netherlands' nacp

This is a publication of

Ministry of Infrastructure and theEnvironment Prepared byThe Authority for Nuclear Safety andRadiation Protection (ANVS)

Bezuidenhoutseweg 67 | 2594 AC The Hague, NetherlandsP.O. Box 16001 | 2500 BA The Hague, Netherlandswww.anvs.nl

Joint Convention (JC

) National Report of the Kingdom

of the Netherlands

October 2017

The Hague, December 2017

2nd Update of the National Action Plan for the follow-up of post-Fukushima Dai-ichi relatedactivities

Netherlands' NAcP - edition 2017

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan, edition 2017

Ministry of IenW December 2017 2

Abstract

This is the 2nd

update of the National Action Plan (NAcP) of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

for the follow-up of Fukushima Dai-ichi related activities at the single NPP in the Netherlands

as well as at the governmental bodies involved.

This National Action Plan is structured along six main topics identified by ENSREG and the

Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. For each topic it presents an update

and status of the analyses conducted, activities performed by the operator and those performed

by the regulator. It also provides for a tabled summary of the planning of activities at the

Licensee (EPZ of NPP Borssele).



Contents

List of tables 5

List of figures 6

List of Symbols and Abbreviations 7

Introduction 11

PART I Topics 0, 1, 2 and 3 15

0. General 15

0.0 Introduction 15

0.1 Tabled summary of items reported 16

1. External Events (Natural Hazards) 21

1.0 Introduction 21


2. Design Issues 27

2.0 Introduction 27


3. Severe Accident Management and Recovery (on site) 39

3.0 Introduction 39


PART II Topics 4, 5 and 6 51

4. National Organisations 51

4.0 Introduction to National Organisations 51

4.0.a Regulatory Body (RB) 51

4.0.b Governmental supporting organisations: RIVM 53

4.0.c Education and training organisations 54

4.0.d Technical (Support) Organisations 54

4.0.e Utility N.V. EPZ 55

4.0.f Vendor 55


5. Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post Accident Management (off site) 67

5.0 Introduction to organisation of EPR and PAM in the Netherlands 67

5.0.a Regulatory frame work - National Nuclear and Radiological Response Plan NCS 67



5.0.b Advisory organisation - national nuclear & radiation assessment team, CETsn 68

5.0.c Training and exercises and their organisation 68


6. International Cooperation 77

6.0 Introduction to contributions of the Netherlands to international cooperation 77


PART III Additional Topics 87

7. Specification of Additional Topics 87

7.0 Introduction 87

7.1 Tabled summary of items reported on ‘Additional Topics’ 88

PART IV Implementation of Activities 89

8. Specification of the Implementation of Activities 89

8.0 Introduction 89

8.1 Tabled summary of national implementation of post-stress test actions 90

8.1.a Actions on the part of the LH 90

8.1.b Actions on the part of the RB 102

8.2 Compliance with recently updated WENRA RLs 107

Appendix A Implementation of IAEA Action Plan 109



List of tables

Table 0-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 0 ‘General’. In the first

column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found

between parentheses, combined with a code with the format ‘0.x’ which results

from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second column presents

the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and

the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth column presents the

reflections of the Dutch RB in 2012 on the ENSREG observations, the Action

numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP, in which

these national Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth column

summarises the status of actions as per 1 December 2017. .................................... 16

Table 1-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 1 – External Events / Natural

Hazards. In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations

(items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format

‘1.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second

column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the

associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth

column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB in 2012 on the ENSREG

observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV

of this NAcP, where these national Actions can be found with their planning.

The sixth column summarises the status of actions as per 1 December 2017. ....... 22

Table 2-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 2 – Design Issues. In the first

column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found

between parentheses, combined with a code with the format ‘2.x’ which results

from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second column presents

the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and

the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth column presents the

reflections of the Dutch RB in 2012 on the ENSREG observations, the Action

numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP, in which

these national Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth column

summarises the status of actions as per 1 December 2017. .................................... 28

Table 3-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 3 – Severe Accident

Management (SAM). In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG

observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with

the format ‘3.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.

The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives

the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth




The sixth column summarises the status of the actions as per 1 December 2017. . 40

Table 4-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 4 –National Organisations. In

the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is

found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format ‘4.x’ which

results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second column

presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated

Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth column presents

the reflections of the Dutch RB in 2012 on the ENSREG observations, the

Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP,



where these National Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth

column summarises the status of the actions as per 1 December 2017. ................. 56

Table 5-1 Tabled summary of items reported for ‘Emergency Preparedness and

Response and Post Accident Management off-site’ In the first column, the

original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between

parentheses, combined with a code with the format ‘5.x’ which results from a

renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second column presents the

ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the

fourth the source of the observation. The fifth column presents the reflections of

the Dutch RB in 2012 on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers

mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP, where these national

Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth column summarises the

status of the actions as of 1 December 2017. .......................................................... 70

Table 6-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 6 – International

Cooperation. In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG

observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with

the format ‘6.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.

The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives

the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth




The sixth column summarises the status of the actions as of 1 December 2017. ... 79

Table 7-1 Additional Topics regarding licensees, specific for the Netherlands and not

inventoried or listed by ENSREG and/or CNS ....................................................... 88

Table 8-1 National post-stress test Actions – initiated by or imposed on Licensee EPZ

(operator of one NPP unit). This is the official national list of Actions. Mx-,

Px- and Sx- numbers between parentheses refer to original list of proposed

measures of licensee EPZ. Other numbers in between parentheses: NR refers to

section in National Report (2011), PR refers to section in Peer Review Report

(2012). ..................................................................................................................... 90

Table 8-2 National post-stress test actions – acting on and initiated by the national RB ..... 102

Table A-1 Implementation of IAEA Action Plan as of December 2017 110

List of figures

Figure 1 Organisation of the ANVS ...................................................................................... 52



List of Symbols and Abbreviations

AC Alternating Current

ANVS Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming, (Authority for

Nuclear Safety and Radiation protection), the new Regulatory Body

CNRA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (of the OECD/NEA)

CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety

CP Contracting Parties

CSA Complementary Safety margin Assessment, a.k.a. ‘stress test’

CSNI Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (of the OECD/NEA)

DBA Design Basis Accident

DBE Design Basis Earthquake

DBF Design Basis Flood

DC Direct Current

DG Diesel Generator

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

EDMG Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group

EOP Emergency Operating Procedure

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

EPZ N.V. Elektriciteits-Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland EPZ, licensee of the

Borssele NPP

ERO Emergency Response Organisation

EU European Union

EUROSAFE Forum organized by European TSOs

10EVA13 Current 10 yearly safety evaluation; periodic safety review (PSR)

HERCA Heads of the European Radiological protection Competent Authorities

HF Human Factors

HOF Human and Organisational Factors

ICMS ‘Intensivering Civiel-Militaire Samenwerking’; intensifying civil-military

cooperation

IenW ‘Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat’; Ministry of Infrastructure &

Water Management.

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IPPAS International Physical Protection Advisory Service

IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service



KCB Kerncentrale Borssele; NPP Borssele

KNMI ‘Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut’; Royal Netherlands

Meteorological Institute

KWU Kraftwerk Union

LH Licence Holder, licensee

LOOP Loss Of Offsite Power

LUHS Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink

MCR Main Control Room

NAcP National Action Plan (for post-Fukushima Dai-ichi activities)

NCS ‘Nationaal Crisisplan Stralingsincidenten’, i.e. National Plan for Nuclear and

Radiological Emergencies

NEA Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD

NERIS European Platform on Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological

Emergency Response and Recovery

NL Netherlands

NMR ‘Nationaal Meetnet Radioactiviteit’; national radiological monitoring

network

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

NRG Nuclear Research & consultancy Group (in the Netherlands)

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAR Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner

PGA Peak Ground Acceleration

PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve

PSA Probabilistic Safety Analysis

PWR Pressurised Water Reactor

RB Regulatory Body or ‘regulator’

RIVM ‘Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu’; National Institute for

Public Health and the Environment

SALTO Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation

SAM Severe Accident Management

SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidelines

SBO Station Blackout

SFP Spent Fuel Pool

SMA Seismic Margin Assessment

SOER Significant Operating Experience Report (WANO)

SSCs Structures, Systems and Components

TSO Technical Support Organisation, in this NAcP organizations supporting

Regulatory Bodies.

UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply



USA United States of America

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators Association

xCNS Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on

Nuclear Safety – in this NAcP reference is made to the 2nd

xCNS



Introduction

This section starts with the background of the National Action Plan (NAcP) and then sets out

the purpose and scope of this document. It then continues with the intended audience, links to

detailed information on the single operating Dutch Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), and introduction

to the Regulatory Body. The introduction finishes with a description of the structure of the

present report.

Background

In 2011 the licensees of NPPs in the EU produced their reports (‘Licensee Reports’) on the

‘stress test’ of their facilities, in accordance with the ENSREG specifications. In a second step,

the regulatory bodies evaluated these reports, and reported their findings in ‘National Reports’

and submitted these to ENSREG. Later in a third step there was a Peer Review of these reports.

This yielded a set of so-called Country Reports and a Summary Report with recommendations

for consideration by the participating countries, which was endorsed by ENSREG in April 2012.

This publication was one of the actions of the ENSREG action plan to assist the member states.

In parallel with the European efforts, the international community took important steps. On the

5th regular review conference of the CNS (4 – 14 April 2011) it was decided to organize from 27

– 31 August 2012 a 2nd

CNS Extraordinary Meeting1 on the lessons learnt after ‘Fukushima Dai-

ichi’. In May 2012, all participating countries submitted a National Report to the CNS

secretariat, dedicated to the purposes of this 2nd

Extraordinary Meeting (‘xCNS’). A summary of

the findings of the meeting was published in a CNS summary report2. In 2014 the 6

th CNS peer

review meeting was held, which reaffirmed the findings of the 2th Extraordinary meeting.

ENSREG has pursued continuation of the efforts of European countries in strengthening nuclear

safety. Among others it published a ‘Compilation of recommendations and suggestions’3 (July

2012).

In December 2012 National Action Plans (NAcPs) on the follow-up of post-Fukushima actions,

were submitted to ENSREG to be discussed in a dedicated ENSREG National Action Plan Peer

Review workshop in April 2013. The NAcP Review Workshop was a focused review meeting,

concentrating on actions and their implementation, responses and new developments that have

been initiated or influenced by the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant in

Japan, and have been presented earlier in National Reports to ENSREG and the 2nd

Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS.

In 2015 a second Peer Review workshop was held which provided added value in understanding

of the extent and the nature of measures to be implemented and was a valuable opportunity for

exchange of information among participants. It was based on the 1st update of the NAcPs

provided end of 2014.

Purpose and Scope of this second update of the National Action Plan

This NAcP will be the final one. This NAcP aims to present the current status of

implementation (December 2017). It should be noted that updates of the reporting are now also

included in the publicly available CNS-report (refer to the CNS-report from 2016). In the years

1 The first Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS on 28 September 2009 was dedicated to the revision of the Guidelines

regarding National Reports and rules of procedure and guidelines for training purposes. 2 Mr Li Ganjie, Mr William Borchardt, Mr Patrick Majerus, ‘2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to

the Convention of Nuclear Safety 27-31 August 2012 – Final Summary Report’, IAEA, CNS/ExM/2012/04/Rev.2,

August 2012. 3 ‘Compilation of recommendations and suggestions – Peer review of stress tests performed on European nuclear

power plants’, ENSREG, 26 July 2012



to come the CNS-report will be the place to show the updates and finally completion of the

limited number of remaining actions.

Like with the previous NAcPs, the present NAcP addresses the six topics identified in the

‘Guidance for National Reports’ of the 2nd

Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS1. For the first

three topics the elaboration is in line with those of the ENSREG-led Complementary Safety

Assessment (CSA, a.k.a. ‘stress test’).

The ENSREG secretariat in the past provided detailed guidance on the structuring of the first

NAcP. This guidance is also observed for the present NAcP. Since then, ENSREG issued

further guidance4 for the 1

st update of the NAcP which the present report adheres to. Per

ENSREG guidance, the NAcP features four main parts.

Part I

This part features the topics of the ENSREG-led CSA.

Topic 1: External Events

Topic 2: Design Issues

Topic 3: Severe Accident Management and Recovery (On-Site)

Part II

This part features the remaining topics of the Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS.

Topic 4: National Organisations

Topic 5: Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post-Accident Management (Off-Site)

Topic 6: International Cooperation

Part III

Generic activities and conclusions from National Review and related discussions.

Part IV

National implementation of activities, with schedules.

Further explanation of the Dutch approach to the reporting in the NAcP can be found in the last

section of the Introduction; ‘Structure of the Dutch National Action Plan (NAcP)’.

Intended Audience

This National Action Plan (NAcP) is mainly targeted at regulatory bodies of other states that

have participated in ENSREG-led Complementary Safety Assessments (a.k.a. ‘stress tests’) and

related Peer Review. As agreed the report is written in English. Nevertheless, it will be made

available to the general public. The report will also be sent to the Dutch Parliament.

Detailed information on the Borssele NPP and its robustness

Detailed information on the Borssele NPP and assessment of its robustness can be found in:

The self-assessment by utility EPZ, also called ‘Complementary Safety margin Assessment’

(CSA), following the format prescribed by ENSREG, can be found at:

http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-

publicaties/rapporten/2011/11/02/final-report-complementary-safety-margin-

assessment/complementary-safety-margin.pdf

The regulatory body’s evaluation of the CSA performed by utility EPZ:

http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-

4 Among others: ENSREG 2nd National Action Plan Workshop 2015 Information Pack Final, HLG_p(2014-28)_140,

ENSREG, 2014

http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/11/02/final-report-complementary-safety-margin-assessment/complementary-safety-margin.pdf



http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/12/20/netherland-s-national-report-on-the-post-fukushima-stress-test/netherland-s-national-report-on-the-post-fukushima-stress-test.pdf



publicaties/rapporten/2011/12/20/netherland-s-national-report-on-the-post-fukushima-

stress-test/netherland-s-national-report-on-the-post-fukushima-stress-test.pdf

Regulatory Body or Regulator

All nuclear facilities in the Netherlands, including the NPP of Borssele, operate under licence,

awarded after a safety assessment has been carried out.

The licence is granted by the Regulatory Body (RB) under the Nuclear Energy Act. The

‘Regulatory Body’ is the authority designated by the government as having legal authority for

conducting the regulatory process, including issuing authorizations, inspection and enforcement

and thereby regulating nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety, nuclear

security and safeguards. Since 2015 in the Netherlands this is the Authority for Nuclear Safety

and Radiation Protection (ANVS).

For more information on the RB, refer to chapter 4.

Structure of the Dutch National Action Plan (NAcP)

The present NAcP (version 2017) is designed to be a ‘standalone’ document. On the other hand

it refers to publicly available material.

The information is presented largely in tables to provide maximum clarity.

The present NAcP has four main parts, per ENSREG-guidance.

PART I

Chapter 0 ‘General’ addresses general conclusions as described in the ENSREG document

‘Compilation of recommendations and suggestions’ and the way these apply to the situation in

the Netherlands.

Chapter 1 on ‘External Events’ addresses conclusions and activities related to External Events,

as described in the ENSREG document ‘Compilation of recommendations and suggestions’.

Actions proposed are described to limited detail.

Chapter 2 on ‘Design Issues’ focuses on actions to prevent severe damage to the reactor and the

spent fuel pool, including any last resort means, as well as an evaluation of the time available to

prevent severe damage. The focus is on LOOP-SBO events and LUHS events.

Chapter 3 addresses the ‘Severe Accident Management’ (SAM) and Recovery on site. It focuses

on actions to improve the capability in terms of mitigating actions taken if severe reactor or

spent fuel pool damage occurs, in order to prevent large radioactive releases.

PART II

Chapter 4 ‘National Organisations’ reviews actions taken by the organisations involved in

maintaining and enhancing nuclear safety, and on the strength of these organisations. This

review extends past governmental organisations, incorporating vendors and Technical Support

Organisations cooperating with the governmental organisations in maintaining a high level of

safety.

Chapter 5 is about ‘Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post Accident Management off

site’. These are essential to prevent or reduce the potential health effects of a release of

radioactive materials.

Chapter 6 ‘International Cooperation’ considers just that. The present report considers the

actions taken to strengthen the global nuclear safety regime and reports on actions that have

been taken or are being planned to enhance international cooperation.

PART III

Chapter 7 ‘Additional Topics’ addresses generic activities and conclusions from the National

Review and related discussions that have not been addressed in Parts I and II.





