national transportation safety...

PB87-9 1.0403

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NATIONALTRANSPORTATIONSAFETYBOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

GRAND CANYON AIRLINES, INC.,AND HELITECH, INC.,MIDAIR COLLISION OVERGRAND CANYON NATIONAL PARKJUNE 18, 1986

NTSBIAAR-87103

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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T'ECHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE.r Report NO. 2.Government Accession No,

NTSB/AAR-87/033.Recipient's Catalog No.

PB87-9104031. Title and Subtitle Aircraft Accident Report-Grand u.Report Date

Canyon Airlines, Inc., and Helitech, Inc., Midair July 24, 1987Collision Over Grand Canyon National Park, June 18, 1986 6.Performing Organization

CodeI. Author(s) 8.Performing Organization

Report No.

1. Performing Organization Name and Address lO.Work Unit No.4426B

National Transportation Safety Board ll.Contract or Grant No.Bureau of Accident InvestigationWashington, D.C. 20594 13.Type of Report and

Period Coveredl2.Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Aircraft Accident Report

June 18, 1986NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARDWashington, D. C. 20594 14.Sponsoring Agency Code

lS.Supplementary Notes

16.Abstract On June 18, 1986, at 0855 mountain standard time a Grand Canyon AirlinesDHC-6, N76GC (Twin Otter), call sign Canyon 6, took off from runway 21 of the GrandCanyon Airport. The flight, a scheduled air tour over Grand Canyon National Park, was to beabout 50 minutes in duration. Shortly thereafter, at 0913, a Helitech Bell 206B (Jet Ranger),NGTC, call sign Tech 2, began its approximate 30-minute, on-demand air tour of the GrandCanyon. It took off from its base at a heliport adjacent to State route 64 in Tusayan, Arizona,located about 5 miles south of the main entrance to the south rim of the park. Visualmeteorological conditions prevailed. The two aircraft collided at an altitude of 6,500 feet mlin the area of the Tonto Plateau. There were 18 passengers and 2 flightcrew members on theDHC-6 and 4 passengers and 1 flightcrew member on the Bell 206B. All 25 passengers andcrewmembers on both aircraft were killed as a result of the collision.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causeof this accident was the failure of the flightcrews of both aircraft to “see and avoid” eachother for undetermined reasons. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FederalAviation Administration to .exercise its oversight responsibility over flight operations in theGrand Canyon airspace and the actions of the National Park Service to influence the selectionof routes by Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators. Also contributing to the accident wasthe modification and configuration of the routes of the rotary-wing operators resulting in theirintersecting with the routes of Grand Canyon Airlines near Crystal Rapids.

17.Key Words 18.Distribution StatementThis document is available

air tour flights; midair collision; “see and avoid;” to the public through theflight operations National Technical

Information Service,Springfield, Virginia 22161

ly.Security C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 20.Security C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 21.No. o f P a g e s 22.Price(of this report) (of this page)

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED6 8

NTSB Form 1765.2 (Rev. g/74)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*........................ V

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1.1.11.21.31.41.51.5.11.5.21.61.6.11.6.21.71.81.91.101.111.121.12.11.12.21.131.141.151.161.16.11.16.21.171.17.11.17.21.17.31.17.41.17.51.17.6

2.2.12.22.32.42.4.12.4.22.4.32.5

3. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283.1 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283.2 Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

FACTUAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1History of the Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Injuries to Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Damage to Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Other Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Personnel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2The DHC-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2The Bell 206B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Aircraft Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5The DHC-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5The Bell 206B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Aids to Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Aerodrome Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Flight Recorders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Wreckage and Impact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The DHC-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The Bell 206B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Photographic Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Flightpath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Additional Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Operating Procedures of the DHC-6 and the Bell 206B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Grand Canyon Air Tours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15National Park Service Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Federal Aviation Administration Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Actions of the Department of the Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Visibility and Conspicuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21The Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Human Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Grand Canyon Flight Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23FAA Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Grand Canyon Flight Operators Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26National Park Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Crash, Fire, and Rescue Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

CONTEN’I%(continued)

4. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*..29

5. APPENDIXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Appendix A-Investigation and Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Appendix B--Personnel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Appendix C--Aircraft Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Appendix D-Grand Canyon Air Tour Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Appendix E-Photogrammetry Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Appendix F-Letter From Grand Canyon Flight Operators Association . . . . . .42Appendix G-Letter of Agreement Between Federal Aviation

Administration and Grand Canyon Flight Operators Association . . . . . .43Appendix H-Alternatives Presented in Grand Canyon National

Park Aircraft Management Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Appendix I-Advisory Circular 91-36C . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 () .;Appendix J-Interagency Letter of Agreement among Federal Aviation

Administration, National Park Service, and the Fish and ?Wildlife Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Appendix K-Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 86-21 .58 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

L

On June 18, 1986, at 0855 mountain standard time, a Grand Canyon Airlines DHC-6,N76GC (Twin Otter), call sign Canyon 6, took off from runway 21 of the Grand CanyonAirport. The flight, a scheduled air tour over Grand Canyon National Park, was to beabout 50 minutes in duration. Shortly thereafter, at 0913, a Helitech Bell 2068 (JetRanger), NGTC, call sign Tech 2, began its approximate 30-minute, on-demand air tour ofthe Grand Canyon. It took off from its base at a heliport adjacent to State route 64 inTusayan, Arizona, located about 5 miles south of the main entrance to the south rim ofthe National Park. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The two aircraft collidedat an altitude of 6,500 feet msl in the area of the Tonto Plateau. There were 18passengers and 2 flightcrew members on the DHC-6 and 4 passengers and 1 flightcrewmember on the Bell 206B. All 25 passengers and crewmembers on both aircraft werekilled as a result of the collision.

Because of the lack of cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders in bothaircraft, as well as the lack of radar data, no assessment of the flight path of eitheraircraft could be made. As a result, the reason for the failure of the pilots of eachaircraft to “see and avoid” each other cannot be determined. Consequently, the issueshighlighted in this report concern primarily the oversight of the Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) on Grand Canyon-based scenic air tours or sightseeing flights andthe actions of the National Park Service to influence these operations. Recause of anexemption to 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, local scenic air tours wereconducted under 14 CFR Part 91. This investigation revealed that there was no FAAoversight on the routes and altitudes of Grand Canyon-based scenic air tour operators.This was contrary to the intent of Safety Recommendation A-84-52. Further, theNational Park Service, through its authority under a 1975 law, was conducting a study todetermine the effects of aircraft noise on the Grand Canyon and, at the same time,influencing the selection of air tour routes. The routes of the rotary-wing operators were

‘moved as a noise conservation measure to where they converged with those of GrandCanyon Airlines at the location of the accident.

Other safety issues concern the lack of regulations to limit flight and duty times ofpilots conducting scenic air tour flights, and the lack of a requirement for the pilots ofsuch flights to use intercoms or public address systems when narrating during the flights.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of thisaccident was the failure of the flightcrews of both aircraft to “see and avoid” each otherfor undetermined reasons. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FederalAviation Administration to exercise its oversight responsibility over flight operations inthe Grand Canyon airspace and the actions of the National Park Service to influence theselection of routes by Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators. Also contributing to theaccident was the modification and configuration of the routes of the rotary-wingoperators resulting in their intersecting with the routes of Grand Canyon Airlines nearCrystal Rapids.

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board issued recommendations to theFAA to apply 14 CFR Part 135 flight and duty time limitations on scenic air touroperations; require air tour pilots to use a public address system, intercom, or similarsystem while narrating air tour flights; and require all scenic air tour flights to operateunder the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 and not 14 CFR Part 91.

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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARDWASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: July 24,1?87

GRAND CANYON AIRLINES, INC., AND HELITECH INC.,MIDAIR COLLISION OVER GRAND CANYON NATIONAL PARK

JUNE 18,1986

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

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1.1 History of the Flight

On June 18, 1986, at 0855 mountain standard time, L/ a Grand.Canyon AirlinesDHC-6 (Twin Otter), N76GC, call sign Canyon 6, took off from runway 21 of the GrandCanyon Airport (GCN). The flight was a scheduled 50-minute air tour over Grand CanyonNational Park. At 0913, a Helitech Bell 206B (Jet Ranger), NGTC, call sign Tech 2, beganits approximate 30-minute, on-demand air tour of the Grand Canyon. It took off from aheliport adjacent to its base near State route 64 in Tusayan, Arizona, located about 3miles south of the boundary of the park and 1 mile northeast of the approach end ofrunway 21 at GCN. There were 18 passengers and 2 flightcrew members aboard the DHC-6; there were 4 passengers and 1 flightcrew member aboard the Bell 206B.

The flights, scenic air tours over the Grand Canyon, were conducted inuncontrolled airspace under visual flight rules. The only air traffic control facility in thearea, the control tower at GCN, controlled only departures and arrivals into the airport.At the time of the accident, most sightseeing flights were conducted under therequirements of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, in accordance with theprovisions of 14 CFR 135.1(b)(2). 2/

Both flights proceeded normally, making the customary voluntary positionreports over frequency 122.75 MHz. (See Section 1.9. Communications for additionalinformation.) A pilot who was flying south of Mencius Temple, a prominent landmark inthe Grand Canyon, stated that about 0930, he saw the Bell 206B and heard “Tech 2” report“west of Mencius at 6400 feet, southbound.” This pilot had previously heard “Canyon 6”report passing another landmark, Havasupai Point. (See appendix D.)

About the same time, a pilot who had just passed Havasupai Point eastbound at7,100 feet believed that he saw a flash of light. Prom his position about halfway betweenHavasupai Point and the Scorpion, he saw a rrmushroom-topped’t column of smoke about1,000 feet high rising from the Tonto Plateau. By the time he passed south of Scorpion hecould identify another column of smoke and a smaller area of vaporous cloud between thetwo columns.

uxi-%nes herein are mountain standard time- based on the 24-hour clock, unlessotherwise indicated.2/ 14 CFR 135.1(b)(2) allows nonstop sightseeing flights that begin and end at the samegirport, and are conducted within a 25-statute-mile radius of that airport to be conductedunder 14 CFR Part 91.

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A group of whitewater rafters had just passed the Boucher Rapids on theColorado River inside the Grand Canyon about 3 miles from the accident site. Althoughnone of the rafters saw either aircraft before they collided, several stated that theylooked up in time to see both aircraft as they emerged from a small cloud of smoke or avaporous cloud. They reported seeing the helicopter fall to the west and the DHC-6 fallto the east of the collision point. After the debris disappeared from view behind aplateau, they heard the sound of ground impact and saw black smoke rising from theimpact sites.

About 0930, a Bell 206B, operated for the National Park Service (NPS),departed the South Rim Heliport on a medical evacuation flight to Phantom Ranch. Thepilot subsequently overheard a radio report describing the accident which reported thatsurvivors were walking about the wreckage site. He flew to the heliport to acquireneeded medical equipment and returned immediately to the site. On arrival, he circledover the wreckage of the helicopter and then proceeded to the wreckage of the DHC-6.He was unable to locate survivors.

The accident was estimated to have occurred about 0933 during daylight hoursat 36010’ N latitude and 11295’ W longitude.

1.2 injuries to Persons

Cockpitcrew Passengers Other Total

Fatal 3 22 0 25Serious 0 0 0 0Minor 0 0 0 0None 0 0 0 0

Total 3 22 5 25

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

Both aircraft were destroyed by impact and the postimpact fire. The value ofthe Bell 206B was estimated at $300,000 while the value of the DHC-6 was placed at$750,000.

1.4 Other Damage

The vegetationpostimpact fire.

in the immediate area of the DHC-6 was consumed by the

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 The DHC-6

The flightcrew of the DHC-6 was qualified in accordance with existing Federalaviation regulations. Both crewmembers were qualified to act as pilot-in-command of theDHC-6 in accordance with the requirements of 14 CFR Part 135. (See appendix B.)

The captain, 27, was employed by Grand Canyon Airlines in July 1982 andassigned to the position of pilot-in-command of the Cessna 207, a seven-passenger, single-engine airplane. He completed ground school and flight training in the airplane in

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August 1982. In September 1983, he completed the transition training required to act asfirst officer of the DHC-6. In October of that year he also qualified as an instructor pilotin the Cessna 207. In March 1986 he upgraded to captain on the DHC-6. At the time ofthe accident, he had accrued 5,970 hours of flight time, about 5,000 of which were aspilot-in-command. He had accrued 1,556 hours in the DHC-6 airplane.

The captain had been scheduled to be off-duty on June 15 and 16. On June 15,however, he provided flight instruction to a friend, and on June 16, he flew two scenic airtour flights for Grand Canyon Airlines. Therefore, he was considered to have beenon-duty for 2 hours on June 16. On June 17 he reported for duty at 0630 and went off-duty at 1930. He had dinner with a friend and retired at 2300. On the day of the accidenthe arose at 0600 and reported for work at 0630.

The first officer, 27, was employed by Grand Canyon Airlines in July 1980 andcompleted all ground and flight training for the Cessna 207 in that month. He flew aspilot-in-command of the Cessna 207 until 1984. In July 1984 he successfully transitionedto the first officer position on the DHC-6. He upgraded to captain on that airplane inApril 1986. At the time of the accident, he had accrued of 4,450 hours of flight time,3,500 of which were as pilot-in-command. His total flight time in the DHC-6 was 1,076hours. Both pilots of the DHC-6 flew 9 hours on the day preceding the accident. Inaddition, the pilot-in-command flew 111 hours in the 30 days before the accident whilethe second-in-command had flown 160 hours during the same period.

The first officer was off-duty on June 16. On June 17 he reported for duty at0630 and went off-duty at 1930. He retired at 2200 and on the day of the accident awokearound 0600. He reported for duty at 0630. Both the captain and first officer flew oneGrand Canyon Airlines scenic air tour before the accident flight. The duty day for pilotsat Grand Canyon Airlines was from 0630 to 1830. On a typical day pilots would accrue 8to 9 hours of flight time.

Grand Canyon Airlines ground training incorporated instruction in thefollowing general topics: general operating and flight rules, rules applicable to air taxiand commercial operators (operations conducted under 14 CFR Part 135), companyoperations, navigation and air traffic control procedures, company routes, meteorology,and emergency procedures. Flight instruction included training in takeoffs and landings,normal and emergency maneuvers, flight under simulated instrument conditions, climbsand climbing turns, engine failure, flight at minimum controllable airspeeds, and stalls.All training and certification met the requirements of 14 CFR Part 135.

1.5.2 The Bell206B

The pilot-in-command of the Bell 206B was 39-years-old at the time of theaccident. He was employed by Helitech on June 13, 1986. (See appendix B.) SinceHelitech began operations on June 1, 1986, the pilot-in-command had previously receivedhis training in the Bell 206B and in Grand Canyon flight operations when he was employedby other companies which operated in the Grand Canyon. He received his initialhelicopter training and flight experience while he was in the U.S. Army. He was employedby Grand Canyon Helicopters in May 1978 where he flew the Bell 206 in flight tours overthe Grand Canyon and in contract flights for the NPS. In August 1979, he was employedby a company performing mineral exploration activities in Utah. He returned to theGrand Canyon area in July 1981 and was employed by Madison Aviation to conduct airtours over the Grand Canyon in the Bell 20613 and to perform the duties of chief pilotunder the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135. At the time of the accident, he had accrued6,953.6 flight hours, all of which were in rotary-wing aircraft.

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Figure l.-Grand Canyon Airlines DHC-6.

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The pilot had been off-duty from June 14 through June 17. He returned to theGrand Canyon on June 17 following a trip to the east on a commercial air carrier toattend personal business. On June 17 he retired about 2000 to 2030 and awoke at 0630 thefollowing morning. He reported for work about 0800. The duty day at Helitech beganabout 0800 and continued until 1800.

1.6 Aircraft Information

1.6.1 The DHC-6

The DHC-6-300, Twin Otter, United States Registry N76GC, was operated byGrand Canyon Airlines and was configured for a flightcrew of 2 and 19 passengers. (Seeappendix C.) The airplane was modified in March 1982 with larger than standard windowsin the passenger compartment under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approvedSupplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. SA1814NM. The airplane was equipped withtwo Pratt and Whitney of Canada PT6A-27 powerplants, each with a three-blade,Hartzell, constant-speed propeller. The airplane was painted with an overall beige paintscheme with horizontal dark brown, gold, and blue stripes. (See figures 1 and 2.) Thestripes were about the same width for the length of the fuselage. The brown was 24inches wide, the gold was 6 inches wide, and the blue was 3 inches wide. The stripestapered gradually along the rear fuselage and swept upward along the rudder and thenforward near the top of the vertical stabilizer.

The cruise airspeed of the airplane with loo of flaps extended, theconfiguration used by Grand Canyon Airlines, was 100 miles per hour. The maximumcertificated takeoff weight of the airplane was 12,500 pounds. The takeoff gross weightof the DHC-6 before the accident was 11,934 pounds and its center of gravity (CC,),expressed in percent of mean aerodynamic chord was 25.1 percent. Both the weight andCC were within allowable limits for the accident flight. The maintenance records of theairplane revealed that the only deferred minimum equipment list item at the time of theaccident was a discrepancy in the first officer’s attitude gyro. All maintenance had beenperformed according to an FAA-approved program. No discrepancy trends or repeatedmaintenance actions on major items were found.

1.6.2 The Bell 206B

The Bell 206B III, Jet Ranger, United States Registry NGTC, was asingle-engine, utility-type helicopter. It was configured for a pilot and one passenger inthe front seats and three passengers in a rear bench-type seat. It was equipped with anAllison 250-C20B powerplant, a two-blade main rotor and a two-blade tail rotor. (Seefigure 3.) The aircraft was painted white and yellow with yellow the predominant color ofthe passenger cabin. The main rotor color was gray and the tail rotor was mostly red.

The maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft was 3,200 pounds. Its weight andCG were within acceptable limits at the time of the accident. There were no discrepancytrends or repeated maintenance actions relating to the aircraft. Its maintenance andinspection activities were performed in accordance with applicable regulations.

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DE HAVILLAND CANADADHC-6 TWIN OTTER SERIES 300

MAINTENANCE MANUAL

IAMETER 8 FT 6 IN.

DIHEDRAL 3’

PROPELLER SIDEcLEARANCE’25.6 IN.

0 lwl R

HE&TlQFT6IN

IGROUND

-LINE1 il,.,,,,N-j

L E N G T H 5 1 F T 9 I N . -

Aircraft Dimensions

Figure 2. --Aircraft dimensions - the DHC-6-300.

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1.7 Meteorological Information

At the time of the accident, visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The0845 local observation taken at GCN was as follows:

Sky-clear; visibility-50 miles; temperature-74’ F; dew point-39’ F;wind-200°F at 7 knots; and the altimeter-30.27 inches of mercury.

The 0958 local observation taken at GCN was:

Sky-clear; visibility-50 miles; temperature-77’F; dew point-36’F;wind-200° F at 8 knots; and the altimeter-30.27 inches of mercury.

The clear conditions with a high degree of visibility were considered typical ofmeteorological conditions at the Grand Canyon at that time of year and that time of day.In addition, there was often low-level turbulence associated with the Grand Canyon in thelate afternoon.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

There were no reported problems with aids to navigation.

1.9 Communications

There were no reported problems with communications between the DHC-6and the GCN air traffic control tower or the Bell 206B and the GCN air traffic controltower. Air tour operators in the Grand Canyon had developed an informal, voluntaryreporting system in which pilots gave position reports, altitudes, and flight directions overthe common frequency, 122.75 MHz, when they passed prominent landmarks in the GrandCanyon. This system had been in use for several years.

Following the accident, several pilots of air tour aircraft told Safety Boardinvestigators that in recent years there had been increasing congestion on the commonfrequency. One helicopter pilot stated that the congestion had been getting worse andthat there had been excessive, nonpertinent “chatter” particularly when air tour trafficwas light. The director of operations of Grand Canyon Airlines testified that although thefrequency was congested at times, in his opinion it had “never been congested to the pointwhere it became unsafe.” In addition he noted that when air tour traffic was heavy,simultaneous transmissions from two flights might interfere with or block each other. Headded that pilots of transient aircraft, both general aviation and military, would not befamiliar with the position reporting system and, therefore, would not use it. When atransient aircraft was observed by an air tour pilot, the air tour pilot would typicallybroadcast position information on the nonreporting aircraft.

The former president of Helitech testified that the aircraft reporting systemwas an effective one. Moreover, when two or more transmissions interfered with eachother, pilots would generally inform each other that the transmissions had been ?steppedon” or interfered with.

On the day of the accident, there were no reported difficulties with the ability ofeither the DHC-6 or the Bell 206R to make position reports over the common frequency.

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1.10 Aerodrome Information

The departure airport of the DHC-6 was located 7 miles south of the parkheadquarters and 3 miles south of the park boundary. The airport elevation was 6,606 feetabove mean seal level (msl). The single runway, 03/21, was 8,999 feet long and 150 feetwide. The air traffic control tower operated from 0800 to 1800.

The heliport from which the Bell 206J3 departed was used by Helitech aircraftonly. Clearance to traverse the GCN airport traffic area from the heliport was obtainedfrom the GCN air traffic control tower.

1.11 Flight Recorders

Neither of the two aircraft was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder or aflight data recorder nor were such recorders required for the type of operations beingconducted at the time of the accident.

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1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

1.12.1 The DHC-6

The wreckage of the two aircraft came to rest about 2,450 feet apart on theTonto Plateau between Mencius Temple and Tuna Creek. The sites are about 1 l/2statute miles north of the Crystal Rapids of the Colorado River.

Most of the wreckage of the DHC-6 was located on the western side of thebase of Mencius Temple oriented to a magnetic heading of 150’. The rear fuselage andthe empennage were positioned on a magnetic heading of 057O and were separated fromthe remainder of the airplane by 953 feet.

The left main landing gear leg with the wheel, tire, and brake missing, and a 4-inch portion of a blade tip of the left propeller were located between the rear fuselageand the main wreckage. The nose gear strut was found north of the wreckage site.Various pieces of both aircraft, including the baggage door and fuselage skin sections ofthe DHC-6 and sections of the main rotor mast including the boot, as well as engine cowlsections with particle separator components, were randomly scattered over a distance of300 feet west of the tail section of the DHC-6. A 6-foot section of the main rotor bladespar of the Bell 206B was located 810 feet southwest of the DHC-6 tail section. The leftmain wheel of the DHC-6 was located 177 feet from the airplane% tail section. The mainrotor mast of the Bell 206B was found about 150 feet farther to the east. The main rotorhub was located about 875 feet south of the main rotor mast.

Most of the DHC-6 fuselage from just aft of the wings forward came to rest inan inverted position. It was destroyed by impact and postimpact fire. The aft section ofthe fuselage below the floor line was relatively free of fire damage. There was a diagonalslash on the left side of this section from just aft of the baggage door forward angled aftabout 24’. This section above the floor line was fragmented in a large area to the west ofthe location of the airplane% tail section. The ailerons and flaps, which were in the ?.O”position, were attached to the wing trailing edges. There was no evidence of the in-flightcollision on the wings.

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Nearly 18 inches of the red main rotor blade spar cap of the Bell 206B wasfound embedded in the left side of the rear fuselage of the DHC-6. There was a 5-inchchordwise penetration of the bottom surface of the left horizontal stabilizer and severalother skin penetrations in this area, including one that severed the underlying stringers.There was aftward crushing of the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer, angledaft about 16’, as well as gray paint transfer on the deicer boot.

The nose gear was separated from the airplane at a distance of about 400 feetnorthwest of the main wreckage. The right side of the tire had been cut near the crown.There was a 21-inch by 28-inch portion of the fuselage structure attached to the strut.The left main landing gear, which also was separated from the fuselage, was 175 feetnorth-northeast of the tail section. There was a large dent in the leg tube about 11 inchesabove the brake flange near the lo:30 position when viewed from outboard. The axle wasfractured 3 inches outboard of the bottom of the leg with the remaining portion displacedforward.

The wheel and tire assembly was separated from the gear leg, southeast of thetail section. The axle, bearings, and brake disc were missing. The inboard half of thewheel was broken on a line several inches wide through the hub and rim. The right mainlanding gear remained with the debris of the fuselage. There was no evidence of thecollision on its components.

The right engine was severely damaged by impact and postimpact fire.Disassembly of the engine revealed no evidence of preexisting damage. The propellerblades were bent slightly opposite to the direction of normal rotation and were twistedtoward low pitch.

The left engine was severely damaged by ground impact and the postimpactfire. Disassembly of the engine revealed no evidence of preexisting damage. Thepropeller blades were bent opposite to their direction of normal rotation and were twistedtoward a low pitch position. All blades exhibited gouging along the leading edges.

1.12.2 The Bell206B

Most of the wreckage of the helicopter was located near the edge of TunaCreek, 2,450 feet from the main wreckage of the DHC-6. It was inverted and on aheading of 204’. Most of the forward part of the fuselage had been consumed by thepostimpact fire. The tailboom was displaced to the left about 60’ and was twistedclockwise. The top 40 inches of the vertical fin was located about 1,200 feet northeast ofthe main helicopter wreckage. There was a lateral indentation at the base of the leadingedge of the vertical fin and red paint transfer on the left side of the fin.

Most of the engine and transmission cowlings were fragmented. The forwardright transmission cowling was crushed inward and aft with evidence of rubber transfer onthe surface. The forward edge of the right access door of the engine was crushed at anangle of 35’ aft from the vertical. There was a light rubber transfer mark closelyresembling the main gear tire tread of the DHC-6 on the aft cowl of the engine at anapproximate 20’ angle forward of vertical.

The main rotor hub and mast were separated and located apart from theaircraft. The entire mast, which had separated from the transmission, was located nearthe tail section of the DHC-6. It was bent forward about 45’ near the top of theswashplate support. There were heavy contact marks on the vertical portion of the

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swashplate support about 20’ to 25Oright of forward. The mast was fractured just belowthe static stop area. The main rotor hub was located about 1,300 feet northeast of themain wreckage of the Bell 206B. About 5 feet of each rotor blade remained with the hub.There was a 23-inch black rubber transfer mark across the top surface of one bladeprogressing outward from the root to a fracture of the trailing edge. Pieces of deicerboot material were found between the blade skin and honeycomb filler. In addition, therewas a lo-inch-long patterned indentation, matching the splines of the brake discs of theDHC-6, on the bottom surface of the mating section. There was no rubber transfer on thetop surface of the mating section.

The remainder of the rotor blade was found at a later date about 4,700 feetnorth of the’ main wreckage of the Bell 206B. It was comprised of two sections whichwere close to each other--a 3-foot section from the blade tip inboard and an 8 l/2-footsection which mated with the blade root that remained with the hub.

The blade spar was deflected aftward from about midspan to the tip. Thetotal deflection at the tip was about 1 inch. The top of the blade spar was broken outfrom the tip to about 4 l/2-inches inboard, and the tip block was broken out. There wereapproximate l/4-inch deep gouges just outboard of the surface of the tip section thatmated with the intermediate blade section. In addition, there were approximately5-inch-long scratches in the spar which extended from the gouges inboard at a 350° angle.

There was a fracture that was deflected upward at an approximate 40’ angleat the tip section of the main spar. There appeared to be compression-type bulking at theinboard fracture of the blade spar.

Across the lower surface of the blade were gold and brown oaint transfermarks extending from the gouges as well as numerous parallel indentations in theintermediate section. There were several chordwise skin buckles in the intermediatesection of the afterbody of the blade.

Two sections of the red blade spar were found in the wreckage area of the Bell206B. The blade spar was fractured about 62 inches from the root. The outboard sectionwas separated from the remainder of the blade. It was bent up at the inboard end anddown at the outboard end. A section of sheet metal from the bulkhead/skin joint of theaft fuselage below the horizontal stabilizer of the DHC-6 was lodqed in the inside radiusof the blade spar. In addition, there were scoring marks in the counterweight and a redand white paint transfer on the bottom surface near the counterweight location.

The tail rotor and 9O’gearbox had separated from the tailboom. There was aleading edge strike evident near the white stripe of one blade.

The engine of the Bell 206B was extensively damaged from impact andpostimpact fire. There was no evidence of preexisting damage in t’le remaining portion ofthe engine and transmission.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The three flightcrew members and the passengers onboard the two aircraftsustained fatal injuries as a result of the accident. Following the post mortemexamination, the cause of death of the crew?nembers and passengers was listed as“multiple severe crushing and thermal injuries, consistent with an airplane or helicoptercrash.” Toxicological analysis of the flightcrew members of both aircraft revealed noethyl alcohol or illicit drugs.

1.14

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Fire

There was no evidence of an in-flight fire on either of the two aircraft beforethe collision. Following the collision, the wreckage of both aircraft burned continuouslyfor several hours. The fire consumed the cockpit, much of the fuselage, and most of thesystems on the DHC-6. Similarly, the fire on the Bell 206B consumed most of the cabin,most of the systems of the aircraft, and all cockpit instruments except for one altimeter.

1.15 Survival Aspects

The accident was not survivable due to the severity of the ground impact andpostcrash fire. Nevertheless, because of the remote location of the accident site, theSafety Board examined the potential ability of crash, fire, and rescue personnel to rescuesurvivors from the accident site had the accident been survivable.

The NPS informed the Safety Board that it operated a Bell 206B for itsexclusive use. According to the NPS, this was used extensively in rescuing injuredindividuals from remote areas of the National Park. In addition, in an emergency, it couldaccess both rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft from private and corporate operators inthe area. These aircraft could have been used to reach and transport survivors tohospitals in Williams and Flagstaff, Arizona, if necessary. These hospitals, the closest tothe Grand Canyon, are located about 50 and 70 miles, respectively, from the mainentrance to the South Rim. The NPS maintains a clinic in the National Park to treatminor injuries.

1.16 Tests and Research

1.16.1 Photographic Reconstruction

Following the accident, the Safety Board performed a photographicreconstruction of the point of impact using a photograph of the postimpact vaporouscloud. The photograph had been taken by a passenger on board a raft near Boucher Rapidson the Colorado River.seconds of the collision.

The photographer estimated that he took the photograph within

The technique employed in the reconstruction, known as photogrammetry,recreates a scene in three dimensions using terrain features in the photograph and in thetopographic map of the area in the photograph as well as other data pertaining to the sizeof the negative, the camera lens, and the lens setting. To derive the altitude of thevaporous cloud, terrain features in the photograph and the topographic map werecorrelated with the location of the photographer, the impact site, and the elevation of theriver at the point the photographer took the photograph. The resultant altitude wasdetermined to have been 6,507 feet msl plus or minus 106 feet. (See appendix R.)

1.16.2 Plightpath

It was not possible to reconstruct the flightpath of either of the two aircraftbefore the collision due to the absence of flight recorders on either aircraft and the lackof radar data in the Grand Canyon airspace.

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1.17 Additional Information

1.17.1 Operating Procedures of the DHC-6 and the Bell 206B

The DHC-6.-At the time of the accident, Grand Canyon Airlines operated twoDHC-6 type airplanes and two C-207 type airplanes. According to its director ofoperations, 90 to 95 percent of its flights were air tours over the Grand Canyon, while therest were either scheduled flights across the Grand Canyon or charter and specialcontract flights. The airline, which had been operating since 1926, employed 10 pilots atthe time of the accident. During June, which was considered to be its “busy” season,flights in the DHC-6 were scheduled hourly and passengers could reserve their seats inadvance. The director of operations stated that during the winter season, the airlinereduced its operations and employed about “three or four’” pilots.

Two pilots operated the DHC-6; one pilot performed the tour narration whilethe other controlled the airplane. The flying pilot scanned the outside area with thenonflying pilot and made the position reports. The pilots were taught to clear the area forother traffic on their side of the airplane when making a turn. Grand Canyon Airlinesused a standard challenge and response checklist procedure in which the nonflying pilotwould read the checklist and the flying pilot would then respond to each checklist item.The pilots wore headsets and communicated with each other through an interphonesystem. Cockpit communication over the headsets was carried out over an “open” or “hot”voice-activated microphone. The nonflying pilot, who performed the narration, wouldidentify scenic points along the route. This was broadcast to the passengers over the cabinpublic address system in the airplane. Communication over the public address system wascarried out through a control located in the yoke.

The tour route was flown in a counter-clockwise direction in the morning andin a clockwise direction in the afternoon to take advantage of the changes in the angle ofthe sun in the Grand Canyon during the day.

According to the director of operations of Grand Canyon Airlines, the plannedroute of the DHC-6 following its departure from the airport was to fly to Kachina Pointat an altitude of about 7,700 feet msl. (See appendix D.) The airplane would thencontinue to the North Rim and follow the Colorado River at an altitude of 6,800 to7,100 feet and continue to Vishnu Temple. It would then proceed to Angel’s Gate, BrahmaTemple to Zoroaster Temple, and then cross Bright Angel north of Phantom Ranch atabout 7,000 feet msl. The airplane would pass Shiva Temple, make a slight left turn southof Dragon’s Head, and turn north at Point Sublime; it would turn west around the ShinumoAmphitheater at 7,100 to 7,200 feet msl. The airplane would then pass the Holy GrailTemple, descend to about 6,500 feet, and proceed to Wheeler Point where it would turneast, parallel the river to Havasupai Point, and continue south of the Scorpion. Theairplane would begin a shallow climb to about 7,000 feet msl cross the river on anortheasterly heading, and turn right to a southerly heading around Crystal Rapids. Itwould exit the Canyon at an altitude of 7,300 to 7,500 feet msl at Cocopa Point andproceed directly to the airport.

The director of operations stated that the following points were reportingpoints over the frequency 122.75 MHz: Kachina Point, Angel’s Gate, Shiva Temple,Dragon’s Head, Wheeler Point, Holy Grail, Havasupai Point, Scorpion, Crystal Rapids(optional reporting point), and Cocopa Point.

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The Bell 206B.-Helitech, because it had been in business only about 2 weeksbefore the accident and because it was operating under 14 CFR Part 91, had no formaloperations manual or training program. However; each of its pilots had flown rotary-wingair tours in the Grand Canyon for several years and accrued several thousands of hours offlying experience in such tours. At the time of the accident, Helitech had employed onefull-time pilot and two part-time pilots who also performed the major administrativetasks. A fourth pilot, who had agreed to work for Helitech before the accident, beganflying for them on June 23. The four pilots had previously been employed by two otherrotary-wing air tour companies which shared aircraft types, routes, and altitudes.Helitech adopted these routes and altitudes when it commenced operations.

At the time of the accident Helitech operated two aircraft. A third, whichhad been scheduled to be placed into service in July, was never placed intoservice. 3/ Helitech’s flights operated on an “on-demand’? basis, after at least threepassengers purchased tickets for a flight.

According to the former president of Helitech, their aircraft would enter theGrand Canyon near Kachina Point at an altitude about 100 feet above ground level (agl) orabout 7,300 feet msl at Kachina Point. It would proceed to Clear Creek, then turn westto Zoroaster Temple, continue to Phantom Creek, and on to Shiva Saddle. It wouldproceed westbound to The Dragon at 6,500 feet msl and continue to the Tuna Creek area.It would then begin a shallow climb to the Anasazi Indian ruins and descend to SublimePoint. From there the aircraft would proceed at about 6,500 feet southbound pastMen&us Temple, continue directly to Crystal Rapids, and exit the park at Cocopa Point.

