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In discussing how his CRS meets the desiderata required from any

semantic theory applicable in psychology, Block notes that conceptual

role, as he construes them, determines the nature of referential role,

not of reference (p. !!". #ow whatdoes the latter distinction amount

to$ %pparently, he intends to &esh out this dichotomy by appealing to

'utnams twin earth thought e)periment. Block claims, I take it, that

*reference+ means the thing picked out in a certain possible world,

whereas *referential factor+ would hae a broader signi-cance, i.e. it

would stand for the thing picked out across possible worlds *a word

with the conceptual role of /water could map onto one substance here,

another on 0win 1arth, and another on 0riplet 1arth. 2hat is the head 3

conceptual role4 determines the nature of reference without

determining reference itself.+ (p. !!". Block seems to be implying

here, in 'utnams smile, that the reference of the term *water+ on

1arth as compared to the reference of *water+ on 0win 1arth. 5or

'utman, *water+ has di6erent e)tensions in both cases because it

picks out two distinct types of liquids that are equal in macroscopic

features and yet di6erent in chemical composition. But if *water+ has

the same conceptual role both on earth and on 0win 1arth, then

shouldnt it be a primary function of conceptual role precisely to

distinguish between things that are apparently similar and yet are

ultimately di6erent in a deeper sense$ 7et me illustrate what I hae in

mind with an e)ample reasonably, the conceptual role of *water+ is

8/17/2019 Ned Block on Concepts

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