PART IV

Chapter 8 ‘Implementation of Activities’ identifies timelines and key milestones of each

improvement activity in the Netherlands, at the licensee and at the Regulatory Body. In the

tables in the chapters 0 through 7, in many cases reference is made to numbered activities

(‘Actions’) specified in the tables in chapter 8 for detailed explanation of their statuses.

In addition, chapter 8 also briefly addresses the status of implementation of the recently updated

WENRA Reference Levels in Dutch regulation and at the NPP Borssele.



PART I Topics 0, 1, 2 and 3

Part I of this National Action Plan (NAcP) consists of the Chapters 0, 1, 2 and 3. Activities in

the domain of Part I mostly are the responsibility of the licensee. However governmental bodies

have many associated tasks like assessing actions proposed by the licensee, reviewing the

progress of actions agreed, imposing actions and overseeing their correct implementation.

0. General

0.0 Introduction

This chapter of the present NAcP addresses issues of a general nature that do not fit in one of

the categories ‘natural hazards’, ‘design issues’ and ‘severe accident management’ or apply to

more than one category.

The items reported have been listed in a table, refer to section 0.1.



0.1 Tabled summary of items reported

Table 0-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 0 ‘General’.

In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format

‘0.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.

The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation.

The fifth column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB in 2012 on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections

refer to Part IV of this NAcP, in which these national Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth column summarises the status of actions

as per 1 December 2017.

ENSREG

No.

Measure / Requirement identified

by ENSREG / xCNS

Theme Source NL Implementation (NAcP 2012) Status 1 December

2017

0.1 (1) a. The peer review Board recommends

that WENRA, involving the best available

expertise from Europe, develop guidance

on natural hazards assessments, including

earthquake, flooding and extreme weather

conditions, as well as corresponding

guidance on the assessment of margins

beyond the design basis and cliff-edge

effects.

general ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

a.1. Several studies contracted by the

Regulatory Body (RB) have been

performed to develop guidance on

external hazards.

a.1. Completed

a.2. A final guidance document has

not been established yet

a.2. Completed. The

requirements have

been documented in

the so-called VOBK

(Action RB-4.002).

a.3. The RB participates in the

WENRA T1 task force.

a.3. Completed



ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

0.1 (1) b. Thereby the harmonization of licensing

basis methods, the use of deterministic

and probabilistic methods, the definition

of probabilistic thresholds and

clarification of the BDBA/DEC scenarios

considered in the safety assessment should

be integrated. Further studies should use

state-of-the-art data and methods and

address trends in hazard data.

general b.1. The RB notes the use of

deterministic & probabilistic

methods is an established practice in

the Netherlands. BDBAs are part of

the safety assessments, but the stress

test may have an influence on the

future scope of these studies. The use

of state-of-the-art data is

compulsory. The NL expertise on

magnitudes and frequency of

earthquake and flooding hazards

rests with several governmental

bodies.

[also note b.2 below]

b.1. Completed

0.1(1) b. (continued) b.2. The Dutch RB has required the

NPP to specify a list of SSCs that are

necessary for (severe) accident

management and assign to these

SSCs the required qualifications and

availability under accident

conditions. This is related to Action

27 (refer to Part IV of this NAcP):

"Assessment of the need to upgrade

equipment and/or instrumentation

dedicated to SAM purposes".

b.2. Completed

As a result of the

study it was decided to

upgrade the robustness

of the SFP level

measurement



ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

0.1 (1) c. It should be stated, that safety

assessments should benefit from timely

operational experience feedback and

include organizational and human aspects,

and that regulations and regulatory

guidance should be regularly updated. In

order to avoid blind spots, a peer review

of assessments should be considered.

general c.1. The current practice is that

operational experience and

maintenance status is fed into the

PSA model. HF aspects are

mandatory aspects to be considered

by the licensee.

c.1. Completed

(continued practice)

c.2.1. The Dutch regulations and

guides for existing reactors have

been updated recently, taking into

account the WENRA RLs.

c.2.1. Completed

c.2.2. A project is underway to

define regulations for new

(research)reactors (RB-4.001),

considering its application for the

existing ones as well.

c.2.2. Completed. This

guidance has been

provided in the VOBK

document and was

published in 2015.

c.3. Major safety assessments

generally are reviewed and assessed

by or together with the TSO.

c.3. Completed


0.2 (2) a. The peer review Board recommends

that ENSREG underline the importance of

periodic safety review. In particular,

ENSREG should highlight the necessity to

reevaluate natural hazards and relevant

plant provisions as often as appropriate

but at least every 10 years.

general ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

a. The NL has a practice of PSRs for

NPPs. There are 10-yearly PSRs and

2-yearly smaller exercises. Natural

hazards are part of the 10-yearly

PSRs. At this moment the 4th PSR is

ongoing at Borssele NPP. PSRs are

mandatory in the NL.

a. Completed




ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

b. External hazards and their influence on

the licensing basis should be reassessed

periodically using state-of-the-art data and

methods. PSR was identified as one good

tool.

b. External hazards are included in

the PSR.

b. Completed


0.3 (3) Urgent implementation of the recognised

measures to protect containment integrity

is a finding of the peer review that

national regulators should consider.

general ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

In the NL there is one water cooled

reactor (PWR) type. The necessary

facilities are in place like

autocatalytic recombiners, means to

depressurize and to lower H2

concentrations, associated

procedures, (filtered) containment

venting facilities and associated

procedures, etc.

In addition, the RB has demanded

the licensee to perform additional

studies to establish the reliability of

the facilities present.

Depressurisation of primary system

and procedures (EOPs and SAMGs)

are implemented fully with special

SA-proof valves. One of the

identified measures from the

stresstest is ensuring the availability

of the filtered containment venting

system under seismic conditions

(Action 14 / M10).

Completed.

Study showed no

modification

necessary.



ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

0.4 (4) Necessary implementation of measures

allowing prevention of accidents and

limitation of their consequences in case of

extreme natural hazards is a finding of the

peer review that national regulators should

consider.

general ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

SAMGs are present at the NPP since

the 1990s. Currently they are

available for all plant states. Also see

Action 6 (M3) on refilling the SFP.

Various measures have been

proposed by licensee and endorsed

by the RB. In addition the RB has

demanded compliance with some

extra post-stress test requirements.

E.g. ensure availability of venting

systems and others after seismic

events etc.

Completed



1. External Events (Natural Hazards)

1.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the natural external hazards earthquakes, flooding and extreme weather

conditions. The items reported have been listed in a table, refer to section 0.

The phenomena loss of electrical power and loss of ultimate heat sink may be caused by natural

or man-made extreme events. In the present NAcP, these topics are addressed in chapter 2

‘Design Issues’.




Table 1-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 1 – External Events / Natural Hazards.





refer to Part IV of this NAcP, where these national Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth column summarises the status of actions as

per 1 December 2017.

ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS

Theme Source NL Implementation (NAcP 2012) Status 1 December 2017

1.1 (5) Deterministic methods should

form the basis for hazard

assessment. Probabilistic methods,

including probabilistic safety

assessment (PSA), are useful to

supplement the deterministic

methods.

natural

hazards

xCNS This is the long standing practice in the NL. The

licensee has a full scope PSA (PSA 1, 2 and 3)

for all operational states, which is continuously

updated with operating and maintenance data.

Completed (continued

practice)

1.2 (6) Hazard Frequency

The use a return frequency of 1E-

4 per annum (0.1g minimum peak

ground acceleration for

earthquakes) for plant

reviews/back-fitting with respect

to external hazards safety cases.

natural

hazards

ENSREG

Compilation

of

Recommend

ations, xCNS

a. Earthquake: A new seismic safety assessment

is being conducted (SMA). The DBE has a PGA

0.06 g at ground level and 0.075 at pile

foundation level corresponding with a return

period > 1 E4. However according to the stress

test analysis it is judged that there is a safety

margin up to at least 0.15 g. Post-stresstest, the

PSR will consider a DBE 0.1 g at free field, as

per IAEA guidance. Links with Action 33.

a. Studies completed in

2017.

New DBE (RLE) defined.

Measures to increase

margin (robustness) will

be implemented next years

(2018/2019).

refer to Action 33 (S3) in

Part IV.



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b. Flood: KCB has the wet side concept which

can withstand high tides with a return period of

longer than 1M years (DBF). There is also

protection by dykes which is not part of the NPP

design, but protects the plant against waves with

a return frequency of 10-4

per annum. The

seadyke was improved in 2012. The NPP KCB

has to analyze if the multiple layer concept of

IAEA-regulation is fulfilled. Links with Actions

18 and 30.

b. Completed

1.3 (7) Secondary Effects of Earthquakes

The possible secondary effects of

seismic events, such as flood or

fire arising as a result of the event,

in future assessments.

natural

hazards

ENSREG

Compilation

of

Recommend

ations

a. Flood as a result of a local earthquake is not a

likely scenario for the Netherlands. Floods from

other origins are more likely.

Fire from earthquakes is a possible scenario. Fire

fighting systems (and some other not seismically

qualified systems) and their resistance against

seismic impact are subject of a study that is

being conducted;

Action 12 (M8): Ensuring the ability of fire

annunciation and suppression systems after

seismic events.

a. Completed: studies

completed and

implementation completed

in 2017.

b. Action 33 (S3): Study Seismic Margin

Assessment (SMA)

b. Refer to Action 33 in

Part IV, largely completed,

SMA completion in 2018.

Robustness measures in

2018-2019.



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1.4 (8) Protected Volume Approach

The use of a protected volume

approach to demonstrate flood

protection for identified rooms or

spaces.

natural

hazards

ENSREG

Compilation

of

Recommend

ations

The Protected Volume Approach has been

implemented since 1984 and modified in the

PSRs of 1993 and 2006. It is known at EPZ as

"beveiligde zone". Measures are being

implemented to increase the margin within

which certain volumes will remain 'dry', e.g.:

Completed

a. Action 18 (M11): Wave protection beneath

entrances.

a. Completed, study

showed no extra actions

needed.

b. Action 2 (M2): Storage facilities for portable

equipment - enhancing robustness warehouse for

SAM equipment

b. Completed in 2017.

Temporary solution

implemented in 2013.

Final solution coupled to

final solution ERC. Refer

to Action 2 in Part IV.

c. Action 1 (M1): Emergency Response Centre

(ERC) - study and consider options to better

protect ERC like alternative location ERC, new

building, strengthening current building etcetera.

c. Completed in 2017.

Temporary ERC locations


Refer to Action 1 in Part

IV.

1.5 (9) Early Warning Notifications

The implementation of advanced

warning systems for deteriorating

wheather, as well as the provision

of appropriate procedures to be

followed by operators when

natural

hazards

ENSREG

Compilation

of

Recommend

ations

Early warning and appropriate procedures for

high tide exist and are in preparation for extreme

weather.

Action 23 (P3) ' Develop check-lists for plant

walk-downs and the necessary actions after

various levels of the foreseeable hazards', will

Completed



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warnings are made. assure adequate preparation in case of extreme

weather.

1.6 (10) Seismic Monitoring

The installation of seismic

monitoring systems with related

procedures and training.

natural

hazards

ENSREG

Compilation

of

Recommend

ations

Seismic monitoring systems will be operational

from June 2013. This measure was planned

before the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

Completed

1.7 (11) Qualified Walkdowns

The development of standards to

address qualified plant walkdowns

with regard to earthquake,

flooding and extreme weather – to

provide a more systematic search

for non-conformities and correct

them (e.g. appropriate storage of

equipment, particularly for

temporary and mobile plant and

tools used to mitigate beyond

design basis (BDB) external

events).

natural

hazards

ENSREG

Compilation

of

Recommend

ations

Periodic walkdowns to check availability and

correct storage of ERO equipment exist.

Walkdowns as reaction to early warnings (severe

weather approaching) are under development.

Action 23 (P3) ' Develop check-lists for plant

walk-downs and the necessary actions after

various levels of the foreseeable hazards'.

The Dutch RB has the opinion standards for such

checklists should be developed by international

expert groups which will also contribute to

harmonisation of such standards.

Completed

1.8 (12) Flooding Margin Assessments

The analysis of incrementally

increased flood levels beyond the

design basis and identification of

potential improvements, as

natural

hazards

ENSREG

Compilation

of

Recommend

ations

This is the current practice. The flooding margin

assessment was performed by incrementally

increasing the flood levels beyond the DBF

levels in the flooding studies performed in the

frame work of the past stress test.


practice)



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required by the initial ENSREG

specification for the stress tests.

1.9 (13) External Hazard Margins

In conjunction with

recommendation 1 and 17, the

formal assessment of margins for

all external hazards, including

seismic, flooding and severe

weather, and identification of

potential improvements.

Licensing basis protection against

external hazards (e.g. flood seals

and seismic supports) should be

verified to be effective. Margin

assessments should be based on

periodic re-evaluation of licensing

basis for external events

considering possible cliff-edge

effects and grace periods.

natural

hazards

ENSREG

Compilation

of

Recommend

ations, xCNS

Margin assessments were part of the stress test

performed in 2011. Licensee has to perform

additional studies on seismic (SMA, e.g. Action

33 S3), flooding and extreme weather hazards.

E.g.:

Studies completed.

Action 33 (S3): Study Seismic Margin

Assessment (SMA);

SMA to be finished in

2018

Measures to increase

margin (robustness) will

be implemented next years

(2018-2019).

Action 30 (S2): Investigate measures to further

increase safety margin in case of flooding - this

includes study of flooding (Action 31) and

superstorms (Action 32).

Refer to Action 33 in Part

IV. Study completed;

no measures necessary.



2. Design Issues

2.0 Introduction

This chapter ‘Design Issues’ focuses on the hazards loss of electrical power and loss of ultimate

heat sink. These may be caused by natural or man-made extreme events. In general these topics

are referred to in terms of Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP), Station Blackout (SBO) and Loss of

Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS). These are all considered to be within the design basis of the NPP.

In addition loss of all AC power is considered.





Table 2-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 2 – Design Issues.





refer to Part IV of this NAcP, in which these national Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth column summarises the status of actions

as per 1 December 2017.

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2.1 (14) Alternate Cooling and Heat Sink

The provision of alternative means

of cooling including alternate heat

sinks.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

Ample means of alternate cooling and

heat sink are available. Borssele has

ground water pumps, fire water pool and

can apply feed and bleed. Refer to

National Report on the stress test of the

Netherlands (2011) for details.


practice)

However, additional

measures to strengthen

the availability of the

SFP have been studied

and implemented (Act’s

7 and 29 in Part IV)

2.2 (15) AC Power Supplies

The enhancement of the on-site and

off-site power supplies.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

Examples are:

Action 9 (M5): Reduction of time to

connect mobile diesel generated power to

2 hrs.

Completed.

Equipment ready to use

and apply. Confirmatory

test outstanding in 2018,

refer to action 9 in Part

IV.



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Action 10 (M6): Establishing ability to

transfer diesel from any of the storage

tanks to active diesels;

Completed

Action 36 (S4): Study regarding

strengthening off-site power supply;

Study completed.

Implementation of a new

measure completed.

Action 37 (S5): Study for more extensive

use of steam for powering emergency feed

water pump;

Completed. Decided not

to make extended use of

steam, mobile pumps

preferred.

Action 43: Reassessment of alternative

power sources (alternative to emergency

grids) including reassessment of the

possibility of having extra fixed external

connections for mobile diesel generator.

Completed. Additional

connection points to

mobile power are

implemented.

2.3 (16) DC Power Supplies

The enhancement of the DC power

supply.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS


power sources (alternative to emergency

grids).

Study completed 2013.

Implementation

completed (2017).

Action 44: Better arrangements for mobile

diesel generator and batteries;

This includes studies of small mobile

emergency power facilities for recharging

purposes or as backup facility, as well as

drafting of instructions for using such

Study completed.

Implementation

rescheduled from 2013 to

mid-2017 to align with

PSR and completed.



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facilities

Action 16 (M9): Increasing autarky time

beyond 10h.

Study completed.

Implementation mid

2017 completed.

2.4 (17) Operational and Preparatory

Actions

Implementation of operational or

preparatory actions with respect to

the availability of operational

consumables.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Examples are:

Action 10 (M6) - Establishing ability to

transfer diesel fuel from all storage tanks

to active diesels

Completed

Action 42 - Study amount of lubrication

oil in crisis situations

Completed; always

enough lubricant

available for 1 week.

Action 19 (P1) Also the introduction of

EDMGs to restore equipment in case of

extreme external events

Phase 1 completed, Phase

2 (purchases)


mid-2017 and completed.

Action 27 Assessment of the need to

upgrade equipment dedicated to SAM

purposes.