The former president of Helitech testified that its pilots would make thefollowing position reports: Kachina Point, Phantom Creek, Shiva Saddle, the Dragon, theAnasazi Ruins, !VIencius Temple, and Crystal Rapids.

He testified that in the beginning of April 1986, when he had been the directorof operations of a large rotary-wing Grand Canyon air tour company, at the request of theGrand Canyon Plight Operators Association, the entry and exit points of the helicooterswere changed from Shoshone to Kachina and from Pima to Cocopa Points, respectively.(See appendix F.) These changes, which placed the entrv and exit points of thehelicopters close to those of the Grand Canyon Airlines’ airplanes, were implementedprimarily as a noise conservation measure, by moving the helicopter operations away frompopular tourist sites in the park. Helitech used the modified routes when they beganoperations. After the accident, Helitech and other helicopter air tour operations revertedto the previous routes.

Helitech pilots wore headsets which were used for communicating with airtraffic control and other aircraft. There was no intercom or public address system usedon Helitech aircraft and passengers did not wear headsets. Pilots communicated withpassengers by speaking directly to them in a voice sufficiently loud to have been heardover the ambient engine and rotor noise. Since the majority of the passengers on theaircraft were seated in the rear bench seat, the pilot generally turned his head to the leftwhen speaking to the passengers. According to the former president of Helitech, therewere three points on the tour which the pilots identified to the passengers: the ColoradoRiver, Phantom Creek, and the Indian Ruins. According to the former president,narration was kept to a minimum. Interphones between the pilot and passengers were not- - -3/ About 2 weeks after the accident, Helitech’s insurance carrier terminated theirLsurance coverage and, as a result, Helitech ceased operations.

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used since, according to his testimony,“. . . installing headsets forgoing to, it would have a tendency for us to provide more narration,to do.”

the passengers, waswhich we didn’t want

1.17.2 Grand Canyon Air Tours

According to information provided by the Grand Canyon Flight OperatorsAssociation, about 350,000 to 400,000 passengers flew over the Grand Canyon each yearon scenic air tour aircraft. The assocation estimated that the Grand Canyon air tourindustry generated about $50 to $80 million in revenue annually.

The former president of the Grand Canyon Flight Operators Associationtestified that the association included 32 of the 44 companies that operated air tourflights over the Grand Canyon. The operators were based in Arizona, California, Nevada,New Mexico, and Utah. The association began in 1970 as an informal alliance ofoperators. At the time of the accident, the association had as its four main goals “. . . topromote aviation safety, to promote aviation, to serve as a vehicle for communicationamong the operators, and to lobby governmental agencies on the members’ behalf.”

Membership in the association was voluntary. The association had noenforcement authority against operators who were considered to have been conductingflights in an unsafe manner. Operators generally developed their own routes andaltitudes, or, like Helitech, used the routes and altitudes that had been developed byothers. The FAA did not suggest routes or altitudes to operators. Those operating under14 CFR Part 135 published their routes in operations manuals which were examined by theFAA in its routine surveillance of operators.

Following the accident, the association drafted a letter of agreement betweenthemselves and the FAA regarding the conduct of air tour flights. (See appendix G.) Theactivities that the operators would perform, according to the letter, were voluntary. Theletter had not been implemented at the time that the FAA proposed new rules regardingflights in the Grand Canyon airspace. Several points in the letter were included in theproposed FAA rules.

1.17.3 National Park Service Actions

The FAA possessed the statutory authority for the regulation of airspace inthe NPS system, which included Grand Canyon National Park. This was recognized by theNPS which administers the National Park system. According to the chief of the Divisionof Resources Management Planning at the park, the NPS was directed to preserve theresources of the Park. He testified that this was “to be foremost in the minds ofmanagement of the units of the National Park Service.”

In 1975 under prqvisions of the Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement ,4ct,the NPS was directed to study the effects of aircraft activity in the Grand Canyon and, if“an injury to the health, welfare, or safety of visitors to the park” was perceived or if itwas believed that aircraft noise would “cause a significant adverse effect on the naturalquiet and experience of the park,” the NPS was to recommend specific actions to theSecretary of the Interior. After reviewing the recommendations, the secretary wouldforward them to the relevant agency.

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The study began in 1981 and was expected to continue for about 3 l/2 years.The process included meeting with representatives of the Grand Canyon air touroperators, environmental groups, and government agencies. According to the NPS, nine.meetings were held from the winter of 1984 through the spring of 1586. However,according to the National Park Superintendent, in 1984, before the study was completed,the NPS identified “the effects of aircraft noise within and above the park . . . as thenumber one resource management issue in the GCNP [Grand Canyon National Park1National and Cultural Resource Management Plan.”

The NPS held a public review period in the fall of 1985 to solicit comments onthe information gathered. Following this period, the NPS examined and analyzed publiccomments and scheduled a second public review period from May 20 to August 1, 1986, toconsider the information gathered and alternatives presented in the Aircraft ManagementPlan. This document, published in the spring of 1986 by the NPS, summarized much of thefindings of the study and public comments on these findings. In addition, it proposed sixalternatives to the operations of Grand Canyon scenic air tour flights. The alternativesconsisted of a range of options from maintaining the existing system of routes andaltitudes to establishing minimum altitudes and “flight free” zones in certain areas. (Seeappendix H.)

As part of the study, the NPS collected data on the extent of the perceivedproblem of aircraft noise. This included documenting instances of noncompliance withAdvisory Circular (AC) 91-36C. (See appendix I.) The AC, effective October 19, 1984,requested pilots to fly at least 2,000 feet above the surface of a National Park area. (Thiswas presented as alternative 2 of the six alternatives included within the AircraftManagement Plan.) However, since much of the South Rim of the Grand Canyon extendsas high as 7,500 feet msl, complying with the provisions of the AC essentially would haveprevented pilots from flying below 9,000 feet msl while over much of the Grand Canyon,an altitude considered impractical for conducting air tours over the Grand Canyon.

Although the NPS had no authority to regulate airspace in the Grand Canyon,the flight operators reacted to what they perceived as the ability of the NPS to influencethe selection of their routes and the conduct of their flights through the study andpotential subsequent legislation. If considered necessary, they would modify aspects oftheir operations, such as their routes in response to perceived NPS influence. Accordingto the director of operations at Grand Canyon Airlines:

The FAA has had minimal impact on the routes in the Canyon,from my experience here at Grand Canyon. The Park Service, onthe other hand, has had not only in the 6 years that I’ve been here,7 years, over the years, the Park Service has had considerableinfluence on where we flew our airplanes.

Similarly, the former president of the Grand Canyon Flight Operators Associationtestified that the NPS:

. . . did not come out and” ask directly, please do this or please dothat. Or you will do that or you will do this. And they have madeit very clear that anything that we can do within reason, perhapsshould be [done] .

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1.17.4 Federal Aviation Administration Actions

The Las Vegas Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) was responsible forperforming surveillance of Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators who were based at theGrand Canyon. Surveillance of other Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators such asthose based in Phoenix or Los Angeles was performed by the FSDO closest to theiroperations base.

The type and extent of surveillance that the FAA performed was determinedby the regulation under which flight operations were being conducted, according tostandard FAA policy, irrespective of the FSDO responsible for performing thesurveillance. Operators that conformed to the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135, althoughthey may have conducted air tours under 14 CFR Part 91, received surveillanceappropriate to Part 135. For example, in 1985 Grand Canyon Airlines received three rampinspections, two on the C-207 and one on the DHC-6. In the 90 days before the accident,the principal operations inspector (POI) performed one en route inspection of a scenic airtour flight. However, since the air tours were conducted under Part 91, the PO1 did notinspect the routes and altitudes published in the operating manual nor did the PO1determine how closely the air tour route conformed to what had been published. Thoseoperating under Part 91, such as Helitech, would not have received a comparable level ofsurveillance.

The airspace in the Grand Canyon was unrestricted and with the exception ofthe GCN airport traffic area was uncontrolled. As a result, most flights in the GrandCanyon were required only to maintain 1 mile visibility, clearance from clouds, and aminimum safe altitude above the surface. In addition, no air traffic control radarfacilities were available in the airspace. Scenic air tour flights were operated undervisual flight rules (VFR) and, as in all flight operations, the pilots were responsible to “seeand avoid” other aircraft.

Grand Canyon Airlines performed some point-to-point scheduled flights duringthe summer season under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135. As a result, Grand CanyonAirlines pilots were trained and certificated under 14 CFR Part 135, and the operator wasrequired to comply with the provisions of those regulations for the scheduled flights.Since Helitech pilots had previously been employed by operators conducting flights similarto those at Grand Canyon Airlines, they also had met the training .and certificationprovisions of 14 CFR Part 135.

Helitech did not obtain an operating certificate under 14 CFR Part 135because it had been operating for only 2 weeks at the time of the accident and thecertification process generally takes considerably more time than that to meet therequirements of 14 CFR Part 135. Shortly before Helitech began operations, the formerpresident of Helitech asked an FAA PO1 at the Las Vegas FSDO about obtaining a Part135 operating certificate. The PO1 informed him that the FAA “workload was suchthat . . . he [the PO11 probably would not be able to even look at it [the Part 135application] for 3 months.” The chief of the FSDO testified that his interpretation of theconversation between the PO1 and the former president of Helitech was different. Hebelieved that the former president of Helitech was familiar with the application processand, therefore, was aware of the steps involved and the time required to obtaincertification under 14 CFR Part 135. As a result, since Helitech was scheduled to operateduring the summer through early fall, the former president of Helitech decided topostpone applying for the Part 135 operating certificate until early 1987.

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The PO1 of Grand Canyon Airlines had held that position since April 1, 1986.She was responsible for the surveillance of 15 operators who had been conductingoperations under 14 CFR Part 135. She estimated that she spent about 20 percent of hertime in surveillance activities. According to the chief of the Las Vegas FSDO, the PO1“could use more time” for her surveillance activities, but he was reluctant to say that theamount of time she had available was “inadequate.” The Las Vegas FSDO was responsiblefor the operating certificates of 31 air taxis operating under 14 CFR Part 135; 5 of thesewere commuter operators. In addition, they were responsible for the surveillance of threeair carriers operating under 14 CFR Part 121 and four operators operating under 14 CFRPart 125. The former president of the Grand Canyon Flight Operators Associationtestified that the relationship between the Las Vegas FSDO and the scenic air touroperators was good. Moreover, he added that the FSDO has been ffexceptionallyresponsive” to the requests of the air tour operators.

In 1984 the FAA, NPS, and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), entered into aletter of agreement in which the FAA agreed to perform the following actions with regardto aircraft noise in the Grand Canyon: communicate to pilots the need to reduce aircraftnoise in certain areas; investigate NPS and FWS reports of violations by pilots of minimumaltitude recommendations; make available to NPS and FWS the status of thoseinvestigations; and participate with the NPS and FWS in meetings to assist in reducingaircraft noise. (See appendix J.)

Representatives of both the FAA and the NPS testified that each had compliedwith the terms of the letter of agreement. Moreover, both the FAA and the NPS met todiscuss the environmental concerns of the NPS. The Manager of Quality Assurance Staff,Air Traffic Division at the FAA’s Western Pacific Region, testified that meetings hadbeen held regularly in the years preceding the accident. However, he testified that duringthose meetings:

. . . we have told the Park Service people that our primary concernwas for aviation safety, and the safe, expeditious movement of airtraffic through the national air space system. While wecommiserated with their environmental concerns, we would nottake an arbitrary position to restrict air space over or in thecanyon to deny sightseeing aircraft.

On August 17, 1983, a Piper PA-31-350 operating as Las Vegas Airlines flight88, a scheduled sightseeing flight from Las Vegas to GCN, crashed in the Grand Canyonkilling the pilot and all nine passengers onboard. 4/ As a result of this accident, on May31, 1984, the Safety Board issued Safety Recomme%dation A-84-52 to the FAA:

Examine the operating procedures used by Grand Canyonsightseeing tour operators and, if necessary, develop and publishstandards for operating procedures, including route selection, flightscheduling, and altitude selection for sightseeing flights in theCanyon, and require that operators incorporate these standards intheir operations specifications.

- - - - - - -.7TFor more detailed information, read Aircraft Accidentplight 88, Piper PA-31-350, Grand Canyon, arizona, August

Report-“Las Vegas Airlines,17, 1983” (NTSB/AAR-84/05).

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In its response to the recommendation, dated August 14, 1984, the FAApromised to implement certain actions. However, none of these actions called for thedevelopment and publication of standards for route and altitude selection and flightscheduling for Grand Canyon scenic air tour flights as called for in the recommendation.Moreover, in the course of its investigation into the June 18, 1986, midair collision, theSafety Board was unable to determine that the FAA had ever planned or carried out suchactivities. Therefore, the Safety Board has classified this recommendation as Wlosed-Unacceptable Action.l’

On December 4, 1986, the FAA issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)86-21 to modify the regulations governing flights over the Grand Canyon. (Seeappendix K.) The NPRM proposed promulgation of a temporary Special Federal AviationRegulation @FAR) to modify the regulation of the Grand Canyon airspace. Following theexpiration of the SFAR on June 15, 1987, the NPRM would promulgate a final, permanentrule incorporating many of the provisions of the SFAR. The SFAR would accomplish thefollowing:

1. Establish a Special Flight Rules area from the surface to 9,000 feetmsl in the Grand Canyon airspace.

2. Prohibit aircraft that are not under 14 CFR Part 135 fromoperating in the Special Flight Rules area.

3. Require operators in the Special Flight Rules area to submit theirroutes and altitudes for review and approval by the Las VegasFSDO and require operators to adhere to those routes andaltitudes.

4. Require pilots in the Special Flight Rules area to monitor certaincommon radio frequencies and make position reports, over thosefrequencies, after passing over prominent landmarks, according totheir operations specifications.

According to the NPRM:

In effect, the rule would generally prohibit flight below theapproximate rim level of the canyon except those flights necessaryfor operation of the park and for provision of emergency services.In addition, the rule would restrict aircraft operations in theairspace between the rim and 9,000 feet msl to aircraft with apark-related need to be in the area and to commercial tour aircraftwhich meet extensive equipment, experience, training, andoperational requirements.

Because it required the Las Vegas FSDO to approve the routes and altitudes ofall Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators, the NPR’M would increase the workload of theLas Vegas FSDO. However, FAA personnel did not believe that the increased workloadcaused by the NPRM would hamper their ability to effectively implement the rules. FAApersonnel testified that following the initial heavy workload caused by approving theroutes and altitudes of all Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators, the FSDO workloadwould diminish and eventually become more routine.

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1.17.5 Actions of the Department of the Tntqrioy

The Department of the Interior maintained a separate Office of AircraftServices that was based in Boise, Idaho. In April 1985, in preparation for the publicreview of the NPS study of the aircraft noise issue at the Grand Canyon, a representativeof that office rode on several sightseeing flights over the Grand Canyon. He payed theregular fare and did not identify himself to any of the operators as a Federal official.

He found that the flights were conducted in accordance with existing FAAregulations. However, in his opinion, one flight, conducted by a helicopter operator thathas since ceased operations in the Grand Canyon, was hazardous since it was conducted aslow as 20 feet above the Colorado River. As a consequence, on May 7, 1985, therepresentative wrote to the NPS that:

Existing Federal Aviation Regulations, when applied to the GrandCanyon flying environment, are quite liberal. This causes concernin the area of aviation safety when considering such potential risksas midair collisions and wire strike accidents. The commercialoperators appear to be regulating themselves to a degree, but is itenough? It appears not. General Aviation and military aircraftminimua altitude restrictions are even more liberal than those forthe commercial operators. It is felt an aviation safety problemexists in the Grand Canyon.

Moreover, he wrote several additional memos to his superiors and to the NPSin which he stated his belief that there was an aviation safety problem at the GrandCanyon. In particular, he believed that flights in the “inner gorge” of the canyon, thenarrow inner canyon along the Colorado River extending upward several hundred feetfrom the surface, should be prohibited. He also expressed these views to the GrandCanyon Flight Operators Association and actively participated, as a member of a workinggroup involved in the aircraft management planning process at Grand Canyon NationalPark, during meetings held by the NPS in 1985 and 1986.

1.17.6 Visibility and Conspicuity

Both the director of operations of Grand Canyon Airlines and the formerpresident of Helitech testified that aircraft colors were not a factor influencing theability of pilots to “see” or visually detect and perceive other aircraft. The director ofoperations testified that aircraft movement and size were significant factors in suchdetection, but color was not. The former president of Helitech testified that:

. the Canyon is like a chameleon. It’s alwavs changing. I’ve seen%ys out there when an orange helicopter disappears into an orangewall. When conditions, meteorological conditions in [different]times of year, various sun angles, diffusions by clouds and so forth,any aircraft at one time or another can blend in where it’s almostinvisible. Because the Canyon, like I say, has so many variedconditions of light and so forth. Generally speaking, I have neverhad any degree of difficulty in picking out the traffic out there.

He also testified that although witnesses reported that the pilot of the Bell2065 generally wore a baseball cap while he flew, he had seen the pilot before theaccident flight and the pilot was not wearing a cap at that time. Woreover, he had knownthat the pilot had worn such caps in flight and, after he joined Helitech, asked him not towear them.

