national identity and foreign policy: the dynamics of indonesian identity towards the arab...

8/18/2019 National Identity and Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Indonesian Identity towards the Arab Revolution

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National Identity and Foreign Policy:

The Dynamics of Indonesian Identity

towards the Arab Revolution

and Its Potential Effect on the Security

Problems in South East Asia

By: Radityo Dharmaputra

Department of International Relations

Faculty of Social and Political Sciences

Universitas Airlangga, Indonesia

Presented at the PSS-ISA Conference 2013

27-29 June 2013, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary


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National Identity and Foreign Policy:

The Dynamics of Indonesian Identity towards the Arab

Revolution and Its Potential Effect on the Security

Problems in South East Asia

Radityo Dharmaputra

Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya

( [email protected] / [email protected] )

ABSTRACT

The relationship between identity and foreign policy is one of the mostinteresting subjects in the study of foreign policy. This paper tries to

highlight the importance in studying the relations between national

identity and foreign policy by using the case of Indonesia. As a

heterogenous country, the national identity of Indonesia are always

under the debates, whether it is the nationalistic model of Soekarno, the

more liberal view of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, or the power of

Islam based on the majority of the people. This paper tries to analyze

the current dynamics of Indonesian national identity and its relations to

the Indonesia foreign policy towards the Arab Revolution. As one of

the largest Muslim populations, the responds of Indonesia regarding

the Arab Revolution will reflect the debate of identity and the dominant

discourse. By using the post-structuralist approach written by Lene

Hansen, this paper tries to analyze which discourse is the dominant

one, and predicts the potential security problems caused by the

dominant identity, especially in the South East Asian regions.

Key words: Islam, Indonesia, foreign policy, Arab Spring, identity, discourses.

Introduction

The dilemma of the relations between Indonesian identity and foreignpolicy has been understudied in recent years. The lack of academic debateson this subject was apparent. Only two books elaborated this issue. Thefirst was Rizal Sukma’s book, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy (2003). Thesecond was Anak Agung Banyu Perwita’s book, Indonesia and the Muslim World (2007). This lack of research or rather, the lack of published research was one of the weaknesses in Indonesian academic atmosphere. If Sebastian

and Lanti’s research (2010) proved right, this research try to elaborate one


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Radityo Dharmaputra

2 PSS-ISA Conference on International Studies

of their outspoken challenge, that is “...while social constructivist variableslike identity...have great explanatory value...constructivist approaches needto explain deviant behaviour...” (Sebastian & Lanti 2010, p.167). One of thechallenges in asnwering Sebastian and Lanti’s research is to conductresearch on identity/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia.

As far as the current trend in research of Indonesian foreign policy goes,the main theme was the connection of Islam and foreign policy. The mostprominent research on this subject is Sukma’s project on Islam and foreignpolicy (2003), Perwita’s works on Indonesia’s foreign policy towards theMuslim World (2007), and Anwar’s article on Foreign Policy, Islam, andDemocracy in Indonesia (2010). All three were looking at the “given”Islamic identity of Indonesia, and the consequences of that identity to

Indonesian foreign policy. This position was also encouraged by the officialstatement of the current Indonesian president that Indonesian identities wasa “moderate, tolerant, and modern face of Islam” (Hermawan et al. 2011,p.42). This is where the problems appeared. According to the founding father of Indonesia, Indonesian foreign policy was based on the “free andactive” policy, as expressed by former Vice President Mohammad Hatta(1976). The dilemma between the “Islamic identities” and the “free andactive” policy has prompted the start of this paper.

By using the newly emerging phenomena of the “Arab Revolution”, that is

the wave of democratization that currently happening in the several Arabstates, this paper examines the Indonesian foreign policy in responding theevents. While this paper still builds its logical thinking from the relationsbetween Islam and foreign policy, this paper tried to elaborate the debateon the discourses of Indonesian foreign policy towards the post-ArabSpring states. Elaborating the official discourses (from the Presidentialspeeches) and the societal discourses (from academics and social groups),this paper finds that the official discourses were limited in the promotion of the moderate values but not into direct involvement. At the same time, the

societal discourses were torn between the direct involvement (as stated by many academics and the PKS member) and more fundamentalisticdiscourses (from the Hizbut Tahrir). Those conditions create the moderate way on foreign policy, in which the government benefited by acting like what the President-led discourses went. This state of affairs further led theIndonesian foreign policy to be directed only by the President, not by thesocietal discourses. While this findings concur with the majority of theprevious research, the low level of influence from the societal discourses,even when the official discourses was promoting the values of democracy,could give a new light on the importance of analyzing all the discourses of

foreign policy.


