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NATIONALISM AS POLITICALPARANOIA IN BURMA

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NATIONALISM ASPOLITICAL

PARANOIA IN BURMA

An Essay on the HistoricalPractice of Power

by Mikael Gravers

CURZON

NIAS Report series 11

First published in 1993by the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’scollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Second edition, revised and expanded,published in 1999by Curzon Press

15 The Quadrant, Richmond Surrey TW9 1BP

© Mikael Gravers 1993, 1999

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataGravers, Mikael

Nationalism as political paranoia in Burma : an essay on thehistorical practice of power. - (NIAS reports ; no. 11)

1 .Nationalism - Burma 2.Buddhism - Burma 3.Burma - Ethnicrelations 4.Burma - Politics and government

I.Title320.9'591

ISBN 0-203-63979-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67899-0 (Adobe eReader Format)ISBN 07007 0980 0 (Hbk)ISBN 07007 0981 9 (Pbk)

ISSN 1398-313x

CONTENTS

Preface to the 1993 Edition vii

Preface to the 1999 Edition ix

Acknowledgements xii

Abbreviations xiv

Introduction 1

1. The Colonial Club: ‘Natives Not Admitted!’ 5

2. The Violent Pacification’ of Burma 9

3. Buddhist Cosmology and Political Power 15

4. The Colonisation of Burmese Identity 21

5. Buddhism, Xenophobia and Rebellion in the 1930s 33

6. Two Versions of Nationalism: Union State or Ethnicism 43

7. Buddhism and Military Power: Two Different Strategies—Two Different Thakins

55

8. Ne Win’s Club 69

9. Aung San Suu Kyi’s Strategy 75

10. Nationalism as the Practice of Power 81

11. The Rules of the Myanmar Club since 1993 87

12. Buddhism and the Religious Divide among the Karen 89

13. U Thuzana and Vegan Buddhism 99

14. Buddhism, Prophecies and Rebellion 103

15. Autocracy and Nationalism 117

16. Historicism, Historical Memory and Power 127

17. A Final Word—But No Conclusion 135

Epilogue 143

Appendix 1: Theoretical Concepts 149

Appendix 2: Karen Organisations 155

Glossary 157

Bibliography 161

Index 171

MAPS

1. Burma xv

2. Exduded Area 1946 283. Karen and Mon States 604. Myit Szone 92

vi

PREFACE TO THE 1993 EDITION

This essay is an elaborated version of a paper presented at a seminar inhonour of Nobel Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at LundUniversity, Sweden, on 9 December 1991. It is part of a researchproject aiming at an identification and analysis of those historicalprocesses in Burma which have made ethnic opposition escalate into anunending nationalistic struggle—a struggle that has reduced politics inBurma to extreme violence.

*****As preparation for anthropological fieldwork in Thailand from 1970 to1972 I spent two months in intensive learning of the Pwo Karenlanguage at the Baptist mission in Sangkhlaburi near the Burmeseborder. I had three teachers. One was Ms Emily Ballard, a long-timemissionary in Burma and a brilliant linguist. The other two were a well-known Christian Karen politician Saw Tha Din and his wife. They cameto Thailand as refugees and worked for the mission. After the sessionswith the Pwo Karen spelling book and grammar, Saw Tha Dinexplained Karen nationalism during the colonial era and afterindependence. He gave a vivid and strong impression of how potent themixture of ethnic self-consciousness, religious affection and nationalismcan be in a colonial situation.

The endeavours of the Karen National Union, a visit to one of theBurman guerrilla camps belonging to forces loyal to U Nu and underthe command of Bo Yan Naing (one of the famous thirty comrades),and a meeting with Mon leader Nai Shwe Kyin came to mind whilst I wasworking at the India Office Library and Records in London (now calledthe Oriental and India Office Collections) in May 1988. AmnestyInternational had just published a report on Burma, documenting thetorture and killing of Karen civilians, and Rangoon was about toexplode in anger and repression. Whilst reading secret reports onreligious and ethnic rebellions in the middle of the last century, it struck

me how the conflict and the violence in Burma have been ingrained insocial relations and their cultural expression during the last two centuries.

History in itself cannot explain the violence of today, but the tragicdevelopments since 1988 have made the need for an analysis of theroots of Burmese nationalism even more urgent This essay is, however,a preliminary contribution based primarily on the works by renownedscholars on Burma and its focus is more on theoretical explanation thanon a detailed historical account. Except for information collected duringmy stay in Thailand and a short visit to Burma in 1972, I have relied onwritten sources and documents, mainly in English. Hopefully, I havenot misappropriated the insights of the valuable works on Burma towhich I am referring.

I am grateful to NIAS for inviting me as a guest researcher in May1992—it was a very stimulating visit. I am indebted to the India OfficeLibrary and Records, London, and especially to dr Andrew Griffin forhis kind and valuable assistance in locating important documents. TheDepartment of East Asian Languages at the University of Lund inspiredme to continue this work by the very timely celebration of a genuinenon-violent nationalist (Aung San Suu Kyi). Last but not least, I mustexpress my thanks to the Research Foundation at Aarhus University,Denmark, for financially supporting the English-language editing of thismanuscript.

May peace soon strike the peacock in Burma!

viii

PREFACE TO THE 1999 EDITION

Since the initial publication of this book, I have been pleasantlysurprised by the interest and the positive assessments that it hasreceived, although it was—and remains—a brief and incomplete sketchof Burma’s history and a preliminary analysis of nationalism.

I was even more surprised and delighted when the Journal of AsianStudies (vol. 5, no. 3, 1994) published a review of the book byProfessor James F. Guyot. He rightly concludes that my analysis ofnationalism does not come through clearly in the text. Nationalism andtheories of nationalism are indeed difficult to handle in a briefpresentation, especially when the history concerned is as complex asBurma’s. I have added six new chapters in an attempt to take theanalysis one step further. But it is clear, as I stated in the first edition,that my view is one from afar. Although I have recently collectedadditional information along the Thai-Burmese border and have hadintensive discussions with Burmese people living in Europe as well aswith colleagues, this book is not an attempt to write a history of modernMyanmar/Burma or to assess the complexity of the changes since 1988.It is an analysis of nationalism, ethnicity and power in the history ofBurma from an anthropological perspective.

A Burmese friend, Brenda Pe Maung Tin (Daw Tin Tin Myaing), haskindly drawn my attention to the term kala (‘South Asian’, ‘Indian’)which I have used to mean ‘foreigner’ or ‘Westerner’. In the beginningof the colonial period the term was used for everyone who came fromIndia, including the British. This usage is found in English literaturewritten during and immediately after the colonial period and has ahighly problematic connotation in the modern context. Today kalarefers to a person of South Asian ethnic origin. But it was also used as aderogatory term for Aung San

Suu Kyi in an article in the official New Light of Myanmar entitled‘Feeling Prickly Heat, Instead of Pleasant Cool’: Pretty little wife of the

white kala (U Phyo 30 May 1996). I apply it metaphorically as asimplification of cultural differences within a nationalistic discourse.However, this simplification and the negative connotations aremisleading when interpreted as a common modern expression. In thefirst edition, the term appears as a historical concept as well as ananalytical concept. I should have emphasised this. In this revised editionI shall replace kala with more appropriate terms when necessary.

In her review published in the journal Crossroads (vol. 8, no. 2,1994), Mary Callahan rightly criticises my use of the word kala. DrCallahan states that I have used the term to comprise the ethnicminorities. That is, however, not true. Although the Christian Karen, inthe opinion of many Burmese, became a divisive force allied toforeigners, and lost their original identity through adopting a foreignreligion, they were not collectively called kala. Dr Callahan fails torecognise that the aim of my book is to analyse nationalism and powerin their historical context. I did not argue, as Dr Callahan states, that thexenophobic rhetoric of the State Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC, renamed the State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, in1997), is shared by the majority of the population. However, therhetoric, still applied by the SLORC, cannot be dismissed as a merebravado having no effect on civil society. The often xenophobiclanguage contains a strong symbolic violence. It is the strategy of theSLORC to gain support and simultaneously to create fear by thisdominating discourse of nationalism. It is unfortunate that in this contextresistance releases more repression in the name of the Myanmar nation.As another Burmese friend, Dr Khin Ni Ni Thein, explained to me:‘During Ne Win’s rule, I did not think of the difference between Burmaas the nation, as the state, and as the military regime.’ The threeelements melted into a single identity not to be questioned. This isprecisely how the interpellation of xenophobic propaganda works inBurma and in other places where nationalism is appropriated byautocratic regimes. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991) has a clear understandingof this mechanism and its effects: it derives from fear and it generatesfear. The memory of past resistance generates fear and releasesviolence; the memory of past violence is the fear of new violent acts, adinfinitum. The result of the nationalistic policy and itsrepressive character is that social practices in Burma move into a greyzone of dissemblance: neither compliance nor genuine participation;neither direct dissent nor open resistance. The grey zone is ruled byfear, distrust, rumours and gossip. It is probably filled with secretimaginings that are beyond the reach of this analysis; we cannot know

x

who listens to the rhetoric, what is internalised by whom and whoremains indifferent. A dialogue between the military and the oppositionseems extremely difficult after ten years of confrontation. Dialoguewithout a belief in compromise and reconciliation is futile.

