new strategies of the tatmadaw in northern kayin state and bago region

8/7/2019 New Strategies of the Tatmadaw in Northern Kayin State and Bago Region

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New Strategies of the Tatmadaw inNorthern Kayin State and Bago Region,

Myanmar

November 2010

Kim Jolliffe


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Notes on Methodology

The following information has been compiled primarily from retired Western Special

Forces working in Eastern Myanmar with various urban and rural underground andresistance forces, who therefore have access to intelligence coming from these sources.

Other sources include persons closely associated with the Karen National LiberationArmy, security experts that have spent time in the region, as well as a number of publicsecondary sources that are cited accordingly.

Aside from the public secondary sources, citations are not provided. This report willtherefore be approached with a certain amount of skepticism. While this is understoodby the author, who is also not in position to assert any of the following information to be

absolute, undisputed fact, all readers with stakes in the region are strongly advised toanticipate the realization of its fundamental predictions

Notes on Terminology

Throughout this paper the author aims to denominate all institutions, organizations,

governments and people groups with the most common designation self-assigned by therespective entity or its ruling government in the English language, to avoid politicization.

However, in some cases the author has used a shortened version.

Myanmar is officially known as the The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. It is oftenreferred to as Burma, a shortened version of its previous official denominationThe Myanmar Governmentis officially known as the Government of the Republic of theUnion of Myanmar. It often referred to as the State Peace Development Council orinformally as the the Burmese Junta or the Burmese RegimeThe Tatmadaw is a transliteration of the Burmese term and is used by Myanmar Statemedia. The countrys armed forces are often referred to as the Burma Army or, more

recently, as the Myanmar Armed Forces. The armed forces itself is also commonlyreferred to as the State Peace and Development CouncilBago Regionis often referred to as Pegu Division, its previous official denominationKayin Stateis often referred to as Karen State, its previous official denominationThe Karen and Karenni Ethnic Groupsare referred to by many as Kayin and Kayahrespectively, as a transliteration of the pronunciation used in the Burmese languageThe Bamar ethnic group is often referred to in English as Burman or by fewer,

Burmese. Although, the latter is more commonly an unofficial term used for all MyanmarcitizensThahan Prahnis a transliteration of the Thai term taken from Des Balls Boys in Black

The Thanlwin River is the Burmese name. However, the Thai pronunciation, which isvery similar to the Karen, Karenni and Shan, can be transliterated as Salween, Salawinor Salaween.


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Executive Summary

Following general elections in Myanmar, a predicted post-election push from the

Tatmadaw to wipe out the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) now seemscertain to materialize, focusing on northern Kayin State and Eastern BagoRegion.

Decades of unnecessarily protracted conflict in the region, perpetuated by

civilian-targeted counter-insurgency (COIN)methods, have forced the Tatmadawto shift their approach to the insurgency significantly. Indicators in the field showthat The Myanmar Government may now be borrowing methods from theGovernment of Sri Lankas successful COIN strategy used against the Liberation

Tamil Tigers of Ealam in 2008 (LTTE). This strategy would include theassassination of key leaders, the pinpointing of key bases and the herding ofKNLA forces and civilians into kill zones using heli-borne forces. The final phase

of these hammer and anvil tactics is the obliteration of everyone in kill zonesusing massed artillery.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) activities have been undertaken by the Tatmadawin the region for the past two and a half years, aimed at developing networks oflocal informants. This has set the stage for the introduction of hunter-tracker

teams now training in the region, whose mission is to pinpoint key KNLAindividuals and basing. From the resistance forces perspective, theTatmadaws recent construction of helipads along the Thanlwin (Salween) Riverand its purchase of fifty helicopters signal unambiguous intent to envelop KNLAfrom the rear.

The Tatmadaw has been methodical and in no apparent rush to develop this newcapacity in what appears to be an economy-of-force effort to destroy the KNLA.This is likely because it has failed to defeat KNLA frontally in the field or indirectly

by forcing it to become a border guard force under the Tatmadaws command.