Completed

2.5 (18) Instrumentation and Monitoring

The enhancement of

instrumentation and monitoring.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

Action 27: Assessment of the need to

upgrade equipment and/or instrumentation

dedicated to SAM purposes (increasing

robustness of existing

equipment/instrumentation, protection of

Completed



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equipment/instrumentation against BDB

hazards, periodic test/inspection program

of those equipment/instrumentation, well

defined and trained procedures to use

those equipment / instrumentation).

2.6 (19) Shutdown Improvements

The enhancement of safety in

shutdown states and mid-loop

operation.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

There are several measures being

implemented, related to this topic, e.g.:

Action 21 (P2): Training of the procedure

to ensure water supply during midloop

operation and loss of AC power.

Completed

Action 22: Prepare and validate the

capabilities to cope with SBO during

midloop operation

Completed

Possibility of remote control should be

investigated

Implementation

rescheduled to mid-2017

and completed.

Action 29 (S1): A reserve SFP cooling

system independent of power supply

Study completed 2013,

chosen modification

aligned with PSR,

implementation 2017.

Completed.

2.7 (20) Reactor Coolant Pump Seals

The use of temperature-resistant

(leak-proof) primary pump seals.

Study of RCP pump seal leakage

following long term AC power

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

The licensee states that the Sulzer MCPs

have a sealing concept that is not

dependent on AC (once MCPs stopped).


practice)



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No.


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failure.

2.8 (21) Ventilation

The enhancement of ventilation

capacity during SBO to ensure

equipment operability.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

The licensee states that: Equipment

required to be operational under SBO

conditions are supplied by the SBO

diesels. This includes the required

ventilation systems. In case of complete

loss of AC, no forced ventilation is

required for operable equipment.


practice)

2.9 (22) Main and Emergency Control

Rooms

The enhancement of the main

control room (MCR), the

emergency control room (ECR) and

emergency control centre (ECC) to

ensure continued operability and

adequate habitability conditions in

the event of a station black-out

(SBO) and in the event of the loss

of DC (this also applies to Topic 3

recommendations).

Habitability of control

rooms/emergency centers under

DEC conditions.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

There are several measures being

implemented that are related to this topic,

e.g.:

Action 1 (M1) and Action 4 : Realization

of an emergency response center facility

that can give shelter to the emergency

response organization after all foreseeable

hazards, including habitability (analysis of

the potential doses to workers during

severe accident management activities,

including habitability of MCR and ECR).

Completed. Alternative

ERC locations arranged

(2013). New ERC was

scheduled for end 2017

and completed.


power sources (alternative to external

grid)


Implementation

completed in 2017.



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Action 44: Better arrangements for mobile

diesel generator and batteries





facilities.

Study completed.

Implementation


mid-2017 and completed.

2.10 (23) Spent Fuel Pool

The improvement of the robustness

of the spent fuel pool (SFP).

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

Action 6 (M3) Possibility for refilling the

SFP without entering containment, design

& implementation of coupling to system

that provides water for fire-fighting (UJ).

Completed

Action 7 (M4) Additional possibilities for

refilling the SFP (and sustaining cooling),

design & implementation.

Completed

Action 29( S1) Reserve SFP cooling

system independent of power supply.


Chosen modification

aligned with PSR,

implementation


mid-2017. Completed.

Action 33 (S3) Study SMA will also

contribute to more certainty of the

robustness of the SFP.

Also refer to ENSREG point 2.17 (30) of

this table.

refer to Action 33 in Part

IV.



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2.11 (24) Separation and Independence

The enhancement of the functional

separation and independence of

safety systems.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Separation & independence are part of the

design basis. However several measures

will enhance these. Refer to other topics

in this table.


practice)

2.12 (25) Flow Path and Access Availability

The verification of assured flow

paths and access under SBO

conditions. Ensure that the state in

which isolation valves fail and

remain, when motive and control

power is lost, is carefully

considered to maximise safety.

Enhance and extend the availability

of DC power and instrument air (e.

g. by installing additional or larger

accumulators on the valves).

Ensure access to critical equipment

in all circumstances, specifically

when electrically operated

turnstiles are interlocked.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

The operability of the major safety valves

has been checked (2012). The PORVs

need DC power.

Completed

Further analysis is ongoing. Completed.

This refers to Actions 3

and 44 of the LH in Part

IV.

2.13 (26) Mobile Devices

The provision of mobile pumps,

power supplies and air compressors

with prepared quick connections,

procedures, and staff training with

drills.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

Several measures are implemented that

are related to this topic, e.g.:

Action 44 : Better arrangements for

mobile diesel generator and batteries





Study completed.

Implementation proposed

rescheduling from 2013

to mid-2017 to align a.o.

with PSR. Completed.



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facilities.

Action 9 (M5), Reduction of the time to

connect mobile diesel generator to 2 hours

Completed, equipment

available and ready to

use. Confirmatory test

outstanding in 2018.

Action 19: Further development of

EDMGs.


2 (purchases) proposed


to 2017. Completed.

2.14 (27) Bunkered/Hardened Systems

The provision for a bunkered or

“hardened” system to provide an

additional level of protection with

trained staff and procedures

designed to cope with a wide

variety of extreme events including

those beyond the design basis (this

also applies to Topic 3

recommendations).

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

The NPP has bunkered systems, however

some measures will be implemented that

will further enhance nuclear safety, e.g.:

Action 1 (M1), Emergency Response

Centre (ERC) - study and consider

options to better protect ERC like

alternative location ERC, new building,

strengthening current building etc.

Final solution delayed,


2017. Completed.

Temporary ERC

locations implemented in

2013. Refer to Action 1

in Part IV.

Action 2 (M2), Storage facilities for

portable equipment - enhancing

robustness warehouse for SAM

equipment.

Delayed and rescheduled

from 2014 to 2017 and

completed.

Temporary solution


Final solution coupled to



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final solution ERC. Refer

to Action 2 in Part IV.

Action 19B (P1) addresses training;

'Develop set of EDMGs and implement

training program'.

Completed

2.15 (28) Multiple Accidents

The enhancement of the capability

for addressing accidents occurring

simultaneously on all plants of the

site and consideration of the site as

a whole for a multi-units site in the

safety assessment.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

The Borssele site features one NPP and a

coal fired plant. Effects of the coal fired

plant and other nearby industry on NNP

risk has been studied during the CSA and

in preparing the Safety Analysis Report;

no specific issues have been identified.


practice)

2.16 (29) Equipment Inspection and Training

Programs

The establishment of regular

programs for inspections to ensure

that a variety of additional

equipment and mobile devices are

properly installed and maintained,

particularly for temporary and

mobile equipment and tools used

for mitigation of BDB external

events. Development of relevant

staff training programmes for

deployment of such devices.

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Equipment and training programs are in

place. However enhancement of these is

part of the focus of several measures like:

Action 27B, Study regarding the need to

upgrade equipment dedicated to SAM

purposes.

Completed (2013)

Action 19 (P1) Further development of

EDMGs and associated training

programme.


2 (purchases) proposed


to mid-2017. Completed.



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2.17 (30) Further Studies to Address

Uncertainties

The performance of further studies

in areas where there are

uncertainties. Uncertainties may

exist in the following areas:

design

issues

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

a. The integrity of the SFP and its

liner in the event of boiling or

external impact.

a. Integrity of the SFP is part of the SMA.

Impact on liner of boiling effects is under

consideration.

Completed. Research has

established that boiling

does not pose a threat to

the integrity of the SFP.

b. The functionality of control

equipment (feedwater control

valves and SG relief valves, main

steam safety valves, isolation

condenser flow path, containment

isolation valves as well as

depressurisation valves) during the

SBO to ensure that cooling using

natural circulation would not be

interrupted in a SBO.

b. Refer to ENSREG point 25.

c. The performance of additional

studies to assess operation in the

event of widespread damage, for

example, the need different

equipment (e.g. bulldozers) to clear

the route to the most critical

locations or equipment. This

includes the logistics of the

c. Action 19(P1) Develop set of EDMGs

and implement training programme, the

licensee was in the process of developing

EDMGs before the start of the ENSREG-

led CSA.


2 (purchases)


2017 and completed.



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external support and related

arrangements (storage of

equipment, use of national defense

resources, etc.).



3. Severe Accident Management and Recovery (on site)

3.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on SAM and Recovery on site.





Table 3-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 3 – Severe Accident Management (SAM).





refer to Part IV of this NAcP, where these national Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth column summarises the status of the

actions as per 1 December 2017.

ENSREG

No.


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2017

3.1 (31) WENRA Reference Levels (version

2008)

The incorporation of the WENRA

reference levels related to severe

accident management (SAM) into

their national legal frameworks, and

ensure their implementation in the

installations as soon as possible.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

WENRA RLs have been implemented fully

into the regulations. This has been verified

in the WENRA RH project dating from

2005-2008. The implementation in NPP

KCB was complete too. The issue of

molten corium stabilization / in vessel

retention (IVR) has been analyzed in PSRs

before and will be analyzed again in the

upcoming PSR 2013.

Completed

Refer to chapter 8 for

the latest status of

implementation of the

2014 version of SRLs.

IVR has been


Action 39 (S7) In previous periodic safety

reviews an extensive set of formal analyses

has been performed to address the threats

of hydrogen to the containment. In

10EVA13 these studies will be reviewed

and where necessary renewed and

extended, e.g. the management of hydrogen

from the SFP, into the filtered containment

venting system and into the neighbouring

Completed



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2017

buildings.

Action 14 (M10) Ensuring the availability

of the containment venting system TL003

after seismic events would increase the

margin in case of seismic events.

Completed.

Study showed no

modification was

necessary.

3.2 (32) SAM Hardware Provisions

Adequate hardware provisions that

will survive external hazards (e.g.

by means of qualification against

extreme external hazards, storage in

a safe location) and the severe

accident environment (e.g.

engineering substantiation and/or

qualification against high pressures,

temperatures, radiation levels, etc),

in place, to perform the selected

strategies.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Action 1 (M1), Action 2 (M2). Rescheduled from 2014

to 2017, and completed.

Refer to Actions 1 & 2

in Part IV.

Action 3, Action 4. Completed

Action 12 (M8). Studies completed

2013.

Implementation

rescheduled from 2016

to mid-2017 and

completed.

Action 14 (M10). Completed



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2017

Action 19 (EDMGs). Phase 1 completed,

Phase 2 implementation


to mid-2017 and

completed.

Action 27. Completed

Also refer to ENSREG No. 2.14 (27) in

Table 2-1 of section 2.1 of this NAcP

3.3 (33) Review of SAM Provisions

Following Severe External Events

The systematic review of SAM

provisions focusing on the

availability and appropriate

operation of plant equipment in the

relevant circumstances, taking

account of accident initiating

events, in particular extreme

external hazards and the potential

harsh working environment.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Action 26: Improvements of SAMGs and

EOPs (e.g. focusing on longer term

accidents and including better training

provisions)

Rescheduled from 2013

to 2016 and completed.

Action 27: Assessment of the need to

upgrade equipment and/or instrumentation

dedicated to SAM purposes.

Completed

3.4 (34) Enhancement of Severe Accident

Management Guidelines (SAMG)

In conjunction with the

recommendation 4, the

enhancement of SAMGs taking into

account additional scenarios,

including, a significantly damaged

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

Several measures are being implemented to

further enhance the SAMGs, including:

training of long term SAMG measures

(Action 24),

Completed

developing specific SAMGs for the SFP Completed



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2017

infrastructure, including the

disruption of plant level, corporate-

level and national-level

communication, long-duration

accidents (several days) and

accidents affecting multiple units

and nearby industrial facilities at the

same time.

(Action 25),

assessment of the need to upgrade

equipment for SAM (Action 27).

Completed

Actions on EDMGs (like Action 19).

Phase 1 completed,



to mid-2017 and

completed.

For communication issues refer to

ENSREG No. 3.5 (35) of this table.

3.5 (35) Analysis of human resources,

communication, personnel training

and guidance during severe long

term accidents (esp. multi-unit) and

validation of effectiveness through

exercises.

severe

accident

management

xCNS This is addressed in measures mentioned

with ENSREG topic 34. In addition there

is:

Action 5 'Assessing ERO staffing regarding

its adequacy 24/7.'

Completed

Action 11 (M7) attention to communication

issues; 'Establishing independent voice and

data communication under adverse

conditions'.

Completed

3.6 (36) SAMG Validation

The validation of the enhanced

SAMGs.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

This is part of the measures mentioned with

ENSREG No. 3.4 (34).

Refer to 3.4 (34) in this

table.



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2017

3.7 (37) SAM Exercises

Exercises aimed at checking the

adequacy of SAM procedures and

organisational measures, including

extended aspects such as the need

for corporate and nation level

coordinated arrangements and long-

duration events.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

SAM exercises are a frequent phenomenum

at Borssele NPP. Structures & procedures

are in place for interfacing with the national

and local authorities in crisis situations.

Exercises often involve more than 1,000

people. There are additional exercises for

specific scenarios (like flooding) in

cooperation with the armed forces.

Related Actions are:

Action 24 (training of long term-term SAM

measures should improve the reliability of

existing procedures),

Study finished 2013,

training finished March

2015. Completed.

Action 26 (improvements to SAMGs and

EOPs, e.g. focusing on longer term

accidents and including better training

provisions,

Rescheduled from 2013


Action 27C (well defined and trained

procedures to use those

equipment/instrumentation).

Completed



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2017

3.8 (38) SAM Training

a. Regular and realistic SAM

training exercises aimed at training

staff. Training exercises should

include the use of equipment and

the consideration of multi-unit

accidents and long-duration events.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

a Refer to ENSREG No. 3.4 (34) for

enhancing training SAM. Also refer to

ENSREG No. 3.7 (37) of this list.

Refer to named

references in list.

b. The use of the existing NPP

simulators is considered as being a

useful tool but needs to be enhanced

to cover all possible accident

scenarios.

b. A full scope simulator (in Essen,

Germany) is used regularly, but its purpose

does not extend to SAM exercises. KCB

uses a desktop simulator for support of its

exercises/training of severe accidents and

the improvement of this facility is under

consideration.

Completed

A recent OSART

mission did not give

additional

recommendations with

respect to this item.

3.9 (39) Extension of SAMGs to All Plant

States

The extension of existing SAMGs

to all plant states (full and low-

power, shutdown), including

accidents initiated in SFPs.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

The SAMGs cover all plant states.

Dedicated SAMGs are being developed for

the SFP (Action 25).

Completed

3.10 (40) Improved Communications

The improvement of

communication systems, both

internal and external, including

transfer of severe accident related

plant parameters and radiological

data to all emergency and technical

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Structures and procedures are in place to

communicate and cooperate with local and

national authorities in crisis situations.

Plant data can be shared with the

authorities. All important plant data and

radiological data are available in the ECC

and the TSC. Some enhancement of

Completed



ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

support centre and regulatory

premises.

communication systems is being pursued

(Action 11 / M7 Establishing independent

voice and data communication under

adverse conditions)

3.11 (41) Presence of Hydrogen in

Unexpected Places

The preparation for the potential for

migration of hydrogen, with

adequate countermeasures, into

spaces beyond where it is produced

in the primary containment, as well

as hydrogen production in SFPs.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations,

xCNS

The SFP is in the containment of Borssele

NPP. So the facilities to lower H2

concentration (autocatalytic recombiners,

ventilation, dispersion over larger volumes

etc) that are present in the containment also

apply to the SFP.

Action 39 (S7): In previous periodic safety

reviews an extensive set of formal analyses

has been performed to address the threats

of hydrogen to the containment. In

10EVA13 these studies will be reviewed

and where necessary renewed and

extended, e.g. the management of hydrogen

from the SFP, into the filtered containment

venting system and into the neighbouring

buildings.

Completed

3.12 (42) Large Volumes of Contaminated

Water

The conceptual preparations of

solutions for post-accident

contamination and the treatment of

potentially large volumes of

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Enhancement of the means to handle

contaminated water is being pursued in

Action 45 'procedures for handling of large

amounts of radioactively contaminated

water'

Completed



ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

contaminated water.

3.13 (43) Radiation Protection

The provision for radiation

protection of operators and all other

staff involved in the SAM and

emergency arrangements.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

In Dutch legislation there are dose limits

for several categories of staff involved in

crisis situations. An analysis is being

conducted to analyse the potential dose to

workers (Action 4).


implementations


to mid-2017 and

completed.

3.14 (44) On Site Emergency Centre

The provision of an on-site

emergency centre protected against

severe natural hazards and

radioactive releases, allowing

operators to stay onsite to manage a

severe accident.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Borssele NPP has an on-site Emergency

Response Centre (ERC). The protection

against extreme severe natural hazards is

being re-evaluated (flooding, seismic

events). This includes the protection against

radiation from radioactive releases.

