neuclear program

7/30/2019 Neuclear program

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2

OVERVIEW OF IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Overview

History

Chapter 3

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

February 2007 Report

May 2007 Report

November 2007 report

February 2008 report

May 2008 report

September 2008 report


May 2010 Report

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Chapter 4

IRAN WORK ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM

United States

May 2012 Baghdad negotiations

Chapter 5

NUCLEAR DECLARATION

Tehran Nuclear Declaration

Attacks on Iranian nuclear scientists

Nuclear power as a political issue

Iran's nuclear program and the NPT

Iranian statements on nuclear deterrence

Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Mideast

REFERENCES

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The nuclear program of Iran was launched in the 1950s with the help of

the United States as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The participation

of the United States and Western European governments in Iran's nuclear

program continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah

of Iran.

After the 1979 revolution, the clandestine research program was disbanded

by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had serious religious reservations

about nuclear weapons, which he considered evil in terms of Muslim

jurisprudence. Small scale research restarted during the Iran-Iraq War, and

underwent significant expansion after the Ayatollah's death in 1989. Iran's

nuclear program has included several research sites, two uranium mines, a

research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known

uranium enrichment plants.

Iran's first nuclear power plant, Bushehr I reactorwas complete with major

assistance of Russian government agency Rosatom and officially opened on

12 September 2011. Iran has announced that it is working on a new 360 MW

nuclear power plant to be located in Darkhovin. The Russian engineering

contractorAtomenergoprom said the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant would

reach full capacity by the end of 2012. Iran has also indicated that it will

seek more medium-sized nuclear power plants and uranium mines in the

future.

In November 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board

of Governors rebuked Iran following an IAEA report indicating Iran had

undertaken research and experiments geared to developing a nuclear

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weapons capability. For the first time, the IAEA report outlines, in depth, the

countrys detonator development, the multiple-point initiation of high

explosives, and experiments involving nuclear payload integration into a

missile delivery vehicle. Iran rejected the details of the report and accused

the IAEA of pro-Western bias and threatened to reduce its cooperation with

the IAEA

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Chapter 2

OVERVIEW OF IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Overview

The controversy over Iran's nuclear programs centers in particular on Iran's

failure to declare sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities to the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Enrichment can be used to

produce uranium for reactor fuel or (at higher enrichment levels) forweapons. Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful, and has enriched

uranium to less than 5%, consistent with fuel for a civilian nuclear power

plant. Iran also claims that it was forced to resort to secrecy after US

pressure caused several of its nuclear contracts with foreign governments to

fall through. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's

noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the UN Security Council,the Council demanded that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities

while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has argued that the

sanctions are "illegal," imposed by "arrogant powers," and that Iran has

decided to pursue the monitoring of its self-described peaceful nuclear

program through "its appropriate legal path," the International Atomic

Energy Agency.

After public allegations about Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities,

the IAEA launched an investigation that concluded in November 2003 that

Iran had systematically failed to meet its obligations under its NPT

safeguards agreement to report those activities to the IAEA, although it also

reported no evidence of links to a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA

Board of Governors delayed a formal finding of non-compliance until

September 2005, and reported that non-compliance to the UN Security

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Council in February 2006. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported

Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the United Nations

Security Council, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment

programs. The Council imposed sanctions after Iran refused to do so. A May

2009 U.S. Congressional Report suggested "the United States, and later the

Europeans, argued that Iran's deception meant it should forfeit its right to

enrich, a position likely to be up for negotiation in talks with Iran."

In exchange for suspending its enrichment program, Iran has been offered "a

long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the

development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect

and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful

nature of Iran's nuclear program." However, Iran has consistently refused to

give up its enrichment program, arguing that the program is necessary for its

energy security, that such "long term arrangements" are inherently

unreliable, and would deprive it of its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear

technology. In June 2009, in the immediate wake of the disputed Iranianpresidential election, Iran initially agreed to a deal to relinquish its stockpile

of low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a medical research reactor, but

then backed out of the deal. Currently, thirteen states possess operational

enrichment or reprocessing facilities, and several others have expressed an

interest in developing indigenous enrichment programs. Iran's position was

endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement, which expressed concern about thepotential monopolization of nuclear fuel production.

To address concerns that its enrichment program may be diverted to non-

peaceful uses, Iran has offered to place additional restrictions on its

enrichment program including, for example, ratifying the Additional

Protocol to allow more stringent inspections by the International Atomic

Energy Agency, operating the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as a

multinational fuel center with the participation of foreign representatives,

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renouncing plutonium reprocessing and immediately fabricating all enriched

uranium into reactor fuel rods. Iran's offer to open its uranium enrichment

program to foreign private and public participation mirrors suggestions of an

IAEA expert committee which was formed to investigate the methods to

reduce the risk that sensitive fuel cycle activities could contribute to national

nuclear weapons capabilities. Some non-governmental U.S. experts have

endorsed this approach. The United States has insisted that Iran must meet

the demands of the UN Security Council to suspend its enrichment program.

In every other case in which the IAEA Board of Governors made a finding

of safeguards non-compliance involving clandestine enrichment or

reprocessing, the resolution has involved (in the cases of Iraq and Libya) or

is expected to involve (in the case of North Korea) at a minimum ending

sensitive fuel cycle activities. According to Pierre Goldschmidt, former

deputy director general and head of the department of safeguards at the

IAEA, and Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation

Policy Education Center, some other instances of safeguards noncompliancereported by the IAEA Secretariat (South Korea, Egypt) were never reported

to the Security Council because the IAEA Board of Governors never made a

formal finding of non-compliance. Though South Korea's case involved

enriching uranium to levels near weapons grade, the country itself

voluntarily reported the isolated activity and Goldschmidt has argued

"political considerations also played a dominant role in the board's decision"to not make a formal finding of non-compliance.

