nature and autonomy: an organizational view of social and...

Development and Psychopathology, 9 (1997), 701–728Copyright 1997 Cambridge University PressPrinted in the United States of America

Nature and autonomy: An organizational viewof social and neurobiological aspects ofself-regulation in behavior and development

RICHARD M. RYAN,a JULIUS KUHL,bAND EDWARD L. DECIa

aUniversity of Rochester; and bUniversity of Osnabruck

AbstractThe concepts of self-regulation and autonomy are examined within an organizational framework. We begin byretracing the historical origins of the organizational viewpoint in early debates within the field of biology betweenvitalists and reductionists, from which the construct of self-regulation emerged. We then consider human autonomyas an evolved behavioral, developmental, and experiential phenomenon that operates at both neurobiological andpsychological levels and requires very specific supports within higher order social organizations. We contrastautonomy or true self-regulation with controlling regulation (a nonautonomous form of intentional behavior) inphenomenological and functional terms, and we relate the forms of regulation to the developmental processes ofintrinsic motivation and internalization. Subsequently, we describe how self-regulation versus control may becharacterized by distinct neurobiological underpinnings, and we speculate about some of the adaptive advantagesthat may underlie the evolution of autonomy. Throughout, we argue that disturbances of autonomy, which have bothbiological and psychological etiologies, are central to many forms of psychopathology and social alienation.

Organizational principles represent a para- implies reciprocal influences among levels ofanalysis and thus entails consideration of bothdigmatic framework in the life sciences,

applying not only to issues in psychological upward and downward forms of causation(Campbell, 1974; Sperry, 1977) or vertical co-development but also to problems across the

fields of biology, psychology, and sociology, action (Gottlieb, 1992), psychologists whoemploy this theoretical paradigm are able toand to the interrelations among these disci-

plines (Mayr, 1982; von Bertalanffy, 1968). place their work fully within the system of thelife sciences (Laszlo, 1987; Piaget, 1971).The organization idea applies to entities from

cells, to organs, to organisms, to social organ- This article focuses on a specific and par-ticularly central concept derived from organi-izations, and it describes the principles

through which these successive levels of liv- zational thought—namely, that of autonomy,which implies self-regulation. Theoretically,ing forms operate and interrelate (Rosenberg,

1985). Because the concept of organization autonomy is both an expression and an out-come of the more general organizational na-ture of animate entities—a manifestation of a

Preparation of this article was facilitated by fellowshipscentral tendency toward the extension, coordi-to the first author from the James McKeen Cattell Foun-nation, and integration of functioning that is adation and the Max Planck Institute for Human Develop-

ment and Education; a grant to the second author from common property of living things (Augros &the German Science Foundation (DFG); and a grant to Stanciu, 1987; Laszlo, 1987). Although manythe third author from the National Institute of Child theorists have suggested that autonomy isHealth and Human Development (HD-19914).

uniquely human and thus discontinuousAddress correspondence and reprint requests to: Rich-within nature, an organizational perspectiveard M. Ryan, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY

14627. suggests instead that it can be related to the

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R. M. Ryan et al.702

fact that all organisms, to varying degrees, are cal and social conditions for its optimal devel-opment and expression.“centres of regulation” (Polanyi, 1958) that

cohesively and purposively direct their behav- Despite its clear importance within de-velopment, the concept of autonomy hasior toward satisfying needs. As Sinnott (1958)

once remarked, it is this “quality of self-direc- prompted criticism from diverse quarters. Forexample, Bandura (1989) defined autonomytive regulation, whatever its chemical and

physical processes may prove to be, that is a as behavior that occurs “without any externalinfluence” and then used that inappropriateuniquely biological phenomenon” (p. 38).

Thus, while there may be unique features and definition to deny the construct’s significance.Other social–cognitive perspectives attributedynamics associated with the autonomy in hu-

man development, particularly given the facts behavioral regulation to internal schemata thatare activated by contextual cues (e.g., Mis-of self-awareness and social embeddedness, it

is our thesis that autonomy is a natural poten- chel & Shoda, 1995), thus peripheralizing theimportance of regulation by an integrated self.tial and one that has deep evolutionary roots.

In human personality, the construct of au- In a different vein, some neuropsychologi-cally focused theories emphasize modular ac-tonomy concerns the processes through which

action and experience are initiated and gov- counts of complex brain processes, and in do-ing so raise important questions about theerned by “the self.” The greater one’s auton-

omy, the more one acts in accord with self- scientific promise of constructs such as auton-omy that concern “central” regulative func-endorsed values, needs, and intentions rather

than in response to controlling forces external tions (e.g., Fodor, 1983). Finally, some socio-culturalists equate the idea of autonomy withto the self, whether these forces are within the

individual (e.g., drives or ego involvements) individualism, thus viewing it as an ideologyrather than as a central problem of life (Ger-or from outside (e.g., social pressures). Au-

tonomy can thus be understood as a critical gen, 1993).Because of its observable fragility and thedevelopmental trajectory that concerns not

only competence and control (J. Heckhausen, definitional controversies that surround it, webelieve it is worth revisiting the construct of1997; Skinner, 1996) but also the movement

away from heteronomous regulation toward autonomy to clarify its meaning and functionswithin an organizational framework of thought.self-regulation (Deci & Ryan, 1985).

Many theories of human development and Specifically, we argue that the phenomenonof self-regulation or autonomy is neither mys-personality have embraced the organizational

perspective, which assumes a natural progres- tical nor uniquely human. The striving to inte-grate and cohesively direct action is a basicsion toward autonomy and integration in psy-

chological development (e.g., Loevinger, 1976; form of biological activity. Organizationalviewpoints, accordingly, postulate that livingPiaget, 1971; Rogers, 1963). Yet clearly there

are many behaviors in both adults and chil- systems have an internal tendency to hierar-chically coordinate their functions and, atdren that are not autonomous because there

are forces, both organic and social, that can times, to direct their behaviors in the serviceof needs or goals (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, inundermine the integrative process, or make its

expression problematic. Internal challenges, press; Ryan, 1995). Further, many organisms,particularly those with a protracted develop-from basic temperament to neurobiological

constraints (Greenspan, 1979; Kuhl & Beck- mental course, show an intrinsic motivationto extend and integrate the regulation of theirmann, 1994; Luria, 1973), as well as external

challenges, from deleterious parenting to im- functioning (Deci & Ryan, 1985) and alsoshow signs of developmental dysfunction andpoverished socioeconomic conditions, can im-

pair the development and sustained enactment psychological distress when that tendency isdisrupted (Kuhl & Halle, 1994; Ryan, Deci, &of self-regulatory capacities (Ryan, Sheldon,

Kasser, & Deci, 1996). In this sense, auton- Grolnick, 1995; White, 1963).Moreover, the fragility of autonomy is ren-omy, although a central human potential, is

also fragile. It is dependent upon both biologi- dered explicable within an organizational per-

Nature and autonomy 703

spective. The degree of autonomy possessed Connell, 1989), which is the process thatallows individuals to assimilate extrinsic so-by an organism is always relative, both within

and across species. For most organisms the cial prescriptions to the self. We then reviewrecent work on the neurobiological founda-tasks of coordinating and entraining their

evolved component systems, while at the tions of autonomy in humans (e.g., Rosahl,Tennigkeit, Kuhl, & Haschke, 1993), arguingsame time becoming coordinated within

higher order biotic or social organizations, is that there is reason to expect a specificity ofneurological processes subserving the opera-formidable. This is perhaps especially true of

human autonomy or integrity which is simul- tion of autonomous regulation. We then spec-ulate on the sociobiology of autonomy andtaneously dependent upon its evolutionary

and neurobiological underpinnings and chal- self-regulation, particularly the adaptive ad-vantages yielded by it and by its phenomeno-lenged by ever-changing higher order (and

more vs. less autonomy-supportive) interper- logical accompaniments. Finally, we discussthe significance of autonomy in the study ofsonal and cultural conditions.

The analysis of integration and autonomy developmental psychopathology.has particular significance for the field of de-velopmental psychopathology. Many develop-

Organization Construct: Originsmental psychopathologists have embraced the

and Applicationsorganizational paradigm and, with it, the un-derlying assumption of a developmental tra- Although many contemporary life scientists

acknowledge organizational principles as par-jectory towards greater differentiation and in-tegration in functioning (Cicchetti & Tucker, adigmatic (Mayr, 1982; Rosenberg, 1985), it

is noteworthy that the concept of organization1994). Within this framework the acquisitionof self-regulatory capacities is seen as critical itself represents, historically speaking, a rela-

tively recent human invention. It emerged pri-for adaptive functioning, and disruptions ofself-regulation or “disturbances of autonomy” marily as an outcome of intense debates about

the nature of life which transpired between re-are widely implicated as etiological factors invarious types of psychopathology (Kuhl & ductionists (e.g., Helmholtz, 1861; La Met-

trie, 1748/1961; Loeb, 1906) and their nowBeckmann, 1994; Ryan et al., 1995; Shapiro,1981). Disruptions of autonomy, whether lo- extinct rivals, the vitalists (e.g., Bichat, 1815;

