national terrorism alert levelskrextresource.com/ctc/national threat level.pdf · boko haram have...

NATIONAL TERRORISM ALERT LEVELS

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FOREWORD

1. Nigeria's war on insurgency and terrorism has been making

positive strides. All territories hitherto under the control of the

terrorist group Jama'atul ahlis sunna lil da'awati wal jihad known as

Boko Haram have been successfully brought back under Nigerian

control. Citizens have also begun to return to their villages that

have been declared safe for reoccupation. The gains also

achieved by members of the Security Agencies have also put

pressure on Boko Haram, denying them the freedom to carry out

continued attacks on towns and villages. However, while

insurgency can and will be defeated, terrorism is an ideology

which takes virtually a lifetime to defeat.

2. The gains have led to the terrorists adopting desperate

measures to continue to spread terrorism using means such as

suicide bombers. The increase in dismantling the Boko Haram

terrorist is anticipated to result in sleeper cells being formed and

activated. These developments require constant monitoring and

analysis of information. The analysed information would produce

intelligence that would conrm the likelihood and scale of possible

attacks by terrorists. In line with the 'Secure' and 'Identify' principles

of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), National

Terrorism Alert Levels (NTAL) have been developed.

3. The National Terrorism Alert Levels are meant to guide

Government Agencies on measures to be taken on receipt of

information of a likely terrorist attack. It outlines the alert levels and

the actions to be carried out when a terrorism alert level is

declared. The alert levels can be stepped up or down in response

to changing events. Heads of Ministries, Departments and

N A T I O N A L T E R R O R I S M A L E R T L E V E L S

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Agencies are implored to develop protocols and give their various

Institutions orientation on the NTAL. They are to foster the spirit

behind the NTAL which is to know how to act in various terrorism

situations.

Dated August 2016BABAGANA MOHAMMED MONGUNOMajor General (Rtd)National Security Adviser

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NATIONAL TERRORISM ALERT LEVELS

INTRODUCTION

1. The ability of a nation to respond to acts of terrorism

depends on its ability to collate information on security and other

activities that could lead to terrorist attacks. Nigeria's ght against

terrorism has been ongoing with denite gains made by Security

Agencies (SA). As progress is made, the terrorists have resorted to

the cowardly option of attacking soft targets in crowded public

spaces. These attacks have taken the form of suicide bombings

and mass attacks. In the international arena, terrorists have also

adopted the tactics of using marauding gunmen to open re on

civilians in public places or holding civilians hostages in public

buildings. The most recent tactics employed by the terrorists was

the bombing of an airport in Brussels, Belgium on 22 March 2016. This

act not only impacted people on the ground but also airlines that

either had to abort ights mid-air or have their passengers

disembark for fear of other suicide attacks.

2. Intelligence gathering and analysis has led to the

observation of patterns and trends in terrorist activities, which is

utilised to alert authorities and enable them take pre-emptive

measures. It gives authorities the ability to plan and respond to

terrorist attacks within the shortest possible time frame.

Consequently, this has led to the development of a terrorism alert

level system. Various threat level systems exist within SA. However,

there is the need to develop a well-coordinated and holistic

terrorism alert level system that would give various organisations

appropriate national responses. This would enhance the Nations'

ability to prevent and foil attacks while maintaining the ability to

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react swiftly and effectively to any terrorist attack. It is meant also to

educate citizens on how to respond appropriately to situations,

while keeping them abreast with the security environment.

3. The National Terrorism Alert Level (NTAL) System was

developed with contributions from various agencies. It also

addresses the unique nature of Nigeria's vast land mass and

diverse geopolitical peculiarities. The threat levels are made up of

3 layers, the state, geopolitical and national levels.

AIM 4. This document aims to outline the various NTAL in Nigeria

while outlining appropriate stages of posture and activities to be

implemented by the Security Agencies, MDAs and CSOs.

SITUATION

5. Recent defeats suffered by the Boko Haram Sect have

forced them to resort back to asymmetric attacks on soft targets.

This form of attack unfortunately, due to its nature will be a part of

the national consciousness for the near future. The 15 April 2013

bombings in Boston, Massachusetts and several lone gun attacks

occurred over a decade after the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks

on the World Trade Towers in New York. The impact of these attacks

also have far reaching effects on a nation such that an incident

perceived as isolated in one part of the country could lead to

another incident in another far-ung part. A bomb explosion in a

shopping mall in Port-Harcourt for instance could be considered as

an act of terrorism within Nigeria with attendant consequences

both domestically and internationally.

