nation, separation and threat: an analysis of british media discourses on the european union treaty...

Nation, Separation and Threat: An Analysis of British MediaDiscourses on the European Union Treaty Reform Process*jcms_2248 561..577

BENJAMIN HAWKINSLondon School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine

AbstractThis article examines the framing of the European Union in British media debates surrounding thenegotiation of the Lisbon Treaty. As such, it analyzes the discursive context in which both citizens’attitudes and government policies towards the EU are formed. It identifies a predominant, Euro-sceptic discourse that dictates the terrain on which wider debates about the EU are conducted. Thisdiscourse views the EU through the lens of the nation-state and frames the relationship between theUnited Kingdom and the EU in terms of separation and threat. The United Kingdom is excludedfrom the EU mainstream, which works to undermine its interests.

Introduction

The United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union is one of the most contentiousand longest-standing issues in British politics. Furthermore, the British EU debate is ofvital importance to the future development of the European integration project. As one ofthe largest and politically most powerful Member States, the United Kingdom exercisesconsiderable influence over the pace and direction of European integration. With theexception of the referendum vote in favour of Britain’s renegotiated terms of membershipof the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1975, British citizens have expressedconsistently low levels of support for the process of European integration (Eurobarometer,2007). Some 30 years after the United Kingdom’s accession to the EU, British citizensremained less likely than those of any other EU Member State to define their identity aseven partly European (Eurobarometer, 2003).

Existing scholarship indicates that these facts are not unrelated; exclusively nationalidentities are strongly correlated with low levels of support for the EU (Hooghe andMarks, 2005, 2009). Recent studies argue that anti-EU sentiments are the manifestation ofa general hostility towards those perceived as outsiders (Azrout et al., 2010) and definingone’s identity in purely national terms positions other Europeans as an out-group. Inkeeping with this, anti-immigrant attitudes are also a powerful predictor of opposition tothe EU (McLaren, 2002; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; De Vreese et al., 2008).These attitudes are found to solidify where there is a perceived threat to the nationalin-group from such outsiders (McLaren, 2002, 2007; Boomgaarden et al., 2011).

The antipathy expressed towards the EU by the British people is reflected in thereticence of successive British governments towards the deepening of European

* I would like to thank Dr Richard Freeman and Dr Lynn Dobson from the University of Edinburgh for their help andsupport conducting this research and for reading and commenting on previous drafts of the article. The newspaper articlescited in this article were accessed using LexisNexis in October 2007 and are available at: «http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/srcsel/sourceDirectory.do?rand=1249131163092&origin=SRCDIR>».

JCMS 2012 Volume 50. Number 4. pp. 561–577 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02248.x

bs_bs_banner

© 2012 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 MainStreet, Malden, MA 02148, USA

integration (Aspinwall, 2004; Geddes, 2004; Diez, 1999; George, 1998). However,perhaps the clearest articulation of anti-EU sentiment is to be found within the Britishprint media, and the right-wing press (RWP) in particular. This is of crucial importance asthe media is citizens’ principal source of information on EU affairs (Gavin, 2000).Furthermore, there is evidence that media framing influences public attitudes towards theEU. Framing the EU in terms of potential benefits is correlated with higher levels ofsupport for the EU (Vliegenthardt et al., 2008), whilst presenting EU politics in terms ofconflict is associated with greater cynicism and opposition to the EU (De Vreese, 2007;Vliegenthardt et al., 2008). Schuck and De Vreese (2006) find that framing EU policies interms of risk rather than opportunity leads to lower levels of support, with those lackingknowledge of the EU most affected (see also De Vreese and Kandyla, 2009). This isnoteworthy when examining the United Kingdom, given the low levels of knowledge of,and interest in, the EU evident amongst citizens (Geddes, 2004). In the British context,Carey and Burton (2004) also find newspaper coverage influences attitudes towards theEU where information provided mirrors that from political parties.