Following a decades-long trend of receiving tacit and explicit support from the

West, the KNU has recently received backing from Western corporate leaders todocument the Tatmadaws activities in detail using hi-tech remote-controlledcameras and other associated technology.


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Contents

1. Current Context

2. A shift in strategy

2.1 Tatmadaw COIN strategies in recent decades

2.2 New Developments and Their Origins

- 2.2.1 The Sri-Lanka Connection

- 2.2.2 The strategy fundamentals

3. The Offensive3.1 Visible Tatmadaw actions

3.2 Expectations of coming events


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1. Current Context

Following general elections in Myanmar, a 61-year war continues between theTatmadaw and the Karen National Union (KNU) and their allies, the KarenniNational Progressive Party (KNPP)in the east. A final push from the Tatmadawto wipe out the KNUs armed wing, Karen National Liberation Army has for thepast 2 years been expected to come after the elections, a scenario which nowseems certain to materialize once the former are ready.

The KNUs last remaining stronghold, which corresponds closely to the areasdenomintaed Hpapun Township, Kayin State and Nyaunglebin District, BagoRegion by the Government, will be the prime target. Since 2007, eastern parts ofthis region have seen routine burning of villages and attacks on KNLA bases,

while areas closer to the border have been kept sectioned off and isolated byTatmadaw troops guarding supply roads. This has been coordinated alongside

efforts to maintain a state of blanket instability in the isolated regions by use oflandmines, mortar attacks on farms and markets, as well as attacks on civilians,including torture, harassment, rape, and extrajudicial killing.

This month, Myanmars ruling generals have undertaken the fifth step in their 7-step roadmap to democracy, which can be understood more accurately as anoverall effort to rationalize and centralize the countrys political and economicstructures, reshuffle military to suit those most loyal to Than Shwe, and develop amore internationally-friendly environment to encourage investment and closer ties

from the fast growing economies across all borders. While numerousstakeholders in the country unaligned with Than Shwe have persisted to use thisshift in approach towards governance to develop a more diverse politicallandscape, the process has been successfully dominated by the senior general.However, their efforts have achieved unprecedented successes in theproliferation of legitimate civil society and the loosening of restrictions on themedia and information technology, which was previously an instrument solely

used by successive military juntas to suit their aims.

Tantamount to Than Shwes endeavor to reshape the countrys economy has

been the elimination or total subjugation of all political opposition outside of themilitarys direct rule, both armed and non-armed. The primary obstacle to thisundertaking has been the vigilance of armed opposition groups in predominantly

non-Bamar ethnic regions, attempting to govern and achieve greater autonomyfor the populations of their respective ethnic group.

Less threatening in recent years has been the non-armed opposition in urbanareas and exile. Reliant primarily on the fosterage of public dissent and political


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defiance, as well as encouragement of international pressure through isolation,this movement has been rendered increasingly ineffectual by the Government.This has been accomplished by use of violent retribution for acts of dissent, theprotracted detainment of iconic leader Aung San Suu Kyi, augmentation of

regional economic ties and, in the past 3 years, the allowance of relative

proliferation of civil society addressing civilian needs in non-conflict regions.

The Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing the KNLA, have played asignificant role in both the ethnic armed opposition movement and the non-armed political movement for decades, aligning their political wing closely withnon-armed opposition groups in exile. During this period, neither The Myanmar

Government, nor previous ruling military juntas, have attempted to hold evenly-matched negotiations with the KNU based on the organisations role as thegovernors of Karen citizens of Myanmar, making the emphasis on militaryactivities necessary to the latter to try to remain relevant and force bilateral talks.

From the Governments viewpoint, the KNLA, alongside the KNPP, haveremained the symbol of longest-standing resistance to Tatmadaw since 1949.The length of this resistance adds further insult, as it underscores the failure ofTatmadaw.

For the Government, elimination of the KNUs power base is crucial at this stage

in order to gain secure access to Hpapun townships border with Thailand,primarily for trade; augment its rule in nearby contested regions; andpsychologically damage the violent and non-violent opposition movements.Furthermore, the territories in which the group remains in control or has a

presence are critical to secure the construction and maintenance of the Wei Gyi,Dagwin, Hatgyi and Kyauk Naga hydropower dams, primarily for sale of power toThailand, as well as the exploitation of the regions extensive logging and miningpotential. The financial potential of the region is likely in the billions and is key toThan Shwes long-term plans to secure power in the hands of his lineages andclose corporate associates before retirement.

