national institute of aerospace technology rosa mª rengel gálvez marina b. gutiérrez...
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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGYNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY
Rosa Mª Rengel Gálvez
Marina B. Gutiérrez García-Arias 11/09/2007
Rosa Mª Rengel Gálvez
Marina B. Gutiérrez García-Arias 11/09/2007
OPTIMIZATION OF A SOLAR HYDROGEN STORAGE SYSTEM: SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGYNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY
Public organization for aerospace technology research and development.
Since the early seventies, renewable and alternative energies have been one of the R&D areas in which INTA has dedicated a continuous effort.
In 1989, INTA started a program focussed on the use of hydrogen as a storage medium for solar electricity.
Since 1990, interest in terrestrial use of fuel cells and hydrogen technologies.
Facilities in Torrejón de Ardoz (Madrid) and “El Arenosillo” (Huelva).
Public organization for aerospace technology research and development.
Since the early seventies, renewable and alternative energies have been one of the R&D areas in which INTA has dedicated a continuous effort.
In 1989, INTA started a program focussed on the use of hydrogen as a storage medium for solar electricity.
Since 1990, interest in terrestrial use of fuel cells and hydrogen technologies.
Facilities in Torrejón de Ardoz (Madrid) and “El Arenosillo” (Huelva).
- Hydrogen production from renewable energy, mainly solar and wind.- Development of new hydrogen storage systems.- PEMFC testing. - Integration of PEMFC in transport applications.- Development of hydrogen production systems from fossil or renewable fuels.- Simulation of hydrogen systems (energy and CFD aspects) .- Safety.
AREAS OF INTERESTAREAS OF INTEREST
Development of Metal Hydride H2 Storage Systems
Fuel Cellvehicle
12 kW PEMFCTest Bench
INTA SOLAR HYDROGENSTORAGE FACILITY
INTA SOLAR HYDROGENSTORAGE FACILITY
• Built up in the period 1992-1996.
• Original design: passive and active safety measures → legislation and good engineering practices , but not a specific risk assessment was done:
• ATEX• Pressure vessel regulations.
• Operational period: additional safety recommendations from international standards →
• ISO/TR 15916 Basic consideration for the safety of hydrogen system
• Built up in the period 1992-1996.
• Original design: passive and active safety measures → legislation and good engineering practices , but not a specific risk assessment was done:
• ATEX• Pressure vessel regulations.
• Operational period: additional safety recommendations from international standards →
• ISO/TR 15916 Basic consideration for the safety of hydrogen system
STORAGE FACILITY CHARACTERISTICSSTORAGE FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS
• Hydrogen production rate: 1.2 Nm3/h
• Hydrogen storage capacity: enough for an operation week (25-30 Nm3)
• Operation during 48 weeks per year
• Charging cycles number higher than discharging cycles number
• Availability and reasonable cost for small facilities
• Other requirements: availability, auxiliary systems, etc.
• Hydrogen production rate: 1.2 Nm3/h
• Hydrogen storage capacity: enough for an operation week (25-30 Nm3)
• Operation during 48 weeks per year
• Charging cycles number higher than discharging cycles number
• Availability and reasonable cost for small facilities
• Other requirements: availability, auxiliary systems, etc.
RISK ASSESSMENTRISK ASSESSMENT
H2 production fromrenewable energy
H2 storage systemsneeds
RISK ASSESSMENTRISK ASSESSMENT
Safety requirementsSafety requirements
A risk can be defined as “a measure of a significance of hazard involving simultaneous examination of its consequences and probability of occurrence for the scenario”.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
System Description
Hazard Identification
Consequence Analysis
Frequency Analysis
Risk Determination
Operate System
Modify Risk Mitigation Measures
AssessRisk
OK
Unacceptable
FMEA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
System Description
Hazard Identification
Consequence Analysis
Frequency Analysis
Risk Determination
Operate System
Modify Risk Mitigation Measures
AssessRisk
OK
Unacceptable
FMEA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Hazard identification is the most important step in risk analysis
HAZARD IDENTIFICATIONHAZARD IDENTIFICATION
WHAT CAN GO WRONG?WHAT CAN GO WRONG?
METHODS:
• FMEA• HAZOP• What-if analysis• Check list analysis• Fault tree analysis• Event tree analysis
BEFORE THE PROJECT IS FULLY IMPLEMENTEDOR A REDESIGN OF A PLANT
The objective is to determine a list of potential incidents might be occurred to the accidents.
FMEAFMEA• Qualitative method.
• FMEA: systematic methodology to identify product and process problems, assessing their significance, and identifying potential solutions that reduce their significance.
• Each failure mode has a cause and a potential effect.
• Can be performed by two different approaches: bottoms-up / top down.
• Qualitative method.
• FMEA: systematic methodology to identify product and process problems, assessing their significance, and identifying potential solutions that reduce their significance.
• Each failure mode has a cause and a potential effect.
• Can be performed by two different approaches: bottoms-up / top down.
METHODOLOGYMETHODOLOGY
• FMEA to the three different solar hydrogen storage systems => failure modes, causes and effects.
• FMEA is an ongoing process and must be updated every time design or process changes are made =>Top-down approach.
• For a good quality hazard identification, complete information about the system must be compiled.
• The data was provided to a team with expertise on various aspects of hydrogen.