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6. It thus behoves on various agencies to know that the

collection, dissemination and sharing of actionable information is a

crucial necessity to forestall the next terrorist attack. These attacks,

if kept at a minimum would signify progress in improving security

against terrorism. Constant analysis should also enable

identication of indicators of future attacks thereby facilitating

appropriate responses. It is also pertinent to mention that with the

increased degradation of ISIS capabilities, the possibility of Africa

being the next haven for terrorism is likely. The prospect of these

terror ists orchestrating another insurgency cannot be

overemphasised and they could carry out or instigate lone attacks

using violent extremists, sympathisers or vulnerable citizens.

THE THREAT

7. The United Nations denes terrorism as the use of military

weapons or forces to generate multiple causality incidents in

which non-combatants and vulnerable civilians are the victims.

The Terrorism Prevention Act 2013 as ammended also denes

terrorism as an act deliberately done to harm or cause damage

with the intent to intimidate, destabilize or negatively inuence a

group of people, organization or government to achieve a

political, religious, economic or social goal. Terrorism has evolved

over time while maintaining its capacity to generate multiple

casualties among citizens. The 9/11 attacks marked a watershed in

the way acts of terrorism were conducted. Since then, terrorism has

developed into a global inter-connected enterprise where the

terrorists annex territories, declare caliphates, export mineral

wealth, deploy unprecedented skil l of campaigns and

propaganda on social media, remotely inuence lone attackers to

carry out attacks on their home soil and form alliances across

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regions and continents. These trends have facilitated their ability to

carry out brazen attacks in public places, hold hostages, recruit

followers in plain sight and bring large-scale transportation systems

to a halt.

8. The ability of terrorists to send its followers for training

abroad, utilise social media and enlist the help of foreign ghters as

it pledges allegiance to another terror group are clear

manifestations of its evolution. Despite the Nation's success in

regaining territory, freeing of enslaved citizens and reducing Boko

Haram's capability, the Sect is still able to carry out bomb attacks

remotely in areas outside the Northeast. This signies the need for

proper identication of indicators within their activities to enable

pre-emption and disruption thereby preventing them from

actualising their extremist intentions.

9. The collation of information and development of

actionable intelligence and proactive response to this intelligence

is identied as the key means to unlock the terrorist network through

denying them the ability to successfully function.

THREAT LEVEL PROCEDURE

10. The NTAL mean the following: a. Attack is imminent. Critical (Red).b. Attack is highly likely.Severe (Orange).c. Attack is a strong possibility.Substantial (Yellow). d. Attack is possible, but not likely.Moderate (Blue).e. Attack is unlikely. Low (Green).

The authority to issue appropriate threat levels lies with the Ofce of

the National Security Adviser. The NSA will issue appropriate threat

levels based on threat analysis and risk assessment by the Joint

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Terrorism Analysis Branch (JTAB) whose work is dependent on inputs

from relevant intelligence gathering and SA. When the threat level

is raised to an 'actionable level' i.e. Critical (Red), the Presidential

Command, Control and Communication Centre (PC4) is

convened with the necessary cast list where the intelligence and

subsequent posture changes are discussed and agreed upon.

Threat levels do not have expiry dates, they can change at any

time as different information becomes available to security agents.

11. The 'Life Cycle' from raw Intelligence to posture change is a

5 step process namely:a. Step 1. Intelligence ow from SAs in JTAB. The role of

ONSA will be to ensure JTAB continues to get the

intelligence ows from SSS, military and police.b. Step 2. Analysis and insight from JTAB (or SSS,

Military, police if required). The role of ONSA will be to

ensure JTAB continues to develop its analytical capability. c. Step 3. Recommendation from JTAB to the NSA

(and others) e.g move to 'critical (red)'. The technique and

processes behind making those recommendations is a

specic skill that JTAB will need to continue to develop.d. Step 4. NSA convenes PC4. Once the NSA is satised

that the intelligence points towards action being required

he will convene PC4. e. Step 5. Decision on posture change/actions to be

taken by each relevant MDAs/ agency. This will be a

decision to be taken by each individual MDA/ agency

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POSTURE

12. The changing nature of the threat would also necessitate

and reect a change in posture in the activities of agencies in

areas as diverse as stepping up vigilance on the streets by the

citizens, to stepping up security at an airport or where necessary

deployment of security personnel in public areas. ONSA will not in

any way micromanage Security Agencies and MDAs. They are

required to develop their own protocols and be adept at it. It must

be noted that the coming into effect of a threat level goes beyond

mere rhetoric as a denite posture change involves a lot of

planning and logistics. As a guide, the expected reaction to each

threat level is contained in succeeding paragraphs.

