Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424

www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Nation states, ideological power and globalisation:can geographers catch the boat?

Martin Jones *, Rhys Jones

Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, University of Wales, Aberystwyth SY23 3DB, UK

Received 13 February 2003; received in revised form 26 November 2003

Abstract

After a period of considerable and sustained hegemony, many commentators have argued that contemporary processes of

globalisation are acting as a challenge to nation state sovereignty. The paper argues that geographers need to focus on the ways in

which the nation state continues to act, albeit in a modified manner, within the era of globalisation. This might help to position

geography within globalisation debates, which––according to Dicken [Geographers and �globalization’: (yet) another missed boat?

forthcoming, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 2004]––we have not been centrally involved in. Drawing on the

work of Michael Mann, we focus on a neglected dimension of state power––namely, its ideological form––as a means of exploring

how the nation state is being differentially re-engineered under globalisation. Using Mann’s classification of forms of ideological

organisation, we deploy three vignettes in order to demonstrate the evolving nature of ideological power within the contemporary

UK State.

� 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Nation state; State power; Ideological power; Globalisation; UK

Jo

00

do

The evidence shows unequivocally that geographers

are marginal––at best––to the wider globalization

debate. Geography is like the small child in the

school playground who always gets missed out

when the big children are picking teams. Nobodyseems to want to choose us. So, we have a serious

case of �missing geographers’ on our hands . . .[and] globalization could turn out to be yet another

one of geography’s �missed boats’. Indeed, the hi-

story of our discipline is replete with cases where

what would seem to be geography’s �natural’ terri-tory has been invaded and taken over by other dis-

ciplines, often in ways that grossly distort �thegeographical view’ (Dicken, 2004, p. 5; see also

Angel, 2002, p. 254).

*Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: msj@aber.ac.uk (M. Jones), raj@aber.ac.uk (R.

nes).

16-7185/$ - see front matter � 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

i:10.1016/j.geoforum.2003.12.002

1. Introduction

There has been much academic debate, in recent

years, concerning the functional and territorial restruc-

turing that is affecting the contemporary state. Scholarshave argued that the nation state’s prime position as the

shaper of economic and political processes, and the

anchor for cultural identities is increasingly being chal-

lenged by organisations and processes lying within and

beyond its boundaries (e.g. Brenner et al., 2003;

Fukuyama, 1992; Horsman and Marshall, 1994; Jessop,

1999; Keating, 2001; Mann, 1997; Murphy, 1996).

Jessop’s (1994, 2002) now-familiar work on the reorga-nisation of the state has been influential as a way of

conceptualising the character of some of these changes.

Focusing on the de-statisation of the political system,

reflected most clearly in the shift from government to

governance; the internationalisation of policy commu-

nities and networks; and the denationalisation of the

state––as evidenced in the sedimentation of new organ-

isations of governance, with their societal effects, atdifferent spatial scales––Jessop’s work has contributed

much to our understanding of the contemporary state.

Academic attention has also focused on the forces that

410 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424

are allegedly eroding the state’s hegemony. Key here has

been the various accounts of the impacts of globalisa-

tion on the nation state (e.g. Amin, 2002a; Brenner,

1999; Kelly, 1999; Ohmae, 1996; Panitch, 1996; Ruggie,1993; Sassen, 2003; Scott, 2001; Shaw, 1997; Yeung,

1998). Globalisation––which equates to: the increasing

importance of financial markets; the centrality of

knowledge as a factor of production; the international-

isation and �transnationalisation of technology’; the rise

of transnational corporations; an intensification of cul-

tural flows; and the rise of �transnational economic

diplomacy’ (Amin and Thrift, 1994)––has been viewedas the main challenge to the functional and territorial

integrity of the nation state. Significantly, the fact that

globalisation relates to ‘‘not merely the geographical

extension of economic activity across national bound-

aries but also the functional integration of such inter-

nationally dispersed activities (Dicken, 1998, p. 5,

emphasis added), implies that globalisation is leading to,

and is associated with, �new global geographies’ (Aminand Thrift, 1997). Globalisation is redefining the role of

the nation state as regulatory animateur of cultural,

economic, social and political life and in doing so is

challenging the established territorial geographies of the

Westphalian sovereign national state system.

Admittedly, accounts of the impacts of globalisation

on the nation state have varied. So-called �booster’academic accounts argue that globalisation is driven byan economic logic that brings about an end-state of a

single global market (see Dicken et al., 1997). Within

these explanations, it is contended that transnational

networks of production, trade and finance are ultimately

leading to the denationalisation of economic space.

Consequently, an �end of geography’ thesis (O’Brien,

1992) exists because ‘‘traditional nation states have be-

come unnatural, even impossible business units in aglobal economy’’ (Ohmae, 1996, p. 5). Globalisation is

associated with a �borderless world’ where national

governments are relegated to transmission belts for

global capital (Ohmae, 1996; also Horsman and Mar-

shall, 1994; Strange, 1996). Political praxis has sup-

ported this position. In the words of the British Prime

Minister, Tony Blair, ‘‘what is called globalisation is

changing the nature of the nation state as power be-comes more diffuse and borders more porous’’ (quoted

in Dicken et al., 1997, p. 159).

Others have been keen to offer a healthier prognosis

for the nation state. Taking issue with the arguments

made for economic globalisation, �hypercritics’ (Dicken

et al., 1997) or �sceptics’ (Held et al., 1999)––such as

Hirst and Thompson (1996)––question the significance

of contemporary globalisation, along with its impact onthe nation state. Using evidence of world flows of trade,

investment and labour, Hirst and Thompson claim that

because levels of economic interdependence remain

stable, no significant changes have occurred since the

19th century and it is wrong to suggest that the con-

temporary period has witnessed the formation of a

particularly integrated economy. Globalisation is, in

their terms, a �myth’; the nation state remains a regu-lator of cross-border activity and it is foolish to suggest

a scenario whereby the ‘‘glue holding traditional nation

states together, at least in economic terms, has begun to

dissolve’’ (Ohmae, 1996, p. 79). For Hirst and Thomp-

son (1996) globalisation is a politically convenient

rational for practising neoliberal economic strategies––a

claim developed by others (see Fox-Piven, 1995; Harvey,

2000; Swyngedouw, 2000).These two extreme positions (booster and sceptic) are

currently being re-assessed. In this respect, it has been

suggested that Hirst and Thompson do not give any

sense of the trends underway over the past 25 years in

economic, political, social and cultural life (Amin, 1997).

By focusing purely on a quantitative (economic) evalu-

ation of change, there is no consideration of qualitative

dimensions to globalisation, especially its impacts on theterritorial nexus of the nation state (Amin and Thrift,

1997; Anderson and Goodman, 1995; Anderson, 1995,

1996). Dicken (1998), who suggests that Hirst and

Thompson ultimately confuse the concept of globalisa-

tion with internationalisation, shares similar thoughts.

Commenting on both the booster and sceptic position,

Dicken argues that globalisation has to be seen as a

complex set of interrelated processes that are leading toa qualitative reorganisation of the geo-economy (also

Dicken, 2004; Dicken et al., 1997; also Scholte, 2000).

Here, the nation state is presented as �permeable’ to the

processes of globalisation––it has �political complexion’

and the strategic capacity to filter the various driving

forces (Dicken, 1998). The state enacts a series of policy

mixes that influence the ways in which economies

operate within a globalised world. In a similar vein,Yeung (1998, p. 292) challenges the �borderless world’

discourse on the grounds that it plays down the ‘‘intri-

cate and multiple relationships between capital, the state

and space’’. For Yeung, there is an enduring importance

for national boundaries because capital is still embedded

in distinct national-social and/or institutional structures.

