new guinea campaign (1943)
TRANSCRIPT
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NSPORTOPER
JAN. FEB.
1943.p-8r::
EVALUATION
AIR
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A IR EVALUATION BOARDSOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
AP O 92 5
10 June 1945
The Air Evaluation Board was established by
th e War Depar tment fo r th e purpose of eva lu a t i ng
th econduct and effectiveness of air attack in
th e Southwest Pac i f i c Thea te r.
Th e Batt le of Wa u was selected fo r evaluat ion
because it presented Air Transport with it s f i r s t
opportunity to prove it s potential value to f u tu r e
opera t ions in th e Southwest Pac i f i c Area.
Wi . E. LMaj Gen, USA,
Director.
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BRIEF
The s ign i f i cance o f th e ba t t l e fo r th e Wau
air strip commencing 27 Ja n 1943 was twofold . In
th e first place , th e airfield was a s t r a t e g i c pr ize ,
upon control of which depended to a considerable ex-
tent th e immediate success of th e Allied effort to
continue it s march northwestward up the New Guinea
coast. Second. and the reason for this report, Ai r
Transport provided the most dramatic instance up to
that time in this Theater of it s potentialities as
an e ff ec t i ve arm of th e armed fo rces . The surprise
reinforcement by air saved th e beleaguered Australian
garrison from possible elimination an d preserved this
indispensable strip for future operations. Altho
there had been some experience in reinforcement of
ground t roops by air p r e v i o u s l y, th e r i sk , ca l cu l a t e d
an d assumed in this operation, demonstrated tha t
such employment of air transport provided a mature
and potent weapon.
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EVALUATION
1. The re in fo rcement of t roops and s u p p l i e s by a irwas th e major f ac to r in th e s u c c e s s f u l defense of Wau.
2. Due to th e r ugged terrain, air transport was th e
only method for movement of troops and supplies by whichthe mission could be accomplished.
5. The e lemen t of surpr i se was obta ined by th eemployment of ai r t r anspo r t .
4. The isolation of the battlefield was accomplishedby air attacks on th e enemy supply lines and troop concen-trations.
5. All ied f i gh t e r s main ta ined s u f f i c i e n t control-ofthe air to permit th e air transports to accomplish theirmission.
6. Eff ic iency of th e a ir opera t ions was impaired bypoor communications and weather reporting facilities,insufficient t ra ined mechanics , lack of maintenance fac-ilities and spare parts, and lack of standardization ofaircraft types.
7. D i f f ic u l t ie s of maintenance were reduced byingenious improvisation.
8. Adverse e ff ec t s of unfavorab le weather, poorterrain, lack of weather reporting and efficient commun-
ications were reduced by superior pilot technique an ddetermined effort.
9. The t echn iques and l e ssons learned in air t r an spo r topera t ions during th e Wau Campaign provided va luab le da tafo r th e employment of air t r a n s p o r t in subseq.ient operations.
10. The Wau Campaign, conc lus ive ly demonstra ted tha tair transport had ripened into a cogent weapon of thearmed forces.
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An unimpressive looking strip withno apparent va lue . In a l l i e d handsit constituted a threat to nearbyenemy Lae an d Salamaua. The Japsneeded it to protect their operationsa g a i n s t Por t Moresby. A battle fo rth e strip wa s inevitable.
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The A u s t r a l i a n s had occupied Wau inMarch 19142 s h o r t l y fo l lowing Japinvasion of Lae and Salamaua to th e
nor thwes t . In th e suimer, however,the enemy moved below it down th e
coas t , t ak ing Buna an d nearby Gonae.The All ied garrison was isolated,
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THE SITUATION
In 1942 th e t i de eas tward of Japanese v ic to ry in
New Guinea had continued. The enemy had landed at Lae and
Salamaua on 8 March, giving them an excellent foothold from
which to launch t h e i r f u r t h e r advance down th e New Guinea
coas t . Buna an d Gona fo l lowed on 22 Ju ly. Although temp-
orarily set back by the desperate action of th e Australians
a t Milne Bay on 26 August, th e stream f lowed on in a n o t h e r
direction via Kokoda and over the Owen Stanley Mountains
with th e o b j ec t of e n g u l f i n g all-important Port Moresby.