Estimating when Iran might possibly achieve nuclear "breakout" capability,

defined as having produced a sufficient quantity of highly-enriched uranium

to fuel a weapon - if a working design for one existed and the political

decision to assemble it was made - is uncertain. A detailed analysis by

physicists at the Federation of American Scientists concludes that such an

estimate would depend on the total number and overall efficiency of the

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centrifuges Iran has in operation, and the amount of low-enriched uranium it

has stockpiled to serve as "feedstock" for a possible high-enrichment

program. A 23 March 2012 U.S. Congressional Research Service report

quotes the 24 February 2012 IAEA report saying that Iran has stockpiled 240

pounds of 20-percent-enriched uranium - an enrichment level necessary for

medical applications - as an indication of their capacity to enrich to higher

levels. The authoritarian political culture of Iran may pose additional

challenges to a scientific program requiring cooperation among many

technical specialists. U.S. intelligence agency officials interviewed by The

New York Times in March 2012 said they continued to assess that Iran had

not restarted its weaponization program, which the 2007 National

Intelligence Estimate said Iran had discontinued in 2003, although they have

found evidence that some weaponization-related activities have continued.

The Israeli Mossad reportedly shared this belief.

History

1950s and 1960s

The foundations forIran's nuclear program were laid on 5 March 1957, when

a "proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of

atomic energy" was announced under the auspices of Eisenhower's Atoms

for Peace program.

In 1967, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center(TNRC) was established, run

by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was

equipped with a U.S.-supplied, 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor, which

was fueled by highly enriched uranium.

Iran signed theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified

it in 1970, making Iran's nuclear program subject to IAEA verification.

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1970s

The Shah approved plans to construct, with U.S. help, up to 23 nuclear

power stations by 2000. In March 1974, the Shah envisioned a time when the

world's oil supply would run out, and declared, "Petroleum is a noble

material, much too valuable to burn ... We envision producing, as soon as

possible, 23,000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants."

Iran had deep pockets and close ties to the West. U.S. and European

companies scrambled to do business in Iran. Bushehr would be the first

plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of Shiraz. In 1975, the

Erlangen/Frankfurt firm Kraftwerk Union AG, a joint venture of Siemens

AG and AEG, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the

pressurized water reactornuclear power plant. Construction of the two 1,196

MWe, and was to have been completed in 1981.

The joint stock company Eurodif operating a uranium enrichment plant in

France was formed in 1973 by France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden. In 1975

Sweden's 10% share in Eurodif went to Iran as a result of an arrangement

between France and Iran. The French government subsidiary company

Cogma and the Iranian Government established the Sofidif (Socit franco

iranienne pour l'enrichissement de l'uranium par diffusion gazeuse)

enterprise with 60% and 40% shares, respectively. In turn, Sofidif acquired a

25% share in Eurodif, which gave Iran its 10% share of Eurodif. MohammedReza Shah Pahlavi lent 1 billion dollars (and another 180 million dollars in

1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory, to have the right of buying

10% of the production of the site.

"President Gerald Ford signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance

to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extractingplutonium

from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete 'nuclear fuel cycle'."At the time, Richard Cheney was the White House Chief of Staff, and

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Donald Rumsfeld was the Secretary of Defense. The Ford strategy paper said

the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs

of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to

petrochemicals."

ThenUnited States Secretary of StateHenry Kissingerrecalled in 2005, "I

don't think the issue of proliferation came up." However, a 1974 CIA

proliferation assessment stated "If [the Shah] is alive in the mid-1980s ... and

if other countries [particularly India] have proceeded with weapons

development we have no doubt Iran will follow suit."

The Shah also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with South Africa

under which Iranian oil money financed the development of South African

fuel enrichment technology using a novel "jet nozzle" process, in return for

assured supplies of South African (and Namibian) enriched uranium.

Post-revolution, 19791989

Following the 1979 Revolution, most of the international nuclear

cooperation with Iran was cut off. Iran has later argued that these

experiences indicate foreign facilities and foreign fuel supplies are an

unreliable source of nuclear fuel supply.

At the time of the revolution, Iran was a joint owner in the French Eurodif

international enrichment facility, but the facility stopped supplying enriched

uranium to Iran shortly afterwards. Kraftwerk Union stopped working at the

Bushehr nuclear project in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete,and the other reactor 85% complete, and they fully withdrew from the

project in July 1979. The company said they based their action on Iran's non-

payment of $450 million in overdue payments, while other sources claim the

construction was halted under pressure from the United States.

The United States cut off the supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel

for the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, which forced the reactor to shutdown for a number of years, until Argentina's National Atomic Energy

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Commission in 198788 signed an agreement with Iran to help in converting

the reactor from highly enriched uranium fuel to 19.75% low-enriched

uranium, and to supply the low-enriched uranium to Iran. The uranium was

delivered in 1993.

In 1981, Iranian governmental officials concluded that the country's nuclear

development should continue. Reports to the IAEA included that a site at

Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC) would act "as the center for

the transfer and development of nuclear technology, as well as contribute to

the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain a very

ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel

cycle technology." The IAEA also was informed about Entec's largest

department, for materials testing, which was responsible for UO2 pellet fuel

fabrication and a chemical department whose goal was the conversion of

U3O8 to nuclear grade UO2.

In 1983, IAEA officials were keen to assist Iran in chemical aspects of

reactor fuel fabrication, chemical engineering and design aspects of pilotplants for uranium conversion, corrosion of nuclear materials, LWR fuel

fabrication, and pilot plant development for production of nuclear grade

UO2. However, the U.S. government "directly intervened" to discourage

IAEA assistance in Iranian production of UO2 and UF6. A former U.S.

official said "we stopped that in its tracks." Iran later set up a bilateral

cooperation on fuel cycle related issues with China, but China also agreed todrop most outstanding nuclear commerce with Iran, including the

construction of the UF6 plant, due to U.S. pressure.

In April 1984, West German intelligence reported that Iran might have a

nuclear bomb within two years with uranium from Pakistan. The Germans

leaked this news in the first public Western intelligence report of a post-

revolutionary nuclear weapons program in Iran. Later that year, Minority

Whip of the United States Senate Alan Cranston asserted that the Islamic

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Republic of Iran was seven years away from being able to build its own

nuclear weapon.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the two Bushehr reactors were damaged by

multiple Iraqi air strikes and work on the nuclear program came to a

standstill. Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency of the

blasts, and complained about international inaction and the use of French

made missiles in the attack.