2. A shift in strategy

2.1 Tatmadaw COIN strategies in recent decades

For over 30 years, the Tatmadaws primary counter-insurgency (COIN) strategyin the Mountainous regions of Kayin State and Bago Region has been terrain-centric, visibly focusing on securing key routes to critical terrain for mining andhydropower production. In order to secure these targets, it has undertaken a

continual forcible relocation program that aims to destroy civilian settlements,destabilize communities out of reach and systematically move all civilians inenemy-dominated and contested regions into areas under the Governments


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control. While ensuring access to human resources, this has served to weakenthe civilian support base upon which the insurgents depend.

Ruthlessness has allowed the army to slowly remove the majority of insurgency

threats in Myanmar by dividing alliances, forcing ceasefire agreements, and

responding to the most persistent insurgents with disproportionate force andviolent intimidation methods thought to have been learned from the Japaneseduring World War 2.

However, these COIN methods have arguably prolonged the conflictunnecessarily and further entrenched xenophobia among non-Bamar citizens,

fueling anti-government sentiments, and thus the insurgents support bases.They have also given opposition movements significantly more clout when callingfor the international community to apply pressure to the Government.

Another self-imposed hindrance which has burdened the Government has been

the poor allocation of funds. While spending vast sums on building the newcapital Napyidaw, its extensive network of bunkers and tunnels and a poorly-runnuclear program, salaries and even ration supplies for military personnel havebeen minimal leading to low moral from the battalion commander level down.There have been reports in recent years through multiple channels of unitsfighting one another, work stoppages and desertions, as indications of this. Up

against nationalist armies, fueled by the belief they are the only hope to protecttheir ethnicity from total subjugation, these under-nourished, underpaid andlargely apathetic troops suffered kill rations of over 80:1 in some Karen regionsover the past year. While continuing to have the upper hand overall, the

Tatmadaw were making unnecessary sacrifices.

The successful assassination of highly revered leader Padoh Mahn Shah in 2008caused catastrophe not just for the KNU, but for the pro-democracy movement inexile and chances for an evolution towards peace between the various Karenarmies. The success of this method proved the viability for using this on a largerscale to defeat oppositions groups by literally taking off their heads, as one

source put it. This has been achieved with a number of other armed oppositionleaders since.i Subsequent attempts to assassinate Karen leaders have beenless successful than planned, largely due to incompetence and leakages fromwithin the government-aligned splinter group Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

(DKBA).

2.2 New Developments and Their Origins

2.2.1 The Sri-Lanka Connection


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The Myanmar Government and Government of Sri Lanka have undertakeninformation exchange on COIN methods and it now appears that a shift instrategy occurred among Tatmadaw leaders a number of years ago, which willlikely be seen on the ground in coming years if not months. New methods look

like they have been adapted from those used by the Government of Sri Lanka in

2008 to bring an end to the insurgency of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Ealam(LTTE).

Connections between the two militaries are public and well-documented. In May2009, representatives of both countries spoke at the 2009 Shangri-La Dialogue,an event which saw multiple Governments hail the Government of Sri Lankas

COIN success. The Shangri-La Dialogue is an annual convention that accordingto its website, is the most important regular gathering of defence professionalsin the region and has become a vital annual fixture in the diaries of Asia-Pacificdefence ministers and their civilian and military chiefs of staff.ii

At the event, Myanmars speaker, the then Deputy Minister of Defence, MajorGeneral Aye Myint, proclaimed, The world has already witnessed the successfulend of a longstanding insurgency in Sri Lanka, but people have forgotten aboutinsurgency in Myanmar. He then indicated a shift in his own armed forces approach to COIN, stating, We have realised that hard power alone is not fullyeffective in winning counter-insurgency campaigns. Therefore, we are

painstakingly and patiently solving the problem of insurgency. iii

Subsequently in June 2009, Than Shwe and other leading generals visited SriLanka to mark the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two

countries, where the senior general was thanked by President MahindaRajapakse for the The Myanmar Governments support to "combat illegalactivities carried out by the LTTE in the past and in drug trafficking in the region."