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National Identity and Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Indonesian Identity


PSS-ISA Conference 2013, 27-29 June, Budapest, Hungary 3

This paper was structured in several parts/subsection. The first partexplained the theoretical debates on the relations between identity and

foreign policy. The second part elaborates a little about the previousresearch on the relationship between Islam and foreign policy. The thirdpart reviewed the previous research on Indonesian foreign policy and theimportance of Islam as a factor. The fourth part analyzed the differentdiscourses concerning the Arab Spring and the Indonesian foreign policy. The last part was the concluding remarks, by elaborating the potentialsecurity issues in the Southeast Asia concerning the dominant discourses inIndonesian foreign policy towards Arab Spring.

Identity and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Debates

The study of identity and foreign policy was blooming just after the end of the Cold War.1 Either by focusing their work on the resurgence of culturalfactors in analyzing foreign policy or by focusing on the case study, onecannot argue that the study on identity/foreign policy nexus was emerging.

In general, the study of identity and foreign policy can be divided into twomajor groups. The first group is the group that considers identity as a

determinant factor of foreign policy. In other words, foreign policy wasdriven by the dominant view on identity of the country. This group, whichargued in the context of causality, was also divided into several streams. There were several scholars who argued on the concept of the strategicculture of the country, indicating the presence of a national identity which was given for each country.2 There was a group that considers nationalidentity as a logical consequence of the geographical-geopolitical position of a country, so that national identity is regarded to be similar, or at least

1 Several of them such as Hansen (2006), Neumann (1996), Fawn (ed., 2004), Sondhaus

(2006), Campbell (1998), Christie (ed., 2008), Bassin (1991), Hudson (ed., 1997; 1999),Schafer (1999), Wallace (1991), Doty (1993), Clunan (2009), Vlahos (1991), Lantis (2005),Prizel (1998), Basrur (2001), Hopf (2002; 2005), Schonberg (2009), Bozdağlıoğlu (2003),

Tsygankov (2010), Uzer (2011), Tamaki (2010), Bukh (2009), Commuri (2009), Karimifard(2011), Bullen (2009), Moulioukova (2011), Piontkovsky (2006), Dijkink (1996), or

Atanassova-Cornelis (2011).2 For the explanation of the strategic culture as a concept, see Snyder (1977), Johnston(1995), Sondhaus (1996, pp.1-13), Graham (1996), Lantis (2002; 2005), Gray (1999; 2006),Uz Zaman (2009). However, not all of the above mentioned articles or books containedthe application of strategic culture in analysis. For the articles with the explicit explanationof the relations between strategic culture and policy, especially foreign policy, see Farrell

(2005), Cha (2001), Harris (2009), Feng (2007), Morgan (2003), Ermarth (2006), Cassidy (2003), Basrur (2001), DeGroot et al. (2008), and Mufti (2009).


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linked, with geopolitical vision.3 The majority of this first group however,assumed that national identity comes from the discourse of identity, ornational self-image, which was dominant in the domestic discourse, whichthen became the dominant national identity. Dominant national identity then pushed foreign policy in a particular direction.4

The second groups argued that the relations between identity and foreignpolicy could not be understood causally, as the previous group hasproposed. Rather, this body of scholars proposed the context of “constitutive” relations between identity and foreign policy.5 The works of Hansen (2006) and Campbell (1990; 1998) was considered to be thehallmarks in this category. Hansen (2006) analyzed the relations betweenthe foreign policy discourse in the West and their foreign policy during the

“Balkan Crisis” using the methods of discourse analysis. Meanwhile,Campbell (1990) proposed the idea of how the U.S. foreign policy constitutes the political identity of “America”. On his second book (Campbell, 1998), he had extend his research to include the construction of “America” during the longer period of time. Iver Neumann (1996) alsoargued about the Russian identity construction, but his research was morefocused and narrower than Campbell’s, as he focused on the idea of Europein the Russian identity discourses.

