Security for All ina Changing World Programme’, UK

Dr Lee Willett, Head, Maritime StudiesProgramme, UK

Please note: participants attend in their individual capacities and not as repre-sentatives of any organization or government. Organizational informationprovided here is for information purposes only.

Pugwash Consultation on Issues Related to the NPTLondon, UK, 6 October 2009

[This workshop does not have a report, just the list of participants is available.]

Participant List

P U G W A S H M E E T I N G N O . 3 5 3

Pugwash Meeting No. 353


Introduction

This document summarizesinput received during a seriesof Pugwash consultations in

Autumn 2009. The purpose of thisseries of meetings was twofold:

To explore the security concerns andpolitical obstacles to Entry IntoForce1 of the Comprehensive NuclearTest Ban Treaty (CTBT), and

• To obtain a better understanding ofwhat each country can doconcretely to create an environmentto overcome these obstacles.

• Our goal is to explore synergisticsteps that can create a more posi-

ment. We do think, however, thatthere were several very useful sugges-tions that came out of these meetings,and we encourage dialogue at theappropriate governmental levels onsome of the points raised at the endof this document.

In all of our meetings, participantsreaffirmed the value of the CTBT. Itsaffect on regional security and globaldisarmament efforts was interwoventhroughout the detailed discussions.Participants acknowledged that theCTBT is not an end in and of itself,but a step toward delegitimizingnuclear arsenals. Individual countrieswill rightly make judgment on theimpact ratification and Entry IntoForce will have on their own securitycalculus. There is some hope that weare now moving toward achievingsome of the CTBT’s central goals.

International environment

Participants acknowledged that thesemeetings took place at a remarkabletime, in which the world communitywas witnessing many encouragingsteps that could create a positivemomentum toward achieving long-standing disarmament and non-proliferation goals, notably thehistoric chairing of the UN SecurityCouncil by US President BarackObama and the approval of UNSCResolution 1887, ongoing US-Russian negotiations on strategicnuclear arms, progress on ballisticmissile defense issues, an approved

tive environment and identify somepreliminary steps that might facili-tate Entry Into Force of the CTBT.

Pugwash convened a special meetingin New York City in October 2009with 23 senior policy makers andexperts from most of the key states.This was preceded and followed by aseries of discussions in New York (atthe UN), Washington, DC, Geneva,Islamabad, Beijing, and with keyMiddle Eastern countries.

While Pugwash is deeply grateful toall participants for their honest input,assessments, and creative sugges-tions, there was no attempt to seekconsensus. This document is anoverview of the points raised. Sincethe input was from varied sources, noone person should be identified withany particular point in this docu-

Reportby Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Pugwash Consultation

The Status of the CTBT and Prospects for its Entry into ForceNew York, NY, 12 October 2009



(from left) Jofi Joseph, Leon Sigal, Tibor Toth, Sergio Duarte, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Christopher Chyba.

impact on the US Senate and couldplay some role in any future attemptto bring about CTBT ratification inthe Senate.

The goal of our past and future activ-ities has been and will be then toencourage key political players invarious countries to see what can bedone in each country to support theidea of CTBT Entry Into Force whilestressing the synergistic elements, asopposed to the “wait and see whatothers are doing” approach.

Country Profiles

This section gives a general overviewof the situation in the nine remainingAnnex 2 countries. It is not meant tobe fully comprehensive. We welcomefeedback and dialogue on thesepoints.

China (signed, not ratified)

The Chinese Foreign Ministerrecently reiterated Chinese supportfor the CTBT. “China is the Treaty’sconstant supporter and abides by itscommitment to moratorium onnuclear test [sic]. …China has…alsotaken active and steady steps toadvance the preparatory work for theimplementation of the Treaty.…TheChinese government will continue towork with the international commu-nity to facilitate the early Entry IntoForce of the Treaty.”5

A 17 November 2009 joint statementbetween US President Barack Obamaand President Hu Jintao states,“They committed to pursue ratifica-tion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible,and will work together for the earlyentry into force of the CTBT.”6

It is widely believed that China willratify once the US Senate confirmsthe CTBT. However, some in Wash-

of the Treaty and its early entryinto force (emphasis added).4

While there is a need to give capitalsof the remaining nine so-called‘Annex 2’ countries time to assesshow this new international situationplays into each country’s individualsituation, this series of Pugwashconsultations built on the approachcalled for in the above declaration.

We focused on opportunities forleadership among the key countriesand, to the extent possible, on identi-fying ways in which these individualnational actions might have a syner-gistic effect benefiting the global non-proliferation and disarmamentregime. This is time urgent. Whilethere is a current international focuson nuclear disarmament, there arethose who question whether this is apermanent ‘turn of the page’ or ifthings could regress.

There is a danger the current windowof opportunity may be missed if theCTBT is tied too much with the needto resolve regional problems in theMiddle East, in South Asia, etc. Someof our participants thought there is awindow of approximately 1-2 years,and if missed, a similar opportunitymay not present itself for a genera-tion.

In other words, according to one ofour participants, the ‘transformativeefforts’ of Obama and others mustnow be urgently operationalized.

One of the main issues addressed inseveral meetings was the view thatthe US bears the main responsibilityfor leading the Annex 2 countriesinto ratification. On the other hand,people in Washington pointed outthat a positive approach towards theCTBT from the remaining Annex 2countries could have an important

work plan for the Conference onDisarmament, and a growing interna-tional consensus among formerministers and policy makers that aneventual nuclear weapons free worldis in the security interests of all.

CTBT trends

There also have also been positivetrends regarding the CTBT itself.While at the time of the 2000 NPTReview Conference there were 50states that had ratified the CTBT,today there are 151 (with 182 signa-tories). The verification regime isemerging, with 250 InternationalMonitoring System (IMS) centers andlaboratories now certified2. A rela-tively positive side effect of the DPRKtests in 2006 and 2009 was that thesystem has now been tried and tested.

On September 24-25 2009, theConference on Facilitating Entry intoForce of the CTBT, or “Article XIVconference” took place in New YorkCity and involved representativesfrom 103 States (86 ratifying States,13 signatory States and two non-signatory States)3. The final docu-ment states,

We call upon all States which havenot yet done so, to sign and ratifythe Treaty without delay, in partic-ular, those States whose ratifica-tion is needed for entry into force.We strongly encourage suchAnnex 2 States to take individualinitiatives to ratify the Treaty. Wealso commend efforts to createconditions facilitating ratificationby such Annex 2 States, includingconfidence building measuresthrough which such States couldbe encouraged to consider, as anoption, ratifying the Treaty in acoordinated manner. At the sametime, we renew our commitmentto work for universal ratification



will need possibly more tests. Theyalso need to increase the reliabilityand functioning of their medium andlong-range missiles. It is a reasonableassumption, according to one partici-pant, to assume there are technicalpeople in DPRK looking into thesesorts of questions.

The need for inducements wasdiscussed, and the fact that for yearsthe DPRK’s negotiating position wasthat it wanted a new political relation-ship with the USA. The DPRK wouldlike to be reassured that the US, Japan,South Korea are no longer a threat totheir security and economy. It must benoted that the USA does not have agood track record in this regard, andthere is a trust deficit on both sides.When the DPRK is reassured, at theminimum they may be prepared togive up capacity to build more nuclearwea pons. It seems they do, however,intend to keep at least their presentdeterrent, though “denuclearization ofthe Korean peninsula” remains theirstated goal, implying that even theirnuclear weapons may be on the table.

It might help with negotiations withthe DPRK if the US were to make astatement to the effect of “The

U.S. maintains nuclear weapons todeter, and if necessary, respond tonuclear attacks against itself, itsforces, or its friends and allies.” Somethought this might be possible in thecontext of the US nuclear posturereview, or some sort of negative secu-rity assurance.

Questions were discussed over thepossible proactive role China mightplay in promoting a positiveoutcome, though some expressed thesense that the possible impact ofChina’s role may be smaller thanwhat is generally believed.

at this moment in time. After a seriesof successful confidence buildingmeasures and progress on theseissues, this discussion might then bereopened. This further emphasizedthe need for the negotiations to moveforward in a productive manner.

It was noted, however, that theDPRK has sent signals in the past bynot restarting plutonium productionand seems to be doing so now.Although this was perhaps a ‘two-edged’ signal with the implicit threatto resume, it was noted that in stop-ping reprocessing numerous times theDPRK gave up a significant amountof plutonium.

A concern was raised, however, thatmore attention needs to be paid tothe impact on prospects for CTBTentry into force if the DPRK were totest prior to a vote on CTBT ratifica-tion in the US Senate. It was notedthat DPRK probably does not yethave the ability to arm missiles withnuclear warheads, and to do this they

ington, DC believe that if Chinawould ratify the CTBT, but withholddeposition of the ratification until theUS ratifies, then that would giveChina maximum political leverage toensure US ratification.

It was noted that China could play animportant leadership role. If a countrylike the PRC, with modest numbers ofnuclear weapons and a more limitedtesting history than the US, can feelcomfortable about its warhead relia-bility under a CTBT, then this wouldsend a clear message to the US andother countries that they too can havea similar confidence.

Democratic Peoples’ Republic ofKorea (has not signed nor ratified)

The CTBT is not an active part of theongoing discussions and priorities inrelation to negotiations with theDPRK. It was, however, consideredconceivable by some participants thatthe DPRK might make a statementon a testing moratorium, and thatthis might be the most realistic “ask”


20 Pugwash Newsletter,Summer 2010

Pakistan that the two sides remaincommitted to the moratorium. Forten years this moratorium has held,and there has not been a single state-ment in public discussing testing(prior to Santhanam). On 1 Januaryof each year, there is an exchangeregarding nuclear installations inwhich each side agrees not to attackthe others’ installations. There arenotifications of ballistic missile tests.The MOU includes also discussion ofnuclear doctrine.13 In 2007 India andPakistan signed detailed nuclear riskreduction measures. There are stillquestions as to how to work throughPakistan’s concerns regarding theIndian stockpile.

Some participants suggested it mightbe useful to go back to the MOU, toexplore expanding the ‘non attack’provisions to other facilities, and usethis as a way to restart the process.India supports an FMCT.

In September 1998, Indian PrimeMinister Vajpayee emphasized India’scommitment to the goals of theCTBT, “‘After concluding this limitedtesting program, India announced avoluntary moratorium on furtherunderground nuclear explosions,’’ hesaid. ‘’We conveyed our willingnessto move toward a de jure formaliza-tion of this obligation. In announcinga moratorium, India has alreadyaccepted the basic obligation of theC.T.B.T.”14 He also stated that Indiawould not stand in the way of opera-tionalizing the CTBT.15

It was agreed that building on themomentum of Obama’s Praguespeech, ratification by the US andChina, for example, would certainlycreate a more favorable environmentin India not only for the CTBT butalso for the general framework ofnuclear disarmament. Some partici-

as many would raise the raw historythat when Egypt joined the NPT,Israel did not follow suit. They wouldprefer for Israel to move first. On theother side, Egypt, being a member ofthe NPT, has also signed (but not yetratified) the Pelndaba Treaty, soEgypt has multiple obligations thatare impeding any nuclear test.

Thus, in this as in many other cases,the refusal to ratify the CTBT ismainly a part of a political checkersgame, in which arms control itemsare the draftsmen. This is all under-standable, but an effort should bemade to call the attention to what theCTBT and the other arms controlitems mean in reality, and not only inthe realm of political symbolism.

India (has not signed nor ratified)

India maintains a voluntary testingmoratorium. Indian Prime MinisterSingh reiterated India’s commitmentto this moratorium in a press confer-ence with Japan’s Prime MinisterHatoyama. He said, “…India hasunilaterally declared moratorium[sic] on conducting nuclear explosivetesting and that is a commitment wewill honour.”8

As part of the US-India deal, theIndian foreign minister reaffirmedIndia’s unilateral moratorium ontesting and the US Secretary of Stateand others stated this deal would bewrecked if India were to test.9 TheIndian Prime Minister, NationalSecurity Advisor10 and the Depart-ment of Energy have all disagreedwith the perception recently put forthby K. Santhanam, an Indian scientistwho claims that India needs furthertests.11

As part of the Lahore Declaration,there is a Memorandum of Under-standing12 between the India and

Egypt (signed, not ratified)

In Egypt public opinion is focused onthe non-universality of the NPT, withattention to the CTBT framed in thatcontext. At the recent Article XIVConference, Amb. Abdelaziz restatedEgypt’s position:

Egypt played a visible role in thenegotiation of the CTBT and wasamong the first states to sign theTreaty in 1996. Egypt’s supportfor the Treaty has been associatedwith the fact that, as stipulated inthe CTBT preamble itself, CTBT isa complementary reinforcement tothe NPT system, and was moti-vated by the adoption of the NPT1995 review/extension packagethat included an essential resolu-tion on the Middle East….the2010 Review Conference will beof paramount importance to moveour agenda together, to implementthe 1995 Resolution on theMiddle East, which will open thedoors for a new horizon to theCTBT.7

There is a deep sense of frustration inEgypt that there has not been signifi-cant progress on the Middle Eastresolution, and this affects not onlythe CTBT but prospects for asuccessful NPT Review Conferenceas well. Ways on which the MiddleEast WMD Resolution could beimplemented have been discussed andseveral proposals have been consid-ered, including an international coor-dination to promote a WMD FreeZone in the Middle East.

In our meetings, some expressed theview that there is a need to create thepublic environment in Egypt fordiscussing the CTBT. However,others felt that at the moment, ifEgypt were to push forward onCTBT, it may be counterproductive,





pants thought that these sorts of stepswould create the conditions whereIndia’s unilateral moratorium couldtransition into a legally bindingobligation. Indian Prime MinisterManmohan Singh reported statedrecently in December 2009 that,“”Should the US and China ratify theCTBT, a new situation willemerge.”16 An even more directcommitment from the leaders wouldbe most useful.

There is however a spectrum of viewsin India, as in all countries. Partici-pants discussed the possible negativeimpact of encouraging debate inIndia at this time. At the moment,some said, there is no serious ‘appli-cation of minds’ to the idea ofconducting nuclear tests likelihood ofan Indian test in the foreseeablefuture is seen by some as negligible,though questions related to designand reliability cannot be ignored, asis the case in most states with nuclearweapons. It was felt that this situa-tion is unlikely to change unless thereis a dramatic turn—for example if thenuclear regime collapses, or if there isa need for nuclear modernization, orif the Indian security environment isseverely undermined. Some pointedout that if India takes steps to test asthreatened by K. Santhanam, it willbe of interest to see if it takes steps tochange the Lahore Declaration. Somethought that even if relations werenormalized between

India and Pakistan it is unlikely thateither would sign/ratify the treaty dueto nationalist sentiments and pride.

Indonesia (signed, not ratified)

Indonesia’s recent statement that itwould ratify the CTBT immediatelyafter the US ratifies was widelyappreciated as a very positive step.

Indonesian Foreign Minister HassanWirajuda stated in June 2009, “Weshare [President Obama’s] vision of aworld in which nuclear weaponshave been eradicated. We trust thathe will succeed in getting the CTBTratified—and we promise that whenthat happens, Indonesia will immedi-ately follow suit.”17

Iran (signed, not ratified)

It was noted that officially Iran hasnot indicated any specific anti-CTBTsentiment, that it has generic supportfor it, though it couches its support,as do some other countries, in termsof general trends toward nucleardisarmament. For example, at the2007 Article XIV conference, Amb.Ali Asghar Soltanieh said,

…the Islamic Republic of Iranbelieves that the following keyfactors could pave the way for thetotal elimination of nuclearweapons in general, and earlyentry into force of the CTBT inparticular:

-The NWSs bear the main respon-sibility in entry into force of theCTBT and they should take thelead in this regard. Ratification ofthe CTBT by Nuclear WeaponStates could be considered as apositive step towards restorationof the confidence of NNWSs andinternational community.

-Some of the Annex II States arenot even a party to the NPT andhave un-safeguarded nuclearmaterial and facilities. Theirpromptly acceding to the NPTwould be another significantelement in facilitating early entryinto force of the CTBT.18

While the absence of exposure on theissue can create opportunities for

forward movement, it was felt thatIran is unlikely to start with theCTBT as a confidence buildingmeasure.

In Iran the issue of the CTBT is notconsidered separate from nuclearnegotiations. Movement on theMiddle East WMD Free Zone mighthelp. Perhaps a 5+1 agreement couldimply a corollary for CTBT ratifica-tion. However it was noted that ofthe ‘5+1’, 2 of the 6 have the sameposition as Iran with regard to theCTBT so there is no leverage to pushIran on the issue at the moment. Itwas felt it might be useful to empha-size NAM support for the CTBT indiscussions with Iran19 .

If one considers the Iranian declara-tion that they have no intention tobuild nuclear weapons, the logicalconsequence is that it should bepossible to have inspections, trans-parency, and possibly to allow inter-national bodies to have control. Ifthis is combined with the lifting ofsanctions, this is a possible way outof the deadlock. It should not bepolitically impossible to consider as aside point negotiating for CTBT rati-fication.

It was noted that the extent to whichIran may help test a ‘new non-prolif-eration regime’, and to be at the fore-front of facilitating communicationsand scientific understanding of thepossibilities of this new regime, theremay be prospects for cooperation.

Israel (signed, not ratified)

At the most recent Article XIVconference, Amb. David Danieli reit-erated Israel’s “unequivocal supportfor the CTBT. Israel’s support hasbeen manifested all along includingin our active participation in themany activities of the Preparatory



Commission.”20 He emphasized theneed to address nuclear issues in theirregional context.

Participants in the Pugwash consulta-tions emphasized that Israel gavegreat thought before signing theCTBT, and that this should be seen asa very clear commitment. It wasnoted that when the yearly CTBTresolutions come up in the FirstCommittee, Israel always votes forthem and agrees to the ministerialdeclarations. Further Israel haswelcomed verification centers, andhas political standing within theCTBTO, and it was expressed thatthis should be viewed as an impor-tant perspective on Israel’s policytoward the CTBT. Israel is not likelyto tie its ratification of the CTBT toratification by other countries.

Participants stressed that from theIsraeli perspective it is important tosee how the regime and the non -proliferation architecture can dealwith breaches. Israel prioritizes a verystructured regional process based onconfidence building measures, andimproved relations with neighborsover global regimes. This is anchoredin a 1993 cabinet decision, adopting astep by step approach, starting withpeace accords between Israel and itsneighbors, followed by confidencebuilding measures, followed byregional processes, conventional armscontrol, then non-conventional (bio,chemical, then nuclear). This is notenvisioned in decades but in a fewyears, step by step and gradual. It wasnoted that while it has not ratifiedvarious regimes (CWC, BWC, NPT),Israel has incorporated into its legisla-tion the relevant suppliers’ groupregimes.

Israel does not see May 2010 as acritical date for the CTBT, as they are

not a party to the Review Confer-ence, and are not likely to join theNPT in the near future.

Due to regional considerations, Israelwill not ratify the treaty, especiallygiven their concerns about Iran’scurrent policies. Others commentedthat there are a lot of people in Israelwho are ready to go back to ACRS,to see what can be done in a regionalforum.

Pakistan (has not signed norratified)

At the 2007 Article XIV conference,Amb. Shahbaz reaffirmed Pakistan’ssupport of the CTBT. He said,“Despite being a non-signatory state,we are not opposed to the objectivesand purposes of the treaty.

Pakistan had resolved to abide by themain provisions of the Treaty bydeclaring and maintaining a unilat-eral moratorium on nuclear testing in1998.”21

Pakistan maintains its Memorandumof Understanding regarding a testingmoratorium with India (see above)and is likely to continue to maintainthis moratorium, unless somethingundermines it. There is a belief that ifthe US were to ratify the CTBT and ifmomentum builds with India,Pakistan would not stand in the way.Currently, there is a question as towhy Pakistan should move forward ifthe US, India, and China have notdone so.

There is no opposition to CTBT (oreven to FMCT) in terms of principles,but there is a sense that beforePakistan could proceed, reassurancesconcerning India should be very clear.The US India nuclear deal has obvi-ously sent the wrong message ingeneral and to Pakistan in particular,and a forward looking Indian nuclear

policy (non increase of forces, CTBT,etc.) would have of course a positiveeffect on Pakistani nuclear policy.Statements or hints that the US mightdecide to take control by force ofPakistani nuclear weapons in time ofcrisis, have of course the oppositeeffect. Likewise statements or hintsthat India may need to test again,have a detrimental effect in Pakistanon these issues.

There remains a considerable conven-tional imbalance between Pakistanand India, and the CompositeDialogue is stalled. Given thisconventional imbalance, some partic-ipants in the Pugwash consultationsquestioned whether it is a given thatPakistan would move forward on theCTBT even if India does. Anothernegative point was that like India,Pakistan may not have confidence inits designs. Although neither countrylikes to discuss this, they do not havea sense of where they want to stop.Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are India-specific, and this may create bothopportunities and challenges for theCTBT. There was a sense that if theUS continues to pressure Pakistan onnuclear security issues, and ifPakistan feels squeezed between Indiaand the US on this topic that there isno way they will move forward.

Some participants believed thatperhaps the best way to promotediscussion would be to make thetechnical aspects of the CTBT morewidely known, especially given thedevelopments made in the past decade.This sort of discussion could moveforward in parallel with progress inother areas of the disarmamentregime, including confidence buildingmeasures and regional security.

It was noted that Pakistan is partici-pating in some of the technical work

ments made by Secretary of DefenseGates). The US National Academy ofSciences has a study underway toaddress some of the technical issues.The US Nuclear Posture Review(now reportedly due 1 March,though there are indications this datemay slip further) is another bell-wether. The recent JASON report onwarheads definitely stated that thereare no concerns about the aging ofthe arsenal.24 It is possible some ofarguments from the defense establish-ment may arise during debate of theUS-Russia Strategic Arms ReductionTalks, though the belief is that theObama administration firmly realizesthat designing a new warhead is notnecessary and would complicate theirbroader non-proliferation goals.Meanwhile, some in the US will say,why should the US stick its head out,when there is no indication that all ofthe other countries will follow USratification?

The administration understands theneed to show progress, and thestudies about to be published mayhelp with this. The Vice President isbeginning to make speeches, and itmight be possible to start SenateForeign Relations hearings ahead oftime. However, there is a strongconcern that it would be a hugemistake to push for a vote before thenumbers are solid. The stakes arehigh—as one participant phrased it,“There won’t be a third Senatedebate on the CTBT.”

One US participant said that whenthe US Senate ratifies the treaty, theIndian and Pakistani and otherambassadors should expect to becalled into the Oval Office, and thoseconversations at that time will beimportant bellwethers.

The US further reaffirmed itscommitment to the CTBT in a jointUS-EU declaration in November2009, “We express our support forentry into force of the Comprehen-sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)at an early date, and in the meantimecontinued observance of moratoriaon nuclear test explosions.”23

Following the failed 1999 ratificationvote in the US Senate, there is nowfor the first time in a decade activeconsideration of putting forward theCTBT for ratification in the USSenate. A total of 67 votes areneeded, and approximately 7 are stillquestionable. Some say the targetshould be 68 or 69 to allow for a‘hedge.’ Achieving this target maybecome more difficult after theDemocratic defeat in the recentspecial election in Massachusetts andthe upcoming mid-term elections.

President Obama has said he will notauthorize new nuclear warheaddevelopment (despite contrary state-

of the CTBTO, though this is notwidely publicized.

United States of America (signed,not ratified)

At the recent Article XIV conference,US Secretary of State Hillary Clintonreiterated the Obama Administra-tion’s support for the CTBT:

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an integral part ofour non-proliferation and armscontrol agenda, and we will workin the months ahead both to seekthe advice and consent of theUnited States Senate to ratify thetreaty, and to secure ratification byothers so that the treaty can enterinto force…..President Obamaand I applaud Indonesian ForeignMinister Wirajuda’s recent pledgethat his country will moveforward with ratification once wehave done so. We look forward tosimilar statements from theremaining Annex 2 nations…22



: (from left) Tibor Toth, Sergio Duarte, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino.

two countries. Others may still saythat this MOU is a very weak substi-tute for the CTBT. Yet the point isthat both India and Pakistan are to acertain extent legally bound not totest. This fact should be furtherinjected into the relevant policydebates in other Annex 2 countries.

Further engaging in technicaldiscussions

While emphasizing the ratification ofthe CTBT is above all a political deci-sion, participants identified areaswhere technical discussions mighthelp create an atmosphere promotingmutuality. If the scientists areconvinced in different countries as tothe merits of the CTBT EIF, this willhave a profound impact.

For example, more discussions couldbe held detailing the benefits of theverification regime for countries.These sorts of discussions couldcontribute to an informative debatein different capitals, not putting pres-sure, but stressing informationsharing. The CTBTO could conducttechnical sessions about theworking/monitoring systems indifferent countries as a way to fosteran informed discussion. “Conveniententry points” for discussions includea nuanced understanding of what thesystem can do beyond verification –for example, tsunami warningefforts. Exploring ways scientific datacan be exchanged, and how scientistscan contribute, is very important.This sort of discussion/presentationshould be possible in most countries.The possibility of additional MiddleEast monitoring stations might beraised.

It was noted that all states couldshow their support for the treaty’sgoals by funding the CTBTO.Providing CTBTO access to data and

Review Conference. It was pointedout that the test ban issue has been amajor stumbling block in manyReview Conferences.

The idea of pulling togethercomposite documents or variousdeclarations to which the Annex 2countries have at times agreed maybe an interesting exercise (forexample, the Article XIV 5-pagedeclaration includes most, but notIndia, Pakistan, DPRK or Israel;there have been General Assemblyresolutions that have includedPakistan, DPRK, etc.)

Reinforcing and building uponexisting commitments

Most of the Annex 2 countries havecommitted to testing moratoria, or insome other way have agreements orpublic statements that they will nottest. Yet many prefer to wait forothers to ratify first. The fact is that ifthe other Annex 2 countries do notsign/ratify the CTBT, the treaty willnot Enter Into Force. The argumentthen that countries do not want tostick their heads out and ratify firstshould be switched. For states thathave no intention to test, nothing isin fact jeopardized by ratifying thetreaty, but rather such a move createsthe momentum toward Entry IntoForce.

The norms that exist to preventtesting are strong in some regions.For example, according to AhmerBilal Soofi, a lawyer in the SupremeCourt of Pakistan and the foundingPresident of Research Society ofInternational Law, the moratoriumon testing contained in the 21February 1999 Memorandum ofUnderstanding between India andPakistan as part of the Lahore Decla-ration has treaty status, and thusserves as a “mini-CTBT” between the

Mutuality and Opportunities forFurther Movement

This section briefly identifies some ofthe areas where it might be possibleto further explore the synergistelements involved with creating theclimate conducive for Entry IntoForce of the CTBT. Further discus-sion on these sorts of points isurgently needed.

The importance of dialogue andpublic statements

While some raised concerns aboutprematurely raising the CTBT indifferent countries, it was pointed outthat one should not confuse this with,nor use it as, an excuse to avoid theneed to get increase familiarity overthe various options. Suggestions wereput forward for ways to promotediscussion at the appropriate levels.

Many believed that it would be veryuseful for the US debate in particularto have statements expressing will-ingness to move forward once the USratifies from heads of state and publicofficials in other Annex 2 countries.

Another idea put forward was tohave initiatives similar to the ‘FourHorsemen’ in the US – to get formerministers, former army chiefs, etc tostart the discussion specifically on theCTBT in various countries, eitherthrough a letter or at a multilateralconference.

A related option would be to havethe nine Annex 2 governments sepa-rately or in groups review the situa-tion and make a statement before theReview Conference, to the effect thatthey support the objective of theCTBT, that it is an excellent instru-ment, that they understand that allwill benefit from the treaty when it isworking, etc. This might create apositive environment for the NPT





full support for all the organization’sactivities would also be helpful.

A separate but related technicaldiscussion centers on nuclearmodernization as a driver for theperceived need for continued testing.Further discussions could be heldboth internally and between stateswith nuclear weapons on whatmatters and what doesn’t regardingmodernizing nuclear arsenals.

For example, other countries arewatching the US, to see if a deal willbe made with the nuclear labs onnuclear modernization as a quid proquo for Senate ratification. Such amove undoubtedly would have anegative effect in other countries. Forexample, if the US increases thequality and capabilities of its nuclearweapons, this will have an impact onthe security calculus of other coun-tries and cause a ripple effect. Somesay this lack of US progress on theCTBT, and this outstanding questionabout the possible form of US nuclearmodernization, is discouraging anymeaningful debate in other countries.