The Myanmar Government gave a goodwill donation of 50,000 USD and wasoffered placements for two officials of the Tatmadaw to be trained at theKothalawala Defence Academy to strengthen the cooperation in combating

terrorism and intelligence sharing. iv

Numerous indicators visible both on the ground in Northern Kayin State and fromethnic opposition groups intelligence networks show that these agreements have

taken effect and that methods adapted from those used in Sri Lanka in 2008 arelikely to take place in Myanmar soon.

2.2.2 The strategy fundamentals

The Tatmadaws strategy now appears to have become increasingly leader-centric. It aims to kill leaders, leave forces in disarray, then clobber them in kill


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zones with artillery. This is a steel-on-forces approach, which by avoiding force-on-force engagements on the KNLAs terms that have consisted predominantly ofambush tactics in the past, aims to minimize Tatmadaw casualties and dictatethe terms of combat.

In its essence, the Tatmadaws new strategy would appear to consist of the

following phases:

(1)Wage a continuous disinformation campaign to minimize internationalawareness of the Tatmadaws evolved COIN strategy

(2)Develop human intelligence to support targeting requirements(3)Pinpoint key leaders, basing and critical nodes(4)Kill key leaders in Myanmar and in Thailand to create disarray(5)Use air mobile forces to drive forces and supporters into kill zones(6)Destroy with massed artillery and conventional infantry

3. The Offensive

3.1 Visible Tatmadaw actions

For at least two and a half years, the Tatmadaw has undertaken low-levelintelligence activities in Northern Kayin State and eastern Bago Region, whichhave focused on developing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) networks with the aimof pinpointing commanders and bases. Since Springtime 2010, the Tatmadaw

has introduced hunter-tracker teams to the region to capitalize on this HUMINTeffort.

Helicopter landing pads have been completed along the Thanlwin (Salawin)River, which borders Myanmar and Thailand, consistent with COIN methodology

to envelop KNU forces from the rear. Mi-24 helicopters purchased from Russia inSeptember 2010 are expected to be used to this end. This purchase was firstleaked by a Burma Air Force official speaking with the Irrawaddy, who alsoconfirmed, The main reason for purchasing the Mi-24s is for counter-insurgency. v

In recent months the Tatmadaw has reinforced troops along the border from HtuMway Ke, Kayin State to Pasaung in Kayah State. They have existing camps at

Ler Toe, Kaw Hsa Ko and Mae Kar Hta, near Ei Thu Hta IDP camp which allhave long range artillery capabilities.

The Thai border guards, Thahan Phrann, some of which have close relationships

with SPDC and DKBA, recently placed restrictions on the KNU and their reliefnetworks using the Mae Sot-Mae Sariang road for the elections period. This routeis the only link between key unofficial border crossing points and KNU


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infrastructure on the Thai side of the border. It is crucial for the deliverance ofhumanitarian aid to tens of thousands of people in Kayin State as well as militarysupplies. This is not the first time Thahan Phrann has aided the MyanmarGovernment in this way and indicates its potential to become part of the

Tatmadaws aim to cause disarray within the KNLA in the target region.

Similarly to the Government of Sri Lanka, this has all been carried out alongsidea continuous disinformation campaign of many facets to covet brutal methodsused by the Tatmadaw and promote national support for the Government and theneed for military rule. This campaign has focused on both Myanmar s populationand the international community and uses state-controlled media outlets

including, The New Light of Myanmarand MRTV, both of which have English andBurmese services and continuously propagate disinformation regarding theconflict and displacement crises in Myanmars ethnic regions.vi

3.2 Expectations of coming events

As before, the Tatmadaw continues in its intention to assassinate key Karenleaders, but the focus appears to now be on commanders in Northern KayinState and Bago Region and key functional leaders along the Thailand-Myanmarborder that support military and humanitarian operations in those regions.