I have not had the opportunity like Dr Callahan to study theMyanmar military (Tatmadaw) and its history from inside its archives inRangoon. However, the SLORC seems to control the Tatmadaw andalso has supporters outside the army. Although the SLORC suffered aspectacular defeat in the 1990 elections, they obtained about 25 per centof the votes (albeit a mere nine or ten seats) in the countryside. Theopen economy may also have turned some of the new entrepreneurs intoat least tacit supporters. Otherwise, without some support amongstcivilians as well as within the army, it would be difficult for the SLORCto preserve its totalitarian control. Of course, a tacit support inperforming daily duties to earn a living and out of fear of reprisals is notthe same as ideological consensus.

Further, in her review Mary Callahan claims that there is a ‘Graverspro-democracy project’ in the book. However, it has to be appreciatedthat the democracy project belongs exclusively to the people of Burma!As regards the fate of democracy in Burma since 1948, the reviewer,perhaps unintentionally, confirms my point that even during thedemocratic period after independence, politics turned violent due to thecomplexity of ethnic conflicts, religion, nationalism and rivalries withinthe Myanmar political parties. Despite the turmoil, the Burmese haveparticipated in four elections between 1948 and 1962. No one, includingthe present author, would blame the violence and all other misfortunesin Burma on the colonial era. On the other hand, no one would denythat the colonial policy and practice are extremely important to self-perception and historical interpretations in Burma.

The new chapters include an update of events and an assessment ofthe role of Buddhism in recent developments, which also include thesplit within the Karen National Union and the formation of a BuddhistKaren organisation. The analyses of nationalism, ethnicity, resistanceand violence are related to a recent anthropological discussion of socialand historical memory to demonstrate the importance of the past on thepresent. I have made a few changes to the original text; I have alsoadded new references and data.

xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

By courtesy of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Frederik of Denmark,who awarded me a grant from his Research Fund, I was able to visit theKaren people in Thailand and collect information on the role of religionin the present context. I am very grateful for this support. It was withgreat kindness and and with patience that many Karens in Wa Ga Gla ofUthaithani province and in the town of Sangkhlaburi in Kanchanaburiprovince, as well as in other places, answered the questions posed bythe anthropologist. I shall always be indebted to them for theirfriendship and help.

Unfortunately, I arrived in Sangkhlaburi six months after Saw ThaDin died in 1995 at the age of 99. His daughter, Olivia, kindly receivedme in his house and shared her memories of her father since 1970. SawTha Din was a genuine representative of the Karen nation as itdeveloped in colonial Burma and in the days of Independence whencooperation and mutual tolerance were still possible.

At the British Library Oriental and India Office Collections, London,Patricia Herbert, the Curator, helped me to locate interesting documentsand shared her profound knowledge of Burma and its history.

Suggestions and advice from Brenda Pe Maung Tin, a former lecturerin French at the Foreign Languages University, Rangoon, have beencrucial to the revision. Dr Khin Ni Ni Thein, Executive Director at theWater Research and Training Centre for a New Burma, Delft, Holland,has supplied valuable information to update the book.

I am, as well, indebted to Thomas Lautrup from the Department ofEthnography and Social Anthropology at the University of Aarhus forhis critical review of the manuscript.

Thanks are also due to the staff of NIAS Publishing who helped tobring the present revised edition to its completion.

Last but not least, I am grateful to Anders Baltzer JØrgensen for hiscooperation and the exchange of knowledge and anecdotes during ourfieldwork in 1970–72, and in 1996, because

[in doing fieldwork] a high level of linguistic competence isobviously an advantage but a flair for friendship is moreimportant than an impeccable accent or a perfect lexicon (EdmundLeach 1982:129).

xiii

ABBREVIATIONS

ABKNA All Burma Karen National AssociationAFPFL Anti-Fascist People's Freedom LeagueASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsBIA Burma Independence ArmyBNA Burma National ArmyBSPP Burma Socialist Programme PartyCPB Communist Party of BurmaDDSI Directory of Defence Services IntelligenceDKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist ArmyDKBO Democratic Karen Buddhist OrganisationDSI Defence Services InstituteGCBA General Council of Burmese AssociationsKCO Karen Central OrganisationKNA Karen National AssociationKNDO Karen National Defence OrganisationKNLA Karen National Liberation ArmyKNU Karen National UnionKYO Karen Youth OrganisationNLD National League for DemocracyOIOC Oriental and India Office CollectionsPVO People's Volunteer OrganisationSLORC State Law and Order Restoration CouncilSPDC State Peace and Development CouncilUKO United Karen OrganisationUSDA Union Solidarity and Development AssociationYMBA Young Men's Buddhist Association

Map 1: Burma

xv

INTRODUCTION

Since 1988 Burma has gained notoriety for the extreme violence usedby its military regime. The country has long been in AmnestyInternational’s spotlight, while refugees tell of unimaginable torture,rape and killing of civilians. The Nobel Peace Prize of 1991 was thereforea well-placed tribute to Aung San Suu Kyi and the fight for democracythrough non-violent methods. Unfortunately, it was also a reminder ofthe widespread breaches of human rights which take place in Burma.We are sadly reminded of George Orwell’s description of the colonialera in his 1936 novel, Burmese Days, which includes scenes that pointprophetically to the present situation with foreboding accuracy.

But why has this beautiful country, synonymous with Orientalexoticism, turned away from the world and isolated itself in gratuitousviolence which, in the media, has been compared to Sadam Hussein’sIraq, Pol Pot’s Kampuchea and Ceausescu’s Romania?

In many of their reports, observers have referred to the fact that thecountry’s problems are self-created. These problems are defined in suchstereotypical terms as military dictatorship, socialism, and totalitarianone-party rule. The comparison made with the above-mentionedregimes is telling and simple, yet explains nothing about the specificconditions in Burma’s historical, social and cultural development thathave brought about the current situation. Many wondered howBuddhists, with non-violence as their ideal, could perpetrate so many actsof cruelty. Typically, reporting has focused on pseudo-psychologicalexplanations in the treatment of how nonviolence and non-confrontationbring about an accumulation of aggressive feelings, which in turn findexpression in an almost volcanic eruption of violence.1 On the basis ofsuch theories and superficial comparisons with other violent regimes,there is a pressing need for a detailed examination of the background ofthis development, especially at this point in time when nationalism,

ethno-religious conflict, and the division of states capture our attentionthrough the carnage left in their wake.

The initial explanation of Burma’s present situation must be sought inthe legacy of the colonial era, or rather in the nationalistic paranoiawhich was generated by developments following independence in 1948—a politically orchestrated paranoia linking fear of the disintegration ofboth union and state with the foreign takeover of power and thedisappearance of Burmese culture. In this way the legacy of the colonialera has been used as the rationale for isolation and the use of violence.

Burma has been gripped by a strong, almost religious nationalismwhich has retained the expunging of the colonial heritage as its keymotivating force. This belief, which has legitimated the army’sautocratic regime under General Ne Win since 1962, has not allowedthe creation of a more democratic society. Foreign influence must bekept out with force and violence. Thus, the colonial era’s model ofsociety seems to have stunted the country’s development since theregime has focused on this model in a manner bordering on paranoia.During the last thirty years of military rule, this strategy has equated allforeign presences with colonialism and imperialism, as reflected in statepropaganda. At the same time the regime has sought to keep Burmesetraditions within what could be called a modern version of thetraditional autocratic political structure.