One idea put forward was to explorethe possibility of having a clear state-ment from the US and/or other coun-tries, stating that new tests are notneeded to maintain existing arsenals.It would be helpful if side agreementsand understandings on permissibleactivities were made public orcommunicated to the CTBTO. Someexpressed the opinion that this is azero yield treaty, that hydrodynamictests with no yield are not forbidden.Some suggested it would be worthasking the P5 what form these agree-ments took, as it is unclear if forexample a signed piece of paperexists. Participants were advised tolook very closely at the 1997 Clintontransmission of the CTBT to the

Senate, which spells out an article byarticle analysis.

As a related corollary, some partici-pants believed that countries need tohave a more public discussion of therole nuclear weapons in their securitypolicies, including further definitionof the minimum deterrent needs, andpossibly clear public statements thatdemonstrate an effort to decrease thesalience of nuclear weapons indoctrines. This could reinforce theprinciple that no new designs need tobe tested for the purpose of intro-ducing new capabilities.

There was a suggestion that perhapsUS National Academy of Sciencesmembers and other scientific expertsmight go to India and Pakistan andother regions to discuss these issues.Some related points also could beraised in the Obama summit in 2010.

Regional interplays

As mentioned throughout thissummary, regional dynamics wereobviously thread through all of ourdiscussions.

In India/Pakistan, the role of majoropinion makers (former officials andthe media) in catalyzing the discus-sion about the CTBT was discussed,while emphasizing the importancethat it must not seem to be manufac-tured externally. Nuclear confidencebuilding measures can help. Indiaand Pakistan might seek to furtherdefine their minimum deterrentlevels. Pugwash was encouraged toorganize a meeting in the regionspecifically on the CTBT and FMCT.One proposal was that India andPakistan might use joint talks on theCTBT as a confidence buildingmeasure.

Between Israel/Egypt there exists acomplex dynamic. Both countries

could consider decoupling the CTBTfrom the Middle East situation.Egypt could perhaps begin to discussthe CTBT in terms of general globalstability. It is after all not interestedin nuclear testing. However, givenEgypt’s reluctance to ratify first dueto the NPT history, some wondered ifIsrael might ratify first to satisfyEgypt’s concerns. There was a ques-tion raised as to the wisdom of usingthe WMD Free Zone as a bargainingchip in a area where political leader-ship could have a profound impact.

A question was posed that if neitherIsrael nor Egypt intends to test anuclear weapon, is it reasonable tohold the CTBT hostage to politicaldissatisfaction arising from theregional setting? This was put incontrast with the situation in SouthAsia. However, from anotherperspective, it was recognized thatthere is a degree of political normal-ization in South Asia which does notexist in the Middle East.

Provisional Entry Into Force

A controversial idea was raised as towhen it might be necessary to thinkabout provisional entry into force ofthe treaty, and whether or not theArticle XIV conferences could domore work on this. For example, onepossibility posed was whether or notit would be useful to move forwardwith provisional entry into force if allother Annex 2 countries sign andratify, except for one (such as theDPRK). Some participants worriedabout the impact of leaving a ‘blackhole’ and questioned why it is impos-sible to think such a hole might notbe able to be blocked. There is aconcern of the impact on the regime’slong-term stability, and the sustain-ability of the NPT if we begin tothink in these terms.



Anticipating possiblestumbling blocks

Concerns were raised in our consul-tations as to the need for furtherconsideration of the question as towhat to do if a state tests or claims itwill conduct a limited number of testsbefore ratifying. This was highlightedas a weak spot in the current climate.What disincentives to CTBT EIFwould this raise and how should sucha situation be handled were questionsidentified as needing further explo-ration.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the above veryinitial selection of possible activities,there are many ways to push forwardtoward the goal of Entry Into Forceof the CTBT. It is essential that theinternational community step backfrom this idea of a ‘chicken or egg’scenario. There are avenues that canbe pursued which emphasize mutu-ality of interests and that can create asynergy on these issues. More work isneeded to push these sorts ofapproaches forward, both in Track 2and inter-governmental fora.

Pugwash would like to thank themany foundations, governments, andindividuals who have shared theirresources and expertise with usduring this project, and we lookforward to continuing our discus-sions in the lead up to the 2010 NPTReview Conference and beyond.

Please share any feedback on theabove points.

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary General([email protected])

Sandra Ionno Butcher, Senior Program Coordinator([email protected])

Notes

1 The CTBT will enter into force 180days after the 44 states specificallylisted in Annex 2 of the Treaty havesigned and ratified the treaty. Thesestates were those with nuclear tech-nology capabilities at the time of thefinal Treaty negotiations in 1996. Ofthese, nine are still missing: China,DPRK, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran,Israel, Pakistan and the USA. DPRK,India, and Pakistan have yet to sign theCTBT. See for example, “CTBTO FactSheet,” http://www.ctbto.org/ fileadmin/user_upload/public_information/CTBT_FactSheet.pdf.

2 See for example, statement of TiborToth, Executive Secretary CTBTO, 17November 2009, http://www. ctbto. org/fileadmin/ user_upload/public_information/2009/Verification_Statement_17_November_2009. pdf.

3 “Unique Day for Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” PressRelease, 25 September 2009.http://www. ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2009/unique-day-for-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty

4 “Annex, Final Declaration andMeasures to Promote the Entry intoForce of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” CTBT-Art.XIV/2009/6, available at: http://www. ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/CTBT Art.XIV-2009-6.pdf

5 “Message from H.E. Yang Jiechi Min -ister of Foreign Affairs for the People’sRepublic of China to the Sixth Confer-ence on Facilitating the Entry IntoForce of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” 24 September 2009.http:// www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/ user_upload/Art_14_2009/240909_After-noon_Session/240909_China.pdf

6 “In Full: US-China Joint Statement,”CBS News, 17 November 2009.http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/11/17/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry5677524.shtml

7 Statement of Egypt, delivered by H.E.Amb. Maged Abdelaziz, PermanentRepresentative of Egypt to the UnitedNations in New York, at the Confer-

ence of Facilitating Entry Into Force ofCTBT, 25 September 2009, http:// www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/250909_Morning_Session/250909_Egypt.pdf

8 “Japan asks India to sign CTBT, noword on N-deal,” Press Trust Of India,29 December 2009, http://ibnlive. in.com/news/japan-asks-india-to-sign-ctbt-no-word-on-ndeal/107916-3.html

9 Secretary of State Condoleezza Ricetold Congress on April 5, 2006, “We’vebeen very clear with the Indians …should India test, as it has agreed not todo, or should India in any way violatethe IAEA safeguard[s] agreements towhich it would be adhering, the deal,from our point of view, would at thatpoint be off.” http://csis.org/publication/ us-india-nuclear-deal-and-nonproliferation. A US governmentofficial responded to a Congressionalquestion on this matter by saying,“Article 14 of the proposed US-Indiaagreement for cooperation provides fora clear right for the U.S. to terminatenuclear cooperation and a right torequire the return of equipment andmaterials in all of the circumstancesrequired under the Atomic Energy Act,including if India detonated a nuclearexplosive device….” Questions for theRecord Submitted to Assistant Secre-tary Bergner by Chairman Tom Lantos,House Committee on Foreign Affairs,October 5, 2007, http://media.washington post.com/wp srv/ world/documents/Lantos_Letter.pdf

10 National Security Adviser M.K.Narayanan, “As of now, we are stead-fast in our commitment to the morato-rium. At least there is no debate in theinternal circles about this.” In the samearticle he is quoted as saying, “I thinkwe need to now have a full-fledgeddiscussion on the CTBT.” Quoted inSiddharth Varadarajan, “NSA: Indiadoesn’t need another nuclear test,” TheHindu, 30 August 2009, http:// www.thehindu.com/2009/08/30/stories/2009083059910800.htm

11 K. Santhanam, a former official withthe Defence Research and Develop-ment Organisation , was quoted assaying, “We can’t get into a stampede

20 Statement by Ambassador DavidDanieli, Deputy Director General(Policy), Israel Atomic EnergyCommission, Conference on Facili-tating Entry Into Force of the Compre-hensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,United Nations, New York, 24-25September 2009, http://www. ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/240909_Afternoon_Session/240909_Israel.pdf

21 Statement by Ambassador Shahbaz,Permanent Representative of Pakistanto the International Organizations inVienna, Conference on Facilitating theEntry Into Force of CTBT, Vienna, 17-18 September 2007, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/reference/article_xiv/2007/statements/1809_pm_session/1809pm_pakistan.p df

22 US Secretary of State Hillary RodhamClinton, Remarks at CTBT ArticleXIV Conference, New York, NY,September 24, 2009, http://www .ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/240909_Morning_Session/240909_US.pdf

23 2009 U.S.-EU Summit Declaration,Annex 3, Declaration on Non-prolifer-ation and Disarmament, November 3,2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-eu-joint-declaration-and-annexes.

24 See for example, Hans Kristensen andIvan Oelrich, “JASON and Replace-ment Warheads,” 20 November 2009,http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/11/jason.php

15 See for example, “To save N-deal, PMsays India won’t sign CTBT”, Times ofIndia, 12 June 2008, http://times ofindia.indiatimes.com/india/To-save-N-deal-PM-says-India-wont-sign-CTBT/articleshow/3121769.cms

16 Josy Joseph, “Let US, China SignCTBT First [sic], Singh Tells Japan,”DNA, 30 December 2009. http:// www.dnaindia.com/india/report_let-us-china-sign-ctbt-first-singh-tells-japan_1328949

17 Indonesian Foreign Minister HassanWirajuda at the Carnegie Endowmenton 8 June 2009, http://www. carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1356

18 Statement by H.E AmbassadorSoltanieh, Permanent Representativeof the Islamic Republic of Iran To theUN and other international organiza-tions in Vienna, To the Fifth Confer-ence on Facilitating the Entry intoForce of the CTBT Vienna, September17-18, 2007, http://www.ctbto. org/fileadmin/content/reference/article_xiv/2007/statements/1809_pm_session/1809pm_iran.pdf

19 The final document of the XV Summitof Heads of State and Government ofthe Non-Aligned Movement, Sharm elSheikh, Egypt, 11 – 16 July 2009states, “The Heads of State andGovernment stressed the significanceof achieving universal adherence to theCTBT, including by all NWS, which,inter alia, should contribute to theprocess of nuclear disarmament. Theyreiterated that if the objectives of theTreaty were to be fully realized, thecontinued commitment of all Statessignatories, especially the NWS, tonuclear disarmament would be essen-tial.” NAM2009/FD/Doc.1, http://www. namegypt.org/Relevant% 20Documents/01FINAL%20document.doc

to sign CTBT. We should conductmore nuclear tests which are necessaryfrom the point of view of security,”Times of India, 27 August 2009,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No CTBT-India-needs-more-nuclear-tests-Pokhran-II-coordinator-/articleshow/4940502.cms . FollowingSanthanam’s statement, the govern-ment reportedly “strongly refutedclaims that the 1998 test of a thermo -nuclear device had been a failure”,Siddharth Varadarajan, “‘Fizzle’ claimfor thermonuclear test refuted,” TheHindu, 28 August 2009, http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2009/08/28/stories/2009082859831000.htm. Thisarticle quotes Principal ScientificAdviser R. Chidambaram.

12 The Lahore Declaration states (21February 1999 Memorandum ofUnderstanding): “The foreign secre-taries agreed that the two sides….shallcontinue to abide by their respectiveunilateral moratorium on conductingfurther nuclear test explosions unlesseither side, in exercise of its nationalsovereignty decides that extraordinaryevents have jeopardized its supremeinterests;” See for example: http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/lahore.pdf,p. 3.

13 For related documents, see “LahoreSummit, February 20-2, 1999,”http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa20020109215

14 Quoted in Barbara Crossette, “NewDelhi Pledges to Sign World Ban onNuclear Tests,” New York Times, 25September 1998, http://www. nytimes.com/1998/09/25/world/new-delhi-pledges-to-sign-world-ban-on-nuclear -tests.html?pagewanted=1



Participants

Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Talat Masood, Indepen-dent Columnist, Commentator andAnalyst, Islamabad, Pakistan [Formerly:retired Lt. General; Secretary, DefenceProduction Division, Ministry ofDefence; Chairman, Pakistan OrdnanceFactories Board; various command, staffand instructional appointments in thearmed forces]

Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, Professor of Inter-national Relations and Member, NationalKnowledge Commmission, JawaharlalNehru University, New Delhi, India[Formerly: Vice Chancellor, University ofJammu, J&K; Member, Prime Minister’sTask Force on Global Strategic Develop-ments; Member, National Security Advi-sory Board]

Dr Rajiv Nayan, Research Officer, Instituteof Defence Studies and Analyses, India.

Mr. Andreas Persbo, Acting ExecutiveDirector, The Verification Research,Training and Information Centre(VERTIC), UK, *Office: VERTIC, Devel-opment House, 56-64 Leonard Street,London EC2A 4LT, UK, Tel: (++44) (0)207065 0880, Fax: (++44) (0)20 70650890, E-mail: [email protected]

Jean du Preez, Chief: External Relationsand International Cooperation, Compre-hensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organi-sation (Preparatory Commission), SouthAfrica [Formerly: Director of the Interna-tional Organizations and Nonprolifera-tion Program, James Martin Center forNonproliferation Studies (CNS) andSenior Lecturer, Graduate School forInternational Policy Studies, MontereyInstitute of International Studies; formerdiplomat and arms control negotiatorwith 17 years service in the South AfricanForeign Service]

Dr Rodica Radian-Gordon, Director,Arms Control Department, Ministry ofForeign Affairs Jerusalem, Israel

Amb. Mohamed Shaker, Chairman,Egyptian Pugwash Group, and ViceChairman, Egyptian Council for ForeignAffairs (ECFA), Cairo [formerly: Ambas-sador to the UN (New York), Vienna(IAEA) and London]

rity, Landau Network – Centro Volta,Como, Italy]

Amb. Sergio Duarte, United NationsHigh Representative for DisarmamentAffairs, Brazil [Formerly: President of theReview Conference of the Parties to theTreaty Prohibiting the Emplacement ofNuclear Wepons on the Seabed and theSubsoil Thereof (Geneva); Chairman ofthe Board of Governors of the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);President of the VII Review Conferenceof the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, inNew York (2005). He has representedBrazil at many other international meet-ings in the field of disarmament, armscontrol and non-proliferation. A careerdiplomat, Ambassador Duarte graduatedin law from the Federal FluminenseUniversity (Niterói, Rio de Janeiro) andin public administration from theBrazilian School of Public Administration(Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Rio deJaneiro).]

Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack (Col.),Chief, Weapons of Mass DestructionBranch, United Nations Office for Disar-mament Affairs, Germany [Formerly:BW/CW Division, Department for Disar-mament and Arms Control, FederalForeign Office, Germany; ChiefInspector, United Nations SpecialCommission on Iraq; Colonel, FederalMinistry of Defence, Germany; Post-Doc,Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich,Germany]

Mr. Jofi Joseph, Senior Advisor to Under-secretary of State for Arms Control andInternational Security, USA. [Formerly:Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of SenatorRobert P. Casey, Jr., 2007 2009; Profes-sional Staff Member, U.S. Senate ForeignRelations Committee, 2001-2004]

Mr Daryl Kimball, Executive Director,Arms Control Association, USA[Formerly: executive director of theCoalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers(1997 – 2001); Associate Director forPolicy and later, the Director of SecurityPrograms for Physicians for SocialResponsibility (1989 – 1997)]

Please note: participants attend intheir individual capacities and not asrepresentatives of any organizationor government. Organizational infor-mation provided here is for informa-tion purposes only.

Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein, Deputy Head ofMission of Egypt to the UK, Egypt[Formerly: Director of the United NationsDepartment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Cairo, Deputy Representative of Egypt tothe Conference of Disarmament, UN,Geneva, Post Doctoral Researcher, Diplo-macy Academy, University of Westmin-ster, London and author of several publi-cations on nuclear disarmament].

Jo Adamson, Deputy Head of the UKDelegation

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, Washington, DC, USA;Member, Pugwash Council [Formerly:Associate Executive Officer, AmericanAcademy of Arts and Sciences,Cambridge; Staff Aide, National SecurityCouncil, Washington, DC]

Ms. Sandra Ionno Butcher, SeniorProgram Coordinator, London PugwashOffice, USA/UK, [Concurrent positions:Director, Pugwash History Project; Exec-utive Secretary, British Pugwash Group.Formerly: Senior Analyst and InterimResearch Director, British American Secu-rity Information Council; ExecutiveDirector, Student Pugwash USA]

Prof. Christopher Chyba, Professor ofAstrophysics and International Affairs,Princeton University USA [Concurrentposition: Member, President’s Council ofAdvisors on Science and Technology(PCAST)]

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences onScience and World Affairs; Professor ofMathematical Physics, University ofMilan, Italy [Formerly: SecretaryGeneral, Union of Italian Scientists forDisarmament (USPID); Director, Programon Disarmament and International Secu-



International Peace and Security at theFord Foundation in New York; consul-tant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative;Visiting Fellow at Princeton University’sCenter of International Studies; Coordi-nator of the National DisarmamentProgram at the American Friends ServiceCommittee (AFSC); AFSC’s NationalRepresentative for Economic Rights].

Mr. Moeed Yusuf, Fellow, Frederick S.Pardee Center for the Study of the LongerRange Future, Boston University,Pakistan [Concurrent positions: ResearchFellow, Strategic and Economic PolicyResearch, Islamabad, Pakistan; TeachingFellow, Boston University; Regularcolumnist, The Friday Times [formerly:Special Guest Scholar, Brookings Institu-tion, Washington, DC]

tional Organizations in Geneva and theConference on Disarmament; Ambas-sador-at-Large for Non-proliferation andCritical Technologies, HungarianMinistry of Foreign Affairs; PermanentRepresentative of Hungary to the UnitedNations and other International Organi-zations in Vienna; Ambassador-at-Largefor Non-proliferation; Hungarian DeputyState Secretary of Defense in charge ofinternational affairs; Permanent Repre-sentative of Hungary to the PreparatoryCommission of the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons in TheHague.]

Dr Christine Wing, Senior Fellow andProject Coordinator, StrengtheningMultilateral Approaches to Nuclear andBiological Weapons, New York Univer-sity, USA [Formerly: Program Officer for

Prof. Leon Sigal, Director, Northeast AsiaCooperative Security Project, SocialScience Research Council, USA[Formerly: Member of the editorial boardof The New York Times (1989 – 1995),Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, USDepartment of State: InternationalAffairs Fellow (1979) and Special Assis-tant to the Director (1980); BrookingsInstitution: Rockefeller Younger Scholarin Foreign Policy Studies (1972 – 1974)and guest scholar (1981 – 1984).Professor of government, WesleyanUniversity (1974 – 1989).]

Amb. Tibor Toth, Executive Secretary ofthe Preparatory Commission of theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyOrganization, Hungary [Formerly:Permanent Representative of Hungary tothe United Nations and other Interna-



Dear Sandy,

It is official. The Internatio

nal Astronomical Union na

med

Asteroid Rotblat.

Here is how the citation for

asteroid Rotblat appeared in

the

2 Dec 2009 Minor Planet Ci

rculars:

(22645) Rotblat = 1998 OT6

Discovered 1998 July 26 by

the Lowell

Observatory Near-Earth Obj

ect Search at the Anderson

Mesa Station.

Joseph Rotblat (1908-2005)

was a Nobel Peace Prize lau

reate in 1995

for his efforts toward nucle

ar disarmament. A signator

y to the 1955

Russell-Einstein manifesto,

he was the guiding spirit of

the Pugwash

Conferences on Science and

World Affairs and helped p

revent the use

of nuclear weapons during

the Cold War.

The citation material provid

ed by A. Alsabti.

I would also like to take thi

s opportunity to thank Dr E

dward Bowell

of the Lowell Observatory, U

SA for his important role in

this.

Athem Alsabti / Iraqi Pugw

ash

Dr Athem W. Alsabti Tel: +44

(0) 208 238 8870 (Secretary)

University of London Obser

vatory +44 (0) 208 238 8888

553 Watford Way Mob: +44 (

0) 777 985 0599

Mill Hill

London NW7 2QS Office (Te

l): +44 (0) 208 291 5085

United Kingdom Office (Fa

x): +44 (0) 208 291 9211

Seminar at the Atlantic Council with Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Stephen Cohen of theBrookings Institution, and Aziz Ahmed Khan.

Executive Summary

Afghanistan, insurgency, relationswith the US (and India)

There is a widespread resentment inPakistan towards the US; Pakistanisare cognizant that the lack of trust ismutual. At the root of this resent-ment is the US role in the AfghanJihad, the link between US operationsin Afghanistan at present and the fallout on Pakistan, and the broadernegative perceptions that have beenbuilt around the Muslim world ofwhich Pakistan is, by definition, anintegral part.

There is skepticism about the way inwhich US is conducting its campaignin Afghanistan. The skepticismconcerns the goals, the tactics and theresults thus far. The perception is thatUS heavy handedness has dictatedPakistan’s policy and it has often notbeen in Pakistan’s own interests. Theproblems of the insurgency inPakistan are deemed to be distinctfrom the corresponding problems inAfghanistan. Pakistan wants todecide itself how to deal with theinsurgency in its own territory andwhat its priorities should be. Cooper-ation with the US is certainly possible

border, there is the feeling thatPakistan is more concerned withcontrolling the border than eitherAfghanistan or the US, and thatobstacles to improving the control(e.g. biometrics, fencing, increase inthe number of checkposts) emanateprimarily from US and Afghanistan.

There were also concerns, invarying degrees, about the US rolein Pakistan’s domestic politics. TheUS’ view of itself as a domestic playerin internal politics, especially itsperceived influence on successivePakistani governments is notwelcomed. Excessive visibility ofUS official presence in Pakistan isreceived equally negatively. The“special relationship” between USand India was also mentioned as amajor concern.

and even welcome, but once theAfghanistan and Pakistan challengesare contextualized as linked, yetseparate. The roles and responsibili-ties have to be different. Respect forPakistan’s territorial integrity is highon the demand list. Despite the possi-bility of Pakistani governmentsupport to the policy, the drone-attacks are seen as a national andpolitical liability, irrespective of thelimited tactical results they obtained.In dealing with the cross-borderoperations near the Afghan-Pakistan

The following report is the result of several meetings and consultationsheld in Pakistan in June 2009 and to a limited extent in August 2009.The opinions/ suggestions expressed in the report reflect the sentiments

of a majority of the people who were involved in these meetings and consulta-tions. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of each individual participantor Pugwash per se.

Pugwash-Pakistan Delegation

Meetings and ConsultationsWashington, DC, 18–23 October 2009



Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director, Policy Planning Staff, hosts a discussion at the State Department.

Uzbeks, etc) in FATA, the ready avail-ability of weapons, the large amountof money coming in, among othersare worrisome but require enhancedinternational cooperation to reverse.These problems stem from trans-national factors outside the controlof Pakistan alone.

One issue raised repeatedly was thepossibility of integrating FATA withNWFP. There are, on paper, obviousadvantages to this proposal. Prob-lems come when one considers theiractual feasibility, the local sentimentof the people of FATA, and particu-larly the need of maintaining tradi-tional autonomous prerogatives ofthe region (the suppression of whichcould only be successfully carried outif there is corresponding compensa-tion in terms of tangible improve-ment of economic and social stan-dards of living). In any case, theprospect of integrating FATA withNWFP should be kept on the agendaand examined thoroughly before adecision is taken.

Despite the concern towards India,there is a largely shared desire to seea resumption of the CompositeDialogue. The attitude towards Indiais not of blind hostility. It is an atti-tude of serious concern meshed withthe desire for reconciliation.

Throughout the discussions it waspointed out that the terms insur-gency, terrorism, radical Islamicmovements, etc., are often confusedand interchanged. In reality one hasto understand the nature and distin-guish the characteristics of thedifferent groups of militants oper-ating on the territory. A single policyacross the board is not always thebest strategy.

The case of Swat was of particularinterest to our exercise in Pakistan.

not only one of national pride; thereis a genuine concern among thestrategic enclave that the permanenceof the threat from India has noteroded. There are not many takers inPakistan for the argument that Indialoses from Pakistan’s collapse and isthus willing to help it in its fightagainst terrorism. Again, Afghanistanis seen as a concern that has to beaddressed but not by considering theAfghanistan and Pakistan militancyproblems as part of the same theater.There is absolute consensus thatPakistan must focus on its own prior-ities which while including stabilityin Afghanistan do not extend to thepoint where Pakistani policy is beingdetermined based on the Afghan,rather than Pakistan situation. Thereis objectively no interest for Pakistanto be fully involved in what ishappening outside its borders,namely in Afghanistan. And insidePakistan the confrontation with mili-tancy should be carried on, with aneye to the effective danger, to theproblems caused to Pakistan, and tothe concrete possibility of improvingthe situation on the ground.

The presence of a large number offoreign fighters (Arabs, Chechens,

There is the general perception thatPakistan’s portrayal in the US mediaand popular discourse is exception-ally negative. This has wide rangingconsequences for the future of theUS-Pakistan relationship, the quest towin the hearts and minds, as well asthe economic well-being of thecountry. Both countries are engagedin ‘double speak’ which results inmixed signals and often incorrectinformation making its way into thepublic domain. It is believed that USofficials understand Pakistan’sconcerns but often turn a blind eye tothe negative publicity Islamabadreceives as a means to maintain pres-sure on Pakistan. This also castsdoubt in the Pakistani mind whetherAmerica is willing to invest inPakistan’s well-being over the longrun. The current relationship islargely seen as transactional with aone-point agenda, i.e. elicitingsupport for fighting militancy.

On the other hand, the Af-Pak termi-nology is disliked and has receivedstrong criticism across Pakistan. ThePakistani intelligentsia is not pleasedwith a de-hyphenation of the Indo-Pak equation and the hyphenation ofthe Pak-Afghan calculus. The issue is



direct threat and a few of them havebeen killed. Nonetheless, it should beunderscored that within the discourseon political Islam, there are powerfulantibodies to the global visionsupported by the most radical Islamicmovements.

Talking about the role of radical“Islamic movements” it was pointedout that popular perception ofPakistan being the country with thestrongest Islamic movements ismisplaced. It is common belief that if,in many so called “moderate” Arabstates, free and fair elections wereheld, Islamic movements would havea realistic chance of rising to power.The dynamic is completely missing inPakistan.

Overall, Pakistani stress that theyhave been a victim of many acts ofterrorism that has cost dearly in termsof human lives, destroyed infrastruc-ture, and hurt the country’s economicwellbeing. In this light, Pakistan’sconstant portrayal as the globalsource of terrorism is deeply resented

The Nuclear Factor

Pakistan has been forthcoming inimproving its (multilayered) com -mand and control system and thesafety and security of the nucleararsenal. Moreover, its role instrength ening its export controlregime and management of nuclearmaterial has been acknowledged evenby outsiders. To the extent possible,Pakistan has also regularly briefedlocal and foreign interested partiesabout the progress in this regard.

The A.Q. Khan affair was a source ofembarrassment for Pakistan. Regard -ing A.Q. Khan’s motivations, it hasbeen privately pointed out that,besides economic gains, A.Q. Khanwas probably motivated by the desire

particular the aid should be effec-tively aimed at improving the well-being of the civilian populationrather than being recycled to bureau-cratic red tape and overhead costsboth within the US and in Pakistan.

Compromises with the Taliban andthe militants in general are possible,provided that the end-result isimprovement of living conditions forthe civilians. A generalized militaryconfrontation is not the solutionaccording to most Pakistan experts.Certainly we have no solution if mili-tary operations also result in constant,heavy “collateral damage”, if civilianlives are wasted, and if the people aremore traumatized and terrorized thanbefore. This points to the need foreffective military operations, for adistinction to be drawn betweendifferent militant outfits, and to dealwith different policy measuresdepending on the group in question.Al Qaeda and the Taliban are not thesame entity and Pakistani policymakers insist on a distinction here.