The main argument underlying this study is that national identity is not

something that was given, but something constructed. Therefore, relations with foreign policy may not be a causal relationship but, rather, aconstitutive relation. In this instance, it is possible that foreign policy conducted by states could constitute state’s identity. To that end, thisresearch seeks to answer the following general questions. Whatconstructions of “Indonesia” are articulated? Which discourses becamedominant in certain cases? How is the relationship between Indonesian

3 For the categories of geopolitical vision or the relations between national identity,

geopolitics, and foreign policy, see the works of Dijkink (1996), Kerr (1995), Isakova(2005), Smith (1999), Erşen (2004), Dodds (1993), and Flint (2006). However, some notesmust be underlined, that most of the discussion of geopolitics, identity, and foreign policy

were focusing on Russia’s foreign policy, especially with regard to the security aspects.4 The majority of the constructivist account on identity and foreign policy were using thislogic. For further explanation, the works of Clunan (2009), Hopf (2002), Fawn, ed. (2004),

Tolz (1998), Kuzio (2001), Schafer (1999), Wallace (1991), Molchanov (2002), Schonberg (2009), Bozdağlıoğlu (2003), and Uzer (2011) could be the guidance. Unfortunately, themajority of these books/articles were still speaking about Russia and Turkey.5 This strands of thought were still few, but several scholars have stand out, like Hansen(2006), Campbell (1998), Neumann (1996), Doty (1993), Tamaki (2010), and perhaps Prizel

(1998). But the works of Hansen (2006) was one of the most important; one of her mostimportant contribution was the “methods” of post-structuralism.


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identity and Indonesian foreign policy? Was Indonesian identity thedetermining factor of Indonesian foreign policy? Or was it Indonesianforeign policy that constitutes the identity of Indonesia? Or both are the

aspects of the mutually constitutive relations and inseparable from eachother? Exploring these questions by using Hansen’s approach, but with adifferent timeframe and different case, would extend the possibilities of using the post-structuralist methods in analyzing foreign policy. At the sametime, this research would deepen the understanding of Indonesian foreignpolicy by exploring the possible construction of the Islamic identity, andIslamic foreign policy by assuming the “constitutive” approach.

While this research was based on those perspectives, in this short paper, I will only seek to elaborate the possible construction of an Islamic identity.

The main goal of this paper was to analyze how the dominant discourse onIndonesian foreign policy was constructed by elaborating the officialdiscourse and the societal discourse. I did not seek to elaborate theconstitutive process in this short paper. However, in the research (possibly the next papers), the constitutive process of the identity-foreign policy nexus is elaborated.

The methods used in this research would be mainly inductive, in a sensethat this research would focus on the analysis of the data, not the

application of some theoretical models. The analysis of the discursiveconstruction of identity will be conducted with the examples set by Wodak et al. (2009). While the main approach, in this research is based on theintertextual research model, proposed by Hansen (2006). In her works,Hansen (2006, p.57) proposed 3 (three) research model based on theintertextuality of official discourse, wider debate, cultural representations,and the marginal discourses. To capture both the governmental perceptionof identity and the society’s perception, in this research, I will focus on theofficial discourses (model 1) and academic discourse (model 3B). Toelaborate more on the fact that Indonesia is a democratic countries, I will

add model 2 (the wider foreign policy debates) to the mix of analysis.

The official discourses analyzed by looking at the official documents, in-depth interview with the decision-makers, and by analyzing the speechesand the spontaneous live interviews (Hudson 2007). The 2nd model consistof the wider foreign policy debate was analyzed by analyzing the foreignpolicy debates in the parliament, the debate held in the media, and theeditorial reports of the main media in Indonesia. The 3rd model, in thispaper, was analyzed by looking at the academic debate held on seminar and

academic papers


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Radityo Dharmaputra


Islam as a Factor in Foreign Policy Analysis

Before describing the dilemma of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy, thereare two basic questions that need to be answered first. The first question is“What is Islamic Foreign Policy?”. Elaborating this question would be themain task in the preliminary step of analysis. To help me addressing thisquestion, I borrowed the concept of Islamic foreign policy that was stressedby Karabell (1997). Karabell (1997) had endorsed the idea of an Islamicforeign policy that differentiated the target of the policy. According toKarabell, in term of policy, the policy of a fundamentalist state6 towardsanother Muslim state could not be considered as “foreign”, based on theprinciples of Umma . On that account, the foreign policy of a fundamentaliststate will be directed towards the “outside” world such as the Israelis or the

United States (Karabell 1997, p.85).