Once this is achieved mobile air forces will be able encircle KNLA troops andforce them into a kill zone away from the borders with Thailand and Bago Region.Such hammer and anvil tactics would typically call for the use of air mobile forcesto drive insurgents into kill zones blocked by infantry to then destroy them by use

of supporting artillery, as well as fires from helicopters.

The time that these events will take place is impossible to predict, but willlogically be predicated on air-mobile forces readiness and access to targetableintelligence. Than Shwe was hoping to achieve domination over numerous ethnicarmies in April but was unable too launch a strong offensive, mainly due to low-morale at battalion commander level and further down the ranks.

There are two schools of thought among analysts regarding the Government soptimum time of attack. While it may aim to make this happen before the newGovernment is implemented in February 2011, to inaugurate the new political

framework in a reinvigorated environment, it could also see the benefits ofwaiting until regional legislatures are in place to bear the brunt of civilian dissentand discord without stretching the Tatmadaws central leadership.

Questions still remain as to how prepared the Tatmadaw is to undertake such anew type of operation. This will depend largely on the level and amount of


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training received by helicopter pilots as well as the current level of morale andhealth among troops.

Indications are that the dictatorship will methodically implement its strategy once

it has set conditions for sure success. The Government needs a sure victory

against the KNU/KNLA and has time is on its side. Following recent spikes ininsurgent activity in Kawkereik, Kyain Seigyi and Myawaddy townships of KayinState, the Tatmadaw is likely to be stretched to a greater extent than it hadexpected, both in terms of troop availability in the region as well the burden on itsleadership to deal with the uncommon stress of defensive decision-making.

Following close observation of the Tatmadaws activities in the region, the KNUhas also taken steps to adapt their approach to opposing the Government, withcorporate backing from the West. The following three paragraphs were takenfrom an interview with retired Western Special Forces working in EasternMyanmar with various urban and rural underground and resistance forces.

Given that this strategy of annihilation is well underway, aconcerted effort has been made to capture what will likely happenfor unambiguous proof of the Myanmar Armed Forces humanrights abuses. With the training and technological support ofWestern special forces advisors, the Karen have been wiring the

jungle, so to speak, installing networks of trail watch cameras,remote-controlled video cameras, spy cameras and sensors.

Training on mini-UAV technology and cyber warfare is also

underway in at least one third country, as I write. This has beenresourced by a network of Western corporate backers who want tosee change in the present government. Given that ethnic landscontain most of Myanmars natural resource wealth, the backing ofethnics may pay off well for profit-minded venture capitalists willingto bet on the come by backing the right horse now.

The thinking here is that if atrocities against the Karen people andthose who protect them are inevitable, then it is best to capture itall in living video color in order to expose what is really going on.In a land where its all about profit this tact may be a real money

maker.

While western support for pro-democratic insurgents in Myanmar has been seen

decade after decade since independence, recent support coming fromcorporations in the west is likely to be in part aimed at curbing Chinasdominance in the region, to which Myanmar plays a pivotal geo-strategic role.


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i1.Leaderofethnicceasefiregroupassassinated.MizzimaNewsat

http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/1989-leader-of-ethnic-ceasefire-

group-assassinated.html

2.TopMonglaleaderassassinatedat

http://www.bnionline.net/news/shan/7770-top-mongla-leader-assassinated-.htmliihttp://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/about/iiihttp://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-

2009/plenary-session-speeches-2009/fifth-plenary-session/major-general-aye-

myint/iv

http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10150&Itemi

d=44vhttp://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19419viFor4examplesread:

1.MinistryofForeignAffairsreleasesPressStatementinresponsetothe

declarationofEUPresidencyathttp://myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease_PMGev/Press%20Release%20No%205-

2009.pdf

2.WhatisKNU?athttp://www.mrtv3.net.mm/open7/080110for.html

3.Whichway,KNU?athttp://www.mrtv3.net.mm/open7/140210for.html

4.Regionaldevelopmentaswitnessedbyanexpedition-1at

http://www.mrtv3.net.mm/open/180506for.html

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