The ideological aspects of the mili-tancy are critical. There is no doubtthat the ideology of the militantsdoes, one way or the other, refer towhat can generally be called “radicalIslam”. A pivotal role in removingthe conflation between Taliban’spolitical rhetoric couched in an“Islamic” dialect and religious valuesthemselves can be played by theIslamic scholars and Islamic leaders.Even the variety of traditional so-called Islamic parties can provideanswers that are different from theones that are dominant amongcertain types of militants. Wellknown Islamic scholars who criticizethe Taliban ideology must questionthe politico-religious assumptions ofthe militants.. It is not by chance thatmany of these scholars are under

The tribal structure, that for a longtime was the main reference point forthe area, has undergone a significantloss of authority. Main problemsaffecting the people have been thelack of quick and reliable justice,concerns with broader governanceissues, and unemployment coupledwith a extreme youth bulge. TheState is perceived as being incapableof addressing these problems. Thepower vacuum in Swat was progres-sively filled by a group of individuals,who started as preachers but gradu-ally altered their rhetoric anddemeanor to morph into the SwatChapter of the TTP. As they wereunable to improve the situation of thepopulation in structural terms, theyincreased their leverage by a combi-nation of coercion, promotion of socalled “Islamic” ideology, offeringselected job opportunities to thosewho were involved in keeping their“order”, and in a lot of cases, shearbrutality. All these activities havebeen de facto tolerated by the centralpower (due to lack of means, politicalwill and/or capabilities).

Ultimately, when the state had all butlost its writ, it (also thanks to USpressure) reacted militarily. It evacu-ated the area and sent the troops in.People were displaced and lost prop-erties, houses, etc; hence they becameeven more resentful. While thePakistan Army has ensured a swiftreturn of the IDPs and locals seemdetermined to keep the Taliban away,ultimately normalization is impos-sible with speedy relief and rehabili-tation. What is required is effectivereconstruction – the possibility ofreal economic development. This is acomplex job requiring money (wiselyspent!) and international coopera-tion, given the limited amount ofresources available to Pakistan. In



Press breakfast for the delegation at the Old Ebbitt Grill.

Army simply loses control of theinsurgents. Both cases are not real-istic, at least no more realistic thanmany other worst case scenarios thatone can imagine for most nuclearstates countries in different parts ofthe world. Most western and theIndian government has expressedconfidence in Pakistan’s ability tocontrol its arsenal.

Yet, the scenarios described above arequite often mentioned in the interna-tional press and, in relation to thesescenarios, a perception has developedthat the US may prepare contingencyplans to take out the Pakistaninuclear weapons. The reluctance onthe part of the US to deny such plansis problematic. While experts dismissthese plans as unfeasible, they ques-tion why the US does not challengethis version to reassure Pakistan. Ascontingency plans induce counter-contingency plans, the attitude inPakistan is that, it should prepareitself to fully deny the possibility thatthe US may take possession ofPakistani nuclear weapons. At leasttheoretically, this could lead to stepsthat are considered destabilizing inthe nuclear calculus.

The nuclear issue has to be dealt withregionally, with India taking the lead.It is unrealistic to expect Pakistan totake the initiative when India is main-taining and expanding its nucleararsenal. Pakistan has in the pastpresented a number of proposals toreduce nuclear risk in South Asia; infact, it also tabled a NWFZ proposal.Pakistan’s position is clear: it wants aSouth Asia which is not held hostageto the possibility of a nuclear cata-strophe and wants India to be anactive partner in ensuring this.Pakistan’s position on CTBT andNPT is linked to India’s. The USshould play an active role in

and security measures. This isprecisely where its new-found obses-sion with redundancy emanates from.In terms of the risk of unauthorizeduse or inadvertent launch, it waspointed out that systems like PALshave been developed. Moreover,recessed postures minimize this riskto begin with.

Pakistani nuclear weapons are India-specific, namely they are an answerto India’s nuclear arsenal. Anythinglike the deployment of Indian BMDsystems or expansion of the Indiannuclear weapons program will desta-bilize the situation. On the otherhand, reinitiating of the dialoguewith India, common discussions onnuclear restraints, strategic stability,conventional balance and the mora-torium of the test ban and otherNuclear Risk Reduction Measurescould induce a progressive de-emphasis of nuclear weapons.

Scenarios have been described in theinternational press in which Pakistaninuclear weapons could be “lost” tomilitants, Taliban or other radicalmovements. The scenarios include a1979 Iran-type situation with a fullrevolution or a situation in which the

to facilitate the acquisition of nuclearweapons for the larger Islamic com -munity. Ideologically or economicallymotivated proliferators are certainlya serious problem, but the specificproblem of A.Q. Khan is now undercontrol and extreme care is taken bythe Pakistani military in assuring thescreening and the reliability of thepersonnel inducted in sensitive posts.Pakistan realizes its own vulnerabili-ties and is thus much more careful tobuild in redundancy and triangula-tion in its safety and security proto-cols. There is a realization that ititself will be the biggest loser shouldany incident remotely resembling theAQ Khan affair take place.

The reality of the matter is that allnuclear weapons (irrespective of thecountry possessing them) are intrinsi-cally insecure. In comparative terms,why should Pakistani nuclearweapons be more insecure thanothers? For example, the questionhas been asked “what information dowe have about the security of nuclearweapons in India or in Israel?”Pakistan builds its insurgent problemand political instability in thecalculus when it plans on its safety



Gen. Mahmood Durrani leads discussion at the Heritage Foundation.

the public safety conditions, receivesubstantial economic help, be able tobring visiting businessmen fromwestern countries to the productionsites, and similar basic prerequisitesto improve business prospects. Allthese conditions look difficult torealize. It was also pointed out thatmaking such a limited, economicallyisolated area a ROZ does not haveany multiplier effects for the rest ofthe country. While there were sugges-tions for alternate models, the chiefdemand was to declare the entirePakistan as an ROZ as far as goodsdestined to America are concerned.

On investment, Pakistani busi-nessmen saw a negative US role. Thefrequent travel advisories forPakistan and a perpetual hammeringof a negative image in the media havekept even the most serious investorsaway. Compared to many othercountries which have serious law andorder problems, the US State Depart-ment has been hyperactive in raisingalarm about physical presence of UScitizens in Pakistan. This has hurtPakistan’s investment attractivenessas it has kept western investors atbay. For a western investor, commit-ting to a deal with, say, a Pakistanitextile exporter and then not feelingcomfortable (or being allowed)visiting the factory, is a non-starter.

and nationals benefit as much aspossible. This will also help generategreater goodwill for the US. More-over, commonly cited aid figuresshould only reflect the amount actu-ally delivered to Pakistan and utilizedwithin the country.

Ultimately, Pakistan seeks increasedtrade and investment from the US.Pakistan’s requests for a more activepartnership in this realm have beendeferred since 9/11. Participantspointed to a number of non-alliedcountries which have a more prefer-able trade arrangement with the US.Pakistani exporters would ideally liketo see zero-rated access for Pakistan’sprincipal exports, at least for the next3-5 years. Pakistanis wish to see theUS assist it in becoming highly inte-grated in the global economy.

The general sentiment about theROZs (Reconstruction OpportunityZones) remains rather negative.Experts argued that the policy will beunable to deliver results given thesecurity environment and capacityissues in FATA. Also it is very diffi-cult to establish an ROZ andpromote the development of, say,textile industries in an area with noprevious industrial experience in thesector. In order to do so a Pakistaniinvestor should be confident about

supporting Nuclear Risk ReductionMeasures in South Asia. Thus far,Washington has been reluctant to doso. Finally, it must not be forgottenthat Indian conventional superiorityforms the cornerstone of Pakistan’sdeterrence equation.

Economic Relationships

Pakistani economic experts seek arevision of the presently transactionalnature of the relationship with the US.The constant reminder of Pakistanbeing an expensive strategic partnerfor the US is not well received. Dur -ing our meetings, quite a few partici-pants repeatedly said that Pakistandemands ‘trade’, not ‘aid’ from the US.

While Pakistanis remained apprecia-tive of the new direction towards aholistic economic relationship underPresident Obama, the economic billsbeing debated in Washington haveraised concerns. Conditionalities onaid are extremely tricky. On the onehand, domestic compulsions forAmerican policy makers necessitatethese. Yet, the Pakistani governmentdemands minimizing them. That said,lack of conditionalities often leads toleakage of funds and ultimately theblame is transferred to the US for notsupporting the Pakistani people. How -ever, whatever conditionalities areimposed, they should be specific toperformance in the sector they arebeing provided for, not linked toterrorism and other non-economicconcerns.

Currently, 30-60 percent of the fundsshown as ‘aid’ to Pakistan are actu-ally repatriated in the form of consul-tant fees and overheads. Pakistandoes not benefit from that money.The composition of aid should there-fore be altered. Local partners (with amajor share) should be elicited ineach case such that Pakistani firms



Pugwash-Pakistan Delegation Meetings and ConsultationsWashington, DC, 18–23 October 2009

Schedule of Meetings and Seminars

Tuesday, October 20:

09:30–16:30 Conference on US-Pakistan Relations Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW

19:00 Dinner hosted by New America Foundation Cosmos Club, 2121 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Wednesday, October 21:

08:45–10:00 Press and Media Breakfast (entire delegation)Old Ebbitt Grill, 675 15th St., NW

11:00-12:00 Meeting with Richard Armitage

12:00–14:00 Luncheon seminar on US-Pakistan Economic and Political RelationsStimson Center, 1111 19th St., NW, 12th floorPanelists: Hon. Ahsan Iqbal, Mr. Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Dr. Adil Najam

13:30-15:30 Seminar on Pakistan nuclear concernsNational Academy of Sciences, 500 5th St., NW Discussants: Feroz Hasan Khan and Stephen P. Cohen

15:00–17:00 Panel at New America Conference on Counter-terrorism,Mayflower Hotel, 1127 Connecticut Ave, NWPanel speakers: Gen. Mahmud Durrani, Hon. Sherry Rehman, Mr. Ejaz Haider, Gen. Talat Masood

19:30 Dinner with Pentagon WMD South Asia teamSt. Gregory’s HotelGen. Talat Masood, Ejaz Haider, Brig. Feroz Khan, Moeed Yusuf

Thursday, October 22:

09:30–11:00 Seminar on Pakistan Nuclear Issues The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Ave., NESpeakers: Gen. Mahmud Durrani, Mr. Ejaz Haider

15:00–17:00 Meeting with Policy Planning Staff (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director)US State Department, 2201 C St., NW

17:30–19:30 Farewell reception



With the May 2010 NPTReview Conference somesix months away,

Pugwash convened jointly withCPAPD and IAPCM a major confer-ence to discuss possible strategies andmodes of cooperation that can rein-vigorate and strengthen the interna-tional non-proliferation regime.Pugwash expresses its appreciation toits Chinese host institutions for theirsupport of the conference, and to theFord Foundation (Beijing office) for agrant covering travel expenses forinternational participants. As is stan-dard practice with reports ofPugwash meetings, this summary isthe sole responsibility of the authorand is not intended to represent theviews of other participants.

Introduction

The conference was held just a fewdays after a state visit by US Presi-dent Barack Obama to the People’sRepublic of China, during whichPresident Obama and Chinese Presi-

From a Chinese perspective, majorissues that need to be addressed are:(1) continued US and Russian reduc-tions in their nuclear weapons, whichaccount for 95% of all existingnuclear weapons; (2) strengthenedmechanisms for preventing the prolif-eration of nuclear weapons andnuclear materials; (3) renewed effortsto create and expand nuclearweapons-free zones; (4) multi-lateral-izing No First Use undertakings;

(5) abandoning ballistic missiledefense efforts; and (6) improvedmechanisms for dealing with viola-tions of and withdrawal from theNPT Treaty.

Major nuclear disarmament andnon-proliferation challenges

Compared to the most recent NPTReview Conference held in 2005,there is a much improved atmospherefor nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation affairs that holds outthe promise of a more successfuloutcome for the 2010 NPT ReviewConference.

Yet, much remains to be done tosuccessfully manage both the issuesand the expectations that will accom-

dent Hu Jintao committed theirgovernments to working together fora successful NPT Review Conferencein May 2010. More generally, a newclimate of international cooperationwould seem to promise a far morepositive outcome of the 2010 ReviewConference than was true in 2005.

Nonetheless, there are substantialchallenges facing all three pillars –disarmament, non-proliferation, andpeaceful uses of nuclear energy - ofthe international nuclear non-prolif-eration regime. In nuclear disarma-ment, despite substantial reductionsin nuclear weapons in the last twodecades, some 23,000 nuclearweapons continue to held by ninenuclear weapons states. The possibleemergence of new nuclear weaponsstates and the proliferation of fissilematerial to non-state groups remainfundamental challenges to the worldcommunity. And, renewed interest inmany countries around the world inthe peaceful uses of nuclear powerhighlights the urgent need tostrengthen the NPT Treaty and otherinternational mechanisms forensuring no diversion of civiliannuclear efforts and materials to mili-tary purposes.

Report by Jeffrey Boutwell

Pugwash Workshop

Strengthening the International Non-Nuclear Non-ProliferationRegime: Promoting a Successful NPT Review Conference in 2010

Beijing, China, 20-21 November 2009

J O I N T LY S P O N S O R E D BY

Chinese People’s Association for Peace and DisarmamentPugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics



issue prior to 1995 Review Confer-ence. And the courageous action ofSouth Africa in unilaterally giving upits nuclear weapons capability in theearly 1990s helped create a positivepolitical atmosphere in 1995 thatwas conducive to overall success ofthe conference. The always difficultissue of the Middle East and calls forit to adopt a regional zone free ofnuclear weapons (or weapons ofmass destruction) will require muchadvance discussion and work prior tothe conference. Finally, the benefits ofa talented management team fororganizing the Review Conferenceand orchestrating multi-lateral diplo-macy can not be underestimated.

Looking ahead to next year, appro-priate issues for the 2010 conferencewill be guaranteed supplies of nuclearfuel for civilian purposes, interna-tionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle,and the Middle East. Regarding thelatter, the existence of a nuclearweapons capability in one country –Israel – has in the past spurred others(Iraq, Libya, possibly Syria) toacquire their own, and could stimu-late similar actions in the future. Itwould be beneficial if the 2010Review Conference proposedconvening a conference (by 2011)that would study the modalities of anuclear weapons-free Middle East,with a designated coordinator toensure appropriate follow-up andimplementation. The three deposi-tory governments of the NPT Treaty(US, Russia, UK) could have a specialrole to play in promoting a confer-ence on the Middle East.

Then there is the important role ofcivil society, which has the advantageof not being constrained by narrowlydefined national security intereststhat often handicap the policies ofnational governments. Bipartisan

piles; and complementary measureson CW and BW and conventionalweapons technologies (especially onmissile defense and space weapons)that will provide greater stabilitywhich in turn will facilitate the reduc-tion and elimination of nuclearweapons. Too often, an active rolefor the United Nations is overlookedin the many plans being promulgatedfor moving towards a nuclearweapons-free world.

To facilitate progress, policymakersshould be looking at inter-lockingarrangements (domestic, national,regional, international) that can facil-itate solutions on the three pillars ofnuclear disarmament, non-prolifera-tion, and the peaceful uses of nuclearenergy. An interesting example of thisis Brazil, which has both a nationalconstitution prohibiting developmentof nuclear weapons and an important1991 bilateral agreement withArgentina on the peaceful uses ofnuclear energy, which then created ajoint organization (ABACC) thathelps ensure joint benefits on civiliannuclear technologies while providingtransparency that neither countryseeks to use its nuclear capabilitiesfor military purposes.

How to measure NPT success,and how to promote it

Exactly what will constitute asuccessful NPT Review Conference inMay 2010? Certainly the adoption ofa final consensus document would domuch to repair the uncertainty left atthe conclusion of the 2005 ReviewConference on the ability of nuclearand non-nuclear weapons states towork together. Pre-conference prepa-ration in highlighting specific goalscan help pave the way for conferenceagreement, similar to the efforts ofPresident Bill Clinton on the CTBT

pany the 180 states parties to theNPT who convene in New York nextMay, along with thousands of NGOand civil society representatives andthe world press.

For its part, as host of this meeting, ithas been 17 years since the PRCacceded to the NPT Treaty, andChina can play a valuable role inpromoting a successful ReviewConference and contributing toreducing the threat posed by nuclearweapons. China’s long-establishedpolicies of maintaining a minimumdeterrent nuclear force, of not gettingcaught up in escalatory arms races, ofpromoting unconditional NFU poli-cies, and of declaring itself opposedto missile defense and military spaceactivities, could help the PRCcontribute to strengthened disarma-ment and non-proliferation policies .

One important ingredient, however,is the lack an agreed integrated plan,which would set timetables andspecific goals for reducing nuclearweapons, and which would alsowould address the important issue ofconventional weapons in a non-nuclear weapons world.

The only specified plan along theselines has been that of UN SecretaryGeneral Ban ki-Moon, issued 24October 2008, that set out five majorinter-related areas for movingforward. Important components ofhis plan include the negotiation of anuclear weapons convention; newinitiatives undertaken by the UNSecurity Council; constructive actionsby non-NPT nuclear weapons states;renewed efforts to bring the CTBTinto force and to commence earnestdiscussions of the FMCT; expandingIAEA safeguards provisions; account-ability and transparency measures,especially on nuclear weapons stock-



force will not occur until all 44 of theso-called Annex II countries (thosewith nuclear weapons or havingsignificant nuclear capabilities) haveratified, and nine of these have yet todo so (US, China, Israel, India,Pakistan, DPRK, Iran, Indonesia, andEgypt). The next two to three yearsare likely to be key for this tohappen, otherwise the CTBT mightbe lost forever.

The significance of the CTBT as animportant disarmament and non-proliferation measure is that (1) itserves the security interests of allcountries; (2) is a critical steptowards a nuclear weapons-freeworld; and (3) has a demonstrablyeffective verification system. Nationalimplementation measures for theCTBT (e.g., criminalizing nuclearweapons activities) would furtherhelp create an overall architecture formoving toward a nuclear weapons-free world. And, there is the addedbenefit that the verification technolo-gies already in place for the Interna-tional Monitoring System of theCTBT (including seismology, hydroa-coustics, infrasound, and radionu-clide monitoring,) also have impor-tant civilian applications and benefits(e.g., tsunami warning systems).

rately tailored solutions needed toresolve both issues, what would bevery useful are actions that demon-strate the diminishing utility ofnuclear weapons as indicators ofpower and prestige. This will requireleadership from both the P-5 originalnuclear weapons-states as well asnon-NPT nuclear weapons powers.Also important will be the examplesset by major non-nuclear weapons-states such as Brazil, Indonesia,South Africa, and as important inter-national actors that did not neednuclear weapons. Most imperative inthis effort will be new internationaland regional security arrangements,and accountability for actions thatcontravene international law, thatboth reduce the salience of nuclearweapons and increase the oppro-brium of those seeking to acquirethem.

CTBT entry into force and the FMCT

One of the cornerstones of a viablenon-proliferation regime will be thesuccessful entry into force of theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty,which was signed and opened forratification in 1996. To date, 182countries have signed the treaty, and151 have ratified it. Yet entry into

support from respected policyfigures, innovative research andproposals from think thanks, thefacilitating role of organizations likePugwash, activist NGOs that stimu-late grass-roots public interest innuclear weapons issues, and interna-tional commissions and campaignson nuclear weapons, all have impor-tant roles to play. Given limitedfunding sources for NGOs and civilsociety, it becomes important to forgealliances in order to avoid duplica-tion of effort. In an increasingly inter-dependent world, NGOs must explic-itly demonstrate the connectionsbetween issues (e.g., civilian nuclearpower, proliferation risks, climatechange, and opportunity costs for awide range of human security bene-fits) to better mobilize publicopinion.

Perhaps most important of all, a cate-gorical commitment by all nuclearweapons states to the ultimate elimi-nation of nuclear weapons, similar tobut even more forceful than thatexpressed by President BarackObama in his Prague speech of April2009, would be very beneficial indevaluing the utility of nuclearweapons in the eyes of the interna-tional community.

Other issues raised included thepossibility of integrating nuclearsecurity issues as a possible 4th pillarof the NPT, which most participantsthought better considered on its ownmerits, as with the April 2010summit conference being convenedby Pres. Obama.

Then, of course, there are the difficultissues of the DPRK and Iran, verydifferent in their own ways, yet eachconstituting a major challenge to theviability of the non-proliferationregime. Over and above the sepa-



(from right): Steve Miller, John Finney, Serguey Batsanov, Chen Duming.

(FMCT) noted the following points:(1) scope of what should be covered(existing or future stocks; definitionof fissile materials subject to FMCT;naval HEU); (2) verification of noproduction of FM, no diversion ofFM; maintaining weapon designsecrecy; (3) linkages with otherissues.

Moving towards deep reductionsamong all nuclear weapons-states

Of equal importance to the CTBT isthe need for all members of the NPTto feel that the original nuclearweapons states, the P-5, are movinghonestly ahead to fulfill their ArticleVI obligations for nuclear disarma-ment. Certainly the prospects seemgood for a follow-on START treatybetween the US and Russia, but thequestion is immediately raised, whatnext? How do the other originalnuclear weapons states (NWS) jointhe process, to say nothing of neededparticipation in multi-lateral armscontrol by the non-NPT nuclearpowers (Israel, India and Pakistan)?At a minimum, the other P-5 shouldjoin discussions of their futureinvolvement in arms reductions, andthey might also become moreinvolved in US-Russian negotiatingand verification efforts to build up abody of knowledge on such issues.One way of doing so, of course,would be through the FMCT processin the CD.

A summary of the situation in theUnited States noted the importanceof the Wall Street Journal articles byMssrs. Shultz, Kissinger, Nunn andPerry and Pres. Obama’s Praguespeech and his focus on START,CTBT, missile defense, and theFMCT. Progress thus far has provenmore difficult than envisioned,however, because of an overloaded

ratify. Similar to India, Pakistan isobserving a self-imposed testingmoratorium, but anti-US sentiment issuch that many in Pakistan are suspi-cious that the US would use theCTBT to roll back Pakistan’s nuclearprogram.

As for China, it was thought that if acountry like the PRC, with modestnumbers of nuclear weapons and amore limited testing history than theUS, can feel comfortable about itswarhead reliability under a CTBT,then this would send a clear messageto the US that it too can have asimilar confidence. This point wasmade to illustrate the benefits ofChina taking a more pro-active rolein promoting ideas for the 2010Review Conference and other aspectsof the non-proliferation regime.

The sensitive subject of provisionalentry into force (without all 44 statesneeded to ratify) was discussed, withopinion being that now is not thetime to focus on this option; that alleffort should be devoted to getting allthe nine remaining Annex II coun-tries to sign and ratify so as to ensureuniversal adherence to the CTBT.

Technical issues related to the CTBTwere also discussed, such as warheadsafety and reliability; technical capa-bilities of the IMS; and the effect ofclandestine testing (decoupling oftests to evade detection). The body oftechnical knowledge built up sincethe CTBT was concluded, and sincethe treaty was voted down by the USSenate in 1999, is such that highconfidence exists across all threeareas, as attested to by the NationalAcademy of Sciences and the influen-tial JASON group in the US.

A presentation and brief discussionof the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

To be sure, major difficultiesconfront the entry into force of theCTBT, even in the United Stateswhere Pres. Obama has pledged tomake US ratification a top priority.

His administration is already over-loaded with revitalizing the USeconomy, instituting major health carereform, reversing a deteriorating situa-tion in Afghanistan, and having todecide the fate of Guantanamodetainees. All of these issues are beingplayed out in an atmosphere of divisivepartisanship that makes it very difficultfor Republican House or Senatemembers to support the President. Onthe CTBT, he will need at least sevenRepublican Senate votes, and it is notat all certain he will succeed. His advi-sors are currently taking the positionthat postponing a vote when success isnot certain is preferable to going downto defeat, even if that means waitinguntil well after the 2010 ReviewConference in May.

Given the uncertainty in the US, itwas suggested that the oft heardstrategy of waiting for the US toratify first and then working on theother eight needed countries may notmake sense. Especially if the US voteis delayed further by the 2010midterm elections in November2010, perhaps the focus should be ongetting at least some of the otherAnnex II countries to ratify and setan example.

It was noted that one of these coun-tries, India, opposed the CTBT in the1990s because of perceived discrimi-natory treatment, a worseningregional security situation, andconcerns over verification capabili-ties. The situation has changed in thepast 15 years, so that the chances ofIndia ratifying the CTBT are good, inthe event that both the US and China



General discussion noted that China,the UK, and France should not beallowed to continually point to theneed for further US and Russianweapons reductions as an excuse notto join the process of reducing thesalience of nuclear weapons. Thesecountries need to indicate when, andat what US and Russian force levels,they will be ready to join a multilat-eral reduction process. Following upa point made about China, the USand Russia could help transparencyand confidence-building by allowingthe other NWS to participate in theverification process of US andRussian reductions. Obstacles to afull-fledged multilateral disarmamentprocess will continue to exist, ofcourse, from the inter-dependence ofUS-UK Trident cooperation, toconservative opposition to armscontrol in the US, to vested interestsin all the NWS that still equatenuclear weapons with supremenational and military interests.

The importance of having greatertransparency by the NWS was alsonoted, precisely because of issuessuch as the uncertainty over the totalnumber of UK warheads; skepticismwas expressed that no reservewarheads exist above the total of 160deployed. It should be rememberedthat this type of transparency wasalmost achieved by PresidentsClinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki inOctober 1997 when they nearedagreement on START negotiationsthat would focus on warheads.

Promoting nuclear weapons-free zones

A review of existing nuclearweapons-free zones (NWFZ) notedthat a total of five regional and onenational (Mongolia) NWFZ, plusthree physical geographic zones

the alert response time for being ableto launch the missiles or even goingto a cruise missile option. There weredifferences of opinion on whether theUK has excess warheads in reserve,above the 160 operational warheadsit is believed to have deployed withTrident.

As for China, one participant stressedthe importance of jump-starting thedisarmament process across a widerange of policy initiatives, from theCTBT and FMCT to reductionsdown to 1,000 total warheads for theUS and Russia, to stronger NegativeSecurity Assurances, the de-alertingof operational forces, limitations onmissile defenses, and prohibitions onthe use of conventional weaponsagainst nuclear forces. The PRC, itwas asserted, has fashioned a nuclearforce and doctrine that is closer tothe ideal of a nuclear weapon-freeworld than any other nuclear weaponstate. Precisely because it has a‘minimum deterrent’, China is seri-ously concerned about the impact ofmissile defenses on strategic stability.It was noted that the PRC will jointhe US-Russian disarmament processat the appropriate time, as it did theCTBT process. It was also floatedthat China might perhaps participateas an observer in US-Russian negotia-tions and the implementation andverification of reductions, if invitedto do so, in order to gain experienceand knowledge about nuclear armsreductions. A concluding point wasthat nuclear disarmament is morethan just numerical reductions; it’sreally finding ways to reduce overallnuclear capability through funda-mental changes in doctrine, throughde-alerting, and through reductionsin the value placed on nuclearweapons in military doctrine andnational security policy.

policy agenda and partisan domesticpolitics.

Other perspectives noted that the USand Russia need to go much furtherin their weapons reductions, wellbelow the 1,700 limit that wasalready the lower limit of START,and that reductions need to be madein stockpiled as well as deployedweapons. Another important compo-nent of moving toward a nuclearweapons-free world would be adher-ence by all the NWS to unconditionalno first use policies. Missile defenseefforts should be abandoned,according to some, as these onlyincrease pressures for modernizingoffensive nuclear systems. Also,disarmament needs to take advantageof new advances in verification tech-nologies that facilitate the disman-tling and destruction of warheadsand fissile material.

A review of the UK situation notedthat Britain has reduced its arsenal by75% since the height of the ColdWar, now relying on four Tridentballistic missile submarines with 160warheads. Official UK policyconsiders this a ‘minimum deterrent’,though there has never been a fullpublic debate about what exactlyshould constitute a minimum deter-rent in today’s security environment.The current government of PrimeMinister Gordon Brown is toutingthe UK as a disarmament laboratory,but it was thought that this is a bit“out of synch” with plans for a fullmodernization of the Trident follow-on deterrent. Some of the variationsfor modernization being discussed doinclude reducing the number of subsfrom four to three (and giving upalways having at least one boat atsea) and and/or reducing the numberof missile tubes per boat from 16 to12. Other options include reducing



An additional point is that a countrylike Japan can help take the lead inenhancing best practices in nuclearsecurity.