Dreisch, 1908).cated in organic or social processes, can thushave a broad, cascading impact on subsequent Reductionists aspired to explain the work-

ings of life solely by reference to elementaldevelopmental processes (Cicchetti, 1991;Ryan, 1993). or lower order efficient and material causal

principles (Augros & Stanciu, 1987; Rychlak,The remainder of this article explicatesthese views. We begin by tracing the histori- 1975). In short, they tried to reduce biology

to physics. By contrast, vitalists argued thatcal origins of the concept of organization it-self, showing how it inherently assumes the living entities, with their obvious tendencies

toward activity and integrity, possess an irre-functional property of organismic self-regula-tion and relative autonomy. We next examine ducible, unique nature. Dreisch (1908), for

example, ascribed to organisms a principle ofthe phenomenological and attributional mani-festations of organismic integration and au- entelechy, which guided the ordering and real-

ization of organismic potentials, a concepttonomy in humans, as well as their linkageswith specific types of motivational processes that has much in common with psychological

constructs such as actualization (Rogers,critical to optimal development. These pro-cesses include intrinsic motivation, which is 1963) and individuation (Jung, 1923). Berg-

son (1911) attributed to life an elan vital, athe spontaneous tendency of organisms to ex-ercise their capacities in the service of both nonphysical force through which develop-

ment and evolution flowered.cognitive and personality growth (Deci &Ryan, 1985; Flavell, 1977; White, 1963), and However, in spite of their focus on life and

development, the early vitalists’ program wasinternalization (Kuhl & Kazen, 1994; Ryan &


hopelessly regressive. The course of the de- that are hierarchically arranged. Indeed, it hasbeen argued that most of the problems uniquebates entailed reductionists producing ever

more detailed accounts of processes vitalists to biology concern the issue of hierarchicalorganization—how lower order elements arehad hoped would remain unexplained, forcing

the vitalists to retreat ever backward and fi- combined and coordinated into higher orderstructures and functions that operate as a unit.nally into silence. Nonetheless, these debates

produced concessions among reductionists as The hierarchical, systems’ view suggests thatthe “whole is more than the sum of its parts”well, because simple principles of accretion

and efficient causality were found insufficient and that the parts are interdependent acrosslevels (Jonas, 1966). The phenomenon of au-for framing, describing, and predicting pro-

cesses such as the coordination of function- tonomy represents, in this respect, a particu-larly compelling problem for hierarchicaling, equifinality, and, more generally, the na-

ture of self-regulation. As Jacob (1973) put models, because it concerns how an organismat times operates as a self-directed unit, coor-it, given the observed unity, coordination, and

regulation of organisms, “it had to be admit- dinating its parts toward certain ends.Sperry (1969) and Campbell (1974) haveted that these elements were not merely stuck

together, but integrated” (p. 116). Thus, al- used the term downward causation to de-scribe how higher order units are not only de-though vitalists never accomplished their full

aims, their efforts prompted a fuller, more ap- pendent upon and constrained by the elementsthat constitute them, but can, in certain cir-propriate framework for scientific discourse,

namely the organismic paradigm (Jonas, cumstances, entrain and redirect those veryconstituent mechanisms. More recently Gott-1966; Mayr, 1982), within which biological

mechanisms and physiological processes can lieb (1992) depicted such top-down influencesas instances of vertical coaction, to betterbe studied as aspects of an overarching nonre-

ductionistic account of living systems. specify that such influences are not, strictlyspeaking, unidirectional causes. The recogni-The organismic paradigm thus arose as a

framework for describing the attributes that tion of top-down influences, however de-scribed, is nonetheless critically important todifferentiate developing organisms from inan-

imate entities. Perhaps the most basic of these developmental and personality psychologies,whose central phenomena concern how hu-is the negentropic nature of animate forms.

Indeed, the very essence of organization, to mans develop the capacities for purposive ac-tion and behavioral regulation. Although pur-which the term organism itself refers, in-

volves living systems working to maintain posive, self-regulatory capacities are to someextent based in, and operate on behalf of,and elaborate themselves. In contrast, inani-

mate objects are characterized by entropy; lower order biological processes, they are alsoshaped in content and operation by still higherthey tend toward equilibrium or deterioration

to simpler forms (Bartley, 1987). The animate order social organizational processes andpressures. That is, social conditions influenceattribute of negentropy is in no way contradic-

tory to the laws of physics (e.g., the second the acquired motives and experienced goals ofthe individual, which in turn exert top-downlaw of thermodynamics) because such entropy

concerns only closed systems, not living sys- effects upon the functioning of the compo-nents upon which they depend. Only withintems that are in active exchange with an envi-

ronment (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). the context of these hierarchical dynamics canhuman autonomy and purposiveness be mean-Negentropy thus implies a tendency to-

ward the “working together” or coordination ingfully studied.A final tenet of organismic theories, andof parts in an active, self-regulating unity.

This organization entails an assumption that perhaps an ultimate dividing line between re-ductionistic and organismic thinking, con-such unities are made up of, or constituted by,

lower order functional unities, and are also cerns the fundamental question of what beingpurposive itself entails. A nonliving machineembedded within higher order ones. That is,

living systems involve parts and structures can have a “purpose,” but that occurs only if


an animate being has programed into it the Werner, 1948) have embraced the organismicparadigm in order to understand the dynamicsheuristic that creates the purpose. Organisms,

on the other hand, have purposes with internal of human behavior and personality function-ing. In doing so, each has assumed that psy-origins; they have purposes that originate in

their innate needs. As Jonas (1966) argued, chological development entails a natural ten-dency toward greater differentiation (growth,“Only living things have needs and act on

needs” (p. 126). Needs are based in organ- self-extension) and integration (coherence,self-regulation, unity). The organismic frame-isms’ necessity for continuous self-renewal

and their elemental urge to maintain and ex- work has been applied to both cognitivegrowth, as in the assimilation of new knowl-tend themselves. Human needs operate on

both metabolic (Rosenberg, 1985) and psy- edge structures, and personality growth, as inthe assimilation of social values and behav-chological (Ryan, 1995) levels as fundamen-

tal motivators of regulatory processes. In con- ioral regulations (Greenspan, 1979; Overton,1991).trast to organismic theories, cybernetics,

while containing some heuristically valuable Typically, organismic theories in psychol-ogy account for this developmental trajectoryprinciples derived from systems thought, fails

at this final turn to be a comprehensive ap- by positing a broad construct that describes ageneral function subserving growth and inte-proach to animate development, as it provides

no basis for addressing the question of needs. gration. Psychoanalytic theorists posit a syn-thetic function derived from Eros, the lifeAlthough the emergence of the organismic

principles of negentropy, holism, self-regula- force, that is the basis of ego development(Freud, 1923/1962). Loevinger (1976) sug-tion, and needs neither resolved nor com-

pleted the debates about the nature or mean- gested that the “striving to master, to inte-grate, to make sense of experience, is the es-ing of life, their introduction changed forever

scientific discourse in the life sciences (Jacob, sence of the ego itself” (p. 59). Humanisticpsychologists posit an actualizing tendency1973; Bertalanffy, 1968). Indeed, organismic

thinking has as its great merit that it provides (Goldstein, 1939; Maslow, 1943), a strivingtoward maintenance and enhancement thata theory of totality between the extreme alter-

natives of reductionism and vitalism (Piaget, Rogers (1963) argued “is the very nature ofthe process we call life” (p. 3). Jung posited1971), and in so doing it provides biology

with a raison d’etre, a focus on processes not individuation as a core construct to accountfor unifying processes in development, whichwholly reducible to material–causal principles

(Mayr, 1982). Similarly, organismic thought for him reflected “the peculiar and autono-mous quality of living matter, i.e., to a lawprovides developmental psychology with its

own mandate to focus on the organism’s in- inherent in life itself” (Jung, 1923, p. 557).And Piaget (1952) assumed organization to beherent tendencies toward differentiation and

integration (Overton, 1991). This includes a “functional invariant” in cognitive develop-ment, reflecting the fact that “life, at whatevercoming to grips with the trajectory of individ-

uals toward increased self-regulation over level shows a continual tendency to extend it-self” (Piaget, 1971, p. 204). These statementstime, understood as a process that, itself, must

be located within both the lower order biolog- illustrate just how basic the idea of organiza-tion is in such theories, being equated withical mechanisms through which it is enacted

and the higher order social organizational pro- the very nature of life itself.While recognizing the importance of suchcesses that influence its represented aims and

purposes. general constructs, it is also critical to con-sider the inherent dangers in positing “natu-ral” functions or “invariant” tendencies that

Organization and Self-Regulation inoperate in psychological development (or

Psychological Theoriessimilarly, in evolution, social history, or anyother organizational process). Abstract func-Many previous psychological theorists (e.g.,

Loevinger, 1976; Piaget, 1971; Rogers, 1963; tions or tendencies can easily become reified


(Ryle, 1949). Furthermore, once assumed, avoid both the Scylla of reductionism and theCharybdis of transcendental thought.they can be mistakenly considered automatic

or nonproblematic. Thus, to the extent that theprocesses underlying the “unfolding” of de-velopment are simply presumed, there is Self-Regulation Versuslikely to be too little focus on (a) the specific Controlled Regulationcomponent or “modular” structures throughwhich these processes operate and that there- Self-regulation and autonomy concern the

processes through which an organism initi-fore constrain their operation (Kuhl, 1996);(b) individual differences in the rate and dy- ates, coordinates, and governs its behavior. As

we use the term autonomy it is not equivalentnamics of the functioning of such processesand in the structures that result from them to either independence or freedom from exter-

nal influences (Ryan, 1995) but rather refers(Edelstein, 1995; Flavell, 1977); and (c) varia-tions in the social conditions that facilitate to the holistic integrated functioning through

which action is centrally regulated. Autonomyversus inhibit both the functioning of theseprocesses and the agentic activity entailed in is an instance of organization par excellence,

because autonomy entails the higher ordertheir operation (Broughton, 1987; Ryan,1995). Put differently, the organizational gathering together of component systems into

a relative unity and acting from that organizedtendencies that nature provides, including themovement toward greater autonomy, do not vantage point. Although self-regulatory pro-

cesses are evident in all animate systems, thejust occur. Rather, to come to fruition theyrequire specific neurobiological capacities cases of most relevance herein are those in-

volving relatively central, nonencapsulated,(Kuhl, 1996), social nutriments, and motiva-tion (Deci & Ryan, 1991). Lacking these, they coordinating processes associated with corti-

cal regulation. These are manifest in a numberwill be delayed or disrupted. Linking social,psychological, neurobiological, and evolu- of species, particularly mammals. The func-

tional roles of autonomy include stabilizingtionary levels of analysis in the conceptualiza-tion of autonomy can thus help us explicate and boosting adaptation and action, for exam-

ple, by facilitating the identification and effi-the multiple levels of support required for op-timal development of autonomy, as well as cient expression of goals related to predomi-

nant needs and shielding such goals fromthe multiple pathways by which the disturb-ance of autonomy contributes to psychopath- competing impulses. The origins of autonomy

are thus located in the more general problemology.A meaningful conceptualization of auton- of the development of behavioral regulation,

which concerns the organism’s selecting andomy can capitalize on the historical lessonsfrom the vitalist–reductionist debates by rec- sustaining behaviors that are intended to meet

its ongoing needs.ognizing that a full understanding of self-reg-ulation cannot be obtained either from a In humans the study of autonomy has clas-

sically involved both functional and phenom-purely top-down psychological approachwhich ignores underlying biological mecha- enological considerations. For example, or-

ganismic perspectives on human developmentnisms that provide constraints and affordancesor from a purely bottom-up reductionist ap- typically attribute the phenomenological locus

of initiation and regulation to the self (Deci &proach which ignores the regulatory influ-ences of psychological processes such as Ryan, 1991; Eagle, 1991; Kuhl & Beckmann,