(Actions 3 and 4).


implementation



3.15 (45) Support to Local Operators

Rescue teams and adequate

equipment to be quickly brought on

site in order to provide support to

local operators in case of a severe

situation.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

At Borssele NPP, there are procedures for

bringing new or additional staff on site in

case of severe situations. A recent exercise

(with the armed forces) showed it is

possible to bring staff and equipment on

site under flooding conditions. It has been

arranged to have these exercises with the

armed forces each year, the next exercise

has been scheduled for 30th January 2013.

Completed



ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

Action 19 (development of EDMGs and

training program) will among others

identify necessary staff, equipment and

procedures.

Phase 1 completed,



to mid-2017 and

completed.

3.16 (46) Level 2 Probabilistic Safety

Assessments (PSAs)

A comprehensive Level 2 PSA as a

tool for the identification of plant

vulnerabilities, quantification of

potential releases, determination of

candidate high-level actions and

their effects and prioritizing the

order of proposed safety

improvements. Although PSA is an

essential tool for screening and

prioritising improvements and for

assessing the completeness of SAM

implementation, low numerical risk

estimates should not be used as the

basis for excluding scenarios from

consideration of SAM especially if

the consequences are very high.

severe

accident

management

ENSREG

Compilation of

Recommendations

Borssele NPP features a full scope PSA,

including PSA-1, PSA-2 and PSA-3.

During the PSR, the PSA is used to identify

potential weaknesses. The development of

the PSA is driven by the instrument of PSR

in combination with the IAEA IPSART

missions, initiated by the RB. The

upcoming IPSART follow-up mission in

April 2013 will address a number of post-

stress test (post-Fukushima Dai-ichi)

aspects.

Completed

3.17 (47) Severe Accident Studies severe ENSREG This is covered by Actions 24, 25, 26 and 25, 27 completed.



ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

The performance of further studies

to improve SAMGs.

accident

management

Compilation of

Recommendations

27 as explained before and

Action 3 and 4 (severe) accident

management under all extreme

circumstances).

Furthermore the areas of study related to

this item are important and will be covered

in international framework.

24 and 26 rescheduled

from 2013 to 2015 and

2016 respectively and

completed.

3 and 4 completed.

3.18 (48) Containment venting for new NPPs severe

accident

management

xCNS The NPP Borssele has facilities for filtered

containment venting, dating from long

before 'Fukushima'.

For new NPPs in the Netherlands it is

expected it will be part of the requirements.

There is one action regarding this system:

Action 14 (M10) Ensuring the availability

of the containment venting system TL003

after seismic events.

Completed



PART II Topics 4, 5 and 6

Part II of this report consists of the Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Activities in the domain of Part II

mostly are the responsibility of governmental bodies.

4. National Organisations

The licensee is primarily responsible for nuclear safety. However, the government, the

regulator, technical support organizations, vendors, service providers and other stakeholders are

also important to improve and to maintain a high standard of safety. Section 4.0 presents a

general introduction to the various National Organisations relevant for nuclear safety. The

developments and actions regarding National Organisations have been listed in a table, refer to

section 4.1.

4.0 Introduction to National Organisations

4.0.a Regulatory Body (RB)

All nuclear facilities in the Netherlands, including the NPP of Borssele, operate under licence,

awarded after a safety assessment has been carried out. The licence is granted by the Regulatory

Body (RB) under the Nuclear Energy Act.

The RB is the authority designated by the government as having legal authority for conducting

the regulatory process, including issuing authorisations, inspection and enforcement, and

thereby regulating nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety, nuclear security

and safeguards.

In 2015, the Netherlands have largely merged several entities of the RB into the newly

established Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, the ANVS5. The ANVS

brings together expertise in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection, as well as

security and safeguards. The merger constitutes a large efficiency and effectiveness

improvement for the development and maintenance of competences for most disciplines.

Various tasks that in the past were performed by different Ministries are now taken care of by

ANVS.

A prominent change in the Nuclear Energy Act established that the Minister of Infrastructure

and Water Management became the principal responsible authority for conducting the

regulatory process under the Nuclear Energy Act and for the main functions of the Regulatory

Body - the responsible Minister used to be the Minister of Economic Affairs. This change took

effect by a Royal Decree of May 1st 2015. Another important step 1st of August 2017 was the

update of the Act and subordinate regulation which legally established the ANVS as an

independent administrative authority (Dutch acronym: ZBO6). The ANVS as a ZBO is legally

independent in its decisions relating to authorization and supervision, its functioning and

organising its activities, but the Minister remains politically responsible for its functioning and

is accountable to the Parliament.

The tasks of the ANVS can be summarised as follows:

preparing legislation and regulations and policy (including the national programme);

5 Dutch: ANVS, ‘Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming’ 6 ZBO, ‘Zelfstandig Bestuurs Orgaan’ or independent administrative authority



awarding licences and the accompanying review & assessment and evaluation tasks;

supervision and enforcement;

informing interested parties and the public;

participating in activities of international organisations;

maintaining relationships with comparable foreign authorities and national and international

organisations;

supporting national organisations with the provision of knowledge;

having research in support of the implementation of its tasks.

In 2014 the IAEA recommended in its IRRS7-report to the Government of the Netherlands to

make a further analysis of the manpower situation. Staff has grown the past few years from

about 90 FTE to about 130 FTE, to be further increased to 141, including the two members of

the board.

The creation of ANVS has also aided the continued development of openness and transparency.

ANVS has its own website and 4 FTE communications staff.

4.0.a.1 Organisation of the RB

The ANVS is organised in three departments: (1) Nuclear Safety & Security (‘Nucleaire

Veiligheid en Beveiliging’, NVB), (2) Radiation Protection & Emergency Preparedness

(‘Stralingsbescherming en Crisismanagement’, SBC) and (3) Control, Communication &

Support (‘Sturing, Communicatie en Ondersteuning’, SCO). The latter supports the other units

in their operation and provides coordination of the many activities of the ANVS. It also

manages the public information and communication tasks of the ANVS.

Figure 1 Organisation of the ANVS

Activities of the RB on regulation

Not related to Fukushima Dai-ichi, an update and extension of Dutch Safety Rules (‘NVRs’

which are based on IAEA-requirements and guides) has been introduced for the existing NPP in

2010. A new update project starts in 2018, finishing in 2020.

Some Decrees associated with the Nuclear Energy Act contain additional regulations related to

the use of nuclear technology and materials. These continue to be updated in the light of

ongoing developments. The updated Council Directive on Nuclear Safety from 2014 has been

7 Integrated Regulatory Review Service, IRRS



transposed in a Ministerial Order. Notable is the ongoing substantial update of the Decree on

Radiation Protection (Bs) because of the transposition of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom

(BSS) laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from

exposure to ionising radiation.

The ANVS has completed in 2015 the new Dutch Safety Guidelines for water cooled reactors,

with Dutch acronym ‘VOBK’8. The VOBK consists of an (extensive) introductory part and a

technical part, the ‘Dutch Safety Requirements’, de DSR. The DSR is based on the IAEA Safety

Fundamentals, several Safety Requirements guides and some Safety Guides, safety objectives

for new NPPs published by WENRA. An annex to the DSR is dedicated to Research Reactors

and describes application of the DSR with a graded approach. The DSR takes into account the

latest (post-Fukushima) insights and is in line with the European Directive on Nuclear Safety9

and the objectives of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VNDS).

In June 2016 ANVS completed a new guidance document on conventional technical

requirements for nuclear installations.

With the establishment on August 1st 2017 of the ANVS as an independent administrative

authority, the ANVS is authorized to issue not only NVRs based on IAEA Safety Standards, but

also ‘ANVS Ordinances’. ANVS ordinances will be issued if:

guidance or rules are needed on technical or organisational issues;

guidance or rules relevant to nuclear safety, radiation protection and security are needed;

and

Governmental Decrees or Ministerial Decrees refer to guidance to be provided in an ANVS

Ordinance.

In the hierarchy of the legal framework the ANVS Ordinances are positioned between

Ministerial Decrees and the NVRs.

The implementation of the 2014 version of the WENRA Reference Levels (RLs) for existing

reactors in the Dutch regulatory framework and their implementation in the NPP is discussed in

chapter 8.

4.0.a.2 Emergency preparedness organizations

This issue is addressed in chapter 5.

4.0.b Governmental supporting organisations: RIVM

An annual contribution is provided to support the work of the National Institute for Public

Health and Environment (RIVM). RIVM provides scientific support to several ministries,

including the ministry responsible for the function of the RB. The RIVM is a specialised Dutch

government agency. Its remit is to modernise, gather, generate and integrate knowledge and

make it usable in the public domain. By performing these tasks RIVM contributes to promoting

the health of the population and the environment by providing protection against health risks

and environmental damage.

The RIVM among others chairs the expertise network on radiation and health, RGEN10

. This is

a network of various institutes that reports and advises on radiological and health-related

consequences of (potential) accidents and other radiation incidents. This issue is also addressed

in chapter 5.

The RIVM supports the Ministries with scientific studies. RIVM works together with other

8 VOBK, ‘Veilig Ontwerp en het veilig Bedrijven van Kernreactoren’, English translation available as ‘Safety

Guidelines – Guidelines on the Safe Design and Operation of Nuclear Reactors’, dated 08-10-2015 9 Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations,

and its amendment, Directive 2014/87/Euratom. 10 Dutch: ‘Radiologisch en Gezondheidskundig Expertise Netwerk’, RGEN



(governmental) expert organisations as the Royal National Meteorological Institute (KNMI)

with models for the prediction of the effects of discharges of radioactive material in the air.

RIVM also operates the national radiological monitoring network.

4.0.c Education and training organisations

4.0.c.1 Education & training organisations and arrangements in the Netherlands

The RID/R3 organisation at the Technical University in Delft and the Nuclear Research &

consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten and Arnhem provide education and training in nuclear

technology and radiation protection to clients from nuclear and non-nuclear businesses and

various governmental organisations. NRG also provides training for the NPP staff.

For the education and training in radiation protection a national system exists with several levels

of education. The government recognizes training institutes for a specific training of radiation

protection. For getting a degree in radiation protection, an exam has to be passed.

In the Dutch system of radiation protection, it is a requirement that a LH has an adequate degree

of expertise in the field of radiation protection. The quality of the expertise depends on the

application and on the risk and is extensively regulated in the Radiation Protection Decree (Bs),

subordinate regulation and in the licences.

Anticipating on the implementation of Euratom Directive 2013/59, the registration of the

Radiation Protection Experts (RPE), (the coordinating expert - level 3 and the general co-

ordinating expert -level 2) has been introduced. For the evaluation of risk and other regulated

tasks, the LH is obliged to involve a (general) coordinating expert.

Furthermore, an LH is obliged to designate a radiation protection officer (RPO) for each

application. The level of training of the RPO depends on the application as well as the risk. Key

terms of the expertise system are continuing training and practice after the initial education. The

LH is required by law to ensure that sufficient resources are present to guarantee radiation

protection.

4.0.c.2 International training arrangements

The Dutch RB benefits from internationally operating organisations with education and training

facilities. Examples are German TSO GRS, ENSTI (training institute of ETSON11

), IAEA,

OECD/NEA and others. The LH EPZ also benefits from internationally operating organisations

offering education and training.

4.0.d Technical (Support) Organisations

The RB has the core disciplines available in-house, while the remaining work is subcontracted

to third parties (like RIVM) or Technical Support Organizations (TSOs such as GRS, and

Lloyd’s Register). For areas in which its competence is not sufficient or where a specific in-

depth analysis is needed, the RB has a budget at its disposal for contracting external specialists

of TSOs or other consultancy organizations.

Organizations are contracted on ad hoc basis to support the RB with various tasks. Support is

provided by foreign TSOs and national and international consultancy organizations. Some

major supporting organizations are listed below:

GRS, Germany. The ANVS cooperates with a Technical Support Organization (TSO) from

Germany, GRS. This is a TSO for the German national regulator and one of the large

German TSOs. In the Netherlands it evaluates safety cases and provides other types of

consultancy to the RB. In addition GRS provides associated education and training for

11 ETSON, European Technical Safety Organisation Network



governmental and commercial organizations. GRS currently has major framework contracts

with both the licensing and inspection branch of the RB.

The Nuclear Research & consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten and Arnhem provides

consultancy & educational services to government and industry. The company has

implemented ‘Chinese Wall’ procedures to protect the interests of its various clients and

avoid conflicts of interest. NRG also is a LH.

The ANVS is supported by one independent notified body, Lloyd’s Register, for inspections

on nuclear equipment under pressure. These inspections are done on behalf of ANVS and

are paid for by the licensees.

4.0.e Utility N.V. EPZ

N.V. EPZ operates the only NPP in the Netherlands, in Borssele, the KCB. The KCB shares its

site a number of wind turbines. In 2015 the coal fired plant has been taken out of service

permanenty.

4.0.f Vendor

The architect engineer and original vendor of the Borssele NPP is Siemens-KWU. Today these

activities are done by Areva. For the non-nuclear part of the plant, the vendor is Siemens AG.

Both companies are contracted by EPZ for specialised services in their respective areas. EPZ

also uses Tractebel as a service provider.

With respect to nuclear incidents, the Areva emergency response support service is particularly

noteworthy. Areva maintains an emergency support organisation for its customers. KCB is one

of the customers that has a contract in place for support during and after incidents, with the

emphasis on beyond design-base incidents including core melt scenarios. In Areva crisis centers

real-time KCB process information can be displayed and all necessary documentation is kept

current and available on a dedicated computer. Specialised equipment for (post-) accident

support can be made available through Areva. The Areva crisis center participates yearly in

three to four emergency exercises with the ERO of EPZ. During these exercises the full scope

simulator in Essen is used with forwarding of the process data of the simulator to Areva.




Table 4-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 4 –National Organisations.





refer to Part IV of this NAcP, where these National Actions can be found with their planning. The sixth column summarises the status of the

actions as per 1 December 2017.

ENSREG

No.

Measure / Requirement identified by

ENSREG / xCNS


2017

4.1 (101) a. Review and revision of nuclear Laws,

Regulations and Guides.

b. Where the RB is constituted of more

than one entity, it is important to ensure

efficient coordination.

c. Emphasis on the need for comprehensive

periodic reviews of safety, using state-of-

the-art techniques.

d. To remind CP that national safety

frameworks include the RB, TSO and

Operating Organisations.

e. Wide participation in safety networks for

operating organizations, RB and TSOs will

strengthen them.

National

organi-

sations

xCNS a. The RB is revising and drafting nuclear

regulations and guides.

a. Completed


b. The RB constituted of mainly two entities

(NIV and KFD) residing in two ministries, NIV

was responsible for licensing and regulations,

KFD was responsible for supervision.

Coordination was provided and was subject to

review in the IRRS self-assessment. For details

on current organisation of the RB, refer to

section 4.0.

c. The licensees of power and research reactors

are required by law and through the licence to

perform PSRs, every two years and 10 years.

d. The safety framework in the Netherlands

includes the RB and the Operating

Organisations. To date there is no national

dedicated TSO. Organisations are contracted to

Rest (b, c, d)

completed. But notice

information on new

RB, the ANVS,

provided in section

4.0.a.



ENSREG

No.


ENSREG / xCNS


2017

support the RB with various tasks. Support is

provided by foreign TSOs and national and

international consultancy organisations.

e. The RB and the licensees are participating in

international activities and working groups of

WANO, OECD/NEA, WENRA, EU (e.g.

ENSREG) and IAEA.

4.2 (102) Changes to functions and responsibilities

of the RB.

a. Effective independence of the RB is

essential, including the following aspects:

b. Transparency in communicating its

regulatory decisions to the public.

c. Competent and sufficient human

resources.

d. Adequate legal powers (e.g. suspend

operation).

e. Financial resources.

National

organi-

sations

xCNS Present situation:

a. The nuclear safety policy is independent

from energy policy.

b. It is transparent in its communication of

regulatory decisions to the public; such

decisions are published with supporting

documentation on governmental websites.

Information about supervision issues is also

published on the website of the RB. A special

act gives citizens the right to request

information related to an administrative matter

as contained in documents held by public

authorities or companies carrying out work for

a public authority.

c. Recently the RB staffing has been

strengthened and the staffs receive dedicated

training.

d. The RB has adequate legal powers; if needed

it can suspend operation of a nuclear facility.

a – d. Completed.

The new RB, the

ANVS, picked up its

duties January 1st 2015.

Refer to text on ANVS

in section 4.0.a.

The new ANVS has a

staff of about 130 FTE

with associated budget.

