national defence strategy romania between individual initiatives and concerted actions in external...

8/3/2019 National Defence Strategy Romania Between Individual Initiatives and Concerted Actions in External Relations

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NATIONAL SCHOOL OF POLITICAL STUDIES AND ADMINISTRATION- SECURITYAND DIPLOMACY M.A.- FIRST YEAR

National Defence Strategy: Romania between

Individual Initiatives and Concerted Actions in

External Relations

Romanian National Security Institutions

Bunoara Elena

Dumitru Alexandru-Mihai

Rosu Cristina-Denisa

Sava Denisa

(S&D- I)

Bucharest, January 2012



2

Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................... 3

1. The Republic of Moldova ......................................................................... 6

2. The Black Sea Region ............................................................................ 12

3. Southern Caucausus and Central Asia ................................................ ..... 12

4. The Middle East ..................................................................................... 23Conclusions and Policy Recommendations ................................................... 28

Bibliography ................................................................................................. 31



3

Introduction

The National Defence Strategy of Romania (2010) reflects the government¶s official

position towards new developments in the international system and Romania¶s reactionsregarding internal affairs. The focus of this paper is placed upon Chapter 7. Romania¶s

Defence, more specifically on part 7.1 regarding External Action. Thus, this document

analyzes the Romanian stance both on regions deemed essential to the national security and

prosperity and on actors playing a significant role in the process of accomplishing the stated

national interest.

Owing to that, the essay is based upon a view of the international system in

accordance to that of the Realist Theory in International Relations and subsequently follows a

geopolitical approach as well as an analysis of Romanian external action as a self-perceived

middle power. For that matter, the research started with the following question: T o what

extent does the National Defence Strategy regarding Romania¶s external actions correspond

to the country¶s capacities? In this sense, the study consists of an investigation on the

equilibrium between the goals stated in Chapter 7.1 of the Strategy and the resources to

achieve them and an analysis on the statement of foreign actions aimed at preserving

Romania¶s interests in accordance with the Romanian potential to accomplish them in the

given international environment. Among the directions mentioned in the Strategy, the

emphasis was put on Eastern international actors due to a number of reasons. First of all, the

major threats to national stability and security lie within those particular areas1. Secondly, as

an EU and NATO member, Romania can achieve its middle power potential as well as its

allies¶ interests in the East by wielding a certain degree of influence due to its proximity to

the regions.

The working hypotheses are: T here is a disparity between Romania¶s intentions and

its potential in terms of international actions- while Romania considers itself a middle power

having an assertive role at regional level, it scarcely achieves influencing the international or

regional system. Secondly, Romania sees as first and most important source of security its

membership to EU and NATO and tries to build its international role and status upon it.

However, claiming an active role in the region often proves difficult because of the limited

options Romania has - even if Romania has the capacity to rise to the challenge it does not

1 The analyzed directions of external action are aimed at: the Republic of Moldova, the Black Sea Region, SouthCaucasus and Central Asia and the Middle East.



4

possess an adequate system (economical, political and diplomatic ties with its identified

partners) to meet the task assigned by itself.

In order to test the hypotheses, a qualitative approach was employed which consists

of: analysis of contents (primary and secondary sources2), reinterpretation and explanation of

scientific researches and official documents (NDS, the Energy Security Strategy of Romania,the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine of Russia etc.). Basically, this model of

analysis aims at evaluating Romania¶s strategy of foreign and defence policy by identifying

its abilities and actions in the international system.

Most importantly, the hypotheses and the theoretical framework rely upon several key

concepts. It is appropriate to mention that the concepts of small and middle power are the key

elements that help identify Romania¶s international status envisaged by the NDS. To begin

with, there is a difficulty to theorize the concepts of small and middle power , also there is a

misuse of ³small states´ rather than ³small powers´ and a lack of fixed criteria to define

them. Most prominently, we can find negative definitions of small states: they are defined by

what they are not as compared to great powers. Also, small states will try to minimize costs

of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint actions. Moreover, strengths and

weaknesses are perceptible through the capacity of the state to withstand stress and its ability

to pursue a policy of its own devising.3

Middle powers are also hard to define, given the fact that while the great powers

remained almost the same since the Vienna Congress, the former kept on emerging as stated

by Neumann and Gstohl in Lilliputians in Gulliver¶s World? As defining characteristics, they

seek to protect their interests and project their values, as perceived by their leaders, they are

more preoccupied with domestic and regional affairs, they present specific vulnerabilities and

large external orientation of their economies while having to deal with a neighbouring great

power.

Another drawback in defining middle power resided within the criteria employed by

scholars of international relations- while the majority of the academia agrees that the main

features are represented by objective dimensions (GNP, population, size, military capability),

there are important voices that emphasize the subjective section (perceived significance-

assuming a certain standard implies acting in a certain way and expecting other actors to

2 For a detailed account of the sources, see the Bibliography section of the paper.3 David VITAL, ³The Inequality of states- A study of the small power in international relations´ in ChristineINGEBRITSEN, Small States in International Relations, University of Washington Press, USA, 2006, pp. 77-78.



5

relate to you in accordance to that particular status; in that sense diplomatic initiative may

represent an instrument that quantifies the line of action of such an actor).

M iddle power diplomacy, is, in short, the kind of diplomacy which can,

and should, be practised by states which are not big or strong enough,

either in their own region or the wider world, to impose their policy

preferences on anyone else; but who do recognize that there are

international policy tasks which need to be accomplished if the world

around them is to be safer, saner, more just and more prosperous (with

all the potential this has, in turn, to affect their own interests); and who

have sufficient capacity and credibility to be able to advance those

tasks.4

In the National Security Strategy one can identify four basic characteristics of

a middle power 5: usage of their relative diplomatic abilities in the service of international

peace and stability; exhibiting foreign policy behaviour that stabilizes and legitimizes the

global order (typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives); practice of their

relative prosperity, managerial skills, and international prestige towards the preservation of

the international order and peace; help to maintain the international order through coalition-

building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict

management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping6.

Considering all of the above mentioned arguments, one is in need to offer a fresh

perspective on the pending debate over the definition of small and middle powers. Thus,

Keohane states that instead of thinking in terms of great, middle and small powers one should

take into consideration another way of categorising international actors according to their role

played in the system as: system- determining, system- influencing, system- affecting, system-

ineffectual states.7 Concerning the international system, small and middle powers realize that

although they may be able to do little together, they can do nothing separately.

4Hon Gareth EVANS, M iddle Power Diplomacy, lecture at Chile Pacific Foundation, Santiago, 29 June 2011 http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech441.html5 http://www.enotes.com/topic/Middle_power 6 See National Security Objectives. National Defence Strategy, p. 8.7 Robert KEOHANE, ³Lilliputians Dilemmas Small States in International Politics´ in Christine Ingebritsen,Small States in International Relations, University of Washington Press, USA, 2006, pp. 59-60.



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1. The Republic of Moldova

In the Romanian public opinion, the relationships built by Romania and Moldova

should always have a privileged character, due to the common culture, language and

historical past. But actually, since Moldova got its independence in 1991, their level of

interaction varied in intensity from romantic and close cooperation to much tensioned

relations during 2001-2002, when a huge diplomatic crisis was hardly overcome. As a result,

real pragmatic relations could not be established and the existing potential has not been

reached so far.