The f inge r s of t h i s advance had been pruned on th e Kokoda
trail, a t Kokoda itself an d by All ied r e cap tu r e of Buna and
Gona in September. In January 1945, however, th e enemy
succeeded in r e in fo rc ing its ga r r i son a t Lae, even th o th e
convoy had been under attack by Allied Air Power. From this
successful reinforcement the enemy started his advance toward
Wa u .
Wau strip la y l i ke a diamond s e t in from th e New
Guinea coas t l i ne , smal l but a glittering reward for those
who would c o n t r o l it. Regarded as an o u t p o s t in th e defense
of Port Moresby, it likewise constituted a potential threat.
to th e Japanese pos i t i ons at Lae and Salamaua. Conversely,
it could be used by the enemy as an a d d i t i o n a l base in con-
tinuing it s operations against Moresby, only 15 0 miles to
th e s o u t h e a s t . In f a c t , in September 19 142 he had made a
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P o r t Moresby area sp r i ng board fo r Al l i edo p e r a t i o n s nor th westward in 19h2.Figh te r s and bombers based on its severa ldromes (Ward's drome upper r i g h t corner )was th e g r e a t e s t stumbling block to Jape ffo r t s to complete t he i r occupa t ion ofN ew Guinea. Wau found its s ign i f i canceas an o u tpo s t in th e defense of Moresby.
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substantial raid with 2 1 bombers in an attempt to knock
o u t th e Ward and Jackson dromes a t Por t Moresby, and sub-
sequently sen t over nuisance r a i d s a t f r e q u e n t i n t e r v a l s .
Wau's importance had been anticipated by the Allies,
fo r in March 1942, Australian troops had been sent boldly
in to th e area . The i n t en t i on was to prepare fo r and fore-
stall Jap seizure of it as w e l l as to reconnoitre th e
surrounding area. This garrison had been isolated fo r
months as th e enemy had long since established bases below
it down the north side of th e New Guinea coast . Neverthe-
less, during th e subsequent eleven months it had ambushed
Ja p pa t ro l s and on one occas ion , ear ly January 1943, had
bad ly mauled th e Ja p outpos t a t nearby Mubo.
As fa r as th e Japanese were concerned, they were
conf iden t they could take Wau a t their l e i su re . It was
obvious e a r l y in January t h a t p r e pa ra t i o n s were being made.
Air reconnaissance activities were observed and an increase
in barge 'traffic along the coas t was apparen t . On 27 Jan-
uary an a t t ack was made by a relatively s t rong fo rce of
ground troops which had proceeded over th e extremely rugged
mountain sec t i on separa t ing th e Lae and W au areas . The
Aus t r a l i an s were compelled to retreat and th e enemy a c t u a l l y
reached the p e r i m e t e r defense of th e air strip in a com-
pa ra t ive ly s h o r t t ime.
It had long been realized that overland supply to
th e garrison was an impossibility due to the New Guinea
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t e r r a i n in th e area - dense jungles , h igh mountains an d
many r i ve r s . An a t t empt had been made to utilize n a t i v e
bearers as a human freight line but had failed. Supplying
these troops via the sea route, moreover, was imposs ib le
with the Japs at Lae an d Salamaua only 30 miles up the
coast. The job would be done by air or not at all . Indeed,
preparations had been taken shortly previous to the battle,
little realizing that a desperate need fo r reinforcements
would arise so soon.
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Terrain between Port Moresby and Wauover which our Transports operatedin reinforcing th e garrison. Thebald spo t in th e cen t e r of th e p i c t u r eillustrates th e type of targets usedin dropping of suppl ies . In manycases these Targets were only 25 to
50 yards long and 10 to 20 yards wide.
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FACTORS IN THE OPERATION
General lessons had been learned from th e transport
and f ree dropping operations on the mainland of Australia
and in N ew Guinea which were to bear fruit. Shor tage of
transport. planes and consequent disregard of pay loads were
an ol d story. Altho present in Australia after December
19L2, rad io ranges were n o t a v a i l ab l e in New Guinea un t i l
April 1943. Short, rough strips surrounded by mountains,
t r i cky wind cur ren ts , and th e compulsion of s i d e s l i p p i n g
at low speeds to make landings, were prevailing conditions.