19902002

From the beginning of 1990s, Russia formed a joint research organization

with Iran called Persepolis which provided Iran with Russian nuclear

experts, and technical information. Five Russian institutions, including the

Russian Federal Space Agency helped Tehran to improve its missiles. The

exchange of technical information with Iran was personally approved by the

SVR director Trubnikov. President Boris Yeltsin had a "two track policy"

offering commercial nuclear technology to Iran and discussing the issues

with Washington.

In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards new partners for its nuclear

program; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive

U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed.

In 1991, an agreement was found for the French-Iranian disagreement since

1979 (see Post Revolution, 19791989): France refunded more than 1.6

billion dollars. Iran remained shareholder of Eurodif via Sofidif, a Franco-Iranian consortium shareholder to 25% of Eurodif. However, Iran refrained

from asking for the produced uranium.

In 1992, following media allegations about undeclared nuclear activities in

Iran, Iran invited IAEA inspectors to the country and permitted those

inspectors to visit all the sites and facilities they asked to see. Director

General Blix reported that all activities observed were consistent with thepeaceful use of atomic energy. The IAEA visits included undeclared

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facilities and Iran's nascent uranium mining project at Saghand. In the same

year, Argentine officials disclosed that their country had canceled a sale to

Iran of civilian nuclear equipment worth $18 million, under US pressure.

In 1995, Iran signed a contract with Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy to

resume work on the partially complete Bushehr plant, installing into the

existing Bushehr I building a 915 MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water

reactor, with completion expected in 2009.

In 1996, the U.S. convinced the People's Republic of China to pull out of a

contract to construct a uranium conversion plant. However, the Chinese

provided blueprints for the facility to the Iranians, who advised the IAEA

that they would continue work on the program, and IAEA Director

Mohamed ElBaradei even visited the construction site.

According to a report by the Argentine justice in 2006, during the late 1980s

and early 1990s the US pressured Argentina to terminate its nuclear

cooperation with Iran, and from early 1992 to 1994 negotiations between

Argentina and Iran took place with the aim of re-establishing the threeagreements made in 198788.

20022006

On 14 August 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesman for an Iranian

dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran, publicly revealed the

existence of two nuclear sites under construction: a uranium enrichment

facility inNatanz (part of which is underground), and a heavy waterfacilityin Arak. It has been strongly suggested that intelligence agencies already

knew about these facilities but the reports had been classified.

The IAEA immediately sought access to these facilities and further

information and co-operation from Iran regarding its nuclear program.

According to arrangements in force at the time for implementation of Iran's

safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Iran was not required to allow IAEAinspections of a new nuclear facility until six months before nuclear material

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is introduced into that facility. At the time, Iran was not even required to

inform the IAEA of the existence of the facility. This "six months" clause

was standard for implementation of all IAEA safeguards agreements until

1992, when the IAEA Board of Governors decided that facilities should be

reported during the planning phase, even before construction began. Iran was

the last country to accept that decision, and only did so 26 February 2003,

after the IAEA investigation began.

In May 2003, shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, elements of the Iranian

government of Mohammad Khatami made a confidential proposal for a

"Grand Bargain" through Swiss diplomatic channels. It offered full

transparency of Iran's nuclear program and withdrawal of support for Hamas

and Hezbollah, in exchange for security assurances from the United States

and a normalization of diplomatic relations. The Bush Administration did

not respond to the proposal, as senior U.S. officials doubted its authenticity.

The proposal reportedly was widely blessed by the Iranian government,

including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei.France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the EU-3) undertook a

diplomatic initiative with Iran to resolve questions about its nuclear program.

On 21 October 2003, in Tehran, the Iranian government and EU-3 Foreign

Ministers issued a statement known as the Tehran Declaration in which Iran

agreed to co-operate with the IAEA, to sign and implement an Additional

Protocol as a voluntary, confidence-building measure, and to suspend itsenrichment and reprocessing activities during the course of the negotiations.

The EU-3 in return explicitly agreed to recognize Iran's nuclear rights and to

discuss ways Iran could provide "satisfactory assurances" regarding its

nuclear power program, after which Iran would gain easier access to modern

technology. Iran signed an Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003, and

agreed to act as if the protocol were in force, making the required reports to

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the IAEA and allowing the required access by IAEA inspectors, pending

Iran's ratification of the Additional Protocol.

The IAEA reported 10 November 2003, that "it is clear that Iran has failed in

a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations

under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear

material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities

where such material has been processed and stored." Iran was obligated to

inform the IAEA of its importation of uranium from China and subsequent

use of that material in uranium conversion and enrichment activities. It was

also obligated to report to the IAEA experiments with the separation of

plutonium. However, the Islamic Republic reneged on its promise to permit

the IAEA to carry out their inspections and suspended the Additional

Protocol agreement outlined above in October 2005.

A comprehensive list of Iran's specific "breaches" of its IAEA safeguards

agreement, which the IAEA described as part of a "pattern of concealment,"

can be found in the 15 November 2004, report of the IAEA on Iran's nuclearprogram. Iran attributes its failure to report certain acquisitions and activities

on US obstructionism, which reportedly included pressuring the IAEA to

cease providing technical assistance to Iran's uranium conversion program in

1983. On the question of whether Iran had a hidden nuclear weapons

program, the IAEA's November 2003 report states that it found "no

evidence" that the previously undeclared activities were related to a nuclearweapons program, but also that it was unable to conclude that Iran's nuclear

program was exclusively peaceful.

In June 2004, construction was commenced on IR-40, a 40 MW heavy water

reactor

Under the terms of the Paris Agreement, on 14 November 2004, Iran's chief

nuclear negotiator announced a voluntary and temporary suspension of its

uranium enrichment program (enrichment is not a violation of the NPT) and

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the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, after pressure from

the United Kingdom, France, and Germany acting on behalf of the European

Union (EU, known in this context as theEU-3). The measure was said at the

time to be a voluntary, confidence-building measure, to continue for some

reasonable period of time (six months being mentioned as a reference) as

negotiations with the EU-3 continued. On 24 November, Iran sought to

amend the terms of its agreement with the EU to exclude a handful of the

equipment from this deal for research work. This request was dropped four

days later. According to Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, one of the Iranian

representatives to the Paris Agreement negotiations, the Iranians made it

clear to their European counterparts that Iran would not consider a

permanent end to uranium enrichment:

Before the Paris [Agreement] text was signed, Dr Rohani ... stressed that

they should be committed neither to speak nor even think of a cessation any

more. The ambassadors delivered his message to their foreign ministers prior

to the signing of the Paris agreed text ... The Iranians made it clear to theirEuropean counterparts that if the latter sought a complete termination of

Iran's nuclear fuel-cycle activities, there would be no negotiations. The

Europeans answered that they were not seeking such a termination, only an

assurance on the non-diversion of Iran's nuclear programme to military ends.