Based on assessments

performed by external

Consultant Berenschot

and others, the ANVS

staff is to be further

increased to 141 FTE,

including 2 board

members.



ENSREG

No.


ENSREG / xCNS


2017

e. The financial resources seem adequate. The

situation is under evaluation.

e. Completed.

Action: New financing mechanisms are being

studied for handling of license applications and

supervision.

Completed.

Nuclear facilities in the

Netherlands are obliged

to pay an annual

contribution under the

Nuclear Energy Fees

Decree. On the basis of

this Decree, the costs of

implementing the law

are to a very limited

extent covered by the

financial contribution

of nuclear installations.

Action: Evaluation in the framework of the

IRRS self-assessment and coming mission.

Self-assessment and

Evaluation by IAEA

IRRS team completed.

In line with the IRRS

team’s

recommendations, the

new RB re-assessed the

adequacy of its

resources. See above.



ENSREG

No.


ENSREG / xCNS


2017

4.3 (103) Importance of inviting IRRS missions, and

to:

• Effectively implement the findings.

• Make the findings and their means of

resolution publicly available.

• Invite follow -up missions.

National

organi-

sations

xCNS Action: The RB will be subjected to an IRRS

mission in 2014.

Action: In advance of the IRRS mission, the

RB will perform a self-assessment.

Actions completed.

Summary Report of

IRRS review team was

published, an Action

Plan was drafted and is

being implemented. A

follow-up mission is

planned for Q4/2018.

4.4 (104) Review and improvements to aspects of

National EP&R

• How to routinely exercise:

- All involved organizations, up to

ministerial level

- Scenarios based on events at multi-unit

sites

• How to train intervention personal for

potentially severe Accident conditions

• Rapid intervention team to provide

support to sites

• Determination of the size of the

Emergency Planning Zone is variable

• Trans- border arrangements need to be

further considered and exercised

• The use of regional centers to provide

support to sites

• Education of the public and the media in

aspects related to emergencies (e.g.

EP&R xCNS The Netherlands has a national EP&R plan,

refer to chapter 5.0 for a description. It includes

the lines of command, communication and

informing the public. The EP&R is regularly

trained, often in large scale exercises involving

some 1,000 staff and occurring once in

aboutevery 5 years.


practice)

EP&R will be

restructured in the

ANVS, refer to section

5.

For ANVS

developments – refer to

section 4.0.a.

For Training and Exercises the NL has a long

range policy plan. Based on this plan and the

lessons learned from exercises, every year, a

yearly schedule for training and exercise is

developed.

Continued practice



ENSREG

No.


ENSREG / xCNS


2017

radiation does and their effects) There are arrangements with bordering

countries for crisis situations. There are MoUs

with Belgium and Germany. In addition there

are MoUs with Great Britain and Norway,

supported by infrequent meetings.

Continued practice

4.5 (105) Openness, transparency and

communication improvements:

a. Communication with stakeholders is a

continuous activity not just in an

emergency

National

organi-

sations

xCNS a. RB and operator communicate with the

public. Meetings are organised at special

occasions, however these are frequent. Via

websites information is provided continuously.

Parliament is informed by the RB via the

ministry of Economic Affairs (now: since 2015

the ministry of Infrastructure and

Watermanagement).

a. Completed, ongoing

and continuously

improving practices.

Refer to developments

regarding the ANVS

(section 4.0.a). Having

this new RB will

increase transparency

and independence in

decision making.

b. Active stakeholder engagement in the

decision making process builds public

confidence

b. Stakeholder involvement is embedded in the

process of the EIA (under the Environmental

Protection Act) and licensing. The Licensee

makes considerable efforts to communicate

with stakeholders.

b: Completed


Recently also stake-

holder involvement in

the preparation phase

(e.g. related to coun-

termeasures foodstuff/

agricultural national/

branch stakeholders)

was set up.



ENSREG

No.


ENSREG / xCNS


2017

c. International bilateral cooperation can be

beneficial (eg joint regulatory inspections)

c. Based on bilateral agreements and MoUs,

cooperation with bordering countries (Belgium,

Germany) is operational. Arrangements for

bilateral information exchange (preparation and

response) are in place.

c. Completed


d. The proper balance of understandable

information provided to informed groups

and the general public needs to be

addressed

d. The RB is aware of the different backgrounds

of informed groups and the general public. The

ministries, of which the RB is part of, often

produce easy to understand press releases, as

well as detailed reports. Of some reports, there

are detailed and summary versions.

d. Completed


e. The transparency of the operators

activities needs to be enhanced.

e. The operator presents its activities via

presentations, dedicated websites and publicly

available reports. The RB publishes its findings

related to the performance of the licensee on

governmental websites.

e. Completed


4.6 (106) Post- Fukushima safety reassessments and

action plans.

a. All CP should perform a safety

reassessment and the resolution of their

findings should be progressed through a

national action plan or other transparent

means and should not be limited to NPPs

in operation.

b. Established safety networks should be

efficiently used by CP to disseminate and

share relevant information.

National

organi-

sations

xCNS a. The Netherlands’ RB produced the present

NAcP and participates in all CNS and

ENSREG-led efforts to enhance nuclear safety.

In the Netherlands for all nuclear installations

stress tests have been performed: research

reactors, enrichment facilities and waste

management facilities. The NPP Dodewaard

which is in safe enclosure (fuel removed) was

not considered relevant.

b. The RB participates in most relevant

networks to share information.

a, b Completed




ENSREG

No.


ENSREG / xCNS


2017

4.7 (107) Human and organizational factors (HOF)

a. There is a need to further develop human

resource capacity and competence across

all organizations in the field of nuclear

safety.

National

organi-

sations

xCNS a.1. Recently the RB staffing has been

strengthened and the staff receives dedicated

training. The common project 'lessons learned

Fukushima' and the self-assessment for the

IRRS will promote the knowledge throughout

the whole organisation of the RB.

a.1. Completed.

The ANVS (refer to

section 4.0.a) has re-

assessed its resources

and increased its staff.

This is also an IRRS

recommendation.

a.2. Licensee EPZ is in the process of further

enlarging HR capacity and competence since

the signing of the Covenant that allows

Borssele to operate till 2034. As of November

2012, the NPP organisation has about 75 fte

more than the organizational chart lists. This

surplus is in initial training and/or in knowledge

transfer phase.

a.2. Completed.

Investment in staff for

large projects and for

replacement, leadership

and organization was

the focus in 2015-2017

and is a continued

practice.

b. Governmental level commitment is

needed to ensure a long-term approach is

developed for capacity building.

b. The long-term approach (capacity plan) will

be evaluated in the IRRS self-assessment and

mission.

b. Completed.

Recommendation IRRS

to re-evaluate resources

has been implemented,

refer to a.1.

c. Collaborative work is needed in the area

of improving and assessing HOF, including

safety culture

c.1. The ANVS is involved in OECD working

group 'OECD/NEA WG HOF' .

c.1. Completed

(continued practice).

ANVS uses the

OECD/NEA Green

Booklet “Safety Culture

of an Effective

Regulatory Body” as its

compass for further



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developing its own

safety culture. ANVS

recently joined the

OECD/NEA WG

SCRB

c.2. Licensee EPZ: HOF has been a focus point

at Borssele NPP already for several years.

INPO guides and practices (e.g. AP928,

AP913) are introduced to improve on work

management and preparation. Also a loop flow

simulator is in development to practice worker

and supervisor skills and behaviours. HOF are

an explicit part of WANO Peer Reviews. The

Borssele NPP had a WANO Peer Review last

September-October (2012).

c.2. Continued practice.

In September 2014

there was an OSART

mission with modules

on Corporate and

Safety Culture.

Findings of the mission

were input for

improvements. OSART

and OSART FU reports

were/are published.

Also refer to item a.2

above and d.2. below.

d. The role of sub-contractors may be

important; can they be harnessed quickly?

d.1. The RB makes use of foreign TSOs. d.1. Continued practice

One of the future actions of the RB is to have

TSO-support during the accident itself.

Completed by

compilation of power

plant information

needed for the TSO

support.



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d.2. Licensee EPZ addresses the contractor

involvement in the HOF improvement program.

d.2. Continued practice.

Current practice at EPZ

is that contractors

receive an e-learning

course when reporting

for the first time at the

site. In preparation of

activities at the site, a

meeting is arranged to

discuss risks and other

relevant issues.

Contractors participate

is such meetings.

Management

expectations are

communicated to

contractors in various

ways (e.g. with

booklets). The LH

(EPZ) specifies

requirements

contractors need to

meet.

4.8 (133) Public discussion of safety issues should be

encouraged (Transparency)

National

Organi-

sations

xCNS The RB endorses and practices this objective. Continued practice



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4.9 (134) An open and trustful relationship between

regulators, operators and the public with

keeping in mind their respective roles and

functions are essential.

National

Organi-

sations

xCNS The RB endorses and practices this objective. Continued practice

4.10

(135)

Recognizing differences in national

cultures, each CPs should define

appropriate actions to ensure that the

desired safety culture characteristics are

achieved in the regulatory and operational

organizations.

National

Organi-

sations

xCNS The RB endorses this objective. The

supervision on safety culture at the operating

organisation already is an important part of the

yearly inspection programme.

In the light of the self-assessment within the

framework of the IRRS-mission special

attention will be paid to explain the

management of Safety Culture within the

Regulatory Body.

Practice continued


practice).

Safety culture within

the RB has been further

developed with support

from the IAEA in a

Safety Culture

Continuous

Improvement Process

(SCCIP) starting with a

workshop at the end of

2014. This was not

continued because in

2015-mid 2017 the

focus was on the

creation of the new

ANVS and detailed

organization/integration

of different cultures.

Mission, vision and



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values were developed

and the new relation

with the ministry after

becoming independent.

The ANVS uses now

the OECD/NEA Green

Booklet “Safety Culture

for an Effective

Regulatory Body” as its

compass for further

development of its

safety culture. From 2nd

part of 2017 on the

further development of

safety culture for the

RB will be pursued by

among others working

strongly together with

other RBs in the

OECD/NEA WG

SCRB.



5. Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post Accident Management (off site)

Off-site emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) and post-accident management (PAM)

mainly is a national responsibility. Nevertheless utility’s responsibility is also important

especially regarding technical information on plant conditions and the potential risk for

emissions.

Section 5.0 presents a general introduction to the EP&R and PAM in the Netherlands. The

developments and actions regarding EP&R and PAM have been listed in a table, refer to section

5.1.

5.0 Introduction to organisation of EPR and PAM in the Netherlands

5.0.a Regulatory frame work - National Nuclear and Radiological Response Plan NCS

Chapter VI of the Dutch Nuclear Energy Act describes the responsibilities and tasks of the

authorities that are responsible inter alia for the preparation and the organisation of measures in

response to emergencies. Under Article 40 of the Act, the national government is responsible

for the preparatory work and for actually dealing with any emergency that may occur in case of

nuclear accidents.

National Nuclear and Radiological Response Plan (NCS)

The operational structure of nuclear emergency preparation and response is based on Article 41

of the Act and is detailed in the National Crisis plan12

for Radiation incidents: the NCS (Dutch:

‘Nationaal Crisisplan Stralingsincidenten’) and the ‘Response Plan NCS’. The NCS describes

the measures and mandates that are available to the national authorities during a nuclear or

radiological accident. It refers to other related documents that address the management of

nuclear and radiological accidents like the Response Plan NCS.

The Response Plan describes the potential threats in the Netherlands classified as Category A

and B objects and the response structure for nuclear emergency management. The response

structure of nuclear emergency management is harmonized with the national response structure

for emergencies as described in the ‘Nationaal Handboek Crisisbesluitvorming’ (National

Handbook for Decision making in Crises).

Threat categories

Since the threat categorization used in the Netherlands was established before the introduction

of IAEA Safety Standard Serie No. GS-R-2, this categorisation is not identical to the threat

categories specified by the IAEA in Table 1 of GS-R-2. The categorization is in categories A

and B. Incidents in category A are those that could have regional or national impact, and include

category I and II of GS-R-2. NPPs are category A objects. Incidents in category B can only have

local impact with regard to the radiation aspects, and include categories III and IV of GS-R-2.

Transport incidents are included in category B.

12 Formerly known as National Nuclear Emergency Plan, NPK (‘Nationaal Plan Kernongevallenbestrijding’)



Roles and responsibilities

The Response plan NCS defines the roles and responsibilities of local/national government. It

also describes the relationship with the regional arrangements of the Safety Region (Dutch:

‘Veiligheidsregio’).

For incidents with category A-objects, the national authorities are responsible for decision

making, the regional authorities are responsible for the implementation of the countermeasures

(such as evacuation, sheltering etc.). The local fire brigade has to be involved in preparing the

emergency planning (this is a licence requirement). The authorities will be advised by the

national radiation & nuclear assessment team, the CETsn13

.

For accidents with category B-objects, the chairperson of the Safety Region or the mayor of the

municipality, depending on the scope of the incident, is responsible for the emergency response.

Incidents with category B-objects can be up scaled to category A. With this type of incident,

local authorities can be advised by the national CETsn.

5.0.b Advisory organisation - national nuclear & radiation assessment team, CETsn

On the national level, the key advisory organization in the nuclear and radiological response

structure is the National Nuclear Assessment Team, (‘CETsn’). The CETsn operates under the

responsibility of the ANVS. Chairman of CETsn is a staff member of the ANVS Crisis

organisation (ANVS CO). The CETsn advises the policy teams on local and national level when

there is a real threat of an off-site emergency in a nuclear installation or a radioactive release (in

the Netherlands or in a neighbouring country).

Depending on the nature and extend of the threat at hand, the chairman of CETsn determines

how much CETsn’s activities need to be scaled up.

The components of CETsn’s organization are:

Chairperson CETsn (ANVS)

ANVS CO, the ANVS Crisis organisation, responsible for functioning of CETsn, provides

input on (1) nuclear installations and nuclear safety, (2) radiation protection, (3)

crisiscommunication, and (4) security.

RGEN14

, the expertise network on radiation and health, a network of various institutes that

reports and advises on radiological and health-related consequences of (potential) nuclear

accidents and other radiation incidents. RGEN is chaired by the National Institute for Public

Health and the Environment (RIVM15

).

RIVM operates the national radiological monitoring network (NMR16

) and in addition

monitoring vans. It also collects data from other institutes.

5.0.c Training and exercises and their organisation

Based on the NCS, the Dutch training and exercise programme for nuclear emergency

management and response is based on a four-years training- and exercise-cycle that is

implemented in the annual programmes. Training is organized for different topics e.g. the use of

Emergency Information and Decision Support Systems, and some exercises. A full scale

exercise is planned approximately every six years. In these national exercises the interaction

between generic national emergency management structures and nuclear emergency

management and response are integrated.

13 Dutch: ‘Crisis Expert Team – straling en nucleair’, CETsn 14 Dutch: ‘Radiologisch en Gezondheidskundig Expertise Netwerk’, RGEN 15 Dutch: ‘Rijksinstituut voor volksgezondheid en milieu’, RIVM 16 Dutch: ‘Nationaal Meetnet Radioactiviteit’, NMR



Officials of different departments and organisations of the CETsn participate in exercises and

trainings. They all have their own expertises and roles during such an exercise and during an

actual accident-response. Examples of such roles are performing radiological/technical analyses,

advising on health aspect, etc.

Nuclear and radiological training and exercises are organised by the Ministry of Infrastructure

and Water Management (IenW). The Ministry of Safety and Justice is responsible for the

generic national crisis response-structure and for exercises to train the national crisis

organisations. Ministries work together in the organisation and conducting of integrated and

large scale exercises.

Integrated exercises (i.e. involving both the plant staff and the authorities) have proved a useful

way of improving the effectiveness of the LH’s emergency plan and organisation and the

emergency organisation of the authorities.

National full scale nuclear exercises have been held in 2005 and 2011. Lessons learnt have been

incorporated in the NCS and the NCS Response Plan. The next full scale exercise will be in

2018.

In addition several special exercises are organized. Some recent examples are:

‘Indian Summer’, October 2011, evaluation in 2012. This was a large scale national

exercise in emergency Preparedness and Reponse and Post Accident Management off-site,

with about 1,000 people involved. This is a reoccurring event. Lessons learnt have led to

reviewing the relation and structure of the of EPAn with the structure of the National Crisis

Management System.

‘WakeUp’, March 2012, a two-week-long large scale exercise near various power stations

of a mechanised army brigade in cooperation with civil units. This is a recurring event. Near

the NPP, a flooding was simulated. The army arranged and transported fuel, food and staff

to predetermined buildings on the NPP site, in accordance with the NPP’s Emergency

Response Organisation’s requirements. The exercise proved that the army was capable to

provide the required support to the NPP under flooding conditions.