For these authors, the nation state remains engaged in

mediating both domestic and transnational economicactivity through offering different �regulatory surfaces’

(also Jessop, 1999).

This paper tries to shape and steer these important

agendas by suggesting ways in which geographers can

contribute to globalisation debates––thereby addressing

Dicken’s (2004) recent concern that we could be missing

the (globalisation) boat? We argue that geographers

need to focus on the ways in which the nation statecontinues to act, albeit in a modified manner, within the

era of globalisation. We do not claim, in this respect,

that the nation state is unaffected by the processes of

globalisation. Instead, our concern is with how the na-

1 We find it interesting to note that although Mann’s current work

tends to cover the transcendent nature of global ideologies, particu-

larly the connections between economic power relations, military

power relations and ethno-nationalism and anti-imperialism, one of

Mann’s forthcoming books is a volume III on the sources of social

power and globalisation––titled Globalizations (see Mann, 2003). The

intention to write this was clearly stated in the preface to Mann’s 1993

volume II on the sources of social power, where he promises an

account of ‘‘the twentieth century (perhaps the whole century, by the

time I finish)’’ (Mann, 1993a, p. ix). We would like to thank one of the

referees for drawing our attention to this important point.

M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 411

tion state is adapting to the challenge of globalisation

‘‘rather than being tidily removed to clear the ground

for new politics’’ (Anderson and Goodman, 1995, p. 25).

On this front, we suggest that contemporary workconcerned with finding a balanced position between

�booster’ and �sceptic’ interpretations might wish to ex-

plore the multifaceted dimensions to, and mechanisms

of, state power under globalisation (cf. Hobson, 1998;

Mann, 1997). With the exception of Taylor’s (1994,

1995) work on the shifting character of the nation state

as a �power container’, relatively little attention has been

directed towards the selective reshuffling of the differentdimensions to state power. This sentiment is expressed

in the following observation, although we would suggest

that this gives little indication as to how, as human

geographers, we can begin to explicate the contours of

these phenomena.

Globalization . . . is making it increasingly neces-sary to differentiate between the various activities

or potential activities of states; the unbundling of

territoriality is often highly selective, and we need

to think of the state and its sovereignty in the plural

rather than the singular (Anderson, 1996, p. 135).

Although much work has been undertaken on the

economic, military and political powers of the nation

state under globalisation (cf. Dicken, 2004; Gill and

Law, 1988; Held et al., 1999; Hudson, 2000; Jessop,

1995; McGrew and Lewis, 1992; Weiss, 1998; Yeung,

1998), little research is being conducted on the role of

ideological dimensions to state power. We address this

lacuna in the paper by concentrating on the contribu-tions made by Mann (1986). We do so for two reasons.

Firstly, Mann has systematically elaborated on the

various aspects of social and state power––ideological,

economic, military and political––in research under-

taken over the last 20 years. As such, Mann’s work can

enable us to highlight the way in which globalisation

affects these different sources of state power, in different

ways. Secondly––and as we discuss below––Mann’scontribution to ideology, amongst other things, revolves

around the ways in which ideological power is multi-

dimensional and, especially with regard to globalisation,

is bound up with the ongoing processes of state action

and formation (Mann, 1997; see also Clegg, 1989). We

further contend that Mann’s focus on ideological power

as a constituent element of state power, and more

importantly the distinction made between transcendentand immanent forms of ideological organisation (see

Section 2), provides a useful framework through which

to explore the re-configuring of nation state territoriality

under globalisation. Historically, the nation state, of

course, cannot depend purely on territorial forces of

control: it has always employed ideological patterns of

dominance (see Jones, 2000; Kirby, 1993; Murphy, 1996;

Poulantzas, 1978). Our point is that the globalisation

debate offers an opportunity for exploring the mecha-

nisms in through which the nation state’s ideological

power is being qualitatively re-engineered during thecontemporary period. Uncovering this could be where

geographers can make a difference and catch the glob-

alisation boat.

Section 2 discusses this further by drawing on Mann’s

(1986) notion of power networks as methodological

tools for analysing the shifting functions of national

governments. Although Mann has made interventions in

the globalisation debate––focusing on its geographicallyuneven impacts (Mann, 1993b, 1997) and on the shifting

character of economic and military power relations

(Mann, 2001, 2002)––there appears to be a missing

methodological link between this contemporary think-

ing and Mann’s previous theoretical writings on the

sources of social power between antiquity and high-

modernity (Mann, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1993a). 1 Likewise,

although Mann’s work has been used in historicalgeography to examine the formation of the state and the

practices through which techniques of power are exer-

cised (Jones, 1999; Ogborn, 1992), with the exception of

Weiss’s (1998) work on comparative economic devel-

opment, its application to the contemporary era has

been somewhat limited. One of the aims of the paper,

then, is to show the relevance of Mann’s historical work

on the sources of social power to contemporary debatesconcerning processes of globalisation. To provide the

empirical basis for our argument that ideological power

remains an increasingly important facet of the nation

state’s role in globalisation, Section 3 provides three

short vignettes on the contemporary UK state to dem-

onstrate the relevance of this perspective. Section 4

concludes the paper.

2. Globalisation and the neglected dimension of state

power

Hobson’s excellent review of approaches to the statewithin the context of internationalisation and glo-

balisation clearly places the work of Mann within a

neo-Weberian perspective (Hobson, 1998). Weber’s

412 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424

contention that the state should be viewed as a ‘‘human

community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of

the legitimate use of physical force within a given ter-

ritory’’ (Gerth and Mills, 1970, p. 78) has been builtupon by Mann. He has elaborated on key criteria that

illustrate the organisational significance of states. Mann

(1984) (see also Giddens, 1985) maintains that states

incorporate

• firstly, a set of institutions and their related person-

nel,

• secondly, a degree of centrality with political deci-sions emanating from this centre point,

• thirdly, a defined boundary that demarcates the terri-

torial limits of the state,

• fourthly, a monopoly of coercive power and law-

making ability.

Indeed, it is Mann’s emphasis on the importance of

territory for all states––in a material and ideologicalsense––that has marked his work out as being of especial

importance to geographers (see Jones, 1999; Ogborn,

1992).

Building on this neo-Weberian legacy, Mann has fa-

mously argued that we need to conceive of social power

as something that exists in an interrelated, multifaceted

and plural form (Mann, 1986, pp. 1–2; cf. Giddens,

1987; Hall, 1996; Runciman, 1989). The four differenttypes of power identified by Mann as being the �foursources of social power’ are economic, military, political

and ideological power. According to Mann, economic

power is based on an individual or a group’s ability to

order the processes whereby a society’s subsistence

needs are extracted from the resources of the territory

that it inhabits. It is by controlling the means of suste-

nance within a given society that an individual or, groupof individuals, are able to maintain a hold on its source

of economic power. Military power is a relatively

straightforward concept, since it derives directly from an

individual or a group’s ability to order the means of

defence and offence within a particular place. It may

also offer the means by which a ruling class may coerce

their subjects into adhering to norms of ideological,

economic and political control within the same society.Political power, according to Mann, derives from the

ability of individuals, groups or institutions to order

aspects of organisation in a territorial manner within a

given society. Finally and critically given the aims of the

paper, Mann emphasises the key role of ideological

power in shaping socio-spatial relations. Ideological

power may derive from an individual’s ability to main-

tain a monopoly of categories of meaning or, in otherwords, the process whereby ideological meaning is

placed upon concepts and categories within a society.