In February 2005, Iran pressed the EU-3 to speed up talks, which the EU-3

refused to do so. The talks made little progress because of the divergentpositions of the two sides. In early August 2005, after the June election of

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President, Iran removed seals on its

uranium enrichment equipment in Isfahan, which UK officials termed a

"breach of the Paris Agreement" though a case can be made that the EU

violated the terms of the Paris Agreement by demanding that Iran abandon

nuclear enrichment. Several days later, the EU-3 offered Iran a package in

return for permanent cessation of enrichment. Reportedly, it included

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benefits in the political, trade and nuclear fields, as well as long-term

supplies of nuclear materials and assurances of non-aggression by the EU

(but not the US). Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy head of Iran's atomic

energy organization rejected the offer, terming it "very insulting and

humiliating" and other independent analysts characterized the EU offer as an

"empty box". Iran's announcement that it would resume enrichment preceded

the election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad by several months. The delay

in restarting the program was to allow the IAEA to re-install monitoring

equipment. The actual resumption of the program coincided with the election

of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and the appointment ofAli Larijani as

the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator.

Around 2005, Germany refused to export any more nuclear equipment or

refund money paid by Iran for such equipment in the 1980s. (See European

reactions 197989.)

In August 2005, with the assistance of Pakistan a group of US government

experts and international scientists concluded that traces of bomb-gradeuranium found in Iran came from contaminated Pakistani equipment and

were not evidence of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iran. In

September 2005, IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei reported

that "most" highly enriched uranium traces found in Iran by agency

inspectors came from imported centrifuge components, validating Iran's

claim that the traces were due to contamination. Sources in Vienna and theState Department reportedly stated that, for all practical purposes, the HEU

issue has been resolved.

The IAEA Board of Governors deferred a formal decision on Iran's nuclear

case for two years after 2003, while Iran continued cooperation with the EU-

3. On 24 September 2005, after Iran abandoned the Paris Agreement, the

Board found that Iran had been in non-compliance with its safeguards

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agreement, based largely on facts that had been reported as early as

November 2003.

On 4 February 2006, the 35 member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted

273 (with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South

Africa) to report Iran to the UN Security Council. The measure was

sponsored by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and it was backed

by the United States. Two permanent council members, Russia and China,

agreed to referral only on condition that the council take no action before

March. The three members who voted against referral were Venezuela, Syria

and Cuba. In response, on 6 February 2006, Iran suspended its voluntary

implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary and non-

legally binding cooperation with the IAEA beyond what is required by its

safeguards agreement.

In late February 2006, IAEA Director Mohammad El-Baradei raised the

suggestion of a deal, whereby Iran would give up industrial-scale enrichment

and instead limit its program to a small-scale pilot facility, and agree toimport its nuclear fuel from Russia (see nuclear fuel bank). The Iranians

indicated that while they would not be willing to give up their right to

enrichment in principle, they were willing to consider the compromise

solution. However, in March 2006, the Bush Administration made it clear

that they would not accept any enrichment at all in Iran.

The IAEA Board of Governors deferred the formal report to the UN SecurityCouncil of Iran's non-compliance (such a report is required by Article XII.C

of the IAEA Statute), until 27 February 2006. The Board usually makes

decisions by consensus, but in a rare non-consensus decision it adopted this

resolution by vote, with 12 abstentions.

On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that

Iran had successfully enriched uranium. President Ahmadinejad made the

announcement in a televised address from the northeastern city ofMashhad,

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where he said "I am officially announcing that Iran joined the group of those

countries which have nuclear technology." The uranium was enriched to

3.5% using over a hundred centrifuges.

On 13 April 2006, after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said (on 12

April 2006) the Security Council must consider "strong steps" to induce

Tehran to change course in its nuclear ambition; President Ahmadinejad

vowed that Iran will not back away from uranium enrichment and that the

world must treat Iran as a nuclear power, saying "Our answer to those who

are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase.

We say: Be angry at us and die of this anger," because "We won't hold talks

with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium."

On 14 April 2006, The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)

published a series of analyzed satellite images of Iran's nuclear facilities at

Natanz and Esfahan. Featured in these images is a new tunnel entrance near

the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan and continued

construction at the Natanz uranium enrichment site. In addition, a series ofimages dating back to 2002 shows the underground enrichment buildings

and its subsequent covering by soil, concrete, and other materials. Both

facilities were already subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.

Iran responded to the demand to stop enrichment of uranium 24 August

2006, offering to return to the negotiation table but refusing to end

enrichment.Qolam Ali Hadad-adel, speaker of Iran's parliament, said on 30 August

2006, that Iran had the right to "peaceful application of nuclear technology

and all other officials agree with this decision," according to the semi-

official Iranian Students News Agency. "Iran opened the door to negotiations

for Europe and hopes that the answer which was given to the nuclear

package would bring them to the table."

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In Resolution 1696 of 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council

demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing related

activities.

In UN Security Council Resolution 1737 of 26 December 2006, the Council

imposed a series of sanctions on Iran for its non-compliance with the earlier

Security Council resolution deciding that Iran suspend enrichment-related

activities without delay. These sanctions were primarily targeted against the

transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies and, in response to

concerns of China and Russia, were lighter than that sought by the United

States. This resolution followed a report from the IAEA that Iran had

permitted inspections under its safeguards agreement but had not suspended

its enrichment-related activities.

