nato expansion to northern europe

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NATO expansion to NorthernEuropeDaniel F. C. Austin aa Postgraduate studies (MPhil) at the Universityof London ,Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Daniel F. C. Austin (1999) NATO expansion to NorthernEurope, European Security, 8:1, 79-90, DOI: 10.1080/09662839908407398

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NATO Expansion to Northern Europe

DANIEL F. C. AUSTIN

Finland and Sweden have been in the forefront of bilateral aidefforts to the neighbouring Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia andLithuania) especially in the promotion of economic and regionalintegration. Although Finland and Sweden have refused tocontemplate NATO membership themselves, their neighbours areall seeking to enhance their security through NATO membership. Itis unlikely that the Baltic States will become part of the Alliance inthe short-term, but new forms of military co-operation betweenNATO and its former adversaries are taking place. With theregional security situation in greater flux than at any time duringthe post-World War II period, Finland and Sweden are thus beingasked to reevaluate their traditional policies of neutrality and non-alignment. This article seeks to show some of the contemporarysecurity problems facing Finland and Sweden and the range ofpolicies which both Finland and Sweden can pursue.

The security policies of both Finland and Sweden have undergone subtlechanges since the end of the Cold War. Both countries still place heavyemphasis on the promotion of regional stability and non-alignment backedup by a strong territorial defence component. However, the security policyof these countries are now being sorely tested by events outside theircontrol. The debate about NATO expansion into Eastern Europe andwhether Finland and Sweden's immediate neighbours to the south, theBaltic States, should be incorporated into Western defence structures hassparked a lively debate in both Sweden and Finland, especially on thesignificance that this would have for each country's future security anddefence policy. Such an open debate would have been unthinkable duringthe Cold War when there was an overwhelming consensus about securityand defence policy. New forms of military co-operation are emergingbetween NATO and its former adversaries which have meant that traditionalconcepts such as 'neutrality' and 'non-alignment' no longer make as muchsense as they did during the Cold War.

European Security, Vol.8, No.l (Spring 1999), pp.79-90PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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80 EUROPEAN SECURITY

FINLAND AND SWEDEN'S NEW SECURITY POLICY

Today both countries refer to themselves as 'non-aligned', but during theCold War they regarded themselves as 'neutral'. Although neutrality hasbeen dropped in Finland and quietly de-emphasised in Sweden thedifference in definition between the two concepts appears to be slight.Neutrality was more restrictive in its scope and did not allow for the typesof military-civilian co-operation between countries that are such aprominent feature of today's security environment. Non-alignment, on theother hand, allows both countries to take part in some aspects of military co-operation with other states and in co-operation with the NATO alliance. Intimes of increased regional tension non-alignment can still provide bothcountries with the flexibility to adopt a position of neutrality.

The cornerstone of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union was asecurity treaty, the Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Treaty(FCMA). This no longer exists, but in its place a more benignly wordedtreaty, signed between Finland and Russia in 1992, bases relations andmutual respect for one another on the principles of international law andrespect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. With the FCMATreaty, the central thrust of Finland's problem was that it had 'a securitytreaty with a power which was the principal embodiment of a vastlydifferent political system'.1 The treaty called for military consultations intimes of international crisis or where one party's territory was threatened bya third power. This meant that Finland was obliged to work towards co-operation and detente between the superpowers so that it would not need tofulfill its contractual obligations under the terms of the treaty.

In the new treaty a more consensual process of consultation is urgedupon the parties through the established international organisations.However, some of the articles still appear to duplicate the former FCMATreaty, particularly the obligation of each party to communicate with oneanother in the event where the security of either party is threatened by athird power. Neither can the territory of either one of the parties be used bya third power as a base to attack the other. The new treaty, therefore,reaffirms and assumes the continuing obligation on the part of Finland, as asmall nation state next to a big, unpredictable power, to remain vigilant andnot to allow the region to become unstable.

Another important change at the end of the Cold War was Finland'saccession to the European Union on 1 January 1995. As the successor stateto the Soviet Union, Russia finally ditched its ideological hostitility andopened diplomatic relations with the EU. Accession to the EU was seen asconfirmation that Finland could and would pursue its own interests in theeconomy and free trade.2 In addition, accession to the European Union has

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NATO EXPANSION TO NORTHERN EUROPE 81

probably provided an important 'soft' security option for Finland; theperception of it's status as a West European state has been elevated. Theproblem for Finland is what it has had to sacrifice in the process to achievethis position.