This strategy has generated fear of change and fear of all foreigninfluences and imported ideas. Aung San Suu Kyi describes thisdeadlock: ‘[the] fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it’, andadds that the population’s fear and feelings of humiliation must becounteracted if change is to be possible. She uses Buddhist concepts inher criticism of the regime, such as the four selfish qualities (agati)which corrupt thought and thereby obstruct ‘the correct path’:corruption by desire, hatred, aberration due to ignorance, and fear.Corruption and fear are important elements in the relations of power inBurma, and Aung San Suu Kyi says that these negative qualities mustbe fought by all and in all individuals. She tries to inculcate civil couragein a population that has been subdued by 3,000–5,000 killings,imprisonment, violent torture, and the forced removal of entire areas of

1. For example, D. D. Gray’s article in the Danish newspaper Information (9September 1988), entitled ‘De fredelige buddhister kan vaere både politiskaktive og voldelige’ [The peaceful Buddhists can be both politically active andviolent] (Associated Press).

2 NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA

Rangoon.2 She is therefore seen as the politician who stands purely inher nationalism in opposition to Ne Win ‘the Culprit’ (as she describeshim) who is the symbol of corruption, the abuse of power and violentoppression. She symbolises the spirit of her father, Aung San. Theregime accuses her of being in collusion with ‘foreigners’, namely theBritish colonial power amongst others.

In this book I shall attempt to identify the relationship between someof the factors contributing to this complex historical process: Burmesenationalism’s fear of foreigners; a colonial era marked by violence; therole of Buddhism in nationalism; the ethnic minorities; and anautocratic political tradition. In analysing these historical conditions, Iintend to apply a simplification in the form of abstract models andcondensed descriptions. (The theoretical concepts are outlined inAppendix 1.) This is at the risk of repro ducing colonialism’s andnationalism’s one-sided understanding of the ‘essence’ of development.Essentialisation is precisely the primary function of nationalism byproducing a simplification of a historical process. Its theory andhistorical memory collapse complexities into a monolithic andprimordial model of the past in the present. Repeating the rhetoric ofnationalism runs the risk of making the same simplification. But there isneed for a more abstract, theoretical analysis of the generative elementsand contradictions of the processes. Such analyses are often absent inthe typically voluminous works on Burma, wherein the dominantelements of Burmese development tend to be buried by detail.3

Whether or not it is possible to pin down some of the ingredients ofnationalism and the strategies of power will become evident on closerexamination of the country’s history. Initially the social hierarchy canbe considered by using ‘the club’ as a symbol of colonial society. Theclub was not only a representative symbol, it was also a model of thefundamental properties of the colonial system: a division of labour andpower based on race, class and culture as natural criteria of division.

2. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:180–185).3. See M. Smith (1991:492)—an extremely important and very detaileddocument.

INTRODUCTION 3

1.THE COLONIAL CLUB: ‘NATIVES

NOT ADMITTED!’

In any town in India the European club is the spiritualcitadel, the real seat of the British power, the Nirvana forwhich native officials and millionaires pine in vain.1

Whilst one of Orwell’s characters in Burmese Days says that he hatesOrientals and that any hint of friendship towards them is an instance ofhorrible perversity, the Burmans themselves were not too fond of these‘foreigners from the West’2 who had conquered them and excluded themfrom any share of power. In Rangoon, which the British hadtransformed into the capital with straight streets and Victorianarchitecture, there were three influential clubs: the Pegu, the Boat andthe Gymkhana. The Pegu Club was dominated by senior officials fromthe Civil Service and the other two by the mercantile establishment.Neither money nor high status could assure a Burman’s access to one ofthe leading clubs in the capital. Race was the unavoidable criterion.3 Tothe male colonisers the club and not the home was the centre of sociallife.4 When Burma closed its borders to the outside world following the

1. G. Orwell (1977:17).2. Kala pyu, ‘white kala or ‘English kala’. The term was used in the beginningof the colonial period and referred to the fact that the colonisers came fromIndia. See Ni Ni Myint (1983:42) and Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:4). A modern termfor ‘foreigner’ or ‘foreign national’ is nyaing-gan khar thar, ‘alien’ or ‘outsider’is ta zein.3. See N.F. Singer (1995) on the clubs in Rangoon, and C. Allen ed. (1987:116), for a broader discussion of the relevance of club life for the colonialpower. There were clubs which admitted native members, but this alwayscreated controversy. As a criterion, class was subordinate to race. Anglo-Indianshad their own clubs.

military coup of 1962, this logic was turned on the foreigners from theWest: ‘The club is only open to Burmese.’5British colonial policy was based upon the notion of the colonialpower’s determining role in keeping the country together with its manydifferent ethnic groups: Burmans, Mon, Shan, Karen, Kachin, Chin,Rakhine, and immigrant Chinese and Indians—a multi-ethnic societywhich the British believed that their Pax Britannica had served to gatherand save from despotism and ethnic conflict.

In Orwell’s book, the Indian doctor Veraswami praises the PaxBritannica which Flory, the book’s main character, dismisses as ‘PoxBritannica’. ‘We steal from Burma’, says Englishman Flory, whereasthe Indian admires ‘the white man’s burden’. The Burman protagonistin Burmese Days, U Po Kyin, is portrayed as a parasite who exploits thesystem through unbelievable intrigues. The Englishman has lost hisinnocence and has become ‘the reluctant imperialist’, whilst the Indiandoctor and the Burman aspire to membership of the club with the pukkasahib (the real gentleman). The Indian states (with his kala accent): ‘Inthe club, practically he is a European, no calumny can touch him.’ Aclub member is sacrosanct.6 He considers the Orientals to be inferior:‘we have no humour; the British on the other hand modernise thecountry.’ But he loses the battle for membership in the local club to theunscrupulous scoundrel, U Po Kyin, who sees the Indian as a foreignerhindering Burmese participation in the struggle for power. This cocktailof apartheid, ambivalence and unscrupulous use of all avenues of powerhas never been portrayed with more precision than in Orwell’smasterpiece. The tragedy of Burma is that these contradictions stilloccupy centre stage, long after the British went home. Pukka sahib andhis white man’s burden continue to haunt Burma—or more correctly,are used as a spectre to legitimate tyranny and isolation.

A couple of grotesque examples illustrate this. Ambivalence inattitudes to the English language, which was absent from the school

4. Furnivall (1956:307).5. The term Burmese is used here to signify a citizen of the Union of Burma,regardless of ethnic origin. A Burman is a member of the ethnic majority group.See Glossary for further explanation.6. G. Orwell (1977:45). Flory’s pessimistic view of Burma does not offer theBurmese much hope for the future, and in fact strikes a chord with those whoblame all problems on the colonial era: ‘In fact, before we’ve finished we’llhave wrecked the whole Burmese national culture. But we’re not civilising them,we’re only rubbing our dirt on to them.’ (Ibid: 40.)

6 THE COLONIAL CLUB: ‘NATIVES NOT ADMITTED!’

curriculum for many years until reintroduced in 1981 when Ne Win’sdaughter Sanda failed an English university’s entrance exam - if therumours in circulation are true—is one such case. Foreign culture,especially Western, is largely kept out. This applies also to individualpersons, for example Aung San Suu Kyi’s husband, who is English. Theregime dismisses the claim that Burma can be ruled by someonemarried to a ‘foreigner’, one whose children therefore cannot beconsidered Burmese.7 The constitution of 1982 defines citizenship asone-dimensional: one has to prove that his/her ancestors lived in Burmabefore the colonisation began in 1824, and that they belonged to one ofthe indigenous ethnic groups. Indians, Chinese and Eurasians can onlyobtain ‘associate citizenship’ and cannot hold high office. This attemptto exploit the fear of foreign influence and the ambivalence still foundin relation to the former colonial power and to ethnic or national identityform one clear symptom of Burma’s problematic condition.

Important incidents in Burma’s history show how the fear of losingcultural identity, combined with the use of violence in the battle againstcolonialism and for independence has developed. However, in order toplace these examples in the context of modern nationalism and thepresent regime, it is necessary to outline how the Burmans regarded theintrusion of colonialism into their lives. They saw the British as a threatnot just against their culture and religion, but also against the unity andtotality of the universe itself with its central tenents based on Buddhistcosmology. Within this view of the world, to lose one’s religion,language and culture is symptomatic of a loss of control of political,economic and social relations. The universe is literally thrown askew. Inother words, Burman ethnic identity is not only culturally defined, butalso refers to an existence in a cosmological totality and in accordancewith its laws. This is a unified model, where all parts are largelymutually dependent in direct relations of cause and effect. Withoutcentral control there would be chaos.

The British colonial model—‘plural society’—was based on theprinciple of ‘divide and rule’, where racial, ethnic, religious, social andeconomic differences and contradictions were allowed to develop. Thecentral power controlled these contradictions via India, and the unity inthis world was found in the Empire and its global market. The local

7. In the colonial era it was considered almost treason for a British person tomarry a Burmese.

NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA 7

society and culture were rendered subordinate to a common division oflabour.