Ideological power is also based on an individual or

group’s ability to shape norms of action or, in effect,

norms concerning the way in which individuals should

act towards each other within a society; or it may derive

from an ability to mould the nature of ritual or aesthetic

practices within a given society. It is the ability to shapeor mould these elements that confers ideological power

on a particular group or individual (Mann, 1986, pp.

22–28).

Along with Mann, we wish to emphasise that the four

constituent sources or networks of social power should

not be viewed as ones that exist independently of one

another: they are not necessarily mutually exclusive and

are, in fact, often combined in complex ways (Clegg,1989; Hobson, 1998). This has two major implications

for any study of the ideological power of the state under

globalisation. First, since all forms of power are impli-

cated one with another, it is often difficult to tease out

the ideological element of the power networks incor-

porated within individual nation states. In other words,

the boundaries between the various networks of power

are often blurred. This raises significant problems in anyattempt to distinguish the nature of the ideological

power of the state vis-�a-vis its networks of military,

political and economic power. Second, and more

broadly, any attempt to interrogate the sources of

ideological power of a given state in isolation may be

viewed as one that is conceptually flawed, since the

process of abstraction that this entails is inimical to the

interrelated nature of power networks within any givensocio-spatial context. We fully accept the validity of

such criticisms and concur that the ideological power of

the state under globalisation is closely linked to its re-

lated sources of economic, military and political power

(see Harvey, 2003). Our aim in this paper, however, is to

emphasise a particularly neglected aspect of studies of

state power under globalisation, namely that of the

ideological power of the state and its organisationalmatrices. As such, the act of abstracting the ideological

context of state power is worthwhile. It has the potential

to highlight fruitful and possibly novel lines of empirical

enquiry within the broader arena of research that is

concerned with exploring the changes occurring to the

contemporary state under the processes of globalisation.

We wish to further argue that such an approach is

warranted since there is an inherent danger that thecrucial significance of ideological power to the territorial

and functional capacity of nation states is being ignored

within studies of contemporary political economy. This

derives, at least in part, from a failure to recognise the

fact that ideological organisation may take one of two

different forms––transcendent and immanent (Mann,

1986, pp. 23–24). Crucially, we would argue that there

has been a tendency, with regard to globalisation, tofocus almost exclusively on the transcendent forms that

ideological organisation may take. Here, attention is

directed towards a type of ideological organisation,

which ‘‘transcends the existing institutions of ideologi-

2 In making this point we recognise that the concept of ideology is a

contested term––frequently interchanged with notions of discourse and

hegemony (see Eagleton, 1991; Fairclough, 1995; Jessop, 1990; Purvis

and Hunt, 1993)––and make the following distinction. We take

discourse as a set of interrelated concepts that act as a matrix through

which to understand the social world, whereas ideology is the means

through which dominant social groups (or classes) present ideas in a

certain manner in order to sustain privileged power relationships.

Hegemony, in turn, is interpreted as the material practices that

generate and help to sustain ideologies––i.e. the structural and

strategic contexts within which meanings, understandings and actions

develop (see Fairclough, 2000).

M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 413

cal, economic, military and political power and gener-

ates a �sacred’ form of authority . . . set apart from and

above more secular authority structures’’ (Mann, 1986,

p. 23). One of the examples Mann uses in order toillustrate this form of transcendent ideological organi-

sation is that associated with the religion of Christianity

(Mann, 1986, pp. 301–340; see also Mann, 2002). Here,

Mann argues that Christianity throughout much of the

later Roman period existed as a set of ideas that ex-

tended throughout the Roman Empire in both a social

and spatial context. In many ways, also, they came to

cut across and challenge the dominant power structuresthat existed within the Empire. Of course, one can draw

close parallels here between the relationship that existed

between early forms of Christianity and the Roman

Empire, and lay interpretations of the relationship that

exists between nation states and the transcendent ide-

ologies of globalisation. In a similar manner to the

erosion of the Roman Empire’s traditional power

structures by a sociospatially transcendent Christianideology, global �boosters’ would have us believe that

nation states in the contemporary world are unable to

structure their political economies due to a prevailing

global ideology of free trade, economic liberalism, a

�rationalist episteme’ (Scholte, 2000, p. 91), and Anglo-

American culture.

We can, perhaps, view booster interpretations of the

dynamics of globalisation as ones that portray contem-porary political and economic relationships as consist-

ing of the interplay between a footloose and aspatial

ideology of globalisation, on the one hand, and a more

territorially rooted nation state, on the other. In effect,

there is a danger that the whole notion of ideological

power can be viewed as the antithesis of a state power,

delineated by territorial boundaries. Swyngedouw’s

(2000) contribution to this arena of research, however,sounds a note of caution against embracing such a

viewpoint. Emphasising the discursive shift that has

taken place in much of the academic literature and

political rhetoric during the 1980s, he contends that the

‘‘propagation of this globalisation ideology (sic) has

become like an act of faith’’ (Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 66).

Crucially, it is the leaders of contemporary nation states

who are often implicated in the processes through whichthese ideologies are produced and sustained. These

global ideologies, in turn, feed back into the ideologies

and discourses promoted within individual nation states:

national politicians use globalisation to support a range

of policies that seek to promote restrictions on social

expenditure, the advantages of flexible labour markets,

and the reduction of environmental and social forms of

regulation (Harvey, 2000). As such, this perspectivedraws our attention to the key role played by forms of

ideological organisation both at a putative global scale,

and at the scale of the nation state, as well as the com-

plex interplay between the two.

In this respect, we would argue that �booster’ con-ceptions of the processes occurring within contemporary

globalisation are flawed since they fail to recognise the

existence of a second, immanent, form of ideologicalorganisation that is closely linked to existing social

groups and power structures. Mann’s understanding of

ideological power is particularly instructive, in this re-

gard, precisely due to his recognition of the existence of

this second form of ideological organisation. He argues

that ‘‘immanent ideology is less dramatically autono-

mous in its impact, for it largely strengthens what is

there’’ (Mann, 1986, p. 23). Though we would questionthe static and unchanging interpretation of immanent

ideological organisation that appears in the above

quotation, we would concur that immanent forms of

ideological organisation have the potential to legitimise

and sustain the relationships of political, economic and

military power that already exist within a given society.

Indeed, in many ways, this mirrors Thompson’s under-

standing of the concept of ideology as something thathelps to sustain relations of domination (1984, p. 4; see,

however, Eagleton, 1991, pp. 6–7). 2 Once again, Mann

(1986, p. 297) delves into ancient history in order to

illustrate his understanding of this concept. Focusing his

attention again on the Roman Empire, Mann argues

that much of what preserved its external form and

internal structure for the long period of its military,

political and economic dominance was a concomitantideological power. This drew the imperial elite into a

common infrastructure based mainly on literacy and

Hellenistic rationalism.

The above discussion raises the obvious question

concerning the various ways in which immanent ideo-

logical power is transmitted to a state’s population. A

precursor to this should appreciate that uses of the term

�state power’ can give the false impression of an organ-isational form that exerts power in and of itself, when

Jessop has famously argued that the state does not

possess any power of its own.