More broadly, there is a history ofCBMs being applied across a widerange of applications (informationsharing, constraint measures, verifi-cation). Since for now only the USand Russia are involved in actualreductions, there is a need for greaterinvolvement of the other nuclearweapons-states to both increasetransparency of intentions and pavethe way for their active involvementin reducing stockpiles. In particular,having other NWS replicate the US-Russian nuclear weapons lab discus-sions would be extremely useful. Inaddition, the US and Russia couldoffer their widespread experience inthe destruction and dismantling ofweapons to other countries.

Summary discussion

There will be a tension betweenseeking the maximum positiveoutcome of the 2010 Review Confer-ence, especially given the disap-pointing results of the 2005 confer-ence, with current political realitiesthat might argue for more modestexpectations. Unlike 2005, US leader-ship at the Review Conference will beimportant, yet the Obama adminis-tration is beset with a complex policyagenda and handicapped by aCongress that is deeply partisan.Thus, expectations for what hisadministration can achieve in thenear term have already been lowered;perhaps START ratification beforeMay 2010, but CTBT ratificationperhaps not until after the November2010 midterm elections, and in anyevent, securing Senate approval willbe difficult.

Looking ahead to the 2010 ReviewConference, how can we ensure thatpolitical disagreements over a MiddleEast WMD-FZ don’t derail overallconsensus on moving ahead on disar-mament and non-proliferation? Inaddition to political support forconvening a special conference andcoordinator for Middle East WMDissues in 2011, many Arab states willwant clarity from Israel on theirnuclear weapons posture, whileurging adherence to the NPT. Anotherview held that Iran will stress theuniversality of the NPT, and will bereluctant to create obstacles tocoming to a consensual agreement.

CBMs for verifying reductions andnon-diversion of fissile material

Technologies continue to developthat can effectively monitor thedismantlement and destruction ofnuclear warheads and prevent theproliferation of fissile materials andother sensitive nuclear and weaponsmaterials. Countries should begin towork more closely on issues such aschain of custody and authenticationof warheads in order to increasetransparency in the disarmamentprocess (such as the UK-Norway-Vertic project), given the need toprotect sensitive information duringthe removal and destruction ofwarheads.

Participants also discussed organiza-tional means for reducing prolifera-tion risks, such as the Asian MutuallyAssured Dependence (A-MAD)concept that lays out a menu ofmultinational and internationalconsortia that could operate enrich-ment facilities, and where toppriority in accessing nuclear fuelwould be given to those countrieswho forego having enrichment andreprocessing facilities on their soil.

(Antarctic, seabed, and outer space)cover more than half of the countries(114) in the world, but less than 20%of the world’s population.

In seeking ways to expand suchzones, which currently are largelyfound in the southern hemisphere,there needs to be a tighter relation-ship between them and regional secu-rity systems. The former do nothappen in a vacuum, but are part of alarger process whereby states havemechanisms and organizations bywhich to discuss issues and peacefullyresolve disputes. Future zones ofcourse will have to deal with themore difficult cases of regions wherenuclear weapons already exist or arebeing sought.

Participants focused on the mostpolitically sensitive region, theMiddle East, and discussed revivingsecurity negotiations such as ACRSin order to help facilitate acceptanceof a Middle East NWFZ. There wasalso discussion of thinking morecreatively about what constitutesMiddle East (from the Maghrebthrough Somalia to Iran). Do newregional realities create new opportu-nities for making progress on aMiddle East zone free of WMD ornuclear weapons? Should we thinksub-regionally, as in creating aPersian Gulf NWFZ?

At a minimum, efforts shouldproceed in parallel on both new secu-rity architectures and the require-ments for implementing a nuclearweapon or WMD-free zone; it is notenough to wait for one or the otherto come into being. It is also impor-tant to look for new initiatives (anArctic NWFZ) that might giveimpetus to broadening the coverageof NWFZs.



(7) continue the process of seeking toinstitutionalize consequences forNPT violators (Art. X) andstreamlining the process of insti-tuting penalties and sanctions;

(8) engage non-NPT members to themaximum extent possible,inviting them as observers to theReview Conference and maxi-mizing their compliance withnon-proliferation norms, even ifoutside the NPT itself.

Many participants agreed on thedesirability of devising a comprehen-sive plan for disarmament, with time-lines for might be achieved andbenchmarks to gauge progress.Countries should take their disarma-ment responsibilities seriously, andnot hide behind excuses of having towait for other developments beforethey can fully join in. It is also impor-tant that there be no discriminatorytreatment in providing access topeaceful nuclear technologies. Sepa-rate cases, such as the DPRK andIran, have to be handled differently.For those nuclear weapons statesoutside the NPT, it is important towork with them on all three NPTpillars, but not to give them NPTlegitimacy.

3) reaffirm the principle of a basicright to nuclear energy for statesthat meet their obligations, butalso acknowledge new realities(economic as well as political) thatmake attractive more seriousconsideration of multi-lateral andinternational cooperation onmanaging fuel cycles;

(4) enhance transparency of thedisarmament process by the NWS(the 12th of the 13 steps) andestablish regular reporting by allstates of their disarmament andnon-proliferation activities;

(5) NWFZ: seek the art of thepossible, including US ratificationof the Pelindaba and Rarotongatreaties, and Russia rescinding itspositive security assuance in theTreaty of Tashkent to facilitate acentral Asia NWFZ, and seekconstructive ways forward onEgypt’s call for a 2011 MiddleEast NWFZ conference and theappointment of a special coordi-nator;

(6) encourage universalizing adher-ence to the Additional Protocaland work with countries likeBrazil, Egypt and others on theirspecial concerns;

Other political realities, in theMiddle East and Northeast Asiaespecially, will also temper expecta-tions for that the NPT ReviewConference can achieve.

The point was made that there is timeto begin now to build political will inadvance of the Review Conference,especially as this relates to balancingconcerns of the NWS and NNWS asthey relate to implementation of arti-cles IV and VI. Other importantmarkers will be:

(1) progress in resolving the DPRKand Iran issues;

(2) issues of nuclear material security;

(3) discussions of bringing non-NPTcountries into the fold;

(4) strengthening the NPT by closingloopholes/lacunae (e.g., enforce-ment mechanisms);

(5) expand authority of the IAEA;

(6) affirm entry-into-force of theCTBT;

(7) revitalize the CD as a viable nego-tiating forum.

Mention was made of a recent reportby Deepti Chouby of the CarnegieEndowment for International Peace,Restoring the NPT: Essential Stepsfor 2010 (November 2010), in whichshe set out what she considers real-istic goals that could be achieved atthe review conference, including:

(1) reaffirm the basic validity of theNPT, through explication of itsbasic security benefits;

(2) reiterate the “unequivocal under-taking,” either unilaterally by thenuclear weapons states orthrough a coordinated P-5 state-ment, and update the 13 steps toaccord with current realities;



Agenda

Thursday, 19 November

14:00– Registration

18:00–20:00 Reception

Friday, 20 November

09:00–09:30 Opening Session, Group Photo

09:30–10:30 Session 1: Evaluation of major nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation challenges, and strategies forensuring a successful NPT Review Conference

Remarks: Sergio Duarte, Jayantha Dhanapala, Mohamed Shaker

10:30–10:45 Tea Break

10:45–12:30 Session 1 (continued)

12:30–14:00 Lunch Break

14:00–16:00 Session 2: Status of CTBT Entry into Force and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

Remarks: Steven Miller, Talat Masood, Ramamurti Rajaraman

16:00–16:15 Tea Break

16:15–18:30 Session 3: Moving towards deep reductions among all nuclear-weapons states

Remarks: Serguei Batsanov, John Finney, Steven Miller

19:00 Banquet

Saturday, 21 November

09:00–10:45 Session 4: Promoting nuclear weapons-free zones

Remarks: Peter Jones, Saideh Lotfian, Mohamed Kadry Said

10:45–11:00 Tea Break

11:00–12:45 Session 5: CBMs for verifying reductions in nuclear arsenals and ensuring non-diversion of civiliannuclear materials for military purposes

Presentations: Tatsu Suzuki, Amitabh Mattoo, Goetz Neuneck

12:45–14:00 Lunch Break

14:00–16:00 Session 6: Wrap-up discussion / Closing Session

Presentation: Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Pan Zhenqiang, Jeffrey Boutwell

16:00 Tea Break

17:00–21:00 Evening Recreation Activity

Sunday, 22 November

9:00– Social Activities/Sightseeing (Free Choices) or departure

Note: Each panel session will be composed of two or three invited presentations, followed by discussions.

countries. What is ultimately impor-tant is that a final consensus docu-ment agreed to at the 2010 ReviewConference be seen as applying even-handed and non-discriminatory treat-ment to all states parties.

as this is not seen as the P-5 trying toset the agenda for all states. Inworking with non-NPT states, itwould be a major setback to the non-proliferation regime if the benefitsaccorded to India under the US-Indiaagreement were accorded to other

In concluding remarks, there wasbroad agreement on creating a roadmap, of a comprehensive plan fordisarmament and non-proliferation.And there was agreement on thesetting of realistic expectations forthe NPT Review Conference, as long



Particular thanks were given tothe Association Suisse dePugwash (ASP) who, together

with the Geneva International PeaceResearch Institute (GIPRI), hostedand organised this Workshop withthe help of Christine Demièrre whomade the detailed arrangements inGeneva. Without the continuingsupport of the Swiss Federal Govern-ment, there would have been noworkshop.

The workshop took place on the eveof the Biological Weapons Conven-tion (BWC) Meeting of States Partieson 7 to 11 December 2009 and wasattended by some 40 participants, allby invitation and in their personalcapacities, from about half thatnumber of countries, includingAustralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Japan,the Netherlands, New Zealand,Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Spain,Sweden, Switzerland, the UnitedKingdom (UK) and the United Statesof America (USA), among themparticipants from the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, theTechnical Secretariat of the Organi-zation for the Prohibition of Chem-ical Weapons, and the World HealthOrganization. In addition, the

reach a politically and legally accept-able decision on this issue. Next, asCW destruction does begin to drawtowards completion, destructionfacilities will be going out of commis-sion and there will be a reduced needfor inspectors. This transition infunction, and the possible attendantneed to downsize the organisation,will require careful planning. It wassuggested that the future direction ofthe OPCW should be towardsimproving monitoring of non-prolif-eration, with a greater emphasis onindustry. It was also pointed out thatthere were other challenges such as tohow new developments in scienceand technology and how the conver-gence of chemistry and biologyshould be addressed. It was suggestedthat the OPCW could with advantagebuild more synergies and allianceswith the BWC, other internationalorganisations and NGOs.

A number of developments as evidentin particular, during the recentlyconcluded 14th session of the CSP,were also discussed. It was notedthat most delegations touched onissues of inspections, destructiondeadlines, cooperation and assis-tance, and the future of OPCW.Discussion in respect to Article 7(national implementation) andArticle 10 (assistance and protection)had been particularly encouraging,and an increasing number of Member

Chairman of the 2009 Meeting ofBWC States Parties, AmbassadorMarius Grinius of Canada, partici-pated.

This report is the sole responsibilityof its author, who was asked toprepare a brief account of theproceedings of the meeting in consul-tation with the Steering Committee.It does not necessarily reflect aconsensus of the workshop as awhole, nor of the Study Group. Theworkshop was strictly governed bythe Chatham House Rule, so refer-ence to specific speakers is notdetailed here.

I. Introductory Session

Developments related to theChemical Weapons Convention

Although scheduled for the openingsession, this was rescheduled forSunday morning to facilitate theparticipation of representatives fromthe OPCW. It is, nevertheless,reported as planned here.

The workshop heard a report on theprogress in the implementation of theChemical Weapons Convention(CWC). It was noted that while theOPCW is a well functioning institu-tion, there exist several inevitablechallenges for the future. First, it isevident that not all CW destructionwill be completed by the April 2012deadline and discussion will need totake place between Member States to

Reportby Catherine Jefferson

30th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions:

Preparing for the Seventh BWC Review ConferenceGeneva, Switzerland, 5-6 December 2009





States focused on the potential role ofthe CWC in mitigating the threat ofCW terrorism.

It was also noted that there had beenpositive developments in terms ofengagement by the OPCW withNGOs. Global Green USA, in part-nership with VERTIC, hosted a two-day meeting during the Conference ofState Parties to push forward theproposal of an NGO Coalitionagainst CW. Some 50 participants,representing around 30 NGOs,attended the meeting to discuss themission statement, organisation andactivities of the Coalition. It hasbeen proposed that the InternationalCoalition for a World Free of Chem-ical Weapons, or ‘CWC Coalition’,be an independent body whose aim isto support the CWC and its effortstowards universality, implementa-tion, transparency and meeting CWdestruction deadlines. 25 NGOshave already signed up to the Coali-tion and it is hoped that many morewill do so in due course.

International CBWCriminalization: the HarvardSussex Draft Convention

A brief presentation was made on theHarvard Sussex Draft Convention onthe international criminalization ofCBW. The Draft Conventionproposes to harmonise domestic lawwith international law by conferringon national courts jurisdiction overindividuals present in their nationalterritory, regardless of their nation-ality or official position, who order,direct, or knowingly render substan-tial assistance to the use of biologicalor chemical weapons anywhere.

Given the growth of new science andtechnology and the attendant chal-lenges of compliance and verificationof the treaty regime, it was suggested

that the need to develop the idea ofindividual criminal responsibility wasbecoming increasingly apparent andthat the time might now be ripe formeaningful discussion of moving thedraft convention forward into thedomain of public policy. In order toaid dissemination of the idea anumber of information resources hadbeen prepared and uploaded to theHarvard Sussex Program website1

and a symposium for further discus-sion of the Draft Convention on theinternational criminalization of CBWis being planned.

Meeting of Experts BWC 24 – 28August 2009

The topic being addressed by theIntersessional Process in 2009 is:

With a view to enhancing interna-tional cooperation, assistance andexchange in biological sciencesand technology for peacefulpurposes, promoting capacitybuilding in the fields of diseasesurveillance, detection, diagnosis,and containment of infectiousdiseases: (1) for States Parties inneed of assistance, identifyingrequirements and requests forcapacity enhancement; and (2)from States Parties in a position todo so, and international organiza-tions, opportunities for providingassistance related to these fields;

The Chairman of the meetings in2009 is Ambassador Grinius ofCanada. In considering a report onthe Meeting of Experts, it was notedthat that meeting had been extremelysuccessful with a high level of partici-pation and high quality expertise. Inaddition, a large part of the meetinghad for the first time been webcast liveto enable wider access and participa-tion of those experts who were unableto attend the meeting in person.

There was rich discussion on imple-mentation of the first paragraph ofArticle X during the Meeting ofExperts. The Chairman hadprepared a synthesis paper from thediscussions at the Meeting of Expertswhich addressed six key themes:

• Aims

• Problems, challenges and needs

• Developing mechanisms forbuilding capacity

• Developing the necessary infra-structure

• Developing human resources, and

• Developing standard operatingprocedures.

In essence, it was recognised thatthere was a need for the following:

• Sustainability

• Integrated approach

• Coordinate assistance, cooperationand capacity-building, and

• Identifying regional needs.

It was also noted that as the SeventhReview Conference in 2011 drawscloser, it will be necessary to preparefor decisions at the Review Confer-ence which will map out the future ofthe BWC. In this regards, it wassuggested that the BWC should beseen as more than just an armscontrol treaty but rather as the focalpoint of a broader security regimethat brings together activities in anumber of arenas, such as scienceand human, animal and plant health.

II. Preparing for the Seventh BWCReview Conference in 2011

A. Preparing for a successfuloutcome

This session began by exploringopportunities for the future of theBWC beyond the Seventh ReviewConference. It could be argued thatit would not be a useful strategy for



the BWC to either revisit the verifica-tion protocol idea or to continue theintersessional process in its currentform. There was a risk that a returnto negotiations similar to those of theverification protocol could risk over-whelming States with divisive issuesat the expense of actual activity thatwould address contemporaryconcerns with the BWC. Yet, at theother end of the spectrum, a simplecontinuation of the intersessionalprocess with its preset agenda wouldnot do enough to enrich andstrengthen the BWC.

What is needed, it was suggested, is anew agenda that goes beyond thecurrent scope of activities andaddresses both cotemporary andmedium-to-longer term questions. Itwas noted that many good ideasalready exist but these need to bebrought together. It was alsosuggested that intersessional activitiesshould be reformulated to be mademore ambitious and effective in theperiod 2012 to 2016 with anextended mandate, and that a widerrange of stakeholders shouldcontinue to be brought into activities.Furthermore, it was argued that thereis a need for a forum for StatesParties to engage in discussion of acompliance strategy.

Reiterating the need for effectiveaction, an alternative view was alsopresented on the verification protocol. It was suggested that the time mightnow be conducive for discussion ofthe protocol. It was proposed that aless prescriptive and less detailed newtext could be prepared based on thetext of 2001 in line with the mandateof the Special Conference of 1994.Furthermore, a phased approachcould be adopted whereby decisionson more contentious issues could be

postponed until future Conferencesof States Parties. Concerns wereexpressed, however, that such anapproach based on the 2001 textmight have “political baggage” andthat advances in science and tech-nology might not be adequatelyaddressed.

This session ended by examining apossible means by which an assess-ment could be made of the success orfailure of the regime to control BW.It was noted that the regime wasmuch wider than simply the BWCitself and also included, for example,the Geneva Protocol, SecurityCouncil Resolution 1540, theAustralia Group and national imple-mentation measures. Some threatambition categories were identified:(non)use; (non)integration;(non)possession; (non)acquisition;(non)aspiration that might be used inanalysing the success or failure of theregime,

B. Improving the Monitoring of theImplementation of the Convention

This session opened with an exami-nation of the importance of an imple-mentation mechanism for the BWC.It was noted that many States Partiesrecognised the importance of alegally binding compliance mecha-nism, and at the Meeting of Expertsin August 2009 there were severalstatements mentioning this in lookingahead to the Seventh Review Confer-ence. It was said that it is time foraction now so that ideas can be putforward through Working Papers atthe intersessional meetings in 2010.Such ideas should provide a freshstart, with no preconditions, toconsider a regime to build confidencein compliance so as to strengthen theeffectiveness and improve the imple-mentation of the Convention.

The promotion of partnerships withthe life sciences industry and civilsociety was explored as a means tosupport the 2010 intersessionalprocess and the upcoming reviewconference. It was said that the lifesciences industry needs be included indialogue in a more concerted manner,modelled on the CWC experience,since private industry is indispensiblein the development of effective codesof conduct and self-regulatory mech-anisms. It was also noted that fewStates had collected information onindustry in their CBM submissionsbut that this could provide a meansto build confidence and harmoniza-tion of standards with regard tobiosafety and biosecurity. However,it was argued that such mechanismsshould apply broadly, not just toindustry, but to all laboratories. Itwas further suggested that civilsociety must play a crucial role inoutreach to educate and build aware-ness of the issue and to promotesupport for the necessary mecha-nisms within the BWC. Such aware-ness-raising should help to build trustand focus on industry as part of thesolution.

This session ended by examining thepromotional, rather than regulatory,aspects of the BWC. It was notedthat during the Meeting of Experts inAugust 2009, the NAM group hadsubmitted a Working Paperproposing a mechanism for effectiveimplementation of Article X as a partof negotiations to strengthen theConvention. Similarly, Iran hadsubmitted a Working Paperproposing a mechanism to deal withdenials of technology and materialtransfers. It was therefore arguedthat cooperation and assistanceshould be strengthened within theframework of the convention to fully



implement Article X. However, itwas also noted that while the BWCshould not inhibit scientific freedom,it would be necessary to recognisethat States Parties had responsibilitiesunder both Article X and Article III –the non-proliferation obligation– ofthe Convention.

C. Improving the CBM regime

This session examined proposals tostrengthen the CBM mechanism. Itwas noted that consensus needs to bebuilt on what is needed, what isfeasible and what information buildsconfidence. In order to buildmomentum to bring this agenda tothe Review Conference, a series ofworkshops have been organised. Thefirst workshop took place followingthe Meeting of Experts in August2009. This workshop examined thehistory of CBMs, the strengths andweaknesses of the mechanism, howcontexts have changed scientificallyand politically, how existing CBMforms may be improved or remod-elled, and what other elements ofcompliance assessment are necessary.A further workshop is scheduled totake place following the Meeting ofStates Parties in order to exploreoptions for moving forward andwhat essential elements are requiredin a confidence building mechanism.A final workshop is planned forspring 2010 on Berlin in order tobring the ideas together.

It was further reiterated that StatesParties need to start considering thisissue in the coming year and tosubmit Working Papers in 2010 onwhat steps should be taken at theSeventh Review Conference tostrengthen the CBM mechanism –through steps to facilitate theirsubmission, through extended under-standings as to what should be

declared under the existing CBMs,and through new CBMs on topicssuch as Article X, as well as onoutreach, awareness-raising, educa-tion and codes of conduct. It wasalso suggested that States Partiesshould be encouraged to sharelegislative data through the CBMmechanism.

Questions were also raised over themechanism through which StatesParties analyse informationsubmitted through CBM forms. Itwas argued that if they are not beingeffectively analysed then it could beargued that their value was question-able. However, it was said thatCBMs should be seen as part of abroader effort of building confidencein compliance.

D. The Convergence of Chemistryand Biology

This session examined the conver-gences in chemistry and biology andattendant challenges for the treatyregime. The session opened byproposing that if chemistry andbiology really are converging to sucha degree, then the two Conventions –the CWC and BWC – ought also tobe considering how best their regimesmight be integrated. It was notedthat while certain potential newagents (such as, for example, bioreg-ulators) fall within the scope of bothtreaties, this does not necessarilymean they are doubly protected. Itwas also observed that although bothconventions prohibit the weaponisa-tion of toxins, it could be argued thatthis overlap, has not reinforced safe-guards. Despite the magnitude ofthreat presented by new agents suchas mid-spectrum agents they are onlyweakly controlled. It was suggestedthat opportunities should be takenduring the 2011 and 2013 Review

Conferences of the BWC and CWCto bring convergences between thetreaties into real prospects.

An update on advances in scienceand technology was provided,focusing on the areas of functionalgenomics, synthetic biology, systemsbiology and targeted deliverysystems. It was noted that progressin functional genomics could facili-tate the manipulation of complexmicroorganisms, including viruses, tomeet designer specifications.Advances in sub-fields of syntheticbiology are also opening up the possi-bility of the potential misuse ofbiological agents other than microor-ganisms and toxins, such as peptideand protein bioregulators of physio-logical systems, and it was arguedthat governance strategies are notsufficient to keep pace with develop-ments. It was suggested that top-down and bottom-up approaches arenecessary to address biosecurity atthe level of provider, purchaser, prin-cipal investigator, project andpremises. It was also noted thatadvances in systems biology – a fieldof biology that seeks to understandthe working of complex physiologicalsystems within and between cells –presents the largest potential scopefor abuse through the manipulationof vital cellular targets. Of furtherconcern are advances in agentdelivery techniques. The productionof defined nanoparticles combinedwith new methods for makingsubstances absorbable through thenasal and respiratory tracts create apotential for greatly improvedaerosol delivery of bioactivecompounds. Improvements intargeting and gene transfer efficacy ofviral vectors (potentially combinedwith aerosol delivery) furtherincrease the dual-use risk.



It was noted that many of thesedevelopments represent a spectrum ofthreat agents that fall within thescope of both Conventions. In addi-tion, it was observed that there is alsoconvergence with other disciplines,such as informatics and engineering,not just chemistry and biology, whichcreates further complexity for theregime – particularly with regard tothe coverage of Article I of the BWC.However, the central agents thatcause harm are chemical or biologicalmaterials and for this reason conver-gence of the two regimes needs to beconsidered. It was observed thatthere could be difficulties in effectiveconvergence of the the CWC andBWC until there is equal or fulluniversalisation of both treaties.However, this was not an argumentagainst developing better linksbetween the two regimes so that bothcan learn from the successes of theother and cross-fertilization betweenthe OPCW and the ISU encouraged.

In order to meet the challenges ofadvancing science and technology, itwas argued that scientific adviceneeds to be a more formal andfrequent part of the BWC processand that a compliance assurancemechanism was essential for main-taining the “web of prevention”.However, it was also noted thatdevelopments do not necessarilyequate to an increased rsik of misuseand it was important to avoid raisingunnecessary alarm, while avoidingthe dangers of complacency. Effectiverisk assessments need to beconducted.

This session ended with an overviewof engagement with the scientificcommunity during the intersessionalprocess, focusing on the meetings of2005 and 2008. It was argued that

without the opportunities offered bythe intersessional process, far lessprogress would have been madetoward engaging the scientificcommunity in issues relevant to theBWC. In dealing with the challengeof convergence and the engagementof the scientific community, three keypoints were made:

• It is a dual-benefit opportunity.The need for sound advice in trendsin science and technology providesan opportunity to engage scientistsin the BWC process.

• Some of that process is alreadyunderway. Discussion of conver-gence is already occurring in someworkshops.

• The work of scientific organisationsmust be complementary notcompetitive.

E. Concrete measures from theIntersessional Programme 2007-2010

This session began with an explo-ration of what concrete measuresmight be identified and adopted bythe Seventh Review Conference inregard to the outcomes of the inters-essional process. A number ofconcrete measures were identified:

• Consideration should be given tofuture annual meetings of StatesParties. being able to discuss awider range of topics

• States Parties should be encouragedto submit their CBMs and shouldprovide a verbal update if they havenot.

• States Parties should be encouragedto provide up to date informationon their national legislation.

• States Parties should provide infor-mation on their national measuresto ensure biosafety and biosecurity.It was noted that the ISU is tryingto maintain record of nations’biosafety and biosecurityapproaches.

• States Parties should provide infor-mation on what steps they havetaken nationally in regard to aware-ness raising, education and codes ofconduct.

• States Parties should consider howto ensure that capacity building istaking place and whether thecapacity within an individual StateParty is adequate or not.

It was also noted that a BWC annualmeeting, in additional to the MX andMSP, should be formalised in orderto build momentum year on year,instead of having to over-compart-mentalise a few aspects of the BWCin the intersessional meetings anddefer any agreed decisions on actionsuntil the subsequent Review Confer-ence. It was said that considerationalso needs be given to how imple-mentation of the convention can betaken forward. It was proposed thatan accountability framework couldbe developed in which systematic andstructured compliance reportingcould be built into the BWC architec-ture (ie, during the proposed annualmeetings).

The session continued with an explo-ration of the topics of the interses-sional meetings 2007-2010.

1. Topics in 2007

Enhancing national implementation

A report on VERTIC’s RegulatoryGuidelines for National Implementa-tion of the BWC was provided. TheRegulatory Guidelines serve as guid-ance to States Parties engaged in theprocess of preparing regulatory andadministrative measures necessary tosupplement their primary legislationfor national implementation of theBWC, as well as obligations underResolution 1540. Part I of the Regu-latory Guidelines focuses on biosecu-rity, including guidance on the estab-

educational module is now availableonline2 and it is proposed thatfurther use of online distance-learning technologies be applied totrain-the-trainer programmes.

3. Topics for 2009

Promoting capacity building in thefields of disease surveillance, detec-tion, diagnosis, and containment ofinfectious diseases

This session examined the EU JointAction International Workshop (co-hosted with the ISU) on improvingcooperation under Article X of theBWC for disease surveillance, detec-tion, diagnosis and containment.Participants discussed three mainthemes that had emerged from theMeeting of Experts in August 2009 –coordination, integration ofapproaches to human, animal andplant health, and sustainability ofcooperation. The workshopprovided valuable input into how tomake cooperation sustainable notingthe challenges of commitment, polit-ical stability, human resources andinfrastructure. It was also noted thatcoordination with NGOs and inter-national organisations providedopportunities for informationsharing.

4. Topics for 2010

Assistance in the case of alleged useof biological or toxin weapons,including improving national capa-bilities for disease surveillance, detec-tion and diagnosis and public healthsystems

This session examined WHO contri-butions to the UN Secretary GeneralMechanism for investigation ofalleged use of CBW. It was notedthat WHO provides support to theUN Office of Disarmament Affairs interms of information sharing and

the fact that monitoring of trade datahad helped to uncover Iraq’s illicitBW program, it is proposed that suchbiological dual-use data be moni-tored globally. It was noted thattrade data is registered using theHarmonized System (HS) which ismaintained by the World CustomsOrganization (WCO) but that biolog-ical dual-use items are poorlydescribed and identified in the HSnomenclature. It was suggested thatcustoms codes for biotechnology andbiological dual use items needs to becreated in order to increase trans-parency of BW relevant trade. Aproposal was developed by theHamburg Group but, despite supportfrom the WCO as well as some stateand industry representatives, it wasrejected on the basis that an NGOdid not have the right to submitproposals to the WCO. TheHamburg Group are now trying togain state sponsorship of theproposal.