While acknowledging Karabell’s view, in this paper I try to broaden thediscussion on the Islamic foreign policy. Karabell used the fundamentalistperception to construct the concept of Islamic foreign policy. But, in thispaper, I started the discussion from the principles of moderate Islam, notthe fundamentalist one. If we had agreed with the debate on Indonesia as amoderate Islam state7, it is possible that the reversed concept could beconstructed. If, as Karabell said, the fundamentalist foreign policy could beanalyze by looking at the policy towards the “outside” world, then the

moderate8 foreign policy could be analyze by looking at how they see theirrelations with another Islamic state. Therefore, to analyze Indonesia’s policy would mean the analysis on Indonesia’s policy towards other Islamic state,thus the case of the Arab Spring.

The second problem that needs to be addressed is about the relationshipbetween Islam and foreign policy. Brenda Shaffer’s book entitled The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (2006) was one of the most authoritative inthe field. Through several case studies, her book was concluded by several

propositions. One of them, which played significant part in this paper’sconclusion, is that culture (in this context, Islam) will played significant partin formulating state’s foreign policy if the material trade-off of the decision was cost-free or low, and when either there is lack of information

6 Karabell used the examples of Iran and Sudan. See Karabell (1997, p.83)7 As the current President Yudhoyono said on his speech before the Indonesian Council of

World Affairs (2005).8 Moderate, in this paper, could be understood as the condition where Islam, democracy,

and modernity go hand-in-hand with the others. This was based on the speech by

Yudhoyono himself (2005).


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concerning the trade-offs or there was a strong lobby from the interestgroups in a democratic political system (Shaffer 2006, p.24). Thisproposition prompt the basic idea that, as a democratic governance, there is

a potential that Islam will played a high level of influence in the formulationprocess of foreign policy.

In compliment with Shaffer’s propositions, I added Shanti Nair’sproposition based on her works on Malaysian foreign policy. According toNair (1997), the influence of Islam in foreign policy was to the extent thatthe influenced state became anti-Western. Furthermore, as Sukma (2003,p.3) said, several Western scholars tend to simplify the effect of Islam inforeign policy to be the principles of anti-Western, anti-America, and anti-Israel. These tendencies of the fundamentalist policy 9 will be the alter-policy

of Indonesian moderate views. If there were any discourses that follow these principles, then it could be seen as counter-discourse to the discourseon moderate Islam (as proposed by the government).

Islamic Identity in Indonesian Foreign Policy: A Survey of PastResearch

Several researches had been conducted on the issue of the relations between

Islam and Indonesian foreign policy. Sukma (2003) and Perwita (2007) aretwo of the most authoritative.10 Both were looking at the extent to whichthe identity of Islam played part in formulating foreign policy. While Sukmaanalyze Indonesian foreign policy using the sequence of the leadershipchange (from Soekarno to Megawati), Perwita used the case study of Indonesian foreign policy towards the Organization of Islamic Conference(OIC), the Moro problem, the problem in Bosnia, and the conflict inMiddle-East. Nevertheless, beside the differences in the case studies, both were coming into the identical conclusions that Islam has not played a very significant part in the formulation of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Sukma (2003, p.140) concluded his research by asserting the problematicdual identity, which is the inclination towards the West on one hand, andthe factual condition of a Muslim-majority population on the other. Theseconditions, combined with the domestic problem of Indonesia, resulted inthe low impact of Islamic identity. This observation was strengthened by

9 If we agree with Karabell’s point of view. See the previous page (page 6).10 As Anwar (2010) said, that for further discussion on Islam and Indonesian foreign

policy, sees both books.