1994; Loevinger & Blasi, 1991; Stern, 1985;needs, self-reflections, and internalized socialvalues. An organismic approach, properly ap- Winnicott, 1965). In contrast to social-cogni-

tive approaches in which the self is typicallyplied, examines its phenomena at multiplelevels of analysis, while at the same time con- defined as a concept, as the object that is per-

ceived by oneself or another, organismicsidering the interpenetrating influences amonghierarchically arranged systems. It thus pro- models use the term self to refer to a central

process that regulates behavior and experi-vides a conceptual rudder by which one can


ence, in other words, to self-as-subject (Mc- Kuhl, 1992), controlled action, which mayeven appear on the surface to be chosen orAdams, 1990).

Furthermore, organismic theories distin- decided upon, lacks the backing of a cohesivecommitment, such that there is a diminishedguish regulation by the self, which is based in

those aspects of the person’s psychic makeup likelihood that one’s full resources will bebrought to bear to carry out the intention. Inthat have been well integrated, from regula-

tion by isolated component processes, coer- philosophical language, this consequence ofregulatory failure is referred to as akrasia orcive external forces, or partially assimilated

goals. Clearly, not all emitted action is self- “weakness of will” (Mele, 1987). Researchhas repeatedly shown that goals enactedregulated, precisely because many types of

behavior occur without the cohesive endorse- through controlling rather than autonomousregulation are likely to suffer from akrasiament or participation of one’s self, as when a

nonintegrated component process controls be- (e.g., Greenstein & Koestner, 1996; Kuhl &Kazen, 1994; Sheldon & Elliot, in press; Wil-havior. This is true, for example, in many

cases of neurobiological disruptions, particu- liams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci, 1996).Furthermore, decrements in creativity andlarly those implicating prefrontal cortical ar-

eas (e.g., Goldman–Rakic, 1987; Luria, 1973). cognitive flexibility have been associated withcontrolled (vs. self-regulated) behavior (Ama-Neuropathology offers dramatic examples of

how, when prefrontal cortical processes are bile, 1996; Grolnick & Ryan, 1987; Koestner,Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984).disrupted, component processes can drive be-

havior without self-endorsement, and inten- Given that self-regulated (i.e., autono-mous) and controlled forms of regulation existtions are seemingly disconnected from the

component systems required for their imple- and have both distinct etiologies and conse-quences, we now turn to a more detailed ac-mentation (Kuhl, 1996). Furthermore, psycho-

logical variables can also disrupt self-regula- count of their phenomenological, develop-mental, neurobiological, sociobiological, andtory functioning, as when behaviors stem

from coercive external controls or rigid, inter- social bases, as each of these levels of analy-sis has an essential place within an organismicnalized demands (introjects) reflecting only

part of one’s personality (Greenwald, 1982; perspective.Meissner, 1981; Ryan, 1982). In such in-stances one might better speak of controlled

Experience of Autonomy:rather than self-regulation, because the inte-

Phenomenological andgrated self neither initiates nor fully stands

Attributional Perspectivesbehind such behaviors. Many forms of psy-chopathology are associated with the feeling Phenomenologists in the Husserlian tradition

have long distinguished autonomous actsthat behavior, even when intentional, is com-pelled, automatic, or in other ways not selffrom non-self-regulated forms of striving. For

instance, Pfander (1911) proposed that whatdetermined (Ryan et al., 1995). Thus, in ageneral sense, controlled regulation is evi- he called a “self-determined” or “willed” ac-

tion is distinguishable from other intentionaldenced to the extent that component systems,whether conceived of psychologically or neu- acts in that it is experienced “precisely not as

an occurrence caused by a different agent butroanatomically, execute behavior without itbeing processed, coordinated, or endorsed by as an initial act of the ego-center itself” (p.

20). He added that an external input (such asthe self (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, in press; Deci &Ryan, 1991). social pressure) may supply the “grounds” for

action, and yet an action could still be autono-The extent to which a behavior is self-reg-ulated versus controlled is important because mous if it is characterized by a directly felt

endorsement of those grounds by the self orit greatly affects the quality of action that en-sues. For example, whereas self-regulated ac- “ego-center.” Similarly, Ricoeur (1966) point-

ed out that an autonomous action does nottion will be sustained in the face of competingtendencies or demands (Deci & Ryan, 1985; need to occur in the absence of strong external


pressures (e.g., from parents or social institu- butional theories of Heider (1958). Heider,who was highly conversant in phenomenolog-tions) to act in that way. The issue is, rather,

the degree to which one fully assents to the ical philosophy (Spiegelberg, 1972), was con-cerned with the nature of everyday percep-actions prescribed by such forces or inputs.

One can be autonomous even when behaving tions of interpersonal events and how thephenomenal construction of such events playsin accord with an external force as long as

one fully and meaningfully concurs with it. a determinative role in social behavior. Ac-cordingly, he sought to articulate the commonThus, autonomy does not in any way entail

being independent of external influences; it sense principles or naive psychology by whichpeople understand their own and others’ ac-only means not being caused by those influ-

ences. Phenomenologists also apply this logic tions. In Heider’s view, it is this naive psy-chology that “we use to build up our pictureto inner forces such as drives or impulses. Au-

tonomy concerns whether one wholly and re- of the social environment and which guidesour reactions to it” (p. 5). Among the coreflectively accepts an inner urge (e.g., to eat,

to hit) rather than experiences the urge as constructs in Heider’s theory was that of theperceived locus of causality (PLOC). He ar-compelling or controlling one’s behavior.

Recent analytical approaches to the prob- gued that among the most salient features ofnaive psychology is one’s judgment aboutlem of autonomy point in similar directions

(e.g., Benson, 1987; Hill, 1991; Pritchard, whether an action or outcome is personallycaused, or is a result of impersonal causes.1991; Wolff, 1990). Dworkin (1988), for ex-

ample, argued that autonomy cannot, and does The critical feature of personal causation isintentionality, which is implied by behavioralnot, mean behaving without constraint. Clear-

ly, one can assent to certain constraints, and equifinality, meaning that both ability and ef-fort appear to be directed toward a particularin doing so still be autonomous. One might

feel constrained, for example, to stop one’s end. In contrast, impersonal causation ismarked by a perceived absence of intentional-car at a particular red light. But, at the same

time one may assent to the idea that traffic ity. For example, an action would be attrib-uted to impersonal causes if the perceiver be-laws are useful in insuring one’s own and ev-

eryone else’s safety. One therefore may will- lieves the actor showed no evidence of tryingto bring it about or lacked the capacity to pre-ingly consent to follow such laws, and in so

doing lose no autonomy. Indeed, one enacts vent it. The verbal outbursts seen in Tou-rette’s syndrome provide a classic example ofautonomy through such higher order, reflec-

tive commitments. For Dworkin, Benson, an impersonally caused behavior.DeCharms (1968) extended Heider’s work,Pritchard, and others, in fact, autonomy en-

tails endorsement of one’s actions at the high- arguing that even intentional or personallycaused actions are not always experienced asest order of reflection.

These philosophical perspectives have di- self-regulated. In fact, he argued, people oftenperform intentional actions precisely becauserect application to clinical phenomena from

obsessive compulsive disorders to schizophre- they feel pressured or coerced to do so. A par-ent makes the child go to his room, or a bossnia. In many forms of severe psychopathology

persons experience their behavior as being demands that a worker do some task. De-Charms thus proposed a distinction withindriven by forces beyond their control and with

which they do not concur. Similarly, in many Heider’s global category of personal causa-tion. Some intentional acts, he argued, are ac-behavioral problems, from acting out to bu-

limia, persons often complain that they cannot companied by an internal perceived locus ofcausality (I-PLOC) in which the self is per-help but in engage in a behavior, even though

they do not “want” to (see Ryan et al., 1995; ceived to be the origin of action and thus theaction is autonomous. Others are character-Shapiro, 1981).

Although these traditions seem disparate ized by an external perceived locus of causal-ity (E-PLOC), in which forces outside the selffrom empirical psychology, they have none-

theless gained entrance to it through the attri- are perceived to be the cause of the action. In


deCharms’ terms, the person is a pawn when cally, one can be a pawn not only with respectto other people but also with respect to con-the PLOC is external.

These two types of self-attributions regard- trolling forces within one’s personality. Onecan be as coerced or controlled by oneself (or,ing intentional actions are exemplified in

manifold everyday occurrences. Think of a more technically, by forces within oneself) asby others. This is the case, for example, withgirl who intentionally engages in cooperative

play in her classroom. In one scenario she adherence to ego involvements (deCharms,1968; Nicholls, 1984; Ryan, 1982), introjectsfeels compelled to do so by social pressure

from the teacher, who disapproves of nonco- (Meissner, 1981; Perls, 1973; Ryan & Con-nell, 1989), or other rigid standards (Kuhl,operation. Here, her “cooperative” sharing of

toys or taking turns would not, phenomenally, 1996; Shapiro, 1981) in which internalized,but poorly integrated, regulations are experi-emanate from her self. Instead, she would ex-

perience herself as a pawn. In a second sce- enced as controls that are external (or alien)to the self. They thus have an E-PLOC. Simi-nario, she willingly cooperates and views

such play as an expression of herself. Here, larly, one would have either an external or im-personal PLOC when internal desires, driveshe would feel herself to be the origin of her

actions. This contrast represents nothing less states, or impulses control action without self-endorsement. In such cases, people often re-than the distinction between alienated and

fully volitional forms of behavior—a contrast port feeling “out of control.” Again, this phe-nomenal construct applies to multiple formsrelevant to every behavioral domain.