Now as in the Cold War, international co-operation and detente, and thepursuit of regional stability are still the essential foreign policy goals forFinland and Sweden in the post-Cold War world. Geopolitics has changedsignificantly but Finland and Sweden's freedom of action has increasedonly so far as Russia and the West are co-operating with one another. Nowthat new areas of military co-operation play a central role in Western-Russian relations, the essential objective for Finland and Sweden is to finda credible security policy; to take part in the new multilateral Partnership-For-Peace programmes (PfP) between NATO and the East Europeancountries without simultaneously straining relations with Russia.

It is important for Finland and Sweden, therefore, that Russia stays intandem with the rest of Europe. President Ahtisaari of Finland reiterated thissoon after Finland had joined the European Union.

Co-operation with Russia is the only credible answer to our commonsecurity needs ... 1 wish to see a permanent dialogue ... between theEuropean Union, the United States and Russia. The goal of thisdialogue should be to safeguard the building of a new Europeansecurity structure ... Finland maintains a credible national defence.Our military non-alliance is, we believe, a constructive contribution tosecurity and stability in Northern Europe ... We are ready to co-operate with NATO as it is developing a continent-wide partnershipgeared to peacekeeping and conflict management ... A fortressEurope should be avoided.3

In this context Finland has always placed great emphasis on the OSCE(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), which it wasinstrumental in setting up during the Cold War. As a forum where all statesof former and current military power blocs are brought together, includingneutral, non-aligned and newly independent states, it can discuss securityissues affecting the entire continent., However, the work of the OSCEappears to be too narrowly focused on conflict resolution and the overseeingof elections and plebiscites in countries with civil and military strife. Inaddition, its decision-making process is rather cumbersome which must becarried out on the basis of unanimity.

Finland and Sweden's influence in international bodies is also limited tothe extent that, as neutral powers during the Cold War, they did not sign theConventional Forces in Europe treaties (CFEs). This has probably hinderedFinland's ability to delay or offset the unnecessary build-up of conventional

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arms in Finland's neighbouring regions as a result of the CFE treaty. Nor didthe CFE treaty concern ballistic missiles such as SCUDs which areconcentrated in the south-eastern area of Finland's concern. Not being asignatory to the CFE Treaty has also meant little chance of renegotiation ofthe Flank zones which Russia would like to change. Neutrality has a price.

Nevertheless, adherence to the CFE regime would have compelledFinland and Sweden to provide more detailed knowledge of the state of theirarmed forces, such as weapons in storage. By revealing more details aboutthe strength of their armed forces, Finland, Sweden and the other Europeanneutrals would have been concerned about weakening their position againstRussia which has far more forces and equipment at its disposal.4 Fulltransparency for small, non-aligned states can, therefore, be problematic.Finland and Sweden, however, are signatories to Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measures (CSBMs) contained in the Vienna documents and haveratified the Open Skies Agreement.5

With hindsight, it is now known that the CSCE/OSCE process was notso significant as the Finns would like to make out in ending the Cold War.It is true that the CSCE, its predecessor, contributed to a broadening ofdiscussions between East and West, and acted as a cradle for the future armsreduction treaties. However, as the former US Secretary of State, JamesBaker, makes out in his memoirs, the real contribution towards ending theCold War and reunifying Germany came from the close, productiveworking relationship established between the then superpower leaders.6

FINNISH AND SWEDISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION(EU)

Finland appears to have forsaken its principle of neutrality for one of non-alignment, in order to join an organisation that has openly stated itsintentions of creating a common foreign and defence policy. This is howone prominent Finnish Euro-sceptic, Paavo Vayrynen, views the securityimplications of Finnish membership of the EU. Vayrynen believes that ingiving up neutrality and attaching itself to transitory, weak alliances withinthe European Union, Finland has placed enormous strains on its owndefence policy.7 Indeed, Western European Integration may even lead to adeepening of European divisions.