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Perwita’s works (2007). Perwita observed the politics of ambiguity in theSoeharto’s era, which meaning would be synonymous with the dual identity,in terms that the Islamic identity was used by the state as a legitimation andjustification of foreign policy (Perwita 2007, p.177). New research,conducted by Wicaksana (2012) showed that Islam is just anothermarginalized identity in terms of formulating foreign policy in Indonesia. Again, in the same terms as both Sukma and Perwita, Wicaksana reassertedthe problem of domestic fragmentation, external factors, and the ever-present “free and active” principles, as the cause of the marginalizedinfluence of Islam.

With those researches as the background, it appears that the probability of an Islamic foreign policy, even not in the fundamentalist terms but in

moderate sense, was quite low. However, several factors should be putforward to extending the debates on the dilemmatic relationship betweenIslam and Indonesian foreign policy. The first factors would be thereemergence of Islamic politics in Indonesia. As Liddle (2003) said during the early years of the Reformasi era, the probability of the rise in Islamicparty was quite high. Indeed, as Baswedan (2003) had predicted and Tomsa(2012) shown in his research, the rise of the Islamic party (in this instancethe Prosperous Justice Party) during the 2004 and 2009 elections had shownthat the possibility of greater Islamic public opinion have emerged. Itshould be noted, however, that the rise of Islamic politics goes hand-in-

hand with the principles of moderation. As Tomsa (2012) had said, even theProsperous Justice Party (PKS, in Indonesian terms) that was deemedstaunchly Islamist and fundamentalist had grown to be more moderatethrough the democratic process in Indonesia.

The second factor that must be taken into consideration is the officialstanding of the Indonesian government, particularly the current worldview of the President Yudhoyono. In his speech, he usually articulated the“democracy-Islam-modernity” triangle that has been characterized as

Indonesian “international identity”.11

During his speeches forcommemorating the 65th years of Indonesian Independence, he reassertedthe need to promote Indonesian “moderate Islam” identity (Hermawan etal. 2011, p.42). Even before that speech, during his opening speech at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, he promotedthe role of Indonesia to “project the virtue of moderate Islam throughout

11 His first speech in foreign policy before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs, May

19, 2005. For official transcript, see

http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html


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the Muslim world”.12 At the same time, based on the Karabell’s view thatIslamic foreign policy could be understood through the country’s positiontoward Israel, the Indonesian government actively support the recognition

of Palestinian state. This position was expressed clearly by the ForeignMinister during his speeches before the OIC’s Annual CoordinationMeeting and before the General Assembly of the United Nations; both were held in New York, September 2011.13

In that notes, I can conclude this subsection by referring back to Anwar(2010) proposition14 that in the near future, the importance of Islam inIndonesian foeign policy will grow, especially after the rise of the moderateIslam and the sheer-will of the government, particularly the President, topromote the moderate Islam’s virtue to the Muslim world. It is in this

context that the next elaboration on the issue of Arab Spring will beconducted.

The Arab Spring: Analysing the Discourse of Indonesian Identity andForeign Policy

In this subsection, based on the previous model of post-structuralist view on foreign policy and identity, this paper analyzes the discourse on the Arab

Spring, Islam, and democracy, and how Indonesia supposed to respond.

Arab Spring and Indonesian Reformation

Several commentators had already draw comparison between theIndonesian Reformation in 1998 and the Arab Spring. Thomas Carothers(2011) had already proposed that Indonesia’s experience in 1998 could be

12 Presidential lectures at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,

Septemr 29, 2009. For official transcript, see

http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2009/09/30/1228.html13 The official speech of the Foreign Minister in the OIC could be read in

http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name

2=Menteri&IDP=734&l=en; while the speech before the General Assembly could be read

here


2=Menteri&IDP=725&l=en.14 Actually, both Sukma (2003) and Perwita (2007) had also said that the possibility was

high, that in the future, Islam will play more prominent role. But while Perwita was more

optimistic than Sukma, both were not taking into account the increasing rhetorical effort of

the President Yudhoyono.