Given the apparent influence of the media on attitudes towards the EU, the structure ofBritish debates surrounding the EU is of crucial importance in understanding the endur-ingly low levels of support for European integration in the United Kingdom. This articleexamines the representation of the EU in the British print media and the parallels whichexist with the identity structures articulated by British citizens. Through a detailed quali-tative analysis of five national newspapers, it argues that the feeling of separation from theEU expressed by British citizens mirrors the representation of Britain’s relationship withthe EU in leading newspapers. The significance of this study is that it focuses on thediscursive context in which political attitudes are formed and government policy is made.

The article aims to build on and supplement the current literature. It employs theconcept of framing to examine the lenses through which the EU debate is refracted inpublic discourses, and how Britain’s interests are constructed in the context of the EU. Itidentifies a predominant Eurosceptic discourse and examines the counter-discourses thatattempt to challenge it.1 The Eurosceptic discourse is most clearly evident in the RWP, inwhich pro-European voices are almost completely absent. However, its influence extendsbeyond this. It shapes the terrain on which broader debates about the EU are conductedand the terms in which they are couched within titles such as The Guardian and TheObserver, which are broadly favourable to the EU.

I. Media Coverage of the EU

A growing body of literature focuses on the representation of the EU in the press and ontelevision across Member States (Peter and De Vreese, 2004; Gleissner and De Vreese,2005; De Vreese et al., 2006, 2011; Kandyla and De Vreese, 2011). The comparative andbroadly quantitative methodology of these studies means they focus on the visibility of theEU in the media, the frequency with which specific themes occur and the levels of supportin different Member States. In addition, evidence is sought for the ‘Europeanization’ ofmedia discourses (see Mayer, 2005). Whilst offering valuable insights into structure of

1 The term ‘Euroscepticism’ is employed here to imply a general opposition to the process of European integration and theparticipation of one’s own country in that process.

562 Benjamin Hawkins

© 2012 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

media discourses on the EU, these studies do not provide detailed, qualitative analysesof the themes which emerge in media discourses in specific Member States.

Additional studies focus specifically on the British case. Firmstone (2004) anal-yzes editorials in three English and one Scottish newspaper to examine their role asagenda-setters in EU debates. Firmstone and Statham (2007) examine claims made byvarious actors in The Times and The Guardian during the ratification of the EU Consti-tutional Treaty and from 1990 to 2006. Statham and Gray (2005) employ a similarmethodology to contrast claims made in The Times and The Guardian with those made intwo French dailies, finding that British EU debates remain internalized within the nation-state. The principal focus of these studies, however, is again on the ‘Europeanization’ ofmedia debates, presenting mainly quantitative data on the type and frequency of claimsmade about the EU by different sets of actors. Whilst providing insights into the structureof British EU debates, they draw on a limited range of titles and article types.

A third set of studies undertake qualitative analysis of the press coverage, examining awide range of sources and article types. Anderson and Weymouth (1999) analyze cover-age of the EU in nine national newspapers during the British general election in 1997 andits Presidency of the EU in 1998, highlighting a number of key themes in the EU debate.Ichijo (2002), meanwhile, examines the coverage of the launch of the euro and the Treatyof Nice in both newspapers and television news. However, these studies do not focus onthe most recent developments in the EU.

Diez-Medrano (2003) attempts to link media discourses to both elite and grass-rootsattitudes towards the EU within the context of a broader study of the framing of EUdebates in the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany. His attempt to link media framingsto issues of public opinion and government policy is a precursor to the current article.However, his focus on the Economist and the New Statesman – two highly specialized,high-end magazines which cater to a limited section of the population – means he canoffer only limited insights into British media debate.

Despite an expanding literature, our understanding of media discourses on the EUremains incomplete. Current scholarship needs supplementing with an updated qualitativeanalysis of the structure of British media discourses, focusing on a full range of titles andarticle types. The research presented here builds on the existing literature by focusing onthe most recent institutional developments in the EU: the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon.Unlike existing studies on Britain, it draws on a representative cross-section of newspa-pers in terms of both genre and political alignment. As such, it captures the detail andnuance of the Eurosceptic and pro-European discourses. Finally, the type of qualitativeanalysis employed here facilitates not just a nuanced examination of EU discourses, but ananalysis of the underlying assumptions on which they depend. This in turn allows us toexamine the parallels that exist with citizens’ attitudes and the identity structures whichunderlie them.