Oversight, education, awarenessraising, and codes of conduct

It was noted that one reason for thelack of awareness of dual use issuesamong the life science community isthat biosecurity does not feature inuniversity life science education. Inorder to address this deficiency it wasargued that top-down State Partyaction will be required to bringawareness-raising on the radar.However, civil society can contributeproductively by producing educa-tional material and modules.Furthermore, it was suggested thatthe development of country andregional networks of lecturers inter-ested in bringing biosecurity and dualuse issues into their courses couldgenerate a much faster developmentand uptake of material. The Brad-ford resource on developing an

lishment of control lists for biologicalagents, toxins, and dual-use equip-ment and technology. Part II focuseson enforcement and includes guid-ance on establishing a National orResponsible Authority for theConvention and the establishment ofa mechanism to respond to anybiological incidents. The RegulatoryGuidelines are available in five of thesix official languages of the UN andare intended not as a set of modelregulations, but rather as suggestions,tips and links to examples of bestpractices.

2. Topics in 2008

Measures to improve biosafety andbiosecurity

WHO [in full if this is first use ofacronym] activities in relation tolaboratory biosafety and biosecurity,including the ongoing developmentof a guidance document on respon-sible life science research, wasreviewed. The guidance documentaims to raise awareness with differentaudiences and stresses the importanceof openness and accountability as thebest guarantees of progress and secu-rity. The guidance document alsoincludes a self-assessment question-naire to address needs and weak-nesses within the research frame-work, research ethics, and laboratorybiosafety and biosecurity. It wasnoted that there is no single solutionor system for all countries and theguidance document is not intended asa global risk assessment. Rather,within the context of public health, itprovides guidelines on the necessaryelements of responsible life scienceactivity.

The proposal by the HamburgResearch Group of global trademonitoring of biological dual-usegoods was also explored. Based on



there was a window of opportunityto look ahead and for all StatesParties to look comprehensively at allthe possible elements such asimproving CBMs, an accountabilityframework, measures to build confi-dence in compliance, annual meetingsof States Parties able to consider theconsolidated agenda and networks soas to move beyond the intersessionalprocess so as to arrive at a strongerBWC with more effective mecha-nisms in which the BWC is a centralelement in an integrated health, secu-rity and safety strategy.

Notes1 http://www.sussex.ac.uk/ Units/spru/hsp/Harvard-Sussex-Program-draft-conven-tion.htm 2 www.dual-usebioethics.net

UNSG. A further point related to thelogistics of reaching the site of thealleged use – the international logis-tical capabilities available in the UNOffice for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) werenoted.

The session was rounded off with theobservation that an integratedapproach to BWC implementationwas important. It was noted thatother relevant multilateral agree-ments (chemical, health, trade, envi-ronmental and transportation)relating to biological and chemicalmaterials can all contribute to theimplementation of the BWC.

Concluding Remarks

The workshop concluded with theobservation that between now andthe next BWC Review Conference

updating operational guidelines forconducting investigations. WHOalso participated in the UNODAtraining course in Umeå, Sweden oninvestigations of alleged use of BW,providing background on interna-tional health regulations and detaileddescriptions of several public healthemergencies. However, it was notedthat WHO maintains public healthneutrality and is not involved in deci-sion-making with respect to allegeduse. In discussion, it was noted thatany consideration of alleged useneeded to recognise the inherent diffi-culties of distinguishing betweennatural and deliberate outbreaks ofdisease and between the use of chem-ical or biological agents on the basisof initial reports. Furthermore,consideration needs to be given to themandate of the OPCW under theCWC and its relationship to the



Introduction

The roundtable was co-hostedby Des Browne MP, convenerof the Top Level Group and

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, SecretaryGeneral of the Pugwash Conferences.It took place at the House ofCommons, London, on January 15,2010. There were twenty partici-pants, all by invitation and in theirpersonal capacities, including formersenior ministers and governmentadvisers from all major politicalparties; senior retired military; andkey UK government and NATOembassy officials.

This report is not a consensus docu-ment, but a summary of the mainpoints of the meeting, observingPugwash/Chatham House rules.

The goal was to define better theissues surrounding NATO nuclearstrategy and to identify areas thatneed further immediateexamination. The meeting had aspecial focus on topical issues arisingfrom recent statements from theGerman, Belgian, Norwegian andDutch governments on the future roleof nuclear weapons in Alliancestrategy and resulting opportunitiesfor UK leadership on these issues.

and obstacles to the revision ofnuclear strategy in Europe, and theopportunities for political leadershippresented by the current processes.

Political Situation

The roundtable began with an assess-ment of the different pressures onNATO countries, and on the Allianceas a whole, with regard to its overallnuclear strategy; the US securityguarantee to European allies; thepresence of US nuclear weapons inEurope; and the practice of ‘nuclearsharing’ – whereby nominally non-nuclear nations are equipped andtrained to use nuclear weapons in theevent of war.

It was noted that these competingpressures include, on one side, acontinued requirement by all allies forextended deterrence and a Europeandesire for a visible symbol of the USsecurity commitment to Europe. Onthe other hand, opposition to thecontinued US nuclear presence isgrowing amongst European publics.As one participant observed, themainstream political position inEurope is now aligned in support ofthe disarmament programme outlinedby President Obama in Prague. In thecontext of the NPT, there is alsogrowing pressure from non-nuclearweapon states for NATO to end ColdWar burden sharing practices and toreduce the role of nuclear weapons indefence strategy.

Currently, the US Nuclear PostureReview is considering how best tobalance extended deterrence for allieswith Obama’s disarmament agenda.The forthcoming NATO StrategicConcept Review is set to discuss therevision of NATO’s nuclear strategy.This presents policymakers with arare and significant moment wherestrong political leadership can achievepositive change. In particular, a newdynamic has been created by the lead-ership shown by the new GermanForeign Minister, Guido Westerwelle,in placing the withdrawal of UStactical nuclear weapons fromGermany and the review of NATOnuclear strategy at the heart of thenew coalition government’s foreignpolicy. He has raised these issues withNATO ministers bilaterally and in theNorth Atlantic Council.

The experts group convened byNATO Secretary General AndersFogh Rasmussen and led byMadeleine Albright has held threemajor seminars, and will convene afourth, to be held in Washington DC,which will include an examination ofNATO nuclear strategy. They arealso consulting widely with NATOgovernments and taking advice fromoutside experts. There is a need toensure that there is political leader-ship in this process, and that it is notconducted exclusively by experts andofficials. Pugwash and the Top LevelGroup therefore convened thisroundtable to examine possibilities

Rapporteur’s Reportby Martin Butcher

Roundtable on Nuclear Weapons Policies and the NATO Strategic Concept Review

London, UK, 13 January 2010



have no relevance. There is little orno consideration in their nationaldebates of the negative effect that USnuclear deployments in Europe playin relations with Russia. They tend tosee security as a zero sum game.

It was also noted that ending USTNW deployments in Europe wouldset a precedent that nuclear weaponsare only based in the possessorcountry’s own territory. This wouldbe important to prevent the develop-ment of nuclear sharing arrange-ments by other countries in otherregions in future.

Across Europe, it was noted that thepolitical centre has coalesced aroundan end to TNW deployments on thecontinent, and looks to some otherform of guarantee from the US.

Extended deterrence in Asia

The unstable security situation inNorth-East Asia was noted, andcontrasted with the very stable situa-tion in which most of Europe findsitself.

Despite this there are no US nuclearweapons deployed in Asia, andextended deterrence is provided by acombination of a conventional mili-tary presence and the US Tridentsubmarine fleet.

A strong need for a step by stepapproach to reducing and eliminatingnuclear dangers in East Asia is neces-sary and possible.

The need for political leadership

The roundtable recognized a need forpolitical leadership in severaldifferent ways. One participant notedthat, during the Cold War, individualleaders were able to have quite adramatic effect on the international

There was some discussion as to thecredibility of this arrangement. Mostparticipants felt that this strategy hadbeen a useful and necessary compo-nent of NATO’s defence postureduring the Cold War. However, thathas now changed. NATO is so uncer-tain of public support that nuclearweapons are no longer mentioned.Ministers no longer engage in nucleardecision-making as they did in theCold War. US nuclear weapons havebeen removed, without public atten-tion, from Greece and the UK.Turkey has ended its participation innuclear sharing. Now three of thefive remaining basing countries haverequested the withdrawal of weaponspublicly. Most, including USEUCOM, believe that these weaponshave no conceivable military use, andthat there deterrent value is zero as itis widely perceived that they cannotbe used.

These factors have combined toproduce a situation where US nuclearweapons in Europe play a negativerole in non-proliferation and disar-mament debates, and no longer fulfilltheir intended role in Alliance secu-rity. The burdensharing element ofnuclear strategy has to a great extentwasted away, while some (notably inEastern Europe) continue to rely on itfor their security—though partici-pants recognized this is perhaps forprimarily symbolic purposes.

It was noted that the Baltic republicsand Poland, in particular, still see astrong value in a US extended deter-rent, and in the presence of USnuclear weapons of Europe – thisdespite the dynamic described above.However, they also have strong secu-rity concerns, relating to issuesincluding energy security or cybersecurity , for which nuclear weapons

The Nuclear Posture Review/Strategic Concept Review CircularPolitical Dynamic

It was noted that a circular politicaldynamic is developing, which isinhibiting both the United States andEuropean NATO nations frommoving forward with arms reductionmeasures. Europeans are waiting forthe outcome of the Nuclear PostureReview (NPR) before activelypursuing talks on nuclear strategy inthe NATO context. And some inWashington DC are using Europeanhesitation to argue for both the main-tenance of forward based nuclearweapons in Europe, and for a contin-uation of relatively aggressive, coun-terproliferation based nuclear usestrategy.

A need was felt to change thisdynamic, to allow a mutually rein-forcing dialogue across the Atlanticto replace the current mutually weak-ening absence of dialogue.

In the context of these currentreviews, it was noted that nucleardisarmament has two importantelements – the reduction and elimina-tion of the weapons themselves, andthe reduction of the role of theseweapons in defence strategy. It washoped that both the NPR and theNATO Strategic Concept Review(SCR) would reflect this reality.

Credibility of the Current TacticalNuclear Weapons Deployment asa Deterrent

The NATO Strategic Concept statesthat “Nuclear forces based in Europeand committed to NATO provide anessential political and military linkbetween the European and the NorthAmerican members of the Alliance.”This policy requires widespreadparticipation by all allies, includingpeacetime basing of nuclear forces.



General Sir Hugh Beach, UK

Rt. Hon. Margaret Beckett MP, UK,Former Secretary of State for Foreign andCommonwealth Affairs

Rt. Hon. Des Browne MP, UK, Convener,Top-Level Group

Mr Martin Butcher, UK, Consultant

Mrs. Sandra Butcher, US/UK, SeniorProgram Coordinator, Pugwash

Mr David Cole, UK, Atlantic Council

Prof Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Italy,Pugwash Secretary General

Admiral de Coriolis, France, DefenceAttaché, French Embassy

Prof. John Finney, UK, Chair, BritishPugwash

Lord Geoffrey Howe, UK, FormerDeputy Prime Minister

Mr Gordon Jones, UK Student Pugwash

Lord Lee of Trafford, UK, Liberal Demo-crat Spokesperson for Defence in theHouse of Lords

Mr Kaoru Magosaki, Japan, First Secre-tary, Embassy of Japan

Prof. Götz Neuneck, Germany, PugwashCouncil Member

Captain Adamantios Paidas, Greece,Defence Attaché, Greek Embassy

Mr. Nick Pickard, UK, Head of SecurityPolicy Department, Foreign andCommonwealth Office

Ms. Shata Shetty, UK, Researcher, TopLevel Group

Andrew Somerville, RUSI Research Assis-tant to the Nuclear Security Project

Ms Birgitta M Tazelaar, Netherlands,Counselor (Political Affairs), RoyalNetherlands Embassy

Baroness Williams of Crosby, UK,Adviser on Nuclear Proliferation to PrimeMinister Gordon Brown, member of theTop Level Group



security situation – for example,Ronald Reagan’s disarmamentengagement with the Soviet Union,and Gorbachev and Shevardnaze onthe Soviet side who brought acompletely new perspective to globalpolitics. Such leadership is stillpossible, and indeed necessary.

Elected leaders have a duty toprovide leadership to their officials.Absent such clear leadership, thedecisions of officials tend towards thestatus quo when revising documentssuch as the NATO Strategic Concept.

President Obama has a particularduty to provide continued leadership,in the US and the world, because hehas raised expectations with hisPrague speech, and with the UNSecurity Council debate and resolu-tion on nuclear disarmament andnon-proliferation.

He has difficulties because thePrague speech was balanced, andthe world heard the disarmamentmessage, while many in the US heardhis promise to maintain a strongdeterrent.

Political leaders in Europe and Asiahave a duty to provide leadership athome, and to communicate theirsupport for the Prague agenda clearlyto the President and other players inWashington DC, so the US debate isnot conducted under false premises.

US security assurances for Europe

The vast majority of participantsnoted that US allies in Europe andNorth East Asia still feel a require-ment for a strategic nuclear deterrent.This can be fulfilled with US and UKTrident forces which, it was felt, arefar more credible than forwarddeployed TNW.

There is a perceived need, widely feltin both regions, for concrete US secu-rity guarantees. While some inEurope would still like these toinclude a forward based nuclearoption, this is now a minorityopinion. Some governments inEurope are promoting the presence ofUS and NATO integrated missiledefence, based on tactical and theatresystems such as the US Patriot and

Aegis systems, as a strong alternativeto the continued presence of nuclearweapons in the continent.

Further Steps

Strong concerns were raised that theprocess of consultation on the NATOStrategic Concept Review is notproviding opportunity for adequatepolitical and public consultation. Inparticular, there is little or no polit-ical leadership from governments atpresent. The consultation process andseminars give an appearance, but notreality of open debate. In fact, theprocess is closed to all but a handfulof officials and experts.

There was a commitment to discussthese issues further; to engage withelected and appointed officials in theUS and NATO, as well as with theexperts group, and to foster publicdebate on US and NATO nuclearstrategy and the issues examined inthis roundtable.

Participants



Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation:

What role might Europe play in light of the upcoming NPT Review Conference

29 January 2010, Sala Rappresentanza, University Of Milan, Milan, Italy

Preliminary Agenda

Please note: this meeting is under Chatham House rules. While the topics under discussion may be mentionedoutside of the meeting, no viewpoints or comments may be attributed to particular participants. Our goal is tobetter define what would constitute a successful Review Conference, identify areas that need further immediateexamination, and what role European countries and institutions might play maximizing the likelihood of success.

This meeting is organized by Pugwash, the Department of Physics and the Department of International Studiesof the Universita’ degli Studi di Milano.

09.00–09.15 Welcome and introduction

09.15–10.45 Status of and prospects for disarmament in the near-term

• US-Russian arms control negotiations

• Tactical nuclear weapons, US nuclear weapons in Europe (incl. Italy). Prospects for their elimina-tion and establishing a precedent for non-basing of nuclear weapons on other territories

• Creating environment for further multilateral disarmament

10.45–11.00 Break

11.00 –12.00 Deemphasizing nuclear weapons: reducing their military and political role

• Are the US nuclear posture review and the NATO strategic concept review likely to do the job?

• What ideas should be put forward?

12.00–13.00 Progress on stalled treaties

• What can be done to promote Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Entry Into Force?

• What is the status of and prospects for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)?

13.00–14.30 Lunch

14.30–15.30 Eliminating weapons of mass destruction from critical areas: the case of the Middle East

• Importance of the Middle East resolution

• Concrete proposals for how to move forward

15.30–16.30 Enhancing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in avoiding proliferation

• Promoting stronger control measures for all countries involved in nuclear energy programs

• The value of the additional protocol and of the multinational fuel cycle

16.30–16.45 Break

16.45–17.30 Recommendations and concluding remarks

For information:Paolo Cotta-Ramusino: [email protected] Vaughn: [email protected]



Amb. Wa’el N. Al-Assad (Jordan),Director, Disarmament & MultilateralRelations Department, League of ArabStates, Cairo, Egypt

Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Director, GenevaOffice, Pugwash Conferences on Scienceand World Affairs; Member, PugwashCouncil; Member, International AdvisoryBoard, Geneva Centre for the DemocraticControl of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Dr. Hans Blix, former Head of theCommission on Weapons of MassDestruction; former Head of the UnitedNations Monitoring, Verification andInspection Commission (March 2000-June 2003); former Director-General ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency(1981-1997); former Swedish Minister ofForeign Affairs (1978-79)

Dr. Chiara Bonaiuti, Defense Economics,Istituto di Richerche Economiche eSociali (IRES)

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, Washington, DC, USA;Member, Pugwash Council

The Rt. Hon. Des BrowneMP, Memberof Parliament for Kilmarnock andLoudoun, UK, Concurrent position:Convener, Top Level Group of UK Parlia-mentarians for Multilateral NuclearDisarmament & Non-Proliferation,Special Envoy to Sri Lanka, Member ofPrivy Council.

Mrs. Sandra Ionno Butcher, SeniorProgram Coordinator, InternationalSecretariat, Pugwash Conferences, UK;Director, Pugwash History Project

Prof. Francesco Calogero, Member,Pugwash Council; Professor of Theoret-ical Physics, University of Rome “LaSapienza”, Rome, Italy

Dr. Paola Ceragioli, Via Pistrucci 6,Milano, Italy

Dr. Emilio Ciarlo, Head, Legal Section,Foreign Affairs Committee, PartitoDemocratico, Italian Parliament, Rome,Italy

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences onScience and World Affairs; Member,Pugwash Executive Committee; Professorof Mathematical Physics, University ofMilan, Italy

Dr. Marco De Andreis, Director,Economic and Fiscal Studies, Italy’sCustoms Agency, Rome

Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka),President, Pugwash Conferences onScience and World Affairs, and formerUnder-Secretary-General for Disarma-ment Affairs at the United Nations(1998-2003)

Amb. Sergio Duarte (Brazil), UN HighRepresentative for Disarmament, NewYork, NY; President of the 2005 VIIReview Conference of the Parties to theTreaty on the Non-proliferation ofNuclear Weapons, in New York

Prof. John Finney, Emeritus Professor ofPhysics, University College London andthe London Centre for Nanotechnology;Chairman, British Pugwash Group;Chair, WMD Awareness Programme;Chair, Nuclear Weapons Policy LiaisonGroup

Dr. Matteo Gerlini, Research Fellow,University of Florence, Department ofStudies on the State, Italy

Dr. Venance Journé, Researcher, NationalScientific Research Council (CNRS),Paris, France;

Mr. Sverre Lodgaard, Member, PugwashExecutive Committee; Researcher (andformer Director 1997-2007), NorwegianInstitute of International Affairs (NUPI),Oslo

Prof. Saideh Lotfian, Chair, PugwashCouncil; Associate Professor of PoliticalScience, and Associate Dean forResearch, Faculty of Law and PoliticalScience, University of Tehran, Iran

Dr. Maurizio Martellini, SecretaryGeneral, Landau Network – CentroVolta, Como, Italy; Professor of Physics,Università dell’Insubria

Dr. Steven Miller, Director, InternationalSecurity Program, Center for Science &International Affairs (CSIA), HarvardUniversity, Cambridge, Massachusetts,USA, Member, Pugwash Council; Co-Chair, U.S. Pugwash Group

Federica On. Mogherini Rebesani,Member of the Italian Parliament

Prof. Dr. Götz Neuneck, Physicist, andMember, Pugwash Council; DeputyDirector and Head of the “Interdiscipli-nary Research Group Disarmament,Arms Control and New Technologies”,Institute for Peace Research and SecurityPolicy (IFSH), Hamburg, Germany

Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Member, PugwashCouncil; Director, Center for Political andInternational Studies (CPIS), Moscow;Vice-Chairman, Russian PugwashCommittee of Scientists for Disarmamentand International Security

Prof. Marco Pedrazzi, Professor of PublicInternational Law, Faculty of PoliticalSciences, Milan University, Italy

Prof. Maurizio Scaini, Docente di Geopo-litica, Corso di laurea in Scienze Inter-nazionali e Diplomatiche, Facoltà diScienze Politiche, Università di Trieste,Sede di Gorizia

Prof. Carlo Schaerf, Professor of Physics,University of Rome “Tor Vergata”,Rome, Italy; Founder in 1966 (with Prof.Edoardo Amaldi) of The InternationalSchool on Disarmament and Research onConflicts (ISODARCO), and currently itsDirector and Chairman of the Board

Mr. Nikolai von Schoepff, Head of Divi-sion, Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Federal Foreign Office,Berlin, Germany

Amb. Mohamed Shaker, Chairman,Egyptian Pugwash Group, and ViceChairman, Egyptian Council for ForeignAffairs (ECFA), Cairo

Amb. Tibor Toth, Executive Secretary ofthe Preparatory Commission of theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyOrganization (CTBTO), Vienna, Austria

Participants



Amb. Carlo Trezza, Chairman of theAdvisory Board of the UN SecretaryGeneral for Disarmament Matters (2010); Currently Co-Director and DiplomaticAdvisor to CASD (Italian Center for HighDefense Studies), Rome, Italy

Prof. Mario Vadacchino, AssociateProfessor, Department of Physics, Facultyof Engineering, Polititecnico di Torino,Italy

Mr. Franco Zallio, Senior consultant(Middle East & North Africa, Russia),Director, Global Watch; ISPI-Italian Insti-tute for International Political Studies,Milan

O B S E R V E R S :

Mr. Riccardo Alcaro, Research Fellow,Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome,Italy

Dr. Anna Giulia Micara, AdjunctProfessor of International Law, EuropeanLaw and International Trade Law,University of Milan

Dott.sa Claudia Nannini, PhD Candidatein International Law, University of Milan

dott. Andrea Spagnolo, PhD Candidate inInternational Law, University of Milano,Italy

dott.sa Sara Gradilone, PhD Candidate inInternational Law, University of Milano,Italy

Mr. Andrea Carati, Research Fellow,Security and Strategic Studies, Istituto pergli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI),Milan, Italy

Mr. Simone Comi, Research Assistant,Security and Strategic Studies, Istituto pergli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI),Milan, Italy

S T A F F :

Claudia Vaughn, Program Coordinator,Rome Pugwash Office, Mobile: +39-333-456 6661, [email protected]

24th ISODARCO Winter Course on:

Eliminating Nuclear Weapons and Safeguarding Nuclear Technologies

ANDALO (TRENTO), ITALY 9-16 January 2011

DIRECTOR OF THE SCHOOL:

Carlo SchaerfUniversity of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Rome, Italy)

DIRECTORS OF THE COURSE:

Matthew Evangelista Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

Giorgio FranceschiniPeace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany

PURPOSE

ISODARCO has organized residential courses on globalsecurity since 1966 primarily in Italy but also in China,Germany and Jordan with the generous support of privatefoundations and international and national institutions andorganizations. The courses are intended for those whowould like to play a more active and technically competentrole in the field of international conflict resolution as wellas those who already have a professional interest and expe-rience in this field. The courses are intensive, interactive,and interdisciplinary in focus. The subject matter spans thetechnical and scientific dimensions of these problems aswell as their sociological and political implications.

After a decade and more during which the issues posed bynuclear weapons were largely eclipsed by concerns overethnic wars and the threat of terrorism, there is renewedserious interest in the goal of nuclear disarmament.

The 2011 ISODARCO Winter School will be devoted tothe practical steps that should be implemented to achievea nuclear-weapon free world and to the challenges andopen questions on the road to nuclear zero.

If you wish to receive any additional information on the subject,please, send an E-mail to: [email protected]



Report on Consultations

Delegation of Former European Ministers L E D BY T H E RT. H O N . D E S B ROW N E M P

Washington, DC, 1–4 March 2010

Reportby Martin Butcher and Shata Shetty

disarmament initiatives, includingsupporting negotiation and imple-mentation of seminal treaties such asthe Non-Proliferation Treaty, theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty andothers. Pugwash has also, since itsinception, worked to reduce thesalience of nuclear weapons indefence strategies, and thus the riskof the use of nuclear weapons inconflict.

From March 1-4, 2010, Des BrowneMP led a delegation of senior Euro-pean leaders to Washington, DC todiscuss European attitudes to nucleararms and disarmament policy withthe Obama administration.

The delegation included:

• Former UK Secretary of State forDefence Des Browne;

• Former Norwegian Prime MinisterKjell-Magne Bondevik;

• Former Czech Foreign Minister JanKavan;

• Former Italian Minister for Euro-pean Affairs Giorgio La Malfa;

• Pugwash Secretary-General PaoloCotta-Ramusino; and

• Pugwash President former Ambas-sador Jayantha Dhanapala.

They were joined by: Pugwash Exec-utive Director Jeffrey Boutwell;Martin Butcher (rapporteur), SpecialProjects Coordinator, Pugwash; andShata Shetty, (rapporteur), researcherto the Top Level Group of UK Parlia-mentarians for Multilateral NuclearDisarmament and Non-Proliferation.

Members of the delegation met withsenior administration officials at theNational Security Council, theDepartment of Defense, the Depart-ment of State and the Office ofScience and Technology Policy.Roundtable discussions were held atthe Nuclear Threat Initiative, theBrookings Institution and theAtlantic Council. The BritishEmbassy hosted delegation membersfor a working dinner.

The aim of the delegation was tounderstand the current situationwithin the Obama administration on

Introduction

The Pugwash Conferencesbrings together, from aroundthe world, influential scien-

tists, scholars and public figuresconcerned with reducing the dangerof armed conflict and seeking cooper-ative solutions for global problems.In line with its mission, Pugwash hasover fifty years experience of Track IIwork in US-Russia and Europeanarms control, non-proliferation and

Jan Kavan, Kjell-Magne Bondevik, Des Browne, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, and Giorgio La Malfa.



key items related to the agendaspringing from the President’s land-mark April 2009 Prague speech onnuclear arms and disarmament,including:

• NATO nuclear policy and USnuclear deployments in Europe;

• Strategic arms negotiations;

• Entry-into-force of the Comprehen-sive Test Ban Treaty; and

• The May 2010 Non-ProliferationTreaty Review Conference.

As senior leaders from across thepolitical spectrum, all of whom havehad experience on policymaking onnational security issues, they soughtto ensure that European perspectiveson these issues were heard and under-stood by their colleagues in theadministration.

The following report is a compositeof the perspectives and opinionsexpressed in meetings with senioradministration officials, Europeandiplomats, and with think-tanks andNGOs in Washington DC. It canserve as a background to under-standing administration policy onnuclear arms and disarmament. Aswith all Pugwash meetings, there wasno attempt to seek consensus and theviews in this report should not beattributed to any one participant.

We would especially like to acknowl-edge the support of The PloughsharesFund and the Connect US Fund forthis visit. Pugwash would like tothank the Nuclear Threat Initiative,the Brookings Institution and theAtlantic Council for their support inorganizing this delegation’sprogramme.

The Nuclear Posture Review

The delegation’s visit had been timedto coincide with the revised dateannounced by the Obama adminis-

tration of it’s Nuclear Posture Review(NPR), with the aim of engaging theadministration and lawmakers on thesubstance and implementation of thiskey policy document. Instead, withthe NPR postponed to allow forfurther debate on key issues, the dele-gation engaged with the administra-tion on key issues under debate as theNPR is concluded.

The delegation offered some pointsbased on mainstream Europeanthinking on nuclear weapons policy.Noting that the US Nuclear PostureReview is now delayed until lateMarch or more likely April, it waspointed out that people around theworld are concerned. They arelooking for this document to showprogress toward implementing thePresident’s agenda, and will bediscouraged if it is a status quo docu-ment. Administration officialsstressed that the President iscommitted to the whole Pragueagenda, and that the goal is to reducethe roles and numbers of nuclearweapons; to strengthen deterrenceand maintain a safe arsenal. Theydescribed the NPR as a roadmap forachieving the goals set out in Prague.

In particular, the delegation stressedthat if the Nuclear Posture Reviewcould send a strong signal that thepurpose of nuclear weapons is onlyto deter the use of nuclear weapons,this will demonstrate that steps arebeing taken to decrease the salienceof nuclear weapons in defencedoctrines. A corollary of this is thatnon-nuclear weapons states parties tothe NPT should receive guaranteesthat they will never be attacked byUS nuclear weapons.