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ANALYSIS

2.1 General

The flightcrew of the DHC-6 and the pilot of the Bell 206B were properlycertificated and qualified in accordance with the applicable regulations for theirrespective, local sightseeing flights. There were no medical or behavioral factorsidentified which could have affected their ability to conduct the flights. Both aircraftwere certificated and maintained in accordance with applicable regulations andestablished maintenance procedures. Examination of the wreckage of both aircraftrevealed no evidence of precollision structural failure, malfunction, or other abnormality.

Visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident and therewere no adverse winds reported. No weather factors that could have limited the ability ofeach pilot to see the other aircraft or to control his aircraft and avoid the other wereidentified.

In view of these findings, the Safety Board examined the operational andhuman performance factors related to each flight to determine why the pilots of the twoaircraft failed to “see and avoid” each other. The Safety Board also examined thesurveillance that the FAA performed on Grand Canyon sightseeing flights and the actionsof the NPS relative to such flights both independently and with the FAA to determine howthese agencies influenced the conduct of sightseeing flight operations. The Safety Boardalso focused on the role of the Grand Canyon Flight Operators Association to determinetheir influence on sightseeing flight operations. Finally, the crash, fire, and rescueefforts in the Grand Canyon were examined for their effect on passenger survivability.

2.2 The Accident

The lack of data from cockpit voice recorders, flight data recorders, as well asthe air traffic control radar recorders prevented the Safety Board from reconstructing theflightpaths of the two aircraft before the collision. Without these data the Safety Boardwas unable to definitively analyze the pilots’ abilities to “see and avoid” each other.Based on an examination of the wreckage of the aircraft, the Safety Board believes thatthe following events occurred in the collision sequence:

0 The left side of the DHC-6 and the right side of theBell 206B sustained the initial impact.

0 The main rotor blade of the Bell 206B struck and severed thenose gear of the DHC-6.

0 The opposite blade of the Bell 206B struck the aft portion ofthe fuselage of the DHC-6.

0 The fuel cell of the DHC-6 ruptured and created the vaporouscloud of fuel that the witnesses on the Colorado River mostlikely had observed.

0 The rotor head of the Bell 206B separated, concurrent withdisintegration of the rotor head and blades.

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0 Debris from the disintegrating rotor blade struck the left sideand tail of the DHC-6.

0 The tail of the DHC-6 separated creating a loss of control.

0 The DHC-6 pitched over, rotated, and struck the ground inan inverted position.

0 The Bell 206B free-fell to the ground following the rotorseparation.

2.3 Human Performance

There were no obstructions to the vision of the pilots found inside eitheraircraft. Although it is not known whether the Bell 206B pilot wore a baseball-type capat the time of the accident, had he peen wearing such a hat, its bill would not necessarilyhave obscured his view of the airplane. This is because the airplane would have appearedto the helicopter pilot about level with the design eye reference point of the helicopter, apoint in his vision unobstructed by the hat. At the same time, there is no evidence thatthe color of either aircraft limited the ability of the pilots to see the other. Thus, thepilots of both aircraft should have been able to “see and avoid” each other.

The evidence indicates that the pilots possessed considerable experience in thetype of aircraft they were flying and in operating those aircraft on Grand Canyonsightseeing flights. Because of the level of their experience, the pilots should haveanticipated and been prepared for the presence of other aircraft near Srvstal Rapids evenwithout a position report from another pilot over the voluntary reporting frequency sinceCrystal Rapids was a highlight of many of the Grand Canyon air tours,

Due to the lack of flightpath data, the Safety Board was unable to assess withcertainty the visibility of each aircraft to the flightcrew of the other. Nevertheless,based on the sizes of the aircraft and their probable positions before the collision, theSafety Board believes that each aircraft should have been visible to the pilots of the otheraircraft at least 60 seconds before the collision. At that point, the Bell 206B hadreported west of Men&us Temple, while the DHC-6 would most likely have been in anortherly heading over the river. Also, at that point the aircraft were about 3 l/2 milesfrom each other and should have been large enough to have been visible to the crew of theother aircraft. This is particularly so since there were no obstructions to pilot visibilityidentified in the cockpit of either aircraft. Consequently, the Safety Board could notexplain or determine why the pilots of both aircraft failed to see each other in time toavoid the accident.

Nevertheless, the Safety Board believes that certain aspects of the operationof both the DHC-6 and the Rell 206B were deficient. Specificallv, the lack of limitationsto the flight and duty times of the flightcrew members of the DHC-6, and the absence ofan intercom or public address system on the Bell 206B detracted from the safety of bothoperations. Grand Canyon Airlines operated its scenic air tour flights under 14 CFRPart 91; therefore, it was not required to limit the flight and duty times of its pilots tothat of others, operating point-to-point flights under 14 CFR 135.265. As a result, thesecond-in-command of the DHC-6 had accrued 160 hours of flight time in the 30 davsbefore the accident. This exceeded the maximum number of flight time hours allowed in

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14 CFR Part 121 and 14 CFR 135.265 by 40 hours. Although he was reported to be restedbefore the accident, without more information the Safety Board cannot determine theextent to which he may have been fatigued at the time of the accident.

Further, the Safety Board believes that the hours flown in scenic air tourflights can be especially tiring since the aircraft generally have no autopilots and they areflown predominantly at low altitudes, where there is often turbulence and the pilot mustexercise vigilance at all times to “see and avoid” other aircraft. Simultaneously, theynarrate highlights of the air tour. Conversely, in most Part 121 operations and in many ofthe Part 135 operations in which flight time maximums apply, autopilots generallv controlmuch of the aircraft functions. At the same time, many of these flight regimes occur athigh altitudes with little or no turbulence, little conflicting traffic and lower pilotworkload. Despite the fact that those flights, in general, are less fatiguing to pilots thanGrand Canyon scenic air tour flights are, flight and duty time maximums apply to thoseoperations and not to the air tour flights. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that toreduce the potential fatigue, the FAA should apply to revenue air tour operations thesame flight and duty time limitations that apply to operations conducted under14 CFR 135.265.

The Safety Board also believes that the practice of Helitech pilots turningtheir heads toward passengers to narrate tours compromi.sed their abilitv to “see andavoid** other air traffic . Although the former president of Helitech testified that thecollision occurred at a point where there would have been no narration, the Safety Boardcould not determine, due to the absence of cockpit voice recorders, whether the Bell 206Bpilot had been turning his head to talk to passengers at the time of the collision.Regardless, the Safety Board believes that any unnecessary activity that detracts fromthe ability of pilots to “see and avoid” other aircraft should be prohibited. Therefore, theSafety Board urges the FAA to require that pilots of revenue and tour flights use a publicaddress system, intercom, or similar system while narrating air tour flights.

2.4 Grand Canyon Flight Operations

The Safety Board believes that the Grand Canyon airspace, in general,presented few hazards to flight operations. Visual meteorological conditions existedthroughout much of the year and there were no obstructions above the rims to endangeraircraft. In fact, despite the considerable volume of uncontrolled traffic in the GrandCanyon airspace, there had not been a midair collision there in almost 3 decades beforethe accident.

However, before the accident, the Office of Aircraft Services of theDepartment of the Interior identified two hazards to flight safety in the Grand Canyonairspace: the narrow area, just above the Colorado River, known as the inner gorge,where flying was considered to be dangerous due to the limited airspace available foraircraft maneuvering; and, the possibility of a midair collision over the Grand Canyon.

In addition, the Safety Board believes that several factors, together with thosementioned, further reduced the safety of flight operations in the Grand Canyon airspace,particularly those of scenic air tour operators. Perhaps most important of these factorswas the limited number of scenic points and the similarity of routes, within the GrandCanyon airspace along which many of these operators flew. As a result, the Safety Boardbelieves that the risk of midair collision was higher along the scenic points where air touraircraft operated than elsewhere in the Grand Canyon airspace.

-24-

While some scenic air tour operators attempted to assign separate altitudesalong the air tour routes according to aircraft type, the system was an informal one thatwas not followed by all flight operators. Therefore, pilots could not expect other aircraftto consistently maintain standardized altitudes, particularly since violators of theinformal altitude separation system received no official warnings, reprimands, orenforcement actions.

Moreover, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, aircraft with substantiallydifferent flight characteristics, shared the same airspace. The mix of aircraft typescreated little risk to air safety as long as the aircraft were separated by altitude.However, with neither altitude nor route separation, the variety and number of aircrafttypes within a narrow corridor of airspace increased the risk of a collision. In addition,because there was no external air traffic facility to either monitor or control aircraftseparation, the risk of a collision further increased. Consequently, pilots could notreliably anticipate the flightpaths or characteristics of the aircraft they mightinadvertently encounter along the air tour routes;

The Safety Board believes that the danger of a midair collision was greatest inthe area of the routes used by the scenic air tour operators. When the rotary-wingoperators modified their entry and exit points on April 1, their routes were brought closerto those of Grand Canyon Airlines. The new route of the helicopter operators intersectedwith that of Grand Canyon Airlines in the vicinity of Crystal Rapids, the area in which thecollision occurred, at a point where the DHC-6 would have been in a right bank and theBell 206B in straight and level flight. Although Grand Canyon Airlines requested thattheir pilots fly at 7,000 feet msl, and the helicopter operators generally flew 500 feetbelow that, the collision indicated that altitude separation according to aircraft type wasnot consistently followed. The Safety Board believes that the modification of the entryand exit points of the rotary-wing operators placed their routes closer to those of GrandCanyon Airlines at a point where the Grand Canyon Airlines airplanes would be in a rightturn. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that modification of the helicopter routes, andthe lack of oversight on aircraft separation within the routes contributed to the accident.

2.4.1 FAA Oversipht

Since many of the scenic air tour flights were carried out under 14 CFRPart 91, under existing rules the FAA was not required to perform routine surveillance onthose operations. As a result, they did not examine the separation among the routes andthe altitudes used by the local air tour operators, require adherence to those routes andaltitudes or oversee changes to them. Consequently, when helicopter operators modifiedtheir routes, the FAA did not examine the new routes for their potential effect onaircraft separation and clearance.

In 1984 the Safety Board recommended that the FAA examine the procedures,and, if necessary, develop and publish standards for route and altitude selection by GrandCanyon scenic air tour operators. This investigation revealed that this had not been done.The FAA inaction could have been due to the difficulty of requiring compliance ofoperators, flying under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91, with published altitudes androutes. However, the Safety Board believes that if the FAA, through its rulemakingprocedures, had modified the existing Federal aviation regulations to implement oversightof Grand Canyon scenic air tolAr flights, it likely would have recognized that the fixed-wing and rotary-wing scenic air tour routes intersected near Crystal Rapids and the riskof a midair collision could have been reduced had the operators been apprised of this.

c

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Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the failure of the FAA to oversee and examinethe routes and altitudes of Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators contributed to theaccident.

However, Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators were based in a variety oflocations including Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake City. While the FAA’s Las VegasFSDO possessed the jurisdiction over Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators who werebased at the Grand Canyon as well as those based in Las Vegas, the fact remains that hadthe FAA possessed the necessary jurisdiction, the surveillance of operators basedelsewhere would have been carried out by the FSDOs that were closest to them. ThoseFSDO’s could not have been as familiar with the special requirements of Grand Canyonscenic air tour operators as was the Las Vegas FSDO. Therefore, because of thegeographic separation among the FSDO’s and the unique requirements of each,surveillance of the scenic air tour operators would not have been as effective as it couldhave been had one FSDO overseen all operations traversing the Grand Canyon.

The Safety Board was pleased to learn that the FAA intends to address thedeficiencies in oversight and surveillance that have been identified as a result of thisaccident. By initiating the process through NPRM 86-21 to modify the rules under whichGrand Canyon scenic air tours are conducted, the exemption to 14 CFR Part 135 forGrand Canyon air tour operations will be removed. The NPRM will require thoseoperators to develop an operations manual with specified routes and altitudes. Themanuals will be subject to FAA approval, thereby requiring compliance with its contents,including routes and altitudes. Furthermore, by placing the approval authority for themanual with the office with the most experience in Grand Canyon sightseeing operations,the Las Vegas FSDO--the FAA will be able to examine the routes of those operatorsperforming sightseeing flights over the Grand Canyon. In addition, according to theSFAR proposed in the NPRM, by restricting the accessability of the Grand Canyonairspace to transient general aviation and military aircraft, only air tour operatorsfamiliar with the particular demands of flight in the airspace encompassing the GrandCanyon will be permitted to fly there. The Safety Board believes that implementation ofthese procedures should enhance Grand Canyon flight safety by providing the FAA withthe needed authorization to ensure compliance with its directives concerning the conductof flight operations there.

At the same time, the Safety Board believes that in order for the FAA toexercise the oversight authority outlined in the rules proposed in the NPRM, the FAAmust reduce the workload of the staff of the Las Vegas FSDO. The Safety Board isconcerned about the potential implications of the response of the PO1 to the formerpresident of Helitech when the latter sought 14 CFR Part 135 certification for thecompany. The POI, according to the former president, informed him that due to workloaddemands, the FSDO could take no action on the application for 3 months. Although thechief of the FSDO testified that the PO1 did not believe that the request of Helitech wasa serious one, FAA personnel admitted that the FSDO workload was high. The SafetyBoard believes that the PO1 in the interest of promoting flight safety should haveencouraged operators to seek the operating certificate requiring the highest possiblestandards of operations and maintenance. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that theworkload of personnel at the FSDO at the time of the accident was high and for theproposed rules to be effective that workload must be reduced.

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APPENDIXE

PHOTOGRAMMETRYANALYSIS

3.0 Methodology '

Several measurements and calculations were made toestablish various parameters of the photograph.

1, The lens was reported to be'a two position lens (35mnor 60mm) and was reported to be set on the 60mm position.It was a Mjnolta AF Tele 35-60 two position zoom lensmounted on a 35mm camera body. The data and photograph areconsistent with a 60mm lens setting and are not consistentwith a 35mm lens setting.

2. The negative size was measured at .94 X 1.42 inches.

3. The photograph size was measured at 6.63 X 9.88 inches.

4. The apparent focal length (af) of the photograph wascalculated to be 417.5 mm or 16.44 inches.

af = lens focal length * photo size / negative size

af = 60mm * 9.88 in / 1.42 in = 417.5 mm

5. The horizon was established at the head height of theoccupants in the boats farther down river.

6. .The tilt angle was established at about 10.1 degrees bymeasuring the sighting angle from the horizon to the centerof the photograph.

7. Four points are identified on the photograph and thefour positions are numbered and identified as Xs on thetopographic map.

8. The impact pocnts of both airplanes are identified ascircled dots on the topographic map.

9. Ballistic data indscate that the helicopter wouldtravel about 21013 feet ground distance and fall about 2903feet from the collision to ground impact. The airplanewc?uld travel about 1530 feet ground distance and fall about2700 feet fro17 the collision to ground impact. The

APPENDIX E -3%

distance traveled was based on the weights of the aircraft,the speed that each were traveling (100 knot true airspeedestimated), and CDS values of 5 square feet for thehelicopter and 75 square feet for the airplane (CDS is theeffective drag coefficient multiplied by the effectivefrontal area). Each of the parameters above was variedover a reasonable range and the range of change in thecalculated distance traveled was less than +lOO feet forthe helicopter and less than +200 feet for fhe airplane.

10. On the topographic map, the circled X represents thepoint of collision which is 2100 feet from the helicopterimpact point, 1800 feet from the airplane impact point, andin line with the relative position of the vaporous cloudseen in the photograph (represented by a dashed line ontopographic map).

11. The sighting angles from the horizon to the fourpoints in the photograph were measured and then used inconjunction with the reported elevation of each point abovethe river to derive the distance from each point to thecamera. The calculations are in the form of:

range fro7 camera to point =

(po'nt elevation - river elevation)tan (sighting angle)

The river elevation was 2320 feet at the camera position.

POINT SIGHTING POINT RANGE (FT)ANGLE ELEVATION

: 10.2 10.3 3360 2960 3521 5780

3 14.0 3200 35254 18.8 3200 2820

12. The range from each point to the camera position wasplotted on the topographic map resulting in a cameraposition defined by the cross line near the letter IIN" inthe word "GRANITE".

13. The measure3 range from the camera position to thecollision position is about 12,300 feet.

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14. The sighting angle from the horizon to the vapor cloudwas measured at 18.8 degrees.

15. The altitude of the collision was calculated to be6507 feet where:

altitude = river elevation + range * tan (angle)

altitude = 2320 + 12,300 * tan (18.8)

= 6507 feet

16. Possible errors in the reconstruction were consideredand defined below:

SOURCE OF ERROR ERROR ALTITUDELIMIT ERROR

1. Position on river +lOO feet +34 feet-

2. Position of collision 2200 feet +68 feet

3. Sighting angle t.2 degrees +50 feet

4. Focal length of lens tlmm +54 feet

Combining the errors using RSS (root sum square of theerrors) results in a ~106 feet error limit.

17. The collision altitude is reconstructed to be at 65372 106 feet m.s.1.

APPENDIX E

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APPENDIX P

LETTER FROM GRAND CANYON FLIGHT OPERATORS ASSOCIATION

GKAND CAkYUi! FLlGtiT Or’ERATORS ASSOCIATIONPost Office Box 3038

Grand Canyon,AZ 86023(602) 638-2463 r

February 27, 1985

TO: ALL MEMBERS OF GRAND CANYON FLIGHT OPERATORS ASSOCIATION

Dear Sir,

This is an URGENT request to all flight tour operators to helpalleviate the growing noise problem at Hermit's Rest.

Since early 1984 most flight tour operators have moved theirCanyon exit point from Shoshone to Hermit's Rest. This hascaused a large increase in the number of complaints from hikerson the Boucher and Hermit's trails because most pilots areflying (10 out of 12) DIRECTLY over Hermit's Rest complex.According to the agreement between the National Park Service,the FAA and the G.C.F.O.A., the aircrafts'are to avoid theentire Hermit's .Basin as far west as Cocopa Point (see attachedmap and refer:to the agreement, area 6).