II. Methodology

The findings presented below are drawn from a qualitative discourse analysis of Britishnewspaper coverage of the negotiations surrounding the Treaty Establishing a Constitu-tion for Europe (TCE) and the Treaty of Lisbon (TOL). It examines the framing of therelationship between Britain and the EU. ‘Frames’ are defined here as particular ways of

Nation, separation and threat 563


depicting processes, institutions and events which highlight certain aspects of these at theexpense of others, presenting issues in varying degrees of positivity and negativity(Schuck and De Vreese, 2006).

Whilst other forms of media (for example, television news coverage) would haveprovided an interesting case study, there are several reasons for focusing on newspapershere. Newspapers offer a clear expression of a range of positions on the EU. Opinionpieces and longer articles, in particular, allow for the treatment of issues in sufficient detailto examine the key themes and underlying assumptions which characterize the discourse.The process of conducting discourse analysis requires that all materials collected beconverted to the form of text (Taylor, 2001; Phillips and Jorgenson, 2002). Newspapersthus present a body of data which is readily amenable to this kind of examination.

Furthermore, the print media continue to be of enormous significance both politicallyand within broader societal debates. Evidence of the sensitivity of politicians to how theirpolicies are received by leading national newspapers is seen in the entry into the politicallexicon of terms such as the ‘Daily Mail factor’ and the access to government afforded topowerful media organizations by politicians keen to receive favourable coverage for theirpolicies. Nowhere is this sensitivity greater than on the issue of the EU. It was widelyrumoured that the decision by Tony Blair to hold a referendum on the TCE resulted fromfears of the adverse reaction to his policy by The Sun and The Times (Watt, 2004).

The focus of the study is limited to the English editions of national newspapers and doesnot attempt to investigate the representation of the EU in other parts of the United Kingdom.Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish newspapers and regional newspapers were excluded fromthe study. In order to control the volume of articles generated, whilst maintaining thebreadth of focus in terms of genre and political alignment, only the highest selling title ineach section of the market was selected for analysis. The structure of the British press is setout in Table 1, along with their daily circulation figures for each title.

Since there was no suitable mid-range, left-of-centre publication available for analysis,five daily newspapers were included in the study: the Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, theDaily Mail, The Sun and the Daily Mirror, along with their Sunday equivalents.2 Whilst thismay bias the selection of articles towards the right, it reflects the skewed nature of the Britishpress in terms of both the number of titles published and their circulation. The range of titlesincluded, therefore, reflects the political biases to which the British public are exposed.

2 From here on, I shall not distinguish between daily and Sunday newspapers. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, referencesto daily titles refer also to their Sunday equivalents.

Table 1: The Structure of the British Press (Daily Circulation in Parentheses)

Left Right

Quality Guardian (364,513) Daily Telegraph (882,413)Independent (240,134) Times (642,895)

Mid Daily Mail (2,353,807)Daily Express (789,867)

Tabloid Daily Mirror (1,525,477) Sun (3,126,866) [Daily Star (771,197)

Source: The Guardian (2009).



Articles were collected from the LexisNexis database for a period of one month around keyevents in the treaty negotiation process using the following keyword search: EuropeanConstitution or EU Constitution or EU Treaty or Reform Treaty.

The articles returned by the keyword search were reviewed for relevance and thosearticles which did not explicitly focus on the EU treaty reform process were discarded. Inorder to capture the full range of discourses surrounding the EU, it was decided to includea wide range of articles, including news reports, opinion pieces (including those by guestcolumnists) and editorials, but letters to the editor were excluded. This process yielded atotal of 1,346 articles, which were then coded thematically (see Table 2). It will be notedthat there was a significant difference in the volume of articles published on the EU in theMirror in comparison with other titles. Only 87 articles were collected compared to 295from its most direct competitor, The Sun.