Fl igh t s from Por t Moresby over th e Owen Stan ley Mountains
to forward un i t s had been sub jec ted to a t tack from enemy
aircraft. P i l o t s were forced to r e s o r t to every poss ib l e
trick - extensive use of camouflage to blend the planes
with the terrain, flying in clouds despite th e extreme dang-
er of mountain peaks common to th e area, and t ree to p l eve l
approaches .
Engineering an d maintenance had long presented an
acute problem. There were few transport planes, most of
them of the Douglas type . Many had been taken over from
Aus t r a l i a n and Dutch commercial l i ne s , most ly DC-2s, DC-3s
and DC-5s. The ins t rument read ings o f th e Dutch planes
were in liters and ki lomete rs , and all i n s t ruc t ions n a t u r a l -
ly in that tongue. A good percentage of tools were almost
primitive. Spare parts were barely obtainable and had to
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One of the worst landing strips inPauua - only 3,600 f e e t long , wi tha g ra s s sur face eas i ly sof tened by
cons t an t r a in s . The mountains com-pelled an approach from only oned i r e c t i o n on a field with a fantasticgradient of 1 to 10 feet.
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be salvaged from crashed planes and from dumps. Miracles
o f improvisation had been performed by th e unde r s t a f f e d
force of mechanics. Epics o f recorded i n g e n u i t y are th e
instances of filed Aussie sixpences being used as magneto
poin ts and Kotex employed as filters. By February, 1943
th e pressure was p a r t l y r e l i eved by th e a r r i v a l o f some
new C-47s and consequent s t anda rd i z a t i on o f pa r t s .
New Guinea weather had a dynamic qua l i t y p re sen t i n g
a constant problem. This condition was due first to the
Doldrum or Bad Weather Belt , which fo r seven months of the
year covers th e I s land and severe ly a ff ec t s its weather ;
and, second, to th e extremes of New Guinea local fogs and
rain, turbulence, and rapid build-ups over th e mountains.
Weather reports were either unreliable or out of date, and
conditions changed so rapidly that only planes which had
recently returned were capable of reporting on any given
area . For the most pa r t , pilots took o ff from Por t Moresby
or advanced bases t ru s t ing to luck and their own f l y ing
skill an d convinced that weather over th e Owen Stanleys
was as serious a hazard as enemy fighters.
Communication between Por t Moresby and Wau were es -
tablished at th e time of the operation. In 1942 an
Aust ra l ian mobile s i g n a l u n i t ha d been f lown in to W au with
radio facilities. This equipment was powerful and reliable.
Contac t over th c i n t e r v e n i n g mountains was on occas ion
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The difficulties of landing C-.7s on
Wau strip are apparent in th is picturean d t h a t on page 12. The strip waslocated in th e Wau Valley 3,300 feetabove sea level, some 30 miles in fromth e coas t , an d surrounded by high mountains .
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frequently interfered with , however, for a period of as
much as th ree hours , due to th e ac t ion of the Heav i s ide
layer an d other physical phenomena.
The Wau air strip was located 30 miles southwest of
Salamaua, about 3,5300 feet above sea level but deep in a
valley. Mountains surround it with particularly high and
rugged ones to th e northwest towards Salamaua. The strip
was 3,600 f e e t long, 450 f ee t wide a t th e nor theas t end,
narrowing to 220 feet on th e southwest, and had a gradient
of 1 to 10. Landings were made uphill an d takeoffs downhill.
Because of th e l o ca t i on o f the surroundi 'ng mountains , t he r e
was only one approach, from th e northeast low end to the
southwest high end. The strip was marked by th e use of
painted fuel drums set on either side of it . The grass
sur face ha d bumps and depress ions t r ave r s ing it, causing
rough l and ings . Drainage was on ly fair and dur ing the wet
weather t r anspo r t s would cu t into th e s l ippery sur face 8
to 12 inches . Wau air strip was not a f i e ld sub j ec t to
normal operations.