• FMEA to the three different solar hydrogen storage systems => failure modes, causes and effects.
• FMEA is an ongoing process and must be updated every time design or process changes are made =>Top-down approach.
• For a good quality hazard identification, complete information about the system must be compiled.
• The data was provided to a team with expertise on various aspects of hydrogen.
Process: Hydrogen Storage
Section: Low pressure storage
Design intent: Store up to 6 Nm3 of hydrogen at 6 bar
Nº Failure Mode Cause Effects
1 Storage tank failure Mechanical failure, corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement Release of hydrogen. Potential risk of fire or explosion
2 Piping/valves leak Mechanical failure Release of hydrogen. Potential risk of fire or explosion
3 Charging process fail Mechanical failure in hydrogen inlet valve, human error No hydrogen stored. Negative influence on electrolyzer
4Discharging processfail
Mechanical failure in hydrogen outlet valve,human error
No hydrogen supply to metal hydride, high pressure sections nor fuel cells
5 Faulty PRD activation Defect/Fault in PRD, mechanical failure Release of hydrogen. Potential risk of fire or explosion
6
Overpressure combinedwith failure of PRD to open
Mechanical failure in PRD, purge line closed Potential risk of catastrophic rupture of the storage unit
7
Formation of hydrogen/nitrogen mixtures in storage tank
Mechanical failure in nitrogen inlet valve, human operation error
Negative effects on metal hydrides kineticLess efficiency in fuel cells
8 Storage tank failure External fireRelease of hydrogen. Potential risk of fire or explosionPotential risk of catastrophic rupture of the storage unit
FMEA Results for each hydrogen storage section
FMEA Results for each hydrogen storage section
Process: Hydrogen Storage
Section: Metal hydride storage
Design intent: Store up to 24 Nm3 of hydrogen in metal hydride
Nº Failure Mode Cause Effects
9 Container failureMechanical failure, corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement
Release of hydrogen to atmosphere/cooling water.Potential risk of fire or explosion
10 Piping/valves leak Mechanical failureRelease of hydrogen to atmosphere.Potential risk of fire or explosion
11
Overpressure in metal hydride container Fault in cooling water supply Potential risk of catastrophic rupture of the storage unit
12 Metal hydride failure High content of nitrogen in hydrogen Decrease of hydrogen charge rate. No safety hazard
13 Metal hydride failure Impurities in hydrogen gas
Decrease of hydrogen charge ratePoisoning of metal hydride and loss of storage capacity. No safety hazard
14Discharging process fail Fault in heating water supply
No hydrogen supply to high pressure section or fuel cells. No safety hazard
15 Shell failureMechanical failure, corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement Lack of cooling/heating water. No safety hazard
16Cooling circuit piping/valves leak Mechanical failure Lack of cooling/heating water. No safety hazard
Section: High pressure storage
Design intent: Compress and store up to 36 Nm3 of hydrogen at 200 bar
Nº Failure Mode Cause Effects
17Compressor suctionline failure Mechanical failure of line or fitting
Release of hydrogen and potential fire or explosion
18Lubrication systemfailure Loss of fluid
Compressor failure and hydrogen leak with potential fire or explosion
19 Seal failure Mechanical failure Release of hydrogen and potential fire or explosion
20Compressor suction ordischarge valve failure Mechanical failure
No hydrogen supply to cylindersNo safety hazard
21Pressure relief device fails open Mechanical failure Release of hydrogen. Potential risk of fire or explosion
22 Air driven supply failMechanical failure or human error and failure in compressed air line
No hydrogen compression.No safety hazard
23Valve on discharge of compressor fails closed
Mechanical failure or human error and failure of pressure relief valve to open
Overpressure compressor and rupture line. Release of hydrogen and potential fire or explosion
24
High pressure (200 bar)hydrogen supply line failure Mechanical failure
Release of hydrogen and potential fire or explosion
25Overpressure and fail storage tank
Mechanical failure in hydrogen pressure regulator at compressor outlet
Overpressure storage tank. PRV releases hydrogen with potential fire or explosion
26Relief device failure (on cylinders) fails open Mechanical failure
Release of hydrogen to atmosphere and potential fire or explosion
27 Storage tank failure Mechanical failure, corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement
Release of hydrogen to atmosphere and potential fire or explosion
28 Piping/valves leak Mechanical failure
Release of hydrogen to atmosphere and potential fire or explosion
29High pressure fitting failure Mechanical failure, human error
Release of hydrogen and potential fire or explosionPotential hazard due to high pressure
30 Storage tank failure External fire Potential failure of tank due to overheating of metal
CONCLUSIONSCONCLUSIONS
• Main potential failure modes: – container or cylinders failure, – piping leaks and valves fails, originated by mechanical or
material failure, corrosion or hydrogen embrittlement, – human error.
• The results of the study have helped to identify a design inherent safety for the new facility, and identify potential prevention and/or mitigation corrective actions.
• Suitable choice of materials and the need of training of personnel are essential for safety purposes.
• Main potential failure modes: – container or cylinders failure, – piping leaks and valves fails, originated by mechanical or
material failure, corrosion or hydrogen embrittlement, – human error.
• The results of the study have helped to identify a design inherent safety for the new facility, and identify potential prevention and/or mitigation corrective actions.
• Suitable choice of materials and the need of training of personnel are essential for safety purposes.