The articles were first read in their entirety and the key themes which emerged fromthem were recorded. These provided the codes used to analyze the content of thearticles systematically. Whilst this form of analysis allows us to say much about therepresentation of the EU within the Eurosceptic discourse, it faces the problem asso-ciated with any form of discourse or content analysis in that what is not said is oftenas important as what is. The inclusion of a full range of titles, representative of thestylistic and political inclination of the British press sector, was designed to counter thisissue to some extent.

III. The Eurosceptic Discourse

There are two principal frames evident within Eurosceptic discourse: the EU as a foreignpower and the EU as a bargaining forum. The first of these depicts the EU not as aninternational organization of which the United Kingdom is a member, but as a state-likeentity from which the United Kingdom is excluded and with which it engages in a bilateralrelationship. Within this frame, the EU is seen as a hostile, quasi-imperial power whichposes an existential threat to the United Kingdom.

The second dimension of the Eurosceptic discourse depicts the EU as a bargainingforum in which the United Kingdom’s interests are set against those of other MemberStates, particularly France, Germany and a shifting coalition of allies. Furthermore, thepolicies and institutions of the EU are seen to work against the United Kingdom’sinterests. France and Germany, as the ‘core’ EU Member States, are seen both to governthe pace and direction of European integration and to reap the rewards from it. The United

Table 2: The Number of Articles Collected by Publication

Newspaper Number of articlesexamined

Sun/News of the World 295Daily/Sunday Mail 288Daily/Sunday Telegraph 393Daily/Sunday Mirror 87Guardian/Observer 283Total 1,346

Source: Author’s data.



Kingdom, by contrast, is consigned to the periphery of the EU with limited influence overdecision-making and enjoying few benefits from being a Member State. The apparentmarginalization of the United Kingdom from the European mainstream again reinforcesthe idea that the EU, by its very existence, poses a threat to the British national interestwhich must be guarded against.

Underlying both these framings of the EU are the themes of separation and subjugationby powerful outside forces. Consequently, the role of the British government is to defendthe national interest by avoiding or delaying any further integration. The description ofBritain’s experience within the EU in these terms depends on the privileging of the nationas a political community and the nation-state as a form of government. In both strands ofthe Eurosceptic discourse, the EU is represented in terms of the nation-state: either as aforum for inter-state bargaining or an emerging superstate itself. These assumptions aboutthe nation form a nationalist meta-narrative underlying the Eurosceptic discourse. Therewas a remarkable degree of consistency in the themes and assumptions evident in thetabloids and broadsheets analyzed, and thus I do not focus on the distinction betweengenres in the analysis presented.

The EU as a Foreign Power

The separation between the United Kingdom and the EU is evident at the most basiclinguistic level. The terms ‘Brussels’ and ‘Europe’ are employed to refer to a rump EUfrom which the United Kingdom is excluded. Reference is made to ‘Britain’s relationshipwith Europe’ (Daily Telegraph, 2004, emphasis added) and to transfers of powers ‘to theEuropean Union’ (Sunday Telegraph, 2006, emphasis added). The effect of this is not onlythat ‘Europe’ is treated as a distant place, somehow separate and apart from the UnitedKingdom. The repeated references to the actions of ‘Europe’ and ‘Brussels’ present theEU as a unitary, internally homogeneous actor – akin to a foreign state – rather than acomplex system of supranational and state-level actors.

This separation is further underlined by the description of the EU as a ‘foreign power’attempting to assume control over various aspects of British life. Melanie Phillips (2003),for example, argues that: ‘A justice system imposed by a foreign power is so oppressive,unjust and undemocratic as to be unconscionable’. The EU is seen, therefore, not simplyas a foreign entity, but a hostile, quasi-imperial power which seeks political control overthe United Kingdom. The integration process is depicted as a piecemeal yet co-ordinatedattempt to assume authority one policy at a time. A headline in the Daily Telegraph claims,for example, that the ‘EU wants control over justice’ (Helm, 2007). Elsewhere, it is energypolicy (Evans-Pritchard, 2007), foreign and security policy (Oliver, 2007) and tax policy(Cecil, 2003) over which the EU is looking to assume control.