Romania assigns a special place for relations with the Republic of Moldova as is

emphasised in the Romanian Defence Strategy where Republic of Moldova represents:

a special case that benefits from a special interest of Romania and support in

order to integrate into the European family. By joining the European common

space, it may remove the last barriers that separate one nation. It also will

create premises for the expansion of security and prosperity space in the

vicinity of Eastern Europe and for the T rans-Dniester conflict settlement, in

accordance with the principles of international law and commitments taken by

all parties.8

Taking into consideration the strategic importance of the Republic of Moldova for

Romania, which is the EU country that is geographically, historically and culturally the

closest it is necessary to identify and overcome factors constraining the evolution of relations between the two countries in the last decade in accordance with the Romanian Defense

Strategy and with the reality. We will focus on three major aspects of the relation between the

two international actors: the real benefits from a special relationship, the support in order to

integrate Moldova into the European family and the role in solving the Trans-Dniester

conflict.

On the grounds that for Romania the Republic of Moldova benefits from a special

interest9, it can be said that the cooperation should achieve the following areas: economy,

agriculture, sustainable development, border security, transport, telecommunications,civil society, media, education, research and culture. Instead of taking mutual benefits from

the existing emotional relations, Moldovan politicians tried to politicize the cultural and

8 National Defense Strategy ± For a Romania that Guarantees the Security and Prosperity of FutureGenerations, Bucharest, 2010, p. 16.9 Ibid .



7

linguistic values for their own benefits. On the other side, Romanian leadership didn¶t

succeed to build a pragmatic relation with their Moldovan counterparts.

On economical level, the signi¿cant di erences between business climates in

Moldova and Romania are revealed by the gap between the two countries in the economy

rankings and in measuring business regulations ratings. Moody¶s long-term ratings are Baa3for Romania10 and B3 for Moldova11. According to the last report for 2012 Romania is

situated on the 72th place and Moldova ± on 81th place in doing business rank 12. During the

last decade the trade relations of Romania with the Republic of Moldova developed steadily.

In recent years, trade exchange volume has dropped from USD 690 million in 2008 to USD

551 million in 2009 and risen to USD 644 million in 2010. Romania¶s imports from Republic

of Moldova augmented in 2010, placing Romania on the second place of destinations of the

Moldovan exports. Moreover, in 2010 exports from Romania have also registered a

signi¿cant increase of more than 24%. In 2008, Romania emerged as the most important

trading partner for Moldova, while the Russian Federation went down to the second position,

nonetheless in 2010 the situation changed: the trade rate between the two former members of

USSR was bigger than USD 980 million.13 Despite the overall positive trends, the potential of

economic relations between the two countries is not fully explored. A series of factors

impeded the intensi¿cation of economic relations: the political tensions, the opaque

privatization policy, the low quality of economic governance, the diculties of ensuring an

adequate railway or customs trac.14 The deficiency of diplomatic skills in the service failed

in building an easier framework for a better cooperation between multinational economic

initiatives.

This lack of practice and managerial skills appears also at the cultural

level. Relations between Romania and Moldova are in a damaged state, far from the

generous opportunities offered by the common language or by the pantheon that houses, on

10 Global Finance, µ Romania Country Report¶ , http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/194-romania-gdp-country-report.html#axzz1iP5IRQaw, accessed January 2nd 2012.11 Global Finance, µ M oldova Country Report¶, http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/219-moldova-

gdp-country-report.html#axzz1iP5IRQaw, accessed January 2nd 2012.12 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a M ore T ransparent World, 2011,http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual/Reports/English/DB12-FullReport.pdf, Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.13 µSchimburile comerciale dintre România i Republica Moldova,în cretere cu 17% în 2010¶ in RomanianT ribune, no. 215, January 2011,http://www.romaniantribune.net/a5910_Schimburile_comerciale_dintre_Romania_si_Republica_Moldova_in_crestere_cu_17_in_2010.aspx, Retrieved on January 2nd 201214 Expert-Grup and Societatea Academic Român , România-Republica M oldova-Analiza relaiilor economicebilaterale, Bucharest, 2008, p. 7.



9

Romanian policy of engagement in Moldova is accompanied by its active advocacy of

Moldova within the EU and displaying in this way a status of regional power who acts for

stability and legitimacy through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. For example,

Bucharest is pushing through the idea of µtransferring¶ Moldova from the group of countries

covered by the European Union¶s Neighborhood Policy to the Western Balkan group19. Sincethe latter is covered by the Enlargement Policy, this would open a prospect for EU

membership to Moldova. Romania has also initiated the creation of an informal µGroup of

Friends¶, intended as an unofficial pro Moldovan lobby inside the EU. It includes, apart from

Romania, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Poland. Such actions, taken

together, indicate that Romania is using its EU membership with growing skill and

consistency to realize its national interest in Moldova, defined as a maximum rapprochement

of the two countries.20

One of the main tools could be to engage both sides in a cooperative partnership

starting from the experience Romania acquired as a candidate EU member. There is a large

scale for cooperation, including sharing the experience of translating and implementing the

Acquis communautaire, organizing trainings and trans-border activities, institutional

management, legislative reforms. The common language, common problems and geographic

proximity represent the main advantages to be taken into consideration during the adaptation

period of Moldova to the EU standards. As a NATO member, security management and

conflict resolution measures may represent other significant fields where Bucharest could

share its experience to its Chisinau counterparts. A convention on small border traffic was

signed and the political decision was made for an EU integration partnership. Bucharest

offered a 4-year grant of 100 million Euro. Bilateral cooperation agreements were signed for

agriculture, environment, education, in which Romania will offer assistance and financial

support for fulfilling EU criteria.21

19 µBsescu: Includerea R.Moldova în grupul Balcanilor, o necessitate¶, România Liber, 17th October 2010http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/politica/basescu-includerea-r-moldova-in-grupul-balcanilor-o-necesitate-202849.html, Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.20 Tomasz Dborowski and Witold Rodkiewicz, µRomanian project for European integration of Moldova¶,Centre for Eastern Studies, 3th February 2010, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2010-02-03/romanian-project-european-integration-moldova, Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.21 see Cristian Ghinea and Victor Chirila, EU- M oldova negociations- What is to be discussed, what could beachieved, Fundatia SOROS, Chisinau, 2010, Fig.1. Member States¶position versus Moldova, p. 6,http://www.crpe.ro/eng/library/files/crpe-ape,eu_%E2%80%93_moldova_negotiations.pdf Retrieved on January2nd 2012.



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In this context, Romania is the EU member state with a natural interest in maintaining

Moldova on the EU agenda, but Romania suffers as a European player from22: lack of

experience and capacity to lobby and lack of credibility on this issue, with many Member

States being reluctant to Romanian initiatives out of fear of having the EU high-jacked by

policies based on identity/feelings criteria.The process of dissolution of the USSR (1990-1991) generated historical tensions

between ethnic groups rekindling of heterogeneous composition of the Soviet colossus, one

example being the Trans-Dniester conflict. Parts involved, the Moldovan (Romanian-

speaking) and Slavic (Russian and Ukrainian) have not reached the common view of

maintaining peaceful Trans-Dniester in the new independent state with its capital in Chisinau,

after the war from 1991 to 1992. The presence on the Trans-Dniester territory of the XIVth

Russian Army, the involvement of its troops and weapons in the conflict, have tilted the

balance decisively in favor of separatist leaders.

The OSCE Mission to Moldova was established in February 1993 to assist the parties

to the conflict of the Trans-Dniester region in negotiations for a lasting political settlement.