Table 5-1 Tabled summary of items reported for ‘Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post Accident Management off-site’






actions as of 1 December 2017.

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5.1 (108) Expansion of the set of scenarios on

which the plan was based – NPP

PLUS Infrastructure / NPP PLUS

chemical plant

EP&R xCNS External threats other than nuclear facilities (e.g.

transport, chemical plants) have been considered

in safety assessments, up to certain levels of

severity in the process of licensing the NPP.

Completed

In the EP&R multiple scenarios, multiple units

(there is only one NPP) and damage of

infrastructure are not fully taken into account yet.

Action: Damage to infrastructure (hampering

EP&R activities) is subject to renewed evaluation

in the light of post-Fukushima learning.

Completed. This has been

accounted for in various

Actions of the LH that

reduce the dependence of the

NPP on external support.

Examples are: purchase of

fuel transport trailers, mobile

fuel transfer pumps

(completed), internal means

to transport mobile

emergency power supply

(completed), purchase

satellite telephones for

external communication.



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A new Action for the RB is

to consider the purchase of

alternative communication

means for RB staff to

support their activities in a

crisis area.

Completed.

Refer to RB-5-003 in part

IV.

5.2 (109) Increasing the scope of off-site

exercise programs to reflect NPP plus

external infrastructure simultaneous

problems

EP&R xCNS Under consideration. Completed. First small size

technical scenario (cut of

external power) exercised by

RB and LH in March 2014.

5.3 (110) Blending mobile resources into

planning and drill programs

EP&R xCNS Mobile NPP equipment is included in exercising;

other mobile equipment e.g. diesel engines or

fuel tanks can be supported in the framework of

the national mechanism assistance program from

the ministry of Defence ("ICMS").


practice)

Licensee EPZ conducts exercises together with

the armed forces, simulating harsh conditions.


practice). Annual event. The

army can support EPZ with

for example transport of

staff, supply of diesel or

mobile EDG, setting up of

communication networks et

cetera. These aspects are



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trained in the exercises.

5.4 (111) Increasing emphasis on drilling with

neighbouring countries

EP&R xCNS On a regular base, several national exercises in

NL or the bordering countries are joint exercises.

Bilateral exercise planning and organization is

ongoing.


practice)

Observers from both

national and regional

organizations participate in

relevant exercises

5.5 (112) Exercising all interface points

(national, regional, municipal,…)

EP&R xCNS During exercise and training all interface points

are involved.


practice)

Depending on the scope and

scenarios, interface points

are selected & involved

5.6 (113) Performing of longer term exercises to

reflect the challenges of extreme

events

EP&R xCNS In NL every year a national exercise is

performed. Extreme events like high

tides/flooding, extreme weather, forest fire, loss

of electricity, cybercrime etc. are scenarios for

these exercises. See 5.0c


practice).

In practice most scenarios

address the early and mid-

term phase of a scenario.



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5.7 (114) Enhancing radiation monitoring and

communication systems by additional

diversification / redundancy

xCNS The Netherlands has an extensive national

radiation monitoring network. There are several

communication systems available in crisis

situations, providing redundancy and diversity.

The communication via the National Radiation

Monitoring Network proved to be robust in the

assessment in 2009. Redundant power supply,

telephone lines, dedicated internet etc.

communication is available.

Expansion of mobile monitoring equipment is

ongoing.

Assessment for further improvement of

monitoring and communication systems is

ongoing (post-Fukushima).


practice)

5.8 (115) Development of a common source

term estimation approach

EP&R xCNS This is being developed by a Working Group

with participation by licensee EPZ, ANVS and

governmental institute RIVM (National Institute

for Public Health and the Environment).


practice).

5.9 (116) Provide access to a “big picture”

(international picture) of radiological

conditions

EP&R xCNS RIVM can provide analyses and prognoses.

Information is based on: USIE (Unified System

for Information Exchange in Incidents and

Emergencies), ECURIE (European Community

Urgent Radiological Information Exchange)

information exchange, other formal and informal

sources and sharing of information with other

RBs.


practice)

5.10 Development of reference level for

trans-border processing of goods and

EP&R xCNS Some international reference levels are available. Completed (continued

practice).



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(117) services such as container transport Further policy development is ongoing. Completed (continued

practice)

The RB participates in

HERCA activities and

research is being conducted

by research institute RIVM.

Experiences and policy

developments are shared

with neighbours (e.g.

Belgium/Germany).

5.11

(118)

Re-examination of approach and

associated limits to govern the

“remediation” phase

EP&R xCNS Framework and mechanism for remediation and

recovery is currently being developed in relation

to the implementation of Council Directive

2013/59/EURATOM.

The development of strategy and guidance

documents for EP&R organizations for handling

large volumes of radioactive waste after a nuclear

accident and of human and animal remains after a

nuclear or radiological emergency is considered

to be part of this implementation.

Ongoing

5.12

(119)

Develop criteria for the return to

evacuated area and criteria for return

to normal from emergency state

EP&R xCNS Refer to ENSREG No. 5.11 (118) of this table.

In relation to the implementation of Council

Directive 2013/59/EURATOM reference levels

for a return to normal situation have been

established. More specific criteria for return after

evacuation are currently under development.

Ongoing



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5.13

(120)

Improvement of the approach to

establish contamination monitoring

protocols and locations during the

recovery phase

EP&R xCNS Refer to ENSREG No. 5.11 (118) of this table. Ongoing

5.14

(121)

Hardening of support infrastructure

(Emergency Response Centers,

Sheltering facilities, essential support

facilities (like Corporate Offices) with

back-up power, environmental

radiological filtering, etc.

EP&R xCNS Current facilities meet the criteria. Completed (continued

practice).

Facilities related to the

National nuclear Assessment

Team (Back-Office and

Front-Office) are equipped

with redundant

communication lines and

power supplies. Back up

facilities are available

5.15

(122)

Analyzing medical and human aspects

of response to support Emergency

workers

EP&R xCNS Back-Office Health Information and relevant

Health organisations are involved.


practice)

5.16

(123)

Implementation of processes to enable

access to inter-country support

including customs processes for

access for diplomats and emergency

response personal

EP&R xCNS Netherlands is to become a member of RANET. Completed

5.17

(124)

Systematic assessment of all aspects

of organizations that contribute to

emergency response using tools like

job and task analysis

EP&R xCNS Improvement is under consideration. Completed (continued

practice).

As a follow-up of a major

emergency response exercise

in 1991 an assessment was



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made of said aspects using

such tools. Since then the

EP&R organisations in the

Netherlands have seen

steady development and

assessment of their

functioning.

5.18

(125)

Develop radiological reference levels

for rescue and emergency response

personnel in extreme events

EP&R xCNS Such reference levels are documented in Dutch

regulations, like 'Besluit Stralenbescherming' and

'Responsplan NCS' and the implementation of the

new BSS (Action Plan 2015-2018).


practice)

5.19

(126)

Develop reference levels for the

application of immediate

countermeasures such as sheltering,

iodine distribution and evacuation

EP&R xCNS These reference levels have been documented,

e.g. in the ' Responsplan NCS'.


practice)



6. International Cooperation

Section 6.0 presents a general introduction to contributions of the Netherlands to international

cooperation. The developments and actions regarding this topic have been listed in a table, refer

to section 6.1.

6.0 Introduction to contributions of the Netherlands to international cooperation

The regulatory body in the Netherlands has always participated in the most important

international organisations like OECD/NEA, IAEA and Euratom. Also the Netherlands is a

‘Contracting Party’ to various (nuclear safety-related) conventions.

International cooperation

Regular exchange meetings are taking place with Germany and Belgium, also in relation with

post-Fukushima Dai-ichi lessons learned. Other ways of communications are established

through the incident reporting and communication channels that are well established (e.g.

IAEA/NEA IRS17

, IRSRR18

, INES, NEA/CNRA/WGPC19

).

International organisations, apart from the above mentioned, with which there is cooperation are

for instance WENRA, ENSREG, EUROSAFE Forum, HERCA20

and NERIS21

.

The regulatory body in the Netherlands participates in working groups of IAEA (all Safety

Standard Committees, including the newly established EPReSC), WENRA (reactor

harmonisation working group), and ENSREG (nuclear safety, decommissioning/waste). There

is also cooperation in various OECD/NEA committees like the NEA/CSNI22

and NEA/CNRA23

and their working groups. Examples of CNSI-groups are WGFS, WGAMA, WGRISK,

WGHOF, WGES, WGEV and WGIAGE. CNRA-groups are WGIP, WGRNR, WGDIC and

WGOE.

Peer reviews

International peer reviews have always been part of the strategy for improvement. Regularly

IAEA mission are invited. Examples of missions to the Borssele NPP are AMAT/SALTO

(2003/2009, 2012 and 2014), IPSART (2010, 2013) and OSART (once in 10 years: 2005 and

2014). The OSART mission of 2014 had two additional modules: ‘Corporate’ and ‘Integrated

Safety Culture’ Assessment. There was a two-stage follow-up (2016 and 2017). There were also

WANO reviews. The review of 2012 had a follow-up in 2014 and in 2016 again a WANO

mission was held.

Examples of missions to the Research Reactor HFR are INSARR (2002, 2005, 2011, 2016),

IPPAS (2008 and 2012), IPSART (2000, 2002) and ISCA (2017).

The Waste Safety Appraisal visited the Netherlands in 2009. In November 2014 there was an

IRRS mission to the RB (IRRS FU in 2018). In addition, members of the RB have participated

in IRRS missions to Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

17 IRS: IAEA and OECD/NEA Incident Reporting System, using operational experience to improve safety 18 IRSRR: Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors at the IAEA 19 NEA/CNRA/WGPC: Working Group on Public Communication of Nuclear Regulatory Organisations 20 HERCA: Heads of the European Radiological protection Competent Authorities 21 NERIS: European platform on preparedness for nuclear and radiological emergency response and recovery 22 CSNI: Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations 23 CNRA: Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities




Table 6-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 6 – International Cooperation24

.






actions as of 1 December 2017.

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6.1 (127) Strengthening the peer reviews process of CNS

and of missions (IAEA, WANO and Industry)

a Effectiveness of IAEA peer review processes

should be reviewed in response to concerns raised

by the public and Non-Governmental

Organizations.

b. The CNS national reports should include how

peer review and mission findings have been

addressed.

c. Processes and initiatives should be

strengthened to ensure implementation of

findings of the peer review and missions.

d. CNS review meetings should ensure robust

peer reviews and reporting of peer review results

and findings.

International

cooperation

xCNS The RB endorses this objective.

RB and licensee are in their

respective roles involved in the

Peer Review process of CNS,

IAEA activities, WANO

evaluations and missions etc.

a. The RB endorses efforts to

improve the process.

b. The Dutch CNS reports have

addressed the topic of Peer Review

in much detail to disseminate this

concept and its benefits. In future

CNS reports the findings and their

resolution will be presented.

c. The RB already incorporates the

findings of international peer

review efforts in its own national


practice)

24 Several of the actions mentioned in this and other tables of the report are related to the IAEA action plan.



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evaluations and actions. Almost all

IAEA missions are organised by

the RB as part of the supervision

strategy.

The RB will study possibilities to

strengthen further the

implementation of measures.

d. The Dutch RB endorses this

intention.

6.2 (128) Strengthening the peer reviews process of CNS

and of missions (IAEA, WANO and Industry) -

continue

e. Plant design safety features and related

modifications should be considered in WANO

and OSART missions.

f. Better coordination of WANO and IAEA peer

review activities should be established.

g. International experience gained from the

review of Russian designs after Chernobyl could

be considered as an example of good international

practice.

International

cooperation

xCNS e. The Dutch RB and NPP-licensee

endorse this intention.

f. Coordination of missions is

essential for keeping them effective

& efficient and prevent

unnecessary burden on human

resources of licensees and RB.

WANO and IAEA have concluded

an agreement.

The Dutch RB will take into

account coordination in the

planning of future missions.

g. The Dutch RB agrees with this

statement.

Completed (Continued

practice)



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6.3 (129) Optimisation of the Global Safety Regime

a. Primary responsibility for safety remains with

operators.

b. The collective responsibility of the various

institutions and organizations should be

optimized.

c. The growing number of international meetings,

assessments, peer reviews and expanding

mandates is placing high demands on existing

human resources, which may become

counterproductive.

d. Efforts should be continued to reduce

duplication of initiatives and actions by various

organizations such as IAEA, NEA, EU, WANO,

etc.

e. The respective roles and objectives of the

various organizations, institutions and missions

should be recognized in the optimization process.

International

cooperation

xCNS a. This is the basis of most

regulatory frameworks and thus

also applies to the Dutch situation.

It should be ensured this principle

applies globally.

b. The Dutch RB endorses this

statement.

c. The Dutch RB agrees with this

statement.

d. The Dutch RB endorses this

statement.

e. The Dutch RB endorses this

statement.


practice)



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6.4 (130) Strengthening communication mechanisms

through regional and bilateral cooperation

a. Initiatives relating to the Regional Crisis center

for operators of NPPs with VVER type reactors

as being implemented by Moscow WANO Center

and also considered by some other vendor

countries.

b. Bilateral agreements between vendor countries

and new embarking countries, complemented by

IAEA Standards and review processes, have been

reported to be effective and should be

encouraged.

c. Strong support of political leaders is important

to establish the necessary nuclear safety

infrastructure.

d. Countries with established nuclear programmes

should assist with the establishment of nuclear

and regulatory infrastructure.

e. Countries should cooperate with neighbouring

and regional countries and exchange information

on their civil nuclear power programmes.

International

cooperation

xCNS The Dutch RB endorses this

objective.

a. The Dutch RB agrees with

statement

b. The Dutch RB agrees with

statement

c. The Dutch RB agrees with

statement

d. The Dutch RB agrees with this

statement. Countries with

established nuclear programmes

already contribute to the

establishment of infrastructure

elsewhere by disseminating their

experience, publishing their

regulation and actions on the

internet and participating in

various international processes.

The Netherlands has a small

nuclear programme and a dedicated

but lean RB. Its contribution to

international assistance programs is

expected to be constrained by the

allocation of resources to national

day-to-day duties and international

processes under the CNS,

ENSREG activities, IRRS and the

like.

Action: The RB in the Netherlands


practice)



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will undergo an IRRS mission for

the first time in 2014 (follow-up in

2018). This will claim a

considerable part of available

resources at the RB.

e. The RB agrees with this

statement. Examples of the Dutch

activities are participation in

activities in WENRA, ENSREG

and other EU activities like the EU

HERCA WG Emergencies.

Also bilateral contacts with

neighbouring countries Belgium

and Germany on EP&R are

frequent.

6.5 (131) Effectiveness of experience feedback mechanisms

a. Information exchange and feedback should be

enhanced by using the established mechanisms

(e.g. IRS, INES) and organisations (eg. WANO).

b. The sharing and utilisation of information is

limited and not always necessarily well-

coordinated or disseminated. This has been

identified as an area for improvement.

International

cooperation

xCNS a. The Dutch RB and licensees

already use these mechanisms.

a. Completed


b. The RB agrees that sharing and

utilization of information can be

improved.

The Dutch RB will seek gradual

increase dissemination of

information.

b. Completed




ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

c. All nuclear power plants should share

Operating Experience.

d. The current focus is on reporting events and

not necessarily on learning from the events.

Effectiveness of Operating Experience Feedback

should be assessed and its implementation should

be included in peer reviews.

c.1. The single operating NPP in

the Netherlands is part of the

WANO and the German VGB

network. The operator actively

collects relevant information from

workshops, conferences and

regular participation in experience

feedback working groups like

WANO and VGB. German full

phase out by 2022 will hamper the

option VGB. Therefore the NPP is

considering becoming a member of

the WH-owners group.

c.1. Completed.

Operator joined WH-

owners group. Network

activities are ongoing

c.2. The Dutch RB will evaluate

the possibility to increase exchange

of information with other

regulators of German design plants

like Spain and Switzerland.

c.2. Completed. In 2013

the First annual

meeting of the so-called

KWU Regulators Club

took place in the

Netherlands, followed

by other annual

meetings. Members are

now Brazil, Germany,

Netherlands, Spain and

Switzerland



ENSREG

No.


by ENSREG / xCNS


2017

d. In the Netherlands the focus is

on learning from events.

The RB will evaluate the

possibility to increase the feedback

on improvements in the

Netherlands.

Ongoing.

The RB is improving

the operating &

regulatory experience

feedback, taking into

account the IRRS

recommendations.