13. Critical (Red). This is the highest level, meaning a terrorist

attack is imminent and exceptional security measures are

required. The organizations' expected reactions to the alert level

are as follows:

a. Ministry of Defence/Armed Forces. (1) Troops deployment to key areas. (2) Placement of special forces and reserve

troops on standby at the shortest notice to move

(NTM). (3) Man all Key Points (KPs) and Vulnerable

Points (VPs). (4) Erection of checkpoints and roadblocks as

well as cordon and search operations. (5) Aggressive patrols. (6) Maximum state of readiness at the Joint

Operation Centre (JOC). (7) Prepare for Nuclear, Biological and

Chemical (NBC) attacks.

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b. Police Force. (1) Protection of all KPs and VPs. (2) Intensive patrols. (3) Erection and manning of roadblocks and

check points. (4) Conduct of searches and restriction of

movements. (5) Raids and arrest to obtain additional

information to ll gaps. (6) Deployment of representatives at the JOC.

c. Intelligence Organizations.(1) Continuous surveillance and penetration of

crisis areas to provide real time information &

Intelligence. (2) Exploitation and re-tasking of sources. (3) Continuous analysis of the situation and

dissemination of timely Intelligence.(4) Work out the information operations with

the Ministry of Information (MOI).

d. Ministry of Interior/Para-Military Organisations. (1) Deploy personnel to key areas. (2) Protection of all KPs and VPs. (3) Closure of Land borders (on Instruction). (4) Closure of Air and Sea Ports (on Instruction). (5) Continuous monitoring of the situation and

gathering of information.(6) Deployment of liaison ofcers at the JOC

and the Police Command and Control Centre. (7) Additional support to NEMA.

e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(1) Brief foreign diplomats on the situation and

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advice on action to be taken. (2) Liaise with foreign diplomats for further

support. (3) Provide additional information on the

situation to our embassies abroad.(4) T a s k o w n A m b a s s a d o r s / H i g h

Commissioners on intelligence gathering and

diplomatic operations. (5) Dep loy l ia i son ofcer/Reps at the

Presidential Communication, Command and

Control Centre (PC4).

f. Ministry of Information.(1) Educate the populace on the situation and

what they are expected to do.(2) Provide liaison to the JOC and PC4.(3) Disseminate psychological operations

themes in conjunction with Intelligence and

Security agencies.(4) Constantly update own information ofcers

at consulates abroad. (5) Conduct periodic media briefs. (6) Ensure threat levels are displayed at

airports, train stations and public places.

g. Ministry of Health. (1) Direct all hospitals to operate 24 hours at full

capacity. (2) Designate Hospitals that will receive

emergency cases. (3) Classify hospitals into levels and provide

information to all. (4) Deploy ambulances at des ignated

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locations in conjunction with NEMA. (5) Liaise with the MOI for public health

responses.

h. NEMA. (1) Establish camps for IDPs. (2) Ensure readiness and standby of response

agencies. (3) Coordinate deployment of ambulances to

designated areas in conjunction with Ministry of

Health.(4) Deploy liaison ofcers to the JOC and PC4

as well as the Police Command and Control

Centre. (5) Coordinate activities of NGO.

i. ONSA.(1) JTAB - CTC will do the following:

(a) Retrieve all available intelligence on

the particular threat from their intelligence

database. (b) Continuous l iaison with other

relevant intelligence agencies from the

affected State, region or sector to get

current intelligence on the threat.(c) Evaluation of gathered intelligence

on the threat scenario to advice on possible

change in threat level. (2) Activate PC4 for strategic coordination of

all response efforts. (3) Continuous monitoring and evaluation of

the situation.

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14. Severe and Substantial (Orange and Yellow). This means an

attack is highly likely or has a strong possibility of occurrence,

requiring heightened security. The expected reaction is as follows:

a. Ministry of Defence/Armed Forces. (1) Man KPs and VPs. (2) Troops on standby ready to move at short

notice. (3) Prepare to deploy liaison ofcers at the Joint

Operations Centre. (4) Conduct show of force.

b. Police Force. (1) Conduct Patrols. (2) Raiding of red areas to acquire information. (3) Be proactive and maintain Command and

Control Centre for collection of SITREPS. (4) Erection and manning of roadblocks and

check points.

c. Intelligence Organisations.(1) Continuous surveillance and penetration of

crisis area to provide real time information and

Intelligence.(2) Continuous analysis of the situation and

dissemination of timely Intelligence.

d. Ministry of Interior/Para-Military Organisations. (1) Protect KPs and VPs. (2) Step up surveillance of borders, ports, and

national entry and exit points. (3) Set up monitoring rooms and monitor

situation 24 hours. (4) Establish communication with the police

and Military.