2007present

UN Security Council

The UN Security Council has passed seven resolutions on Iran:

Resolution 1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend its

uranium enrichment activities, invoking Chapter VII of the United

Nations Charterto make that demand legally binding on Iran.

Resolution 1737 (23 December 2006) imposed sanctions after Iran

refused to suspend its enrichment activities, cutting off nuclear

cooperation, demanding that Iran cooperate with the IAEA, and

freezing the assets of a number of persons and organizations linked to

Iran's nuclear and missile programs. It established a committee to

monitor sanctions implementation.

Resolution 1747 (24 March 2007) expanded the list of sanctioned

Iranian entities and welcomed the proposal by the permanent five

members of the Security Council plus Germany for resolving issues

regarding Iran's nuclear program.

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In resolution 1803 (3 March 2008), the Council decided to extend

those sanctions to additional persons and entities, impose travel

restrictions on sanctioned persons, and bar exports of nuclear- and

missile-related dual-use goods to Iran.

Resolution 1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed the preceding four

resolutions, the only one of the seven not to invoke Chapter VII.

Resolution 1929 (9 June 2010) imposed a complete arms embargo on

Iran, banned Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles,

authorized the inspection and seizure of shipments violating these

restrictions, and extended the asset freeze to the Iranian Revolutionary

Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines

(IRISL). The resolution passed by a vote of 122, with Turkey and

Brazil voting against and Lebanon abstaining. A number of countries

imposed measures to implement and extend these sanctions, including

the United States, the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan,

Norway, South Korea, and Russia. Resolution 1984 (8 June 2011) extended for a further 12 months the

mandate of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1929.

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Chapter 3

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The IAEA remains unable to draw a conclusion on whether Iran has a secret

nuclear weapons program. It normally draws conclusions about the absence

of undeclared nuclear activities only in countries that have an Additional

Protocol in force. Iran ceased its voluntary and non-legally binding

implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary

cooperation with the IAEA beyond that required under its safeguards

agreement after the IAEA Board of Governors decided to report its

safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006.

The UN Security Council then passed Resolution 1737, invoking

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, obligating Iran to implement the Additional

Protocol. Iran has maintained that the Security Council's engagement in "the

issue of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran" are

unlawful and malicious. In its Safeguards Statement for 2007, the IAEA

found no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in 47 of 82

states that had both NPT safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols in

force, while it was unable to draw similar conclusions in 25 other states. In

August 2007, Iran and the IAEA entered into an agreement on the modalities

for resolving remaining outstanding issues, and made progress in outstanding

issues except for the question of "alleged studies" of weaponization by Iran.

Iran says it did not address the alleged studies in the IAEA work plan

because they were not included in the plan. The IAEA has not detected the

actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies and says

it regrets it is unable to provide Iran with copies of the documentation

concerning the alleged studies, but says the documentation is comprehensive

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and detailed so that it needs to be taken seriously. Iran says the allegations

are based on "forged" documents and "fabricated" data, and that it has not

received copies of the documentation to enable it to prove that they were

forged and fabricated.

Since 2011, the IAEA has voiced growing concern over possible military

dimensions to Iran's nuclear program, and has released a number of reports

chastising Iran's nuclear program to that effect.


In February 2007, anonymous diplomats at the atomic energy agency

reportedly complained that most U.S. intelligence shared with the IAEA had

proved inaccurate, and none had led to significant discoveries inside Iran.

On 10 May 2007, Iran and the IAEA vehemently denied reports that Iran had

blocked IAEA inspectors when they sought access to the Iran's enrichment

facility. On 11 March 2007, Reuters quoted International Atomic Energy

Agency spokesman Marc Vidricaire, "We have not been denied access at

any time, including in the past few weeks. Normally we do not comment on

such reports but this time we felt we had to clarify the matter ... If we had a

problem like that we would have to report to the [35-nation IAEA

governing] board ... That has not happened because this alleged event did not

take place."

May 2007 Report

On 30 July 2007, inspectors from the IAEA spent five hours at the Arak

complex, the first such visit since April. Visits to other plants in Iran were

expected during the following days. It has been suggested that access may

have been granted in an attempt to head off further sanctions.

August 2007 Report and Agreement between Iran and the IAEA

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An IAEA report to the Board of Governors on 30 August 2007, stated that

Iran's Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz is operating "well below the expected

quantity for a facility of this design," and that 12 of the intended 18

centrifuge cascades at the plant were operating. The report stated that the

IAEA had "been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear

materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran," and that longstanding issues

regarding plutonium experiments and HEU contamination on spent fuel

containers were considered "resolved." However, the report added that the

Agency remained unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and

nature of Iran's nuclear program.

The report also outlined a work plan agreed by Iran and the IAEA on 21

August 2007. The work plan reflected agreement on "modalities for

resolving the remaining safeguards implementation issues, including the

long outstanding issues." According to the plan, these modalities covered all

remaining issues regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities. The

IAEA report described the work plan as "a significant step forward," butadded "the Agency considers it essential that Iran adheres to the time line

defined therein and implements all the necessary safeguards and

transparency measures, including the measures provided for in the

Additional Protocol." Although the work plan did not include a commitment

by Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, IAEA safeguards head Olli

Heinonen observed that measures in the work plan "for resolving ouroutstanding issues go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol."

According to Reuters, the report was likely to blunt Washington's push for

more severe sanctions against Iran. One senior UN official familiar said U.S.

efforts to escalate sanctions against Iran would provoke a nationalistic

backlash by Iran that would set back the IAEA investigation in Iran. In late

October 2007, chief IAEA inspector Olli Heinonen described Iranian

cooperation with the IAEA as "good," although much remained to be done.

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In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the head

of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "no evidence" of

Iran developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaradei as saying "We

have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible

weaponization. That's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right

now, because there is still a lot of question marks ... . But have we seen Iran

having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No.

Have we seen an active weaponization program? No." The IHT report went

on to say that "ElBaradei said he was worried about the growing rhetoric

from the U.S., which he noted focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a

nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If

there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said he would welcome seeing it."