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Jap ground fo rces ha d reached th eperimeter of the strip on 27 Jan. '[3
and practically surrounded th e beleaguered
Aus t r a l i an ga r r i son . In th e course offou r days A ir Tr a n s p o r t made 214 l and ings ,s h u t t l i n g t roops and m a t e r i a l from PortMoresby. Only these re inforcements by a irsaved th e day.
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THE OPERATION
The Allies, as previously indicated, had made prepar-
ations to reinforce the Australian garrison. In fact, on
25 January, loaded C-47s were wai t ing on th e air strip at
Port Moresby, held there on account of uncertain weather
over Wau. There was no immediate sense of urgency. It was
not until noon of th e 27th that th e gravity of th e situation
was realized. Information forwarded by air reconnaissance
and ground pa t ro l s ind ica ted t ha t th e enemy meant bus iness .
Ground contact shortly developed and for the following 36
hours Company A of the 6th Australian Battalion, although
forced back to the perimeter defense of th e strip, managed
to avoid being wiped out .
The night of th e 28th almost four inches of rain fe l l
and there was little promise of any break. Altho at 0700
the next morning Wau Valley was densewith clouds, they
suddenly and unexpectedly rolled back. At 0900 high flying
Allied fighters sent over to observe th e weather radioed
back-to Por t Moresby t ha t th e f ie ld was open. During that
day 57 transport landings were made upon th e strip, subject
both in landing and in taking off to enemy rifle an d machine
gun f i r e . Many of th e A u s t r a l i a n t roops were wounded so
soon fo l lowing their landing t h a t they were evacuated on
th e same planes which had t r an sp o r t ed them to Wau. The
reinforcements by air enabled strong patrols to drive th e
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Wau was not hosp i t ab l e territory,but the enemy wanted the strip.The illustration shows the ruggednature of the terrain around th e
p e r i m e t e r of the field, which Japtroops reached after crossing th e
almost impassable mountain rangebetween Wau an d Lae.
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E*lp:~i;d-
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Japs back. The pressure was re l i e v ed .
Vic tory was assured, however, when a t 0925 of th e 30th
air transports delivered 25 pounder f ie ld guns and addition-
a l troops. By 1330 of that day shells from these guns were
scattering enemy troops back up into the rugged mountains
between WVau an d Lae, and to all i n t en t s and purposes th e
b a t t l e was over. The strip had been saved.
A ir Transpor t demons t ra t ed its versatility dur ing this
f o u r day period. It shu t t l ed between Por t Moresby and Wau
244 times, landed on one of the most difficult strips in
Papua, and supplied both personnel and materiel to a sore-
ly pressed command.
The price paid ( f ive C-47s), particularly in view of
the circumstances of th e operations, was a cheap on e fo r
th e ob j ec t i ve s obtained. The first day of air p a r t i c i p a t i o n
(2 9 Jan), th e 57 landings were made with no losses an d only
minor damage. The fo l lowing day 3 C-47s were l o s t when one
pilot in landing crashed into 2 parked planes. On 31 Jan-
uary another C-47 was l o s t due to mechanical f a i l u r e in
taking off at Port Moresby, and on 7 February one plane
never arrived, presumably due to th e activity of Zeros in
the vicinity.
All ied f i g h t e r cover of air t r a n s p o r t flights had been
improving in New Guinea in th e fall of 19)2. In th i s
operation the cooperation was excellent. The supply runs
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N o t only indispensable troop reinforce-ment s were l anded by ai r bu t also 25 pounde r
field g u n s . T h e e n e m y w as forced b a c k intothe surrounding hi l l s where shells f r o m these
guns dec ima ted h im.
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were made unopposed. Allied planes, moreover, made persistent
a t t a cks upon enemy supply l i ne s and t roop concentrations. So
f a r as th e Jap was concerned, th e Wau battlefield was isolated.