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the model for a muslim-to-democratic transition for the Egyptian. Yang Kassim (2011) stated that post-Mubarak Egypt could learn from Indonesia’s1998 transition. Other scholar, John Sidel (2012), followed Carothers’ andKassim’s proposition by drawing comparison between Egypt 2011 andIndonesia 1998, and shown similiarities between them. Brooke Kantor(n.d.) from Harvard University Institute of Politics had also examined thepromising potential of the Indonesian model of transition for the post-ArabSpring states. Baker and Gamester (2011) also elaborated the potentialmodel of the “east”, from Malaysia and Indonesia, to be used by the Arabstates. Meanwhile, Australian ambassador to Indonesia, Greg Moriarty hadsaid that Indonesia had shown that Islam and democracy are compatible,and it could be used as a model for the Arab uprisings (The Australian,2011). Many U.S. officials also hoped that Egypt will follow Indonesian step

(Solomon, 2011).

While the overall commentary’s theme had been promoting Indonesianmodel to the Arab, especially to the Egyptian, some analyst also had theirpessimistic view. Tom Pepinsky (2013), while acknowledging thatIndonesian model had been a success story on transition to democracy,argued that the limits to the model had made Indonesia’s experience as thepossibility for the Egyptian, not the precise future.

While it would be quite a debate as to whether the similarities will provide

the guarantee of the rise of moderate Islam in the Arab or the differencesand limitation will prove to be the demise of the newly government, it isessential that in the current debate, the issue of democracy and Islam waslinked altogether, as the “moderate Islam” identity in Indonesia had done. The response of the government and society will provide us with theimportant discourse

Responds of Indonesian Government?

The official responds of the Indonesian government was analyzed by articulating the speeches of the President15 as well as the media report of thepolicy.

The common themes in the President’s speeches were the promotion of themoderate values and the willingness of the Indonesian government to helpthe Arab states in the time of turmoil. As shown in his early respond to the

15 The official transcripts of the President’s speeches and interview were compiled from the

official website of the President Yudhoyono, http://www.presidenri.go.id/.


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crisis in Egypt, Antara News16 reported that the President sent a letter tothe Egyptian government in order to “share its experience in dealing with asimilar crisis” (Antara News, December 2011). But, it is important to note

that, despite the early letter and willingness, the President’s respondstowards the Arab Spring proved to be rhetorical only.

Several of his later speeches contain the rhetoric of the moderate values butnot the initial willingness to share the Indonesian experiences. His opening speeches to the conferences of the parliamentary union of the OIC, in thelate January 2012, were directed to promote the moderate values. As hesaid17, “…Indonesia has evolved to be a country where Islam, democracy,and modernity can thrive together…”, while at the same time he only addressed the Arab Spring in terms of inability to predict the current

uprising in the Arab. In the next month, February 6th 2012, in his speechesto commemorate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, he reminded theaudience of the condition in the Arab, the phenomena of the Arab Spring,but yet again only emphasized the importance of the moderate values (inthe link between democracy and Islam).18 Those two events were theopportunities for the President for reiterating his initial concern and willingness to direct Indonesian foreign policy towards the Arab Spring’sphenomena.19 But, judging by his speeches to both events, thoseopportunities were neglected.

The rhetorical aspects of the official discourses were shown again in severaldifferent speeches. President Yudhoyono’s opening speeches in the JakartaInternational Defence Dialogue, March 2012, proved to be just rhetoric. Herepeated his previous statement that none have predicted the occurrence of the Arab Spring, and that the phenomena had been changing the strategic

16 ANTARA is the national news agency of Indonesia. It is a private news company under

the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises.17 Opening Speech in the Seventh Conference of the Parliamentary Union of Organization

of Islamic Conference (OIC) Member States, Palembang, January 30, 2012. For official

transcripts, see


2=Presiden&IDP=749&l=id.18 Opening Speech in the Commemoration of the Birth of the Prophet Muhammad SAW,

Jakarta, February 6, 2012. For official transcripts, see

http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2012/02/06/1804.html.19 The opportunities were provided by the context of the audience. In the first speeches, he

had spoken to the delegates from the Muslim countries; in the second speeches, he had

spoken to the domestic audience under the context of the important events in the Islamic

point of view.