DeCharms stated that people have a “pri- of psychopathology that entail behaviors char-acterized by an E-PLOC (see Ryan et al.,mary motivational propensity” to be origins

of behavior and indeed are “constantly strug- 1995).The PLOC construct of Heider and de-gling against being confined and constrained

by external forces—against being moved Charms offers an operational route into thestudy of agency and autonomy. By instantiat-about like a pawn” (1968, p. 273). Being an

origin versus a pawn can be viewed as a con- ing conditions that add salience to externalforces or reasons for acting (such as control-tinuum (Ryan & Connell, 1989). As de-

Charms stated, “a person feels more like an ling rewards, threats, or pressuring evalua-tions) experimental researchers beginning withOrigin under some circumstances and more

like a Pawn under others” (1968, p. 274). Ad- Deci (1971) have been able to facilitate shiftsin PLOC from internal to external, thus induc-ditionally, unlike behaviorally inclined attri-

bution theorists (e.g., Bem, 1967), deCharms ing the functional experience of being a pawn.With this shift in PLOC comes a variety ofheld the view that knowledge of one’s relative

autonomy need not be derived from taking motivational deficits, such as reductions inself-initiation, creativity, and task persistenceoneself as an object of social perception. It

can instead be directly known, an aspect of (Amabile, 1996; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lep-per & Greene, 1978; Ryan, Koestner, & Deci,personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). Typi-

cally, we need not infer self-motivation from 1991). Conversely, conditions that facilitatean I-PLOC (such as empathy, support for re-our behavior; we know when we have origi-

nated an action and when we have been co- flective choice, or nonevaluative feedback)enhance the quality and sometimes the quan-erced or pressured into an action precisely

because self-regulation is a different act, in- tity of motivation (e.g., Deci, Eghrari, Pat-rick, & Leone, 1994). The functional impactvolving different processes and different ex-

periences, from mere compliance or self-con- of the I-PLOC versus E-PLOC continuum hasalso been shown in numerous field studies introl. Indeed, even within the first 3 months

of age, infants appear to discriminate between classrooms (Ryan & Grolnick, 1986; Valle-rand & Bissonette, 1992), families (Grolnick,voluntary and involuntary actions; they seem

to know the difference between what is self- Deci, & Ryan, in press), workplaces (Deci,Connell, & Ryan, 1989), and clinical settingsversus non-self-initiated (Stern, 1985).

It is important to reiterate that, theoreti- (Ryan, Plant, & O’Malley, 1995; Williams et


al., 1996) among others. Specifically, these sents a primary behavioral manifestation ofthe organization process through which theeffects occur because of the relations between

an I-PLOC and the processes of intrinsic mo- organism endeavors to incorporate ever morecomplex aspects of the world into its own or-tivation and internalization to which we now

turn. ganization. In the context of a protective en-velope provided by caregivers, intrinsicallymotivated processes in infancy are typically

Autonomy as Developmental Process:fluid and wide ranging (Krapp, Hidi, & Ren-

Intrinsic Motivation and Internalizationninger, 1992), thus facilitating the acquisitionof diverse competencies, the discovery of spe-Organismic conceptions of human nature as-

sume an inherent tendency toward growth and cific talents, and the differentiation of inter-ests (Deci, 1975). Regarding subsequent de-assimilation. Perhaps no phenomenon illus-

trates the self-directed, organizationally ex- velopment, White (1963), Greenspan (1979),Harter (1983), and others have recognized thetending activity of life better than that of in-

trinsic motivation. Intrinsically motivated importance of intrinsic or effectance motiva-tion for the acquisition of social competenceactivities are those that occur for the inherent

satisfactions that accompany them and which, and for the overall process of personality de-velopment, including the exploration andtherefore, are not dependent for their occur-

rence on separable rewards or reinforcement. mastery of the internal worlds of impulse, fan-tasy, and drives. Elkind (1971), Hunt (1965),Intrinsically motivated actions are spontane-

ous and done for their own sake; they are au- and others similarly acknowledged the signifi-cance of intrinsic motivation for cognitivetotelic (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) and represent

the organism’s natural tendency to exercise growth. As Flavell (1977) argued, externalfactors may modify this “natural bent,” butand elaborate its capacities by taking interest

in and actively pursuing challenges in both they do not create it.Intrinsically motivated behaviors occur,the internal and external world (White, 1963;

H. Heckhausen, 1991; Deci & Ryan, 1985). however, only under certain conditions. As alarge body of literature now attests (see Con-Prototypical examples of intrinsic motivation

include play, exploration, and curiosity-ori- nell & Wellborn, 1990; Deci & Ryan, 1985;Deci, Ryan, & Williams, 1996; Koestner &ented behaviors.

Intrinsic motivation is pervasively evident McClelland, 1990; Lepper, Keavney, &Drake, 1996; Ryan, 1993), intrinsic motiva-in humans. In our healthiest states, we are in-

quisitive, playful, and active creatures. The tion tends to occur only when the person ex-periences an I-PLOC, perceived competence,renowned ethologist Lorenz (1955) applied to

humans the label Neugierwesen, or “curiosity and relational responsiveness and security. Inother words, any factors, whether they be increature,” in recognition of this robust pro-

pensity to learn. He also argued that humans the external environment or in the person, thatdetract from experienced autonomy, compe-were not alone in this tendency; the more

unspecialized a creature (i.e., the more wide- tence, or relatedness diminish intrinsicallymotivated behavior.ranged its potential niche), the more promi-

nent are its curiosity and exploratory tenden- Fitting with this formulation is the fact thata key element in the early development of in-cies. Lorenz and Leyhausen (1973), Polanyi

(1958), and other commentators have even trinsic motivation is the presence of a sensi-tive, contingently responsive caregiving ma-speculated that the “amount of knowledge”

inherent in the living system and the general trix (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,1978). Indeed, during the first few months ofdirection of evolution towards sentience may

be the result of the adaptive benefits of the life the establishment of a sense of self—ofbeing an internal locus of causality—is linkedexploratory tendency.

The phenomenon of intrinsic motivation is closely to how well caregivers support the na-scent intrinsic motivation of the infant. Thisof great significance for developmental out-

comes (Krapp, 1994; Ryan, 1993). It repre- support of spontaneous initiations is seem-


ingly an intrinsic feature of maternal behavior and field studies that intrinsic motivation isundermined by factors associated with feelingas well—an evolved intuitive interest and ca-

pacity to be in synchrony with the infant emo- controlled (e.g., surveillance, pressured evalu-ating, and the controlling use of rewards,tionally and behaviorally (Papousek & Pa-

pousek, 1987). Attachment researchers use punishments, and praise) or with feeling dis-connected (e.g., lack of empathy, care, or con-the term sensitivity to refer to this supportive,

contingently responsive style of relating to the cern) across domains as varied as sports, edu-cation, health care, and relationships, andchild. Bretherton (1987) for example de-

scribed sensitivity as “maternal respect for the across developmental periods from infancy toadulthood. It seems that when heteronomouschild’s autonomy.” Sensitivity entails the di-

rect and open responsiveness to the infant’s forces attempt to direct intrinsic motivation,the organism no longer wants to play.signals and initiations which gradually strength-

ens the sense of agency, coherence, and voli- It is also the case that the development ofintrinsic motivation depends upon an environ-tional competence. By contrast neglect and in-

trusive responding (i.e., lack of support for ment filled with optimal challenges or oppor-tunities to experience competence. Intrinsicrelatedness or autonomy) fail to strengthen

the inner sense of self, thus undermining the motivation flourishes only when challengesare optimal and feedback (whether task-inher-development and expression of self-regula-

tion, including the tendency toward intrinsi- ent or interpersonal) is positive or construc-tive. Tasks that are unchallenging or easycally motivated activity.

In our theoretical formulations, the early elicit boredom; those that are too difficultelicit either amotivation or anxiety (Csikszen-development of intrinsic motivation is viewed

as especially dependent upon autonomy sup- tmihalyi, 1975; Deci, 1975; Koestner &McClelland, 1990).port and relatedness from caregivers (Ryan,

1993). The child must experience responsive Danner and Lonky (1981) provided a clas-sic experimental demonstration of how oppor-supports for self-initiations in the context of a

secure connection to others. Thus, controlling tunities for both autonomy and optimal chal-lenge are linked to intrinsic motivation withinor neglecting caregivers lead to a fragmented

volitional organization and impoverished in- the domain of cognitive development. Theypreclassified children on a variety of Piagetiantrinsic motivation. In turn, these negative

effects on volitional organization can have tasks, and showed that when children were of-fered a variety of task levels in a “free choice”cascading influences on the subsequent de-

velopment of both intellectual and social framework (i.e., a circumstance conducive toan I-PLOC) they chose tasks that stretchedcompetence and, through them, on overall

adjustment. Numerous studies support the their current range of skills. Yet, as predictedby cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan,connection between controlling and unrespon-

sive parenting and deficits in intrinsic or mas- 1980), they further showed that children whowere extrinsically rewarded for task engage-tery motivation of infants and toddlers (e.g.,

Arend, Gove, & Sroufe, 1979; Egeland & ment (conducing toward an E-PLOC) insteadchoose tasks that were already within their es-Farber, 1984; Grolnick, Frodi, & Bridges,

1984; Morgan, Harmon, & Maslin–Cole, tablished range of skills. This illustrates howthe intrinsically motivated elaboration of ex-1990). Less studied are the irradiating effects

of these motivation deficits on subsequent de- isting structures can often be diminished bycontrolling factors.velopment.