These two models and their collision connect some of history’s mostimportant generative contradictions. Such models can also function asheuristic aids in analysing and identifying the central tendencies inBurma’s nationalistic strategies.8

8. In the description above, there is, of course, no suggestion that all Burmanand British actions in practice were and still are governed by reference to such‘models’ and their rationale. The ‘models’ are analytical tools to explainstrategies—and strategies are expressions of the rationale in the producdon ofpractice and in the perception and representation of historical processes (cf.Bourdieu, 1990:131).

8 THE COLONIAL CLUB: ‘NATIVES NOT ADMITTED!’

2.THE VIOLENT ‘PACIFICATION’ OF

BURMA

The confrontation between the Burman world and British imperialism,which escalated through incompatibility and intransigence, culminatedin the British conquest and ‘pacification’ of the last remnants of thekingdom.

Pacification’ was an important concept in the language ofcolonisation. The British believed that the country could only becomecivilised and attain a democratic constitution, through which thepopulation would learn how to rule themselves, if the colonial powerwas successful in introducing ‘peace’ to the country and in quelling allarmed resistance. This was brought about by the abolition of the‘Oriental despotism’ in 1886, exemplified by the kingdom according tothe colonial power. King Thibaw and his family were driven into exilein India. He and his queen Supayalat - nicknamed ‘soup-plate’ byBritish soldiers—were taken in a narrow bullock carriage to the navysteamer Thoorea whilst the British soldiers waved cheerfully and sang.1Thibaw remained in exile until he died in 1916.

Great Britain had already conquered half of the kingdom in 1826 andin 1852, and had taken over trade in rice, teak, precious stones, etc.During the 1824–26 war, the British took over the great Shwe Dagonpagoda in Rangoon and permitted their soldiers to enter while stillwearing their boots—a blatant act of profanity as Buddhists removetheir footwear when entering religious areas and their homes as a markof respect. In 1852 the British again attacked the fortified pagoda—thecentral and unifying symbol for both Buddhism and the kingship. As thesoldiers swept across the countryside they ransacked pagodas for theirgold and silver Buddha statues.

1. E.C. V. Foucar (1946) gives a detailed, although somewhat antiBurmese,description of the humiliating end of the monarchy.

The British continued to insist on wearing shoes when enteringmonasteries and pagodas, which they used to garrison soldiers during‘pacification’. In 1886, the palace in Mandalay was renamed FortDufferin and part of the palace, which had been a Buddhist monastery,became the Upper Burma Club for the British officers. In the words ofFoucar: The hall of audience would serve admirably as the garrisonchurch…[the] altar before the Lion throne’ (1946:160). A monk whoproclaimed himself as ‘the ruler of the universe’ (setkya mìn), inaccordance with the Burman tradition of resistance, attempted tooverthrow the foreign occupation of the palace, but to no avail. Thecentre of the state had now ceased to exist and the peacock throne wastransferred to Calcutta and placed on exhibition in a museum there.2

The British thereby concluded the political and cultural humiliationof the Burman people, whose conceptual system was endorsed by theall-dominating Buddhist cosmology. The removal of the king and histhrone signalled the end of the Burman kingdom and of BurmanBuddhist culture as everlasting and universal entities. According to thecosmology, Buddhism and dhamma rule will decline before the newBuddha arrives. The lack of recognition given to a leader of the Sangha(thathanabaing) by the British was an obvious sign of imbalance in thesacred-profane universe.

During the ‘pacification’ programme of the 1880s the British metwith tough resistance from the guerrilla forces, which in some caseswere led by monks. The monastic orders (Sangha) did not participatedirectly in the rebellion, insofar as monks are not permitted tocircumvent the principle of non-violence. A monk, as a member of theSangha, must refrain from taking part in secular activities. But restraintwas not possible in situations where the monastic order was left withoutinfluence due to a lack of royal protection and regular gifts from theroyal court and officials. The rebelling monks were therefore seen asdefending Buddhist teachings and the world order against collapse.3Hence the Burmans considered them to be legitimate rebels. Thiscosmological order was, as we shall see, based to a large degree uponharmony between the religious and political spheres. The colonial

2. The peacock is still an important national symbol. It was used by the rebelson their flag in 1886; the nationalists used the flag in the 1930s; and it is stillused by demonstrating students. Originally the dancing peacock was a symbol ofroyal authority and an emblem on the throne in the informal audience hallwhilst the lion was the emblem on the throne in the official hall (Htin Aung,1965: xi).

10 THE VIOLENT PACIFICATION' OF BURMA

forces regarded the rebel monks as criminals, so-called dacoits, anAnglo Indian term for gangs of armed robbers. In the colonialperception the resistance was not a planned or even conscious act ofrebellion but dacoity: The Burmese had a traditional and hereditary loveof desultory fighting, raiding, gang robbery; and their inordinatenational vanity preserved vivid recollection of the time when they werea conquering race.4

If the monks had to reject the ideal of non-violence in order toresurrect the cosmos, then the British in turn employed the scorched-earth policy in order to bring about ‘pacification’. Villages and stocksof rice were burnt daily and the rebels were executed. A single militaryunit was able to report the burning of forty-six villages, 639 houses and509 Ibs of rice. Rewards were given for the capture of the monksleading the rebellion. The rebels’ relatives were rounded up andinterned. The colonial power used the Christian minority, amongstothers the Christian Karen, to fight against the rebels. The Christianspresented the heads of monks and pocketed the reward.5 Hundreds ofdacoits—resistance fighters—were executed, including women andchildren, in a village near Bassein. Rudyard Kipling visited the Britishtroops in 1889 and narrated the atrocities in his poem The Grave of aHundred Heads’. It is based on the soldiers’ recollections of themassacre in the village of Pabengmay. These selected verses should suffice to give an impression of the barbarism of the head-huntingduring ‘pacification’:

They made a pile of their trophiesHigh as a tall man’s chin,Head upon head distorted,Set in a sightless grin,Anger and pain and terrorStamped on the smoke-scorched skin.

3. The opposition between the withdrawn holy order of Buddhism and itssecular political dimension is thoroughly analysed in Tambiah (1976) and Ling(1979). The main work on the Sangha and state in Burma is Mendelson (1975).4. Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, 1907, vol. 5, p. 176. Orientaland India Office Collections, British Library, London.5. The ‘pacification’ has been described by Chief Commissioner Sir CharlesCrosthwait (1968 [1912]), who participated; see also D. Woodman (1962), M.Adas (1982), and M. Aung-Thwin (1985).


Subadar Prag TewarriPut the head of the Boh [‘chief]On the top of the mound of triumph,The head of his son belowWith the sword and the peacock-banner,That the world might behold and know.Then a silence came to the river,A hush fell over the shore,And Bohs that were brave departed,And Sniders squibbed no more;For the Burmans saidThat a kullah’s head Must be paid for with heads five score.6

The Christian participation is certainly an element in the explanation ofmany monks’ active participation in the rebellion. The colonial powerbelieved that its primary assignment was to thwart the rebels, whomthey considered politically illegitimate. The Burmans fought not onlyagainst a foreign occupying force but also against the disintegration oftheir entire social and cultural order, as defined by Buddhist cosmology.A proclamation from the Royal Council of Ministers (Hluttaw) of 7November 1885 makes this clear:

Those heretics, the English kalas, having most harshly madedemands calculated to bring about the impairment and destructionof our religion, the violation of our national traditions andcustoms, and the degradation of our race, are making a show andpreparation as if to wage war upon our state. To uphold thereligion, to uphold the national honour, to uphold the country’sinterests, will bring about threefold good—good of our religion,good of our master, and good of ourselves, and will gain for usthe important result of placing us on the path to the celestialregions and to Nibbana [Nirvana].7

Thus the Burman resistance leaders regarded the war as religious.This is demonstrated in an order issued by the Myinzaing Prince:

6. See Htin Aung (1965:210–211). Kullah is used by Kipling to meanwhite man, i.e., British. Kipling made a single very brief visit to Rangoonand Moulmein.