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e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1) Monitoring of situation. (2) Preparation of briefs.

f. Ministry of Information.(1) Educate the populace on the situation and

what they are expected to do.(2) Provide l iaison to the Mi l i tary Joint

Operations Centre and National Command

Centre. (3) Conduct periodic media briefs.

g. Federal Ministry of Health.(1) Alert hospitals and remind them of their

status during emergency. (2) Select and direct hospitals that will operate

24 hours in full capacity.(3) Stockpile drugs for immediate deployment

to hospitals.(4) Assemble and prepare ambulances in

conjunction with NEMA. (5) C o o r d i n a t e t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f

ambu lances at des ignated locat ions in

conjunction with NEMA.

h. NEMA.(1) Coordinate and ensure readiness and

standby of ambulances in conjunction with Federal

Ministry of Health. (2) Ensure all disaster response elements are

ready for possible deployment. (3) Establish camps for IDPs, if necessary. (4) Request for military assistance if required. (5) E n s u r e r e a d i n e s s a n d s t a n d b y o f

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ambulances to designated areas in conjunction

with the Federal Ministry of Health. (6) Coordinate the activities of all NGOs.

i. ONSA.(1) JTAB CTC will:

(a) Review the current threat level.(b) Provide update on strategic level

information on the expected crisis.(c) Ma in tenance of up to date

intelligence on real or perceived threats to

the Nation.(d) Continuous l iaison with other

intelligence and security agencies.

(2) PC4 ONSA will:(a) Be ready to activate the crises

response coordination cell.(b) Ensure that the National Crises

Response Doctrine is up to date in line with

changing nature of terror threat.(c) Ensure that all MDAs maintain the

required crises response capabilities to

meet their roles as spelt out in the Crises

Response Doctrine.

15. Moderate and Low (Blue and Green). These are states of

affairs in which an attack is possible but the likelihood of

occurrence is very low. The expected reaction is as follows:

a. Ministry of Defence/Armed Forces. (1) Normal routine training and peacetime

deployments.(2) Continuous combat intelligence gathering

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at the domestic and foreign levels.(3) Routine liaison with intelligence and security

agencies at all levels.(4) Continuous maintenance of required state

of combat readiness as required for assessed

threats.

b. Police Force. (1) Routine Patrols/Surveillance. (2) Protection of all KPs and VPs. (3) Maintain law and order. (4) Continuous intelligence gathering/analysis

in conjunction with JTAB and other intelligence

agencies.

c. I n t e l l i g e n c e O r g a n i s a t i o n s . C o n t i n u o u s

surveillance, information gathering/analysis.

d. Ministry of Interior/Para-Military. (1) Normal routine. (2) Protection of all KPs and VPs. (3) Continuous monitoring of the situation and

gathering of information.

e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Continuous monitoring of

the situation in the international domain with emphasis on

intelligence relating to issues of national security interest.

f. Ministry of Information. (1) Continuous media activities to sensitize the

populace on security consciousness and suspicious

behaviour identication and reporting, to be done

in conjunction with NOA and other relevant

agencies. (2) Media awareness campaign against

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radicalisation and other violent extremism as part of

the overall National CVE Strategy, in conjunction

with relevant Ministries of Education, Internal Affairs,

traditional and religious organisations.

g. Ministry of Health. Continue to evaluate the health

condition and promulgate polices.

h. NEMA. (1) Continuous liaison with rst responders. (2) C o o r d i n a t e t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f

ambulances to designated areas in conjunction

with the Ministry of Health.

i. ONSA.(1) JTAB CTC will ensure:

(a) Ma in tenance of up to date

intelligence on real or perceived threats to

the nation.(b) Continuous l iaison with other

intelligence and security agencies.

(2) PC4 ONSA will:(a) Ensure that the National Crises

Response Doctrine is up to date in line with

changing nature of terror threat.(b) Ensure that all MDAs maintain the

required crises response capabilities to

meet their roles as spelt out in the crises

Response Doctrine.

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CONCLUSION

16. Terrorism is a global phenomenon with terrorists being

extremely adaptable adversaries. Terrorism normally mutates from

full-blown insurgency to asymmetric warfare with the main targets

being soft targets. This threat is not likely to abate in the near future

but all efforts will be put in place to ensure terrorist attacks are

brought to the barest minimum.

17. The ght against terror must be a whole of government and

society approach, as information no matter how little, gives rise to

intelligence on terrorists’ plans to wreck havoc on the populace. It

is pertinent that all Nigerians develop the habit of being vigilant,

have awesome situation awareness and volunteer information on

strange activities as soon as possible. The Government will continue

to put in place adequate measures to curb these attacks and

ensure a safer nation, unfailingly.

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