The Mission also works to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of

Moldova. On 9 December 1999, the scope of the mandate was expanded by Permanent

Council Decision No. 329 to include23: ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction

of Russian ammunition and armaments and coordinating technical and financial assistance to

facilitate such withdrawal and destruction.

The results of the OSCE mediation are rather disappointing, as at this point they

managed to reduce armaments and troops of the Russian Federation, but not the deadlines

regarding their total withdrawal from Trans-Dniester region. Neither the Kozak

Memorandum24, officially called Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the

State Structure of a United State in Moldova, a 2003 proposal and the Plan proposed by

former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko25, nor a 2005 proposal did not managed to

give a solution for Trans-Dniester conflict.

Romanian Defence Strategy sustains that:

stationing of foreign troops without the agreement of the host country,

near the borders of Romania represents a threat to national security,

22 Romanian Centre for European Policies, Romania - M oldova partnership for European integration,http://www.crpe.ro/eng/romania-moldova-partnership-for-europe, Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.23 see http://www.mfa.gov.md/osce-en/osce-mission/, Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.24 see http://www.regnum.ru/news/458547.html, Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.25 see http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2005/240505.shtml, Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.



11

therefore we understand to be actively involved in promoting for a solution

aimed at the region's demilitarization, the withdrawal of troops and

armaments stationed illegally.26

Paradoxically, unjustly excluded in the early '90s from the mechanism of conflict

mediation, Romania adopted a passive attitude towards the Trans-Dniester case exactly

when it was having control levers that could influence in an efficient manner the conflict.

Critical in 2001, when Russia began withdrawing troops and armaments from Trans-

Dniester, according to the obligations assumed at the Istanbul Summit(1999),

former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana, at that moment the OSCE Chairman-in-Office,

decided to transfer the file on the agenda of the next presidency , because of fear of

jeopardizing the negotiations on the Romanian-Russian Treaty.

Promoted more by Tiraspol and Moscow, a so-called µKosovo model¶ is met today in

Romanian academic circles quite frequently (for instance see the plan launched in public by

the Social-Democratic Institute ³Ovidiu Sincai´27) but also in open debates in the Republic of

Moldova. The ³Cyprus Model´ is the second idiosyncrasy of the researchers in relation to a

possible solution in the Dniester crises. The Moldavian experts argue that ³the exception

made by the EU led to a strange situation and the Cyprus case is a failure´ 28

The actual 5+2 format comprises the sides, mediators and observers in the negotiation

process: the Republic of Moldova, Trans- Dniester, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the

OSCE, the United States and the European Union. It is in Romania's interest to urgentlyreplace the current format of the negotiations with one that includes the EU and the U.S.

as full members because of the immediate vicinity of EU and NATO to the "frozen" conflict29

but also as a form to fulfill the active role assumed in serving as mediators through

international conflict management and in the two international organisations.

Romania¶s argument to promote the concept of two Romanian

countries proved inadequate. Bilateral relations between Romania and Republic of Moldova

stuck and an obstacle emerged in communication between citizens of the two neighboring

countries. The political elite stressed in this way the legitimacy by promoting aMoldavian movement and adopting an anti-Romanian exacerbated complex.

26 National Defense Strategy, op. cit., p. 16.27 see T ransnistria- Evolutia unui conflict inghetat si perspective de solutionare, Institutul ³Ovidiu incai´,September 2005, Bucharest, available at http:/ /www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport_Transnistria.pdf.28 Igor Munteanu, op.cit., p. 7629 see T ransnistria- Evolutia unui conflict inghetat si perspective de solutionare, op.cit.



12

In conclusion, it may be stressed that there is a stringent need for establishing

priorities of the relation between Moldovan and Romanian foreign policy. The actual

Concept of Foreign Policy should be modified, by defining and developing more clearly its

strategic goals. Taking into account the above mentioned factors and the regional and global

challenges Romania should drop the historical weights which have pulled back the bilateralrelation and should face forward with, promotion of an active, efficient and realist diplomacy

may prove to be more useful.

Romania does not need a special political relationship with the Republic of Moldova

instead of normal relations capable to generate deep and lasting connections with the

Romanians from the left bank of the Prut. Transforming the capacities into capabilities is a

big challenge that can be resolved by participation in monitoring inside of EU in solving the

Trans-Dniester conflict, in accordance with the framework set by the Romanian Defence

Strategy and by reviving the economical and cultural-spiritual actions.

2. The Black Sea Region

The Black Sea region is situated at the periphery of three geopolitical areas- Central

Asia, Southern Caucasus and Europe- dominated each by powerful actors, either states

(Russia) or international organizations (European Union, NATO). This positioning gives the

region a high degree of complexity, triggered by the diversity of opinions with regards to

situations and problems and of relations built here, and therefore, it is considered in the

National Defence Strategy as being one of great strategic importance for Romania.

The big confrontations, as well as the big collaborations, inside and outside the

peripheral area of the strategic pivot represented by the Black Sea, take place at the

crossroads of the Caspian Sea- Manchuria- the Balkans and the Baltic Sea- Persian Gulf axes.

Given its position, the Black Sea plays an important role in the strategy of reconfiguration of

the Euro-Asian security and economic area.

Being a buffer zone between East and West during the Cold War, the Black Sea

region suffered a remodelling after the collapse of the USSR and contains nowadays actors

that present a certain degree of instability and feebleness. In this sense, Romania intends to

contribute to the efforts of stabilizing the area, while proving its ability, as a middle power, of

playing an active role in its region.

In order to explain the importance given by Romania¶s strategy to this region, one

must emphasize the essential role played by maritime areas in international relations. Seas



13

and oceans have a ³decisive importance for a state power´30 especially because states are not

equal regarding the law of the seas. Furthermore, the maritime power is superior to that of the

land with respect to the world commerce (MacKinder). Thus, this superiority drives states to

seek the control of a portion of the sea as big as possible in their effort to consolidate their

international power.The Black Sea region comprises six states with access to the sea - Ukraine, Romania,

Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Russia- to which one has to add other states directly concerned by

cooperation in the region- Albania, Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. These states have known

periods of transition after the Cold War, being subject to risks, threats and vulnerabilities.

Following the logic according to which state stability and cooperation have as a main

consequence the growth of regional stability and prosperity, the Romanian Defence Strategy

states that Romania should play an assertive role at the Black Sea. This means identifying not

only problems but solutions to those problems.

Firstly, one of the region¶s main issues consists in the distribution and production of

energy resources. Also, not only the states in the Black Sea proximity are dependent on gas

and oil coming from this area, but the European continent in its integrity. The world¶s largest

energy producer, Russia remains indispensable, mainly for the EU (in 2001, 20% of the gas

in Western Europe came from the Russian Federation). Russia, ³petro state´ 31, has seen its

economic exchanges decreasing after 1991, and its influence over its ex-satellites shrinking.

Thus, nowadays energy remains one of the main instruments of wielding its influence.