To some extent Vayrynen is correct in his analysis of what membershipof the European Union could mean for a country traditionally committed toa policy of non-alignment. If the European Union were ever to create asingle and credible foreign and defence policy, more decisions would needto be taken by a simple majority decisions that excluded the traditionalinterests of smaller, non-aligned or neutral countries. Finland had made

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known its objections to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP)emerging at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). "The CommonForeign and Security Policy should remain a matter for intergovernmentalco-operation founded on mutual trust between member states.' AlthoughFinland supports in principle 'the use of qualified-majority voting indeciding on questions concerning the implementation of the CSFP ... aprecondition is that the Union's objectives in relation to each particularquestion are clear and that the vital interests of no member state areinvolved'.8

Well aware that a European CSFP is a long way away, Finland andSweden have instead focused their attention on the control of crisis-management situations as a first step towards building a CFSP. In April1996, the foreign ministers of Finland and Sweden jointly submitted aproposal to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that stated that thecrisis-management role of the European Union should be strengthened. Inaddition, all members of the European Union should be able as equals todecide and execute any peacekeeping and crisis control operations under theWest European Union (WEU).9

The Finnish-Swedish proposal was a timely response to the changedsecurity situation in Europe. The WEU and NATO have begun increasingtransparency in decision making and coordination of military operations.However, effective action to control crisis situations requires centralisedpolitical will and resources that are immediately available. Without drawingon the resources of NATO this is impossible as the Bosnia conflictdemonstrated. Many NATO countries, however, would be reluctant orunwilling to allow neutral non-members of the Alliance access to resourcessuch as data intelligence and equipment.

The concept of Combined Joint Task Force operations (CJTFs) was thusendorsed by NATO in January 1994, with the aim of permitting non-Alliance members to participate in a wide range of missions ranging frompeacekeeping/peace-enforcement, humanitarian relief, and rapid crisisresponse operations by highly-trained multinational forces. It is envisagedthat all European nations, irrespective of whether they are members ofNATO or not, will have the possibility to select which military operationsthey would like to be part of.

The Finnish-Swedish proposal of 1996 appears to follow the Frenchline, in other words, to make the EU more responsible for crisis-management and to demonstrate their loyalties to the European Security andDefence Identity (ESDI). Alternatively, the joint memorandum can be readas a pointed reminder to other European states, particularly the French, thatFinland and Sweden want others to understand that 'co-operation in militarycrisis management [must be seen as] separable from collective defence

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commitments'.10 Instead, it is NATO expansion which has become a farmore pressing theme for Finland and Sweden with a secondary issue of howto deal with the security demands of the Baltic States.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE BALTIC STATES

The ex-Soviet Union maintained its hegemony in the Baltic region duringthe Cold War by its occupation of the Baltic States, and neutralising theforeign policies of both Sweden and Finland. The latter two states acted asbuffer states, providing the Soviet Union with soft protection. Norway wasthe only Alliance member which faced the Soviet Union on its borders inthe far north.

Russia does not want the constellation of buffer states in the Baltic tonecessarily change. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from EasternEurope, the original intention of Russian leaders was probably to createsimilar buffer states in central Europe that were neutral or non-aligned andsupportive of Russia's foreign policy. Unfortunately, 40 years of Sovietoccupation cannot be wiped away immediately from the memories of theleaders of East European states. The benign policies of the Shevardnadze-Kozyrev period were also replaced by a more robust, Russia-first policyunder Primakov, which probably confirmed the views of leaders of EastEuropean states (including the Baltic states) that they were better off inNATO.

Finland has stuck to its familiar line, strongly advocating continuousdialogue and patience with Russia, closer economic ties with Russia andmembership of the Baltic States in the EU. For Finland, the importance oftrade between the European Union and Russia can be seen by the wayFinland hopes to profit as a transit point between East and West. In the lastfew years, the amount of international traffic passing over Finland's borderwith Russia has increased enormously whilst the harbours along Finland'ssouthern coasts have benefited from an expansion of trade."

Finland's and Sweden's position in regional security is enhanced by theBaltic States remaining independent and strong, yet neither Finland orSweden can be seen to be helping the Baltic States militarily. The reason isclear: if Finland and Sweden are seen to be co-operating too closely withtheir southern neighbours on matters that affect regional security, Moscowmay well interpret this as contrary to its own interests. In other words, theentire foundations of post-war Finnish and Swedish foreign policy, that is50 years of seeking to stay out of conflicts and pursuing regional stabilityand peace will be thrown away. By losing the confidence of the Russians,Finland and Sweden would also gravely weaken their own securityinterests.

