National SeriesLecture 5

Responsibility of Life Scientists

Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

Picture Image Transparent Globe by digitalart - from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

Outline

• Dual-use ethics/dual-use dilemma• Responsibilities associated with potential/actual dual-use

science• Tensions between scientific benefit versus risk analysis • The Precautionary Principle (PP)• Statement on Scientific Publication and Security 2003• Decision making in dual-use dilemmas

International statements about the responsibilities of life scientists

• IAP: Statement on Biosecurity 2005– “Scientists have an obligation to do no harm”

• WHO: Responsible Life Sciences Research for Global Health Security 2011– “The dual-use dilemma is inherently ethical in nature”

• BTWC: Final Document of the Meeting of States Parties 2008– Codes of Conduct should: “Cover ethical and moral obligations

throughout the scientific life cycle, including during the proposal, funding, execution and dissemination stages”

• US National Research Council: On Being a Scientist 2009 3rd edtn– “Research is based on the same ethical values that apply in everyday

life, including honesty, fairness, objectivity, openness, trustworthiness, and respect for others.”

Why is dual-use an ethical matter?

Dual-Use Research Research……

……“that based on current understanding can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or material.” (Emphases added)

(NSABB 2007) If scientists take the responsibility of showing what they are doing to

prevent the misuse of their research, then “interference” may be minimised

Dual-use as an ethical issue

The dual-use dilemma

(Miller and Selgelid 2007, Sture 2010)

The same piece of scientific research

For harm For good

Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (i)

An influential definition of the bioethical principle........“Non-maleficence” (the obligation to “do no harm”)

Do no harm principle

Possible risks of harm

Intentional actions

The principle covers:

• Not only intentional actions but also unintentional consequences/risks surrounding scientific research

• Risk without harmful intent is part of moral responsibility

(Kelly 2006)

Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (ii)

Dual-use potential raises the ethical question:

• “Should we hold an agent morally responsible for the consequences of an action?”•And....• “When those consequences were not intended and were, in some cases, beyond the agent’s control?”

It asks whether a person (an “agent”) is morally bound to take pre-emptive precautions to avoid unwanted future outcomes.

(Miller and Selgelid 2007)

Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (iii)

The question here is :“Not how far a scientist is responsible for the intended effects of his action,”

“But how far he is responsible for the foreseen effects of his research, for their prevention and also for the effort to predict certain results.”

So....is preventive effort a duty?(Ehni 2008, Dando 2009)

foreseen effects

Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (iv)

Kuhlau et al (2008) also argue.....Reasonable obligationsScientists have....“Duties to consider potential negative implications of one's research, protect access to sensitive material, technology and knowledge, and report activities of concern.”

ResponsibilityAnd also have .....“Obligations concerned with preventing foreseeable and highly probable harm.”

(Kuhlau et al 2008)What is “foreseeable”?

Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (v)

Five criteria for meeting the obligation to prevent harm Researchers should take actions to prevent harm that:

1. Fall within their professional responsibility

2. Fall within their professional capacity and ability (scientists know their work best)

3. Address the minimisation of reasonably foreseeable risk (“’reasonable’ implies active engagement from scientists to seek knowledge and consider potential misuses of research”)

4. Minimise risks that are proportionally greater than the benefits of the research

5. Are not more easily achieved by other means (Kuhlau et al 2008)

Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (vi)

Kuhlau et al propose therefore that scientists have the following ethical obligations:

- To prevent bioterrorism

- To engage in response activities to bioterror attacks

- To consider the negative implications of their research

- To not publish or share sensitive information

- To oversee and limit access to dangerous material

- To report activities of concern(Kuhlau et al 2008)

Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (vii)

A general duty to not contribute to dual-use that is malign and, as far as controllable.....

Specific duties within this include:- Do not carry out a certain type of research

- Systematically anticipate dual-use applications in order to warn of dangers generated by them

- Inform public authorities about such dangers

- Do not disseminate results publicly, but keep dangerous scientific knowledge secret

(Ehni 2008)Implying oversight of research?

Tensions in benefit-and-risk analysis (i)

What is at stake in the dual-use dilemma

(Miller and Selgelid 2007)

Rights to academic freedom and scientific progress

Risk Benefit

Tensions in benefit-and-risk analysis (ii)

What is at stake in dual-use dilemma?