The state as such has no power––it is merely an

institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institu-

tional capacities and liabilities which mediate that

power; the power of the state is the power of the

414 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424

forces acting in and through the state (Jessop,

1990, p. 269, emphasis added).

Given this emphasis on agency and mediation, it is

important to consider the significance of communication

as a way of ensuring that political elites can transmitconceptions of ideological power to their population.

Mann argues for a position that acknowledges

�organizational materialism’: ideologies are at-

tempts to grapple with real social problems, but

they are diffused through specific media of commu-

nication and their characteristics may transform

ideological messages, so conferring ideological

power autonomy. Thus the particularities of ideo-logical power organization should be our object

of study (Mann, 1993a, p. 36).

Immanent ideological power can be transmitted

through a variety of techniques, ranging from prescrip-

tive rules and coercion through to more normative dis-

courses that can encourage particular forms of social

action and/or identity. The more prescriptive rules relate

to Mann’s (1986) ideas regarding �distributive power’

and Clegg’s (1989, 1990) notion of �circuits of power’ or,in other words, fields and circuits of strategic agency.

The organisation of a state’s ideological power through

normative discourses reflects the attempts made by a

state elite to encourage different types of social practice

and is based more on state propaganda contained within

official state communications, state education systems,

social and cultural events, and direct control of the

media. We have to be careful here, of course, ofimplying instrumentalism on the part of the state and its

various projects. Clegg argues that when studying the

co-existence of power networks, ‘‘the temporarily sta-

bilised outcomes may be practices historically encoun-

tered in their fixity and facticity which no one

necessarily �intended’ in any relevant way’’ (Clegg, 1989,

p. 204). State action within the frameworks of social

practice and discursive practice can have intended andunintended consequences.

Significantly the concept of immanent ideological

organisation reveals much about the territorial charac-

ter of the contemporary nation state. Crucially, we ar-

gue that immanent ideological power can be viewed as a

form of ideological power that can be closely linked to

the pre-existing social groups and power structures of

the contemporary nation state. In effect, immanentideological power can be seen to play a significant role

in the reproduction, though, we would argue, not the

unchanging preservation, of the socio-spatial relation-

ships and territorial power structures of the state. Fur-

thermore, the notion of immanent ideological power

enables us to view the role of ideological power in

structuring the relationship between the nation state

and the dynamics of globalisation in a different way.

Rather than seeing ideological power solely as some-

thing that seeks to undermine the territorial integrity

of the nation state, the notion of an immanent ideo-logical power, grounded in pre-existing territorial power

structures, allows us to interrogate the various forms

of ideological power, which enable the contemporary

nation state to be sustained. The state is, therefore,

not a defenceless organisation suffering at the hands

of a globally produced set of orthodoxies and norms.

Effectively, notions of immanent ideological power

necessitate the need to explore the manifold ways inwhich the contemporary nation state is a set of insti-

tutions in and through which ideological meanings, and

their associated power relationships, are produced,

communicated and consumed.

3. Nation states and the three sources of ideological power

In this section we outline three vignettes that illus-

trate the various contexts in which ideological power is

produced, communicated and consumed within indi-

vidual nation states. Moreover, in so doing we seek to

emphasise the continued––though modified––roleplayed by the nation state in structuring discourses,

meanings and orthodoxies in the contemporary world,

even in the face of the allegedly remorseless ideological

capacities of globally based institutions and organisa-

tions. The three vignettes have been chosen since they

reflect Mann’s (1986, pp. 22–23) threefold classification

of the ways in which ideological power may be struc-

tured and communicated. Briefly, ideological power canbe based upon:

• the ascription of concepts or categories of meaning

within a given place or society,

• the denoting of norms within a given place or society,

ones which provide guidance on the ways in which

individuals and groups should act,

• aesthetic and ritual practices which help to convey asense of power within society.

These three sources of ideological power will struc-

ture the arguments made in this section. To illustrate

these arguments, we will be drawing on leading-edge

political developments underway in the UK in recent

years within the context of globalisation and neoliber-

alism. Crucially, the role of the UK state in definingcategories of meaning will be discussed with respect to

the notion of scales of action, or in other words, the

ability of nation states to determine the appropriate

spatial scales over which political, socio-economic and

cultural activity should take place. The influence of the

nation state in determining norms of action will be

illustrated through a brief discussion of the role of

M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 415

individual states (though often in co-operation one with

each other) in promoting new forms of social paternal-

ism. Discussion here centres on contemporary ideologies

of welfare reform, whereby the unemployed are in-structed how to behave in order to receive welfare

entitlement. Thirdly, we will discuss one of the clearest

indications of the continuing significance of individual

nation states in promoting their own sources of ideo-

logical power, namely their ability to sponsor certain

aesthetic and ritual practices. We will illustrate this

theme by discussing the notion of efforts to re-brand

civic nationalism in the UK.

3.1. Categories of meaning: scales of action

One way of considering Mann’s (1986) notion of

ideological power as a category of meaning is to thinkabout the ways in which socio-economic activity is

governed through spatial scales of action. In this re-

spect, we would argue that nation states are maintaining

their strategic capacity to establish institutional param-

eters associated with managing particular problems.

Since the late 1960s, the time at which international-

isation is said to have given way to globalisation

(Dicken, 1998, 2004), the state has played a key role inreshaping the socio-economic environment in and

through which its intervention takes place. This is pre-

sented to interest groups as an attempt to increase the

efficiency and effectiveness of the state’s use of resources,

linked to which is an imperative to secure political

legitimacy for state intervention (Offe, 1985). This pro-

cess not only involves the production of new spatial

scales of state intervention to manage economic life: it isultimately associated with providing new sites for state

(ideological) power, which is indicative of the nation

state’s ability to ‘‘monopolize a claim to meaning’’

(Mann, 1986, p. 22).

Such concerns can be demonstrated with reference to

the development of the �region’ as a key scale of regu-

lation and governance across Europe in recent years (see

Keating, 1998; Keating et al., 2003; MacLeod, 2001). Inrecent �new regionalist’ academic accounts, there is an

emerging orthodoxy that suggests a high-road to eco-

nomic growth based on a movement from national

government and interventionist policy-making towards

reflexive sub-national structures of governance involving

the state, economic actors, and civil society stakeholders

(cf. Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Hirst, 1997; Storper,

1997). Since the mid-1940s, of course, the nation stateand the national scale have been pivotal to economic

policy. This was deemed necessary for post-war recon-

struction and also a means of preventing a repetition of

the economic slump that occurred during the 1930s.

Accordingly, a Fordist–Keynesian institutional com-

promise for capitalism was anchored around the nation

state as an imagined political and economic community.

Nationally co-ordinated economic development, in the

form of labour market and regional policy, endeavoured

to temporarily stabilise and internalise the contradic-

tions and crisis tendencies of capitalism (Parsons, 1988).The period 1945–1975 represented a �long-boom’ of

economic growth, characterised by low unemployment

rates and relative social prosperity.

Under (especially economic) globalisation, national

scales of action are deemed to have become an �obstacle’to economic success (Ohmae, 1996, 2002). Drawing

empirical inspiration from growth regions such as Baden

W€urrtemberg (Germany) and Emilia-Romagna (Italy),the regional scale is claimed to represent an indispens-

able element in the �supply architecture’ for learning and

innovation, deemed essential for establishing economic

competitiveness in an era of globalisation (Storper,

1997). In substantive terms, the �new regionalism’

(Keating, 1998) argues that an economic deficit can be

addressed by harnessing a network of support structures

that help to collectivise economic interests (Cooke andMorgan, 1998). The regional scale is also viewed as key

for reducing a democratic deficit and promoting a plural

society based on ‘‘participatory politics, active citizen-

ship [and] civic pride’’ (Amin, 1999, p. 373).