It is also important to note that the effects The theoretical link between intrinsic moti-vation and an I-PLOC is important to devel-of variations in supports for autonomy and re-

latedness on intrinsic or mastery motivation opmental theory in several respects. First, thefact that intrinsic motivation is manifest fromare not restricted to infancy, but continue

across the life span, and across different life the earliest moments of infancy, as evidencedin the spontaneous and active striving for ef-domains (Ryan et al., 1995; Vallerand, in

press). It has been found in both laboratory fects and responsiveness in one’s environ-


ment, suggests that the nascent core of the Kuhl & Kazen, 1994; Ryan & Connell, 1989).The preponderance of our daily activi-self-as-subject is also present from infancy. In

other words, the roots of the agentic self are ties—from work, to school, to family mainte-nance—are instrumental activities; they areprereflective, as recognized by some develop-

mentalists (e.g., Loevinger & Blasi, 1991; done not for their inherent satisfactions butbecause the outcomes they yield have value.Stern, 1985) and comparative biologists

(Slavin & Kreigman, 1992). This is consistent Such behaviors are classified as extrinsicallymotivated because they are done to attain con-with the view that the self, as an organizer of

action and an integrative center of experience, sequences separable from, or extrinsic to, theexperience of the activity itself. Thus, ais a natural endowment of the organism and

must be nurtured within a social context. woman may try to excel at work not becauseof the spontaneous sense of accomplishmentWhat becomes identified or understood as the

self of self-regulation is thus inexorably inter- but because she wants to acquire materialriches. A boy may do homework not for itstwined with that vital activity characterized by

interest, curiosity, and coordinated striving. inherent challenges but because he desires hisparents’ approval. A person may exercise notResearch on intrinsic motivation has helped

to identify specific social–environmental fac- for enjoyment or challenge but for health ben-efits. All of these represent examples of ex-tors that can facilitate versus diminish the ten-

dency toward organization within a variety of trinsic motivation.Although many theorists have assumeddevelopmental contexts. It thus contributes to

our understanding of differential rates of ac- that extrinsic motivation invariantly repre-sents heteronomously driven activity (e.g., de-tivity and growth, both within and between

domains of competency and behavior, and of Charms, 1968), this is not the case. Whilesome extrinsic activities are clearly coerced,phenomena such as decalage and “gaps” in

ego development (Ryan, 1995). By under- others are done choicefully and are groundedin self-accepted values and beliefs. For exam-standing the influences of interpersonal set-

tings on natural developmental processes we ple, a father may perform an activity that aidshis child (e.g., changing a diaper) because hecan achieve a fuller social psychology of cog-

nitive and personality development. It is this clearly see its importance and necessity forhis loved one. In this case, he would be doingunderstanding that is notoriously lacking from

most structural frameworks and that leads to the activity autonomously, for self-endorsedreasons, even though he is not intrinsicallythe tendency to view natural developmental

processes as being automatic (Broughton, motivated. This was the point so clearly madeby philosophers such as Pfander and Dworkin1987; Schroeder & Edelstein, 1991). The field

of developmental psychopathology particu- cited earlier, who argued that people can befully free in pursuing externally prompted ac-larly requires such analyses, insofar as iden-

tifying the effects of social conditions on de- tivities that, reflectively, have value and im-portance to the self.velopmental processes is one of its central

missions (Cicchetti, 1991). Of course, many extrinsically motivatedactivities are poorly assimilated to the self—that is, they are ambivalently valued and mo-

Internalizationtivated by forces such as guilt or shame thatare phenomenally “outside” (Ricoeur, 1966)The self-extension tendency represented by

intrinsic motivation is but one expression of the self. An extrinsically motivated (instru-mental) behavior can thus be regulated withautonomous regulation in development. A

second manifestation is a process referred to either an internal or an external PLOC(Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan, Connell, & Deci,as internalization, which is the tendency of in-

dividuals to assimilate into the realm of self- 1985). Put differently, extrinsic motivationvaries considerably in its relative autonomy orregulation those behaviors and values that are

extant in the social context and have been ex- the degree to which it is truly self-regulated.The concept of internalization describes aternally motivated (Deci & Ryan, 1985;


continuum reflecting the extent to which the one’s self-related beliefs and values. Inte-grated regulation thus represents actions withregulation of a behavior has been integrated

with the self versus the extent to which it has which one has not only identified but has alsomade congruent with one’s psychologicalremained anchored in and determined by het-

eronomous forces. needs and other identifications.When a regulation has been integrated, in-Figure 1 depicts this continuum, which has

been variously modeled by different research- ternalization has been completed as a mani-festation of the fundamental developmentalers (e.g., Chandler & Connell, 1987; Kuhl &

Kazen, 1994; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Shel- process of organismic integration (Deci &Ryan, 1985). Koestner and Losier (1996) ex-don & Kasser, 1995; Vallerand, in press). At

the left of the figure are actions over which panded on this in their research on reflectiveautonomy, described in terms of the processesone feels no personal control—those that we

label amotivated (Deci, 1980) and that Heider by which one fully considers interests, needs,and outside influences in a nonreactive ap-(1958) described as being associated with the

perception of impersonal causation. As one praisal of behavioral options. Kuhl and Fuhr-mann (in press) recently described a similarmoves into the realm of personal causation,

which requires the perception of control over process of acting when one has accessed ho-listic self representations in the context of theoutcomes, the most heteronomous forms of

action are externally regulated. Although in- action. However described, it is this syntheticprocess in which one compares the “fit” oftentionally done, externally regulated activi-

ties are directly controlled by forces outside potential actions with self-related beliefs, val-ues, and needs that is involved in integratedthe person (usually through contingent re-

wards and punishments). By contrast, intro- self-regulation.At the right side of Figure 1 is intrinsicjected regulation represents behavior per-

formed because of a press within the person motivation, which shares the quality of auton-omy with integrated regulation, but is differ-to gain approval or avoid disapproval from

oneself or from generalized others. With in- ent in that integrated regulation is a form ofextrinsic motivation that is performed becausetrojected regulation, it is as if one part of the

personality were attempting to control other of its personal importance to the individual,whereas intrinsic motivation is performed be-parts (Perls, 1973) by highlighting well an-

chored standards adopted from others or by cause the activity itself is interesting.The relations of this continuum with devel-using threats of guilt or shame. Introjected

controls are thus regulations that are within opmental psychopathology are manifold.Amotivation has been directly linked to anxi-the person, but nonetheless are experienced

phenomenally as external to the self. Further- ety and depressive outcomes, marked as it iswith a perceived absence of control over de-more, introjection often entails the “as if” be-

lief that the values underlying one’s action are sired outcomes (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1987;Strauss & Ryan, 1987). External regulationone’s own (Rogers, 1963). Kuhl and Kazen

(1994), for example, showed how introjection has clear relationships with conduct disordersand social adjustment difficulties insofar ascan involve self-infiltration, in which one

misattributes to oneself goals that have actu- the only motivation at work herein is that ofavoiding punishment or gaining rewards (Ryanally been assigned by others.

A yet more fully internalized, and there- et al., 1995). In a sense, external regulation(the only kind of regulation recognized by op-fore more autonomous, form of extrinsic mo-

tivation is represented by identified regula- erant theory) represents a failure of internal-ization. Introjection is associated with a vari-tion, in which the individual consciously

accepts the value of the activity and assents ety of disorders of an intrapunitive sort, aswell as difficulties with self-esteem, stress,to it as being personally important. Finally,

the most autonomous form of extrinsic moti- and the potential for somatization (e.g., Ryan,Rigby, & King, 1993). Finally, identifica-vation is integrated regulation, wherein identi-

fications are coordinated within the totality of tions, while they have many advantages over

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less internalized forms of regulation, can still mental capacities if it is to be internalized ina way that facilitates relative autonomy andbe poorly integrated with one another and

pose developmental constraints. Thus, the a sense of social competency. In short, likeintrinsic motivation proper, the integration ofanalysis of how one regulates behavior is inti-

mately connected with the more holistic con- extrinsic regulations depends upon opportuni-ties to experience autonomy (freedom fromcept of mental health (Ruble & Thompson,

1992; Ryan, 1995). excessive control), relatedness (involvementand belongingness), and competence (con-Just as intrinsic motivation requires con-

textual nutriments, the natural tendency to in- quering of optimal challenges).We have examined the self-determinationternalize and integrate extrinsic regulations is

dependent upon particular contextual sup- model of parenting in several settings andwith varied methodologies. For example, inports. In fact, we suggest that the tendency to

integrate socially prescribed regulations can one study (Deci, Driver, Hotchkiss, Rob-bins, & Wilson, 1993) mothers and their 5- toitself be thought of as being an intrinsically

motivated process, and therefore, like other 6-year-old children were videotaped in a freeplay situation with a target activity. Chil-intrinsically motivated processes, it requires

supports for autonomy, competence, and re- dren’s intrinsic motivation for the activity wasmeasured at the end of that play period, andlatedness in order to operate robustly (Deci &

Ryan, 1985, 1991). Environments that are ex- mothers’ vocalizations were subsequently an-alyzed in terms of autonomy support versuscessively controlling, for example, are ex-

pected to forestall internalization, fixating control. Results showed that when motherswere more autonomy supportive in these in-regulation at external or introjected styles. A

child who is highly controlled by parents will, teractions their children displayed greater in-trinsic motivation. In another study, Grolnickat best, introject their demands and thus not

experience an I-PLOC for the compliant be- and Ryan (1989) extensively interviewed par-ents regarding their styles of care and disci-havior (Grolnick et al., in press). Excessive

controls can also lead to less internalization pline, and then examined both teacher andchild reports concerning the child’s motiva-of parental values and more peer-oriented so-

cialization (Fuligni & Eccles, 1993). Simi- tion in school. Parents who used more auton-omy-supportive techniques of socializationlarly, a child who is detached from parents

(i.e., lacks a sense of relatedness) will likely had children who reported a greater I-PLOCfor doing schoolwork, performed better, andfail to fully internalize their values and regu-

lations (Ryan & Lynch, 1989; Ryan, Stiller, & were viewed by teachers as more self-moti-vated and competent. In addition, positive pa-Lynch, 1994). By contrast, autonomy support

conduces toward more active assimilation and rental involvement (i.e., the conveyance ofrelatedness) also contributed to greater inter-identification with parental values and regula-

tions, and toward a greater experience of au- nalization. Thus, supports for both autonomyand relatedness were associated with children’stonomy when acting on these identifications

(Grolnick et al., in press; Ryan & Stiller, more autonomous engagement in school.Similar results attesting to the association1991).