12 THE VIOLENT PACIFICATION' OF BURMA

The heretic, savage, and lawless kalas have now entered Burmaand are destroying religious edifices, such as pagodas,monasteries. And the kalas are using in the profane way the whiteumbrellas and other insignia which belong only to royalty.8

This period entered Burman historical representation as the completehumiliation of their society, a literal trampling upon their religion andculture, and the distortion of their universe. Religion and violencecombined as a representation of colonial subjugation. This violence inthe broad sense of the word is both the destruction of life and propertyby force and the act of intervention using the freedom of some todeprive others of their freedom and identity. The memory of thehistorical experience from the colonial ‘pacification’ is crucial to ananalysis of the present nationalism. It is thus relevant to compare theabove-cited proclamation with a recent one from the SLORC. Althoughthe context is different, the rhetoric points indirectly to history:

Not only the Tatmadaw [army] but also each and every citizen isdutybound to safeguard independence, sovereignty—Myanmarexercising basic rights most suited for custom, culture of [the] nationalpeoples.9

7. See Ni Ni Myint (1983:42). She writes from a Burmese point of view andemphasises the invasion not merely as a territorial and political annexation butas an attempt to destroy culture and society.8. Ni Ni Myint (1983:194) shows that the resistance was organised beforeThibaw was exiled. Myinzaing Prince, a son of King Mindon, included Shan,Kachin, Palaung and Karen in his force and fought under the peacock banneraround Mandalay. Monks were crucial in organising his resistance.9. New Light of Myanmar, 6 June 1997.


3.BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND

POLITICAL POWER

In Buddhist cosmology, secular power protects Buddhism as a religiousorder. The monastic order (Sangha) cannot exist without the state’sprotection and gifts. In return, the monks secure king and laymen accessto religious merit—the accumulation of which improves their kamma(karma). This is realised through ceremonies and gifts to monks or,better still, through the building of pagodas. However, the ruling poweris ‘hot’1—it may be necessary to use violence in the defence of thecountry. The king might autocratically order the execution of rebelliousrelatives and officials. In return, the monks must keep the preceptsregarding ahimsa (non-violence); that is, they must not kill livingcreatures. Then, like now, monastaries and monks protected againstarbitrary tyranny. Monasteries were a source of sanctuary, and monkscould intercede for someone who was condemned or who had to pay aninordinately large amount of tax.

The cosmos is thus divided into a sacred and a profane sphere, whichare closely linked and mutually dependent. Both are subordinate todhamma2 or the law or teaching of existence, its beings, its order and itsphysical and metaphysical powers, as recognised by the Buddha. But itis important to emphasise that the state and the exercise of power do notin themselves have a religious character.

On the contrary, they can be seen as being antithetical to Buddhistethics, expressing one of the worst evils of existence.

1. Secular power can be described as ‘hot’ compared with the religious sphere,where Buddhism is a means to avoid violence and anger.2. Dhamma covers several different conceptual areas and can only be translatedin context. Its content embraces the following: ‘correct behaviour, morality,doctrine, the law of nature and its conditions’, as related in the teachings of theBuddha.

Buddhist cosmology is a total model, which covers all aspects ofexistence, including ethical and ontological principles.3 But in theprocess of institutional elaboration, the Sangha is, in a manner ofspeaking, a sanctuary from secular society. Here, men live in celibacyand obey the 227 disciplinary rules and the optimal practice of ethicalrules. Laymen, on the other hand, can make do with five to eight basicrules. The monks within the Sangha maintain justice so that themonasteries do not become sanctuaries for criminals, swindlers orusurpers. However, it was quite normal that a new king would try tosecure control of the Sangha. This took the form of the application ofmore stringent rules, whereby disobedient or opposing elements werepurged. The next step was to build pagodas and raise spires on the top—forming an umbrella-like crown (htì). This is a sign of glory (hpòn) andpower and can be compared with the king’s crown. But the concept ofhpòn is also included in the Burman word for monk (hpòngyi- ‘greatglory’). In this case the word implies, on the contrary, a spiritual andmoral honour achieved through asceticism and knowledge of dhamma.

The monastic order and kingship were thus two separate parts of thecosmos. The king’s hpòn, as a sign of great kamma, can be read in hispersonal abilities and behaviour. This also applies to political leaders tothis day. The monastic order, on the other hand, is an unchallengeableand open zone with equal access for all laymen who seek to attainreligious merit (kutho) regardless of rank, wealth and power. TheSangha is divided up into different sects with different views on dhammaand rules for their monks, whilst each separate monastery possesses agreat deal of autonomy.4

Prior to the colonial era the monastaries functioned as schools whereboys learnt to read and write. Learning was synonymous with learningdhamma and being indoctrinated in the Buddhistic cosmological andontological principles. Earlier, monks enjoyed great respect locally.They were wise men who knew astrology, alchemy and medicine. Sucha hsaya (teacher) was an important person in the local society.

3. See Appendix 1 concerning the following concepts: cosmology, ideology,model and ontology.4. Mendelson (1975:58) describes the Sangha as an aggregation of individualascetics rather than a church. Monks belong to monasteries (kyaung) and branchmonasteries (taiks) dominated by six main sects.


Royal Power

The monarchy was absolutist and dynastic. It was based uponendogamy; the queens were often the kings’ half-sisters. There was alsoa harem, where daughters of officials and tributary vassals lived. Someof the concubines came from minority groups. Accession to the thronewas often accompanied by a palace revolution which tended to be a verybloody affair, where queens and concubines sought to get their sons intopower.5

The king and his council (hluttaw) controlled trade in all importantproduce such as rice, timber and precious stones. They also madedecisions on war, peace and the moving of the capital. But to gain andretain power, the king had to administer his absolutist monarchy inaccordance with Buddhistic cosmology and ethics which dictate anumber of attributes. He must be a dhammaraja and rule in accordancewith dhamma and the ten royal attributes.6 The king’s most importanttask was to protect Buddhism, to ensure welfare and prosperity, and toshow charity. Peace, prosperity and the absence of natural catastrophesdepended upon the laity and monks being content with their lot.Harmony in the universe provided the laity with the possibility ofaccumulating religious merit. As mentioned earlier, this underlined theview that the king possessed honour (hpòn-daw—‘royal glory’) as anexpression of good merit both in earlier incarnations and his presentexistence.

A person became a mìn (king or leader) because he had a kamma(kan) which made him leader. The king was ‘Lord of glory and Lord ofKamma’ (hpòn-shin-kan-shiri). Through his prestigious status as acakkavatti (‘ruler of the universe’ or setkya mìn in Burman), the kingcould maintain law and order in the cosmos. Conversely, dissension andlack of welfare were indicators of declining hpòn and kamma. The

5. The last king, Thibaw, executed eighty members of the royal family on hisaccession to the throne in 1879. In 1884 he executed the rest of the royal family(around 200), who had been imprisoned. In this way European historicalrepresentations of ‘oriental despotism’ were confirmed. The Burmans gained areputation as a gruesome and violent people. See for example Jesse (1946).6. The ten rules, or rather ideals, relevant for a dhammaraja are as follows:almsgiving, observance of the Buddhist precepts, liberality, rectitude,gentleness, self-restriction, control of anger, avoidance of the use of violence inthe relationship with the people, forbearance, and non-opposition againstpeople’s will (Maung Maung Gyi, 1983:21; Michael Aung-Thwin (1983:54);Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:171–173).

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL POWER 17

driving force of the cosmos was not conceptualised as an autonomous,self-centred ego, but rather kamma was the result of earlier and presentinteractions. These human interactions are in turn connected withindividuals’ knowledge of dhamma, their intention and practice inrelation to the ethical rules. Whilst kamma follows on from earlierincarnations, it can be increased/decreased in accordance with changingconditions. The state, the king, officials, peasants, men and women areall subordinated to the law—but in a hierarchy of accumulated reward.Kamma is thus the central ontological principle. Nevertheless, a stableeconomy and peace were the fundamental criteria ensuring thecollective possibilities for the individual accumulation of kamma. Theking was at the top of the hierarchy, a natural auto crat, but, as witheverything in the cosmos, he was subject to its law of impermanence.

Furthermore, the king was the lord of the land and the water’, that isthe lord of all living things. He also stood at the head of the thirty-sevennats—spiritual ancestors, often of royal descent and including a Shanking and a prince from the Mon people. These spirits, which alsoinclude the victims of the palace revolutions, can disturb the living ifthey are not included in the sharing of religious merit. The nats presidedby Thagya Mìn (Indra) are guardians of the royal household (the state)and of the households of commoners. The Shwezigon Pagoda in Paganis the ceremonial headquarters of the thirty-seven nats and thus themost important royal symbol.7 By including local spirit cults and theirleaders in some instances, Burmese dynasties maintained a formalhegemony over the minorities. Conversely, these local cults and theirleaders often borrowed elements from the dynastic model and Buddhistcosmology. In times of decline, princes, monks or peasants could claimto possess the royal attributes—as long as they could convince others ofthe righteousness of their claim. These pretenders to the throne, calledmìn laùng (‘king in the making’), sought to prove that they hadpotential as cakkavatti, dhammaraja and kammaraja, that is, that theypossessed the necessary religious merit. Burma’s history is alive withindividuals calling themselves mìn laùng and seeking to legitimaterebellion by applying Buddhist cosmology and its rules.