The impact of this thinking is evident in recent

political praxis in the United Kingdom. For a number of

years UK policymakers have shown an explicit interest

in developments occurring in the successful Europeanregions. As part of a comprehensive UK-wide devolu-

tion agenda, alongside elected Assemblies for Wales,

Northern Ireland and London, and a parliament for

Scotland, the Labour government has established Re-

gional Development Agencies (RDAs) to enable the

English regions ‘‘to punch their weight in the global

market place’’ (DETR, 1997, p. 1, emphasis added). In

step with the new regionalist orthodoxy, RDAs areintegral elements of a package deemed capable of

learning and innovating to establish a competitive

advantage for economic growth in the global arena.

This �new regional policy’ (DTLR, 2002) is laden with

an ideology of providing institutional parameters for

economic success that is being communicated through

national-level policy documents, parliamentary debates

and political discussion, and the actions of the nineRDAs within their respective English regions (including

London)––being legitimised in this last instance by

boards drawing representation from the business sector

and the social partners. The Labour Party is envious of

territorial developments that have occurred elsewhere in

Europe (see DETR, 2000): the regional scale is seen to

provide the right atmosphere for both business and civil

society stakeholders, in tandem creating strong part-nerships as the basis for a �decent’ society. This is clearlyevident in the following persuasive quotation from a

recent White Paper on the future of English regional

governance, which makes ideological links between

416 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424

modernisation, economic prosperity, and regional levels

of representation.

For decades the needs and aspirations of the Eng-

lish regions were at best neglected and at worst ig-

nored. The laissez-faire and �Whitehall knows

best’ approaches of the past created both a widen-

ing regional economic decline and regional demo-

cratic deficit. By 1997 we had all but abandoned

regional policy and had one of the most centralised

systems of government in the western world. Rightfrom the word go, this Government has taken a dif-

ferent approach, aiming to bring pride and prosper-

ity back to all our regions . . . This White Paper

carries forward that regional renaissance and puts

the regions firmly at the heart of our policies to

build a modern and more prosperous society. By

devolving power and revitalising the regions we

bring decision-making closer to the people andmake government more efficient, more effective

and more accountable. Empowering our regions

does not mean the break-up of England, just as

devolution has not meant the break-up of the

UK. It makes our nation stronger and more dy-

namic . . . This is radical agenda to take us forward

fully into the 21st century, where centralisation is a

thing of the past. It responds to the desires many re-gions are already expressing and sets up a frame-

work which can take other regions forward if they

wish. Better Government, less bureaucracy and

more democracy, and enhancing regional prosper-

ity: proposals from a Government confident that

it is people within our regions who know what is

best for their region (Prescott and Byers, quoted

in DTLR, 2002: foreword).

By contrast, experience is suggesting pressing con-

tradictions that, we argue, illustrate the thinness of this

initiative (also Benneworth, 2001; Robson et al., 2000).

At a basic policy level, RDAs are heavily steered by

political fiat and central government dictate and theylack regional discretion. Although RDAs have a remit

to influence the nature of economic, social and physical

regeneration within their various territories, they control

less than 5% of the money entering into their regional

space and they are, in effect, subcontractors for central

government (national) programmes (Morgan, 2002). 3

Because of this, in contrast to the rhetoric of rational-

ising landscapes of economic governance––created

3 It also has to be recognised that Government Offices for the

Regions (Whitehall’s administrative presence within the English

regions) are being positioned as leading players in regional develop-

ment (see DTLR, 2002), which is set to create further tensions between

central government and the RDAs/future elected regional assemblies

(Musson et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2004).

through numerous rounds of state intervention since the

early 1980s––critics suggest that RDAs are adding to the

complexity of doing regional economic regeneration

(Jones, 2001). They have, in effect, been established in aregional space occupied by a number of existing insti-

tutions: they are contributing to a congested set of re-

gional agendas (in political terms) and arenas (in

institutional terms).

More crucially, at the deeper ideological level, and

again drawing influence from European developments,

RDAs are driven by an economic imperative that as-

sumes a strong regional tier corresponds with an ability tosecure competitive advantage (cf. DTLR, 2002). This is

somewhat misleading if it implies a direct relationship

between economic dynamism and the regional scale,

without first examining the processes in and through

which successful regions are constituted, and the role that

regions play in regulating the economy. Moreover, re-

search has demonstrated that regionalism is not a nec-

essary prerequisite for economic success and democraticrenewal (compare Bolton and Roland, 1997; Keating

et al., 2003; Rodr�ıguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). Since RDAs

have been operational they have been virtually powerless

to affect the economic fortunes of their regions and since

1997 the economic disparities between the top and bot-

tom performing UK regions has increased by over 25%

(see Adams and Robinson, 2002). Additionally, because

RDAs generally follow an existing model of state-definedterritoriality––established during the 1930s to manage

economic restructuring––in most cases their territories

and sponsored institutional arrangements (such as Re-

gional Chambers) are limited for practising an active re-

gional citizenship (compare Jones and MacLeod, 2004;

ODPM, 2002; Tomaney and Mawson, 2002). In short,

does this form of devolution possess the necessary terri-

torial strategic capacity to make a real difference withinthe English regions? And will the directly elected regional

assemblies for the three northern English regions, whose

future depends on a regional referendum (see Prescott,

2003), deliver the goods?

We would go as far as to suggest that this form of

regional economic governance represents a re-scaling of

state power first and foremost through the mechanisms

of ideological power. This example is not too dissimilarfrom the experiences of implementing regional economic

development elsewhere in Europe (see Rodr�ıguez-Poseand Gill, 2003). In this light, this project represents a

political appropriation of (regional) knowledge to be

used to provide economic legitimacy and England’s �newregionalism’ is a political strategy, formed through

complex ideological power networks, aimed at re-scal-

ing, instead of resolving, a longstanding economic anddemocratic deficit (Jones and MacLeod, 1999; Jones,

2001). This has evolved through the creation of a

vibrant regional �development industry’ involving

academics, politicians, the media, and management

M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 417

consultants where localities-specific knowledge or �arte-facts’ is traded and translated through time to construct

a best practice model for doing economic development

(Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000). In the English case,economic regionalisation is certainly a �category of

meaning’ with questionable substance. And for some,

the �new regionalism’ can even be interpreted as the

nation state obfuscating its economic management role

through a smoke screen of scalar ideological tricks using

the mirror of globalisation as justification (Lovering,

1999). Should this experiment fail, the nation state can

blame those represented at the regional scale for eco-nomic failure by scripting the shortcomings of regional

development as a failure of the devolved structures of

governance––hence our (long-run) sceptical remarks on

moves towards elected regional assemblies.