With the advent of increased hiking during the spring months,the number and severity of complaints will certainly increase--much to the detriment of our status with the NPS. Therefore,please inform all of your pilots to be aware of this noiseproblem and to adjust their flight paths accordingly.

Thank you for your cooperation regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

-Bob Donaldson-President

RJD/pdk

enclosure

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APPENDIX G

LETTER OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIONAND GRAND CANYON FLIGHT OPERATORS ASSOCIATION

Pratt dated July 3 , 1986 . . .

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND GRAND CANYON FLIGHT OPERATORS‘A S S O C I A T I O N

LETTER OF AGREEMENT

E F F E C T I V E D A T E : Julv 3 1 . 1 9 8 6

SUBJECT: Recommended Aircraft Flight Procedures within Grand Canyon NationalPark for Members of the Association

1. PURPOSE: This Letter of Agreement establishes procedures for aircraft operationsby Association members within all areas of Grand Canyon National Park, It is theunderstanding of Association members that this will serve as the basis for issuanceof Operations Specifications for commercial flight operations at Grand Canyon NationalPark in accordance with the provisions hereof. This Agreement further sets forththe areas over or within the Grand Canyon National Park in which the flight of air-craft shall be avoided below the altitudes specified herein, as well as appropriatesafe separations of aircraft and apllicable noise abatement procedures.

(The Purpose Section hereof is subject to Revision for Final Form)

2. SCOPE OF AGREEMENT:

[Exact wording of this Section, SCOPE, has not been determinedat time of this submission; howea is contemplated that thisSection shall apply to all commercial flight operations by Members

of the Association)

3 . N O N - F . A . A . R E G U L A T I O N :

[Wording of this Section not determined at time of this submission)

4 . PRIMARY POINTS OF INTEREST: See Exhibi t “A” at tached hereto.

5. OPERATOR RESPONSIBILITIES: Members are agreeable to adoption of the followingprocedures into their Operations Specifications:

A. Use of Discreet Frequencies: Operators shall be responsible for monitoringpublished (on charts) position reporting frequencies while conducting GrandCanyon sightseeing operations; further , Operators shal l posi t ion reportas set forth in Exhibit “A” in accordance with the following:

(1) Ident i f icat ion of type of Aircraf t(2 1 Position (Point of Reference location)(3) A l t i t u d e ,14) Direction

B. VHF Radios: Operators shall ensure that his/her aircraft has at least two(2) fully functional communication radios prior to entry of the GrandCanyon. Failure of a radio will consitute grounds for termination of therespective sightseeing flight.

C. Passenger Intercom or ICS System: Operators shall equip his/her aircraftwith an intercom or passenger address system so that crew should neverbe required to take his/her eyes from outside the cockpit.

D. Aircraft Visibility: Operators shall comply with the following at the earliestpracticable time:

f 1 I All aircraft shall fly with all available lights on at alltimes in Grand Canyon, save and except, either taxior landing lights may be used one at a time.

APPENDIX G -44 -

(2) All helicopters shall comply with O.A.S. (Officeof Aircraft Services) high visibility paint on rotorblades.

E. Experience and Training Requirements: Operators shall require and adhereto the requirements set forth in FAR 135.244 and 135.299 pertaining toOperating Experience and Route/Line checks for Grand Canyon sightseeingirrespective of whether such Operator is within the definition of CommuterAir Carrier as defined in Part 298.

F . A . T . I . S . a n d V . O . R . M o n i t o r i n g : Operators shall monitor any advisoryservice established for Grand Canyon sightseeing, including both ATIS andVOR frequencies.

G. Noise-Sensitive Areas: Operators acknowledge that the areas set forth beloware noise-sensitive and that sightseeing flight operations shall not beconducted therein :

(1) The Inner Gorge which shall be further definedby Operator Agreement; and

(2 1 Thunder River/Deer Creek Falls area; and(3) Toroweap; and(4 1 Developed areas of the Rim of the Grand Canyon,

including, but not limited to, the South Rim Villagearea of paved road.

H. Tour Operator Route Manual: Operators shall prepare and submit their routesand altitudes of sightseeing flights to the Association for the purpose ofcompiling an Official Tour Operator Manual for distribution to all Members.lnformation contained in such Manual shall not be changed by any Memberwithout prior Notification to all other Association members and an opportunityto comment by them. It is intended that such Manual shall be used as atraining tool for all new and/or existing Tour Operators.

I. Adopted Map: Operators shall use U.S. C. S. map N3600 for the Grand Canyonin all training and route preparation/presentations until such map isreplaced by majority vote of the Members.

J. Flight Levels and Minimum Altitudes: Operators are in agreement to utiliz-ation of the following flight level ranges:

( 1 I FAR 135 & Commercial FAR 91 helicopter operators: Surface to 7500’ mslWest of Mooney Falls; 5000’ to 7500’ MSL while in Grand Canyon NationalPark.

(2) FAR 135 E Commercial FAR 91 Fixed Wing operators: 3500’ to 8500’ MSLin all quadrants of Grand Canyon National Park,

(3) Operators strongly recommend flight levels of other operators as follows:la I FAR 91 non-commercial operators:(blMilitary/Commercial Jets:

8500’ MSL in all quadrants of CCNP:18,500’ MSL in all quadrants of GCNP;

(cl Military reciprocating aircraft and military helicopters: 8500’ MSLin all quadrants of GCNP.

K. Routes: As set forth in Member Operator’s individual submissions for theRoute Manual (see “H” above).

6. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: Members shall prepare and signifytheir adherence to by’ signing a Code of Professional Responsibility for Grand Canyonsightseeing operations. Failure to comply with such Code shall be ground for termin-’ation of Membership in the Association or denial of Membership.

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7. ASSOCIATION RECOMMENDATlONS TO THE F.A.A. : Members recognize thatthis Agreement is being prepared in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulations(FAR’s) in existence at time of preparation; it is specifically understood that thisAgreement may be amended as such FARs change or flight safety conditions dictate.

It is specifically understood that this Agreement does not reflect all recommendationsof the Association, some of which are currently without regulatory foundation. TheAssociation reserves the right to submit further recommendations to the F.A.A. asdeemed necessary by either the Association or its individual members.

AGREEMENT dated this day of July, 1986, by and between the Federal AviationAdministration and the Grand Canyon Flight Operators Association.

F . A . A . Grand Canyon Flight Operators Assoc.

by by

page 3 of 3.

Attachments/Exhibit “A”

APPENDIX G -46-

he fo l l owing l oca t i ons a r e prfmary points of interests and p o s s i b l eoute c a t e g o r i e s w i t h i n t h e Crond C a n y o n . Subject to the actualou t e pe r e ach company ops . spec s , t h e f o l l o w i n g l o c a t i o n s o f emptla-

sis (*I w i l l b e m a n d a t o r y r e p o r t i n g po in t s .

QUADRANT ONE: ,-f-F I c / aa / A/A,% 1 c’

f: S h o s h o n e P o i n t5: Ange l s Ga te* Juno Temple* Nankoweap Butte* Temple Butte* Ochoa Point* Solomon Temple

Newberry B u t t e* Lye11 But te

Grand Canyon Airport

QUADRANT TWO:

-% Z u n i P o i n t-L Vishnu Temple+ Angels Gate

Z u r o a s t e r T e m p l e( o p t i o n b e t w e e n * Shiva T e m p l eS u b l i m e P o i n t a n d Dragon HeadPima P o i n t 1 * S u b l i m e P o i n t

C r y s t a l R a p i d s-I; Confucius Temple C o l o p a P o i n t

O s i r i s T e m p l e Hermi t s Res tCope But te

J; Pima P o i n t

()IIADEAtI’I THREE:

* Cocopa P o i n t* C r y s t a l R a p i d s*.,Stlbl ime Poin t* H o l y T r a i l T e m p l e

F a n I s l a n d* Wheeler Point* F o s s i l B a y

Paya P o i n t* Moun t S inya l a

Mooney Fa 11 s* Supa i’ Fa l l s

Mt . Wodo9~ T o p a c o b n H i l l t o p* Apache Po in t

Explorers Monument* T o l t e c P o i n t

Signal Hi 11* C a s t o r T e m p l e

Mescalero P o i n tf; Grand C a n y o n A i r p o r t

EXHISIT A

( o p t i o n r o u t e betwccrlZuroaster and Hermit&Rest 1

* I s i s T e m p l e* T o w e r o f S e t

Cope But te* Pima P o i n t

-47-

APPENDIXH

ALTERNATIVESPRESENTEDINGRANDCANYONNATIONALPARKAIRCRAFT MANAGEMENT PLAN

AIRCRAFTMANAGEMENT

PLANENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT

GRAND CANYONNATIONAL PARK

ARIZONA

APPENDIX H -48-

D. ALTERNATIVES

Alternative 1: NO ACTION

The No Action Alternative is defined to be the status quo as ofMay 1986. No Action is essentially defined by the Affected EnvironmentSection of this Environmental Assessment with the addition of the ActionsCommon To All Alternatives Section described above.

Alternative 2: 2,000 FEET ABOVE THE RIM ‘Except as specifically authorized by the Superintendent, no

flights would be allowed lower than 2,000 feet above rim level, as shown onMap 4.

Alternative 3: NO FLIGHTS IN INNER GORGE PLUS FLIGHT-FREE AREAS

Except as specifically authorized by the Superintendent, noflights would be allowed in the Inner Gorge, as shown on Map 5.

Flight-free areas would be established as follows (see Map 6):- Thunder River/Deer Creek,- Toroweap, and- Developed Areas.

Alternative 4: NO FLIGHTS WITHIN 1,500 FEET OF LANDFORMS PLUSFLIGHT-FREE AREAS WITH QUIET AIRCRAFT INCENTIVES

Except as specifically authorized by the Superintendent, noflights would be allowed within 1,500 feet of all landforms and no flightswould be allowed in the Inner Gorge. Landforms would include all land andwater surfaces in the park whether horizontal or vertical.

Flight-free areas would include those areas described in Alterna-tive 3, with the addition of Hermit Creek to Kaibab Trail to North Rim (seeMap 7).

Aircraft certified as meeting Noise Level Standard #l would beallowed to fly no lower than rim level in the following flight-free areas:Toroweap, Thunder River/Deer Creek, and that part of Hermit Creek to KaibabTrail to North Rim which is greater than 1 mile north of the Colorado Riverfrom October 1 to April 30.

Aircraft certified as meeting Noise Level Standard 52 would beallowed to fly no lower than 1,000 feet below rim level year round in thefollowing flight-free areas: Toroweap, Thunder River/Deer Creek, and thatpart of Hermit Creek to Kaibab Trail to North Rim which is greater than1 mile north of the Colorado River.

-Alternative 5: NO FLIGHTS BELOW RIM LEVEL PLUS FLIGHT-FREE AREASWITH QUIET AIRCRAFT INCENTIVES

r

Except as specifically authorized by the Superintendent, noflights would be allowed below rim level, as shown on Map 3.

-49- APPENDIX H

.

permanent flight-free areas would be established as follows (seeMap 8):

- Thunder River/Deer Creek,- Toroweap,- Boucher to Red Canyon to North Rim (including Clear Creek

and Shiva Saddle), and- Developed areas.

Seasonal flight-free areas would be established as follows (seeMap 8):

- Nankoweap to Red Canyon and South Bass to Boucher (noflights from October 1 to April 30), and

- Kanab Creek and Tuckup (no flights from October 1 toApril 30).

Aircraft certified as meeting Noise Level Standard 111 would beallowed to fly no lower than 2,000 feet above rim level in the followingflight-free areas: Thunder River/Deer Creek, Toroweap, Kanab Creek, andthose parts of South Bass to Boucher and Nankoweap to Red Canyon which arenorth of the Colorado River from October 1 to April 30.

Aircraft which are certified as meeting Noise Level Standard #2would be allowed to fly no lower than rim level in the following flight-freeareas : Thunder River/Deer Creek, Toroweap, Kanab Creek, Tuckup, South Bassto Boucher, and Nankoweap to Red Canyon.

An ad hoc advisory group would be established to monitor planimplementation and identify potential changes which may be necessary ordesirable. This advisory group would provide input to the Superintendent.

Alternative 6: 2,000 FEET ABOVE RIM LEVEL PLUS FLIGHT-FREE AREAS

Except as specifically authorized by the Superintendent, noflights would be allowed lower than 2,000 feet above rim level, as shown onMap 4.

Flight-free areas would be the same as in Alternative 5 (seeMap 8) l

An ad hoc advisory group would be established the same as inAlternative 5.

The NPS would request the FAA to shift East-West high altitude jetroutes away from the park.

-5o-

APPENDIX I

ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-36C

!hbjCCl: Dslc: 10/19/84VISUAL FkHr RULES (vFR) FLIGHT Initiafcdby: ATO-

AC No: 9 I-36CChUlgC:

NEAR NOISE-SENSITIVE AREAS

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular encourages pilot6 making VFR flights nearnoise-sensitive areas to fly at altitudes higher than the minimum permitted byregulation and on flight paths which will reduce aircraft noise in euch areas.2. CANCELLATION. Advisory Circular 91-36B, VFR Flight Near Noise-SensitiveAreas, dated March 19, 1982, is cancelled.

3. BACKGROUND.

a. The Federal Aviation Administration continually receives complaintsconcerning low flying aircraft over noise-sensitive areas. These complaints haveprompted requests for regulatory action prohibiting low altitude fl ight overidentif ied noise-sensitive locations. We believe that a satisfactory solutioncan be realized by means of a pilot/industry cooperative endeavor rather thanthrough the regulatory process.

b. Increased emphasis on Improving the quality of the environment requirescontinued effort to provide relief and protection from aircraft noise.

C . Excessive aircraft noise can result in discomfort, inconvenience, orinterference with the use and enjoyment of property, and can adversely affectwi ld l i f e . It is particularly undesirable near outdoor assemblies of persons,churches, hospitals, schools, nursing homes, noise-sensitive residential areas,and National Park Areas which should be preserved a s important historic,cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage.

d. Adherence to t h e pract’ces d e s c r i b e d b e l o w w o u l d b e a p r a c t i c a lindication of pilot concern for environmental improvement, would build supportfor aviation, and forestall possible regulatory action.

b. VOLUNTARY PRACTICES.

a. Avoidance o f no ise -sens i t ive areas , i f pract i ca l , i s pre ferable tooverfl ight at reletively low altitudes.

,

b. P i l o t s o p e r a t i n g f i x e d - a n d r o t a r y - w i n g a i r c r a f t u n d e r VFR o v e rnoise-sensitive areas should make every effort to fly not less than 2,000 feetabove the surface, weather permitting, even though flight at a lower level may beconsistent with the provisions of Federal Aviation Regulations 91.79, MinimumSafe Altitudes.

-51- APPENDIX I

A; 91-3bc 10/19/84

Typical of noise-sensf tive areas are: outdoor assemblies of persons, churches,hospitals, schools, nursing homes, residential areas designated as noisesensitive by airports or by an airport noise compatibility plan or program, andNational Park Areas (including Parks, Forest, Primitive Areas, Wilderness .Areas,Recreational Areas, National Seashores, National Monuments, National Lakeshores,and National.Wildlife Refuge and Range Areas).

* For the purpose of this Advisory Circular, the surface of a Natiqnal qark,.&eais defined as: the highest terrain within 2,000 feet laterally of the route ‘offlight, or the upper-most rim of a canyon or valley.*

NOTE : The intent of the 2,000 feet recommendation is to reduce potentialinterference with wildlife, and complaints of noise disturbances from low-flyingaircraft in canyons and valleys.

c. During departure or arrival from/to an airport, climb after takeoff anddescent for landing should be made so as to avoid prolonged flight at lowaltitudes near noise-sensitive areas.

d. This procedure does not apply where it would conflict with air trafficcontrol clearances or instructions or where an altitude of less than 2,000 feetis considered necessary by a pilot in order to adequately exercise his or herprimary responsibility for safe flight.

5. COOPERATIVE ACTIONS. Aircraft operators, aviation associations, airportmanagers, and others ‘are asked to assist in implementing the procedures containedherein by publicizing them and distributing information regarding knownnoise-sensitive areas.

R. J. Van VurenAssociate AdministFator for Air Traffic, MT-1

Page 2

us Deportmentof 1ranspor10tmFcderol AviationAdftlifWtr0tKUi

Para 4

RETURN POSTAGE GUARANTEED

-52-

APPENDIX J

INTERAGENCY LETTER OF AGREEMENT AMONGFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,

AND THE FISH AND WILDLIPE SERVICE

Iatct8gcncy Agreementbe tveea

Narironal Park Service,Fish and Wildlife Service

F e d e r a l Aviat ion Adminirtrrtioa

This interagency agreement ir among the @lttiontl park Service of the

Departmeut of the Interior, herein8fttr referred to 81 the “NPS,” the Fish

and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Iaterior, hereinafter referred

to 8s the “FUS,” aad the Fader81 Aviatioa Administrotioa of the Department

of Ir8nsport8tion, hereinafter referred t o as the 0FAA.‘N

Wti&REAS, it is the purpore of the NPS to administer Federal parks,

monurntnts, and rtservatiour , for the purpose of conrerviag the scenery and

the natural aad historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for

the enjoyment of the 8ame in such maaner and by such me8ns 88 will leave

them unimpaired for the eajoyment of future generations, aa provided for in

the Act of August 25, 1916, (16 U.S.C. Section 1 et. seq.).

r

WHEREAS, it is the purpose of the FWS to operate and cmint8in certain

Federal lands for the bettermeat of fish and wildlife resources, and for

fish and wildlife research end fish culture, as provided for in the National

Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act (16 U.S.C. Section 668dd et. seq.)

the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. Section 661 et. seq.) and

the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. 7428 et. seq.).