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Finland and Sweden do not want the perception of being other BalticStates or put into the same bracket as the former Soviet republics. Finlandand Sweden regard themselves as more Western not just out of pride butalso as a matter of security. How the Russians behave towards the BalticStates in the future must not affect their neighbours over the Gulf of Finlandand to the West. Hence, Finland and Sweden need to find a pan-Europeansolution. European wide co-operation should be expanded and the BalticStates must be helped multilaterally by other European States. And if NATOdoes expand it should not be at the expense of Finland's and Sweden's ownsecurity interests.

Finland and Sweden also have mixed views regarding Balticmembership of NATO. Although both states ultimately recognise the rightof the Baltic States to choose their own security arrangements, the officialview in both Finland and Sweden is that each country has a responsiblity foroverall security in the region. 'Collective security' should not be damagedby any one country.12 Privately, however, Finnish and Swedish policymakers are probably concerned that NATO enlargement could destabilisethe region. Hence, their constant references to the importance of involvingRussia at every stage.13

FINNISH AND SWEDISH BILATERAL AID TO THE BALTIC STATES

Security co-operation between Finland and the Baltic States is limited andmost of what does take place is within the NATO Europe-wide Partnershipfor Peace programmes (PfP). Finland and Sweden signed up as observersshortly after Russia joined in 1994. Among the defence and military-relatedmatters addressed in PfP are: improvement of civil emergency planning;airspace coordination; defence procurement issues; civil-military relationsand democratic control of armed forces; scientific and environmental co-operation. Finland does not take part in some aspects of PfP such as defenceprocurement issues and airspace co-ordination. An important offspin to PfPwas in IFOR (Intervention Force in Bosnia) and how SFOR (StabilisationForce in Bosnia) where Finnish and Swedish troops serve next to those fromthe Baltic States, Russia and Poland under Alliance command.

In January 1995, a Planning And Review Process (PARP) wasintroduced within PfP, designed to advance interoperability and increasetransparency among NATO's allies and partners. Finland participated in thefirst phase of this process, which was completed in spring 1995. 'ThePlanning And Review Process provided an important tool for enhancinginteroperability ... in areas of peacekeeping, humanitarian missions andsearch and rescue operations. It also contributes to transparency in defenceplanning."4

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Finland does try to help its Baltic neighbours independently of NATO.The Finnish Border Guard has been active in training Estonian borderguards, and donating patrol vessels for the Estonian Coast Guard. SomeEstonian officers are trained in Finland and Finnish officers have, from1996, made reciprocal visits to Estonia in order to assist in their instructionof Estonia's defence forces. Material help is carried out on a donation basisand arms procurement for Estonia follows the same procedure as that usedfor any other country. It is well to remember that the Finnish and Estonianlanguages are very closely related so that much of this co-operation is seenthrough a cultural prism.

In general, however, Swedish and Finnish co-operation with the BalticStates have been in non-military and non-security areas. This recognises thefact that security for the Baltic region can also be enhanced throughencouraging economic growth and integrated trade and cultural links withthe West. Sweden and Finland have also been careful to involve Russia andRussian regions in the two or three major regional forums, the Council ofBaltic Sea States (CBSS) founded in 1992 and the Euro-Arctic BarentsRegional Forum.

Sweden and Finland do not favour military alliances in the region anddialogue must be maintained between all states in the region. No new ironcurtain should be created between the Baltic States and Russia. Europeansecurity must be indivisible. A strong EU would be beneficial for the regionsince it would promote trade and greater integration. In 1997 Finland beganto advocate the idea of the Northern Dimension in the European Union.Finland wished to maximise the EU's interest in Northern Europe using theavailable financial instruments and structural aid programmes (Interreg,Tacis and Phare) in order to secure the stability and economic developmentof Northern Europe.15

The purpose is to draw the Union's attention to a northern Europeanpolicy which is considered to comprise co-operation in the Baltic Seaand the Barents regions, as well as in other Euro-Arctic regions;Nordic co-operation; bilateral relations in the region as well as co-operation with the neighbouring areas. The aim is to show whatadvantages the northern regions of Europe can offer in the long term,including the enormous energy resources in Northwest Russia, as wellas to point out to the Union the significance of co-operation with theseareas.16

Cross-border co-operation also has a useful security dimension for Finland.It engages Russia in the pan-European political processes. It leads to therebuilding and reconstruction of political institutions and economicinfrastructure in Russia within a programme orientated towards the West.