The TCE and the TOL are depicted as the latest stage in the process of imperial conquest,driven forward by the integrationist drive of the European Commission, the expansionistinterpretation of the treaties by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the imperial urgesof the Chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe, ‘Emperor Giscard d’Estaing’(Heffer, 2003a). The end goal of European integration process, it is argued, is the formationof a European superstate which will subsume the United Kingdom.

Couched in these terms, the very process of European integration poses an existen-tial threat. Consequently, the role of the British government is to delay or prevent any



common action at the supranational level. Great emphasis is placed on the ability of theUnited Kingdom to opt out of, or veto, policies. The language employed around theveto is indicative of the defensive mindset which permeates the Eurosceptic discourse.The ‘loss’ or ‘surrender’ of the veto is equated with a loss of United Kingdom power(see Kirkup and Waterfield, 2007; Evans-Pritchard and Jones, 2004). There is no con-sideration of the possibility that Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) may allow theUnited Kingdom to pass measures that are in its interest, which may be blocked byother Member States. The United Kingdom’s interests are synonymous with its abilityto stymie further integration.

Attempts by British politicians to seek common action in a particular area, or even toengage constructively with debates in the EU, are treated as a sell-out or an abdication ofresponsibility. Commentators openly mock the idea that compromise and concession arethe way for Britain to further its interests within the EU (see Green, 2004). Instead,ministers must attempt to minimize the damage caused to Britain by maintaining thestatus quo.

The EU as Inter-state Conflict

Politics within the EU qua bargaining forum is seen as a zero-sum game played outbetween competing Member States with clear winners and losers emerging from each newregulation or treaty revision. Where one state benefits from a certain measure, this comesat the expense of another. Any idea that the EU involves attaining common goals orcreating a new form of political community is simply not considered. Instead, the EU isa means of maximizing state interests.

Crucially, however, the EU is not seen as a neutral arena, but one in which the rules ofthe game, and the institutions which apply them, are skewed in favour of certain MemberStates and at the expense of others. France and Germany are seen as the driving forcesbehind the European integration project; ‘core’ EU states which have shaped its institu-tions in order to serve their interests. Britain, meanwhile, is consigned to the periphery,benefiting little from its membership of the Union.

The depiction of EU politics in zero-sum terms is reflected in the language and imageryemployed to depict the treaty amendment process. Both sport and war are used asmetaphors for EU politics, underlining the conflictual nature of EU politics. PatrickHennessy (2005), for example, uses the Napoleonic Wars as an extended metaphor for themood at a European Council summit:

In contrast to the historic encounter between Wellington and Napoleon, there was nodirect engagement. But the war of words between the two nations was as ferocious as anyveteran observer of European Union summits could remember.

Although the exchanges are particularly brutal on this occasion, conflict is presented asthe norm for all such summits. A direct parallel is constructed between the wars of the pastand the politics of the EU today. Whilst in the 19th century conflicts were played out onthe battlefield, today they occur behind closed doors in the Justus Lipsius Building inBrussels. The only constant is that the United Kingdom is faced with a hostile coalition ofEuropean states, under French leadership, which it must confront in order to defend itsinterests.



The Costs and Benefits of EU Membership

Whilst France benefits from EU programmes such as the common agricultural policy(CAP), the United Kingdom is seen to foot the bill for its wasteful and inefficient policies.The Mail on Sunday (2005) goes so far as to claim that the very reason the UnitedKingdom was eventually allowed to accede to the then European Economic Communitywas so that it would pay exorbitant contributions to the EU budget in order to subsidizemainly French farmers.

The benefits derived by France from the EU and the costs imposed on the UnitedKingdom are seen to reflect their influence within the EU. At the root of the claim is thebelief that the EU is itself a French invention, geared to serve their national interest. Thissentiment is captured by Peter Hitchens (2005):

The nation whose icy-brained bureaucrats devised the original European system was inthe best position to make sure that it did well out of the rules. Charles de Gaulle keptBritain out of the Common Market in the Sixties mainly because he wanted to rig farmingsubsidies in France’s favour for all time, and feared that British membership would get inthe way of his plan. By the time we joined the deal was done, and it has stayed that wayfor more than 30 years.