November 2007 report

The 15 November 2007, IAEA report found that on nine outstanding issues

listed in the August 2007 workplan, including experiments on the P-2

centrifuge and work with uranium metals, "Iran's statements are consistent

with ... information available to the agency," but it warned that its

knowledge of Tehran's present atomic work was shrinking due to Iran's

refusal to continue voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol, as it

had done in the past under the October 2003 Tehran agreement and the

November 2004 Paris agreement. The only remaining issues were traces ofHEU found at one location, and allegations by US intelligence agencies

based on a laptop computer allegedly stolen from Iran which reportedly

contained nuclear weapons-related designs. The IAEA report also stated that

Tehran continues to produce LEU. Iran has declared it has a right to peaceful

nuclear technology under the NPT, despite Security Council demands that it

cease its nuclear enrichment.

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On 18 November 2007, President Ahmadinejad announced that he intended

to consult with other Arab nations on a plan, under the auspices of the Gulf

Cooperation Council, to enrich uranium in a neutral third country, such as

Switzerland.

Israel criticised IAEA reports on Iran as well as the former IAEA-director

ElBaradei. Israel's Minister of Strategic Affairs Avigdor Lieberman

dismissed reports by the UN nuclear watchdog agency as being

"unacceptable" and accused IAEA head ElBaradei of being "pro-Iranian".


On 11 February 2008, news reports stated that the IAEA report on Iran's

compliance with the August 2007 work plan would be delayed over internal

disagreements over the report's expected conclusions that the major issues

had been resolved. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated that he

would meet with IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei to convince him to

"listen to the West" and remind him that the IAEA is merely in charge of the

"technical side" rather than the "political side" of the issue. A senior IAEA

official denied the reports of internal disagreements and accused Western

powers of using the same "hype" tactics employed against Iraq before the

2003 U.S.-led invasion to justify imposing further sanctions on Iran over its

nuclear program.

The IAEA issued its report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran on

22 February 2008. With respect to the report, IAEA Director Mohammad

ElBaradei stated that "We have managed to clarify all the remaining

outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope

and nature of Irans enrichment programme" with the exception of a single

issue, "and that is the alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran hasconducted in the past."

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According to the report, the IAEA shared intelligence with Iran recently

provided by the US regarding "alleged studies" on a nuclear weaponization

program. The information was allegedly obtained from a laptop computer

smuggled out of Iran and provided to the US in mid-2004. The laptop was

reportedly received from a "longtime contact" in Iran who obtained it from

someone else now believed to be dead. A senior European diplomat warned

"I can fabricate that data," and argued that the documents look "beautiful, but

is open to doubt". The United States has relied on the laptop to prove that

Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons. In November 2007, the United

States National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) believed that Iran halted an

alleged active nuclear weapons program in fall 2003. Iran has dismissed the

laptop information as a fabrication, and other diplomats have dismissed the

information as relatively insignificant and coming too late.

The February 2008 IAEA report states that the Agency has "not detected the

use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it

have credible information in this regard."

May 2008 report

On 26 May 2008, the IAEA issued another regular report on the

implementation of safeguards in Iran.

According to the report, the IAEA has been able to continue to verify the

non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, and Iran has provided theAgency with access to declared nuclear material and accountancy reports, as

required by its safeguards agreement.

Iran had installed several new centrifuges, including more advanced models,

and environmental samples showed the centrifuges "continued to operate as

declared", making low-enriched uranium. The report also noted that other

elements of Iran's nuclear program continued to be subject to IAEA

monitoring and safeguards as well, including the construction of the heavy

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water facility in Arak, the construction and use of hot cells associated with

the Tehran Research Reactor, the uranium conversion efforts, and the

Russian nuclear fuel delivered for the Bushehr reactor.

The report stated that the IAEA had requested, as a voluntary "transparency

measure", to be allowed access to centrifuge manufacturing sites, but that

Iran had refused the request. The IAEA report stated that Iran had also

submitted replies to questions regarding "possible military dimensions" to its

nuclear program, which include "alleged studies" on a so-called Green Salt

Project, high-explosive testing and missile re-entry vehicles. According to

the report, Iran's answers were still under review by the IAEA at the time the

report was published. However, as part of its earlier "overall assessment" of

the allegations, Iran had responded that the documents making the

allegations were forged, not authentic, or referred to conventional

applications.

The report stated that Iran may have more information on the alleged studies,

which "remain a matter of serious concern", but that the IAEA itself had notdetected evidence of actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear

weapons or components. The IAEA also stated that it was not itself in

possession of certain documents containing the allegations against Iran, and

so was not able to share the documents with Iran.

September 2008 reportAccording to the 15 September 2008, IAEA report on the implementation of

safeguards in Iran, Iran continued to provide the IAEA with access to

declared nuclear material and activities, which continued to be operated

under safeguards and with no evidence of any diversion of nuclear material

for non-peaceful uses. Nevertheless, the report reiterated that the IAEA

would not be able to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear

program unless Iran adopted "transparency measures" which exceeded its

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safeguards agreement with the IAEA, since the IAEA does not verify the

absence of undeclared nuclear activities in any country unless the Additional

Protocol is in force.

With respect to the report, IAEA Director Mohammad ElBaradei stated that

"We have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including

the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment

programme" with the exception of a single issue, "and that is the alleged

weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past."

According to the report, Iran had increased the number of operating

centrifuges at its Fuel Enrichment Plant in Isfahan, and continued to enrich

uranium. Contrary to some media reports which claimed that Iran had

diverted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for a renewed nuclear weapons

program, the IAEA emphasized that all of the uranium hexafluoride was

under IAEA safeguards. This was re-iterated by IAEA spokesman Melissa

Fleming, who characterized the report of missing nuclear material in Iran as

being "fictitious". Iran was also asked to clarify information about foreignassistance it may have received in connection with a high explosive charge

suitable for an implosion type nuclear device. Iran stated that there had been

no such activities in Iran.

The IAEA also reported that it had held a series of meetings with Iranian

officials to resolve the outstanding issues including the "alleged studies" into

nuclear weaponization which were listed in the May 2008 IAEA report.During the course of these meetings, the Iranians filed a series of written

responses including a 117-page presentation which confirmed the partial

veracity of some of the allegations, but which asserted that the allegations as

a whole were based on "forged" documents and "fabricated" data, and that

Iran had not actually received the documentation substantiating the

allegations. According to the August 2007 "Modalities Agreement" between

Iran and the IAEA, Iran had agreed to review and assess the "alleged

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studies" claims, as good faith gesture, "upon receiving all related

documents".

Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh, accused the United

States of preventing the IAEA from delivering the documents about the

alleged studies to Iran as required by the Modalities Agreement, and stated

that Iran had done its best to respond to the allegations but would not accept

"any request beyond our legal obligation and particularly beyond the Work

Plan, which we have already implemented."

While once again expressing "regret" that the IAEA was not able to provide

Iran with copies of the documentation concerning the alleged studies, the

report also urged Iran to provide the IAEA with "substantive information to

support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and

individuals" regarding the alleged studies, as a "matter of transparency". The

IAEA submitted a number of proposals to Iran to help resolve the allegations

and expressed a willingness to discuss modalities that could enable Iran to

demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in the documentation werenot nuclear-related, as Iran asserted, while protecting sensitive information

related to its conventional military activities. The report does not indicate

whether Iran accepted or rejected these proposals.

The report also reiterated that IAEA inspectors had found "no evidence on

the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a

nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or onrelated nuclear physics studies ... Nor has the Agency detected the actual use

of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies" but insisted that

the IAEA would not be able to formally verify the peaceful nature of Iran's

nuclear program unless Iran had agreed to adopt the requested "transparency

measures".


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In February 2010, the IAEA issued a report scolding Iran for failing to

explain purchases of sensitive technology as well as secret tests of high-

precision detonators and modified designs of missile cones to accommodate

larger payloads. Such experiments are closely associated with atomic

warheads.

May 2010 Report

In May 2010, the IAEA issued a report that Iran had declared production of

over 2.5 metric tons of low-enriched uranium, which would be enough if

further enriched to make two nuclear weapons, and that Iran has refused to

answer inspectors questions on a variety of activities, including what the

agency called the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.

In July 2010, Iran barred two IAEA inspectors from entering the country.

The IAEA rejected Iran's reasons for the ban and said it fully supported the

inspectors, which Tehran has accused of reporting wrongly that some

nuclear equipment was missing.

In August 2010, the IAEA said Iran has started using a second set of 164

centrifuges linked in a cascade, or string of machines, to enrich uranium to

up to 20% at its Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plan.

November 2011 Report

In November 2011 the IAEA released a report stating inspectors had found

credible evidence that Iran had been conducting experiments aimed at

designing a nuclear bomb until 2003, and research may have continued on a

lower rate since that time. IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said evidence

gathered by the agency "indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant

to the development of a nuclear explosive device." Iran rejected IAEA's

findings as "unbalanced, unprofessional and prepared with politicalmotivation and under political pressure by mostly the United States." A

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number of Western analysts have pointed out that the IAEA report had been

widely misread by the media.

In November 2011, IAEA officials identified a "large explosive containment

vessel" inside Parchin. The IAEA later assessed that Iran has been

conducting experiments to develop nuclear weapons capability.

The IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution by a vote of 322 that

expressed "deep and increasing concern" over the possible military

dimensions to Iran's nuclear program and calling it "essential" that Iran

provide additional information and access to the IAEA. The United States

welcomed the resolution and said it would step up sanctions to press Iran to

change course. In response to the IAEA resolution, Iran threatened to reduce

its cooperation with the IAEA, though Iranian Foreign MinisterAli Akbar

Salehi played down talk of withdrawal from the NPT or the IAEA.


On 24 February 2012, IAEA Director General Amano reported to the IAEA

Board of Governors that high-level IAEA delegations had met twice with

Iranian officials to intensify efforts to resolve outstanding issues, but that

major differences remained and Iran did not grant IAEA requests for access

to the Parchin site, where the IAEA believes high-explosives research

pertinent to nuclear weapons may have taken place. Iran dismissed the

IAEA's report on the possible military dimensions to its nuclear program asbased on "unfounded allegations." Amano called on Iran to agree to a

structure approach, based on IAEA verification practices, to resolve

outstanding issues. In March 2012, Iran said it would allow another

inspection at Parchin "when an agreement is made on a modality plan." Not

long after, it was reported that Iran might not consent to unfettered access.

An ISIS study of satellite imagery claimed to have identified an explosive

site at Parchin.

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The February IAEA report also described progress in Iran's enrichment and

fuel fabrication efforts, including a tripling of the number of cascades

enriching uranium to nearly 20% and testing of fuel elements for the Tehran

Research Reactor and the still incomplete IR-40 heavy water research

reactor. Though Iran was continuing to install thousands of additional

centrifuges, these were based on an erratic and outdated design, both in its

main enrichment plant at Natanz and in a smaller facility at Fordow buried

deep underground. "It appears that they are still struggling with the advanced

centrifuges," said Olli Heinonen, a former chief nuclear inspector for the

Vienna-based U.N. agency, while nuclear expert Mark Fitzpatrick pointed

out that Iran had been working on "second-generation models for over ten

years now and still can't put them into large-scale operation". Peter Crail and

Daryl G. Kimball of the Arms Control Organisation commented that the

report "does not identify any breakthroughs" and "confirms initial

impressions that Iran's announcements last week on a series of 'nuclear

advances' were hyped."

Chapter 4

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IRAN WORK ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Interviews and surveys show that the majority of Iranians in all groups favor

their country's nuclear program. Polls in 2008 showed that the vast majority

of Iranians want their country to develop nuclear energy, and 90% of

Iranians believe it is important (including 81% very important) for Iran "to

have a full fuel cycle nuclear program." Though Iranians are not Arab, Arab

publics in six countries also believe that Iran has the right to its nuclear

program and should not be pressured to stop that program. A poll in

September 2010 by the International Peace Institute found that 71 percent of

Iranians favored the development of nuclear weapons, a drastic hike over the

previous polls by the same agency. However, in July 2012, a poll on an

Iranian state-run media outlet found that 2/3 Iranians support suspending

uranium enrichment in return for a gradual easing of sanctions. Meir

Javedanfar, an Iranian-born commentator with the Middle East Economic

and Political Analysis Company, stated that while Iranians may want nuclear

energy, they don't want it at the price the government is willing to pay.