The model thus contains two genealogical principles, both of whichincorporate relations with spirits/forebears and kinship relations withpersons of dynastic birth. And yet it is important to stress that ethnicorigin was not a significant factor in relation to a mìn laùngs credibility.

7. Htin Aung (1959).


Mon, Karen and Shan have all performed this role. The important factorin relation to power was whether or not the individual declared himselfto be a Buddhist, namely one who pays respect to the Buddha by tryingto live in accordance with ethics (sila) and the giving of alms (dana).8

The cosmology could always credit or discredit a ruler or a rebel. Asituation with deteriorating welfare as well as higher taxes, conflicts andviolence, or famines and natural catastrophes can signal the end of adynasty and the approach of a new era of peace and prosperity. Theconcepts and ideals of the Buddhist cosmology are universal andeverlasting, and they constitute a total model of the society and for itsfuture development. The cosmology implies a utopian vision of acoming Buddha (bodhisattd), who is to appear approximately 5,000years after Gautama (i.e., within the next 2,500 years). The comingBuddha is called Ariyametteya.

During the last part of this era the Buddhist ethics of sila and danawill degenerate, and war and misfortune will prevail. A setkya mìn hasto clean the immoral and chaotic world and prepare the revival ofdhamma before the coming Buddha can enter the world.

Both kings and mìn làung rebels have ascribed to themselves theattributes of setkya mìn and bodhisatta. Secular power and the universalethics of Buddhism are thus closely interrelated in this model. Theseelements could be interpreted as support for an autocratic ruler who hasthe ability to re-establish the world order of dhamma, including ethicsand communal welfare. The autocratic element in this model inhered inthe fact that all central practice of power can in principle be legitimisedas necessary for the maintenance of the dhamma kingdom as a unifiedentity, with regards to kamma and harmony, so that the kingdom canreceive the coming Buddha. Individuals, regimes and their attributes canthus be brought into dispute, whereas the above-mentioned regularities,which both connect and disconnect the sacred and profane parts ofexistence, legitimise the use of violence when the dhamma kingdom isthreatened.

8. Until recently, most of the scholars writing on Burma’s history havemaintained that ethnicity was the main contradiction in pre-colonial society, andthat Burmans were becoming culturally dominant. Analyses by Lieberman(1978) and Taylor (1982) have shown that ethnic oppo sitions were subordinateto that between Buddhist and non-Buddhist, i.e. whether or not the population inquestion held a position in relation to religion and state, or were not included inthese tributary relations. However, there were some cultural differences inceremonies and rituals between ethnic groups in their practice of Buddhism.

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL POWER 19

This model for a total cosmic-ontological-political unity has surviveddespite the attempt by a foreign power to destroy it, thereby making itthe quintessence of both Burman (ethnic) cultural identity and a part ofmodern Burman nationalism. We shall return to this at a later point.

The British made radical inroads into the universe of dhamma, asthey abolished the monarchy and withdrew official support forBuddhism and the Sangha. Thus, a foreign power intervened directly indhamma and kamma and therefore in the conditions that facilitated theexistence of society, culture and individuals, as laid down throughcosmology and ontology. Colonialism usurped not only power but alsothe order of the world itself. This intervention was a key influence onthe construction of Burma’s modern social identity.


4.THE COLONISATION OF BURMESE

IDENTITY

To be Burman (bama) today refers to language, literature, tradition,history, etc. This summarises a modern sense of nationality more or lessin the form of an imagined community (Anderson 1991). But in the oldstate and kingdom the dominant identity was determined by (a) whetherone was a Buddhist, and (b) whether one was a member of an alliance withthe ruling dynasty, that is, the place one occupied in the tributaryhierarchy. This could be as part of the king’s court (officials, craftsmenand soldiers), or as supplier of tribute via local officials, or as a moredistant vassal, who supplied a symbolic tribute from afar. Finally, alarge part of the population were bonded ‘slaves’.1 Most were bonded(indentured) labourers, who could buy their freedom, unlike theprisoners of war. The population around the capital was often ethnicallymixed: Burmans, Shan, Mon and other minorities, as well as prisonersof war from Siam (Thailand). Identity and status within the tributarysystem were inseparable.

The character of the regime was experienced by the populationentirely through local officials and how these officials patronised theirclients amongst the peasants. Most of the king’s men liable to corvéelived around the capital whilst, for example, the Karen in the mountainspaid tribute only occasionally in natural resources or as suppliers ofprovisions to the army. They held a peripheral position but not becauseof ethnic identity; the Buddhist Pwo Karen held a prominent position inthe southern kingdom dominated by the Mon people until 1750.

1. Hierarchy of commoners (following Aung-Thwin, 1984): Ahmudan: ‘bearerof duty’, conducted Crown service, which included military service (corvée);Hpaya kyun: glebe bondsmen working for the monasteries; Athi: non-bonded;they paid capitation tax in natural resources or money; Kyun: bondedindividuals (‘slaves’).

The individual’s place in this system was therefore dependent on thefollowing criteria: kamma from earlier lives and present accumulatedreligious merit, combined with tributary status and rank. As statedabove, there was a connection between kamma and status in this life.Therefore status as a Burman would be unthinkable withoutacknowledging Buddhism as a shared frame of reference. How—andhow much—one practised one’s religion was, on the other hand, not asdecisive as accepting the Buddhist dhamma and subjecting oneself tocosmology and recognising its legitimacy. But what of culture as acriterion for identity? Culture was apparently subordinate to religionand tributary status. This did not prevent Burmans from consideringcertain minorities such as some of the Karen, as wild and uncivilised,but this status was assigned predominantly to non-Buddhists.

The teachings and cosmology of Buddhism are universalistic and, tomy knowledge, do not discriminate on the basis of ethnic differentiation.It is a modern phenomenon to elevate culture as the dominant andexclusive marker of identity. In Burma, the Buddhist cosmology wasdecisive for social, political and cultural identity. This identity wasrevealed when threatened by external forces, namely when the harmonybetween the sacred and the profane worlds was broken and when aforeign religion (and power) contested the indigenous model of theuniverse. Therefore, the important role of Buddhist cosmology indefining the dominant identity as based on Burman cultural values isbest explained through the confrontation with the Christianmissionaries. Whilst Buddhism and Christianity both claim to beuniversalistic systems of ideas, their confrontation in the colonialcontext expressed a particularistic cultural clash. This paradox seems tobe extremely important in understanding the present xenophobia inBurma.

Christian Intervention

American Baptist missionaries came to Burma in 1813. They did notreceive permission to convert Burmans and had no success until theintervention of the British. King Bagyidaw would not allow conversionbecause the Baptists demanded a total break with Buddhist thought, notjust with ceremonies and the monks’ and Buddha’s teachings but alsowith cosmology and ontology themselves. In such circumstances,Christian Burmans were not simply people who broke with Burmanculture and religion—they were disloyal citizens of the Buddhistkingdom of Burma. Foreigners could certainly practise their own


religion but on condition that they did not intervene in the dhamma-ruled universe.

This is extremely important for understanding the Burmans’ self-identification in relation to the surrounding world, not because thenotions of the last century persist unchanged but because reference tothis tradition is woven into present political strategies and models.According to Father Bigandet, Christian Burmans were labelled kala(‘foreigners’); the comparatively few Burmans who converted werepermanently placed outside of society as aliens: they lost theirnationality after they turned away from the religion of their ancestors.2

The king asked the Missionary Judson about the Christian Burmans:‘Are they real Burmans? Do they dress like other Burmans?’3 The kingquickly perceived that Christian fundamen-talism and its absolutedemand for subjugation were a forewarning of attempts to conquerBurma by both usurping the cosmological order itself and changing theculturally defined content. The Baptists would not allow any reverencefor monks, be it in the form of gift-giving in return for religious merit oreducation in the monasteries. This was regarded as idolatry and meantexpulsion from the Baptist sect. For missionaries, Burma was controlledby an idolatrous despotism and tyranny, which inhibited salvation andcivilisation. They did not hide their intention to convert the whole worldinto the disciples of Jesus. Whilst demanding total subjugation, themissionaries also began to reorganise everyday life and work. Workwas measured by time and the sabbath was to be observed. This wasfollowed by the teaching of European culture, from learning the Englishlanguage to ideas on order and cleanliness and ‘shaking hands’—animportant part of the Christian, civilised identity.4 This identity wasbased on an auto nomous self, subjugated to a belief in salvation, andmarked by morality and hard work. In this way, Burman culture becamesynonymous with paganism and something less civilised, which wasincompatible with Christian identity.