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condition in the region.20 His speech during the Shangri-La Dialogue inSingapore was confined by same theme, in which he reminded the Arabcountries that Indonesia had previously went through the same situation.21

In one of his current speech, this time during the conferment of anhonorary doctoral degree from Nanyang Technological University,President Yudhoyono once again promoted the moderate Islamic virtue of Indonesia to the Arab states. In his own words, he said “…We have alsoproved that democracy, ISLAM and MODERNITY can go welltogether…Thus, the Indonesian democracy may well offer valuable lessonsto Arab Spring countries who are now facing similar challenges”.22

And yet, despite all the rhetoric, the President was unable to exertIndonesian influence on the post-Arab Spring countries. His most explicit

and obvious direction for Indonesian foreign policy toward the Arab Spring was stated during his briefing for the media after his visit to Germany andHungary, March 2013.23 He mentioned that the Arab Spring was not over,or, in his own words, “unfinished Arab Spring”. But, when confronted by the question of whether Indonesia could and should participate actively inthe Arab region, he avoided answering by saying that the other countries as well could not resolve the problem in Middle-East. He, then, referred to thedifferences between what Indonesia can do and what Indonesia should do,before explaining Indonesia’s strategic mission in many areas. Once again,the President presented the rhetoric of democracy, of the possibility of

Indonesian model, and yet he evaded the potential of a more active policy towards the Arab, especially concerning the Arab Spring.

We could conclude, in this subsection, that the official discourse that thegovernment tried to promote was the rhetoric of the moderate Islamic values of Indonesia and the possibility of importation of the values to the

20 Opening Speech in the Jakarta International Defense Dialogue, Jakarta Convention

Center, March 21, 2012. For official transcripts, see

http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2012/03/21/1946.html.21 Keynote Speech, by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the 11 th IISS Asia

Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 1, 2012. For official transcripts,

see http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2012/06/01/1864.html.22 Acceptance Speech in the Conferment of an Honorary Degree, Doctor of Letters,

Honoris Causa, Nanyang Technological University of Singapore, April 23, 2013. Capital

Letters were provided by the Official Transcripts. For official transcripts, see

http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2013/04/22/2097.html23 Briefing by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Presidential Aircraft, After the

Visit to Germany and Hungary, March 8, 2013. For official transcripts, see

http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2013/03/08/2088.html.


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post-Arab Spring countries, but at the same time the official discourse lack the willingness to act directly. In the next subsection, we would evaluate thesocietal discourses held by academics and Islamic groups in society.

Responds of the Society?

In this section, we would evaluate the societal discourses concerning whatIndonesia should do with respect to the Arab Spring. I divide thissubsection into three main bodies. The first part that should be evaluated was the analysts and academics position concerning Indonesia and ArabSpring. One of the leading thinktanks in Indonesia, the Center for PoliticalStudies in the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), held a seminar inOctober 30th, 2012, which discussed the Indonesian responds to the

dynamics in Middle-East after the Arab Spring.24 The seminar, comprised of several well-known academics such as Hamdan Basyar and Tri NukePudjiastuti, was concluded by the list of the problems that could relate toIndonesia. Some of them were the problem of refugees, migrant workers,and economic cooperation. While this seminar could contribute to thediscussion, it did not offer significant contribution to the societal discoursesthat the academics had offered. The other seminar, as reported by The Australian (2011), offered much more discourses. This seminar, comprisedof the Muslim intellectual Azyumardi Azra and military reformer Agus

Widjojo, promoted the idea that Indonesia could be a model for the Arab.25

Former Finance Minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, expressed her view thatthe Arab countries could learn from Indonesia’s experience, but had to bein charge of their own transition, just like the Indonesians in 1998. Otherscholar, Agus Wandi (2012), criticized the lack of action from theIndonesian government concerning the Arab Spring. He then urged thegovernment to take more active role in the Arab, especially after analyzing that Indonesia had their own “spring” during the 1998. The same view wasexpressed by Abdul Hakim (2013), researcher and the executive director of

Skala Survei Indonesia (SSI). He said that the Indonesian government couldbe the role model of democracy in the OIC and that position should beused by the government. In agreement with those views, Heri Sucipto,director of the Center for Islamic and Middle-East Studies, stated that the

24 Taken from the report of the seminar “Dinamika Politik Timur Tengah dan Respon

Indonesia Terhadapnya”, October 30, 2012. The short report could be found in

http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/in/kegiatan/tahun-2012/714-seminar-bidang-internasional-

dinamika-politik-timur-tengah-dan-respon-indonesia-terhadapnya-.html.25 Taken from the short report of the seminar found in The Australian , August 27, 2011.