Finally, the practices that parents or cul- between internalization processes and sup-ports for autonomy, competence, and related-tures demand must be calibrated to the exist-

ing competencies of the child if full integra- ness have been obtained in studies rangingover diverse domains including educationtion is to occur. Demands for an action whose

basis cannot yet be grasped or understood be- (e.g., Connell & Wellborn, 1990; Vallerand &Bissonette, 1992), health care (Williams et al.,cause of cognitive immaturity could at best be

introjected, as when parents demand sharing 1996), religion (Ryan et al., 1993; Strahan,1995), and work (Deci, Connell, & Ryan,behaviors from a 13-month-old child or ex-

pect social amenities to be exhibited by a 1989). Together they detail the specific fac-tors associated with variations in regulation,toddler. Social learning must occur at an opti-

mally challenging pace relative to develop- from external to self-regulation.


Autonomy, Internalization, and trolling methods of socialization, even if ac-companied by a sense of belongingness, areSocial Organizationexpected to foster introjection rather than inte-gration, and thus result in more ambivalentThe concept of internalization is critical to a

developmental analysis of extrinsic motiva- and less adjusted group members.The second broad consideration concernstion because it conveys how behaviors that

are originally socially transmitted can become the content of socialization. Some transmittedcontents are themselves inimical to the basicmore or less assimilated to the self of the indi-

vidual, and thereby become regulated in a rel- human needs for autonomy, competence, andrelatedness and, thus, even under optimal so-atively autonomous manner. Insofar as indi-

viduals are able to integrate the reasons for cializing conditions, would never be fully as-similated by group members (Ryan et al.,acting in accord with social prescriptions or

constraints, they can become more fully coor- 1996). Walker and Parmar (1993) recentlyprovided a provocative example of this indinated within groups and cultures without

experiencing alienation. Furthermore, as indi- their interviews with mothers who subjectedtheir daughters to a cultural practice of genitalviduals become more autonomous in carrying

out transmitted practices, they are in turn mutilation. The interviews revealed the regu-lation underlying this to be either heterono-helping the group or culture become more sta-

ble and integrated. mous (“we have to do this”) or introjected (“itis something we should do if we are to beCultures, groups, and families—indeed, all

social organizations—can themselves be char- accepted”). Similarly, socialized emotionalsuppression, (e.g., “men should never cry”)acterized in terms of how well their members

are coordinated or integrated. A stable social can also, at most, be partially assimilated tothe self because essential features of humanorganization is one whose members have

fully assimilated its rules and guidelines and nature are in conflict with such beliefs, at bothphysiological and psychological levels. Fi-who therefore experience transmitted social

practices as autonomous activities. By con- nally, Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) have in-vestigated the relations of various transmittedtrast, unstable social groups are characterized,

in part, by members who have only an exter- values common in market economies to psy-chological integration. They found that hold-nal or introjected basis for enacting transmit-

ted values. Internalization and integration ing very strong extrinsic aspirations con-sistently correlated with indicators of poortherefore represent mediating processes be-

tween the organization processes of the indi- psychological health, suggesting that they arenot, typically, well integrated motivations.vidual that yield greater self-regulation and

those at the level of the group that yield In sum, our view is that human behavioris quite plastic, but human autonomy is not.greater social cohesion (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, in

press; Leontiev, 1932; Ryan, 1995; Vygotski, Humans can be controlled to do almost any-thing, but when acting autonomously they are1978).

We offer two broad considerations for un- far from infinitely malleable (Ryan, 1993).This reflects our position that autonomy,derstanding the degree of volitional fit be-

tween individuals and the social groups whose which we view as a holistic expression of “na-ture in context,” will not result either fromnorms and values they must internalize. The

first concerns the process of socialization. As coercive forms of socialization or from trans-mitted practices or values that are inherentlyoutlined above, when socializing agents pro-

vide autonomy support and optimal chal- in conflict with basic psychological needs.Furthermore, when humans are autonomous,lenges and convey a sense of belongingness,

individuals will be more likely to internalize they are in touch with their true needs and areable to act in accord with them. Develop-and integrate regulations. These factors oper-

ate both synergistically and configurally to mental conditions that are pathogenic includethose that disrupt access to psychologicaldetermine the degree to which the process

of socialization succeeds. For example, con- needs and thus facilitate maladjustment and


misinformed goal structures (see Kuhl & by autonomy versus control would involvedifferent biological underpinnings. The rea-Fuhrmann, in press; Ryan, 1995).

One further note concerns the fact that “so- sons for this are straightforward. First, auton-omous regulation draws upon information thatcial organization” is itself neither a unified

structure nor a homogeneous influence. In is different from the information necessary forcontrolling regulation. Neural networks in-modern life, individuals typically participate

in multiple cultures, which in turn compete volved in self-regulatory processes are clearlyexperience-dependent, and thus may have dis-for the individual’s allegiance and complicate

the problem of integration (Gergen, 1993). tinct operating loci and dynamics. Specifi-cally, autonomous regulation requires greaterCoordinating one’s multiple identifications is

an organizational challenge with many ramifi- access to higher order reflective processes(Dworkin, 1988), holistic representations (Kuhlcations for mental health and well-being (Shel-

don & Kasser, 1995; Sheldon, Ryan, Raws- & Kazen, 1994), or the integrated set of feel-ings, desires, memories, values, and priorthorne, & Ilardi, in press).learnings that constitute the self (Deci &Ryan, 1991). For controlled regulation, how-

Neurobiology of Self-Regulationever, the actor’s task involves suppressing or

and Self-Controlinhibiting access to holistic representationsand instead focusing on control-relevant in-Within an organizational view, autonomy, or

any other behaviorally relevant process, must formation from the environment or its intro-jected structures. Second, autonomous versusbe related to the biological substrates through

which it operates and which it, in turn, influ- controlling regulatory processes have differ-ent means through which component systemsences. Yet, most theories concerned with au-

tonomy have traditionally avoided specific interact. In autonomy, there will be more co-operative involvement of relevant neurologi-linkages with biological mechanisms (Craw-

ford, 1987) as if a concern with mechanisms cal component systems than in controllingregulation where suppression of many compo-inevitably entails reductionism (Kuhl, 1996).

It is indeed the case that many neurobio- nents is necessary. With autonomy, for exam-ple, there would be less top-down inhibitionlogical models are reductionistic (Cicchetti &

Tucker, 1994), often axiomatically consider- than would be required to control oneself. Ac-cordingly, one would expect the processes ofing behavior and experience to be “accounted

for” by elemental, material- or efficient-causal neural activation to be different in self-regu-lated versus controlled goal pursuits.mechanisms that are said to operate in a uni-

directional, bottom-up manner. The essential Kuhl and Fuhrmann (in press), after re-viewing experimental and clinical evidencerole of higher order regulatory processes (e.g.,

the dynamic goal structures that lead one to regarding neurobiological mechanisms thatsubserve self- versus controlled regulation,initiate or sustain behaviors involving lower

order biological mechanisms) is neglected. have begun to describe a general model of thebiological and psychological processes inEqually problematic, however, has been the

corresponding tendency of many psychologi- these different types of regulation. They em-phasized the role of the prefrontal cortex ascal theorists to leave the physical organism

completely out of the picture, as if the higher the functional locus of executive or coordinat-ing functions that would be necessary for au-order determinants of action were uncon-

strained by the machinery of the brain. Orga- tonomous regulation. The prefrontal regionhas a rich network of both afferent and effer-nizational thought avoids both types of myo-

pia by recognizing that the regulatory processes ent connections with various systems of thebrain that are essential to the regulation of ac-underlying intentional action require a consid-

eration of both biological and psychological tion. Based on EEG and imaging data, Kuhland colleagues have inferred that the rightprocesses, as well as their interaction.

Regarding behavioral regulation, one should prefrontal cortex is highly activated in tasksrequiring broad self-relevant information (e.g.,expect that, in principle, actions characterized


Knight & Grabowecky, in press; Nakagawa, Fuhrmann, in press) theorize that activation ofautonomous self-regulation and the corre-1991), whereas it is inhibited in tasks requir-

ing the execution of simple, response disposi- sponding access to holistic self-representa-tions may be facilitated by increases in posi-tions (cf. Pribram & McGuiness, 1992). This

suggests then that the right prefrontal cortex tive, global, and long-lasting (i.e., tonic)affect (or decreases in comparable negativemay be particularly integral for autonomous

regulation. Kuhl and colleagues have identi- affect). Accordingly, when individuals are ex-posed to optimally challenging or personallyfied, for example, an inhibition effect, repre-

sented as slow positive potential shifts over meaningful situations an elevation in positive,tonic affect would facilitate the necessarythe prefrontal region for people with a high

“state orientation” (which is an individual dif- right prefrontal activity. In contrast, overlystressful situations can prompt elevation ofference involving a high level of controlled

regulation) when they are in stress inducing negative, global, and tonic affect, whichwould in turn inhibit the integrative processessituations (Haschke, Tennigheit, & Kuhl,

1994; Rosahl, Tennigheit, Kuhl, & Hascke, upon which such representations are depen-dent, particularly in individuals high in state1993). Similarly, they have cited research

showing that patients with lesions of the pre- orientation.The neurobiological mechanisms theorizedfrontal cortex often display severe deficits in

volitional control, even when intellectual and to underlie this affective globality are basedon slow-acting, subcortical, neuromodulatorymotor functions remain intact, and also that,

in stressful situations, individuals diagnosed networks that emanate from the brain stemand limbic system and have widespread ef-with a wide variety of psychiatric disorders

(which, presumably, involve diminished au- fects on cortical processes. This bottom-upmodulation can be reciprocally stabilized bytonomy) display greater attenuation of higher

order coordinating processes in the prefrontal the effects of top-down modulation that origi-nates in neocortical networks and influencescortex, relative to nondiagnosed controls (e.g.,

Knight, 1991; Luria, 1973). Taken together, the subcortical arousal systems. It is thereforepossible that the extended semantic networksthis research provides evidence, albeit prelim-

inary, that operation of the right prefrontal of the right prefrontal cortex that are neces-sary for integrated self-representations (Bee-cortex is integral to autonomous regulation.