The delegation heard that there willbe a reduction of the role of nuclearweapons in US strategy throughchanges in declaratory policy. These

changes could be considerable. Theadministration will stress that theywish to downgrade the role ofnuclear weapons in relations withRussia and China. The discussion isframed as to whether the deterrenceof other nations’ nuclear forces is thesole role or the primary role of USforces. The new declaratory policycould be linked to stronger NegativeSecurity Assurances in the context ofthe Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),under which non-nuclear weaponstates party to the NPT are assuredthat they will not be attacked withnuclear weapons.

It was suggested to the delegationthat if the number and role of nuclearweapons in the arsenal are reduced,then greater provision for conven-tional Prompt Global Strike (PGS)and ballistic missile defences will benecessary. There is still a debateabout whether the PGS is a nichecapability or whether it is the futureof strategic deterrence as the USmoves towards eliminating nuclearweapons.

Finally, it was made clear that thefinal outcome of the NPR will be apolitical decision for the President.The bureaucracy will present optionsto the President, and he is fullycapable of taking big decisions that“leapfrog’ the more cautious recom-mendations from departments.

Extended Deterrence in Europe

The delegation stated the desire ofthe mainstream of European politicsacross the continent to contribute tothe success of the President’s Pragueagenda, and stressed the extent towhich the disarmament portions ofthat speech had been welcomed inEurope. It was felt that this messagemay not be heard clearly enough inWashington DC.



The issue of the removal of forwardbased US nuclear weapons in Europe,a small remainder of the Cold Wararsenal, is one where Europe canassist the President directly.

Delegation members also stressed theextent to which all NATO membershave a responsibility to addressnuclear issues, as all NATO nationsrely on nuclear weapons for theirdefence. There is a clear desire in theadministration for a debate on howto assure extended deterrence in newsecurity circumstances. There is noquestion that allies continue torequire some form of nuclear deter-rent from the United States, and alsoa clear demonstration of US militarysupport for the security of Europe.

The administration is keen to ensurethat changes in arrangements forNATO deterrence do not promptproliferation in Europe.

The delegation emphasized the needfor strong political leadership todrive the NATO Strategic ConceptReview process.

They also said that recent initiativesfrom the Norwegian, German,Belgian, and Dutch governmentsseeking to explore ways to guaranteeEuropean security without the pres-ence of US nuclear weapons on Euro-pean soil deserve attention anddiscussion.

The administration has engaged inthe debate with key allies, andwelcomes the chance in the NATOStrategic Concept Review to discussthe role of nuclear weapons inEurope. It was made clear that theGerman initiative was helpful, andthe 5-nation letter to the SecretaryGeneral of NATO calling for debatewas welcome. There are concernsthat, if NATO does remove nuclearweapons from Europe, some newerNATO members might raise the needfor enhanced contingency planning, a

strengthened NATO Response Forceand a demonstration that the USdefence guarantee is solid. This mightcomplicate relations with Russia,who might perceive these moves asaggressive – given their new strategicconcept that lists NATO as a majorthreat to Russia.

The delegation noted that newerNATO members tend to be viewedfrom Washington DC as a homoge-nous bloc, which they are not. Thereis a diversity of opinions in centraland eastern Europe on the nature ofsecurity threats, and relations withRussia. Administration officialsnoted that there is a tendency in theregion to conflate Article V mutualdefence guarantees solely withnuclear weapons. However, the dele-gation noted that it is far from truethat all newer NATO members wishto retain nuclear weapons in Europe.

Administration officials stated thatthere is a need to address the smallnumber of nuclear weapons based inEurope in the context of overall sub-strategic nuclear forces. Russia hassome 5,000 such weapons, and theUS 2,000. There are hopes that thesecan be included in future armscontrol negotiations. There areconcerns that the seeming increasingreliance by Russia on non-strategicnuclear weapons, and their integra-tion into warfighting doctrine, iscomplicating the possibility of with-drawal from Europe. The delegationexpressed the opinion that the 200 orso weapons in Europe could be with-drawn to clear a path for negotia-tions on the larger number ofweapons.

The delegation stated that theremoval of US nuclear weapons fromEurope can help establish a normthat no country should base its

Gary Samore, Shata Shetty, Kjell-Magne Bondevik, Des Browne, Giorgio La Malfa, Martin Butcher

Jayantha Dhanapala, Des Browne, JohnHoldren, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, (GiorgioLa Malfa), Martin Butcher, Shata Shetty.



nuclear weapons on foreign soil.This may be an important precedentto make at this time, before othercountries follow the current USexample.

Action this year to announce a with-drawal would be popular with theNon-Aligned Movement. It seemsthat the administration is ready tomake one substantial move in thevery short term, and then considerother smaller steps to complete with-drawal – possibly in conjunction withthe deployment of the first stages ofPhased Adaptive Missile Defences inEurope. It was said that ballisticmissile defences can form part of a21st Century system of deterrence,although there are some problemswith this, notably the negative effecton future arms control and securityrelations with Russia.

It was made clear that modalities fordrawing down nuclear weaponsbased in Europe, and potentiallyeliminating them, are the focus ofadministration discussions, but thatthere is a desire to avoid unintendedconsequences. In particular, there isconcern to achieve this withoutdestabilizing NATO.

The delegation heard that somenewer NATO nations tend to equatethe Article 5 mutual defence guar-antee of the NATO treaty withnuclear deterrence, and that there is adesire and need to examine theirsecurity needs in depth to see howbest these can be assured. As part ofthis, and to improve Allied solidarity,there is a need to adapt the Allianceto the full range of 21st century secu-rity issues. In that context, there wasagreement that nuclear weapons areirrelevant to issues such as energy orcyber-security. The delegationstressed that NATO must do all it

can to meet the needs of newermembers in the current and nearfuture context. Administration offi-cials also stressed the need to addressconcerns about Russia amongst someallies.

There was an awareness thatbudgetary issues, particularly theneed to procure a new generation ofDual Capable Aircraft in the mediumterm, may make this debate moot.There are doubts in the administra-tion that European nations arewilling or able to purchase F35s, orto make the Eurofighter dualcapable. There are also securityconcerns about the risk of terroristsseizing warheads based in Europe,particularly following the recent inci-dent at Kleine Brogel in Belgium.These issues colour the NATOnuclear debate.

START Follow-On andComprehensive Nuclear TestBan Treaty

The delegation offered any assistancethat might be useful to the adminis-tration in the achievement of thenegotiation and ratification of theSTART Follow-on agreement, and onthe ratification and entry-into-forceof the CTBT.

It was also said that while Europeansunderstand that the US may find itnecessary in the lead-up to the CTBTand START Follow-On ratificationprocesses to increase funding toensure the safety and reliability of itsnuclear stockpiles, any assurancesthat can be made, and repeated at thehighest levels, that this will not entailnew nuclear warheads nor increasedweapons capabilities will be veryreassuring to allies and mightpossibly decrease the likelihood ofcontinued arms races in other partsof the world.

Start Follow-On

There was clear frustration from theadministration that the STARTfollow-on agreement had not yetbeen concluded. It had been hopedthat this would have been finishedand forwarded to the Senate for rati-fication to proceed, since the Treatyis a relatively modest step intended tobring arms control back on track andprepare the ground for future agree-ments, rather than a transformativestep itself.

Negotiations with the Russians areproving more difficult than had beenanticipated, and perceived divisionsin Moscow are fuelling that difficulty.There is concern that issues believedsolved such as missile defence, havethen been reopened by the Russianside.

The treaty will achieve a modest cutin launchers and reduction of aroundone-third in deployed warheads.Even this has proved difficult becauseof the unequal nature of the US andRussian arsenals. However, the treatyis mostly concluded with issues suchas verification, telemetry (sharing ofinformation on missile tests) andinspections the major outstandingproblems.

There is also a need to work out acompromise on missile defence. Ifthese are in any way limited by thetreaty, then it will never pass theSenate. The Russians have concernsthat, in the future, US missile defenceplans could negate their nucleararsenal and give the US a first strikecapability over Russia. The adminis-tration is at pains to incorporateRussia into missile defence to theextent possible, and to stress that it isaimed at Iran and others, not atRussia. However, suspicion of the USruns deep in Moscow. However, this



acknowledgement of Russiansconcerns in no way translates to areadiness to slow missile defenceprogrammes.

It was noted that the administrationand NATO are keen to work cooper-atively with Russia on missile defence.However, up to now, missile defenceshave been a very difficult issue whichimpede the possibility of progress inarms control and disarmamentbeyond the START follow-on agree-ment with Russia. The desire of someNATO nations to move forward, evenwithout Russia, is a further compli-cating factor, as is strong support formissile defence programmes in the USSenate and a refusal to link them intoarms control agreements.

The timing now means that STARTratification in the Senate is uncertainat best this year, despite a willingnessto move as quickly as possible in theSenate. It may be that mid-term elec-tions mean that most hearings and avote on START will not happen until2011.

As President Obama said in Prague,there is a desire to work on a post-START agreement with the Russians,and this could cover non-deployedweapons, as well as tactical or sub-strategic weapons.

CTBT Ratification

With the delay on negotiation andratification of the START follow-onagreement, the ratification of theComprehensive nuclear Test BanTreaty has slipped. The administra-tion has begun to engage the Senateon this, but it will not come to theSenate before 2011 at the earliest. Itis important that this is done well, asthe treaty cannot be allowed to go toa vote and fail again, as that will killthe treaty.

The delegation heard that, with thisas with other specific items on thePresident’s agenda, support fromEurope will be welcome and neces-sary to ensure success.

The President has boosted the budgetfor the National Nuclear SecurityAdministration by $5 billion over 7years. The enhanced capacity tomaintain the nuclear arsenal isintended to give confidence to theSenate that the US can keep itsnuclear arsenal safe, secure and reli-able without nuclear testing.

The JASON independent scientificadvisers to the Department ofDefence have said this is possible.The National Academy of Sciences iscompleting a report for Congresswhich will say the same thing.

Some concern was expressed that thefunding boost for NNSA may havecome too early for the CTBT, andthat while it might help with armsreductions in the START process, itwill have been discounted by the timethe CTBT comes forward for a vote.Also that this strategy was pursued tono avail in 1999. However, adminis-tration figures were clear that theyfelt the President was laying thenecessary groundwork for ratifica-tion of both treaties. In this contextthe question of the new capabilityunder the Reliable ReplacementWarhead programme was raised, andthe delegation was assured that thePresident has terminated the RRWand no new weapons will be designedunder President Obama.

The UK in particular, and possiblyFrance, could be of assistance indemonstrating to Congress how anuclear nation can maintain anarsenal having ratified the test bantreaty.

It was felt that lessons from the UKwould be particularly valuable in thisfield, because of the tight linksbetween the UK and US programmes.A visit of senior Congressional staffto AWE Aldermaston and Londonfor briefings on how the UK achievesthis task in late 2010 or early 2011could be useful.

Non-Proliferation Treaty ReviewConference

The delegation conveyed the need fora successful review conference, andthe urgent need for concrete stepstoward disarmament in the lead upto the NPT Review Conference.

Concluding the START Follow-Onnegotiations, progress on the CTBTand FMCT, and removal of US nuclearweapons from Europe are importantsteps in the right direction. In partic-ular, consultations should be organizedinvolving all the Middle Eastern statesaimed at defining an “agenda ofprogress” for a Middle Eastern zonefree of weapons of mass destruction.

These concerns were heard andunderstood by the administration. Adesire for a successful review confer-ence is shared. It was felt that, whilethe timing has not been what waswished for, that successful negotia-tion of the START follow-on andstrong public support for CTBT rati-fication should contribute to a posi-tive outcome. It was said that theadministration is in a weak positionwith regard to Pakistan and progresson the NPT, because of the need fortheir assistance in other policy areas.

The administration wishes to makeprogress on the Middle Eastern reso-lution, and is working to this endwith countries in the region. They areparticularly conscious that this isimportant with regard to Iran.



There was an awareness of a need forprogress across all pillars of the NPT– disarmament, non-proliferationand peaceful uses of nuclear energy.There is an understanding that thelack of specific progress since thePrague speech may lead to disap-pointment, and that expectationsneed to be managed. There is a hopethat nations will understand that theadministration is acting in good faith.

Conclusion

Consultations with the administra-tion were extremely useful, as thedelegation gained greater insight intocurrent thinking in Washington, DCon a wide range of key issues in armscontrol, non-proliferation and disar-mament.

The delegation took away a deeperunderstanding of the administration’sstrategy for implementing the agendalaid out by President Obama inPrague, and clarified ways in whichEuropeans can support that agenda.

They ensured that senior figures inthe administration heard strong

messages of support from Europe,representing diverse geographic andpolitical spread of opinion, for thePrague agenda in general, for specificsteps to achieve the President’s goalsfor multilateral nuclear disarmament,and for ways in which Europeans canindependently help create a positiveenvironment for future progress.

Participants in the Atlantic Council roundtable led by Walter Slocombe (pictured on the right)

Delegation Members

Mr. Kjell Magne BondevikBondevik served as Prime Minister ofNorway from 1997 to 2000, and from2001 to 2005, making him Norway’slongest serving non-Socialist PrimeMinister since World War II. Bondevikwas a member of the Storting (Parlia-ment) from 1973 to 2005. In addition toleadership positions in his party, theChristian Democratic Party, Bondevikwas also Minister of Foreign Affairs1989-1990, Minister of Church andEducation, 1983-1986, also PrimeMinister Willoch’s deputy 1985-1986,and state secretary at the Office of thePrime Minister during 1972-1973.

The Rt. Hon. Des Browne, MP Browne has been a Labour member ofParliament since 1997. He served asParliamentary Under-Secretary of State,Northern Ireland Office 2001-03; Secre-tary of State for Defence 2006-08 andScotland 2007-08, and as the PrimeMinister’s Special Envoy to Sri Lanka2009-. He is the convener of the Top

Level Group of UK Parliamentarians forMultilateral Nuclear Disarmament andNon-Proliferation, which includes 16former UK ministers.

Mr. Jan KavanKavan was the foreign minister of theCzech Republic from 1998 until 2002,and deputy prime minister from 1999until 2002. He was a member of theFederal Assembly from 1990-1992, amember of the Senate from 1996-2000and a member of the Chamber ofDeputies from 2002-2006. He was alsothe President of the United NationsGeneral Assembly from 2002 until 2003.He is a member of the Czech SocialDemocratic Party (�SSD).

Hon. Giorgio LaMalfaLaMalfa has served as member of theItalian Parliament, 1972-1994 and since1996. He served as a member of theEuropean Parliament 1989-1992, 1994-1999 and as Budget Minister 1980-1982.He was Chairman of the Foreign Rela-tions Committee of the Chamber of

Deputies 1983-1987, Chairman of theComitato per la Legislazione of theChamber of Deputies, 1998. He wasSecretary General of Italy’s RepublicanParty, 1987-2001, Chairman of theFinance Committee of the Chamber ofDeputies 2001-2005, Minister of Euro-pean Affairs, 2005-2006, and Presidentof Italy’s Republican Party 2001-2006.

****************

Amb. Jayantha DhanapalaDhanapala is Pugwash President (2007 -), former UN Under-Secretary General forDisarmament Affairs, 1998 - 2003,Ambassador of Sri Lanka to the USA(1995-7) and to the UN Office in Geneva(1984-87). He was President of the 1995NPT Review and Extension Conferenceand a member of both the InternationalWeapons of Mass Destruction Commis-sion (the Blix Commission) and theCanberra Commission on the Eliminationof Nuclear Weapons.



Prof. Paolo Cotta-RamusinoCotta-Ramusino is Secretary General ofthe Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs since August 2002. He isalso Professor of Mathematical Physics atthe University of Milano (Italy) andSenior Researcher at the Italian NationalInstitute of Nuclear Physics. He was

General Points

Europeans welcome the leadership ofPresident Obama and the US admin-istration in encouraging internationalprogress on the move to a nuclearweapons free world.

Drawing on the bipartisan impetusprovided by seminal pieces in theWall Street Journal by Mssrs Shultz,Kissinger, Nunn and Perry, thisdebate has been taken up in countriesacross Europe, and our delegationmembers are key leaders inpromoting dialogue on these issues inour home countries.

However, there is a need to begin toimplement these measures, and showconcrete progress, both in decreasingthe number of nuclear weapons, andtheir salience.

NATO and Nuclear Weapons

Recent initiatives from the Norwe-gian, German, Belgian, and Dutchgovernments seeking to explore waysto guarantee European securitywithout the presence of US nuclearweapons on European soil deserveattention and discussion.

Strong political leadership must drivethe NATO Strategic Concept Reviewprocess.

In the lead up to the Non-Prolifera-tion Treaty Review Conference,

strong steps toward reducing thesalience of nuclear weapons in US,British and NATO nuclear posturesand concrete steps such as theremoval of US nuclear weapons fromEurope can help create a more posi-tive process.

Removal of US nuclear weaponsfrom Europe can help establish anorm that no country should base itsnuclear weapons on foreign soil.This may be an important precedentto make at this time, before othercountries follow the current USexample.

Nuclear Posture Review

The US Nuclear Posture Review isnow delayed until late March orApril, and people around the worldare concerned. They are looking forthis document to show progresstoward implementing the President’sagenda, and will be discouraged if itis a status quo document.

If the Nuclear Posture Review couldsend a strong signal that the purposeof nuclear weapons is only to deterthe use of nuclear weapons, this willdemonstrate that steps are beingtaken to decrease the salience ofnuclear weapons in force doctrines(this is reported to be a key point ofcontention in the NPR Review). Acorollary of this is that non-nuclearweapons states parties to the NPT

Talking Points

should receive guarantees that theywill never be attacked by US nuclearweapons.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty &START Follow-On

While Europeans understand that theUS may find it necessary in the lead-up to the CTBT and START Follow-On ratification processes to increasefunding to ensure the safety and relia-bility of its nuclear stockpiles, anyassurances that can be made, andrepeated at the highest levels, thatthis will not entail new nuclearwarheads nor increased weaponscapabilities will be very reassuring toallies and might possibly decrease thelikelihood of continued arms races inother parts of the world.

Non-Proliferation Treaty ReviewConference

It is urgent that concrete steps towarddisarmament are taken in the lead upto the NPT Review Conference.Concluding the START Follow-Onnegotiations, progress on the CTBTand FMCT, and removal of USnuclear weapons from Europe areimportant steps in the right direction.

Consultations should be organizedinvolving all the Middle Easternstates aimed at defining an “agendaof progress” for a ME zone free ofweapons of mass destruction

formerly Director of the Program onScience, Technology and InternationalSecurity at the Landau Network - CentroVolta (Como) (where he conductedresearch on the conversion of RussianNuclear Cities and the development ofprograms for cooperation on energy-related issues in the Korean peninsula).

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,Pugwash Conferences.

Mr. Martin Butcher, Special ProjectsCoordinator, Pugwash Conferences

Ms. Shata Shetty, Researcher, Top LevelGroup of UK Parliamentarians for Multi-lateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.



Schedule of Meetings and Seminars

Please note that hyperlinks are provided in the text, indicated by underlined text. If you hold down the <control> buttonwhile clicking, you will be redirected to the relevant web page.

Monday, 1 March:

17:30 Coffee with Julian Borger, The GuardianDes Browne, Giorgio La Malfa, Jan Kavan, Paolo Cotta-RamusinoHotel Palomar

19:30 Dinner with Mr. Dominick Chilcott, British Deputy Head of MissionResidence of the Deputy Head of Mission

Tuesday, 2 March:

9:00–10:00 “Joint Assistant Secretary of Defense Roundtable” with principals engaged in US Nuclear Posture Review

Amb. Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security and former USAmbassador to NATO

Michael Nacht, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Julianne Smith, Principal Director for Europe and NATO, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense(Policy).

12:00–13:30 “European Perspectives on the NPR, Extended Deterrence and the New NATO Strategic Concept”A luncheon roundtable, for 20–25, chaired Mr. Walter Slocombe, former UnderSecretary of Defense forPolicyAtlantic Council

18:00 Fourth Annual Christopher J. Makins Lecture“The Transatlantic Community: Time for Some Lateral Thinking”The Rt. Hon. Lord George Robertson of Port EllenFormer Secretary General of NATO

Wednesday, 3 March:

08:45–10:00 Press and Media Breakfast (entire delegation)Old Ebbitt Grill

10:30 Meeting with National Security Council

Gary Samore, Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for Arms Control andWeapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism

12:00–13:00 Teleconference with former US Secretary of State George Shultz and former Senator Sam NunnNuclear Threat Initiative

14:30–17:15 Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs

Dr. John Holdren, advisor to President Barack Obama for Science and Technology, Director of the WhiteHouse Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Co-Chair of the President’s Council of Advisors onScience and Technology (PCAST)

OSTP, New Executive Office Building.

19:00 Dinner with Joan Rohlfing, President NTI and senior staff

Thursday, 4 March:

09:30–11:00 “European Perspectives on Current Nuclear Issues”Brookings Policy SeminarRoundtable discussion 25-30

Amb. Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Director, ArmsControl Initiative



Report on Consultations

Delegation of Former European Ministers L E D BY T H E RT. H O N . D E S B ROW N E M P

Moscow, 24–28 April 2010

Key Points:

The European middle ground is nowin favor of multilateral nuclear disar-mament. The delegation’s purposewas to engage the Russian decision-makers and political elite in theprocess of exploring how to ensureEuropean security without nuclearweapons.

There is strong support for the ‘re-set’of US-Russian relations as signifiedby the political importance of theNew START Treaty. There are goodchances for a positive vote on thetreaty in the Russian Duma andFederation Council. There also isrecognition that “there is no euphoriain Russia for nuclear disarmament.”

While verification, transparency andirreversibility are all importantelements of New START, the numer-ical decrease is not sufficient toensure the current momentumtoward further progress on multilat-eral nuclear disarmament can bemaintained. Establishing a high-levelindependent citizen monitoringsystem may be useful as a confidencebuilding measure, drawing on theexperiences with the INF Treaty.

Planned synergy in US and Russianratification is welcome. Debate onboth sides is encouraged to proceedwith sensitivity to the domestic polit-ical realities in both countries.

The issue of tactical (and, morebroadly, non-strategic) nuclearweapons, and the interrelated areasof European security architecture,ballistic missile defenses, deterrencedoctrine, and conventional forcestructures all need urgent and mostlikely asymmetrical exploration,especially as NATO undertakes itsStrategic Concept Review.

Broader Russian concerns vis a visNATO’s force structure and capabili-ties must be addressed if there is to befuture progress on nuclear disarma-ment. These discussions must be ledpolitically if they are to overcomeNATO’s institutional dysfunctions.

The role of US nuclear weapons inEurope must be addressed urgently,and the concept of extended deter-rence needs to be revisited. It isimperative to establish a principlethat no country will base nuclearweapons outside its own territory.

The rest of the world is watching theUS-Russian process closely. If there isa sense that nothing further will beaccomplished on multilateral disarm -ament for the 7 years it will take forNew START implementation, thiswill have a negative impact, not onlyon decisions among countries inother regions, but it may also affectarrange of issues, for example, forth-coming debates in the UK on warheads.

Summary1

A delegation of senior former Euro-pean ministers visited key officialsand experts in Moscow from 24-28April 2010. The delegation included:

Des Browne (delegation leader),Former British Secretary of State forDefence;

Jan Kavan, Former Deputy PrimeMinister and Foreign Minister of theCzech Republic;

Giorgio La MalfaMP, Former ItalianMinister of European Affairs;

Vappu Taipale, Former FinnishHealth Minister; and

Shirley Williams (Baroness Williamsof Crosby), Former Adviser onNuclear Proliferation to British PrimeMinister Gordon Brown.

They were joined by Prof. FrancescoCalogero, Former Pugwash SecretaryGeneral; Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Pugwash SecretaryGeneral; Amb. Sergey Batsanov,Member International PugwashCouncil; Prof. Alexander Nikitin,Member International PugwashCouncil, and Sandra Ionno Butcher,Senior Program Coordinator,Pugwash.



There was a shared desire to workcooperatively to address areas ofcommon interests between Russia,US, and NATO on some of the mostchallenging issues, including the Iransituation, Afghanistan, addressingextremism, securing nuclear mate-rials, etc.

While the overall message from theRussian side was sobering, the dele-gation was told that compromisesolutions are possible “if youapproach Russia with respect.” It isprecisely this purpose that led to thedelegation’s visit, and the intentbehind the desire to work in partner-ship with Russian colleagues on waysforward via the emerging EuropeanLeadership Network, future Pugwashmeetings, and other fora. The dele-gation was pleased with the variety ofcreative ideas that were producedand looks forward to continuedinteraction.

Introduction

The Pugwash Conferences2

brings together, from aroundthe world, influential scien-

tists, scholars and public figuresconcerned with reducing the dangerof armed conflict and seeking cooper-ative solutions for global problems.In line with its mission, Pugwash hasover fifty years’ experience

of Track II work in arms control,non-proliferation and disarmamentinitiatives, including supporting nego-tiation and implementation ofseminal treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the ABM Treaty,the Comprehensive Test Ban Treatyand others. Pugwash also, since itsinception, has worked to reduce thesalience of nuclear weapons indefense strategies, and thus the risk ofthe use of nuclear weapons in conflict.

From 24-28 April 2010, former UKDefence Secretary Des Browne led adelegation of senior European leadersto Moscow to discuss European atti-tudes to nuclear arms and disarma-ment policy with key policy makersand experts. This delegation buildson an earlier similar delegation thatvisited Washington, DC 1-4 March2010.

This project on “New NuclearReality” was organized by thePugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, Russian PugwashCommittee, Center for Euro-AtlanticSecurity of the MGIMO University,Russian Political Science Association,and the Friedrich Ebert Foundationin Russia. We also would like toacknowledge the support of ConnectUS and the Ploughshares Fund whomade this and related work possible.

The delegation included:

Des Browne, Former British Secretaryof State for Defence;

Jan Kavan, Former Deputy PrimeMinister and Foreign Minister of theCzech Republic;

Giorgio La Malfa MP, Former ItalianMinister of European Affairs;

Vappu Taipale, Former FinnishHealth Minister;

Shirley Williams (Baroness Williamsof Crosby), Former Adviser onNuclear Proliferation to British PrimeMinister Gordon Brown.

Many of the delegates are engaged ina new European Leadership Networkfor Multilateral Nuclear Disarma-ment3 that Des Browne is convening.The ELN will bring together seniorfigures to help foster and coordinatedebate within Europe and to increasethe influence of the European voiceon these issues in the US and globally.

They were joined by Amb. SergeyBatsanov, Member InternationalPugwash Council; Prof. FrancescoCalogero, Former Pugwash SecretaryGeneral; Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino,Pugwash Secretary General; Prof.Alexander Nikitin, Member Interna-tional Pugwash Council, and SandraIonno Butcher, Senior Program Coor-dinator, Pugwash.

Our meetings with a wide range ofofficials and experts took place at theMFA, the Duma (the lower chamberof Parliament), the Council of Feder-ation (the upper chamber of Parlia-ment), the Institute for Contempo-rary Development, InternationalFederation for Peace and Concilia-tion, the Russian Academy ofSciences, and the Institute forStrategic Stability of the“ROSATOM” State Corporation.

General comments

The delegation’s message was toexpress the view that across the polit-ical spectrum Europeans unani-mously welcome the leadership Presi-dents Medvedev and Obama haveshown in negotiating the follow-onto START treaty and to expressappreciation of the tremendous polit-ical significance of this ‘re-set’ ofRussian-US relations and the impetusand energy it provides for furtherprogress.

The delegation underscored theurgency of cooperatively engaging

Browne, Cotta-Ramusino, Calogero,Kavan, LaMalfa, Williams.



with policy makers and experts inRussia to help keep this momentummoving, not only in the ratificationprocess for the so-called “NewSTART” treaty, but also on otherareas of shared objectives in creatingconditions for an eventual world freeof nuclear weapons, for promotingmultilateral nuclear disarmament,revitalizing the Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) and securing nuclearmaterials. There is hope on theRussian side this may contribute tomore widespread acceptance of Russiaas an equal partner, sharing the samedisarmament and non-proliferationgoals with the international commu-nity. All sides seek to ensure that theseperspectives will find their way intothe US debates on these issues, accu-rately reflecting the new mainstreambipartisan European views in favor ofmultilateral nuclear disarmament.