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For Finland, however, cross-border co-operation is also important becauseit maximises the country's security by creating a process of negotiation andconsultation between all nations on either side of the former East-Westdivide. Regional co-operation suits this purpose well and cross-borderinteraction is merely one aspect of this.

In April 1998 both Finland and Sweden made a joint initiative on deeperco-operation on security in the Baltic Sea region. It was proposed that thereshould be more efficient co-operation in such matters as crime-preventionwork, border-guarding functions, rescue services, expansion of training inpeacekeeping activities and deeper regional co-operation in the Euro-Atlantic partnership council. Whilst the points raised in this and otherinitiatives can be generally welcomed by all countries in the region, theBaltic States may have good reason to view with suspicion any proposalsfrom Finland and Sweden to forestall the attempts of the Baltic States to joinNATO.

Greater emphasis on trade and integration in the Baltic region will notnecessarily assist the efforts of Finland and Sweden to satisfy the securitydemands of their neighbouring states. For the Baltic States, a stronger EUthat extends its membership over the next decade is regarded as of secondaryimportance to membership in NATO. As far as the Baltic States areconcerned, only NATO can offer the hard security guarantees which they areseeking. Regional economic integration will develop, if at a slower pace,whether the Baltic States are members of the EU or not. In any case, not allthe Baltic States have yet been accepted as future members of the EU.

For Russia, there are problems with Sweden and Finland's soft securityinitiative too. Whilst over half of Russia's foreign trade is with the EU,Russia must still feel a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) thatis proposed as the eventual outcome of Maastricht Treaty proposals wouldeventually be directed eastwards. Furthermore, the West European Union(WEU) can only be developed, if as the defence arm of Europe, it takes overresponsibility for the security interests of European states from NATO. Inthe current and foreseeable circumstances Russia is, and will remain, theonly other major military power on the continent. Unless, Russia isaccommodated in European integration including the WEU it is hard not tosee how a conflict of interests will emerge between Russia and the rest ofEurope. Fortunately, Finland and Sweden will probably veto any effortsmade towards the WEU taking over the role of NATO since it is realised thiswould probably create new divisions in Europe.

QUESTIONS FOR SWEDEN AND FINLAND

Both Finland and Sweden can contribute to European stability, Both have

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useful experience in UN peacekeeping missions, but as the case of Bosniashows, peacekeeping (the UN role) is not in the same league as peace-enforcing (the NATO role). Although public support for military co-operation through the PfP process appears to be strong in both countries andthere is growing awareness, especially in Finland, of the value of joiningNATO, certain obstacles remain.

The ruling Social Democratic Party in Sweden is still reluctant to discussmembership of NATO so soon after the bruising EU referendum.Considering this party was in power for most of the post-war years, there islittle point in expecting a change in government, but that does not rule outa change in government policy. Therefore, one needs to look for signs ofchange in the attitudes of Social Democratic Party members and, second, toask what is being done to educate the Swedish and Finnish public about thebenefits of closer military co-operation with the Alliance and possibleNATO membership?

The issue of how to incorporate the Baltic States into the Europeansecurity framework is also fraught with difficulties. Their situation dependsto a large extent on Finnish and Swedish viewpoints. Although Finland andSweden are proud of their historical and military traditions whichemphasise neutrality and non-alignment they are still the only Westernneighbours of the Baltic States in the immediate vicinity. Nevertheless,Finland and Sweden are simply not prepared to give any security guaranteesto the Baltic States and they simply do not have the military or humanresources capable of meeting such a challenge, never mind the will toimplement it. Therefore, one must ask whether Finland and Sweden areprepared to be part of a larger military and security organisation that doesprovide the Baltic states with security guarantees? Alternatively, if Finlandand Sweden stay outside NATO would an enhanced form of PfP beacceptable, for instance in building up the Baltic armies, security services,and providing a co-ordinated training programme, etc. In this instance,Sweden and Finland may not be prepared to take part in such a programmeif Russia was not invited.

In many ways the co-operation programmes between NATO and theBaltic States are a distraction from their central concerns: to create an armythat can hold out for two to four weeks. The creation of BALTBAT broughtsome positive results, but BALTBAT distorts thinking because there is noconnection between that and the rest of the military infrastructure in each ofthe Baltic states. BALTBAT is becoming a pool of lucrative salaries andhigh prestige in the Baltic States, but it must serve as a springboard forsomething else, otherwise nothing will be gained. Would Finland andSweden be prepared to join such a project?