-53- APPENDIX J

UBEBEAS, it is the function of the FM to manage the use of the arvigrble

airspace of the United States , as provided for in the Federal Aviation Act

of 19S8 (49 U.S.C. Sectioa 1301 et. seq.).

WEREAS, the NPS and FWS manage lsads for the putpores of protectingn8tUr81, cultur81, and wildlife resources, xad for promotion of the public

tnjOjfWnt l ud use of these resources.

UIIERl?AS, the FAA, recognizing the values for which XPS sad I7JS lands are

maaged, has tstoblished 2,000 feet above ground level (ACL) as the

requested minimum altitude for aircraft flying in airspace over lrnds

l dntioistered b y the NPS and F US.

WHEREAS, the auditory and visual intrusion of aircraft flying et low

8ltitudes is the source of frequeot public complaint in certain areas

8dministered by the NPS and FUS.

WHEREAS, aircraft flying at lov altitude8 m8y pose a potential hotard to

vildlife ia certain areas administered by the NPS 8nd FUS.

UHEREAS, the FAA, NPS, &ad FUS, while recognizing the public freedom of

transit of the navigable airspace, desire to act in cooperatioo to reduce

the incidence of low flying aircraft, including fixed-viog aircraft,

helicopters, ultral ight vehicles, balloons, 8ad gliders over NPS and FUS

administered lands by seeking voluntary cooperation with the established

2,000 feet minimum requested 81tifUdta

APPENDIX J -54-

IiOW TBEBEFORE :

I . The NPS 8nd FUS agree:

A. To identify specific field units where lov flying aircraft

COUStitUtt 8 conflict with resource values, end to convey specific

inforPretion to the FM for appropriate rctiou as described in this

agreement .

B. To develop and implement a standardized reporting system

acceptable to the FAA to documeat incideats of lov flying aircraft

over NPS and FUS administered lands. This reporting system will

provide for transmittal of such docmentatioa in 8 timely oaaner

to the appropriate FAA Flight Standards District Office.

c. To develop training programs and instructional materials for NPS

and FGIS field personnel to enable them to recognize and reporr

inSt8nCeS of low flying aircraft ia 8 competent and professional

manner. The 1aW enforcement training programs of the NPS and F;S

will be expanded to incorporate this subject matter into mandatory

annual in-service training requirements.

D.. To prepare public infonsatioaal materials, including printed

raatter and audio visual programs, for communicatioa to pilots,

using existing FAX pilot contact meetings and programs, aviation

periodicals, and other means of generating pilot understanding of

NPS and FWS resource management objectives.

c

-55- APPENDIX J

E. To make prtroanel available from the respective rgancfer to meet

wltb the FAA and affected pilots to discuss resource m8nagement

obfrcti~es and issues l socfated with low flying rlrcraft.

II. The FAA agrees:

A. To communicate to pilots coacems and objectives of the lops and

RJS about low flying airaaft Fa spectfied areas, using

rdvfsorfes, bulletins, the FAA publlcatloa’Ceneral Aviation Sews,

the ongoing ‘Accident Prevention Program’ for routine pilot

contact, and othsr means of comunication with pilots.

B. To investigate instances of pilot deviations from FAA minimum

altitude recommendations over areas administered by the ?lPS and

FUS, and take action to discourage repeated deviations with the

objectfve of reducing or eliminating such focidents in these

areas. To impress upon pilots that even though participation in

the progran is not mandatory, pilot participation is strongly

encouraged.

e-. To assirt the NPS and FJS in communicating with the various

agencies of the i)epartment of Defense in regard to prOblemi

associated with military aircraft operations over NPS and WS

administered areas.

D. To make available to the NPS and kwS, on request, at the PA\

Flight Standards District Offices the status and results of

incidents reported by the NPS and FWS.

APPENDIX J -56-

t. To enlist the support of 811 l viatiou groups and organizations by

requesting they publicize problem being encouatered within areas

l dmiaistered by the NPS and FUS.

P. TO assist NPS and FIJS persome in combating ptoblems 8ssociated

with lov flying aircraft by participating ia sppropriate meetings

st f ield aad regional levels .

III. The FM, NPS, sud FWS jointly agree:

A. To assess severe situations where impacts of aircraft operations

upon humsa, cultural, or natural resources are sufficiently

serious to warrant consideration of sitc-rpecific rctioa by the

FM to minimize or eliminate the causes of such problems. Where

appropriate, the FAA vi11 advise the NFS and FUS ou mchniques of

conducting.scientific studies and data collect ion to facil itate

understanding of the impacts of aircraft operations on affected

resources.

IV. For purposes of facilitating comunicatioa in implementing this

agreement, each party has identified the folloviag key contact offices:

NPS Fws FAAVisitor Services Division Associate Director forBranch of Ranger Act iv i t ies

Airspace and AirWildlife Resources Traffic Rules

202-343-3227 202-343-5333 Branch202-626-8783

v. The term o f this agreement is 5 years, commencing upon the date of

signature of the final signatory party to the agreement. The part ies

to this agreement will jointly review the results hereof a t the end of

each calendar year. The agreement may be amended by the written

mutual agreement of all parties.

-57- APPENDIX J

VI. Any p8rty t o

by providing

thir agreement may terminate involvement in the agreement

600days notice to the other parties.

Director, National ParkService Aviation Abminirtration

Director, Fish end Wild-l i f e Serv ice ‘0’

Fish a&l Wildlife andParks

&Date

-58-

APPENDIX K

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 86-21

- - - -TuOS&YOecember 9, 1986

Part V

Department ofTransportationfederal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 91 and 135Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of theGrand Canyon National Park; Notice ofProposed Rulemaking

l

C

APPENDIX K -6O-

Federal Register / Vol. 51. No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, 1Q86 / Proposed Rules 41423

I9!iB, as emended, to regulate endcontrol the u8e of navigable airspace ofthe United States. Under aedion 307(a)of the FAAct (49 USC. X348(e)). theeaency is authorized to develop plan5for and to formulate policy with lwrpectto the use of navigable aimpace and toassign by rule. regulation, or order theu5e of navigable airspace under suchterms, con&lions. and limitation5 a5may be deemed necessary in order IOensure the safety of aircraft and theefficient utilization of such ainpace.Under section 307(c) of the FAAc! (49USC. 1348[c)), the agency is furtherauthorized and directed to prescribe airtraffic rules and regulations governingthe efficient utilization of the navigableairspace for pwposes including theprotection of person5 and properly onthe surface, which the agency he5interpreted to include protection fromthe environmental impacts ofaeaf!overflight.

The Grand Canyon, in Arizona, is aunique area of natural beauty whichattracts nearly 3 million visitors eachyear. The canyon is approximately ~75miles in length and up to 22 miles inwidth between the north and south rims.A large portion of the canyon has beenset aside a5 a National Park operated bythe National Park Service (NPS) of theDepartment of the Interior. Other areasin and around the canyon include indianreservations which are provided cer!ainprotection5 under Federal law.

Airspace above the eurface of theGrand Canyon National Park (GCNP) iswithin the exclusive regulatory authorityof the FAA. The park &elf is operaledby the NPS in accordance with specificFederal statutes. One such s!atute, theGrand Canyon National ParkEnlargement Act of lQ75,16 U.S.C. Z&g,provides that

Whenevur the Secntary bf the W&or]has reason to believe that any aircraft orhelicopter ectivity or operation may beoccurring or eboul Lo oazur within the GrandCanyon National Park.. . in&ding theairspsce below the rims of the caayon. whichis likely to cause an injury to the he&h,welfare. or safety of vi5itors to the park or tocause a significant adverse effeci on thenatund quiet and experience of the park, theSecretary shall submit to the FederalAviation Administration, the EnvinmmentalProtection Agency.. . or other respoasibieagency or agencies 8och complaints.Information. or recommendations for n&aend regulations or other actions a6 habelieves appropriate to protect the publichealth, welfare. and safety or the naturalenvironment within the Park. After reviewirtgthe submission of the Sec~~ery. theresponsible agency aball consider the -t&r.and after consultation with the Se&aryohall take appropriate action to prelect thepark and visitora. _

The Superintendent d the Pa& &I umemorandum dated March lO.¶Q3& m’i55ued a finding &a~ the J&C& activityoccurring over or within the park k -currently causing a rig&cant adverseeffect on the naturai quiet andexperience of the park, and that aircr&activity may be likely to cnu8e an injuryto the healB, welfare or safety ofvisitor5 to the park. The NM ha5 _under!aken to developrecommendation5 for measure8 tomitigate such effect5, following a eerie5of public hearings in 1985 and 1986 andthe eolicitation of comments from thepublic, including environmental gr6up5and air tour operatore. On the basis ofthe above proceoa the Department ofthe Interior. in a letter from tbeAssistant Secretary for Fish andWildlife and Parks, submittedrecommendation5 IO the FAAAdministrator on November l7,19t!6. Inclummary form, the Department ofInterior recommended that tbe FAA:

(1) Adopt eimpace/flight regula!ionawhich:

&-Provide for the reparation ufaircraft, including hebcopters;--Prohibit Rights h Ye inner gorge of

the canyon;-Provide for some nrmfation of nights

between the inner &ge and the <pperrim of the canyon: and

-Establish flight paths over the canyonwhich avoid major viritor overlooksand peregrine nesting areas.(2) Install radar at the Grand Canyon

National Park Airport to abeist inaircraft separation;

(3) Undertake a join! Z-year rtudy,with the NPS, of the impacts of aircraftnoise on !he Park with the object ofadditional regulation to reduce thoseimpacts.Finally. the Department offered toc~mult and cooperate with the FAA inthe implementation of these actions.

The FAA will fully and carefullyconsider the recommendation5 andcontinuing advice of the Depar!ment ofthe Interior in !he development ofaviation safety and environmentalmeasures at GCNP. The Interiorrecommendations will not nececsarilybe reflected in the Drowsed interimSFAR, in view of t&e &mplexity of therecommendatioae. although the SFARdoes address the rewnunendations to -an extent. However, thoserecommendations, and any sukequentinformation and comments offered bythe Department of the Interior. will befully coneidered in the promulgation of apermanent final rule a5 propored in thirnotice.

FAA invohmti with Gmnd Cunycmmwfl&hts. An FAA dptui ireffic

cuibul tower 4 Guw Affpotl directsair traffic arriving at or departing fromthat airport Several &aye and jetroutes pa55 near but no! over the park.ATC doee not otberwbe wntro1 trafficabove the park Mow an altitude of9,000 feet M!% the lowert base ofcontrolled 8hDaw over meal of (beGrand Canyod

FAA renulations a&icable !o VFRfliit abode the Grar8 Canyon areFederal Aviation Regulations (FAR)0 81.~9, Minimum Safe Altitudes;f 135.203, VFR Minimum Altitudes,which applies only to Part 135ooerations: and P 81.109. VFR cruisinnajtihide or flight-bvel. Section 9179(i)require5 that aircraft be operated at analtitude from which a safe landing canbe made in the event of a power failure.section 81.78(c) pllohibits operation offixed-wing aircraft in other thancongested area5 below 300 feet abovethe surface (AGL), except that insparsely populated areas flight may bewnducted at any level but !he aircraftmust not be operated cloeer than 300feet to my pemm. vessel, vehicle orstructure. Section 133.203, in par!,prohibit5 operations during the day byfixed-wing aircraft below 5011 feet abovethe ourface or lee5 than !iOO feethorizontally from any obstacle. Section81-109 requires that aircraft operatingVFR in level cruising fright more than3,ooO feet above the surface mustmaintain “hemispheric” altitudes: anodd thousand plus !%&foot altitude (e.g.7,300 feet MSL) when eastbound and aneven thousand plus !io&foo! altitude(e.g. 6,500 feet MSL] when westbound.The FAA, through FAA AdvisoryCircular QI-~BC, VFR Flight Near Noise-Sensitive Areas, requests pilotsoperating under VFR to remain at least2ooO feet above the surface of certainareas including national parks. Thecircular defines the surface of E nationalpark a5 “the highest terrain within 2OOOfeet laterally of the route of flight, or theupper-moat rim of a canyon or valley.”

The FAA ha5 taken several other non-’regulatory action5 topromote oafety andminimize aircraft noise impacts on theGCNP, including:-Radio frequendee have been

identified for wmmon uBe by air touroperator5 to report aircraft lacation toother aircraft in the are-a.

-The Lao Vega5 Flight StandardsDisMct Office5 ha5 wnducted regularmeeting5 with commercial air touroperaton to ertablish rafety andnoise-abatement goal5 and update thestandardized routes over the canyonused by the operators.

-Advieorie5 conceraing flightoperation5 over the Grand Cenyon ore

A P P E N D I X K

44422 Federal Register / Vol. 51, No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, 1986 / proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORtAflON

Foderrl Avhtion AdminirWatlon

14 CFR PM8 91 l nd 135[Dock81 No. 2514% Wotka No. W-211

Proposed specirl Plight Rules In theVicinity of the Gmnd Canyon titionalewk*Q&CC Federal Aviation ’Administration (FAA). DOT.ACTIONZ Notice of Proposed Rulemaking(NPRM).

9UYMARY: This notice proposes aSnecial Federal Aviation Renulation(iFAR) to establish temporaryprocedures for the operation of allaircraft in the airspace above the GrandCanyon up to an altitude of 9,ooO feetabove mean rea level (A&L). The noticealso proposes a follow-on final rule totake effect unon exoiration of the SFARin June 1987.‘in recent years, the highvolume of air traffic over the GrandCanyon National Park has increased thdrisk of midair collision. The overflightsalso generate noise impacts on parksurface areas to a degree which may beinconsistent with Federal policies foroperation of the park. The proposedSFAR would: (1) Establish a SpecialFlight Rules Area from the surface to9,ooO feet MSL in the area of the GrandCanyon: (2) prohibit flights in this areaunless specifically authorized by thelocal FAA Flight Standards DistrictOffice: and (3) establish certain terrainavoidance and communicationsrequirements for flights in the area. Theproposed final rule would include, inaddition to the general restrictionscontained in the SFAR, (I) provisions topermit access to the special flight rulesarea by general aviation operators,and(2) if supported by evidence, provisionsfor avoidance of certain noise-criticalsites in the park by low-flying aircraft.The proposid rule; would reduce therisk of midair collision, reduce the riskof terrain contact accidents below therim level, and reduce the impact ofaircraft noise on the park environment.DATES Comment d&s: Commente mustbe received on the SFAR on or beforeJanuary 10,1987. Comments must bereceived on the proposed final rule on orbefore March I, 1887.

Hewing date: A public hearing will bebald at 790 p.m. on December 18,1988.&DORIS%A Comments on this proposalmay be mailed in duplicate to:Federal Aviation Administration. Office

of the Chief Counsel, Attention: RulesDocket (AGCZ04). Docket No. 2514%800 Independence Avenue. SW..Washington. DC 20591.

or delivered in duplicate to:FAA Rules Docket, Room 916.808

.

Independence Avenue SW.,Washington, DC.Comments may be examined in the

Rules Docket weekdays, except Federalholidays. between 830 a.m. and 5:oOp.m.

The public hearing will be held at thefollowing location: Airport ConferenceRoom, 5th Floor, Main Terminal BuildingMcCarran International Airport, LasVegas. Nevada.FOR FURTHER INFORYATIOW CONTACT.David L Bennett, Office of the Chief-Counsel, AGG230. Federal AviationAdministration, 880 Independence *Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591.T e l e p h o n e : (202) 287-3073. ,WFFl.8YENTMV INFQRMATION:Cvmments Invited

Interested persons are tnvited toparticipate in this rulemaking bysubmitting such written data, views, orarguments as they may desire on anyportion of the amendment. Commentsthat provide the factual basis supportingthe views and suggestions presented are

particutarly helpful in developingreasoned regulatory decisions.Communications should identify the

regulatory docket number and be:- submitted in duplicate to the addresslisted above. Commenters wishing theFAA to a&nowledge receipt of theircomments must rubmit with those -.comments a self-addressed, stamped ’postcard on which the followinnhatement is made: “CommentsTo

Docket No. 28149.” The nostcard will bedate/time stamped and -&turned to thecommenter. The proposals contained inthis notice may be changed in the lightof comments received. AH commentssubmitted will be available for ‘.. ’examination in the Rules Docket bothbefore and after the closing date forcomments.

in addition to seeking comments onthis amendment, the FAA wiH hold a -public hearing to allow additionui publicinput. The hearing will be held onDecember 16,19&3, at McCarrank;ted;tional Airport. Las Vegas.

Availabiity of DocumentAny person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to theFederal Aviation Administration, Officeof Public Affairs, Attention: Publtclnformation Center. APAq38.800Independence Avenue. SW.,Washington, DC 20581: or by calling(202) 2674471. Communications mu8tidentify the notice number of the NPRM.Persons interested in being placed on a

mailing list for future notices should alsorequest a copy of Advisory Circular No.11-2 which describes the applicationprocedure.

Meeting Prvceclurer- Persons wishing to make a

presentation at the meeting may contactWilliam Patterson at @l3) 297-1858.

persons who plan to attend themeeting should be aware of thefollowinn nrocedures to be followed:

(a) The bearing will be informal innature and will be conducted by thedesignated representative of theAdministrator under 14 CFR 11.33. Eachparticipant will be given an opporiumtyto make a presentation. Questions maybe asked of each presenter by otherparticipants or by representatives of theAdministrator.