The general tone of the Russiancounterparts with whom our delega-tion met was supportive of theoutreach made by the delegation, andthere was overwhelming (though notunanimous) agreement that it isimportant to start to explore stepstoward a nuclear weapons freeworld. However, this was counter-balanced by a seemingly a-synchro-nistic and extreme unease expressedby the lack of further progress inaddressing Russian concerns vis a visNATO policy and force posture, and

a reminder that there is still wide-spread belief in Russia that nuclearweapons guarantee security. As oneparticipant said, “There is noeuphoria in Russia for nuclear disar-mament.”

While the current focus is on US-Russian negotiations, given the factthe two combined arsenals comprisenearly 95% of the nuclear weaponsin the world, the delegation rein-forced the message that US allies overthe world are waiting for US invita-tion to play into that environment,and they also are ready to develop anarrative receptive to and consistentwith views of the Russian Federation.

New START treaty4

Political significance is crucial

The recent agreement signed by Presi-dents Medvedev and Obama on 8April 2010 is recognized on all sidesas an important and positive politicaldevelopment.

In Russia it is widely perceived as abig political success, signaling a ‘re-set’ of relations between Russia andthe US, and it will be the first bilateralarms control treaty between the USand Russia (as opposed to the formerSoviet Union) to enter into force.

It brings back arms control, andpredictability via the verification andtransparency regime.

Irreversibility was also a major goal.

The treaty provides a guaranteeagainst a new arms race. It providesa basis for future cooperation.

As one senior Russian policy makerstated, the Russians consider signingthe treaty to be “the first major steptoward setting up a global nuclearsecurity system.”

The political leadership provided bythe two presidents (who interactedpersonally during the 10 months oftreaty negotiations on some 14 occa-sions) was perhaps unprecedented,and proof of the importance ofstrong political leadership in thisarea. Their relationship was referredto as “businesslike” and a “workinginteraction,” and this has developedan important “mutual under-standing” between the two leaders.

The treaty corresponds with Russiannational plans to downsize theirarsenal due to technical realities ofthe life times of current weaponssystems and is in sync with Russia’smodernization plans. For example,while START II (which did not enterinto force) limited multiple-indepen-dently targetable re-entry vehicles(MIRVs,) this treaty does not.

Another important element of the“re-set” is that it was noted on theRussian side there is a lack of institu-

Meeting with Deputy Foreign MinisterSergey Ryabkov.

Greeting by Acad. A. Andreev (Photo: Russian Academy of Sciences)

Kavan, Williams, Kozyrev.



tional memory and involvement inarms control at a practical level, andthat the Russians had to rely heavilyon people who were involved inSTART I. Many MFA officials lacktechnical ability on these issues.Reengaging in arms control will helpredevelop this expertise.

This corresponds with the experienceof the delegates who are working toset up a European LeadershipNetwork to similarly educate politi-cians in their countries. It was notedthat a generation of political leadershave been “de-skilled” on theseissues. There are very few leaders inEurope who are sensitized to thecomplexity of issues involved withthese discussions. There is stronghope that the emerging EuropeanLeadership Network will includeRussians as well.

Numerical limitations do notprovide for significant cuts

This treaty was referred to as a“status quo treaty.” It codifies a“text-based parity.” While the treatywent further than limits discussed inthe US-Russian understanding of July2009, the cuts are not as significantas the Russian side originally sought.It allows for a total of 1550warheads and a ceiling of 800deployed and non-deployed deliveryvehicles (of which 700 can bedeployed), in reality the actualnumbers of cuts are not significant inand of themselves. These limits apply7 years after the treaty enters intoforce, and the treaty will last for aduration of 10 years, with an optionto extend for another five if bothsides agree.

The treaty has been presented as areduction of 30% in the limit on thedeployed strategic nuclear arsenals of

the two sides allowed under the 2002Moscow Treaty.

Actual cuts will not be this signifi-cant. By some estimates5 under theagreed counting rules (especially therule that allows bombers to count asonly 1 warhead despite the fact theycan carry many more) the actualnumber the US will cut might beapproximately 100-200 warheadsremoved to storage6. This is perhapsthe most controversial element of theagreement. The counting rules are abit complicated, and estimates varyof the true impact of these cuts.Some Russian analysts say the cutswill be only on the US side (thoughRussian future plans are affected),and it is “reluctantly welcomed” bythe Russian politically elite.However, the US Federation of Amer-ican Scientists analysis is that the USdeploys 1650 and Russia deploys1740, meaning in actual terms the USwill need to reduce 100 warheadsand Russia 190 to reach the NewSTART limits7.

The 1550 ceiling for warheads waslower than the initial US offer, andRussian analysts say the very limitedactual cuts will be made all on the USside (in return the US achieved itsgoals on verification issues). Agreedlimits are “comfortably high” fromthe Russian perspective, it saves theRussians from a perceived need tobuild up their arsenal but allowscontinued development of MIRVsand other desired technology.

While recognizing the treaty’s strongpolitical significance mentionedabove, some participants raisedconcerns that the lack of significantdecrease of the number of weaponsin the nuclear arsenals of the US andRussia must be followed quickly withplans for discussion of future reduc-

tions. Failure to do so may lead to anegative reaction at the NPT ReviewConference, and may not be signifi-cant enough to curtail modernizationtrends in other states with nuclearweapons.

The seriousness of the risks ofnuclear proliferation requires thatfurther steps for disarmament mustbe bold.

In addition, rapid breakout capabilityexists. This is especially true on theUS side, which could for examplewithin days redeploy by one estimateapproximately 2,000 additionalwarheads to Trident and MinutemanIII. (It was noted however that this ineffect represents de-alerting of themajority of the arsenal.) Russia is notconcerned about this breakout capa-bility, because they expect to have asimilar capacity by the end of thedecade.

It is important to note, however, thatin this “fragile” world situation, the7 years provided is a long time andthe states were encouraged to takefull advantage of this time period.

Treaty provides a restart for limitedverification and transparencymeasures

Unlike the 2002 Moscow StrategicOffensive Reductions Treaty (SORT,which one participant wryly referred

Meeting at the Duma with IgorPuzanov MP (Committee for Defense)and Sergei Kolesnikov MP (Committeefor the Protection of Health and

co-president IPPNW).



to as a “SORT-of” treaty), this newtreaty importantly contains verifica-tion and transparency measures.

Unlike the START I treaty that hasexpired, the new treaty does notallow for permanent inspections, aninitial US demand. This changeaddresses what Russians consideredan unequal situation given that theUS is not producing strategic nuclearweapons and Russia has started anew modernization program. Thetreaty does allow for on-site inspec-tions, data exchanges, exhibitionsand notifications of changes tostrategic nuclear forces, for example.

Telemetry will be provided on a case-by-case basis, and each side candecide what to provide (including theoption of providing no data).Russians were concerned thattelemetry information from Russiantests could help the US design missileinterceptors. It is believed the USgave in to this Russian demandlargely due to the fact it has its ownnational technical means and theRussians do not.

The treaty contains real limits onstrategic missile defense whileencouraging cooperation on ballisticmissile defense

It was pointed out that in recognizingthe increasing importance of the“interrelationship between strategicoffensive arms and strategic defensivearms” the treaty’s preamble mayhave created some problems for rati-

fication. It was noted that it isimportant to recognize how difficultit was for Russia to conclude thetreaty in the absence of the previouspillar of the Anti-Ballistic MissileTreaty.

However, Article V of the treatyprovides a real limit on theconverting strategic ICBMs andSLBMs for missile defense intercep-tors and vice versa. This is consid-ered a real limit, and one which(barring unforeseen elements in theas yet unavailable technical annexes)may in fact mean the end of plans,for example, for US Ground BasedInterceptor program.

Ratification process

Presidents Medvedev and Obamareportedly planned to simultaneouslyseek ratification of the treaty. Therewas some concern expressed on theRussian side that this may be unreal-istic given the realities of the ratifica-tion process in the Duma. However,there was a strong signal for a coop-erative engagement throughout theratification process. This was origi-nally supposed to start in late April,but this was delayed due to Russianholidays, until mid-May.

The lower house of the RussianDuma began its first informal consul-tations of the treaty on 27 April. Atthe time of writing this report, the USPresident transmitted it to the Senateon 13 May8, and Russia is expected

to begin the formal process within afew weeks9.

There is no serious opposition to thetreaty expected in Russia. Two-thirds of the Russian parliament areready for it just because they supportall governmentally initiatedproposals. The remaining one-thirdmay support being convinced bytreaty’s essence. According to onesenior policy maker, “This is a casewhere common sense should prevailover party.”

There was some discussion of theneed for synergistic statements duringthe ratification process in both coun-tries, as a way to help addresspossible concerns that may ariseduring debates. It was noted that theUS political system is perhaps moredeeply divided than any time sinceVietnam, and the Obama administra-tion has some very clear limits onwhat they may be able to accomplish.

Citizen monitoring

It would be positive to establish aTrack 1½ process for monitoring ofthe New START treaty by influentialnon-governmental public figures,involving international network offormer Ministers and Defense andForeign Affairs, with an organiza-tional role of International Pugwash,on the model of parallel publicinspections conducted in the years ofthe implementation of the INF Treaty(the Intermediate and Shorter Rangenuclear Forces Treaty).

Further progress on strategic nucleardisarmament

The UK and others stand ready toenter into multilateral discussions,perhaps after the next US-Russiantreaty, but if that time is too farremoved, the current interest may notbe able to be sustained. The engage-

Pikaev, Nikitin. Cotta-Ramusino, Browne, Williams,Kavan, Taipale at the Russian State Duma.



ment of France and China in theprocess needs to be nurtured.

It was noted also that the UK facesdecisions in the next parliament onwarhead issues, if there is a sense thatmultilateral nuclear disarmament ismoving forward and that thesewarheads may be redundant then thiscould affect the thinking and atti-tudes toward making this investment.It therefore would be helpful to havemore people who understand theseissues visit the UK and make thisargument.

The crucial role of the involvement ofcivil society, to the extent possible,was emphasized in our meetings.

Tactical nuclear weapons

Tactical nuclear weapons areoutside current US-Russiandiscussions

The new treaty does not touch theissue of tactical nuclear weapons.Russia is estimated to have at least2,000 tactical nuclear warheads, andthe US approximately 500, of which150-200 are deployed on the territo-ries of its NATO allies.10

Some NATO allies have requestedreconsideration of the basing of USnuclear weapons in Europe.However, Secretary of State HillaryClinton reportedly linked any furtheraction on this topic with the need forRussia to make significant moves inthis area given the Russian numericalsuperiority. It is unclear how thistopic is likely to be addressed in theNATO Strategic Concept Review.The recent US Nuclear PostureReview reinforced the role ofextended deterrence, pledged toproceed with life-extension for the B-61 bombs, and said that “anychanges to NATO’s nuclear postureshould only be taken after a thor-

ough review within – and decision by– the Alliance”.

Our delegation was told by someinterlocutors that the media reportsof Clinton’s Tallinn comments weregreeted in Russia with a “sigh ofrelief” as her public stand nowremoves any pressure the Russiansmight have felt to engage in discus-sions on tactical nuclear weapons.11

Future progress on non-strategic/tactical nuclear weaponsneeds revitalization

It was clear from conversationsacross the spectrum of policy makersand experts that there is neither muchthinking nor enthusiasm in Russia onnext steps for tactical nuclearweapons arms control. It is equallyclear that Russian policy makers donot feel pressure from the US toreview their position on tacticalnuclear weapons.

This was sorely at odds with the opti-mism that seemed possible when adelegation of senior European formerministers held a round of similarmeetings in Washington, DC in earlyMarch 2010.

The prevailing approach in Russia isthat as long as the US does not with-draw its tactical weapons to its ownnational territory as Russia has done,it remains an unequal situation.From this Russian perspective,discussions need to start from anequal footing.

To some extent this represents agenuine confusion on broader issues,and need for further discussion onissues such as: What is the role of USnuclear weapons based, for example,in Turkey? Why does Russia needstactical nuclear weapons, for whichmissions and how many? OneRussian expert asked whether from

the Russian perspective they shouldwant these weapons out of Turkey orif they might prove useful vis a vis,for example, Iran.

Some members of the delegationexpressed an interest in holding asimilar series of discussions withdecision makers and experts inTurkey on these and similar issuesand we plan to pursue this idea.

It was noted that discussions ontactical nuclear weapons will bringarms control to a new juncture,where it will no longer be adequateto discuss delivery vehicles, butdiscussion of warheads will be imperative.

A signal of willingness to engage ontactical nuclear weapons is essential

There is a largely silent majority viewin the rest of Europe that US NATOweapons serve no purpose. There isintense private discussion within thealliance on what role they will play in10 years, the length of time current

Former Czech Foreign Minister JanKavan and Former UK DefenceSecretary Des Browne.

(Photo: Russian Academy of Sciences)

Vappu Taipale and Francesco Calogero.(Photo: Russian Academy of Sciences)



Secretary General will be in place.There are those who want to play apart in these discussions, but theyneed to better understand: if theypursue this issue, would it be recipro-cated by Russia?

The delegation was also told that thecurrent Russian reluctance to discussnon-strategic or tactical nuclearweapons is not necessarily unchange-able and the views within Russia arenot necessarily homogenous. Oneparticipant said, Everything can bediscussed with Russia “if you showenough respect,” meaning thatRussia as a re-emerging global powerwants to be an equal partner at thedecision-making in internationalsecurity area. However, somebelieve the military establishmentwon’t discuss this until the US with-draws its weapons from Europe andunless the UK and France join thediscussions (addressing also someconcerns about French sub-strategicnuclear weapons).

Possible ways forward include:

• Linking informal tactical nucleararms control with CFE Treatyfollow up, since if NATO mightyield on the conventional side thismay encourage Russia to give upsome tactical nuclear weapons;

• Some parallel unilateral actionscould be considered, however therewas caution that there may be aneed for full scale negotiationsbecause there are not the sameincentives today of the crisis situa-tion that led to the last round ofunilateral action;

• It might be possible to start withdiscussions for removing them tocentral storage sites;

• Tactical nuclear weapons can be

linked with non-deployed strategicweapons cuts;

• Emphasizing the need for progressgiven the economic realities (i.e. USNATO allies will find it extremelydifficult to pay for the neededupgrades for the aircraft to carrythe B-61s).

• Discussions could explore creatinga possible nuclear weapons freezone in Central Europe.

There was a concern addressed,however, that it is important not tooverload the already difficult politicalagenda by trying to address this issuenow. From this perspective it might bepreferable to explore options for futuredirections of arms control, includingtactical weapons, and involving othernuclear weapons states, thinking in anon-symmetrical way.

Ballistic missile defenses

Though Russia formally does notconsider NATO to be an adversaryany longer, the Russians are quiteseriously concerned about expandingNATO military infrastructure, andlink questions to BMD to thiscontext. To the extent possible,Russia should be consulted. The lackof consultation before decisions weretaken on the new Bulgarian andRomanian deployments was noted.For example, the role of the recentRomania discussion highlighted an

area of tension. The presidentsreportedly reached an understandingnot to allow this to undermine theirefforts.

There is concern in Russia as tofuture potential instability that maycreated by continued massive USinvestment in BMD capabilities, andthe perceived need to prepare theirforce structure to avoid a possibleimbalance 20 years from now, partic-ularly given concerns over possiblespace-based components.

There were some who thought thatexploring further prospects for ajoint US-Russian BMD programmayprove useful, building on the NATOTallinn ministerial discussions, andsome felt Russia should respond posi-tively. However, serious issues wouldneed to be explored, including howthe threat assessment would beconducted, how the chain ofcommand would work in reality, etc.In other words, according to oneparticipant, “the devil is in the polit-ical will.” The example wasprovided of problems encounteredduring the Yeltsin/Clinton initiateddata exchange Center, when theproject was killed for politicalreasons but with the technicalpretext, relating to the tax status ofthe officers at the Center. Possiblesynergy could be explored on themilitary production side, to theeconomic benefit of both sides.

Amb. Sergey Batsanov. Shirley Williams (BaronessWilliams of Crosby).

(Photo: RussianAcademy ofSciences)

Alexey Arbatov.(Photo: Russian Academy of

Sciences)



However, in this context it is impera-tive for further discussions to be heldon the feasibility and affordability ofthe proposed technologies, and scien-tists can play an important role inadvising their governments on this.

Conventional weapons/Europeansecurity architecture

Conventional force balances affectnuclear arms control anddisarmament

In a reversal from the Cold Wardynamics, today Russia sees an over-whelming conventional imbalance visa visNATO forces. There are manywho believe that progress on furthernuclear disarmament, especially inthe non-strategic realm, cannot bemade without tying this in withdiscussions on conventional forces.

It was noted that Russia is the onlycountry in the world which sharesborders with 16 other countries,which explains its cautiousness whenit comes to conventional forcesstrength/weakness.

Plans for new US conventionalcapabilities is a serious concern forRussia

The US plans to pursue the new“Prompt Global Strike” program iscausing consternation in Russiancircles. There is concern that addingconventional warheads to US ICBMswill hold Russian ICBMs at risk.

NATO posture is a major concernstill in Russia and needs to beaddressed jointly

NATO expansion (one participantpreferred the term “opening”) toEastern Europe, and “the remilita-rization of the Eastern border”remains a significant concern toRussia. Russians asked the delega-tion to give a greater understand of

whether or not NATO policy ishomogenous.

It was recognized that at a certainlevel, NATO is politically dysfunc-tional (a situation acknowledged bycurrent NATO Secretary GeneralAnders Fogh Rasmussen), and thatthe rules prevent a proper dialogueand debate on some key issues. Atthe ministerial level there is nodiscussion on the diversity of viewswithin the alliance, and it is impor-tant to encourage NATO to developa coherent political position.

It was noted that the NATO-RussiaCouncil proved not to be effectiveenough, and it didn’t work as a medi-ator in political moments when suchmediation was mostly needed, forexample, in the days of the recentRussian-Georgian war and therespective increase of tensions.

Ways to increase Russian participa-tion within NATO framework couldbe further explored. Some suggestedthe possibility of the ultimate goal ofRussia becoming a NATO memberor at least a partial member (inte-grated into the political and not mili-tary NATO structures). There is adanger, however, that such a broad“northern” alliance would increaseinsecurity among “southern” coun-tries and may in fact be counterpro-ductive in terms of creating interna-tional stability. The delegationmembers seek to send the messageboth to the US and to Russia thatmainstream Europe will not opposefurther Russian-NATO integration.

Dialogue could be renewed ondiscussions of non-offensive defense,and NGOs could play a significantrole here, drawing for example on thePugwash workshops on this issueduring the Cold War.

There is aneed todevelopdeeperunder-standing ofthe differentviewpoints inNATO. Allnew NATOmembers donot have acommonperspective. There is a need todiscuss and analyze threats and whatcollective security can do to meetthose threats. Russia can and shouldplay a role in those discussions. Forexample, there is need for continueddiscussion on Afghanistan withinNATO and with its partners, and thisis an area where further building oncommon interests could be explored.

There also was discussion that manyin the rest of Europe tend to think ofNATO as a collective security mecha-nism, with a role that is not primarilyfocused toward Russia. In this sense,in Russia the prevailing frame ofmind with respect to NATO isperhaps more traditional.

The Strategic Concept review processmust be politically driven and asopen as possible. It appeared that tosome extent certain Russian inter-locutors were better briefed on theNATO Strategic Concept Reviewthan some US NATO allies.

Russian proposal for a EuropeanSecurity Treaty

This treaty draft is meant to be thebasis for discussions on a new archi-tecture for European security thatwould include also soft securityissues. Russia pushes the idea of thenew all-European security treatyquite intensively, insisting that

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino.



existing old security institutions (likeOSCE or NATO) do not work intime of actual political crises.Medvedev has said this draft is an“invitation to dance.” There has asyet been inadequate response.

One proposal for a way forward wasto set up an international securitycommission, with subgroups/workinggroups, depending on priorities onagenda. This could be one moreforum in which members of theemerging European LeadershipNetwork might participate.

Extremism

It might be possible to furtherexplore approaches to dealing withextremism. For example, a jointroundtable was proposed to bringtogether people who were involved inthe Northern Ireland peace processand people engaged in addressing thesituation in the Northern Caucuses.Parallels exist in the need for politicalsolutions, despite one side havingmilitary superiority.

Some members of the delegationwere concerned about news reportsthat the FSB was to be given increasedpowers. They were cautioned how -ever that it is important in oppositionto such moves, not to fortify the posi-tion you don’t want to strengthen.

Nuclear doctrines

It is important to further explore therole of nuclear deterrence. It is dueto the continued legacy of deterrencepostures that political relationsbetween the two countries remainhostage to military infrastructures ofthe Cold War. At the same time,some of the Russian counterpartswere suggesting, that while deter-rence can’t be discarded overnight, aserious search for an alternative basis

for security should begin soon.

Negative security assurances will beimportant to further explore.

Some participants thought it mightbe useful to start discussions on atreaty or UN Convention on non-useof nuclear weapons, drawing fromthe experience of the 1925 GenevaProtocol banning the use of chemicaland biological weapons, whichcontributed to creating norms thatmade possible the biological weaponsconvention (1972) and chemicalweapons convention (1993). Othersquestioned the efficacy of such thisand other no-first use pledges.

Middle East12

The delegation discussed prospectsfor setting an agenda for progress atthe NPT Review Conference on thisimportant topic, which was part ofthe deal in 1995 that led to indefiniteextension of the NPT. A draftproposal for establishing a UN-appointed representative or advisorwas discussed, along with options fora conference in the region on theseissues.

There is an intersect of interestsbetween Russia and Europe/US onIran. This issue comes up in discus-sion of BMD threats, regionalstability, and tactical nuclear ques-tions.

There was some concern addressedthat the political debate about Iranhas become separated from the tech-nical realities. Russia could play asignificant role in bringing back someof the earlier ideas discussed. Forexample, it might be possible torevisit the idea of removing the LEUto Kish Island under the IAEA super-vision. This idea was supported atthe time by Russia. There is a

concern however, that the US andFrance are losing interest in this ideabecause their original goal was toremove LEU altogether from Iranand that Iran has now producedmuch more LEU.

Pugwash has proposed a commissionin which scientists from Iran and theWest could sit and discuss theseissues, and there is a hope thatRussian scientists and technicalpeople could contribute to thatdebate. This process should bematched with encouraging the imme-diate implementation of the addi-tional protocol in Iran.

It was recognized however that thetime is drawing closer when UNSecurity Council may impose sanc-tions. Problems were discussedregarding the need to better identifyan agenda for the process in theabsence of a mutual interpretationbetween the E3+3 and Iran.

There is some discussion on theimpact of a new UNSC resolution onthe outcome of the Review Confer-ence. Some warned that this could berisky and might have a consequencefor the NPT that is not productive.

Looking forward

The bilateral US-Russian relationshipis watched closely in other parts ofthe world. Further progress in armscontrol, disarmament, and revision ofnuclear doctrines to decrease relianceon nuclear weapons will be needed tosend the appropriate signals that thetwo countries take seriously theirArticle VI commitments under theNPT.

It is important to set a further processin motion now, as some raised thequestion, What will happen afterObama and Medvedev?



Schedule

24 April, Saturday

Main arrivals day

25 April, Sunday

14:00–17:00 Business lunch at the upper floor of the hotel, followed by orientation and introductory overviews:

• Overview, “New Russian-US Nuclear Treaty: Problems and Prospects” by Dr. Alexander Pikaev,director of the Nuclear Disarmament program at the Institute for World Economy and InternationalRelatons

• Overview, “Current State of Russian-Western Relations (Russia-EU, Russia-NATO)” by VictorMizin, former MFA official, currently deputy director of the Institute for International Studies,Moscow State Institute of International Relations

• Overview of the program of the visit and information on ministries and agencies by Prof. AlexanderNikitin, member of International Pugwash Council, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security

• Delegation discussed potential international initiatives and approaches which it would be presentingto the Russian ministries and Parliamentary committees.

26 April, Monday

10:00–12:30 Discussion “New Nuclear Reality and Russian-Western Relations” at the International Federation forPeace and Conciliation (prospect Mira, 36)

Discussion was attended by ~20 Russian experts. Presentations by:

• Dr. Viktor Kamyshanov, President of the Federation for Peace and Conciliation (presentation “PublicMonitoring of the Disarmament”)

• Dr. Andrey Zagorsky, Director of the Center for War and Peace Studies, MGIMO University

• Dr. Sergey Oznobishcnev, Director, Institute for Strategic Assessments (presentation on “RussianReaction to New Start: Time to Change Pattern in Russian-Western Relations”

• Evgeny Voronin, Ambassador (Ret.), Leading Researcher, Center for Euro-Atlantic Security (presen-tation “New Russian Military Doctrine”)

• Valery Zemskov, former official of the Russian MFA and of the Collective Security Treaty Organiza-tion, currently researcher at the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security (presentation “New Patterns ofMilitary Integration”)

15:00–16:30 Visit to the Russian State Duma (lower Chamber of the Parliament). Meeting with MPs and experts fromDefense and Security committees:

Meeting is co-chaired by MP Igor Puzanov (Committee for Defense) and MP Sergei Kolesnikov, co-presi-dent of IPPNW, Deputy Chair of the Committee of Protection of Health, Russia State Duma

17:00–18:00 Meeting with leadership of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Presidium of the Academy, Leninskyprospect)

• Meeting with two First Deputy President of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Acad. A. Andreev),

• Director of the Arms Control Program at the Moscow Carnegie Center Academy corr. memberAlexey Arbatov

• Deputy Director of the Institute for World Economy and International relations Academy corr.member Vladimir Baranovsky



• Director of the Institute for Oriental Studies Dr. Vitaly Naumkin

• Director of the International Nuclear Center at Dubna Acad. Alexander Syssakyan

20:00 Dinner meeting (at the hotel) with former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Andrey Kozyrev

27 April, Tuesday

10:00–12:15 Discussion at the Institute for Contemporary Development.

Topic of discussion: “Russia in NATO Someday? Future for Russia-NATO Relations”. Meeting ischaired by Institute’s Chairman of the Management Board Igor Yurgens. Presentations by:

• Dr. Tatiana Parkhalina, Director of the Center for European Security,

• Lt.-General (Ret.) Eugeny Buzhinsky, in 2001-2009 Chief of the International Treaties Department,Ministry of Defense

• Maj.-General (Ret.) Vladimir Rubanov, Chief of “Informexpertise”

• and by other ICD researchers.

13:00–14:00 Visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov (responsibility area – security and disarmament)and officials from the Security and Disarmament department of the MFA.

14:30–16:00 Visit to the Council of Federation (upper Chamber of the Parliament) Dr.Sergey Kortunov, Chief of ExpertGroup of the Committee on Defense and Security, Council of Federation, and Dr. Alexander Korotaev,Advisor to the Chairman of the Committee

17:00–18:30 Visit to the Institute for Strategic Stability of the “ROSATOM” State Corporation (former AtomicMinistry). Meeting with the former Minister fopr Atomic Energy Acad. Viktor Mikhailov and experts ofthe Institute for Strategic Stability.

Notes

1 Please note: This report was written bythe rapporteur, Sandra Ionno Butcher,Senior Program Coordinator, PugwashConferences on Science and WorldAffairs ([email protected]). Thisis the rapporteur’s personal report ofselected points of discussion from thedelegation’s meetings in Moscow. Aswith all Pugwash meetings, there was noattempt to reach consensus. However,the report does seek to summarize thevarious positions presented. No posi-tion described herein should be attrib-uted to any particular person.

2 www.pugwash.org 3 http://www.rusi.org/eln/about. See also:www.toplevelgroup.org.

4 This treaty has been dubbed “NewSTART” on the US side, without acorresponding term, except the“START-III”, on the Russian side.