Derived from this tendency to exert power through energy resources, the gas conflicts

between Russia and Ukraine showed that there is a high degree of instability in the Black Sea

region, instability that threatens all regional and European actors. This conflict represents a

destabilizing variable at the Black Sea. In order to have a comprehensive image on the issue,

one has to take into consideration the 1994 Energetic Charter which encourages cooperation

and assistance for a more effective use of resources, as well as promoting a framework for

problem- solving. However, Russia did not accept to sign the charter, accusing it of not being

able to respond to all kinds of issues that may appear. Romania addressed this problem in the

National Strategy, by giving as a main solution the strengthened cooperation between states

in a European framework. While acting as an EU and NATO middle power member by

encouraging a concerted manner of solving the potential conflict of interests, Romania does

not have the capacity to influence hypothetical negotiations, given the fact that it did not

30 Sophie CHAUTARD, Géopolitique du XX e siècle, Studyrama Perspectives, Levallois-Perret, 2009, p. 109.31 Doru COJOCARU, Géopolitique de la mer Noire- éléments d¶approche, L¶Harmattan, Paris, 2007, p. 29.



14

manage neither to rebuild its economic ties with the Russian Federation, nor to renegotiate

gas prices with the Russians. In this respect, Romania¶s foreign policy means of influencing

the regional system are limited to those of a small power that can have leverage on the system

only by alliance.

Secondly, another element that threatens regional security is represented by frozenconflicts. Inheritors of imperialism, be it Czarist or Soviet, the formerly controlled territories¶

populations were presented the opportunity to express their religious or ethnic frustrations. In

fact, the frozen conflicts represent an historic, cultural, economical and geographical

accumulation, and, because of that, it is impossible to find a solution that can apply to all

cases in order to put an end to the matter. One of the threats for the regional stability derives

from the process of nation- building of states that gained their independence after the collapse

of the Soviet Union. Phenomena such as terrorism, aggressive separatism, political

extremism, cross- border criminality and illegal trafficking can accompany these processes.

These conflicts are caused by territorial claims, having their roots in ethnic minority issues, as

well as in the delay of economic development- Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Balkans,

Ukraine, Turkey, Greece, all have separatist regions that ³form an arch of pockets of

instability, entities linked like communicating vessels´32.

In Georgia, the two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are the proof that

the state cannot control its territory and population. Furthermore, there are paramilitary

groups, Forest Brothers and White Legion, which conduct guerrilla activities in Abkhazia and

which find financing from illegal trafficking and smuggling on the Georgian ceasefire front.

In Moldavia, the poorest country in Europe, with a limited institutional capacity and a weak

judicial system, Transdniestria escapes the state¶s control. This conflict continues to represent

a potential source of regional instability, deepened by the Russian army¶s presence, by

violation of economical activities legislation, by separatist measures that weaken Moldavian

sovereignty.

None of the separatist conflicts of Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya or

Trandniestria have been brought to an end. The continuous instability caused by these

tensions help terrorism and criminality flourish and trigger migration. Even after solving

these phenomena, it will be difficult to reintegrate individuals. In the end, these conflicts have

an important impact on inter-state cooperation in the Black Sea region.

32 Rzvan UNGUREANU dans Bergdorf round table Odessa 2006, T he Black Sea between the EU and Russia.Security, energy, democracy, edition Korber-Stiftungm Hamburg, 2007, p. 37.



15

The main solution identified in the Romanian strategy in order to overcome these

persistent problems is supporting the processes of democratization and development,

especially through cooperation in a European and Euro- Atlantic framework. Romania,

member of both NATO and EU, acknowledges those organizations¶ capacities to promote a

secure regional environment and states that it will use its status given by these membershipsto assert a greater role in building a secure environment in the Black Sea region. However,

the process of Western framing of the Black Sea area is rather difficult, given its peripheral

position in comparison to the European, Asiatic or Middle Eastern areas. Nevertheless,

Western interest for the Black Sea has grown after the Euro- Atlantic enlargement towards

Central and Eastern Europe, and the Black Sea has been subject to international debate after

Romania¶s and Bulgaria¶s adhesion to the EU.

Efforts of stabilizing the region should be directed towards solving the lacks in

democratic security. This concept has been introduced after the fall of the Berlin Wall and

has been adopted by the Vienna Declaration in 1993. The main aim of this democratic

security is the creation of the context in which states per se are capable of assuring

democracy and respect of laws inside institutions, as well as organizing free and regular

elections in an independent judiciary system which can warrant human and state security.

Human security refers to the lack of constraints imposed by fear or needs; it has four main

characteristics- universality, independence, and prevalence of prevention and of individuals.

In achieving these goals, states from the Black Sea area have created a network of regional

organizations (such as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation which

includes 12 states from the region, the Organization for Democracy and Economic

Development whose members are Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the

Community of Democratic Choice which comprises members from the Black Sea, the

Caspian Sea and the Baltic Sea regions).

Among these initiatives, Romania has engaged itself in creating a Black Sea Forum

for Dialogue and Partnership. Created in 2006, this forum enables the identification of new

projects that can create a dialogue platform and an exchange of practices framework. The

Black Sea Forum represents an instrument for Romania to legitimize its positions regarding

tensed topics like the Serpents Isle or the Transdniestrian zone. Bucharest is also the siege for

two recently created organizations- South European Cooperative Initiative (2000) and Border

Defence Initiative (2004). As for naval cooperation, BLACKSEAFOR, created in 2011, aims

at building partnerships on the sea and an inter- state assistance network, supported by the

two biggest powers in the region, Turkey and Russia. This association includes naval



16

representatives of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Ukraine, Russia (magic ingredient, according

to Teodor Frunzeti, commandant, General Staff of Romania) and Turkey. After 2002, the

aims of BLACKSEAFOR have been aligned with those of NATO with regards to the fight

against terrorism, especially after the Kremlin¶s redefinition of the Chechen conflict as a

terrorist operation33.These examples prove that Romania managed to build, together with its partners,

frameworks that can lead towards at least a partial solution for the crisis triggered by frozen

conflicts. However, the Transdniestrian conflict is another element pointing that Romania

cannot wield sufficient power in order to influence the negotiation process. The

Transdniestrian situation has the biggest destabilizing potential for Romania, due to its border

proximity. Moreover, the Romanian Defence Strategy assigns a special place for relations

with the Republic of Moldova. Thus, although the subject is one of big and strategic

importance to Romania, it cannot influence in any way talks between Russia, Moldova and

Ukraine. The conflict does not seem to end soon, especially because a Western implication is

highly unlikely, given the fact that it would deteriorate the already tense relations with

Russia.

For a small power, as well as for a middle one, the only means of influencing the

international system, regionally and globally, is through alliances and partnerships. Except

for the above mentioned regional organizations, Romania intends to fully use its status as a

NATO and EU member to promote its interests in the Black Sea region. However, there are

some difficulties caused by the fact that until / present day, those organizations did not see

the region as being a top priority. By its last enlargement, the EU has become a regional actor

at the Black Sea and, in consequence, it has to develop a policy in order to insure its interests,

stable borders and energetic autonomy. The EU priorities in the Black Sea region address the

good neighbourliness principles; the necessity of cooperating with Russia. However, the main

problem is that EU¶s approach towards the region is a geographic, more than a conceptual

one, and that there are still a lot of differences between the EU and Russia concerning what

good neighbourliness means. Currently, there are three relevant policies proposed by the EU:

the pre- adhesion process with Turkey, the policy of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

and the strategic partnership with Russia, to which one could add the strategies for the

Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The Commission¶s report on the Black Sea initiated by Black

Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation suggests that the EU should also clarify a potential

33 equipe, ³Que reste-t-il de la BLACKSEAFOR?´, Nouvelle Europe [online], 3 may 2008,http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/node/479, Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.