The particular importance of right prefron- man et al., 1994; Derryberry & Tucker, 1991;Knight & Grabowecky, in press; Kuhl &tal cortical processing to autonomous regula-

tion is, according to Kuhl & Fuhrmann (in Fuhrmann, in press; Nakagawa, 1991) wouldalso help to stabilize positive emotional states.press), due to its being the locus of operation

of holistic self-representations. This region is Thus, for example, this top-down modulation(Luria, 1973) could account for individuals’involved in retrieval from episodic memory

(Nyberg, Cabeza, & Tulving, 1996), remote capacity to better recruit arousal and positiveaffect (e.g., interest) when they perceive anassociations (Beeman et al., 1994, Nakagawa,

1991), and making judgments or decisions activity to be meaningful in terms of the inte-grated set of needs, values, and affects thatabout emotional preferences (Damasio, Tra-

nel, & Damasio, 1991), all of which involve represent self. Conversely, environmental stress-ors may have substantial impact on brainstemthe type of semantic networks that are neces-

sary for access to holistic self information. neuromodulatory systems, sensitizing activitycontrol systems and behavioral reactivity,Because autonomous self-regulation entails

formulating intentions by processing informa- such that such integrative cognitions are cir-cumvented (see also Cicchetti & Tucker, 1994).tion about one’s current organismic state in

relation to holistic self-representations (i.e., The experience of autonomy, which in-volves knowing that one’s behavior originatedthe integrated self), this reasoning also argues

for the right prefrontal cortex being involved with the integrated self, could, accordingly, beexplained in terms of a feed-forward signalin such regulation.

Kuhl and colleagues (Kuhl, 1996; Kuhl & emanating from processes in the right prefron-


tal cortex. In other words, positive, tonic af- self-infiltration, and unwanted ruminations(Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994; Kuhl & Kazen,fective states could function as experiential

markers associated with regulation involving 1994). However, autonomous activity promptedby involved, autonomy-supportive parentingthe semantic networks of holistic self-repre-

sentation (Damasio et al., 1991). could initiate downward regulation of thisemotionality which would to some extentIt is important to recognize that only the

global, tonic type of affect (as opposed to lo- counteract the anxiety, a process that has beendescribed on both the phenomenological (Freud,cal, phasic affect) can have a substantial mod-

ulatory impact in either an upward or down- 1927/1962) and neurobiological levels (Bischof,1993; Luiten et al., 1985). Because of the an-ward direction, because phasic affect cannot

reach the wide neocortical networks theorized tagonism between negative emotionality andthe integrated processing involved in autono-to contribute to self-representations and self-

regulation. Although speculative, such models mous activity, autonomy-supportive parent-ing, which provides comfort and security incould help to explain the developmental sig-

nificance of involved, autonomy-supportive stressful situations, is essential for children todevelop the ability to maintain access to inte-parental styles discussed earlier. The positive

emotional exchange resulting from autonomy- grated self-representations in such situations.In threatening situations when negativesupportive parenting (Cohn & Tronick, 1987;

Grolnick et al., in press; Keller & Gauda, emotionality is not attenuated by autonomousactivity, it would be necessary for greater use1987; MacDonald, 1992; Papousek & Pa-

pousek, 1987) involves participation of right- of downward inhibition, which is a costly top-down strategy for deactivation of competinghemispheric cortical and subcortical systems

that participate in global, tonic emotional tendencies (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, in press). In-deed, as we have mentioned, introjected con-modulation (Wittling, 1990) and of the broad

semantic networks that are necessary for the trol (as opposed to self-regulation) is charac-terized by a “shutting off” of subcognitiverepresentation of warm, autonomy-supportive

social interactions (Beeman et al., 1994; Knight systems and their efferent feedback to the pre-frontal cortex. Kuhl (1996) argued that the& Grabowecky, in press; Nakagawa, 1991).

In sum, warm, autonomy-supportive social in- breakdown in goal maintenance (i.e., theakrasia) so often associated with introjectedteractions may facilitate the integration of

positive emotionality in ever more complex or controlled regulation is partially explainedby the difficulties entailed in effecting suchrepresentations of the relation of self to oth-

ers. The facilitating effect that positive emo- inhibition.We have argued that people will at timestionality has for gaining access to integrated

self-representations (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, in autonomously self-regulate and at times beself-controlling because different social con-press) could therefore be understood in terms

of the early integration of positive emotional- texts conduce toward different regulatory pro-cesses. However, individuals can also developity with extended semantic networks that rep-

resent needs, values, and other self-related chronic tendencies to execute behavior in onemode versus the other. Deci and Ryan (1985)meanings.

In addition to being a developmental pre- used the concept of autonomous and con-trolled causality orientations to capture thiscursor to self-integrated positive emotionality,

autonomy-supportive parenting could facili- distinction, and Kuhl and Fuhrmann (in press)proposed the concept of action orientation andtate development of the ability to cope with

negative emotionality elicited by threats and state orientation to convey a somewhat relateddistinction. It is interesting to speculate hownonoptimal challenges in the environment. As

mentioned, Kuhl and Fuhrmann (in press) such individual differences in regulatory stylesdevelop, especially those associated with psy-proposed that unattenuated negative emo-

tionality inhibits access to integrated self- chopathology (Ryan et al., 1995). One set ofsociogenetic speculations suggests that chil-representations resulting in the symptoms of

controlled regulation, including alienation, dren exposed to cold, controlling, or other


aversive developmental contexts may adapt to selective advantages or enhance inclusive fit-ness, this sensitivity would not be a commontheir circumstances with neural inhibition of

processes necessary for self-regulation, and in characteristic in individuals across widelyvarying cultures and developmental epochs.so doing gain enhanced capabilities for detect-

ing external cues related to threats, controls, To address this issue we separately considerthe adaptive significance of intrinsic motiva-or stressors (Kuhl, 1984). Given the self-regu-

latory deficits of children exposed to neglect tion (which is invariantly autonomous) andthe tendency to integrate extrinsic motivationor abuse (e.g., Shields, Cicchetti, & Ryan,

1995) there is considerable value in under- to the self (which yields autonomy).standing the neural as well as psychologicalprocesses underlying their adaptation.

Intrinsic motivationOur brief discussion of the possible neuro-

biological aspects of autonomy is not in- The adaptive advantages of intrinsic motiva-tion are most obvious for organisms facingtended to be comprehensive or definitive.

Rather, it offers some preliminary findings changing circumstances or environments (Lo-renz & Leyhausen, 1973). Curiosity plays aand some speculative extrapolations that may

relate to the biology of autonomy in order to critical role in the acquisition of diverse adap-tive competencies (Piaget, 1971; White, 1963)highlight the conceptual point that self-regula-

tion is a biological, as well as a psychological, and therefore enhances capacities to cope withunforeseen challenges. As J. Heckhausen (1995)phenomenon. In essence, that means nothing

more than that autonomy is a descriptor of the recently argued, diversity provides the “rawmaterial” upon which unprecedented develop-fact that real, living, material entities engage

in behaviors that vary in the degree to which mental advancements and adaptations aremade. The seeking of new challenges and thethey are self-determined, as a function of en-

during dispositions, biological supports, and pursuit of novel interests also help the indi-vidual avoid the high risks of too narrow aperceptions of social contexts. There is noth-

ing antithetical about mechanistic models of specialization (Heckhausen & Schultz, 1995).By the same token, intrinsic motivation pro-the brain processes that subserve autonomous

regulation, so long as one does not mistake motes not only widespread exploration butalso increased differentiation and refinementthem for complete accounts of the central, ex-

ecutive function which is subject to influences of specific skills (Deci, 1975). A relativelyunexplored issue is the role of intrinsic moti-and constraints from higher order as well as

lower order processes. vation with respect to genetic predispositionstoward strong interests or specific talents. In-trinsic motivation may play a critical role in

Autonomy as Evolved Capacity:facilitating the discovery of, and selective in-

Sociobiological Foundationsvestment in, such areas, and in so doing aidthe expression of individual genetic variabil-An organismic viewpoint on autonomy, to

provide a full account of the concept, must ity, which is an important aspect of selectiveprocesses in evolution. Intrinsic motivation,consider not only the ontogenesis and social

psychology of autonomy but also the basis by then, in the most general sense, yields selec-tive advantages by supplying a built-in or nat-which such a central process of behavioral in-

tegration might have evolved as a species at- ural motor for the acquisition of competenciesand knowledge (White, 1963).tribute. Minimally, this would entail consider-

ing the selective advantages that the capacity It is important to reiterate, however, thatpeople do not, from a phenomenologicalfor autonomy might yield, but ideally it would

also consider why humans evolved so as to viewpoint, explore or play because it is adap-tive. They do so because it feels fun and vital-possess both a phenomenological sensitivity

to the difference between autonomous and izing. Nonetheless, organisms that can find in-herent pleasure in exercising and expandingheteronomous states and a preference for the

former. Clearly, if autonomy does not provide their functioning may simply be more likely


to do so, suggesting that the positive feelings regulations and thereby anchor themselveswithin it. Insofar as cultural evolution, whichof vitality and interest that attend intrinsic

motivation may themselves be selectively operates by its own transformational laws(Durham, 1990), results in institutional valuesevolved features of human nature. The selec-

tive advantages conferred by being intrinsi- or regulatory practices that enhance an indi-vidual’s inclusive fitness, then having a robustcally motivated are thus the likely distal

causes of its selection as a salient species at- tendency to internalize would be advanta-geous to a social animal.tribute, even though such advantages are sel-

dom the proximal reasons why such behaviors In some ways, a readiness to introjectmight alone serve some of these adaptiveare performed in daily life. A further caveat

is that, although intrinsic motivation is perva- functions. Clearly, introjection helps an indi-vidual to appear coordinated with the group,sive in humans, primates, and other species

with protracted postnatal development, it is which in social animals has adaptive benefits(Hamilton, 1975; Tivers, 1971). False inter-not an attribute shared equally by all living

forms (Wilson, 1975). Specifically, some spe- nalizations or self-infiltrations (Kuhl & Ka-zen, 1994) would exemplify this tendencycies are hatched more or less fully developed

and their survival depends less on acquired because they represent a way that people de-ceive themselves and, as a result, are less de-knowledge than on a functional design well

fit for their niche. Such species show less ten- tectable as outgroup members (Alexander,1982). However, we argue that functionallydency toward intrinsic motivation (Lorenz &