3.2. Social norms and co-operation: the new paternalism

Since the middle of the 20th century, the welfare state

has dominated Britain’s political landscape. Following

the social and economic problems created by industri-

alisation and urbanisation in the late-Victorian era, a

series of Royal Committees in the 1930s recommended

an end to the �five giants’ of Want, Disease, Ignorance,Squalor and Idleness. Extending some of the themes

discussed above, national social policy went hand in

hand with national economic development. The much

quoted Beveridge Report proposed a national plan for

social insurance based on ‘‘Giving in return for contri-

butions benefit up to subsistence level, as of right and

without means test, so that individuals may build freely

upon it’’ (Beveridge, 1942, p. 7, emphasis added). Aspart of its national social policy, from the mid-1940s

Britain exercised a one nation political strategy based

on, amongst other policies, a national guarantee of �fullemployment’. Legislation such as the 1944 Employment

White Paper certainly epitomised the role of the (wel-

fare) state in social reproduction: it provided the

mechanisms through which the unemployed could claim

benefit as a universal right and a national entitlement.Of course, the subsequent development of the welfare

state into the areas of health, housing, education and

employment was financed by national economic success

associated with the Fordist long-boom.

During the last 20 years, set firmly within the context

of economic globalisation, the UK along with other na-

tion states has sought to address the fiscal problems

associated with economic restructuring, declining growthrates, and spiralling public expenditure by restructuring

the welfare state and its underpinning philosophical

norms (compare Beck, 2000; Giddens, 2000; Jessop,

2002). According to the timely analysis offered by the

Commission on Social Justice––charged with thinking

the unthinkable with respect to the future of the British

welfare state during the 1990s:

As far as social security was concerned, the welfare

state was passive when people were economically

active––either earning a living themselves or relying

on the family breadwinner while they brought upchildren. It became active only when people were

passive, unable for one reason or another to partici-

pate in employment . . . This model of welfare is

clearly not adequate today. Too many people are

not in employment, andwork for toomany no longer

guarantees income security. Because the conditions

that gave birth to the post-war welfare state no long-

er exist, the post-war assumptions about the welfarestate must also change (Commission on Social Jus-

tice, 1994, pp. 221–222, emphasis original).

As the above quotation indicates, welfare state

restructuring entails the displacement of passive regula-tion with active forms of regulation. Recent policy ini-

tiatives in advanced capitalist societies have been

preoccupied with advocating responsibility and self-suf-

ficiency for the unemployed. The ideology of work is now

being used to re-configure the rights to welfare benefit for

those that refuse to contribute to the labour market. This

is effectively resulting in the restructuring of universal

rights and needs-based entitlements to welfare, whichwere characteristic of the post-war commitment to full

employment and social rights for all citizens. The lan-

guage of �workfare’––welfare +work––is now dominant

in the political vocabulary as means of securing a new

relationship between the state and its subjects and, in the

process, supposedly promoting a new form of competi-

tiveness and efficiency in the labour market (Lødemel

and Trickey, 2001; Peck, 2001). Workfare is basedaround reductions in eligibility, forms of compulsion,

and increased monitoring of welfare recipients. Firmly

linked to supply side intervention, it seeks to make the

unemployed �employable’ and job-ready through various

job search training and education mechanisms. Work-

fare is, therefore, ideologically centred on the principles

of reciprocity and the reassertion of the work ethic over

state-fostered (passive) income support. In contrast withtraditional (welfarist) social policy, a �new paternalism’ is

said to exist, whereby a social contract is reinforced with

strict behavioural requirements and motivational engi-

neering to increase participations in paid formal

employment (Mead, 1997).

The new paternalism is clearly evident in Britain,

drawing heavily on the welfare state restructuring

practices of North America. Since the 1960s, US stategovernments have been allowed to experiment with

mandatory work and training programmes to reduce

the welfare caseload. After the 1988 Federal Family

Support Act, state governments were required to pro-

vide mandatory work or training activities for welfare

recipients as the condition of receiving benefits. This was

intensified under the 1996 Personal Responsibility and

418 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which block-

granted welfare payments to the state level without

universal entitlements and a safety net, and also estab-

lished strict time limits for the receipt of benefits (seePeck, 2001).

Drawing on this North American experience, the

arrival of the �new paternalism’ in the UK is more re-

cent. The universal nature of the welfare state remained

intact until the advent of the 1996 Jobseekers Allow-

ance, which required a formal contract between the

jobseeker and the state (Employment Service) as a

condition for the receipt of benefits. With the arrival ofthe New Labour administration in 1997, elements of

workfare––presented as �welfare-to-work’––have been

clearly evident in the various New Deal programmes

(see Peck, 1999). These require participation in a series

of �options’ in return for welfare benefits. Priority is

given to immediate placement in the labour market,

termed �work-first’, so as to embed the work ethic at the

earliest opportunity and, more importantly, to instil alifelong philosophy of employability.

There is considerable scope for considering the series

of attacks on the welfare state in North America and

Britain during the 1980s and 1990s as a form of ideo-

logical power achieved through norms situated within

place or society, and providing moral guidance for

individual and group action (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim,

2000). At one level, welfare-to-work is an ideologicalmovement aimed at restructuring the moral codes

through which individual and group action is under-

stood in relation to paid formal work as the route for

securing citizenship. The new paternalism can be

understood as ‘‘an effort to control the lifestyle of the

poor. For this reason, some might argue that it is a

throwback to a less enlightened past. But in important

respects it is novel’’ (Mead, 1997, p. 6, emphasis added).The new paternalism represents an ideological power

venture based around telling the poor how to behave. In

the US, the workfare discourse is achieving a similar

status to doctrines of religion. All political parties are

using it and, to paraphrase Stuart Hall (1988, p. 47), it is

entering into struggle and winning space ‘‘in civil society

itself’’. Moreover, to be considered a citizen requires

social inclusion in the labour market (Lister, 1998). Thissaid, there is no little evidence that workfare secures

permanent employment. Despite an increasingly decen-

tralised system of policy formulation and delivery,

supply-side reforms to work-welfare regimes are––at

best––only ever short-term and spatially selective strat-

egies (see Jones, 1997) for reducing unemployment and

benefit dependency in some places (Lødemel and Tric-

key, 2001; National Audit Office, 2002; Peck, 2001;Turok and Edge, 1999). Ideological thickness, a term

that can be used to capture the increasingly hegemonic

nature of this initiative, appears to be associated with

policy thinness.

The example of welfare reform is also indicative of the

role played by globalisation in creating the space for

transnational ideological networks that, at first, appear to

be sociospatially transcendent but are, in fact, immanentand rooted in already existing territorial power struc-

tures. Workfare began in the buoyant labour markets of

North America, especially those located in southern

states (such as California and Oklahoma), and then

spread across the US based on the appropriation of an

isolated number of so-called success stories (Peck, 2001).

This was, in turn, claimed to be a national success and its

ideological basis was transplanted to UK through ideo-logical �circuits of power’ (Clegg, 1989) involving state-

sponsored think-tanks and political advisors, who played

a crucial role in mediating policy-transfer (Peck and

Theodore, 2001). This process is heavily laden with

ideological power and represents moral codes that spe-

cific nations and their localities should follow under

globalisation, with calls for radical welfare state restruc-

turing and the promotion of structural competitiveness(see especially OECD, 1999). This is further evidence of

the ability of the nation state to retain, and even intensify,

the networks of ideological control––often in (ideologi-

cal) collaboration with other nation states.