17

institutional confusion between Black Sea Synergy (which follows a wider Black Sea concept

of cooperation) and the Eastern Partnership (which focuses on its 5 members¶ development

through bilateral means as well as through cooperation with Brussels). 34 ³From energetic

security to dealing with transnational threats to completing Romania¶s and Bulgaria¶s

successful accession to the European Union to managing relationships with Turkey andUkraine and their respective bids for EU membership, the future of the Black Sea region is an

issue the EU cannot ignore.´35

Regarding NATO¶s implication in the region, the organization doesn¶t have a strategy

for the Black Sea, although numerous analyses recommend that the organization gets

involved in the efforts of consolidating the security environment in the region, by offering

more assistance and trying to bring together states with sometimes divergent interests.36 The

West tends to define the Black Sea region as an instrument for Euro- Atlantic integration of

states like Georgia and Ukraine. NATO¶s programs in the region include Membership Action

Plan, Individual Partnership Action Plan and Partnership Action Plan, that can be seen as

frameworks for regional cooperation. Also, a NATO strategy for the Black Sea should

include, in the US Institute for National Strategic Studies¶ vision, naval cooperation

(currently active through BLACKSEAFOR), air reconnaissance, boarder defence to combat

trafficking and crime and civil protection. ³To date, NATO¶s efforts in the Black Sea region

have been limited and ad hoc, hampered by many longstanding regional fault lines. These

problems cannot and will not be overcome until the region can realistically aspire to become

integrated with the continent to which it rightfully belongs. And until such commitment is

made and such vision is in place, NATO will lack a critical ingredient in its effort to build a

stronger system of transatlantic and European security.´37

Moreover, no strategy on the Black Sea can be implemented without engaging in

cooperation with the two biggest littoral states: Russia and Turkey. Thus, the challenge is to

find the way to keep those two powers involved in cooperating in the region, task that is

reinforced by their often different and divergent interests.

34 For a comparison between the two European initiatives: Yannis TSANTOULIS, ³Black Sea Synergy and

Eastern Partnership Different Centres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals?´ in International Center for Black Sea Studies Policy Briefs, Athens, 2009, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=104869,Retrieved on January 2nd 2012. 35 E. B. RUMER and J. SIMON, ³Toward a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region´, Occasional Paper 3, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington D. C., April 2006, p. 6.36 Idem 37 Idem



18

A power that has access to the straits linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean

Sea and that can be an alternative means of communication between Europe and the Middle

East, Turkey has an incontestable strategic value, given its capacity to bring stability into

sensible zones. Being a NATO member and a candidate to EU membership, this state, the

only one that has access to the planetary ocean through the straits, will be a key factor in thePonto- Caspian geopolitics However, its feebleness consists in the Kurd issue, as well as in

problems with corruption and human rights deficit.

On the other side, Russia ranks the Black Sea region among top priorities in foreign

policy and security affairs. Its tensed relations with Georgia, Ukraine or Azerbaijan, its fears

of terrorist attacks at its borders with South Caucasus can have a destabilizing effect over the

region. Also, the long lasting perceived fear towards the West translated into a Russian

Defence Strategy, in 2010, that states as a threat the installation of the anti-missile shield on

the Black Sea shore and the Western intent to offer support to Eastern European and South

Caucasus states that wish to consolidate their democracies. The attempts to ignore Russian

interests can be a factor which will sabotage the regional stability and security. Thus,

cooperation is needed, coming from all sides.

To sum up, Romania perceives the Black Sea region as its main area of interest and

ranks it as a top priority. Thus, Romania behaves as a middle power, stating in the National

Defence Strategy its intent to contribute to the promotion of regional stability. By stating this

intent, Romania presents itself as a power having both the possibility and the capability of

acting according to its goals. However, it can enact its statement only under the umbrella of

international or regional organizations. The proposed military cooperation, integrated actions

and joint operational instruments to overcome destabilizing situation in the region cannot take

place without the Euro- Atlantic support. Although the multilateral cooperation is the most

effective, Romania should not ignore its bilateral ties with littoral states. Romania must not

only benefit from its membership in the EU and NATO but must also conduct separate

strategies to enhance political and economical relations with its neighbours. Only then, it can

pass from a ³system- affecting state´38 to a ³system- influencing state´39. Up to the present

day, Romanian- Russian relations for example and Romanian policy towards the Russian

Federation show that although Romania has the capacity of an influential international actor,

it does not have the knowledge of using this ability.

38 Robert KEOHANE, ³Lilliputians Dilemmas Small States in International Politics´ in Small States in International Relations, University of Washington Press, USA, 2006, p. 59.39 Ibidem



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3. Southern Caucaus and Central Asia

As a small power and a middle±sized country, Romania has to overcome its

shortcomings by alliances and partnerships. Practically, these are conducted with states inhigher power positions or of semminal strategical importance. Under these auspices, in the

Romanian National Defence Strategy, it is clearly stipulated the strategic importance of the

states in Central Asia and Southern Caucasus´.40 The priviledged relationship with these two

regions has to be maintained by boosting the cooperation potential on three segments:

transportation, infrastructure and energy. These opportunities have to be explored and the

threats should be brought to a minimum. From this perspective, Romania has only but to

maintain the main line of action proposed by the EU and NATO in tackling the arising

vulnerabilities in the regions. We will analyze the main countries within these sectors of interest with an emphasis on the status-quo and the perceived improvements to be.

The Southern Caucasus countries include Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.41 This

region is renowned for its geopolitical importance. From an energy security perspective,

Georgia is located at the core of this complex structure. 42 As a republic of former USSR

together with the other two states in the region, Georgia has become the first state to witness

a separatist war in this region in the recent years. The vulnerability of the state was obvious

since both South Osetia and Abhazia have been defended militarily by Russia when the

conflicts escalated in 2008.43 For Azerbaijan and Armenia, the ethnic conflict has been prolongued and reached a stalemate: Nagorno-Karabach is one of the hottest zones in the

world leading to displaced persons and great material damages. In such a context, Romania¶s

proneness towards cooperation with the South Caucasus states has been multifold. It has been

focused mainly on: Euro-Atlantic integration support for the states, energy supply routes

development for the EU, EU rapprochement and democratisation process, regional

cooperation and stability support. 44

40

³Importanta strategica a statelor din Caucazul de Sud si Asia Centrala se mentine ridicata.´ National DefenceStrategy, p. 17.41 For a detailed account of the Romanian perspectives in the area see Raport de analiz politic. Uniunea European i Caucazul de Sud . Rolul Azerbaidjanului. Bucureti iulie 2008, Institutul ³Ovidiu Sincai´ availableat http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport%20Azerbaidjan.pdf.42 For further reference see G.W. Bush¶s speech in Georgia at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4534267.stmRetrieved on January 2nd 2012.43 These two regions have been incorporated into Georgia by the USSR in 1921 after the Red Army occupiedthe country. For a detailed account of the conflict regions see Svante E. CORNELL, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, Richmond, UK, 2000. 44 http://www.mae.ro/node/1479 Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.



