Ramos vs Dir. of Lands39 Phil 175, Gr. No. 13298, Nov 19, 1982Facts:One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryRamos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblevirtual law Issue: The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?Ruling:The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. (Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smithvs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the general rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWe hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryJudgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryArellano, C.J., TorreRepublic vs. CA and Karantes125 SCRA 476, Gr. No. L-56984, September 30, 1987REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest Development and the Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING PIRASO, Respondents.Facts:"It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by the late Salming Piraso and later by his successors-in- interest, who are his children for a period of more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown to have a registerable title on the property which the Court therefore confirms and affirms in accordance with the law. Let the land so described in the technical description of the survey made of the same and in accordance with the corresponding plan be so registered." (p. 50, Rollo)On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of Salming Piraso filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287, covering the following described propertyOn January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for registration stating, among others:jgc:c"That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to said parcel of land the same not having been acquired by them either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;"That the whole area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217, dated February 16, 1929;"That the area sought to be registered is neither released for disposition nor alienation; and that the herein applicant has no registerable title over the whole parcel of land either in fact or in law." (p. 14, Rollo)hanrobles.com.ph]Issue:1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve;Ruling:It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land by the applicants prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and Forester Zapatero support the contention of the petitioner that the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case of Ramos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph"Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on Forestry matters."cralaw virtua1aw libraryThere is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court that the property in question was no longer part of the public land when the Government through the Director of Lands approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan (Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch plan of real property even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no proof in itself of ownership of the land covered by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor has a sketch plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of land which forms part of the countrys forest reserves does not convert such land into alienable land, much less private property. Assuming that a public officer erroneously approves the sketch plan, such approval is null and void. There must first be a formal Government declaration that the forest land has been re-classified into alienable and disposable agricultural land which may then be acquired by private persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural lands.chanrobles.com : virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the land registration court which granted the private respondents application for registration of the land in question is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for land registration is DISMISSED.Heirs of Amunategui vs. Dir. of Forestry125 SCRA 69, Gr. No. L-127873, November 29, 1983Facts:Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.Issue:whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.Ruling:The petition is without merit.A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibraryWHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.Republic vs. Naguit Gr. No. 134209 January 24, 2006Facts:This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.Issue:whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.Ruling:Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act[7]and the Constitution[8]classifying lands of the public domain intoagricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks, do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,[10]which embodies theRegalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[11]All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State.[12]Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.[13]Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the courtHere, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.[18]Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.[19]It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.[20]For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.[21]The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.[22]WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTEDand the assailed decision datedMay 29, 1998of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for original registration of title inLand Registration Case No. N-25-1of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, isDENIED.No costs.De Ocampo vs. ArlosGr. No. 135527, October 19, 2000Facts:On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three parcels of land, Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed the application for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the government through sales patents.The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.Issue:Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753 entitled, Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo, et al., wherein the validity and legality of petitioners TCT No. T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the land in dispute were upheld.Ruling:Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967from Bernardo and ArsenioObdin,[12]who in turn had been in possession of the property since 1947. Hence, when the former filed their application for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said parcels of land for at least 30 years, as required by the Public Land Act.We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains toalienablelands of the public domain.[13]Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073[14]clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.[15]Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subject property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement. This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Act, which provideas follows:SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working-men's village and other improvements for the public benefit.SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-alienable andshall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied.)In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show entitlement to the land. They have not established that they are the rightful owners of the property; or at least, that they, not petitioners, have a better right thereto.Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were fraudulently obtained by petitioners, who have allegedly failed to prove the requisite actual occupation of the land in question. The former cite several portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, showing that the latter have not actually occupied or cultivated the property.The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual averments would be improper in this Decision. If petitioners Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulently obtained, the suit to recover the disputed property should be filed by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. Since petitioners titles originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.[20]At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that respondents have no personality to recover the property, because they have not shown that they are the rightful owners thereof.WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTEDand the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court areREVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs.Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for a possible review, in its sound discretion, of the issuance of the Sales Patents and Certificates of Titles in the name of herein petitioners.G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,Petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, Respondent.Facts:The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryOn December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryOn August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253), to declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and voidab initioand to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIssue:Whether or not the free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol validRuling:When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. A patent is void at lawif the officer who issued the patent had no authority to doso (Knight vs. Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)chanrobles virtuPublic land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707, May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act, the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryFOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, and that of September 29, 1973, denying the motion for its reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No. 1253 of the respondent court, are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent court shall proceed to hear said Civil Case and render judgment thereon accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryYngson vs. Secretary of AgricultureG.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983[G.R. No. L-36847. July 20, 1983.]SERAFIN B. YNGSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, Defendants-Appellees.Facts:The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes."On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal). "In an order dated April 5,1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.Issue:Whether or not thePriority Rule established in FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 is applicable to fishpond applications Ruling:The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications.After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngsons application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngsons priority of application. we reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling weight.All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretarys order states that all three applications must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.chanrobles.com:cralaw:redWHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against Petitioner-Appellant.Dir. of Forestry vs. VillarealG.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989FACTS:The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in themunicipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more thanforty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.ISSUE:What is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known? Part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitutionor are they considered public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private ownership.RULING:Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED.Dir. of Forestry vs. MunozG.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968Facts:Piadeco claims to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadecos evidence of ownership consist of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25, 1894, 4 and a deed of absolute sale of July 12, 1962, in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. The Bureau of Forestry, on December 4, 1963, issued in Piadecos name Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. PWR 2065-New, covering but a portion of the land with an aggregate area of 4,400 hectares and an average stand of 87.20 cubic meters, situated in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose del Monte, all of the province of Bulacan, and Montalban, in Rizal. It was to expire on December 31, 1964. By virtue of the registration certificate, Piadeco conducted logging operations.The controversy in these cases began on April 11, 1964, when Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate. 5On June 1, 1965, Judge Muoz granted Piadecos motion. In line therewith, on June 3, 1965, the corresponding writ of execution was issued, directing a special sheriff to make effective and execute the aforesaid lower courts decision of December 29, 1964.Execution notwithstanding, the forestry officials still refused to permit Piadeco to haul its logs. Because of this, on June 11, 1965, Piadeco asked the court below to declare the forestry officials and those acting under them in contempt. On June 30, 1965, the forestry officials opposed. They averred that Piadecos registration certificate already expired on December 31, 1964; that despite this expiration, Piadeco continued illegal logging operations, which resulted in the seizure of its logs; that after December 31, 1964, the December 29, 1964 decision of the court below became functus officio and could no longer be executed. Piadecos rejoinder of July 1, 1965 was that its registration certificate is not expirable and that it is not a license.Issue:Whether or notSeizure made by the government authorities of logs illegally cut can be branded as illegalRuling:In this case, it is undisputed that Piadecos title which it sought to register was issued by the Spanish sovereignty Titulo de Propiedad No. 4138, dated April 25 or 29, 1894. It is unmistakably not one of those enumerated in Section 7 aforesaid. It should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously, registration thereof can never be renewed.2. Piadeco is nonetheless insistent in its plea that it can still cut, gather, and remove timber from its alleged private woodland, upon payment of forest charges and surcharges.Seizure made by the government authorities here of logs illegally cut cannot be branded as illegal. It was but in obedience to Bureau of Internal Revenue General Circular No. V-337 of May 24, 1961, which prescribed rules on the disposition of illegally cut logs, pursuant to a directive from the Office of the President to the Secretary of Finance on March 22, 1961. Section 3 of Circular V-337.The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any countrys natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the States police power has been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy of forest and forest reserves.Tan vs Dir. of ForestryG.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors,Facts:Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).chanrobles virtual law libraryOn May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).chFinally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.chanrobles virtual law libraryOn May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon - who succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office - issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which state:SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963 -1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of the Department, the authority delegated to the Director of forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of' new licenses , including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.chanrobles virtual law lib Issue:whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of actionRuling:Petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further held that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears that the claim of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).VAs provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.chanrobles virtual law libraryThus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.chanrobles virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMEDIN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.cPeople vs. QueG.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996 FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705. The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the truck. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson Que, who was the owner of said truck, and an unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs, but inserted therein were sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to show a permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated Section 68 OF P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that amended Section 68, which penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal, and considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at the time of the enactment of said E.O. YES.HELD: Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations torefer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber andother forest products. Thus Ques possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.Also, the court rejected Ques argument that the law only penalizespossession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1)(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public and, or from private land without any authority; and(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree." Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel. We do not agree.Merida vs PeopleG.R. No. 158182Merida v People (Natural Resources)MERIDA V PEOPLE (DEFINITION OF TIMBER, AUTHORITY OF FOREST OFFICERS) G.R. No. 158182June 12, 2008FACTS:on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998, 7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife.On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * DENR forester: ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber, 9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter.* RTC (upon complaint of Tansiongco): Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.* CA: affirmed trial court.ISSUES & RULINGS:1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; andYES, DENR has jurisdiction. [NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR, but the preliminary investigation is done by the prosecutor]Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x xReports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction. 2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.YES.Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.3) Is the narra tree timber?YES.The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions or certain "stand age" or "rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber,"We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.Mustang Lumber vs C.A.G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996M ustang Lumber vs CA june 18, 1996DOCTRINE: Possession of lumber is not a crime under PD 705. Timber is the punishable act FACTSThe authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs that were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Readily, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at thesaid lumberyard.During the sting operation, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loadedwith lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transportdocuments, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, QuezonCity. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured therequired documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which wasmoving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without coveringdocument showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must besupported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified,viz ., a search of a moving vehicleThe trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of theGovernment for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they shouldhave been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on thefollowing grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber , as opposed totimber , is not penalized inSection 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even grantingarguendothatlumber falls within the purview of the said section, the samemay not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure,raises a prejudicial questionISSUE:Whether the complaint charges an offenseRuling:(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands.It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offenseThat when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads ofnarra shorts, trimmingsandslabsand a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution31of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself tolumber; thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supaand for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauanin violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied)The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section becauselumber is included in the term timber.The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included inforest productsas defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials intolumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the termlumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market."32Simply put, lumber is aprocessedlog or timber.It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.Lalican vs. VergaraG.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997[G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997]EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.Facts:On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,[1]Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.[2]The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.Issue:whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."Ruling:Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; andWHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; x x x"To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.[10]After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., x x xStress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for apersonto circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x.The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.DENR vs. DaramanG.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi,, Petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, Respondents.Facts:The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside.He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.5The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.Issue:whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.Ruling:The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.28crlwvirtualibrryWe also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.29Strong paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.30People vs. BagistaG.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.Facts:The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office, received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 52" or 53", would be transporting marijuana from up north. 1 Acting upon this piece of information. Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00 oclock that same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves on board. After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428,and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their baggages. While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated. The woman was then identified as Accused-Appellant. 5 The confiscated bundles were subjected to laboratory examination, and found positive for marijuana. Accused-appellants defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was engaged in the buying and selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell.In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible. Said the court a quo.Issue: Whether or not NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, BenguetRuling:Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellants possession.She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats and not from her.Moreover, Accused-appellants defense was weakened by the fact that her witness Nestor Yangkin contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her at the time of her arrest. Appellant claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay for its fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and that no one on the bus offered to pay for the same.Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly disregarded the corroborative testimony of Nestor Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellants reason for being on the bus was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not hers, then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way to Baguio City to sell the marijuana found in her possession.WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against Accused-Appellant.SO ORDERED.Factoran vs CAG.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999[G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999]FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents.Facts:On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber:[2]which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFD Circular requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt; and (4) Tally Sheets.[4] Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[5] Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.[6]On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Secretary) issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.[7] On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.[9]Issue: Whether or Not The alleged Order dated January 20, 1989 of the petitioner Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. of the DENR is validRuling:Petitioner Secretarys authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, in Paat, we held that:x x x precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. x x x. The preamble of EO 277 that added Section 68-A to PD 705- is most revealing:WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the Penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; andWHEREAS, to overcome this [sic] difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power of confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, x x x.[43]in the records supports private respondents allegation that their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to the confiscation of their properties.On the contrary, by private respondents own admission, private respondent Sy who drove the six-wheeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty. Robles at the PIC/SAID Office of the DENR. Thereafter, private respondent Sy and his witnesses were given full opportunity to explain the deficiencies in the documents.[45] Private respondents categorically stated that they made a continuous and almost daily follow-up and plea x x x with the PIC for the return of the truck and lumber x x x.[46] Finally in a letter dated December 30, 1989, private respondent Lily Francisco Uy requested petitioner Secretary for immediate resolution and release of the impounded narra sawn lumber.[47]Undoubtedly, private respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order of confiscation was issued. There was no formal or trial type hearing but the same is not, in all instances, essential in administrative proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[48]Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of AppealsPosted onNovember 18, 2012bySheree TampusG.R.No. 120865-71December 7, 1995Facts:The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges thereforeBig fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.Issues:1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?Held:1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDAand granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and management. It partakes of thenature of police powerwhich is themost pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powersincluding the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated thereinand theauthority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.Tano vs Socrates 278 SCRA 154FactsThe Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.IssueWhether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative of the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen ?HeldNo, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery laws in their local community.267 SCRA 408 (1997)MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSISFACTS:The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered byRenongBerhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS hasdisregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.ISSUE:Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and voidRULING:The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to