Finally, there is the issue of what happens if civil conflict should break

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out in the Baltic States. Although Sweden and Finland have demonstratedthrough their joint memorandum of 1996 their desire to take part in 'peace-enforcing' measures sponsored by the WEU, do these include operations bythe international community in northern and central Europe? If not, do theyforesee a time when they will be prepared to do so, and if so, when this willbe?

SUMMARY

With the expansion of NATO, either territorial, or through new forms ofmultilateral co-operation, Finland and Sweden may not want to remainisolated for long. NATO has come a long way from its Cold War days whenit was just a collective defence organisation. It is now at the forefront ofproviding civil-military help to East European states and co-operating insecurity matters with former enemies.

Until now the real issue for Finland and Sweden has been how theAlliance would expand and whether this would antagonise Russia and sparka renewal of hostilities in the region. Similarly, the test for Finnish andSwedish policy makers was whether they were able to adapt their traditionalemphasis on regional stability and non-alignment with the ever-evolvingsecurity structures of Europe. Although NATO has postponed Balticmembership of the Alliance, the prospect of one or more of those statesjoining the organisation cannot be ruled out in the next few years. In turn,the Baltic States probably realise that Sweden and Finland do not want tooffer any security guarantees and that Sweden is particularly reluctant todepart from two centuries of neutrality/non-alignment.

If the Baltic States do join NATO, then, after carefully considering thenew security situation in the region and the alternatives on offer, Finlandand Sweden may yet conclude that membership of NATO offers the bestsolution for their own security and that of the region as a whole. This is asmuch to do with pride as anything else. For small countries like Finland andSweden, the question about expansion of NATO to Eastern European statestouches a pique in the national psyche. For instance, it is hard to imagine theformer communist states of the Warsaw Pact gaining admission to NATOwhilst the stable, prosperous, democratic and Western orientated countriessuch as Finland and Sweden are being left out of the enlargement process.In the end it may be pride, as much as common sense, which dictates thetrue destinies of Finland and Sweden.

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9 0 EUROPEAN SECURITY

NOTES

1. George Maude, 'Problems of Finnish Statecraft: The Aftermath of Legitimation', Diplomacyand Statecraft 1/1 (March 1990) p.19.

2. During the Cold War accession to the European Union was regarded as impossible becausethe Soviet Union would probably not have allowed it.

3. Excerpts from Martti Ahtisaari's speech, 'Towards a Positive Interrelationship, the EuropeanUnion, the United States and Russia in a Changing World', at the Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, Chatham House, London, 18 Oct. 1995.

4. SIPRI Yearbook 1994, World Aramaments & Disarmament (Oxford: OUP 1994) p.585.5. SIPRI Yearbook 1992, World Aramaments & Disarmament (Oxford: OUP 1992)

pp.480-505.6. James A. Baker III, with Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War

and Peace 1989-1992 (NY: Putnam's 1990).7. Paavo Väyrynen, Suomen puoleettomuus uudessa Euroopassa: kansallinen doktriini

ympäristön murroksessa (Helsinki: Otava 1996).8. 'Finland Points of Departure and Objectives at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference',

Report to the [Finnish] Parliament by the Council of State, 27 Feb. 1996, pp.38-9.9. 'The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension - Towards an Enhanced EU Role in

Crisis Management', a joint memo issued 25 April 1996 by Finland and Sweden. Helsinki:Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also the article, 'EU:n ja WEU:n yhteistyötä tiivistettävä',Helsingin Sanomat, p.D2, 21 April 1996.

10. Ibid.11. Daniel F.C. Austin, 'Recent Trends in Crossborder Interaction Between Finland and Russia',

Idäntutkimus, No.4 (1995). Venäjän ja Itä-Euroopan instituutti, Helsinki, pp.65-70.12. See, for instance, Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen's Introductory Statement in

Finnish Parliament on the Council of State's Report on Security and Defence Policy, 17March 1997.

13. Ibid.14. Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO's Basic Factsheet, No.9, p.6, Office of Information and

Press, NATO HQ, Brussels.15. Paavo Liipponen, 'The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern Dimension', pre-

circulated text of speech at the conference, Barents Region Today, Rovaniemi, 15 Sept. 1997.16. René Nyberg, 'Development of the Northern Dimension in the European Union', unofficial

translation of a draft memo, Department of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Helsinki, 14 Oct. 1997.

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nato expansion to northern europe

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