(Action RB-6.008)

6.6 (132) Strengthening and expanded use of IAEA Safety

Standards

a. The Safety Fundamentals remain appropriate as

a sound basis for nuclear safety when properly

implemented.

b. Implementation should strike the right balance

between prevention and mitigation.

c. The IAEA Safety Standards should be taken

into account in developing national nuclear safety

regulations.

d. These Safety Standards have a role to play in

seeking continuous improvements to safety at

existing nuclear power plants.

International

cooperation

xCNS The RB endorses the statement.

a/b. The nuclear safety framework

in the Netherlands is under review.

The question to incorporate the

Safety Fundamentals is being

discussed.

c. IAEA Safety Standards, they are

the basis for parts of the

Netherlands' nuclear regulation.

d. Continuous improvement

already is incorporated in the

national framework through the

implementation of the EU-Nuclear

Safety Directive.

Completed.

Practices are part of

national policy

document published in

2014. In 2015 guidance

on the design

requirements for new

reactors was published,

using IAEA standards

and ‘WENRA

Objectives’ as one of

the bases. By 2020 all

nuclear installations

will have provisions to

implement IAEA

standards.



PART III Additional Topics

7. Specification of Additional Topics

7.0 Introduction

This chapter addresses topics, not identified in the ENSREG-led Peer Review or the

Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS, but that have been identified in the national review.


7.1 Tabled summary of items reported on ‘Additional Topics’

All Actions on the part of the Regulatory Body (RB) can be found in a table in Part IV of the present report. The next table presents Actions on the part of

licensees in the Netherlands. However, all Actions on the part of the licensee of the NPP already have been addressed in Part I and II, and their planning can

be found in Part IV of the present report. The Actions listed below extend to all licensees, so also to those not operating the NPP.

Table 7-1 Additional Topics regarding licensees, specific for the Netherlands and not inventoried or listed by ENSREG and/or CNS

No. Measure / Requirement

1 All licensees with nuclear installations have undertaken a Complementary Safety Assessment (a.k.a. stress test) to assess the robustness of their

facilities. This applies to waste management facilities, research reactors, nuclear research laboratories, and the enrichment plant



PART IV Implementation of Activities

8. Specification of the Implementation of Activities

8.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the measures agreed with or imposed on the licensee (EPZ). It also details

their planning and status. In addition it presents a numbered list with Actions on the part of the

Regulatory Body (RB). It should be noted, that in December 2014, in Table 8-2 new Actions for

the RB were added.

This chapter also presents our check of the compliance of the Dutch regulation and the design

and operation of the NPP with WENRA Reference Levels (RLs). Refer to section 8.2.


8.1 Tabled summary of national implementation of post-stress test actions

This section features two tables, one table with the Actions initiated by or imposed on LH EPZ, and another table with Actions mainly related to the

functioning of the Regulatory Body (RB).

8.1.a Actions on the part of the LH

Most of the Actions to be executed by the LH have been completed or are on schedule. Some of the Actions of the LH have been proposed for rescheduling

for various reasons, some of which are:

For some of the Actions the initial planning turned out not to be feasible due to the complexity of the measures involved, insights gained since the

publication of the first proposed list of Actions (in the first NAcP) prompted for a rescheduling of some Actions;

For implementation of some of the Actions, some activities are needed that can only be performed during a (long) outage of the NPP or in combination

with measures that are associated with the 10-yearly PSR.

For the implementation of some Actions, support by third parties is needed, that will be provided, albeit with delays.

The RB is in the process of determining its position regarding the rescheduling of the various Actions. Changed finalization dates mentioned below thus

constitute proposed rescheduling dates.

Table 8-1 National post-stress test Actions – initiated by or imposed on Licensee EPZ (operator of one NPP unit).

This is the official national list of Actions. Mx-, Px- and Sx- numbers between parentheses refer to original list of proposed measures of licensee

EPZ. Other numbers in between parentheses: NR refers to section in National Report (2011), PR refers to section in Peer Review Report (2012).

NL Action

No.

Topic Action / Activity Related

Recommendation

No. on European

Level

Status 1 December 2017 Finalization

1 (M1) design

issues

Emergency Response Centre (ERC) -

study and consider options to better

protect ERC like alternative location

ERC, new building, strenghtening

1, 8, 22, 27, 32, 44 Completed 2017



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


current building etc.

2 (M2) design

issues

Storage facilities for portable

equipment (needed for accident

management), study and consideration

of options to improve resistance

against external hazards

1, 8, 27, 32, 44 Completed

2017

3 (NR

7.3.1)

design

issues

Improvement of accessibility under

extreme conditions

32, 44 Completed 2015

4 (PR

4.2.4.2)

SAM Analysis of potential doses to workers 22, 32, 43, 44 Completed

2014

5 (NR

6.1.5)

SAM Reassessment of ERO Staffing

regarding its adequacy 24/7

35 Completed 2014

6 (M3) SAM A possibility for refilling the spent fuel

pool without entering the containment

- this will increase the margin to fuel

damage in certain adverse containment

conditions.

23 Completed 2014

7 (M4) SAM Additional possibilities for refilling the

spent fuel pool - this will increase the

23 Completed 2017


NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


number of success paths and therefore

increase the margin to fuel damage in

case of prolonged loss of spent fuel

pool cooling.

8 (NR

7.3.1)

SAM Improvement of possibilities to sustain

cooling SFP

- this is covered under action 6 and 7

(M3 and M4).

Completed 2017

9 (M5) SAM Reduction of the time necessary to

connect the mobile diesel generator to

Emergency Grid 2 to 2 hours - this will

increase the margin in case of loss of

all AC power supplies including the

SBO generators.

15, 26 Completed.

Phased connection of the 1MW DG to the

emergency bus. At first this DG can be

connected to the bus within two hours

using five lightweight cables (reduced

capacity of 277 kVA, enough for

sufficient SG feed). Afterwards the bus

connection can be strengthened to 1,5

MVA by switching over to 15 heavy

cables. All equipment is available and

ready to use.

2017

A comfirmatory test will be done during

refueling in 2018.

June 2018



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


10 (M6) SAM Establishing ability to transfer diesel

fuel from storage tanks of inactive

diesels to active diesel generators.

Phase 1: emergency grid 1 EDGs,

Phase 2: remaining diesels.

15, 17 Completed Mid-2014

11 (M7) SAM Establishing independent voice and

data communication under adverse

conditions, both on-site and off-site,

would strengthen the emergency

response organisation. Includes

evaluation current means, procurement

satellite communication apparatus, and

arrangements with Ministry of

Defence.

35 Completed.

Satellite telephones are available for

external communication including data

transfer. Independent internal

communication is possible by use of the

existing fixed and portable radio sets.

End-2013

12 (M8) design

issues

Ensuring the availability of fire

annunciation and fixed fire

suppression systems in vital areas after

seismic events - this will improve fire

fighting capabilities and accident

management measures that require

transport of water for

cooling/suppression.



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


13 (NR

7.3.1)

design

issues

Quality fire fighting systems buildings

01/02 and 35 for a DBE.

This is covered under action 12 (M8).

[The fire fighting systems in buildings

01/02 (dome) and 35 (backup control

room) are not designed for operability

after occurrence of the design base

earthquake (DBE). To enhance their

reliability after a DBE they should be

qualified. However, any enhancement

should be based on the results of the

proposed advanced seismic analysis.

This position is linked to licensee's

proposal S3 (Action 33) but also (for

implementation) to its measure M8

(Action 12).]

Completed 2017

14 (M10) design

issues

Ensuring the availability of the

containment venting system TL003

after seismic events - this will increase

the margin in case of seismic events.

3, 31, 32, 48 Completed 2017

15 (NR

7.3.1)

design

issues

Technical and organisational

improvement of availability under

earthquake conditions of systems for

containment filtered venting and fire

fighting - should be based on results of

advanced seismic analysis.

This is covered in actions 12 (M8) and

Completed 2017



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


14 (M10).

16 (M9) design

issues

Increasing the autarky-time beyond 10

h - this will increase the robustness of

the plant in a general sense.

16 Completed

Conclusion is that increase of the autarky-

time is unnecessary as it is very unlikely

that personnel will even under the hardest

external conditions be unable to reach the

plant within the existing autarky-time.

The backup SFP cooling is modified to

automatic start during the autarky-time.

2017

17 (NR

7.3.1)

design

issues

Increasing the autarky time beyond 10

hours (M9). Further study to define its

proper implementation.

This is covered in action 16 (M9).

Completed 2017

18 (M11) design

issues

Wave protection beneath the entrances

to the bunkered back-up injection- and

feedwater systems and to the bunkered

emergency control room - this will

mitigate the sensitivity to large waves

combined with extreme high water and

will make the plant fully independent

8 Completed.

Mid-2013


NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


from the dike.

19A (P1) SAM Develop set of EDMGs and implement

training program (phase 1)

17, 27, 29, 30, 32,

45

Completed End-2013

19B (P1) SAM Develop set of EDMGs and implement

training program (phase 2, EDMGs

and procurement additional

equipment)

Completed

2017

20 (NR

7.3.2)

SAM Developing set of EDMGs - This is

covered in action 19A and 19B

Refer to 19, completed. 2017

21 (P2) SAM Training of the procedure to ensure

water supply during mid-loop

operation and loss of AC power

19 Completed End-2014

22 (PR 3.3) SAM Prepare and validate capabilities to

cope with SBO during mid-loop

operation.

19 Refer to 21, completed 2017

23 (P3) SAM Develop check-lists for plant walk-

downs and the necessary actions after

various levels of the foreseeable

hazards

Completed 2015



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


24 (NR

6.1.5)

SAM Training of long term SAMG

measures


25 (PR

4.2.2.2)

SAM Develop specific SAMG for SFP 34, 47 Completed 2017

26 (PR

4.2.4.2)

SAM Improvement of SAMGs and EOPs

focusing on long term accidents.

Operator EPZ will also become

member of the Westinghouse Owner

Group

33, 34, 47 Completed 2017

27A (NR

7.3.2)

SAM Assessment of the need to upgrade


dedicated to SAM purposes (hardened

core approach). Part A includes: study

increasing robustness existing

equipment & study protection of

equipment against BDB extreme

hazards

1, 17, 18, 32, 33, 47 Assessment completed.

One potential enhancement found: SFP

level measurement.

2017

Update and qualification of existing SFP

level measurement completed.

2017

Realization of more robust version is

found to be very difficult and therefore

delayed for the moment.

June 2019

27B (NR

7.3.2)



dedicated to SAM purposes . Part B

includes study of accessibility of

locations for manual operation,

including relocation options.

1, 17, 18, 29, 32, 33 Refer to 3, completed. 2017


NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


27C (NR

7.3.2)



dedicated to SAM purposes. Part C

includes study of periodic

test/inspection programs for equipment

& of well-defined and trained

procedures to use the equipment.

Completed 2017

28 (NR

7.3.2)

SAM Develop set of clear criteria to provide

a basis for deciding when to switch the

turbine oil pump off to increase the

battery time. Disabling this pump will

damage the turbine

Completed 2013

29 (S1) SAM Study of a reserve SFP cooling system

independent of power supply.

This is also addressed in action 7

(M4).


30 (S2) design

issues

Investigate measures to further

increase the safety margins in case of

flooding (survey & analysis).

When needed, proposal for

modifications and implementation.

13 Completed 2014

31 (NR

7.3.3)

design

issues

Study flooding - this is covered by

action 30 (S2).

Refer to 30, completed 2014

32 (PR

2.3.3)

design

issues

Study super storms - this is covered by

action 30 (S2).

Refer to 30. Completed 2014



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


33 (S3) design

issues

Study Seismic Margin Assessment,

this includes various studies:

Study SMA and SPSA methods

Evaluation KNMI: Recommendation

study 'Seismic Hazard in context

IAEA'

Drafting of proposal SMA

Determining RLE

Undertake SMA

7, 13, 23 Studies RLE and SMA largely completed.

After SMA in 2013, the following studies

have been performed:

- additional seismic hazard analysis

- new 3D-building modelling to examine

building robustness and floor response.

2017

Update of the SMA will finish in 2018.

Measures to increase the seismic

robustness will be implemented

throughout 2018 and finish in 2019.

2018

June 2019

34 (NR

7.3.3)

design

issues

Study SMA - this is covered by action

33 (S3)

Refer to 33

35 (PR

2.1.3)

design

issues

Consider update hazard assessment,

including DBE and liquefaction.

This is covered by action 33 (S3)

Refer to 33

36 (S4) design

issues

Study on strengthening off-site power

supply, includes studies and when

needed implementation.

15 Completed 2017

37 (S5) design

issues

Study more extensive use of steam for

powering an emergency feed water

pump; includes studies and when

needed implementation.

15 Completed 2015


NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


38 (S6) design

issues

Study impact aircraft impact on safety

functions

Extension of first impact study needed,

which needs more time.

2017 2018

39 (S7) design

issues

Study hydrogen threat to containment.

The NPP has ample provisions to deal

with this threat. Nevertheless

additional studies will be undertaken.

31 Completed 2017

40 (NR

7.3.3)

SAM Water accumulation if drain pipes are

blocked during fire-fighting; studies

and when needed implementation of

measures. The studies will also cover

prevention of freezing of underground

piping, other weather related hazards.

Completed mid-2014

41 (PR

2.3.3)

design

issues

Study freezing of underground piping,

operation of diesels in cold conditions,

effects of snow. This is covered in

action 40.

Refer to 40, completed. mid-2014

42 (NR

5.1.5)

SAM Study amount of lubrication oil (for

diesels) in crisis situations

17 Completed 2013

43 (NR

5.1.5)

design

issues

Re-assessment of alternative power

sources (alternative to emergency

grids). This includes planning and

implementing extra external

connection points for mobile diesel

generator and the fire-fighting system

(water supply)

15, 16, 22, 26 Completed 2016



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

Level


44 (PR

4.2.4.2)

SAM Better arrangements for mobile diesel

generators and batteries.

This includes study of small

emergency power generators or fuel

cells as a means for recharging or

backup power. Possibly also

instructions for recharging or

switching to such power sources.

16, 22, 26 Completed 2017

45 (NR

6.4.3)

SAM Study of procedures for handling of

large amounts of radioactively

contaminated water. Includes study &

when needed implementation.

Completed 2015

46 (PR 4.3) SAM Unambiguous tagging of keys of

rooms in bunkered building (ECR).

Keys will be numbered and the

necessity of having SAMG

documentation in the ECR will be

evaluated.

Completed 2012


8.1.b Actions on the part of the RB

Table 8-2 National post-stress test actions – acting on and initiated by the national RB

NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

level

Status end 2017 Finalization

RB-4.001 National

organisation

The RB is drafting requirements for the

design and construction of new nuclear

reactors - they will be implemented in

the regulatory framework.

101 Completed 2015

RB-4.002 National

organisation

The RB is in the process of drafting

requirements related to internal &

external hazards - they will be

implemented in the regulatory

framework.

Completed 2015

RB-4.003 National

organisation

The RB is studying new financing

mechanisms for handling of license

applications and supervision.

102 Completed 2014

RB-4.004 National

organisation

RB evaluation in the framework of the

IRRS self-assessment and coming

IRRS mission. In the self-assessment

the RB will take notice of the xCNS

summary 'Action oriented objectives

for strengthening Nuclear Safety'.

102 Completed 2014



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

level


RB-4.005 National

organisation

Consequences of German phase out.

a. The Dutch RB will study the

possible long term impact of the

German phase out on the operation of

the German-design Dutch NPP.

131 a. Completed. Study of impact

ongoing activity.

no end date

b. The Dutch RB will evaluate the

possibility to increase exchange

information with other regulators of

German design plants like Spain and

Switzerland.

b. Completed. Exchange of

information in ‘KWU Regulators

Club’ is ongoing.

Since 2013

RB-4.006 National

organisation

In the light of the self-assessment

within the framework of the IRRS-

mission special attention will be paid to

explain the management of Safety

Culture within the Regulatory Body.

135 Completed 2014

RB-4.007 National

organisation

The Netherlands is implementing the

IAEA action plan. A number of actions

are already practice, like the adoption

of the IAEA-regulations, the IAEA

missions, and evaluation and

strengthening of EP&R.