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Indonesian government should involve directly in Egypt (Republika Online2012).

We could see that the majority of the academics supported the idea of anactive foreign policy towards the Arab states. However, the academics’ urgeis not enough. Based on the notion that in democracy, interest groups couldpersuade the government through the lobby (Shaffer 2006, p. 24), it isnecessary to look at the groups in the society.

Several groups in the society, especially the Islamic affiliated groups, hadresponded to the condition in Arab after the uprising. Leading member of the PKS, Mahfudz Shiddiq (2012), also the Member of Foreign AffairsCommission of the House of Representative, stated that the time is ripe for

the Indonesian government to put more effort in conducting Islamic Worldforeign policy. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (2012) posted, in their website, thecurrent condition of the Arab/Islamic world. If they did speak aboutIndonesia, it was in terms of the threat from the United States.Spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Ismail Yusanto, declared thatthe U.S. was afraid that the Arab Spring would infect Indonesia, so that it isnecessary for the U.S. to construct another military bases in Darwin(ResistNews Blog 2012).

While bore groups had an Islamic point-of-view, it was interesting to see

that the Hizbut Tahrir differed greatly from the PKS. PKS urged theIndonesian government to do more, while the Hizbut Tahrir emphasizednot the state or foreign policy, but the threat from the West to the Muslim World. From these two views, we could observe that the PKS, inaccordance with Tomsa’s assessment, was the more moderate, while theHizbut Tahrir was more fundamental. Nevertheless, both were emphasizing the importance of the Arab Spring issue. They do not, however, putforward the discourse on what the Indonesian government should do. Evenif they do, the fragmentation within the Islamic political groups will be too

great. In this conclusion, I concur with what Wicaksana (2012) said, that thestrength of Islamization in the arena of domestic politics and foreign policy was influenced by the degree of fragmentation and internal conflict.

Concluding Remarks: Potential Security Problems in Southeast Asia?

The relation between Islam and Indonesian foreign policy, as argued by several scholars, was dilemmatic. In one hand, the fact that majority of

Indonesian people were Islam cannot be denied. On the other hand,


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Indonesian foreign policy, as shown by Sukma (2003), Perwita (2007), Anwar (2010), and Wicaksana (2012), was rather far from the Islamicforeign policy. The findings of this articles showed that the official

discourse was directed by the President. He promoted the rhetoric of themoderate values of Islam, but rather hesitant on pushing for directinvolvement. Meanwhile, the societal discourse was torn between the urgefor direct and active involvement and the different focus on the U.S. andIsrael. These dual discourses prompt a consequence; it was not a dualidentity of Indonesia, to differ with what Sukma (2003) said, but the vagueness of Indonesian identity with regard to foreign policy. Thedominant identity, which then should prompted the national interest (if wefollow the constructivist idea) or create another debate on identity discourses (if we follow the logic of the post-structuralist), was absent.

The absence of the dominant identity, or the vagueness of the identity,could then generate several security consequences, especially in the region.Firstly, concerning Myanmar, there was already tension in the Indonesiansociety that pushes the government to involve directly with regard to theinternal conflict that involved the Islamic community in Myanmar. Whilethe Indonesian government, in this case, was constrained by the ASEANnorms of non-interference, the societal discourses could be more rigorousin their instigation on changing the current foreign policy. Secondly, the

security problems between Malaysia and Indonesia, which has lasted severaldecades, will be interesting to be analyzed through the Islamic factor. Whileboth countries have Islamic background, the potential for conflict,especially concerning identity and culture, are still very high. It would bethought-provoking to differentiate the analysis on official discourses towardMalaysia and the societal discourses toward Malaysia. Third and lastly, if thefundamentalist discourses are flourishing, it will be stimulating to analyzethe effect on Indonesia-U.S. relations, especially if the public opinion inIndonesia starts to be a stronger voice and an important factor in foreignpolicy formulation.

As the concluding remarks, this paper was only an early draft of the biggerresearch. Therefore, the next part of the analysis, especially the media’sdiscourses, the debate on the parliament, and the common people’s attitudehad not been analyzed. In the future articles, the constitutive process of identity and foreign policy nexus could also be highlighted.


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