If the EU is a means for furthering French economic interests, for Germany it is amechanism for projecting power and influence across the continent. The EU is seen as thelatest manifestation of an inherent German desire to control Europe. The debates aboutGermany’s position within the EU and the treaty reform process are frequently linkeddirectly to its Nazi past. Referring to British reticence about agreeing to the TCE, TomUtley (2005) claims that:

One of the most powerful factors stopping us is our knowledge of how the Germansbehaved between Hitler’s election in 1933 and his suicide in 1945. We know that the lastman who tried to impose supra-national authority on Europe was Adolf.

This rhetoric is highly emotive, yet it is not an isolated example (see Phillips, 2003;Heffer, 2003b). Furthermore, it can be argued it is merely a cruder statement of theunderlying fear that further integration will simply hand more power over British affairsto the Germans. The EU is thus seen to pose the same danger to British freedom anddemocracy as Nazi Germany, and that the negotiations over the TCE are of the samesignificance for British independence as World War II.

The Franco–German Alliance: The ‘Core’ of the EU

Whilst the economic objectives of France and political ambitions of Germany are seen asmutually compatible, their common interests are apparently at odds with those of theUnited Kingdom. This is reflected in the references which are made to ‘core’ Europe and‘old’ Europe. Whilst ‘core’ Member States occupy a privileged position within the EU, theUnited Kingdom, along with newer Member States, is confined to the margins, unable towield the political influence of France, Germany and their allies.

The failed attempt by Tony Blair to nominate Chris Patten as President of the EuropeanCommission in June 2005 was seen as further evidence of the United Kingdom’s mar-ginalization. As Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2004) reports:



Germany joined France yesterday to insist that Britain and other ‘non-core’ countriesshould be barred from proposing candidates for president of the European Commission.Berlin’s spokesman, Bela Anda, raised hackles in half of the EU’s capitals by suggestingthat the post in charge of Europe’s policy-making engine be reserved for members of the‘Old Europe’ club. [. . .] As the East European states join the euro it would leave Britainisolated on the margins.

This passage not only maps the division between Britain, on the one hand, and theFranco–German alliance, on the other, onto that between ‘core’ and a ‘non-core’ (and‘old’ and ‘new’) Europe, it links this distinction to the political marginalization of thenon-core states within the EU. It implies that France and Germany will be able to usethe euro as a means of expanding their power base in the EU and leaving the UnitedKingdom in ever greater isolation. Britain thus faces even greater separation from theEU mainstream.

In this context, the role of the British government is to defend the national interest. Thisis again synonymous with resisting any further integration regardless of the issues at stake.Agreeing to common action at the EU level is to sacrifice the United Kingdom’s interestsfor the benefit of those Member States the EU serves. Framing the EU debate in terms ofcompeting national interests cues people to think of the EU not in terms of issues andpolicies, but in terms of nationality. The message this sends to readers is that their interestsare synonymous with the national interest, that this is threatened by collective action at theEU level and that it can only be protected by the British government. The divergentinterests of specific groups within the United Kingdom are ignored and the existence of acommon national interest is emphasized. According to this account, politics at the EUlevel has little to do with ideology or individual interests, but is a contest between Britainand the hostile coalition of Member States which threaten it.

Nationalist Meta-narrative

In both strands of Eurosceptic discourse the EU is viewed through the lens of thenation-state. It is seen as either a ‘foreign’ state or a collection of Member Statescompeting for influence. Underlying these framings is a set of assumptions about thenation as a political community and the nation-state as a form of governance. The nationis seen as an organic form of political community and thus the nation-state is the optimalform of political organization, buttressed by the shared identity which binds co-nationalstogether. As The Daily Mail (2003) argues, national institutions evolve naturally to meetthe specific needs and disposition of the nations they serve:

We [Britons] have a democratic Parliament which, for all its faults, represents the deepestinstincts of the British people. We have a system of law which has grown up over 1,000years to reflect the character and temper of the nation.