2. ‘The few natives that became converts … were called Kalas, because in theopinion of the Burmese they had embraced the religion of the Kalas and hadbecome bonafide strangers, having lost their nationality’ (Bigandet, [1887]1996:4). See also H. Trager (1966).3. Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1823, vol. 4, p. 215.4. See Comaroff and Comaroff (1989), where a similar process in South Africais portrayed and precisely analysed; and Asad (1993), who ties togetherChristianity and power.

THE COLONISATION OF BURMESE IDENTITY 23

Seen from a Buddhist Burman perspective, Christianity was, and stillis, intolerant, arrogant and absolutist. Christian conversion thusgenerated fear of estrangement from what defined Burman identity aswell as the foundation of the kingdom and its subjects among other ethnicgroups (Shan, Mon, Karen and others). If large sections of theseminorities now became like the foreigners, the Europeans could easilyassume power. This is exactly what happened in the three colonial warsof conquest in 1824, 1852 and 1885. Even though the king forbademissionaries from handing out books and missions from operating in theareas of the country he controlled after 1826, this could not prevent theconversion of those Karen who were not well versed in Buddhism.These Sgaw Karen from the delta of the Irrawaddy River in the south ofBurma held the lowest position in the dynastic hierarchy. Apparentlythey had no direct protectors amongst state officials and as such theysaw not only deliverance but also advancement through the ranks ofpower in their alliance with the Baptists.

When the British invaded the kingdom in 1852, which was an eventbrought about in part by intrigues created by some missionaries, theChristian Karen aided the army, killing or capturing many Burmans.5The Burmans took revenge by burning many of the Christian villagesand crucifying a Karen pastor. Such events prefaced a religious war—animportant part of the colonialisation process. Thus religion was broughtinto politics as something irretrievably connected with ethnio-nationalidentity, and which had to be protected through the use of violence. Theanti-colonial struggle developed into a fundamentalistic nationalism,and a struggle for survival which legitimised the use of violence. Thefollowing decades bore witness to constant clashes between Christiansand Buddhists. Missionaries disrupted Buddhist cere monies byarrogantly undermining the monks’ authority and entering intoarguments with them, while Christians were abducted and their villageswere ransacked.

In 1856 a large rebellion was started around Bassein in the IrrawaddyDelta by a Karen mìn laùng (‘king in the making’). The rebellion spreadand thousands of Buddhist Karen from the mountains in the Salweenarea joined forces with some Kayah and Shan. The Karen built a pagoda

5. See Pollak (1979). Immediately before the war the Burmese governor ofRangoon and the American missionary Kincaid had a flerce argument. Thegovernor said: ‘Christianity is aimed to destroy every other religion. You aregetting all people over to your side, for you make them think well of you andyour doctrine’, Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1852, vol. 32, p. 69.


in the mountains on top of which they raised the symbol of royal power,the spire (htì). It was to be the end of foreign rulers—a Karen was to beking. According to prophecy, a Karen king would come to rule overPegu, an old royal city northeast of Rangoon—a king who would, itmust be stressed, follow dhamma and the cosmological principles. TheBritish were thus forced to enter a difficult and bloody guerrilla waragainst the Buddhist Karen and their allies, who also attacked theChristian Karen. The colonial power described this mìn laùngas an‘adventurer and evilly-disposed person’,6 a bewildered and ignorantKaren who exploited the weakened state of the Burman kingdom inorder to achieve personal power (see Chapter 14).

The religious violence culminated in 1887 during the final conquest.As mentioned previously, an exceptional event occurred after KingThibaw was sent into exile: monks in their yellow robes engageddirectly in the organisation of guerrilla troops. The foreign element wasto be hunted and driven out. In return the missionaries requested andreceived weapons from the British: ‘We are belligerent’, ‘God is withus, tyranny and Buddhism are a dying monster’, they enthusiasticallyexclaimed. The rebels killed Christians and burned villages. The armyreciprocated and Christian Karen captured monks or delivered theirheads for a reward of 25 rupees. Many heads were delivered, includingthat of a leading monk (Mayangyung hpòngyi), whose head alonefetched a reward of 5,000 rupees—a small fortune. ‘It is Buddhism inarms against Christianity’, a missionary said.7

This mixture—expressing itself as a religious war with ethnicconnotations—constituted a monstrosity that in later years, right upuntil independence, was a permanent element of Burmese nationalism.Religion and ethnicity were, as mentioned above, not excluded from theBurman understanding of self-identity prior to the arrival of the Britishand the missionaries; however, they were not exclusive criteria.Furthermore, ethnicity was not connected with political independence

6. Burma Gazetteer, 1910, Salween District, vol. A, p. 2. The same source callsthe rebellion ‘a most formidable insurrection’. On the other hand, somemissionaries and officials denounced the leader as yet another Karen prophet—avulgar impostor, making a lot of noise. There was no evidence supporting thenotion that the Burman king was behind the rebellion, or that there was generaldiscontent in relation to the tax system. Only the most insightful of colonialofficials and missionaries located the roots of this strategy in the cosmology andunderstood the meaning and seriousness which was underlined by asimultaneous rebellion in India, the so-called great Sepoy mutiny.


as in the European construction of ethnic and national identity,synonymous with an autonomous and nation-state. However,colonisation in Burma brought with it the developments occurringwithin European nationalism.

Karen Nationalism

The Karen National Association (KNA) was founded in 1881 as anassociation of Baptist churches.8 It was the forerunner of the presentKaren National Union (KNU), and sought the leading role in a pan-Karen nationalist movement. It played a key role in the run-up toindependence, with the aim of attaining an independent state protectedby the colonial power. The KNU organised the 1949 rebellion, whichnow seems to have entered its final phase after fifty years of fighting.

During the 1880s, Christianity gained a foothold amongst the Kachinof northern Burma. This was the beginning of the Kachin independencemovement. Following ‘pacification’, the British began to govern Burmain different areas, whereby Kayah’s small principalities were conceivedof as independent states (called Karenni)? formally placed outside thecolonial administration; Shan, Kachin and part of the Salween districtcame to be known as the ‘excluded area’ in relation to ‘MinisterialBurma’ (see Map 2 overleaf showing excluded frontier areas in 1946).This model was based on ethnic pluralism, that is to say, joint economyand politics in conjunction with the British Empire, but with culturalsegregation as the criterion of internal political administration.

This division was argued by reference to indirect rule via the Shanprinces (sawbwas) and Kachin duwas (chiefs). In 1922 the Shan princesagreed to combine their principalities (möng or muang) to form afederation. By entering into a federation, the sawbwas lost control overeducation and the police. Nevertheless they agreed because they were

7. See Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1886, vol. 66.8. See Appendix 2 on the Karen organisations. See further Gravers (1996b), onthe history of Karen nationalism.9. According to Crosthwaite (1968:202), who headed the administration of‘pacification’ in the 1880s, Eastern Kayah had to accept a tributary status underthe British queen, ‘in accordance with established custom’. The territoriesclassified as ‘excluded’ by the British previously enjoyed a high degree ofindependence, although they were part of the Burmese kingdom at the time ofannexation, and thus considered part of the royal domain. The British stillregarded these as independent states.


worried about losing their hereditary rights and being totally integratedinto Burma proper.

The colonial power thus divided the country according to a mountain-valley dichotomy, which was both political and cultural. The mountainscomprised ‘the frontier areas’ with their ‘tribal’ peoples, who had notyet reached a sufficiently civilised state to be included under the sameadministration policy as ‘Ministerial Burma’, which was a part of India.The mountain peoples were under the direct rule of the Britishgovernor.10

Following ‘pacification’, the flow of immigrants from India and Chinaincreased significantly. The Indians were soldiers (sepoys),moneylenders and casual labourers. The Indian moneylenders increasedtheir landownership in the rich Irrawaddy Delta during the 1930s worldcrisis, as low prices on the world market forced the Burmans intoirrevocable debt. Prior to the Second World War there wereapproximately one million Indians in Burma and over half of thepopulation of Rangoon was Indian.11 Between one-third and a quarterof the Indian population fled from the Japanese whilst those remainingadjusted themselves to their new sahib, with a willingness not approvedof by the Burmans.12 The Chinese population, in turn, numberedapproximately 350,000 prior to the war. They were involvedparticularly in trade.