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As a small power, Romania is following the general lines of action of the EU. Still, in

the security energy field it has assumed the leading role and it has surpassed the European

Union interest and involvement in the region. This is especially true in the case of

Azerbaijan. In this respect it is relevant to mention that three out of the four main energy

security-related projects of Romania include this country: Nabucco, Constanza-Triest andAGRI (Interconnector Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania).45 This preference is obvious also in the

fact that Romania is the coordinator of the Azerbaijan- NATO talks 46 aside from the already

existing talks for a Strategic Partnership between Bucharest and Baku. 47 In this context,

Romania¶s position even if ferm is quite risky. The side Romania has taken in the frozen

conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has lead to harsh reactions on behalf of the

authorities in Yerevan.48

The relationship with Georgia on the other hand is set on other standards. The energy

security prevails however since the government in Tbilisi is the most democratic from the

Caspian Sea states, the collaboration is facil.49 The autonomization of the oil routes in Asia

and Europe from Russia is accelerated with the projects mentioned before: starting from TBC

and TBE50 to Nabucco and AGRI. The latter is significantly bold and important for Romania

since it will also link Central Asia to the rest of the world, with Turkmenistan as the first third

party state involved (in its willingness to overcome a natural vulnerability - its secluded

position in the Asian hinterland). Moreover, since Nabucco is once again ostponed51, AGRI is

even more important. Consequently, Romania is effectively pursuing its middle power status

in the region leading the negotiations and enjoying the benevolent approval of the EU

leadership as well.

Regarding the major players in the region, the US, Russia and the EU, the situation is

balanced. The EU has various cooperation instruments at democratisation, economic and

energy cooperation. These are mainly aimed at ensuring the independization of the states

from Russia, i.e. TACIS, FSP, EIDHR and ECHO programmes together with the European

45 For more details on the energy security strategy of Romania see

http://www.enero.ro/doc/STRATEGIA%20ENERGETICA%20A%20ROMANIEI%20PENTRU%20PERIOADA%202007-2020.pdf Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.46 http://www.epochtimes-romania.com/news/2011/12/romania-este-interesata-de-rezolvarea-conflictelor-din-caucazul-de-sud-ambasadorul-roman-la-baku---136603 Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.47 http://www.ziare.com/basescu/presedinte/basescu-a-semnat-planul-pentru-aplicarea-parteneriatului-strategic-romania-azerbaidjan-1089150 Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.48 http://www.nineoclock.ro/armenian-officials-slam-president%E2%80%99s-comments-on-nagorno-karabakh/49 Hence, Georgia is the only country in the Caspian Sea with whom Romania has a Strategic Partnership signedin 2009. http://www.mae.ro/node/5322 Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.50 http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/BTC.pdf Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.51 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63504 Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.



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Neighbourhood Policy. 52 ALSO, the open condemnation of the Russian intervention in

Georgia53 has emphasized the proneness of the EU towars territorial integrity, but also self-

determination of the people in the frozen conflicts of the region. The issue is even more

complicated in the Azeri-Armenian conflict since its destabilzing effects could be fatal.

Romania, in its defence strategy is to present a higher concern for the resolution of this clashand for a stable region since a spillover could boost terrorist acts and smuggling networks at

the European Union periphery. In this situation, Romania should follow a more active policy

towards humaintarian aid and conflict resolution.

To sum up, there are certain vulnerabilities, risks and threats that have to be taken into

account. The vulnerabilities that Romania should overcome are related to her position as a

liaison between Central Asia and Western Europe with the help of the South Caucasus trio.

Under these circumstances, the political instability inherent to these regions could spill over

into the country. Being a small power, with mid-size power modus operandi, Romania could

get easily caught in a trap. In this respect it is relevant to take the case of the Nagorno-

Karabackh conflict where Romania¶s ranking of Azerbaijan over Armenia has been vocally

sanctioned.54

The Central Asia states include: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,

and Uzbekistan. These states are considered paramount to the security energy in the region.

Even though they are formed Soviet Republics and their path towards democratization is

narrow and difficult, these countries are of vital interest for Romania. Most importantly,

Kazakhstan55 and Turkmenistan are playing a key role in the transcontinental oil transport.

The ³heartland´ is the key towards the control of the entire continent. This is a clear-cut

motto both for the US, Russia and most recently the European Union. The climate in the

region is conflict-prone. The borders have been drawn irrespective of the ethnic structure in

the territories and this situation is the cause of frequent friction among the five states. 56 Thus,

frontier disputes and sovereign enclaves make for the unstable geopolitical environment.

52 http://www.delvie.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_osce/southerncaucasus.htm Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.53 http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/relations/relations/article_7242_ro.htm Retrieved on

January 2nd 2012.54 http://www.nineoclock.ro/armenian-officials-slam-president%E2%80%99s-comments-on-nagorno-karabakh/Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.55 The most developed and rich country from the five of them.http://www.worldfolio.co.uk/reports/kazakhstan/n-320-kazakhstan-central-asias-leading-market Retrieved onJanuary 2nd 2012.56 Most prominently, the case of the Fergana Valley proves relevant.http://www.rferl.org/content/Why_Is_The_Ferghana_Valley_A_Tinderbox_For_Violence/2074849.html Adetailed account of the interests in the area are presented in Hooman PEIMANI, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara CA, 2009.



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Nevertheless, the appeal of this region resides in its access to the most hydrocarbons-

rich regions in the world. Thus, the most important players in the region Russia, US and the

European Union are aiming at exerting the control over it. Still, for the US the aim is pointed

at the fight against terrorism (i.e. the vicinity to Afghanistan) whilst for the EU countries and

Romania especially, the energetic independence from Russia is pursued via the exploitationof the natural resources potential of the countries in question. The other players in the region

such as Turkey, Iran or China also seek their share of influence and balance each other

through alliances and economic partnerships.

The main lines of action for Romania in the region are the same as in the case of the

Southern Caucasus countries: security of the energy transportation, regional stability and

conflict resolution, fight against border organized crime and the security of radioactive

waste.57 Gobal security and energy are the main aims of the Romanian defence policies

together with cultural and economic integration.

The most important collaboration is between Romania and Kazahstan. By its

importance as a possible gas source for PEOP 58 and an uranium exporter, Romania has to

focus on these aspects and take advantage of them. Kazakstan is also a possible large export

market for Romania and can facilitate the Russian-free oil flow. 59 Romania it is also a bridge

between Kazak resources and the EU market of energy products. 60 This is the alternative

Romania has as a small power: it can only hope to maintain the interest of this player since

for this particular region there are plenty of other major powers in the game. Consequently,

the fructification of this bilateral relationship is mutually reinforcing. The same line of

reasoning is maintained in the case of Turkmenistan and the energetic partnership at hand61

and with respect to Uzbekistan although at a slower pace and level.

Thus, Romania¶s policy in the region has to focus on an independent energy supply

route from Central Asia to and through South Caucasus for the European Union. Moreover,

the active involvement in the democratization process of the republics (especially Kyrgyzstan

and Uzbekistan) would guarantee leverage and a multilateral consolidation of the

57 http://www.mae.ro/node/1480 Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.58 http://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/772193.PDF Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.59 It is important not to forget the fact tha KazMunaiGas owns RomPetrol, formder state-owned Romanian oilcompany. http://www.jurnalul.ro/jurnalul-national/kazmunai-wants-a-deal-with-govt-on-old-debt-558102.htm60 http://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/4496#768 Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.61 Turkmenistan is seen as a possible supplier for the Nabucco oil pipe. http://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/4498#792 Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.



23

relationships. This would extend the influence of Romania above the official attachment of

the European Union via institutional means.