In progress no end date


NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

level


RB-4.008 National

organisation

Taking into account the European

developments on this matter, research

is in progress into clearance levels and

protocols for measurement,

decontamination and clearance,

applicable to clearance of containers

and other materials

Completed, related to RB 4.012. 2013

RB-4.009 National

organisation

Implementation in the Dutch

regulations of the update of the

WENRA RL for existing reactors as

published in September 2014 and based

on the Fukushima Lessons Learned

In progress, 75% of updated RLs is

covered, but the remaining 25% is

somewhat delayed

20172018

RB-4.010 National

organisation

Implementation in the NPP of the

update of the WENRA RL for existing

reactors as published in September

2014 and based on the Fukushima

Lessons Learned

In progress 2020

RB-4.011 National

organisation

Implementation in the regulatory

framework of the EU Nuclear Safety

Directive published in 2014.

Completed 2017

RB-4.012 National

organisation

To establish guidance for LHs on

clearance of materials, buildings and

sites in decommissioning projects.

Completed 2014



NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

level


RB-5.001 EP&R Planning and organisation of bilateral

exercises with Belgium and Germany

is ongoing.

111 Completed (continued practice)

RB-5.002 EP&R Damage to infrastructure (hampering

EP&R activities) is subject to renewed

evaluation in the light of post-

Fukushima learning

108 Completed, will be the task of the safety

region.

RB-5.003 EP&R Study alternative means of

communication for RB staff visiting a

potential crisis area with disturbed

communication infrastructure.

108 Completed. RB staff is embedded in the

licensee emergency organization and can

use their satellite phone.

RB-6.001 international

cooperation

Drafting and publishing national report

for CNS 2014

Completed August 2013


cooperation

EU/ENSREG, participation in Peer

Review Workshop regarding National

Action Plans (post Fukushima

measures)

Completed April 2013


cooperation

EU/ENSREG, participation in

workshops 'Natural Hazards' and

'Emergency response', publication

guidance documents planned for

review.

Completed Nat Haz, June

2013

Em zones,

March 2013


cooperation

Harmonisation effort with

neighbouring countries regarding

emergency countermeasure zones (and

Completed 2014


NL Action

No.


Recommendation

No. on European

level


associated intervention levels) and

responses


cooperation

Two workshops of Dutch RB with

peers in Belgium (FANC)

Completed.

2013


cooperation

Collaboration in international forums is

continued

101 Completed (continued practice) No end date


cooperation

cooperation with foreign TSOs Completed (continued practice) No end date

RB-6.008 International

cooperation

Regarding improvement of regulatory

experience feedback, implement IRRS

recommendations before IRRS follow-

up mission

131 Ongoing 2018



8.2 Compliance with recently updated WENRA RLs

WENRA in 2006-2008 published a set of 295 safety reference levels (RLs) for operation of

NPPs. The RLs represent expected practices to be implemented in WENRA countries. They are

implemented in 2010 in the license of the NPP. In September 2014 an update25

of the RLs was

published by WENRA.

The Dutch RB in 2014 has undertaken a quick scan of compliance of its regulatory framework

with the very recently updated RLs. In 2015-2016 a more thorough self-evaluation was carried

out in the framework of WENRA RHWG. The implementation of the RLs is found in various

pieces of regulations like:

DSR, Dutch Safety Requirements (refer to chapter 4 for an explanation of the DSR);

M&O, Management & Organisation regulations, that detail M&O requirements for licence

holders;

Bkse, Nuclear installations, fissionable materials, ores, and radioactive substances Decree;

Bs, Radiation Protection Decree to be superseded by the new Bbs with the transposition of

Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM26

;

Implementation Euratom Directives, the requirements of these have been implemented in

Decrees like Bkse and Bs, but also in dedicated other regulations.

NVRs (Dutch adaptations of IAEA guides), referenced in the licences.

The conclusion is that Dutch regulation largely complies with the new RLs. The planning is

that the RLs will be completely implemented in the license by 2018, in line with the planning of

most WENRA members. A verification of the implementation in the NPP is ongoing. The idea

currently is to have implemented these around 2020.

25 Report WENRA Safety Reference Levels for Existing Reactors – Update in Relation to Lessons Learned from

TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, WENRA RHWG, 24th September 2014 26 Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against

the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom,

96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom



Appendix A Implementation of IAEA Action Plan

Table A-1 Implementation of IAEA Action Plan as of December 2017

Nr. Activity Implementation Status

2017

1.1 Member States to promptly undertake

a national assessment of the design of

nuclear power plants against site

specific extreme natural hazards and to

implement the necessary corrective

actions in a timely manner

(European) Stress test on all

nuclear installations

Completed

2.1 Member States to provide experts for

peer review missions.

List of possible reviewers for

European IRRS missions

provided.

IRRS Training sessions being

followed.

Participation in IRRS-missions

2012 (Sweden), 2013 (Bulgaria,

Belgium) and follow-up mission

in 2013 (UK)

Completed

2.3 Member States to be strongly

encouraged to voluntarily host IAEA

peer reviews, including follow-up

reviews, on a regular basis; the IAEA

Secretariat to respond in a timely

manner to requests for such reviews

Long tradition (see list in CNS6

report)

E.g. OSART mission at plants

every 5 years, SALTO

mission+fu, IPSART+fu, etc…

Completed

3.1 Member States to conduct a prompt

national review and thereafter regular

reviews of their emergency

preparedness and response

arrangements and capabilities, with the

IAEA Secretariat providing support

and assistance through Emergency

Preparedness Review (EPREV)

missions, as requested

Decision about EPREV mission

will be taken after the completion

of the 2014 IRRS mission (i.e.

end of 2018 when the FU-

mission is held). Decision in

2019.

Open

3.2 The IAEA Secretariat, Member States

and relevant international

organizations to review and strengthen

the international emergency

preparedness and response framework,

taking into account recommendations

given in the final report of the

International Action Plan for

Strengthening the International

Preparedness and Response System for

Nuclear and Radiological

Emergencies, and encouraging greater

The RB has participated in the

European EPR review and

further is participating in

European/regional harmonization

efforts. Participation in

HERCA/WENRA and several of

their working groups (e.g. mutual

assistance and exchange of

information and the development

of the DEEPER database for

European NPP’s).

Completed

(continued

practice)



2017

involvement of the relevant

international organizations in the Joint

Radiation Emergency Management

Plan of the International Organizations

See also 11.1

3.3 The IAEA Secretariat, Member States

and relevant international

organizations to strengthen the

assistance mechanisms to ensure that

necessary assistance is made available

promptly. Consideration to be given to

enhancing and fully utilizing the IAEA

Response and Assistance Network

(RANET), including expanding its

rapid response capabilities.

The Netherlands is registered as a

member in RANET.

Completed

3.4 Member States to consider, on a

voluntary basis, establishing national

rapid response teams that could also be

made available internationally through

RANET

In the Netherlands there is only 1

NPP. Therefore no national

response team will be

established.

Completed

4.1 Member States to conduct a prompt

national review and thereafter regular

reviews of their regulatory bodies,

including an assessment of their

effective independence, adequacy of

human and financial resources and the

need for appropriate technical and

scientific support, to fulfil their

responsibilities

Self-assessment ( within the

IRRS 2014 frame) performed in

the period 2012-2013 with the

following result:

Government decision to

reorganize RB and set up a new

authority to increase and better

organize efficiency, resources,

independence, communication

etc.

IAEA was consulted. To be

implemented in 2014 – 2016.

Regular self-assessments (are

now part of the strategy of the

RB.

Completed

4.3 Each Member State with nuclear

power plants to voluntarily host, on a

regular basis, an IAEA IRRS mission

to assess its national regulatory

framework. In addition, a follow-up

mission to be conducted within three

years of the main IRRS mission

IRRS mission including follow-

up mission requested in 2012.

The mission is scheduled in Nov

2014. It is also an obligation

according to the EU Nuclear

Safety Directive.

Completed

5.1 Member States to ensure

improvement, as necessary, of

management systems, safety culture,

human resources management, and

scientific and technical capacity in

operating organizations the IAEA

Secretariat to provide assistance to

Human and organisational

Factors are a specific topic in a

yearly meeting between the

operator and the RB. Additional

efforts have been carried out to

review the HOF area in the

framework of the license

Completed




2017

Member States upon request application for LTO during full

scope SALTO-mission in 2012

as an added issue.

Further reviews are going on

during the current PSR and

inspection work. In addition the

OSART mission of September

2014 contains two added

modules dealing with the subject:

the corporate OSART and

integrated safety culture

assessment modules.

On a more regular basis the

operator will host a WANO Peer

Review every 4 years, with a

follow-up after two years.

OSART missions will take place

every ten years.

5.2 Each Member State with nuclear

power plants to voluntarily host at

least one IAEA Operational Safety

Review Team (OSART) mission

during the coming three years, with

the initial focus on older nuclear

power plants. Thereafter, OSART

missions to be voluntarily hosted on a

regular basis

OSART mission scheduled in

September 2014, advanced one

year compared to the original

schedule (2015) to comply with

the IAEA action plan for older

reactors. OSART mission every

ten years was already the practice

in the Netherlands.

Completed

6.2 Member States to utilize as broadly

and effectively as possible the IAEA

Safety Standards in an open, timely

and transparent manner. The IAEA

Secretariat to continue providing

support and assistance in the

implementation of IAEA Safety

Standards

It is a long standing policy and

practice in the Netherlands to use

the IAEA safety standards. This

policy and practice is now being

formalized and extended (e.g. in

the area of the RB).

NVRs (Dutch adaptation of

IAEA Safety Standards) are part

of the license requirements for

KCB.

New Dutch Safety Requirements

are being developed, based on

new safety insights published by

WENRA and IAEA , including

the already known Fukushima

lessons. These requirements are

applied to new reactors, but will

also be used as a reference for

existing installations.

Completed

7.1 States parties to explore mechanisms NL participate actively in CNS, Completed



2017

to enhance the effective

implementation of the Convention on

Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention

on the Safety of Spent Fuel

Management and the Safety of

Radioactive Waste Management, the

Convention on the Early Notification

of a Nuclear Accident and the

Convention on Assistance in the Case

of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological

Emergency, and to consider proposals

made to amend the Convention on

Nuclear Safety and the Convention on

the Early Notification of a Nuclear

Accident

JC, Early Notification and

Assistance and supports all

efforts to increase the

effectiveness to enhance nuclear

safety and transparency

worldwide.

7.2 Member States to be encouraged to

join and effectively implement these

Conventions

See 7.1 Completed

7.3 Member States to work towards

establishing a global nuclear liability

framework that addresses the concerns

of all States that might be affected by a

nuclear accident with a view to

providing appropriate compensation

for nuclear damage. The IAEA

International Expert Group on Nuclear

Liability (INLEX) to recommend

actions to facilitate achievement of

such a global framework. Member

States to give due consideration to the

possibility of joining the international

nuclear liability instruments as a step

toward achieving such a global

framework

NL is Contracting Party for the

Paris+Brussel convention on

liability.

Further developments in this area

are being followed.

Completed

(continued

practice)

9.1 Member States with nuclear power

programmes and those planning to

embark on such a programme to

strengthen, develop, maintain and

implement their capacity building

programs, including education,

training and exercises at the national,

regional and international levels to

continuously ensure sufficient and

competent human resources necessary

to assume their responsibility for safe,

responsible and sustainable use of

nuclear technologies the IAEA

Secretariat to assist as requested. Such

programmes to cover all the nuclear

safety related areas, including safe

operation, emergency preparedness

In general in the Netherlands it is

not difficult to attract people with

a good technical or scientific

background, but it is difficult to

attract people experienced in the

usual nuclear safety technical

competences. The Dutch

education infrastructure

(universities and technical

schools) has only a limited

capacity in this field. Therefore a

long training period is needed

before new personnel become

effective.

At this moment there is no

National Programme to

Completed

(continued

practice)




2017

and response and regulatory

effectiveness and to build upon

existing capacity building

infrastructures

strengthen, develop etc... On the

other hand there are some

initiatives by the industry (e.g.

support of regional higher

education facilities).

The reorganization of the RB in

the next years will merge the

available capacity (and

knowledge) of the RB into one

organization. This will contribute

to increase its robustness. Please

refer to the latest update .

Since the Netherlands has a small

but diverse nuclear programme

strong international participation

is necessary.

The formation of the informal

KWU Regulators Club (Initiative

of the Netherlands, with

participation of Germany, Spain,

Switzerland and Brazil) is part of

the efforts to sustain knowledge.

The plan of ANVS is to

introduce a formal inspector

qualification programme in the

future (as one of the actions from

the IRRS-action plan).

9.2 Member States with nuclear power

programmes and those planning to

embark on such a programme, to

incorporate lessons learned from the

accident into their nuclear power

programme infrastructure the IAEA

Secretariat to assist as requested

See 4.1 and 6.2 Completed

10.1 Member States, the IAEA Secretariat

and other relevant stakeholders to

facilitate the use of available

information, expertise and techniques

for monitoring, decontamination and

remediation both on and off nuclear

sites and the IAEA Secretariat to

consider strategies and programmes to

improve knowledge and strengthen

capabilities in these areas

Bilateral agreements with

neighbouring countries and

actions/recommendations

HERCA/WENRA. IAEA and EC

are working on protocols to

exchange information from the

EC member states with IAEA.

See also 3.2

Completed

(continued

practice)



facilitate the use of available

One of the actions following the

stress test analysis at the Borssele

power plant involves a “study of

Completed



2017

information, expertise and techniques

regarding the removal of damaged

nuclear fuel and the management and

disposal of radioactive waste resulting

from a nuclear emergency

procedures for handling of large

amounts of radioactively

contaminated water. Includes

study & when needed

implementation”.



share information regarding the

assessment of radiation doses and any

associated impacts on people and the

environment

Bilateral protocols and

arrangements are in place and

contact with the relevant

institutes and organizations are

established and under

construction.

NL is party to the EU Ecurie etc.

Completed

(continued

practice)

11.1 Member States, with the assistance of

the IAEA Secretariat, to strengthen the

emergency notification system, and

reporting and information sharing

arrangements and capabilities

Competent Authority domestic

and abroad is merged into one

Competent Authority; USIE is

implemented at the National

Nuclear Emergency Management

and Response Plan (“NCP”). The

USIE system is operational. NL

is involved in the development

of the IRIX format to improve

standards for information

exchange.

NL participates actively in the

development of the DEEPER

database (technical specialized

information database of the

Western Europe NPP’s: WENRA

initiative). See also 3.2..

Completed

(continued

practice)

11.2 Member States, with the assistance of

the IAEA Secretariat, to enhance the

transparency and effectiveness of

communication among operators,

regulators and various international

organizations, and strengthen the

IAEA’s coordinating role in this

regard, underlining that the freest

possible flow and wide dissemination

of safety related technical and

technological information enhances

nuclear safety.

The RB has a long tradition is

informing the public (and the

Parliament). It has completed a

new external communication

strategy based on the ENSREG

guidelines from 2011. This will

be further implemented in the

framework of the development of

the new RB.

Regularly bilateral meetings with

regulators of neighboring

countries (B, D) are held in order

to exchange information and

share experiences.

Similar exchange of information

will also happen within the KWU

regulators club including Brazil,

Switzerland, Spain and The

Completed

(continued

practice)




2017

Netherlands).

See also 3.2 en 11.1

11.6 The IAEA Secretariat and Member

States, in consultation with the OECD

NEA and the IAEA International

Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

(INES) Advisory Committee to review

the application of the INES scale as a

communication tool

In 2011 NL has taken part in the

stock-taking of the INES-actions

in The Netherlands during the

Fukushima accident.

In 2012 we participated in the

review of the guidance on

communication.

Completed

12.1 Relevant stakeholders, with assistance

provided by the IAEA Secretariat as

appropriate, to conduct necessary

research and development in nuclear

safety, technology and engineering,

including that related to existing and

new design-specific aspects

The government finances

(partially) research and

development activities (on

nuclear technology and nuclear

safety) by the NRG consultancy

group and TU Delft.

Some regulatory research and

development (mainly in the area

of radiation protection) is

commissioned by ANVS (on

project basis).

The nuclear safety regulatory

research by ANVS (participating

in OECD/NEA/CNSI projects)

has been reduced over the last

couple of years.

Completed

(continued

practice)

12.2 Relevant stakeholders and the IAEA

Secretariat to utilize the results of

research and development and to share

them, as appropriate, to the benefit of

all Member States

see 11.2 Completed

(continued

practice)

This is a publication of

Prepared byThe Authority for Nuclear Safety andRadiation Protection (ANVS)

Bezuidenhoutseweg 67 | 2594 AC The Hague, NetherlandsP.O. Box 16001 | 2500 BA The Hague, Netherlandswww.anvs.nl

Joint Convention (JC

) National Report of the Kingdom

of the Netherlands

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safetyof Radioactive Waste Management

National Report of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Sixth Review Meeting(May 2018)

The Hague, October 2017

Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management

December 2017

netherlands' nacp

Documents