3.3. Aesthetic and ritual practices: re-branding a British

civic nationalism

A further illustration of the nation state as a site in

the production of ideological power within the context

of globalisation appears in the context of the territorial

and group ideologies that it promotes. We think here,

especially, of the critical importance of nationalism asan ideology, and more specifically, as a common set of

aesthetic and ritual practices (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Bil-

lig, 1995), that are promoted by all states. Practices such

as military conscription (Mann, 1995), compulsory

education (Gellner, 1983), the erection of flags (Billig,

1995) and monuments (Johnson, 1995) in prominent

places, can all be viewed as part of the state’s effort to

�educate’ its citizens, through aesthetics and rituals,regarding their role as members of the wider political

and cultural community of the nation (see also Breuilly,

1993; Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1995). As a result of these

processes and institutions, states ‘‘now [loom] over the

lives of their subjects, taxing and conscripting them,

attempting to mobilise their enthusiasm for its goals’’

(Mann, 1995, pp. 47–48). The price paid for this support

has been the incorporation of the �people’ into thepolitical citizenship of the state, girded by the commu-

nity of the �nation’. In this way, such civic nationalisms

clearly illustrate the �softer’ mechanisms through which

the ideological power of the modern state is organised.

The development of the UK nation state during the

period post-1945 illustrates the ways in which ideologi-

cal power has been deployed to structure group identi-

M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 419

ties in the form of British civic nationalism. This was

achieved in and through the development of �national’institutions and organisations (Hutton, 1995, p. 43; also

Osmond, 1985). According to Davies (1999, p. 876),these comprised, amongst other things, ‘‘Seapower,

Empire, the Protestant Ascendancy, . . . the Mother of

Parliaments’’, the monarchy, the sporting tradition, . . .the British economy and British law’. It was institutions

such as these that helped to justify and sustain a wide-

spread sense of British civic nationalism throughout

much of the modern period. Many political commen-

tators, such as Hutton (1995, p. 2), now argue, however,that the ‘‘sense of belonging to a successful [British]

national project has all but disappeared’’ (see also

Davies, 1999; Marr, 1999; Nairn, 2000; Redwood,

1998). Significantly, the forces of globalisation have

been viewed as key reasons for the erosion of senses of

Britishness. Leading authors, for instance, note the sig-

nificant role played by multiculturalism, European legal

and monetary mechanisms and world cultures in callinginto question notions of Britishness (see Amin, 2002b;

Davies, 1999; Marr, 2000). Global forces mean that

‘‘many aspects of life in the United Kingdom [are] being

transformed out of all recognition’’ (Davies, 1999,

p. 878), thus leading to considerable national anomie for

the inhabitants of the UK.

We contend, in this respect, that it is perhaps pre-

mature to ascribe the �death of Britain’ (Marr, 2000)––atleast in its role of reproducing the ideologies of civic

nationalism––to the processes of globalisation. The UK

state still plays a crucial role in structuring the ideo-

logical symbols and rituals promoted within its territory,

albeit in fundamentally modified ways. Perhaps most

instructive here is the notion of �Cool Britannia’, used as

a way of responding to ‘‘multiplying crises of [national]

confidence’’ (Davies, 1999, p. 868). Promoted by theLabour Party in the first year of its mandate, and re-

flected in the new-found friendship between Tony Blair

and popular music through Oasis’ Gallagher Brothers,

this notion advocates the existence of a progressive,

forward-looking and youthful United Kingdom (Harris,

2003). 4 In effect, the whole purpose was, as many

political commentators in the late 1990s noted, to �re-brand Britain’. In the era of New Labour, Britain toowas to have a �new look’ where �designer cool [would

out] cricket and warm beer’ (The Observer, 1997). There

was a need, it was argued by Gordon Brown, the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, for ‘‘Britain to reinvent

itself and rediscover a new self-confidence’’ (quoted in

The Guardian, 1997).

4 It is also important to recognise the role of the media within

advanced capitalism––depicted by the relationship between New

Labour and the tabloid press at this time––communicating ideological

power within political and civil society (see Thompson, 2000).

By abandoning more staid and traditional visions of

Britishness, Cool Britannia represented a shift in the

form of the ritual symbols of British nationalism.

Importantly, this was carried out largely as a reaction tothe potentially pernicious impacts of the processes of

globalisation. Tony Blair’s famous speech on the nature

of Britishness helps to illustrate this point.

We are living through a period of unprecedented

change . . . In this new world, it has become

increasingly fashionable to predict the end of the

nation-state . . . [A] world where supra-nationalorganisations like the EU and the WTO play an

increasingly important role is a world where ques-

tions are inevitably going to arise about the contin-

uing significance of national identity. What is the

answer to such a challenge? Not to retreat into

the past or cling to the status quo . . . but to redis-

cover from first principles what it is that makes us

British and to develop that identity in a way in tunewith the modern world (Blair, 2000, pp. 1–2).

Similarly, Gordon Brown argued that (quoted in The

Guardian, 1997):

For all the changes wrought by globalisation, na-tional identity is still a vital force . . . only by under-

standing our Britishness and the very things that

bind our country together will we be able to meet

the challenges of the future.

Here, the whole effort to re-brand Britain during the

early years of the New Labour government is clearlylinked to the need for Britain to react to the challenges

of globalisation and the emergence of what Habermas

calls an emerging �post-national constellation’, within

which our national and cultural identities are being

radically remade (Habermas, 2001). A British national

identity was still deemed vital for the UK during this

period, but significantly, what becomes clear from the

above quotations and associated political commentary(especially Marr, 2000) and academic analysis (see

Coddington and Perryman, 1998) is that this was to be a

revitalised national identity, drawing on a new set of

traditions and different aesthetic symbols and rituals. At

the risk of caricaturing this shift in emphasis, it was a

case of out with the welfare state, Parliament and Brit-

ain’s military might (before 2003), and in with the rock

group Oasis and the fashion designer, Alexander Mac-Queen.

Key to this attempt to promote new symbols of

Britishness in recent years has, of course, been the ill-

fated Millennium Dome and its linked projects. Viewed

as a means of capturing the �best of Britain’ and �all thatwas good about ‘‘Cool Britannia’’’ (The Guard-

ian, 2000)––by concretising the representation of a

420 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424

forward-looking British identity within a single space––

the Dome has played a key role in the efforts of the

contemporary UK state to re-brand itself within the

context of globalisation and the changing nature of na-tional identities. Following on from other successful

national exhibitions such as the Great Exhibition of 1851

and the Festival of Britain of 1951––both crucial events

in cementing an imperialist British national identity

(Porter, 1994)––individuals such as Michael Heseltine, a

Commissioner charged with the responsibility of assess-

ing the need for a Millennium Festival under the previ-

ous Conservative government, argued that:

It is right in the conduct of the nation’s affairs every

so often for nations to make a great statement of

confidence, of great commitment to their own pride

in the past and their optimism for the future. There

could be no more obvious moment to do that than

on the anniversary of the Millennium itself (Dep-

CMS, 2000a, p. 2).

The idea of a celebration of British national identity,

with the Dome as its centrepiece, was seized upon by the

Labour government as a means of furthering its efforts

to re-brand Britain. One commentator, for instance,

argued that Tony Blair himself viewed the Dome as a

way of demonstrating a new ‘‘national pride [in a] young

country, big, bold, regenerative, entertaining, informa-tive and �on message’’’ (The Observer, 2000, p. 45). In-

deed, the official brochure of the Millennium Experience

held within the Dome, helps to reinforce this message.

The introduction, ascribed to Her Majesty the Queen,

states that:

The great national exhibition housed in the Dome

on the Meridian Line at Greenwich is a demon-stration of our confidence and commitment to the

future. Within the largest enclosed space on earth

are many examples of this country’s inventiveness

and imagination [and] provides a focus for the

nation’s celebrations at an important moment in

our history (DepCMS, 2000b, p. 5).