(b) The hearing will begin at 7~00 p.m.(local time). There will be no admissionfee or other charge to attend andparticipate. AH sessions will be open toall persons on a space available basis.The presiding officer may accelerate themeeting if it is more expeditious thanplanned.

(c) All meeting sessions will berecorded by a court reporter. Anyoneinterested in purchasing the transcriptshould contact the court reporterdirectly. A copy of the court reporter’stranscript will be filed in the docket.

(d) Position papers or other handoutmaterial relating to the substance of themeeting may be distributed. Participantssubmitting handout materials shouldpresent an original and two copies to thepresiding officer. There should be anadequate number of copies provided-forfurther distribution to all-participants.

(e] Statements made by FAAparticipants at the hearing should not betaken as expressing a final FAAposition.Public Hearing Schedule

The schedule for the meeting is asfollows:Date: December l&1988,7:00 p.m.Pface: Airport Conference Room. 5th

Floor, Main Terminal Building.McCarran International Airport. LasVegas, Nevada

Agenda7zOO to 7:l!j-Presentation of meeting

procedures.7:15 to &&FAA presentation of

proposal.8~15 to finish-Public presentations and

discussion.Background

The FAA has broad authority underthe Federal Aviation Act (FAAct) of

A P P E N D I X K

Federal Register / Vol. 51, No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, 1966 / Proposed Rules 44425

there had been no midair collisions oftwo air tour aircraft since suchoperations began in the 1926’s. The FAAattributes this record in large part to thevoluntary use by the commercial touroperators, whose flights representapproximately 87 percent of the lower-altitude traffic in the area, of standardroute, altitude, and communicationsprocedures. Because each tour operatorflies a standard route over the canyon -and Periodically announces its locationand altitude on a common radiofrequency at designated rePortingpoints, the pilot of each such aircraft isaware of the location of all other touraircraft in the area. In addition to thecontribution of pilot experience and thevoluntary standardized procedures, therelatively slow speed and high pilotvisibility characteristic of most air touraircraft enhance the effectiveness ofree-and-avoid separation.

Notwithstanding this past record.however, the FM believes that thereare two general reasons why somedegree of additional regulation ofcanyon overflights is necessary. First,the existing procedures used by the airtour operators are voluntary. There is noobligation for an operator to participateand no sanction against a pilot whoignores the procedures. Whilecompliance with the procedures hasbeen high in the past, safe operations inthe future are not assured, and even aamall degree of non-standard operationcan reduce the level of safety. Whilesome degree of control over Part 135commercial operators can be exercisedthrough the operations specifications ofeach operator, commercial air tours maybe conducted under Part Ql by virtue ofan exception to the applicability of Part135. Section 135.1(b)(3) provides that aperson conducting nonstop sightseeingflights within 25 miles of the airport atwhich the aircraft takes off and lands isnot covered by Part 135.

Second, the voluntary procedures donot apply to general aviation andmilitary flights. General aviation andmilitary pilots on a one-time sightseeingflight over the canyon have no practicalmeans of learning the standard radiofrequencies and procedures used by thetour operators and no requirement orincentive to do so. Also, theinexperience of these pilots withoperation over the canyon increases therink of impact with the walls or surfaceof the canyon. Because of the unusualterrain and strong air currents, a pilotinexperienced with the Grand Canyoncan get into a situation from which theaircraft may be incapable of flying out.Several accidents in the canyonl pparentfy resulted from these factors.

The voluntary procedures, therefore,have substantially contributed to theaafe operation of commercial touroperators but have little safety benefitwith respect to general aviation,military, and nonparticipating air touroperators. The FAA believes that thereis a need to require that commercialoperators use the standard proceduresand to separate transient generalaviation traffic from the reaular touroperations until permanenrproceduresfor all operators can be developed.

IVoise impact on the swfoce. Inaddition to operational air safety andefficiency considerations, the FAA iscognizant of a degree of public interestfn preserving a quiet environment in thecanyon and minimizing the intrusion ofaircraft noise on this environment.Congress, in the Grand Canyon NationalPark Enlargement Act of of 1975,expressly provided for protection of thenatural quiet of the park. As discussedearlier in this preamble, if the Secretaryof the Interior finds that aircraft orhelicopter activity within the park islikely to cause a significant adverseeffect on the “natural quiet andexnerience of the Park.” he is reauiredto iubmit recommendations to th’eAdministrator of the FAA for measuresto mitigate that impact.

In March 1988, the Superintendant ofthe GCNP issued a findina of sianificantnoise impact on the park f&m &craftoverflight. On November 17,1988, theDepartment of the Interior submittedrecommendations for action on thisissue wfiich include additional airspaceregulation by the FAA. The FAA is inthe process of evaluating therecommendations at this time.

Also, FAA personnel attended thepublic hearings held by the NPS, and theagency received the various materialsprepared by the NPS and submitted bycommenters. A summary of thesecomments has been placed in the publicdocket for this rulemaking. The agencyis, therefore, aware of the opinionc andinformation offered to support theexistence of an excessive noise impacton the canyon environment. Informationreceived by the FAA on the noiseimpact issue to date is almost entirelysubjective in nature. For example, to theFAA’s knowledge, neither the NPS norany other party has conducted atechnical study which would determinethe actual decree of sound enerav fromoverilying a&raft which impa& them&ace in the GCNP. Such a studvwould establish the actual level of noiseexperienced, without mgard to opinionsaa to relative loudness or annoyance.This information would be necessary todetermine certainaffects of noise, such

as the potential impact on wildlife, andwould be useful for other purposes.

With respect to the humanenvironment and the impact of aircraftnoise on park visitors. however, noisemeasurements may not be as significantas a reliable indicator of public opinion,in that the issue is what level of noisethe public expects and desires toexperience on a visit to GCNP. Someenvironmental groups have expressedthe opinion that the sound or even sightof any aircraft is inconsistent with theexperience of the Grand Canyonintended by establishing it es a nationalpark. A more common view expressedby environment-oriented commenterswas that aircraft flight should beprohibited in the airspace above certainareas of the canyon, up to a certainaltitude. A comprehensive, statisticallymeaningful survey of public opinion onthe issue apparently has not been done.

In light of the congressional policystatement that a quiet environment bepreserved at the GCNP, with specificreference to aircraft noise, the FAA issensitive to the opinions expressed byenvironmental organizations and othersin the NPS Aircraft Management Planproceedings. There is no doubt thatunnecessary flights by aircraft at lowlevels within the canyon can beextemely intrusive on the parkenvironment and annoying to parkvisitors. The information available tothe FAA at this time, however, does notpermit the agency to determine if anyactions other than those proposedherein are necessary to limit the impactof aircraft overflight of the park to theextent desired by the public and byCongress, consistent with safety andother public policy objectives. In orderto minimize those operations having thegreatest impact on park activities untilfurther information can be obtained. theFAA believes that aircraft night in thecanyon at low altitude should berestricted to necessary flights. Thistemporary restriction can be achievedby the same mechanism proposed toregulate Part 133 and genera! aviationoperations for safety and efficiencypurposes.The ProposedSpecial Fedeml AviotionJZeguIation

For the reasons discussed above, theFAA is proposing to adopt a SpecialFederal Aviation Regulation. whichwould be published and take effectwithin a short time after the agencyanalyzes and responds to the commentsreceived and would expire on June 15.1~87. The proposed SFAR would do thefollowing: .

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Federal Register I Vol. 51, No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, 1986 / Proposed Rules

-broadcast on the voice signals of two

-Pilot weather briefings by the locallocal navigation facilities.

flight service stations includeinformation and advisories on flightover the Grand Canyon.Aimmft operations over the Cmnd

Canyon. The FAA estimates that thereare approximately 90,000 flights over theGCNP each year at altitudes low enoughto have an impact on park visitors. (Aircarrier jet aircraft frequently pass nearthe canyon on established airways butare high enough that they do not mixwith VFR traffic or generate significantnoise levels at the surface.) Overflightsof GCNP involve several differentcategories of operators.

Air tour operators. Approximately 87percent of the flights are by commercialtour operators who conduct sightseeingflights from McCarran InternationalAirport in Las Vegas. NV, GCNP Airportnear the south rim of the canyon, or oneof several other smaller airports in theregion. Air tour flights may beconducted between airports such as LasVegas and Grand Canyon, with arouting over the canyon, or may beround trip flights returning to the sameairport. It is estimated that 300.000 to100.000 passengers are carried on airtours over the canyon each year.

About 18 operators offer air tours on aregular basis althounh as many as 40may operate some l&e1 of to& flights.The majority of flights are by fixed-wingaircraft although frequent helicoptertours are also conducted. Most touroperators hold Part 135 operatingcertificates for commercial operations.However, under FAR 4 135.1(b)(Z), Part135 does not apply to nonstopsightseeing flights that begin and end atthe same airport and are conductedwithin 25 miles of that airport. Suchflights may be conducted on acommercial basis under Part W generalflight rules.

In 1972, the Grand Canyon touroperators active at that time enteredinto an agreement with the FAA and theNPS on the routes and altitudes for airtour flights over the park. The agreementremains in effect. although theprocedures have been amended. Underthe voluntary procedures, tour flightsgenerally operate in a west-to-eaetdirection at specified altitudes. withspecial routes designated for certainfeatures or areas of the canyon.Helicopters generally operate at 500 feetlower than fixed-wing aircraft tomaintain separation. The tour flightsoperate below the rim elevation of thecenyon in some areas but do notdescend to the inner gorge along the

Colorado River in their regular

- Geneml aviation and miM&y.operations.

Noncommercial general aviation flightsand flights by mgitary aircraft for -sightseeing purposes are also conductedover the canyon, occasionally at verylow altitudes. These aircraft must bsoperated in compliance with FARf 91.79 altitude limitations, but theiroperations are otherwise not restricted.While sightseeing flights by generalaviation aircraft are fewer in numberthan commercial tour operations, theypresent additional safety considerationswhich generally do not apply to the tourflights. A transient general aviation piloton a one-time flight over the canyon willbs unfamiliar with canyon terrain, aircurrents, and weather patterns, alJ ofwhich are unique and demand specialskills. In spite of this, some transientpilots fly at low altitudes in the canyon.Finally. many general aviation aircraftare smaller single engine aircraft withrelatively low performance at thealtitudes necessary for canyonoverflights.

Military aircraft operate under FARPart 91 general flight rules. Flights bymilitary aircraft through the GrandCanyon are unrelated to any militarypurpose but do not violate existing FMregulations. Because military aircraft aregenerally larger and faster than generalaviation or tour aircraft, overflights bymilitary aircraft may generate adverseoperational effects and noise impacts onthe surface disproportionate to therelatively amali p&entage of flightswhich militarv aircraft remeaent of totalpark ovefflig6ts. -

NPS Aircmft. Operation of the GCNPbv the NPS reauirea freauent aircraftfl&hts in the airspace bklow the rim ofthe canyon. Most such operations areconducted by a helicopter undercontract to the NPS. Purposes of suchflights range from emergencies, such asevacuation of injured hikers from thecanyon floor. to routine support of parkoperations. As a practical matter theseuDerationa have not added to the mix ofa-ticraft in the canyon because theflisthts. for the east 10 vears have beenoperated by a cornpa& which alsoprovides helicopter tour flights. Whilethe flights apparently do generate noiseimpact on the surface because of thelow-altitude operations involved, theFAA assumes that the NPS balances thisimpact with its need for the operationsin determininn the number of ninhts byNPS aircraft. -

” -

Related ActionsAs discussed above, the Nps recently

has submitted recommendations to theFAA on the management of aircraft

overflights of the park, pursuant to theprovisions of the Grand CanyonNational Park Enlargement Act of 1975.

In May 1985, the Sierra Club LegalDefense Fund and the WildernessSociety filed suit against theDepartments of the Interior andTransportation in the U.S. District Courtfor the District of Arizona. The plaintiffsbave requested the Court to mandate atimetable for regulation of aircraft flightover the park, primarily on the basis ofthe GCNP Enlargement Act of 1975.

On September 17, the House ofRepresentatives passed House Bill 4430,which would require the NFS to studythe impacts of aircraft overflight onseveral national parka and wouldimpose specific flight restrictions atGCNP, Yosemite National Park inCalifornia, and Haleakala National Parkin Hawaii. The bill would haveprohibited moat flights below the rim ofthe-Grand Canyon. Although acompanion bill was introduced in theSenate, the legislation did not pass in1988.The Need for Regulator Action

safety and efficiency. The size andnatural beauty of the Grand Canyonconstitute an attraction to sightseers,from the air as well as the ground, whichresults in an unusual level of air trafficin the airspace above the canyon. Whilethe concentration of traffic is lower thanthat nesr most urban airports, thesixhtaeeinn traffic over the GrandCLyon is‘hifferent in that is is notcontrolled by FM air traffic control.The result is a situation in which asubstantial number of aircraft (morethan 350 a day in July and August)operate in the same general airspaceover the canyon under the flight rulesthat apply to sparsely populated areasand low traffic volume airspace.Separation of aircraft in this airspace isaccomplished by the see-and-avoidresponsibility of each pilot and, aboveB,CW%l feet A& the l,@foot separationof eastbound and westbound trafficunder 14 CFR Sl.100.

National Transportation Safety Boardrecords show 51 accidents in the vicinityof the canyon since 1975, of which 11can be considered to have occurredwithin the canyon itself. Many of theaccidents involved landing or otherfactom unrelated to the u&quecharacteristics of the Grand Canyonenvironment. Overall, the aafety;ecordin the vicinity of the canyon comparesfavorably with the general accidentrates for-general av:ation and air taxioperators. For example, until June lQ88.when an air tour airplane and a tourhelicopter collided over the canyon,

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Federal Register / Vol. 51, No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, l966 / Proposed Rules

(1) Establish a Grand CanyonNational Park Special Flight Rules Areafrom the surface to 9,000 feet MSL Thearea would be marked on aeronauticalcharts and described in other pilotinformation publications.

(2) Prohibit operation by any aircraftin the defined area unless (a) theoperator holds a Part 135 certificate andbas express authorization in its Part 135operations specifications to operate inthe airspace, (bl the operator isauthoriied in writing by the FAA LasVexas Flinht Standards District Office toop.&ate inthe airspace, or(c) theaircmft is on an official search andrescue mission. In either of the first twooases (which would include virtually allRights within the area) the authorizationwould oontain soecific limitations on theoperation, including minimum altitudes.Minimum allowable flight altitudeswould be approximateb the rim level ofthe canyon unless there is anoperational need for flight below thatlevel (such as landing at one of thereservations]. The terms “rim” or “rimlevel” are not used in the proposed ruleor authorizations because the north androutb rims are at different levels andbecause the.rim is too variable inelevation to constitute a practical flightreference for pilots. -

(31 Prohibit commercial tourop&ations below 9.000 feet MSL by P&81 operators unless they obtain a Part135 certificate and operationsspecifications which authorize operationin the Grand Canyon National ParkSpecial Flight Rules Area.

(4) Prohibit, except when necessary orwhen specifically authorized for certainpurposes, flight closer than 500 feet toany terrain or structnre in the canyon.

(5) Require pilots to monitor certaincommon frequencies and make positionreports as specified in theira;thorizati& to enter the airspace.

In effect, the rule would generallyprohibit flight below the approximaterim level of the canyon except thoseflights necessary for operation of thepark and for provision of emergencyservices. In addition, the rule wouldrestrict aircraft operations in theairspace between the rim and Q.CIOO feetMSL to aircraft with a park-related needto be in the area and to commercial touraircraf? which meet extensiveequipment. experience, training, andoperational requirements. Therestrictions which would apply totransient aircraft between the rim and9.ooO feet MSL would remain in effectonly until procedures for transientoperation8 could be inlegr8kd with thestandard prooedures used by the regularcommercial operators over the canyon.The rule would impose no new

restrictions on flight above the-canyonabove9,000feet M S L

hhgilyis of the Repwad @iIt by

Section I provides that the proposedSFAR applies to all persons operatingunder VFR in certain airspace from thesurface to 9.000 feet MSL an defines theboundaries of that airspace Applyingthe rule to all persons would have theeffect of applying the rule to military aswell as civil pilotr. Aircraft operatingunder IFR would not be operating at thealtitudes or Jn the area covered by therule. (With the exception of a smallportion of VOR airway in the northeastcorner of the area, the base of controlledairsoace within the desinnated area is at9,ocrb feet MSL or higher:]

Airsoace UD to S.OOCi feet MSL isrestricied to hclude a sufficient numberof Section 91.1Og hemispheric altitudesfor nonconflicting eastbound andwestbound operations by authorizedoperators, e.g., 5,500 and 7,500 feet MSLeastbound and 8,500 and 8,500 feet MSLwestbound. Capping the special area at9,ooO feet MSL nermits overflight of the&yon by gen&al aviation &crafteastbound at 9,!j00 feet, which is withinthe capability of even small eingle-engine aircraft.

The lateral boundaries of theproposed area extend beyond the limitsof the park itself to include all of theareas which are commonly subject tocanyon sightseeing overflights, includingcertain Indian reservation land, and toprovide simplified boundaries forpractical compliance by pilots. Wherepossible, 4he proposed boundaries havebeen established coincident with VORradials to enable pilots to uee aircraftnavigation equipment to locate theirposition tn relation to a boundary line. Acutout from the area has been providedfor the GCNP Airport control zone, inrecognition of the need for aircraft tode&&d to and climb out from theeimort. The two wblished instrumentap&acbes to tb; GCNP Airport arefrom the southwest and would not beaffected by proceduras proposed.

Section 2 of the proposed SFARdefines the term “Park”as the GrandCanyon National Park.