Leyhausen, 1973). well assimilated, centrally coordinated regula-tion of behavior—namely regulation throughintegration—is associated with less fraction-

Internalizationated functioning, less need for inhibition ofcompeting tendencies, and therefore smoother,Processes of internalization are critical at

many levels of functioning, biological as well less costly performance than regulatory pro-cesses based on introjection or compartmen-as psychological (Edelman, 1987; Magnus-

son, 1992). However, the specific tendency to talized identifications. Integration, when pos-sible, is simply more efficient and effective,integrate to the self socially transmitted regu-

lations may afford particularly compelling so the preference for autonomy may haveevolved as a bootstrapping incentive for gen-functional advantages for creatures with a

protracted developmental course. Internaliza- erating these more adaptive modes of func-tioning. Furthermore, evidence is emergingtion with regard to behavioral regulations en-

hances the fit of the individual within a social that more integrated regulatory functioningmay be associated with a number of healthniche, which may have importance for pur-

poses of both protection and inclusion. An in- and energy benefits, including less risky be-haviors and greater energy (e.g., Ryan &cluded member benefits from reciprocal altru-

ism within the group and gains access to Frederick, in press; Williams, Deci, & Ryan,in press). Finally, the integration of behavioralresources, including mates (Tivers, 1971). In-

ternalization also has implications for compe- regulations provides an individual the free-dom of functioning that permits purposefultency, as internalized regulations function to

anticipate social situations and challenges and activity aimed at need satisfaction and sur-vival while at the same time participating ac-thus may result in greater efficacy.

Internalization processes also serve the tively as a member of the group. Integrationmeans the individual is a member of theaims of the social organization. They repre-

sent an instance of vertical coactions (Gott- group without being subjugated by it: The Iidentifies with the We.lieb, 1992) between the social organization

(e.g., a cultural subgroup) and the individuals’ And what about the phenomenal feeling ofautonomy? We have argued, along with de-developing personality structure. Clearly, a

social organization can coordinate its mem- Charms (1968), that people typically haveboth direct personal knowledge of being anbers only if they are prepared to take on its


origin versus pawn and a great sensitivity to be centrally coordinated and endorsed haveevolved precisely because they provide signif-the functional significance of environmental

events with regard to their own autonomy icant selective advantages. That is, autonomy(i.e., top-down influences based on integrated(Deci & Ryan, 1985). Further, philosophers

and writers have perennially been occupied representations of a variety of needs and pro-pensities of the organism) provides a func-with the meaning of such issues as freedom

and control, attesting to the prominence of au- tional basis for satisfaction of multiple chal-lenges and constraints in a comprehensivetonomy as an experiential issue. How might

this sensibility regarding autonomy have way. Autonomy enables the organism to iden-tify actions that provide optimal satisfactionevolved and/or conveyed adaptive advantage?

First, being able to detect autonomous ver- of its needs.In sum, the need for autonomy, like thesus heteronomous origins of action is an im-

portant means through which the organism need for relatedness (e.g., Baumeister &Leary, 1995; Ryan, 1995), is a deeply func-can keep from having its needs or aims sub-

verted by authorities or “parasites.” If behav- tional propensity. Although these considera-tions of adaptive advantage are neither com-ior were easily entrained by outside agents

without ready detection, organisms would be plete nor definitive, they suggest that anevolutionary account of autonomy need not beat great risk for being used by others. Thus

the sense of knowing whether one is an origin incompatible with ontogentic and social-psy-chological analyses.versus pawn and being sensitive to the func-

tional significance (Deci & Ryan, 1985) ofexternal inputs has an important cuing func-

Autonomy as Central Construct in Studytion with potential adaptive value. An addi-

of Developmental Psychopathologytional and perhaps more important advantage,from a selective standpoint, derives from the Throughout this paper we have suggested that

both phenomenological and functional ac-fact that individuals vary considerably in theircharacteristic propensities and attributes. Phe- counts of psychopathology implicate disturb-

ances of autonomy and integration. For exam-notypically expressed variability is the basisby which evolutionary selection processes op- ple, many internalizing disorders entail a

sense of being controlled by introjects orerate (Alexander, 1982). It has therefore beenargued that an aspect of the functional design compelled toward certain standards, whether

reachable or not. Externalizing disorders, onof the psyche which would be universallyadaptive is some process through which the the other hand, often involve failures of inter-

nalization and/or a sense of being unable toindividual’s expression of unique attributescould be known, integrated, and maximally control impulses or desires. Failures of inter-

nalization, as in amotivation and external reg-employed in the pursuit of inclusive fitness(Slavin & Kreigman, 1992). The organismic ulation, can be similarly related to global

types of pathology, such as depression andintegrative process through which this occursis precisely what allows autonomous action. conduct disorder, respectively. For these rea-

sons a plethora of clinicians have placed dis-Thus, there are multiple reasons why the sen-sitivity to being an origin versus pawn, which turbances of autonomy at the heart of both

mental illness and social alienation (e.g.,supports the general function of self-regula-tion, may have evolved. Bruch, 1973; Jahoda, 1958; Kuhl & Beck-

mann, 1994; Lerner, 1988; Meissner, 1981;In our view, the capacity for autonomy,which includes the ability to self-direct be- Ryan et al., 1995; Shapiro, 1981).

Our organismic view of autonomy has sug-haviors in uncharted directions, is itself a bio-logical feature of the human psyche. The gested several reasons for the broad sig-

nificance of autonomy in both optimal andtendencies to be intrinsically motivated, to in-ternalize and integrate external regulations, nonoptimal developmental outcomes. First,

autonomy represents a “deep structure” in theand, more generally, to have what one does


evolved design of the human psyche (Slav- greater relative autonomy at various stages ofdevelopment is associated with multiple as-in & Kreigman, 1992). Its disruption is there-

fore likely, from a psychological perspective, pects of optimized personal functioning, cross-ing both cognitive and social domains, andto have a broad array of effects. Second, au-

tonomy is a central feature of the processes studies of the contexts surrounding such opti-mal functioning have told us much about fa-through which individuals get their needs met

(Ryan, 1995). People lacking autonomy can- cilitating factors that contribute to growth andwell-being. Conversely, the study of disruptednot access the holistic knowledge necessary to

identify what they need (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, self-regulation informs the study of auton-omy, not only in terms of the mechanismsin press), so they are vulnerable to falling vic-

tim to goals and aims that actually detract through which it operates, and the contextualrisk factors that can undermine its develop-from development and health (e.g., Sheldon &

Kasser, 1996; Ryan et al., 1996). Finally, the ment, but also the multiple systems upon whichit is dependent and in which it is implicated.etiological factors associated with deficits in

autonomous functioning are wide ranging, Historically, autonomy has been consid-ered by some to be a transcendent humanand include genetic, neurobiological, psycho-

logical, and social variables. quality, and by others a mere epiphenomenonthat is reducible to lower order mechanisms.Because autonomy is a broad develop-

mental process that can be disrupted or facili- An organizational view renders neither ofthese alternatives viable. Instead, within thetated by multiple types of factors operating on

different levels of analysis, variations in it organismic paradigm, autonomy is a naturalphenomenon with corporeal and mental mani-will have wide-ranging irradiating impact

both temporally and functionally. For exam- festations. Autonomy is not an irreduciblephilosophical concept but rather an empiri-ple, disruptions in the early development of

autonomy can be expected to have cascading cally definable construct concerning the pro-cesses through which behavioral propensitieseffects, with implications not only for cogni-

tive and emotional regulation but also for the are coordinated, regulated, and unified in ac-tion and experience. Autonomy does not rep-acquisition of social competencies and identi-

ties. Equally so, disruptions of cognitive ca- resent a freedom from determinants but ratheran attunement and alignment of the organismpacities or their neurobiological underpin-

nings can impact upon autonomous regulation, toward some determinants rather than others.Viewed in this way it makes sense that auton-as we have detailed, and even upon the social

environmental treatment of the individual, omy would be reflected in distinct types ofbrain functioning and distinct types of experi-which in turn affects the further development

of autonomy in and across life domains. This ence and would emerge robustly only in thepresence of specific social nutriments. Fi-is only to say that autonomy, like any other

broad developmental line subserving growth nally, autonomy is itself not simply a humanattribute but one with a deep history amongand adaptation, is deeply embedded in multi-

casual networks which require equally multi- living systems. Self-regulating humans canthus be viewed as members of an evolvingfaceted conceptual models to be understood.

The organizational viewpoint espoused by de- social species that has a deeply structuredpsychological need to be the origin of behav-velopmental psychopathogists (e.g., Cic-

chetti & Cohen, 1995; Cicchetti & Tucker, ior and that can, under very specific condi-tions, synthesize new ways of behaving and,1994) seems particularly apt for this task.

Nonetheless, the study of autonomy and its at times, even envision and construct a betterenvironment for meeting their needs. How-relations to psychopathology will entail a con-

tinual interplay between investigation of ever, under conditions of need deprivation,organic perturbation, or deleterious culturalhealthy individuals and of those who manifest

various forms of developmental psychopath- demands, self-regulation can be undermined,resulting in diverse forms of psychopathology.ology. A plethora of studies have shown that


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