In explaining why it had left its enrichment program undeclared to the

IAEA, Iran said that for the past twenty-four years it has "been subject to the

most severe series of sanctions and export restrictions on material and

technology for peaceful nuclear technology," so that some elements of its

program had to be done discreetly. Iran said the U.S. intention "is nothing

but to make this deprivation" of Iran's inalienable right to enrichment

technology "final and eternal," and that the United States is completely silent

on Israel's nuclear enrichment and weapons program. Iran began its nuclear

research as early as 1975, when France cooperated with Iran to set up the

Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) to provide training for

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personnel to develop certain nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. Iran did not hide

other elements of its nuclear program. For example, its efforts at mining and

converting uranium were announced on national radio, and Iran also says

that in consultation with the Agency and member states throughout the

1990s it underlined its plans to acquire, for exclusively peaceful purposes,

fuel enrichment technology. Iran's contracts with other nations to obtain

nuclear reactors were also known to the IAEA but support for the contracts

was withdrawn after "a U.S. special national intelligence estimate declared

that while 'Iran's much publicized nuclear power intentions are entirely in the

planning stage,' the ambitions of the shah could lead Iran to pursue nuclear

weapons, especially in the shadow of India's successful nuclear test in May

1974". In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had failed to meet its obligations

to report some of its enrichment activities, which Iran says began in 1985, to

the IAEA as required by its safeguards agreement. The IAEA further

reported that Iran had undertaken to submit the required information for

agency verification and "to implement a policy of co-operation and fulltransparency" as corrective actions.

The Iranian government has repeatedly made compromise offers to place

strict limits on its nuclear program beyond what the Non-Proliferation Treaty

and the Additional Protocol legally require of Iran, in order to ensure that the

program cannot be secretly diverted to the manufacture of weapons. These

offers include operating Iran's nuclear program as an internationalconsortium, with the full participation of foreign governments. This offer by

the Iranians matched a proposed solution put forth by an IAEA expert

committee that was investigating the risk that civilian nuclear technologies

could be used to make bombs. Iran has also offered to renounce plutonium

extraction technology, thus ensuring that its heavy water reactor at Arak

cannot be used to make bombs either. More recently, the Iranians have

reportedly also offered to operate uranium centrifuges that automatically

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self-destruct if they are used to enrich uranium beyond what is required for

civilian purposes. However, despite offers of nuclear cooperation by the five

permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, Iran has

refused to suspend its enrichment program as the Council has demanded.

Iran's representative asserted that dealing with the issue in the Security

Council was unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility

because its peaceful nuclear program posed no threat to international peace

and security, and, that it ran counter to the views of the majority of United

Nations Member States, which the Council was obliged to represent.

"They should know that the Iranian nation will not yield to pressure and will

not let its rights be trampled on," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

told a crowd 31 August 2006, in a televised speech in the northwestern

Iranian city ofOrumiyeh. In front of his strongest supporters in one of his

provincial power bases, the Iranian leader attacked what he called

"intimidation" by the United Nations, which he said was led by the United

States. Ahmadinejad criticised a White House rebuff of his offer for atelevised debate with President Bush. "They say they support dialog and the

free flow of information," he said. "But when debate was proposed, they

avoided and opposed it." Ahmadinejad said that sanctions "cannot dissuade

Iranians from their decision to make progress," according to Iran's state-run

IRNA news agency. "On the contrary, many of our successes, including

access to the nuclear fuel cycle and producing of heavy water, have beenachieved under sanctions."

Iran insists enrichment activities are intended for peaceful purposes, but

much of the West, including the United States, allege that Iran is pursuing

nuclear weapons, or a nuclear weapons "capability". The 31 August 2006,

deadline called for Iran to comply with UN Security Council Resolution

1696 and suspend its enrichment-related activities or face the possibility of

economic sanctions. The United States believes the council will agree to

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implement sanctions when high-level ministers reconvene in mid-September,

U.S. Undersecretary of StateNicholas Burns said. "We're sure going to work

toward that [sanctions] with a great deal of energy and determination

because this cannot go unanswered," Burns said. "The Iranians are obviously

proceeding with their nuclear research; they are doing things that the

International Atomic Energy Agency does not want them to do, the Security

Council doesn't want them to do. There has to be an international answer,

and we believe there will be one."

Iran asserts that there is no legal basis for Iran's referral to the United

Nations Security Council since the IAEA has not proven that previously

undeclared activities had a relationship to a weapons program, and that all

nuclear material in Iran (including material that may not have been declared)

had been accounted for and had not been diverted to military purposes.

Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute requires a report to the UN Security

Council for any safeguards noncompliance. The IAEA Board of Governors,

in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions, decided that "Iran'smany failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT

Safeguards Agreement" as reported by the IAEA in November 2003

constituted "non-compliance" under the terms of Article XII.C of IAEA

Statute.

Iran also minimizes the significance of the IAEA's inability to verify the

exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, arguing the IAEA hasonly drawn such conclusions in a subset of states that have ratified and

implemented the Additional Protocol. The IAEA has been able to verify the

non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but not the absence of

undeclared activities. According to the IAEA's Safeguards Statement for

2007, of the 82 states where both NPT safeguards and an Additional

Protocol are implemented, the IAEA had found no indication of undeclared

nuclear activity in 47 states, while evaluations of possible undeclared nuclear

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activity remained ongoing in 35 states. Iran ceased implementation of the

Additional Protocol and all other cooperation with the IAEA beyond that

required under its safeguards agreement after the IAEA Board of Governors

decided to report its safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council

in February 2006. Iran insisted that such cooperation had been "voluntary,"

but on 26 December 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1737,

invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which among other things required

Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA, "beyond the formal requirements of

the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol." The IAEA reported on

19 November 2008, that, while it is "able to continue to verify the non-

diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran," it "has not been able to make

substantive progress" on "key remaining issues of serious concern" because

of a "lack of cooperation by Iran." Iran has maintained that the Security

Council's engagement in "the issue of the peaceful nuclear activities of the

Islamic Republic of Iran" are unlawful and malicio

neuclear program

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