Section 3 of the proposed rule setsforth the requirement for authorizationfor aircraft to operate in the SpecialFlight Rules Area. An exception to thegeneral requirements is made foremergencies, to clarify that a bona fideemergency landing in the canyon wouldnot violate this rule. Also, authority bl-tserved for die AdmJniBtrator toauthorize flights in the area in theinfrequent Uc in which the aonnalauthotiatioo pmcess would not apply.

The agency doer not anticipate the useof this provision during the duration ofthe rpedal mle.

Section 3 would prohibit flight tn theGrand Canyon National Park SpecialFlight Rules Area unless authorization tooperate tn the designated area isobtained fmm the Lss Vegas FlightStandards District Office or unless theaircraft is on an Air Force-directedrearch and reecue mission. Paragraph(a) provides that specific authorizationmay be incorporated in the operationsspecifications irsued to a Part 135operator. Operations specifications aredetailed rule8 and conditions forcommerical operation which are issuedto each holder of a Part 133 certificate.To FAA’8 howledge all of the operatorscurrently conduct& commetiai air

’tours of the Grand Canvon hold Part 13.5certificates. The Las Vegas FlightStandard8 District Office (FSDO), incooperation with the active touroperators, has developed specificconditions and limitations on the GrandCanyon operation of each such operator.Those amditions and limitations will beincluded in the operations specificationsof each tour operator and will beenforced bv the FM. The ~rovistonawill tnclud;! detailed requi~ementa forroutes, altitudes, communications andother procedures, and for pilotexperience and equfpment.

Authorization through operationsspecifications would permitcontinuation of the air tour industry atthe Grand Canyon without significantchange fmm present procedures. Theindustry successfully serves a certainsegment of the demand for touristacceo8 to the Grand Canyon and hasdone so with an impressive safetyrecord over the year. The restriction8proposed would, however, make theprocedures now voluntarily used bymost operators mandatory andenforceable. Second, the prescription ofcertain minimum altitudes woukl requiresome operatom to fly at higher altitudeson their tours, in wme areas, than theyhave in the past. Thi minimum altitudesspecified in the operationsspecifications would in most cases be anMSL altitute near to the approximateelevation of the rim in each sector of thecanyon.

Paragraph (a) would also permitcontinuation of commercial operationsto Indian msarvations within the SpecialFlight Rules Area. Such flights areroutinely conducted for tourism at thereservations. for pick-up of river rafters.and far serial supply and transportationrervices to the reservations. Operatorsconducting these flights must hold Part135 celtihtes and operations

APPENDIX K -64-

Federal Re&ter I Vol. 51, ko. 256 ‘/ Tuesday, December 9, 1986’ / ‘Proposed Rules 44427

specifications and would be subject tothe same general restrictions as the touroperators consistent with the nature oftheir operations.

Paragraph (b) provides that operationfn the area is not Drohibited ifauthorized ln w&ing by Las VegasFSDO and conducted in accordancewith the conditions of thatauthorization. The proposed rule statesthat authorization will normally beprotided only for operations of aircraftnecessary for law enforcementfirefighting, emergency medicaltreatment or evacuation of person8 in ornear the park;or for support of parkmaintenance or activities. As mentionedearlier, the NPS has a continuing needfor aircraft access to the canyon surfaceby Nps and contractor aircraft for awide range of purposes related tooperation of the park. FAA. through theLas Vagas FSDO. would authorize suchoperationa by written certificate ofauthorization upon confirmation fromthe Superintendent of the GCNP that herequests the authorization for thatoperation- The written authorizationwould contain conditions similar tothose included in the air tour operators’operations specifications. This willensure that operations in the SpecialPlight Rules Area are using commonprocedures and radio frequencies andthat the incidence of low altitudeaircraft flights is kept to the minimmnnecessary for operation of the

St is not the FAA’s intent to gark*eny airawes8 to any surface point withintheSDecial Flinht Rules Area. Flizhtsrequested by the NPS or by ”representatives of the Indian reservationlanding areas would be authorizedsubject to the standard conditionsImposed on all operators within thearea.

Other requests for flight through thearea below 9,999 feet MSL, includinggeneral aviation and military sightseeingflights, would normally be denied duringthe duration of the SFAR.

Paragraph (c) permtta search andrescue (SAR) aircraft under the directionof the U.S. Atr Force RescueCoordination Center to anter the areawithout pdor coordination with the LasVenas FSDO. SAR missions over the&yon are very infrequent-and are notexpected to occur during the period ofthe proposed special rule.

Section 4 requires all commercialsightseeing operations to be conductedunder a Part 135 certificate,notwithstanding the exception to Part135 applicability contained in0 135.1(b)(2). This provision wouldprohibit tour operations by Part 81operators. under 0 1351(b)(2). over thecanyon below 9&t99 feet MSL. To the

agency’6 knowledge all operatorscurrently providing commercialrightseeing flights over the GrandCanyon hold Part 135 certificates.although operations by Part 91 operatorehave been-common in-the past. -

Section 5 would or&bit ooarationwithin 500 feet of terrain in the canyonunless necessary for takeoff or landingunless authorized by the Las VegasFSDO for one of the park operationpurposes listed in Section 3, or except inan emergency. This provision appliesthe Part 135 restriction8 of4 135203(a)(1) to all operators. Therestriction would provide certainminimum protections to unique parkterrain, wildlife. and archaeologicalsites until the effect of low altitudeaircraft fh$t can be determined.

Section 6 would require that pilotsoperating in the area monitor certainfrequencies and make radio positionreports at the points rpecifieb in theirauthorization. The FM believes thatthe use of common frequencies andperiodic reporting of aircraft location,similar to the procedure for a CommonTraffic Advisory Frequency atuncontrolled aiports, &&antlyreduces the risk of midair collision.Therefore, this procedure would bemade mandatory for the duration of thespecial rule. Exceptions areincorporation for aircraft required to bein contact with the GCNP control toweror on a USAF-directed search a rescuemission.

The Special Federal AviationRegulation, when issued, would containan additional section providing that itwould expire on June 15,1987. The FAAis also proposing to issue permanentrule, to become effective on or beforeJune 15, to incorporate the commentsreceived and reflect the results ofexperience under the SFAR. Ifdevelopment of the rule is delayed andcannot be completed by June 15, theSFAR could be extended to provide thenecessary additional time.Effectlva Data of tha Propoa4 SFAR

The comment period on the proposedInterim special rule closes on january10,1987. It is the aeencv’s intention that.if tha proposed SF?LR s adopted, itwould take effect less than 39 daye afterpublication in the Federal Register. Theagency believes that circumstanceswarrant the prompt regulation of aircraftoperations over the Grand Canyon.While the past statistical safety recordhas been satisfactory. the voluntarymeasures which contributed to thatrecord may be insufficient to ensure anadequate level of safety in the future, asindicated by the recent midair collieionof two tour operators. (One of those

operators was operating under Part 91.under the Part 135 exception for localsightseeing flights in 0 135.1(b)(2)). Onthis basis the agency believes that thereir a need (1) to require frequent canyonoperators to comply with the basicfeatures of the standard procedures nowin use, and (3) to exclude the occasionaland less experienced sightseeing pilotfrom the low-altitude airspace until asystem of appropriate routes andprocedures for that kind of operationcan be developed. By prohibitinguncontrolled sightseeing flights andprescribing minimum altitudes forauthorized fliahts. the DroDosed SFARwould also pr‘bvide immektemitigation of the environmental impactsof unneceeeartly low aircraft flights overthe park surface.

The axency soecificallv solicitscommerita on the impactbf making theSFAQ effective immediatelv uDonpublication. or within som; aliernativeperiod of less than 30 days ofpublication.

The proposed SFAR, if adopted,would include an expiration date of June15,1987. The FAA proposes to issue apermanent final rule effective on orbefore that date. In addition tocomments requested earlier in thispreamble on the adoption of the SFAR.the agency solicits comments on theneed for permanent measures toregulate the flight of aircraft above theGrand Canyon, for safety andenvironmental reasons, and on whatthose measures should be. Commentemshould clearly indicate which commentsOIV directed toward the SFAR andwhich comments are directed towardthe permanent final nrle.

The FAA proposes a final rule whichwould contain the following provisions:

3. The rule would take effect uponexpiration of the SFAR. if the SFAR isa d o p t e d .

2. The rule would incorporate theprovisions of the SF’ as proposed inthis document, subject to the additionsand revisions listed below.

3. The rule would provide means bywhich general aviation operators couldoperate within the Special Flight RulesArea, subject to certain limitations andpreconditions. Such provisions couldtnciude. for example:-A requirement for a briefing from a

Plight Standards district office in theregion before entering the area. The;briefmg could include requiredprocedures (such as reporting points).environmentally sensitive areas whichshould be avoided, and information

44428

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Federal Register / VoL 51, No. 338 I Tuesday, December B, 1986 / hpored Rules

on the activities of other operatore inthe area.

-preferred or required routes andaltitudes for general aviation transitover tbe canyon.4. The tule would identify any parts of

the canyon which the FM finds, on thebasis of comments received and therecommendations of the Department ofthe Interior, are unusually rensitive tolow-altitude aircraft overflight. Theseareas could be the subject of voiuntaryor mandatory limits on overflight belowcertain minimum altitudes.

The agency specifically requestscomments on the following issues:

1. The need for or adequacy of thespecific measures proposed. -

2. Minimum altitude8 for air touronerations and neneral aviationsightseeing flight& above the canyon,including whether different altitudesshould be soecified in different areas ofthe canyod

g. The appropriate lateral boundariesof the proposed Special Flight RulesArea.

4. Procedures for pennitting generalaviation flights above the canyon ataltitudes comparable to those at whichthe commercial tour operatom fly. Suchprocedures could include specific routes,altitudes, prerequisite briefings ortraining, etc.

5. Identification of wildlife,archaeological sites, and other naturaland historical values in the Park whichmight be impacted by aircraft overflight.

6. Identification of the areas of thecanyon which are most sensitive andleast sensitive to aircraft overflight.hkzmmick?m~ct

The economic impact of the proposedtemporary SFAR and permanentregulation are expected to be minimal.The restrictions which both NIW imposeon commercial tour operators would notrequire any substantial changes in theiroperations. Other commercial flights,such as air transportation to Indianreservations, would be authorizedwithout eubetantial change from presentoperation. Transient general avtatidntraffic, which conatitutee a minority ofcanyon overflights, ivould be restrictedonly from operating at low altitude. ThaWOO-foot MSt restriction would applyonly until provisions for general aviationtraffic are adopted, which would beprior to the summer season when mostof this traffk occurs. Prior to that time Qpilots may still overfly the canyon above .:6.0(10 feet MSI. which at some points is iless than &OOO feet above the north rimof the canyon. En mute traffic would notbe affected because the special FlightR&sArea&b4!lowthefloorofcontrolled abepace In the ena. Thwe

would be no economic impact on theDepartment of Defense because there isno official reason for military aircraft tooperate over the canyon below 8,WOfeet ML. Because the propowdregulations would have no wbstantialeconomic tmpact oa any category ofoperator, the FM hae determined thatthe expected impact of the rule b sominimal that It does not warrant furtherregulatory evaluation. For the same ’reasons, tbir proposed rule (1) is not IImajor rule under Executive Order 12281,and (2) is not considered significantunder Department of TransportationRegulatory Policies and Procedures (44FR 11034: February 25.1979).Regulakxy Flmibility Detetmination

The Regulatory Fledbility Act of 1980(RFA) was enacted by Congrees in orderto insure, among other things, that anal1entities are not disproportionatelyaffected by Government regulations.The RFA requires agencies to reviewrules which may have a “rigniftcantimpact on a substantial number of smallentities.” For purposes of the RFA. smallentities are considered to include smallbusinesses, non-profit organizations,and municipalities but not privateindividuals. Small entities affected bythe proposed rules are limited to theapproximately 20 Part 155 air tour andair taxi operators operating in thecanyon area. As discussed under“Economic impact” above, neither theSFAR nor the permanent rule wouldrequire any significant change tn theoperations of these fms as currentlycbnducted. As a result, the impact onthe affected small entities. if anv. wouldbe substantially less than.&e t&holdfor significant impact under agencyauidelines. Therefore, I certify thatunder the criteria of the RegulatoryFlexihilitv Act these rules. ifpromulgiw &II not have a rignificantimpact on a substantial number of smallentities.UstofSubjactsfn1(:CFRParts91and285

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Air taxi andcommercial operators, Grand Canyon.Tlm!&ged f5padal Faded Aviatioe

For the reasons set out above, theFAA is proposing to amend 14 CF’R Parts61. and 155 as follows:

PART Bl~AMEMDEDl

l.Tbeauthoritytitimfurkrt81oontirn~ea to read aa foilowr

Anttmrily. 49 tJ.s.c mm(t). 1303.1344.1346.1352 lbmq#l185.5. nal, 1421 tbmttgb1431,147l. n7z lw2, lsm, lszz and nn

through nt5; Attich 12. ta 31. and 32(a) ofthe Convention on Mernatiwal civilAviation (61 SUL 1180); 42 USC. 4321 et 6eq.:EO. 11514; 49 USC. la+(g) (Rcvired pub. L07+9,~annary12 ls8q.

2. Part 91 is amended by adding a newSpecial Federal Aviation Regulation NO.SO to read as followszSpecial Faderal Aviation Reguh tion No.#I Specks Flight Rules iu the Vicinity ofthe Grand Canyon National Park, AZ

Section 1. Appficubihly. Tbir ruleprercribea special operating rules for allpersona operating aircraft under VFR in thefollowing airspace. derignated a6 the GrandCanyon National Patit Special Flight Rule6Area:

That aimpace extending upward from thesurface to and including a.@30 feet MSLwithin an area bounded by a line begitmingat ht. 66’09’W’ N, long. 114’03’CNY’ W;routhwert to lat. 36’14’00” N, long. 113’12’00”W.. to lat. 36’3Uu)” N.. long. 1%?‘36’00” W.; toht. 36’30’00” N.. long. 111’42’00” W; to tat.35’5930” N, long. 111’42’00” W.; to lat.WSTW’ N.. low. 112’03’aD” W.: thence viathe s statute mile radius of the Grand CenyonAirport airport reference point (lat. 35’57’09”N.. ionn. li2’06’4.7+* W.1: to (at. 35’57’30” N.,long. &‘%*W’ W.: toiat. 3s58’tW N.. long.113’11m’ W; to 35’Vs(T’ 27?W W.; thencevia the S-statutomile mdiu8 of the Peach&XiQJE VORTAC to ht. 35’43’#I’ N., bon&113’38’00” w: tll6Ace to lb6 point dbeginning.

SaCtiM 2 DafirlitiM. For the PUP0666 oftbir rpecia) regulation. “Park’ means theGrand Canyon Na tionel Park.

Section 3. Aimmft opemtions: geneml.Except in an emergency or u&66 otherwiseauthorized by the Administrator, no personmay operate an aircraft in the airipacedocxibed in Section 1 unless the operation-

(a) Is ooaducted in accordance with aspecific authorization to operate in thatl trspace tncorporeted in t&e opuelor’6 part136 operation6 rpecificationr and approvedby the !.flE Ve#a6 Flight 6tnndanL DiEtridOffiCe;

@) Is authorized in writing by the LasVegas Flight Standards District Office and isconducted tn compliance with tbe MAditiOAScontained in that euthorizatio~. Normallyauthorization will be graded only foroperation6 of aircraft ~ece6sary for Iswenforcement, fiifighting. emergency medicaltre.atment/evacation of persons in the vicinityof the Park, or for ruppafl d Pakmatntanance or l ctivtties. Authoriaatton mayb6 hEnEd OA a cuttiAtllAg bsb; or

(c)Isa6aarcbandm6cuemiukmdireckdby the U.S. Air Form Rescue CoordinationCenter.

Section 4. Commen5oi 8ightseeing flights.(a) Notwithrtalding the provi6ions of

Federal Aviation Regulatims 0 X%1(b)(2).nonetop 6ight6eeiAg ftights that begin md endat lbe r&me aitport are conducted within a 256tatute miL r&u6 of that oh-port. endoperate tn or &rough the airspace describedin Section 1 dkng any portion of the flightl legovemedby&eptvvi6kul6afPart135.

APPENDIX K -66-

L Federal Register / Vol. 51, No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, 1986 / Proposed Rules 44429

(b) No person holding or required to holdon operating certificate under Part 125 mayoperate an aircraft in the airspace describedin Section 1 except as authorized byoperations ape&cations issued under thatPart.

Section 5. Minimum termin clmmnce.Except in an emergency. when necessary fortakeoff or landing. or unless authorized bythe Ler Vegas Flight Standards District Officefor a purpose listed in Section 2(b), no personmay operate nn aircraft within 500 feet of anyterrain or l tnrcture located between the northand south rims of the Grand Canyon.

Section 6. Communications. Except whentn contact with the Grand Canyon NationalPark Airport Traffic Control Tower duringarrival or departure or on a search and rescuemission directed by the U.S. Air Force RescueCoordination Cent& no person may operatean aircraft in the ah-apace deacrtbed inSection 1 unless he-

(a) Transmits a position report on theappropriate frequency at each reporting pointdesignated tn the operator’r Part 125operations specifications or in A writtenauthorization to operate in that aimpecetaaued under Section 2, and

(b) Monitors the appropriate frequencycontinuously while in that &apace.

PART Wt+AMENDED]

3. Pert 135 is amended by adding areference to SFAR No. SO.

larued tn Washington. DC, on December 4.

g R. Ryan.Director, Air Tmffic Opemtions Service.(FR Dot -27542 Filed 126-88; 10135 am]mLwlQ#E4(ou4

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*IJ.~.COVCRNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:19E7-181-lOlr60019

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