5 Without access to classified information,it is not possibly to be precise aboutthese numbers.

6 See for example, analysis by Hans Kris-tensen, Federation of American Scien-tists. http://www.fas.org/ blog/ssp/ 2010/03/newstart.php#more-2826

7 Ibid.8 The US State Department’s websiteincludes background materials: http://www.state.gov/t/vci/trty/126118.htm

9 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/05/14/Russia-expected-to-ratify-START-in-June/UPI-34951273877689/

10 Federation of American Scientists, ibid.11 The actual position is more nuancedthat media reports suggest. Forexample, NATO Spokesman JamesAppathurai said on 22 April 2010, “AsI said, no decisions were taken. Nospecifics or specific proposals were puton the table, but one point was stressedby many and that is, of course, that thisis a discussion that cannot just includeNATO in the broader sense. NATO’snuclear policy is for NATO to decide.But when it comes to reducing the

number or role of nuclear weapons inEurope, it is impossible to ignoreRussia, which has, I believe, some3,000 sub-strategic nuclear weapons inEurope, and there was a substantialamount of discussion about how bothfrom a bilateral U.S.-Russia point ofview, but in a larger context of reduc-tion, Russia should be engaged in adiscussion of reducing the number ofnuclear weapons in Europe…. I did notsay that there would be no moveswithout the Russians. I did say thatRussia had to be taken into accountwhen looking at the broader issue ofreducing the total holdings of nuclearweapons in Europe. So big distinction.”http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_62906.htm

12 Please note this section pre-dates therecent announcement of the agreementbetween Turkey, Brazil, and Iran andthe recent US announcement regardingsanctions.


Marcovich was an active member of the original PugwashContinuing Committee and the later Pugwash Council.He attended more than 57 Pugwash meetings and played acrucial role in the Pugwash Vietnam backchannel, aninitiative credited with laying the groundwork for thesubsequent Paris peace negotiations.

Personal life and scientific career

Herbert Marcovich died in Rueil-Malmaison, near Paris,on November 7th, 2009.

He was born in Cairo on October 10th, 1920 in acosmopolitan environment. He became a French citizen in1933, thanks to his father, a newspaper editor. After hisfather’s death, in 1935 the family moved to Alexandria.

In 1938, Herbert moved to Paris at the age of 18 to studymedicine. The anti-Jewish laws obliged the family to fleethe capital in 1942. After a few months in the free zone,where he worked in a factory in St Amand Montrond, thefamily tried to reach Spain across the Pyrénées. They werestopped and locked in the Castelmodelo jail. In late 1943,he managed to reach Algeria and he joined the free Frencharmy as a doctor in the Spahis unit with which he tookpart in fighting in the Vosges and Germany.

Upon his demobilisation, he resumed his medical studies;he had always been passionately interested in research.He joined the Centre National de la Recherche Scien-tifique in 1949 in the laboratory of Boris Ephrusssi at theOrsay University (Paris). He then joined the departmentof Radiology and Oncology, working with Professor A.Lacassagne at the Pasteur Institute in Paris. From 1952 to1967, he worked with Professor Latarjet at the RadiumInstitute on mutagenesis under the action of ionizing radi-ation. In 1967 he joined the Institute of Microbiology ofthe Orsay University (Paris). He was reinstated at thePasteur Institute in 1975 as Head of the Laboratory in therecently established Genetic Engineering Unit. Until hisretirement, he worked on cellular aging and oncogenictransformation of viral origin.

Author of numerous publications, he developed in 1976with David Perrin, a unit of production “pure” waterhumorously called “gold water”, the patent for which wasfiled by the Institut Pasteur.

Marcovich was a man of vast literary culture, who lovedmusic. His family writes that they “will never forget hismastery of the flute and cello.”

Involvement in Pugwash

According to Marcovich’s family, “The dramatic events heexperienced during the Second World War and his life-long commitment to research in basic sciences led him toengage early on in the Pugwash Conferences. He agreedfully with the organisation’s perspective that scientific,rigorous analysis prevails in arguments of authority,ideology or power. Without vain illusions but with convic-tion, his shared the goal of preventing armed confronta-tion in solving conflicts of this world.”

Herbert Marcovich was involved with Pugwash from theearliest days, having been invited to become involved byAntoine Lacassagne, upon his return from the first confer-ence in Pugwash, Nova Scotia in 1957. Marcovichexpressed surprise, however, nearly 50 years later in aninterview, that he was asked to be one of five members onthe first continuing committee (which later became thePugwash Council). He said that when he asked JosephRotblat why he was being chosen, Rotblat replied“because you answer my letters.” Marcovich laughedabout this later, saying he was “not diplomatic at all,” andthis shocked the Soviets. According to Marcovich, Artsi-movich referred to him as the “bête noire”.

Marcovich went on to attend 57 international Pugwashmeetings between 1959 – 2001, in addition to his involve-ment with the French Pugwash group. He would speak ofthe friendly attitude that existed at the meetings, despitemany disputes with the Soviets. For example, he remem-bered discussions with Millionshchikov about the freedomin the West to read all sorts of publications.

Herbert Marcovich1920–2009

O B I T U A R I E S


Perhaps most famously, Marcovich played a key role in alittle-known Pugwash back channel to Ho Chi Minhduring 1967. Code named “PENNSYLVANIA”, thisinitiative involved Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara,and President Johnson himself, in the search for anopening to dialogue with North Vietnam.

The initiative grew out of a small meeting in Paris in June1967, that was originally scheduled to discuss the Six-DayWar and Vietnam. The meeting went forward despite thefact the Six-Day War ended before the meeting was held.The meeting involved Androssian (USSR), Bauer (France),Doty (USA), Feld (USA), Marcovich (France), Million-shchikov (USSR), Perrin (France), and Rotblat (PugwashSecretary-General). Henry Kissinger, who had beeninvolved in prior Pugwash activities, was in Paris at thetime, and was invited to come to the meeting.

At the meeting Kissinger made a comment that the WhiteHouse would stop bombing the North, if Hanoi wouldcommit to not take advantage of this pause to increasetheir infiltration to the South. The statement was consid-ered interesting, and when Kissinger implied the NorthVietnamese were not aware of this, discussion turned towhat role Pugwash might play in discussing such anoption with Hanoi. As Marcovich wrote in a 1976 articlein the Pugwash Newsletter, “The desire to take advantageof any opportunity to be useful in such a tragic situationled to the proposal to send to Hanoi a Pugwashite toconvey this information.” Through connections in FrenchPugwash, Raymond Aubrac was brought into the picture.Aubrac was a former leader of the French Resistance whowas personal friends with Ho Chi Minh. Both Aubracand Marcovich insist that they considered this only aproposal that arose from the Pugwash meeting, and not adirect message from the US government. Marcovichacknowledged in the 1976 piece that they were “[i]n igno-rance of preceding secret negotiations and of the circum-stances of their failure.”

Aubrac had rejected earlier approaches by other groups touse his personal connection with Ho Chi Minh, but heaccepted this opportunity due to Pugwash’s reputation.What followed must have been a whirlwind of activity forMarcovich and the others. They had to receive funding forthe trip (this came from a private dinner where high rankingpeople were asked to donate without being told why).

They were unable to get a visa to go directly to Hanoi, sothey stopped first in Phnom Penh, where with the help of

an Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett they weregranted visas for Hanoi, and they traveled to Hanoi on 21July 1967 and stayed there for four days of meeting withofficials. Aubrac met privately with Ho Chi Minh. Upontheir return to Paris, they spent a whole day debriefingwith Henry Kissinger. There was a decision made tocontinue to use this channel. A planned second visit toHanoi was apparently scuppered by the poorly timed USbombing of a bridge. The channel stayed open throughOctober. The available volumes of official documentsabout PENNSYLVANIA show how seriously this channelwas taken on the US side, and how high the connectionsreached. There was one point in the negotiations whereMarcovich and Aubrac felt the wording of a documentwas improperly translated, resulting in “could” ratherthan “would”. Marcovich later said the temptation hadbeen overwhelming to change this, but they remained trueto the wording they were given. Following the collapse ofthis route, Kissinger continued to try to use Pugwashchannels, this time involving the Soviets, into early 1968.

In a 1996 interview with Harry Kreisler, McNamara cred-ited PENNSYLVANIA with laying the groundwork for theSan Antonio accords, “the foundation for the start of thenegotiations between North Vietnam and the U.S. inParis.” In a book by McNamara and others, called Argu-ment Without End, which is an interesting meetingbetween former US and Vietnamese officials, a formerofficial in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in HanoiNguyen Khac Huynh said, “PENNSYLVANIA did notfail. PENNSYLVANIA proved to us in the ForeignMinistry of the DRV—and to the leadership—that talkswere about to begin. As such, it gave tremendous supportand encouragement to those of us who were at thatmoment working on a negotiating strategy. We were veryencouraged…. PENNSYLVANIA succeeded severalmonths after it was initiated, because it provided the basisfor beginning the Paris peace process. There is youranswer. Our ears were not ‘deaf.’ We ‘heard’ you. And wegave you our answer after Tet.” Some have said that theinitiative could not have moved forward because it coin-cided with planning that was underway for Tet.Marcovich said in his 1976 article that some asserted thatMcNamara’s departure from the US DoD was linked insome way to the ‘failure’ of PENNSYLVANIA.

Marcovich was an understated man. Despite his namehaving been known worldwide for a period of time whenpartial information about this initiative became available


in the early 1970s, he was humble about his role in thisimportant history. He concluded the 1976 article with thefollowing: “Since then, Raymond Aubrac has become aninterested participant in the Pugwash Conferences. As forHenry Kissinger, M had the opportunity to see him twicein the White House, and to exchange Christmas greetingscards. Kissinger’s name has sometimes appeared in theinternational press. M went back to his lab.”

This obituary was compiled by former Pugwash CouncilMember Venance Journé (based on correspondence withMarcovich’s family) and Director of the Pugwash HistoryProject Sandra Ionno Butcher, with input from researcherGordon Wyn Jones.

Please note: a new edition of the Pugwash History series,focused on PENNSYLVANIA, is due to be published laterthis spring. Written by Sandra Ionno Butcher andGordon Wyn Jones, it will go into greater detail, based onprimary source documents and interviews.

Carl Kaysen(1920–2010)

Carl Kaysen, professor emeritus of political economy atMIT and a leading figure in US national security affairs formany decades, died on February 8, 2010 in Cambridge,Mass.

In the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, Kaysenwas deputy special assistant to McGeorge Bundy, the pres-ident’s national security advisor. Kaysen was also Presi-dent Kennedy’s personal representative to talks thatresulted in the 1963 signing of the Partial Test Ban Treatyto prevent nuclear bomb tests in the atmosphere, under-water, and outer space.

During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, Kaysenplayed a key role in coordinating White House foreignpolicy while the President, Bundy, Robert McNamara andother officials focused on the Russian nuclear missiles inCuba.

Kaysen was born in Philadelphia and did graduate work atColumbia and Harvard universities before later teachingat both Harvard and MIT and being the director of theInstitute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J. DuringWorld War II, Kaysen was involved as an intelligenceofficer in the strategic bombing campaign againstGermany.

Prof. Kaysen first attended a Pugwash meeting in January1964 – the 12th Pugwash Conference in Udaipur, India –and continued his involvement with Pugwash for the next40 years. He was the cochair of the Committee on Inter-national Security Studies at the American Academy of Artsand Sciences in Cambridge, Mass.


The Russian Pugwash Committee noted with deep regretthe sudden death of Academician Alexey N. Sissakian, onMay 1, 2010.

Son of a famous Soviet scientist, Nikolay, who himselfparticipated in Pugwash activities in the 1950s and 1960s,Alexey Sisskian distinguished himself in the field ofelementary particle physics as well as theoretical andmathematical physics. He was department chair at theMoscowInstitute of technical physics and the NationalResearch Nuclear Unversity - MIPHI, and Professor atLomonosov Moscow State University. For many years hewas also a researcher at the Joint Institute for NuclearResearch (JINR) in Dubna, Moscow Region. In 2006Acad. Sissakyan was elected as a Director of JINR.

Alexey Sissakyan was Acting Member (Academician) ofthe Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) and member ofthe RAS Presidium. He was also elected as a President ofUnion of Scientific Cities of the Russian Federation.

In 2007 he began his active participation in the activity ofthe Russian Pugwash Committee. Acad. Sissakian wasorganizer and Chairman of the Dubna branch of theRussian Pugwash. In 2009 he was approved by the RASPresidium as the First Deputy Chairman of RussianPugwash Committee.

Acad. Sissakian helped organize several Russian Pugwashmeetings, and he helped facilitate the visit of the Presidentof the Pugwash Conferences, Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala,to Dubna in June 2009. He also participated at the 58th

Pugwash Conference, held in the Hague, Netherlands, inApril 2009.

His colleagues and friends shall miss not just his scientifictalents, but his kind personality, poetic talent, and interestin science history.

Mikhail A. Lebedev,Russian Pugwash Committee

Alexey Sissakian(1944-2010)

Academician Albert Nikiforovich Tavkhelidze passedaway on 27 February 2010, age 80. Tavkhelidze was anoutstanding physicist and science organizer, the GeorgianPlenipotentiary to the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research(JINR, Dubna, Moscow Region), a member of the JINRScientific Council, one of the establishers and a scientificsupervisor of the RAS Institute for Nuclear Research, andthe laureate of the Lenin Prize and the State Prizes. Hewas also President of the Georgian Academy of Sciences(1986-2006) and a member of the Presidium of theAcademy of Sciences of the USSR.

Academician Tavkhelidze was active in the PugwashConferences for more than 30 years, beginning in 1976.From 1992 to 2006 he was Chairman of the GeorgianNational Pugwash Committee.

Tavkhelidze was devoted to science; he was notable for hisrare sense of purpose and working capacity, and for hisability to unite people to implement ambitious goals. Hewas demanding to himself and to his colleagues, and at thesame time, he was a kind and sympathetic person. He willbe greatly missed by his colleagues, friends, and family.

Academician Yury RyzhovChairman, Russian Pugwash Committee

Albert Tavkhelidze (1930–2010)


Eric Lars Tollefson, a longtime member of the CanadianPugwash group, passed away in Calgary, Alberta onSeptember 20, 2009. Born October 15, 1921, in MooseJaw, Saskatchewan and raised on the family farm nearMossbank, Eric earned his B.A. Honors and M.A. fromthe University of Saskatchewan and a Ph.D. in PhysicalChemistry from the University of Toronto. He thenworked with the National Research Council in Ottawabefore moving to Tulsa, Oklahoma, where he worked withStandard Oil of Indiana. In 1967, Eric was invited to jointhe Chemical and Petroleum Engineering Department of

the University of Calgary and ultimately became Head ofthe Department. Eric was very concerned about theimpact on the environment posed by the burning of fossilfuels, and the threat to civilization from nuclear weapons.He served as the first Chairperson of the University ofCalgary Peace and Conflict Resolution Study Group andon the Executive of the Canadian Pugwash Group. Ericattended a total of ten international Pugwash meetings,from the 31st Pugwash Conference held in Banff, Albertain August 1981 to the 47th Pugwash Conference held inLillehammer, Norway in August 1997.

Eric Lars Tollefson (1921–2009)

Dr. Alexander A. Pikayev, a leading Russian expert indisarmament and arms control, died at his home in Maltaat the age of 48.

Dr. Pikayev was Head of Department of Disarmament andConflict Resolution Studies of the Center for InternationalSecurity at the Institute of World Economy and Interna-tional Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy ofSciences (RAS). In addition, he was an advisor to thedeputy of the State Duma (Parliament) of the RussianFederation, Deputy Chairman of the Committee ofRussian scientists for global security, and a member of theScientific Council of the Moscow Carnegie Center.

For several years, Dr. Pikayev was Scientific Editor of theRussian version of SIPRI Yearbook, scientific leader of theIMEMO Yearbook on Disarmament and Security, andeditor-in-chief of Nuclear Proliferation magazine.

Dr. Alexander Pikayev was very active in Pugwash Confer-ences programs and projects. Since 1996 he had partici-pated in many international Pugwash workshops andconsultations on nuclear forces and chemical weapons,and other key problems of international relations andsecurity. Since 2001 he was a member of the RussianPugwash Committee under the RAS Presidium.

Mikhail A. LebedevRussian Pugwash Committee

Alexander Pikayev (1962-2010)


E X - O F F I C I O M E M B E R S

PresidentAmb. Jayantha Dhanapala is a formerUnder-Secretary-General for Disarma-ment Affairs at the United Nations(1998-2003), and former Ambassador ofSri Lanka to the US (1995-97) and to theUN Office in Geneva (1984-87). He iscurrently Chairman of the UN UniversityCouncil, a member of the GoverningBoard of SIPRI, and several other advi-sory boards of international bodies. Healso has been a member of both theCanberra Commission (1996) and theWMD Commission (2006).

Secretary-GeneralProf. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino is SecretaryGeneral of the Pugwash Conferences(since August 2002) and Professor ofMathematical Physics at the University ofMilan. He is the former Director of theProgram on Science, Technology andInternational Security, Landau Network–Centro Volta, Como, and former Secre-tary General of the Union of Italian Scien-tists for Disarmament (USPID).

Executive DirectorDr. Jeffrey Boutwell is Executive Directorof the Pugwash Conferences on Scienceand World Affairs, former AssociateExecutive Officer at the American Acad -emy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge,and former Staff Aide at the NationalSecurity Council in Washington, DC.

Former Secretary GeneralProf. Francesco Calogero is Professor ofTheoretical Physics at the University ofRome “La Sapienza”. Formerly, he wasSecretary General of Pugwash (1989-1997), Chair of the Pugwash Council(1997-2002), and a member of theGoverning Board of SIPRI (1982-1992).

= = = = = = = = = =

Amb. (ret.) Ochieng Adala, of the AfricaPeace Forum (APFO) in Nairobi, Kenya,is former Permanent Representative ofKenya to the United Nations in NewYork (1992-93), former Deputy Secre-tary/Director for Political Affairs,Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Interna-tional Cooperation (1988-92), and

former Ambassador of Kenya to the ArabRepublic of Egypt, the Kingdom ofMorocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

Amb. Sergey Batsanov is Director of theGeneva Office of International Pugwash,member of the Pugwash CBW SteeringCommittee, and member of the Interna-tional Advisory Board of the GenevaCentre for the Democratic Control ofArmed Forces (DCAF). He is formerDirector of Special Projects at the Organi-zation for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (OPCW) in The Hague, andformer Representative of theUSSR/Russian Federation to the Confer-ence on Disarmament, Geneva (1989-93).

Dr. Adele Buckley is a physicist, engineerand environmental scientist, and pastChair of the Canadian Pugwash Group.She was formerly Vice President of Tech-nology & Research at the Ontario Centrefor Environmental Technology Advance-ment (OCETA) in Toronto, Ontario,Canada.

Dr. Lynn Eden is Associate Director forResearch and Senior Research Scholar atthe Center for International Security andCooperation (CISAC), Freeman SpogliInstitute for International Studies (FSI),Stanford University in California, and co-chair of the US Pugwash Committee.

Prof. John Finney is Professor of Physicsin the Department of Physics andAstronomy at University College London,Deputy Chairman of the British PugwashGroup, and Chair of the WMD Aware-ness Programme. His former positionsinclude: Professor of Crystallography atBirkbeck College in London; Chief Scien-tist at the ISIS Facility of the RutherfordAppleton Laboratory; and Science Coor-dinator for the European SpallationSource Project.

Prof. Galia Golan-Gild is Professor ofGovernment at the InterdisciplinaryCenter (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel, andProfessor Emerita in the Department ofPolitical Science at The Hebrew Univer-sity of Jerusalem, where she was alsoDarwin Professor of Soviet and EastEuropean Studies, and Chair of theDepartment of Political Science.

Prof. Karen Hallberg is Professor ofPhysics at the Instituto Balseiro (Bari -loche, Argentina), Research Fellow of theArgentine National Council of Scienceand Technology at the Centro AtomicoBariloche (National Commission ofAtomic Energy), Fellow of the Guggen-heim Foundation, Member of the boardof the Latin American Center of Physics(CLAF), Commission Member of theInternational Union for Pure and AppliedPhysics (IUPAP), and member of theBariloche Group for Science and WorldAffairs (Argentine Pugwash branch). Shewas formerly a member of the Board ofthe Argentine Physical Association.

Dr. Peter Jones is Associate Professor inthe Graduate School of Public and Inter-national Affairs at the University ofOttawa, Ontario, Canada. He wasformerly: Senior Policy Advisor, Securityand Intelligence Secretariat, Privy CouncilOffice, Ottawa (The Prime Minister’sDepartment), Project Leader, Middle EastProject, Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute (SIPRI) and DeskOfficer in the Arms Control and Disar-mament Division Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade, Ottawa.

Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said isHead of the Military Studies Unit andTechnology Advisor at the Al-AhramCenter for Political and Strategic Studies,Al-Ahram Foundation in Cairo, Egypt,and Member of the Committee ofStrategic Planning of the EgyptianCouncil of Space Science and Technology.

Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu is AssociateProfessor (non-proliferation, arms control& disarmament matters) in the Interna-tional Relations Department of BilkentUniversity, Ankara, Turkey, and wasformerly with the International SecurityProgram & Project on Managing the Atomat the Belfer Center for Science and Inter-national Affairs, John F. Kennedy Schoolof Government, Harvard University.

Mr. Sverre Lodgaard is former Directorof the Norwegian Institute of Interna-tional Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, formerDirector of the United Nations Institutefor Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in

Pugwash Council for the 2007–2012 Quinquennium


Geneva, and former Director of the PeaceResearch Institute of Oslo (PRIO).

Prof. Saideh Lotfian is AssociateProfessor of Political Science at theUniversity of Tehran. She was formerlyDeputy Director of the Center for MiddleEast Strategic Studies (1996-2002), andVisiting Iranian Fellow at St. Antony’sCollege, Oxford University (2003).

Dr. Riad Malki is Minister of ForeignAffairs and Minister of Information ofthe Palestinian National Authority. He isalso Director General of Panorama (ThePalestinian Center for the Disseminationof Democracy and Community Develop-ment) in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestine,and formerly taught at BirZeit UniversitySchool of Engineering.

Amb. Miguel Marin-Bosch is Professor ofDisarmament and International Security,President of Desarmex (an NGO inMéxico, D. F.), and a former DeputyForeign Minister of Mexico.

Gen. (ret.) Talat Masood, IndependentColumnist, Commentator and Analyst,Islamabad, Pakistan [formerly: retired Lt.General; Secretary, Defence ProductionDivision, Ministry of Defence; Chairman,Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board;various command, staff and instructionalappointments in the armed forces]

Prof. Amitabh Mattoo is Vice Chancellorof the University of Jammu, Jammu,J&K, India, a Member of the PrimeMinister’s Task Force on Global StrategicDevelopments, and Professor of Disarma-ment Studies at the School of Interna-tional Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru Univer-sity (JNU), New Delhi. He was formerlya Member of the National Security Advisory Board of India.

Dr. Steven Miller is Director of the Inter-national Security Program of the BelferCenter for Science and InternationalAffairs at Harvard University’s KennedySchool of Government, Editor-in-chief ofthe quarterly International Security, andCo-chair of the US Pugwash Committee.Formerly, he was a Senior ResearchFellow at the Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Institute (SIPRI), and

taught defense and arms control studiesin the Political Science Department at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology.

Prof. Marie Muller is Dean of the Facultyof Humanities, former Director of theCentre for International Political Studiesat the University of Pretoria, formerCouncil Member of the Academy ofScience of South Africa, and former(Founding) Chair of the Pugwash SouthAfrica Group.

Prof. Götz Neuneck is a physicistworking on international security issuesand technical aspects of arms control. Heis currently Project Leader of the “Inter-disciplinary Research Group Disarma-ment, Arms Control and New Technolo-gies” at the Institute for Peace Researchand Security Policy (IFSH) in Hamburg.He teaches in the postgraduate Master’sProgramme “Peace and InternationalSecurity”, is a Member of the Council ofthe German Physical Society (DPG), andDeputy Chairman of the Working Group“Physics and Disarmament” in the DPG.

Dr. Alexander Nikitin is Director of theCenter for Political and InternationalStudies (CPIS), Vice Chairman of theRussian Pugwash Committee of Scientistsfor Disarmament and International Secu-rity, Professor at Moscow State Institutefor International Relations, President ofthe Russian Political Science Association,Director of the Center for Euro-AtlanticSecurity of MGIMO University, andBoard Member of the Russian Academyof Political Sciences.

Mr. Niu Qiang is Secretary General andSenior Researcher at the Chinese People’sAssociation for Peace and Disarmament(CPAPD) in Beijing, China.

Gen. Pan Zhengqiang is DeputyChairman of the China Foundation ofInternational Studies, a retired MajorGeneral in the Chinese People’s Army,and former Director of the Institute ofStrategic Studies.

Acad. Yuri Ryzhov is President of theInternational Engineering University inMoscow, Chair of the Russian PugwashGroup, Academician of the Russian

Academy of Sciences, former Member ofthe Presidential Council of the RussianFederation, and former AmbassadorExtraordinary and Plenipotentiary ofRussia to France.

Prof. Ivo Slaus is Director of the WorldAcademy for Southeast Europe Division,President of Croatian Pugwash, aMember of the Club of Rome, and aFellow of the Academia Europea.Formerly, he was a Member of the Croa-tian Parliament, Chairman of the Parlia-mentary Subcommittee on Science,Higher Education & Technology,Professor of Physics at Rudjer BoskovicInstitute, and Foreign Secretary of theCroatian Academy of Sciences & Arts.

Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh is a SouthKorean political scientist, Chairman ofthe Corea Trust Fund, and a VisitingScholar at the Institute for Peace Affairs(IPA) in Seoul. He was formerly a SeniorResearcher and Korean Co-ordinator ofthe Free University of Berlin in Germany,President of the Korean Pugwash Group,and member of the Presidential AdvisoryCouncil on Peaceful and DemocraticUnification of Korea.

Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki is Visiting Professorat the Graduate School of Public Policy(GRASPP) at The University of Tokyo, anAssociate Vice President at the Socio-economic Research Center of the CentralResearch Institute of Electric PowerIndustry (CRIEPI) in Tokyo, and Co-Founder of Peace Pledge in Japan. Hewas formerly Professor at Keio UniversityGraduate School of Media and Gover-nance (April 2001-March 2004), VisitingAssociate Professor in the Department ofQuantum Engineering and SystemsScience at the University of Tokyo.

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan is Senior Scien-tific Researcher at the Energy ResearchCenter of the Netherlands (ECN) inAmsterdam and at Columbia University’sEarth Institute in New York. He has heldformer research positions at the BCSIA atHarvard University, IVM at the VrijeUniversiteit Amsterdam, CISAC at Stan-ford University, IFRI in Paris, and CERNin Geneva.

Calendar of Future Pugwash Meetings

2011

9-16 January 2011 24th ISODARCO Winter Course on Eliminating NuclearAndalo (Trento), Italy Weapons and Safeguarding Nuclear Technologies

17-20 June 2011* 59th Pugwash Conference on Science and World AffairsBerlin, Germany

* Tentative

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

President Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala

Secretary-General Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Executive Director Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Pugwash Council

Chair Professor Saideh Lotfian

Members Ambassador Ochieng Adala

Ambassador Serguei Batsanov

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Dr. Adele Buckley

Professor Francesco Calogero

Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala

Dr. Lynn Eden

Professor John Finney

Professor Galia Golan-Gild

Professor Karen Hallberg

Professor Peter Jones

Maj. Gen. Mohamed Kadry Said

Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu

Mr. Sverre Lodgaard

Pugwash Executive Committee

Chairman Dr. Steven Miller

Members Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala

Prof. John Finney

Mr. Sverre Lodgaard

Dr. Riad Malki

Ambassador Miguel Marin-Bosch

Gen. (ret.) Talat Masood

Professor Amitabh Mattoo

Dr. Steven Miller

Professor Marie Muller

Dr. Götz Neuneck

Dr. Niu Qiang

Dr. Alexander Nikitin

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang

Academician Yuri Ryzhov

Professor Ivo Slaus

Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh

Dr. Tatsu Suzuki

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan

Dr. Götz Neuneck

Dr. Alexander Nikitin

Prof. Saideh Lotfian

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang

Geneva Office16 rue de la Voie-Creuse1211 Geneva, SwitzerlandPhone: **41-22-919-7920Fax: **41-22-919-7925E-mail: [email protected]

Washington, DC Office1111 19th Street NWSuite 1200Washington, DC 20036Phone: **1-202-478-3440Fax: **1-202-238-9604E-mail: [email protected]

London OfficeFlat A Museum Mansions63A Great Russell StreetLondon WC1B 3BJ, EnglandPhone: **44-20-7405-6661Fax: **44-20-7831-5651E-mail: [email protected]

Rome OfficePugwash Conferencesvia dei Riari 86I-00165 Rome, ItalyPhone: **39-06-6878376E-mail: [email protected]