Thus the Burmans could easily ascertain with bitterness that otherethnic groups dominated many areas of employment: doctors, nurses(often Karen women who were also preferred as nannies), soldiers andseasonal farm workers. British firms employed Indians and Karen ratherthan Burmans. This trend in immigration, together with the colonialpower’s use of Indians in many of the lower administrative positions,created yet another ethnic and—in part—religious opposition, whichcan still be felt, for example, in the great upsurge of anti-Muslimagitation and conflict in Arakan since 1991, which sent 300,000 peopleinto Bangladesh as refugees.

Constant strikes and demonstrations against the colonial power tookplace in 1938. Tensions between Indians and Burmans also appeared in

10. See Silverstein (1980) on the British policy of divide and rule.11. Taylor (1987:127).12. According to U Maung Maung (1989:69–70), a general feeling of delightpervaded the country on the forced departure of the British and their Indian‘servants’ in 1942.


Map 2: Excluded Area 1946 (Source: Tinker, 1983–1984)


the form of an unpleasant mixture of religious and racial/ethnicopposition. Newspapers expressed the fear that mixed marriagesbetween Indian Hindus or Muslims and Burman women would lead tothe women being forced to renounce Buddhism. Such marriages cameto be regarded as a threat to religion and ‘racial identity’. However,inter-marriages were quite rare, but the mixture of economicexploitation by Indian chettyar or chetti-kala (moneylenders), race,religion and culture challenged the population with an alarming forceand during the ensuing riots more than 1,000 people died.13

In 1931 Burmans numbered approximately 17,000 in the publicadministration while there were 14,800 Indians and 1,644 Eurasians. TheIndians and Eurasians (descendants of the British and Burmese)dominated the middle ranks under the British in the rail and postservices. The Karen played a comparatively prominent role within themilitary, police and health services, and as teachers -especially theChristian Karen, who comprised approximately 15 per cent of the Karenpopulation. Eurasians numbered approximately 20,000 and weredependent upon the charity of the British to procure education andemployment. On the whole they were better educated than Burmans butthey were nevertheless social outcasts. Orwell describes these ‘half-castes’ and their social position in Burmese Days (p. 117), when Floryhas to answer to whether or not one socialises with them: ‘Goodgracious, no. They’re complete outcasts.’ They could be used to guardBurman prisoners or as clerks but they were looked down upon by bothsides.

This multi-ethnic colonial model has been labelled the ‘pluralsociety’ and has been defined and critically assessed by colonial officialJ.S. Furnivall:

Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture andlanguage, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, butonly in the market-place. There is a plural society, with differentsections of the community living side by side, but separately,within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere thereis a division of labour along racial lines…the union cannot bedissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy.14

13. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:10) has commented upon the significance of thisfear. She says that mixed marriages were a blow against ‘the very roots ofBurmese manhood and racial purity’. See also KhinYi (1988:96).


Thus, the colonial power established its hegemony with an inbuiltdoomsday prophecy: when the colonial union model disintegrates,everything collapses into chaos. It is precisely this fear which hasfuelled the last thirty years of military rule. This model contained anacknowledgement of cultural differences, due to different stages on theevolutionary ladder, leading necessarily to a division of labour based onrace. As we shall see later on, race still plays a role in nationalistpolitical rhetoric.

The pluralistic model’s division of labour was also reflected in classrelations. The middle classes were dominated by Indians, whileprominent Burman political leaders in the 1930s were often dependenton Indian financial backing of their political ventures. These leaderswere usually lawyers and rarely independent businessmen. In addition,the Indians were interested in allying themselves with Burmanpoliticians in order to assure their influence in banking and tradecircles.15

The wholesale trade in provisions and medicine was dominated byIndians (as was banking and moneylending). Obviously the Europeanscontrolled the large oil, timber, mining and transport firms. Thisunequal class relationship can be proved by examining the taxationsystem in Rangoon, where the Indians contributed 55 per cent of alltaxes, the Europeans 15 per cent and the Burmans 11 per cent.16 The restcame from all other groups. This distorted development is an importantfactor that has augmented the ethnic race-related oppositions andemphasised that the kala controlled everything. This was alsodemonstrated by the composition of the student body. The educationalsystem favoured Christians via the mission schools. In the 1930s two-thirds of university students came from the minority ethnic groups,including Indians, who, for example, comprised one-third of themedical students.17

In the nineteenth century, the British attempted to use the monasticschools to teach English, geography and mathematics, but many monkswere opposed to this as they considered these subjects as anti-Buddhist.

14. Furnivall (1956:304, my emphasis). Furnivall’s Fabianism inspired some ofthe young Burman nationalists. He was U Nu’s advisor in the 1950s.15. Taylor (1981, 1987) proves the political importance of the poorly developedBurman middle class and the Indian influence on Burman politics, at timesunderlined by economic support. The disclosure of this connection cost Ba Mawhis position as prime minister in 1939.


The primary goal of the Christian schools was to promote conversion toChristianity and only thereafter to educate and civilise. The colonialpower, however, wanted education to be a part of the division of labourand colonial rule. The missionaries created deeper ethnic divisions byfavouring those minority groups they converted, namely the Karen,Kachin and Chin. In the 1930s, they realised that if Buddhist Burmansacquired greater influence or even independence, this policy could workagainst their interests. Futhermore, educational policy became thefundamental issue of the Burman national movement, which was led bystudents. Thus the colonial power realised quite early on that thedivision of labour along racial lines resulted in unintended opposition.In order to create a united identity out of this plurality, a ‘committee toascertain and advise how the imperial idea may be inculcated andfostered in schools and colleges in Burma’ was founded in 1917. Thisconsisted of eight British senior officials, four missionaries and onlytwo Burmans. Symbols such as the Union Jack and the national anthemwere to be promoted, as was Burma’s own history and literature—aspart of the Empire. A sense of ‘unity of Empire’ was to be created: oneEmpire—many cultures; one hegemonic identity above the many.

This political and economic policy of divide and rule, with its totalopposition between the club mentality notion of ‘segregation’ and theunification of the pluralistic society within a single union, expresseditself in the form of a hegemonic set of conventions and stereotypeswhereby ethnic, religious and cultural differences became the yardstickof national identity and political power. Some examples taken from theperiod preceding the Second World War will show how xenophobia andfear ingrained themselves in the ruling mentality.

16. Taylor (1987:133–36).17. The division of students in Rangoon University according to religionindicates the following: Buddhists 32.2%, indigenous Christians 14.5%,Europeans and Anglo-Burmans 9.9%, Hindus 29.8%, Muslims 5.3% and others(encl. Sikhs) 8.0% (Bless, 1990:252). His book includes a well-documentedanalysis of the division of labour under colonial rule.


5.BUDDHISM, XENOPHOBIA AND

REBELLION IN THE 1930S

Following the ‘pacification’ and its humiliation of the Burman socialorder, Buddhism returned as a political medium in 1906 when theYoung Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) was established inresponse to Christian dominance.1 The YMBA was an imitation of theYMCA but it was a political organisation meant as an alternative toChristian influence. It was especially attractive to young Burmans whohad been educated in the West. The YMBA’s goal was to halt Westerninfluence and to regain respect for Burman culture as well as forBuddhism. This was achieved through ‘no footwear in the pagodas’campaigns, for example. However, the Buddhist and anti-Christiancontent was soon reinforced with agitation against foreign power andpresence.

At first, the movement’s founders, who were mainly youngbarristers, were careful not to provoke the colonial power nor to beaccused of sedition in the event of securing employment for themselves.These young men, with Ba Pe at the fore, were legislators and reformerswho demanded Burmese participation in government. U Maung Maunghas described the YMBA as an alternative to the most powerful of theBritish clubs: ‘The Rangoon YMBA had become by 1908 not theBuddhist counterpart of its Western archtypical association but reallythe Burman equivalent of the British Pegu Club.’2

The YMBA was the first sign of a political awakening in Burma after1885 but with time the organisation became more radical and internalconflict arose between the reformists and the boycott movement led by

1. It was probably modelled after the YMBA established in Sri lanka in 1889 aspart of the Buddhist revival lead by Dharmapala and influenced by theTheosophical Society. YMBA was anti-Christian and nationalistic.2. U Maung Maung (1980:4).

the monks. The

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