Making decisions about the “censorship” of science

Responsibilities(of whom?)

Rights(of whom?)

(Miller and Selgelid 2007)

Tensions in benefit-and-risk analysis (iii)

Making decisions for trade-offs

Security/public health needs

Rights to scientific progress and

science dissemination

(Miller and Selgelid 2007)

small sacrifices in the way of public health and/or security to achieve

enormous benefits with regard to the progress of science

small sacrifices with regard to the progress of science to achieve

enormous benefits regarding public health and/or security.

Who is responsible for what, to whom and why?

Prospective Responsibility

• Looks forwards

• The responsibility to care for somebody founded on a duty resulting from the role the responsible person has

• Stems from the duties of the scientists and the scientific community

Retrospective Responsibility

• Looks backwards

• The result(s) of an action imputed to the actor (the scientist) who contributed actively to this action or who could have prevented it

(Whitby and Novossiolova 2011)

Exercise1

Is oversight of research relevant?

• Discuss the rationale for the (biosecurity) oversight of scientific research (10 min)

• Who should be responsible for identifying possible research areas of concern (scientists, institutions, government, others?). How should the balance between security and the freedom of science be managed?

• Report to the class.

The Precautionary Principle (PP) (i)

When serious and credible concern exists in legitimately intended biological material, technology or knowledge

The scientific community is obliged to develop, implement and adhere to precautious measures to meet the concern

The Precautionary Principle (PP) (ii)

In cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information or knowledge could be readily misused

through bioterrorism or biowarfare

All persons and institutions engaged in any aspect of the life sciences must . . . seek to restrict dissemination of dual-use

information and knowledge to those who need to know

(Somerville and Atlas 2005)

The Precautionary Principle (iii)

A fundamental message of the PP....“...‘on some occasions, measures against a possible hazard should be taken even if the available evidence does not suffice to treat the existence of that hazard as a scientific fact’....”

(Kuhlau et al 2009)

Evidence

The Precautionary Principle (iv)

Four main conceptual dimensions/triggers come into play: threat, uncertainty, prescription and action

If there is:

(1) a threat, which is

(2) uncertain, then some kind of

(3) action is

(4) mandatory.

(Kuhlau et al 2009)

The Precautionary Principle (v)

Concerns of “over-securitization”....

Security measures (e.g. mandatory oversight of scientific research) without concrete risk-assessments

May degrade confidence in the entire biosecurity effort of governments = striking the right balance between scientific

freedom and security is particularly challenging

(Kelle 2005, Fildler and Gostin 2007. Koblentz 2010)

Statement on Scientific Publication and Security (i)

(Journal Editors and Authors Group 2003)including Nature, Science and ProNAS

“We recognise that…on occasion … the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits”

“the paper should be modified or not be published”

Important role of scientific journals/societies “encouraging investigators to communicate results of

research in ways that maximize public benefits and minimize risks of misuse.”

Statement on Scientific Publication and Security (ii)

Are scientific journals qualified to judge security risks?

“An important question thus concerns the extent to which the government, bioethicists and/or the security community should be involved in scientific censorship.”

(Miller and Selgelid 2007)

Decision making in dual-use dilemmas (i)

Optional mechanisms for the decision-making process include:

- Complete autonomy of the individual scientist

- Institutional control

- Mix of institutional and governmental control

- An independent authority

- Full governmental control

(Miller and Selgelid 2007)

Decision making in dual-use dilemmas (ii)

Existing proposals

• Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM))

•Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance (J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

•Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information (US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)

•DNA Synthesis and Biological Security (Bugl et al)

(United Nations 2008b)

Decision making in dual-use dilemmas (iii)

The common (shared) viewOnly a mixed authority which is constituted by the scientific community together with government bodies can address the dual-use dilemma effectively

Responsibilities of scientists, governments and others = “context dependent”.

Exercise 2

Is the decision on the H5N1 influenza appropriate?

• Discuss the consequence of the decision to recommend the modification of the paper on H5N1 influenza (2011) (10 min)

• Is the decision acceptable from the perspective of the precautionary principle or have security requirements overwhelmed scientific freedom in this case?

• Report to the class.

References

• The references cited in this lecture are viewable in the Notes section of this presentation.