With its various displays, which seek to characterisethe hybrid, multicultural, and innovative nature of the

British state and people, along with its overall sense of

grandeur and aesthetic eclecticism, the Dome demon-

strates the strenuous efforts being made to sell a new and

vibrant UK state to the world. The comments made by

the Labour Minister with responsibility for the Dome

help to illustrate this issue:

Three years on from the Dome’s conception, it is

clear that the impact of the Dome is being felt far

beyond its immediate neighbourhood. It is already

a national asset for UK Plc and a major source of

wealth creation. The Dome presents an opportunity

for the UK to demonstrate that it continues to lead

the world in both traditional and cutting edge

fields––it showcases the work of our manufacturingindustries alongside the creative industries. It pro-

vides the opportunity for the tourism industry to

highlight both our rich cultural heritage and more

contemporary attractions (Falconer Lord, 2000,

pp. 4–5).

Despite the predictions of hyper-globalisers, there-

fore, the ability to define meanings and orthodoxies,symbols and rituals still lies very much within the pur-

view of individual states, such as the UK. Crucially,

however, these rituals and symbols have been funda-

mentally modified, at least in part as a result of the

processes of globalisation. The examples discussed

above demonstrate some of the ways in which the UK

state is attempting to redefine and adapt––through or-

ganisational projects such as the Dome––the more tra-ditional institutions, symbols and rituals of British

nationalism into forms of identity and ideological power

far more attuned to the needs of economic globalisation.

Rather than emphasising a civic nationalism based on

the importance of discovery, tradition and history, the

notion of �Cool Britannia’ symbolises an enthusiastic,

educated, successful and trendy UK, a state that should,

perhaps, be viewed as a location worthy of inwardinvestment within the global neoliberal market place. In

this regard, the fact that the idea of �Cool Britannia’ wasplaced on the political back burner during the early 21st

century––especially after the failure of the Millennium

Exhibition was perceived as a ‘‘politicised exemplar of

the country’s failings’’ (The Observer, 1996) and the

Millennium Dome became home to financial problems

and much critical publicity (House of Commons,2000)––are not the only issues to focus on. Though they

may not have succeeded in creating a long-lasting set of

new and revitalised rituals and aesthetic symbols of

Britishness fit for the new millennium––perhaps given

their dependence on informal, rather than prescriptive

means of ideological organisation––they still represent

significant, if perhaps still-born, efforts to rearticulate

the ideological basis of British nationalism. As such,they illustrate the changing role of the UK State in

helping to shape the form of civic nationalism within its

borders; often with unintended consequences.

4. Concluding comments

Space is not a scientific object removed from ideol-ogy or politics; it has always been political and stra-

tegic . . . Space is political and ideological. It is a

product literally filled with ideologies (Lefebvre,

1977, p. 341).

M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 421

Over the last decade or so the term globalisation has

generated considerable debate within the social and

political sciences. According to Kelly (1999, p. 379) the

discourses of globalisation have become the ‘‘newmantra for our times’’. This sentiment is echoed by

Walters, who suggests ‘‘just as postmodernism was the

concept of the 1980s, globalization may be . . . a key idea

by which we understand the transition of human society

into the third millennium’’ (1995, p. 1). After a period of

considerable and sustained hegemony, many commen-

tators have argued that contemporary processes of

globalisation are acting as a challenge to nation statesovereignty. Our paper has argued for the need to focus

on the ways in which the nation state continues to act,

albeit in a modified manner, within the era of globali-

sation. It has outlined some under developed themes in

studies of the nation state under globalisation and in

doing so has highlighted the important contributions

that geographers can make to globalisation studies––so

we do not miss that boat, which Dicken (2004) hasimportantly drawn our attention to.

We have argued that much may be gained by exam-

ining on the multifaceted nature of state power, as

outlined by Mann (1986, 1993a). Specifically, we have

focused on a neglected dimension of state power––

namely, its ideological form––as a means of exploring

how the nation state is being differentially re-engineered

under globalisation. We suggested that the notion ofideological power might be seen as a useful tool for

demonstrating the continued––though modified role––

of the UK nation state within contemporary political

economy. Using Mann’s classification of forms of

ideological organisation, we deployed three short vign-

ettes in order to demonstrate the evolving nature of

ideological power within the contemporary UK state.

This task has been undertaken by drawing on Mann’sdistinction between transcendent and immanent ideo-

logical organisation. In the contexts of defining scales of

meaning and norms of action, as well as in the pro-

duction of nationalisms through reference to ritual

symbols and practices, we sought to demonstrate the

crucial significance of ideological power to the contem-

porary UK state.

In doing this, however, we believe it is not enoughmerely to argue that ideological power is still being

exercised by the UK state. More crucial, in this regard,

are the manifold mechanisms in and which the ideo-

logical power is being altered and revised through forms

of mediation and communication. We have explored the

ways in which the capitalist state continues to act by

encouraging particular forms of social action and/or

identity. By using the three vignettes, it is interesting tonote the state’s ability to embed itself within the activi-

ties and networks of civil society. This is clearly evident

in the example of welfare-to-work, with it ability to

prescript a �new paternalism’ through partnership-based

local state action, and role of the �new regionalism’ in

transmitting ideologies of supply-side competitiveness

through associational governance. By contrast, Cool

Britannia, which attempted to provide a non-prescrip-tive and almost atmospheric focus for social identity,

struggled to secure legitimation for its informal ideo-

logical actions and we can perhaps attribute some of

demise to this weakness. Hobson’s (1998, p. 292) com-

ments on state power being ‘‘maximized or enhanced

when the state co-operates with, and embeds itself

within, society’’ are important here, as are Mann’s

(1986) thoughts on the �organic state’ and Evans’ (1995)writing on �embedded autonomy’ of the state––in the

latter two cases, the maintenance of consent through

civil society is important for sustaining forms of state

power.

In offering some brief insights into how the ideolog-

ical power of the UK state is being �transformed’ in the

contemporary period, there is considerable scope to

extend empirical research on such themes and toundertake comparative national-level studies. Firstly, in

relation to empirical concerns, an area that we have not

touched on, but is seriously in need of in-depth research

under globalisation, is the role of nation state restruc-

turing through the digital realm (see Kobrin, 1998;

Lessig, 1999). Secondly, with their various path depen-

dencies––in terms of the ideological bases of their poli-

cies, institutions and group ideologies––other nationalcontexts offer the possibility for potentially fruitful

comparative studies of the changing ideological power

of the state under globalisation. It is only by developing

our understanding of the impacts of globalisation on the

different aspects of state power––and only by analysing

this in a variety of states––that we will be able to

establish the interrelations between different forms of

contemporary state power. In other words, a compre-hensive understanding of the relationship between state

power and the dynamics of globalisation will only be

achieved when we grasp the interrelated and possibly

mutually dependent nature of the constituent aspects of

state power, along with the differential impacts of

globalisation on them in various states. In undertaking

this research, we agree that an important future task is

‘‘to establish degrees of relative causality: to what extentis the nation state being transformed, to what extent is it

declining––or even perhaps still growing’’ (Mann, 1997,

p. 474)?

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Andy Leyshon and the

anonymous referees for comments on an earlier version

of this paper. Martin Jones would also like to thank the

University of Wales Aberystwyth for funding two

small grants (between 1998 and 2004)––�The New

422 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424

Regionalism: Building the Regional Development

Agencies’ and �English Regional Questions: Devolution,

Territory, Civil Society, Identity’––which has informed

arguments developed here.

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