In conclusion, the European Union and NATO interest in the area persists. However,

there have been certain decisions at European level that might point to a decrease in the level

of determination towards democratization support in the South Caucasus region especially.62 This downgrading proves relevant in the context of Romania¶s power status. Even though this

decision is just a step away from becoming a fact, Romania has actually accelerated and

intensified its partnerships in the region. On the other hand, it has rallied to the general EU

foreign policy of also by strengthening the economic and energetic partnerships with Central

Asia, mainly in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It will be an interesting point of research the

subsequent line of action of the government in Bucharest with respect to the former region. In

case the divergent opinions prevail, it might represent the starting point of a more muscular

foreign policy of Romania in the region and a sign of a new, emerging power status.

4. The Middle East

The Middle East remains one of the ³hottest´ conflict zones in the world right now.

Although it is considered that global terrorism originates from the Middle East63, there is no

coherent peace plan based on the traditions of the land and the cultural characteristics of the

region. And despite all the peace efforts of the last years, it can be the trigger for world peace

disruption.

The Middle East is one of the most tension ridden, and heavily armed regions on the

globe where conflict can start at any moment and home to a number of countries with WMDs

arsenals. Add to the equation the fact that most countries in this part of the world are ruled by

authoritarian regime of various types (dictatorships, monarchies, religious republics etc.) that

have at some point in time have been legitimated by foreign support, such as some Western

powers or the USSR.

During the last few decades, the Middle East has been a hub of tensions and

insecurity, more so after September 11th 2011 when the West undertook the road to eliminate

terrorism. When analyzing the security situation of the region, one must take into account its

62http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Plans_To_Scrap_South_Caucasus_Moldova_Envoys/2057672.htmlRetrieved on January 2nd 2012. EU plans to retrieve its special representatives from Moldova and SouthCaucasus and focus on Central Asia most significantly since the involvement in Afghanistan.63 Kayhan BARZEGAR, ³The Middle East and the ³new terrorism´, J ournal on Science and World Affairs,vol.1, no.2, 2005, p. 113, http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Barzegar_Vol1.pdf, Retrieved onJanuary 2nd 2012.



24

unique political, cultural and economic characteristics (cultural ethnic fragmentation,

religious confrontations, traditional communities, the occurrence of the wars, foreign

interventions and the vast oil/fossil fuel resources). The major issues that affect the stability

of the Middle East are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran¶s nuclear program, the situation in

Iraq, the developments caused by the ³Arab Spring´, terrorism and religious extremism, theKurdish problem, border disputes, human rights violation, a growing young population and

water shortage.

Traditionally, the Middle East is made up of: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,

Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab

Emirates and Yemen, although at the G8 meeting in 2006, United States introduced a new

concept, that of the ³Greater Middle East´, that defines a larger area, including countries in

northern Africa, Sudan, the Horn of Africa and also Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Geographically, the Middle East represents a vast geopolitical entity of 4000 km² between

Turkish Straits and the Gulf of Aden, between the Nile Valley and the Afghan mountains. It

is considered to be a bridge between Asia, Africa and Europe due to the land and marine

trade routes and a lifeline between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

As a whole, the Middle East is often the arena for social and territorial conflicts, and

an essential pillar of international security issues. The train of events becomes even more

complex when foreign powers get involved in internal affairs of countries in the region. The

Middle East has great geopolitical relevance, being also the chess board a number of world

powers. The US wants to have access and control over the oil resources and the revenues

from oil trade; it desires the geostrategic control over naval trading/shipping routes; a strong

market for arms and military technology and supports Israel, one of its the best allies in the

region. The European Union sees the Middle East as a marketplace for goods, arms and

military technology and a mean to ensuring a large quantity of oil reserves. The EU aims to

maintain and develop UK and France¶s influence while counterbalancing US and Russia.

China wants to secure the procurement of crude oil, to counterbalancing the US and Russia,

and to maintain a market for weaponry and consumer goods. Russia, on the other hand,

pursues to regain some of its former political influence in the region, to ensure a marketplace

for the military industry and counterbalance or at least influence the political positions of



25

other power. While Japan wants to preserve the procurement of crude oil and to further

develop its export in the area.64

Along with Romania¶s interest of promoting and defending human rights and

strengthening the principles of international law as foundations for stability and international

security, of ensuring a climate of peace, stability and security, and increasing Romania¶sinfluence in the region, our national interests in the Middle East are also of economical

nature: regaining the traditional markets of Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, and

supporting the countries that can guarantee import of crude oil. Just as the Romanian

president Traian Bsescu declared, Romania does not have only economic interest in the

Middle East; the government is also concerned about the energy issue and the situation of

Romanian nationals living in countries of the region.65

Despite the fact Romania acts as a middle power by stating that it wants to ensure a

climate of peace, stability and security, to strengthen principles of international laws and to

support the democratization process in the Middle East, the region is the conjunction of

several greater powers¶ interests. Thus, Romania does not have the ability to impose its own

foreign policy perspective, in which case the membership in EU and NATO offers the best

course of action.

Romania has a series of advantages in the Middle East: the relations developed during

the communist regime and the prestige Romania had during that time in the region; good

relations with all the parties involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the existence of a

large number of politicians and business men in the Arab countries that have studied in

Romania, the presence of a significant Arab business community in Romania and the mixed

marriages that have occurred over time;66 the wide number of Arab embassies in Bucharest67

and a diplomatic Romanian service well represented in the Arab world68. Furthermore,

Romania can create a political advantage in regard to other European countries because the

64 Corneliu PIVARIU, T he Geopolitical and M ilitary Situation in M iddle East-Some Evolutionary Outlooks,February 2008, https://www.ingepo.ro/download-materiale/102/22%20februarie.pdf Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.65 România are interese economice deosebite in Orientul M ijlociu, July 13th 2009,http://www.evenimentul.ro/articol/romania-are-interese-economice-deosebite-in-orientul-mijlociu.htmlRetrieved on January 2nd 2012.66 Un test numit Orientul M ijlociu, March 24th 2007 http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista- presei/International/58318/Un-test-numit-Orientul-Mijlociu.html Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.67 Arab diplomatic mission in Romania, http://www.mae.ro/foreign-missions Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.68Romanian diplomatic missions in the Arab countries, http://www.mae.ro/romanian-missions Retrieved onJanuary 2nd 2012.



26

Arab states are somewhat more agreeable to us and we can offer our assistance in area were

other states cannot and also because our status as a middle power does not cause anxiety.69

Beyond security reasons, less evident but not inexistent, Romania has a

tradition of engagement in the region more or less balanced. T his was in

part founded on the hypertrophic wants and ambitions of the Ceausescu

regime that spent billions for influence in the region. On the other hand, the

role played by Romania during the ¶70 and µ80s, of niche in the bloc policy

of Warsaw T reaty, made it a credible partner for states in the region and for

the US. Romania was economically tied to the Arab countries but also to

Israel. T he end of the Cold War and the participation in 2004 in the Iraq

conflict changed this dynamic. T oday, these relations are terse and in

decline.70

Although the Strategy has identified a series of goals that partake to a middle power

status, Romania¶s potential in terms of influencing international actions in the region does not

reach that status. Despite the advantages previously mentioned that place Romania in a

favorable position in regard to other actors of the same rank, it does not have the necessary

economical, political and diplomatic resources to act by itself upon the assertions made in the

NDS. Insofar as it perceives itself as a middle power, Romania should try to use its Euro-

Atlantic membership to become a more credible ally for all actors involved in order to

accomplish its national interest.