It was no t until 6 February t h a t th e enemymade a determined,
a l b e i t t a rdy aireffort. On t ha t day 18 medium bombers and some
55fighters came over th e Wau area, achieved little damage and
found it to be an unprofitable venture. Thirtyeight planes
were lost, distributed as fol lows;
Destroyed Probably DamagedDestroyed
Jap All ied Jap. Allied Jap. All ied
Fighters 20 0 8 0 2 0
Bombers 3 o o o 5 o
U n i d e n t i f i e d 2 0 0 0 0 0
In addition to the movement of troops and supplies into
W u, air t r a n s p o r t opera t ions were used effectively in dropp ing
s u p p l i e s to f r o n t line troops in t h a t area. The difficulties of
transporting s u p p l i e s from th e Wau airstrip to th e f r o n t l i ne ,
often resulted in troops being in urgent need of ammunition an d
food. The difficulty of locating f r o n t linetroops in th e dense
jungles on the seaward slopes on the densely wooded mountains;
was almost unsurmountable . Desp i te th e jungle, fire fromf ront
l i ne un i t s , and poor weather, air t r a n s p o r t planes dropped many
much needed supplies to our advance elements, a good percentage
of i h i ch were recovered.
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CONCLUSION
Th e en em y raid of 6 Feb rua ry m a r k e d th e en d of its
attempts to interrupt th e Allied supp ly run from Port
M o r e s b y to Wau, and , in effect, the conclusion of the
W a u Ca mpa ign . There is little doubt that but fo r the
success of the Ai r Transport operations the Wa u battle
w o u l d have t e rmina t e d b y Jap o ccup a t i on of th e s t r i p .
T he C a m p a i g nw as m a r k e d in that the principle of surprise
was employed by both parties: first by the Japanese in
su rmoun t ing the r u g g e d t e r r a i n an d a t t a ck ing wi th ground
troops; and s u b s e q u e n t l y b y the Allies in their unexpect-
ed air r e i n f o r c e m e n t of the garrison. T he action mater-
ially c on t r i bu t ed to the subs eque n t Allied campaign in
the H u o n G u l f w h e r e b y th e v i t a l enemy bases of Lae and
Sa l amaua were d e s t r o y e d .
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w
,ji
,i- Ary>,
:.~~~~~~,*"C^ ^ rtLirty
Symbolic of th e Wautroops backed up by
Campaign Aussiea C-17.
o,/, * *
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AI R UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE WAU OPERATION
pe o f O p e r a t o n
8 th Photo Squadron . .7 th Figh t e r Squadron . .
49th Fighter Group9 th Figh t e r Squadron . .
49th Fighter Group59th Figh te r Squadron
49th Fighter Group40th Figh te r Squadron
35th Fighter Group
30th F i g h t e r Squadron55th Figh t e r Group
7 1 s t Bomb Squadron . .38th Bomb Group
38th Bomb Squadron . .3rd Bomb Group
374th Troop Ca r r i e r Group6 th Squadron21st Squadron22nd Squadron33rd Squadron
517th Troop Car r i e r Group
h9th Squadron0th Squadron41st Squadron16th Squadron
. . . Pho to Reconnaissance
. . . . Fighter E s c o r t
. . .. Fighter Escort
. . . .. Interception of enemyaircraft
S. . . . Fighter Escort
)
)
))
)
)
)
Ground Strafing
Photo Reconnaissance
Photo Reconnaissance
Transpor t ing t roopsand supplies
Unit
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Battle of Wau, Official Army Australian PublicationDaily Situation ReportsHistory of 374th Troop Carrier GroupMeteorological Data, Meteorological Bureau, BrisbaneChronology of Air Force Activities in Pacific Wa r
Papuan Campaign, US War DepartmentAllied Geographical Section, SWPA, No . 6
RAAF Weather and CommunicationsIn t e l l i gence S i t ua t i on Report, All ied Air Forces and
RAAF Command, July 19)2 to Latest Current DateDai ly In t e l l i gence Report, Hq FEAF, Sep 43 to Lates t
Cur ren t DateATIS (Al l ied Tr a n s l a t o r and I n t e r p r e t e r Section)
Enemy In fo rmat ion and Data, June 4 to December 44ATIS I n t e r roga t i on Report , October to L a t e s t CurrentDate .
Objective Folders, Allied Air Forces, 23 June 35 to
23 March 44.Objective Folders, CIU, 19)2 to Present Date.H i s t o r y of 22nd Troop Car r i e r SquadronMission Reports , D. o f I. Summary, February 42 to
Curren t DateMission Summaries, Allied Air Forces, 1 December 42
to 31 March 43 .
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SVB8 09900 9691 L