Being a responsible and active member, NATO¶s military missions are also

Romania¶s military missions. The goal is to promote national interest in the region and to

assert our loyalty towards our military responsibilities and engagements. Romanian presence

in the Middle East can be seen as an opportunity; the opportunity to be present at the table of

the rich when the gains from the oil export revenues will be divided. Here we have the

possibility to warrant our energy security. Despite caring out NATO¶s political objectives,

our presence in Afghanistan can also mean conforming and boosting our credibility as an

ally. This in turn cements out partnerships and bolsters our international influence. The

Romanian participation in NATO operations in the Middle East has several other benefits

69 Crisan MAGDA, România un ³honest broker´ în Orientul M ijlociu, October 6th 2005,http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/International/19991/Romania-un-honest-broker-in-Orientul-

Mijlociu.html Retrieved on January 2nd 2012.70 Andrei RNEA, ³Ciocnirea intereselor´, Foreign Policy România, nr. 4, September/October 2011, extractat http://www.adevarul.ro/international/Noi_pentru_ce_votam_in_chestiunea_palestiniana_0_ 556744672.htmlRetrieved on January 2nd 2012.



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besides those previously articulated: flexible and prepared troops trained in real combat

situations, the opportunity to use and receive military technology from the great powers and

showing solidarity for the principles that give us a common identity.

For a small or middle power, the only way to influence the international system at a

regional or international level can be done only through creating alliances and partnerships,and using the status of member in different international organizations to promote and defend

its interests around the globe. This is also the line of action that Romania has chosen through

its membership in the EU and its status as a credible and active member in NATO, a strong

transatlantic relation and an active neighbor policy. Romania can act on its opportunities

more efficiently in order to achieve national interests through positioning itself as a reliable,

constant and active member of NATO and EU. By showing that it does not seek to

bandwagon, but actually invests resources and time in different international missions and

coalitions, Romania is able to pursue its interests and diminish the risks and threats identified

in the National Defense Strategy.

Romania considers the Middle East as a main area of interest ranking it as a top

priority. By projecting its interest at a regional level, Romania acts as middle power. The

National Defense Strategy is a manifestation of this by stating the intent ³to continue the

tradition of an equidistant involvement in asserting the Middle East peace process and of

developing cooperation with all states in the region.´ 71 Romania behaves like a power that

has the capacity to act according to its interest and objectives. Nonetheless, the strength to act

on these statements is limited and it can be done only under the auspices of international or

regional organizations. Without the support of Euro-Atlantic partners the measures stated in

Chapter 7 of the NDS cannot be put into action. Romania¶s membership in the Euro-Atlantic

structures represents a mean of fulfilling the fundamental objectives of the Romanian foreign

and security policy and its credibility on the world stage can ensure that cooperation with

allies and international partners will help achieve national interests.

Being the eastern ³border´ for the EU and NATO, Romania is in a delicate but also

opportunistic position. While perhaps more vulnerable due to the proximity to one if not the

most instable regions in the world, Romania has also the possibility to benefit from a greater

European and Atlantic support, it has the capacity to rise to the challenge and propose

solutions or mediate relations and bring into focus some of its interest, but it does not have

the adequate system in terms of economical, political and diplomatic ties to handle any

71 National Defense Strategy ± For a Romania T hat Guarantees the Security and Prosperity of FutureGenerations, Bucharest, 2010.



28

situation by itself. Its status as a middle power will not provoke uncertainty or threaten the

security of any other actor. Romania is too small to go against a more powerful state and it is

not strong enough nor does it have access to enough resources to pose a serious threat to

states in this region.

Even though Romania lacks the power to impose its policy preferences on anyoneelse, it realizes that it has certain advantages which can give it the possibility to succeed in

the accomplishment of some of its interests. Among these advantages we encounter its

strategic position (border line country for NATO on the south east flank - one of the most

exposed areas to major threats, territorial proximity to the Middle East, open sea, internal

waterways), its historic diplomatic ties with Arab nations, the fact that it is not perceived as a

threat by actors in the region and it is considered to be a credible ally. Connect these

advantages with the membership in NATO and EU, with strong allies (United States) and

multiple international partners and Romania has the means to reach some of its interests.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

The analysis has revised Romania¶s strategy towards the regions that can affirm its

status as a middle power. After having observed Romanian policies regarding Moldova, the

Black Sea region, South Caucasus and Central Asia and the Middle East, one can state that

although Romania¶s interests are those of a middle power in principle, it presents a lack of

capabilities and vision in pursuing them. Even if Romania¶s main leverage lies within itsallies in EU and NATO, it should increase its individual efforts in order to be able to claim

the role it has assigned itself in the strategy.

Thus, the initial hypotheses find their confirmation through the extensive study of the

four directions of external action. One could also argue that Romania presents characteristics

of both small and middle powers, having the vocation of a system-influencing state. Among

the most relevant findings of the research one could mention the following. First of all,

Romania¶s current EU and NATO membership recommends it as a stability-enabler in the

analysed cases. Still, it requires more pragmatic and precise lines of action in order to achieve

its interests and enhance its position in the structures. Even though it does not aim for a

game-settler status, Romania has the capacity to become more visible in the system.

Moreover, it is pertinent to recommend that Romania follows complementary approaches to

the already existing lines of action; it should not only support the common interest of EU and

NATO but it should also strive to pursue its interests. For instance, Romania¶s bilateral



29

relations with Russia could extend further than the interests established by both EU and

NATO in the region.

Furthermore, Romania should strive to become a reliable and resourceful actor inside

the international structures by abstaining from the small power tendency towards

bandwagoning . The credibility derived from this behaviour would match its middle power aspirations. In order to achieve this, Romania should overcome the lack of experience and

capacity to lobby; it should further develop its diplomatic personnel as well as highly-

qualified professionals on specific issues.

Moreover, Romania has the potential of acting like a mediator in specific tensed

issues, such as the Transdniestrian conflict, or being one of the regulators and enablers of

security in the Black Sea region. Whatever the case should be, Romania has two viable

options of acting externally: in its quality of EU and NATO member, and as a state with

sufficient potential as to wield a certain amount of influence upon some of its international

partners, according to its national interests.

Regarding the energy security policy which represents a core focus in the

aforementioned directions of action, Romania¶s declarative position does not live up to its

accomplishments. Aside from the prior presented improvement of the relationship with

Russia, Romania should also aim to balance its rapport with Armenia in the ethno-political

conflict that was a cause of its alienation. This is also a valid recommendation in the

associations with the other three Central Asian states besides Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Its

main purpose should be to create an amiable climate for energetic cooperation that would

allow an independent energy transport route and simultaneously a functioning partnership

with Russia in the name of the EU and the Western world, at large.

Referring specifically to the Middle East, Romania needs to vitalize its historic

economical, political and cultural ties with regional actors. By capitalizing on the human

potential in terms of foreign Arab students and members of the Arab economic community

present within our borders, Romania can reach areas distinct of the political field and create

the image of a ³friend ally´. Stepping up its involvement in the peace process, offering to be

a mediator and a neutral space for parts in the various conflicts to meet and negotiate, while

having a public rhetoric that augments the fact that Romania does not seek to take advantage

of the current tension ridden situation to the detriment of states in the region, can thus rank

Romania as a viable and credible ally and consequently offer the possibility to reach some of

its national interest.



30

Overall, the strategy is a result of Western foreign policy trends, visible through the

mentioning of terrorism and WMDs as viable threats, the active involvement in peacekeeping

missions and democratization processes. All of these add up to the profile of Romania as a

middle power inscribed within the Euro-Atlantic space.



31

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