By contrast, the EU is something artificial and invented, which is distant and disconnectedfrom the peoples of Europe. It is a political structure imposed from above, lacking both thepopular support and loyalty of citizens which functioning institutions require. This pointis made by Mark Steyn (2004), quoting former American president Ronald Reagan, whoassured his countrymen that ‘we are a nation that has a government – not the other wayaround’. Steyn argues that the EU, by contrast, is a government without a nation, like theSoviet Union and Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.



Similarly, Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan (2004) argues that because the EU is anartificial construct, it is inherently undemocratic:

European democracy fails because there is no demos – no community with which weidentify when we use the word ‘we’ – only the kratos of a system that must compelobedience through force of law, not loyalty.

According to Hannan, the EU is not only undemocratic, but ‘anti-democratic’. It can neverbe democratic as it lacks the essential characteristics required for democratic government.The process of European integration is simply the latest in a long line of unsuccessfulattempts by supranational powers – including the Habsburgs, the Ottomans, the Yugoslavsand the Soviets – to usurp the nation-state. All these, he argues, ended in failure for ‘assoon as their peoples were given the vote, they opted for self-determination’.

The claim that the EU is artificial and inorganic is reflected in the association of theEuropean integration process with idealism and dogma. The goal of European integrationis presented as a utopian ideal of the political elite which fails to take account of politicalreality or the wishes of citizens. Europhiles are described variously as ‘EU dreamers’(Kavanagh, 2005), or as ‘true believers’ (Rennie, 2005) who follow ‘the dream of evercloser union’ (Daily Mail, 2005).

The idea that one can be a ‘true believer’ in the European integration project invests itwith quasi-religious qualities. The EU, like the scriptures, is accepted as an article of faithand inspires unquestioning devotion from its adherents. The EU and its supporters are thusdescribed using language very different from that employed to describe the nation-state.Nowhere are those who oppose the expansion of powers towards the EU described asidealistically nationalistic. The difference in the terminology employed reflects theassumption that, whilst nations are organic political communities, the EU goes against thenatural political order.

IV. Counter-discourses in the Left-Wing Press

In The Guardian, The Observer and The Mirror there is evidence of a counter-discoursethat challenges the Eurosceptic narrative and the assumptions on which it is based. TheEU is given credit for the unprecedented period of peace, stability and democracy expe-rienced in Europe over the last half-century. The TCE and the TOL are seen as imple-menting necessary reforms which will allow an expanded Union of 27 Member States tofunction more effectively. However, despite the positive coverage of the EU, certainthemes from the Eurosceptic discourse are also present. Furthermore, whilst pro-European voices are almost completely excluded from the RWP, space is afforded in thesepro-European titles to overtly Eurosceptic voices. Thus, whilst the left-wing press (LWP)offers a more balanced and less uniform account of the European integration process, itdemonstrates the wider influence of the Eurosceptic discourse.

The EU as a Source of Peace, Prosperity and Democracy

A central theme in the LWP is the role played by the EU in guaranteeing peace andstability in Europe for over 50 years. As William Keegan (2004) comments, the EU ‘hasachieved the aims of its founders in binding Europe so closely together that another war



is unthinkable’. In addition, there are attempts to highlight the economic and politicalachievements of the EU. Polly Toynbee (2004) writes of ‘the union that has broughtunprecedented wealth and trade, while dragging a host of priest-ridden, poverty-strickenbackward nations into democratic modernity’. The lament for these commentators is thatthe EU has been so successful in these objectives that many younger Europeans areunaware of what a remarkable transformation there has been in the continent’s fortunes asa consequence of European integration.

The Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon

The treaty revision process is viewed in the LWP as the next stage in the developmentand consolidation of the EU. It is argued that the purpose of the treaty is the clarifi-cation of the EU’s powers, the demarcation of competences between the national andthe supranational levels of governance, and the simplification of decision-making pro-cedures to meet the needs of an expanded EU of 27 Member States. However, whilstsome commentators in The Guardian advocate the changes brought about by the TCE,others are keen to downplay the significance of the reforms it contains, arguing that itsimply codifies existing policies and procedures. William Keegan (2004), for example,comments that the TCE ‘in most key areas confirms the status quo’. Other commenta-tors argue that the agreement is an attempt to ward off the creation of a trans-Europeanstate. Robin Cook (2004), for example, claims that the treaty ‘delivers a hard knock tofederalism and tilts the balance of power towards the member-states’. Thus, whilst therepresentation of the TCE and the EU is significantly more positive in the LWP than inthe RWP, the arguments made in their favour are often defensive in nature. Similarly,the limited coverage of the EU in The Mirror is indicative of the reticence of manycommentators to make pro-European arguments. Their support for the EU may be outof line with the views of the majority of the public, but rather than argue their case, thetopic is simply avoided.

The EU as Inter-state Conflict

Despite the positive coverage the EU receives, the terminology and imagery of interna-tional conflict are also evident in the LWP. Gaby Hinsliff (2004), for example, refers to‘the battles ahead’ between Member States, a ‘clash of wills’ between Britain and France,and the potential ‘surrender’ of the British veto in certain areas. However, the use of thisterminology in the LWP is not as uniform as in the RWP. In some quarters there is anattempt to challenge the notion that the process of EU politics involves simply thestubborn defence of the national interest. As David Clark (2007) argues:

Successful European diplomacy involves patient alliance building and complex dealsacross policy areas in which support in one is secured by being flexible in others.Sometimes this means accepting decisions that in isolation fail a strict national interesttest, but that contribute to a greater gain.

As in the RWP, the main rivalry within the EU is seen to be that which exists between theUnited Kingdom and France. Duval-Smith et al. (2005) employ the same military meta-phors as in the RWP to describe the conduct of EU-level politics:



Britain and France used to resolve their differences on the battlefield, as Napoleonic fanswill remind Europe this weekend when they stage their 190th-anniversary re-enactmentof Waterloo. Today, their leaders trade blows in a soulless modern building a few miles tothe north, where the opposing Anglo–French visions of Europe guaranteed a bruising, ifslightly less bloody, confrontation.

The idea also persists that France, not the United Kingdom, is at the heart of the EU.France, we are told, is ‘the country which has been the driving force behind Europeanintegration since 1957’ (The Guardian, 2005). As in the RWP, France is able to rely on thesupport of Germany to pursue its interests, with the two forming a powerful alliance at theheart of the EU. The apparent predominance of France and Germany is reflected by DavidClark’s (2005) contention that Tony Blair’s European policy had been driven by the ‘twinobjectives of reconciling the British people to Europe and making Britain the equal ofFrance and Germany’. What is absent from the LWP, however, is the idea – expressed inextremely crude terms in the RWP – that the EU is a mechanism for projecting Germanhegemony over Europe.

Reference is made to the emergence of a ‘core Europe’ (see, for example, Kettle,2005). However, the significance afforded to the existence of a set of ‘core’ EU statesvaries slightly from that in the RWP. In the LWP, it is argued that the United Kingdom isable to wield influence within the EU through its active engagement in the Europeanintegration process. Only its failure to do so will result in the development of a core groupof Member States, frustrated at the EU’s stagnation. Furthermore, the contention that theUnited Kingdom is consigned to the periphery is challenged. The idea of a Franco–German axis as the motor driving the European integration process forward is replaced attimes by the idea of an EU ‘big three’ including the United Kingdom (see, for example,White, 2004) and the argument is made that the EU is moving in the direction advocatedby the United Kingdom.

Eurosceptic Voices

Within the LWP, space is given to commentators who voice Eurosceptic opinions, similarin tone and content to those found in the RWP. By contrast, only one article from the RWP– a guest piece by then President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering – couldbe described as overtly favourable to the EU. The references by Simon Jenkins (2007) to‘euro-fundamentalists’, the ‘Brussels steamroller’ and moves towards an EU ‘super-state’bear a striking resemblance to Eurosceptic discourse. Similarly, he categorizes attempts torevive the TCE in a new reform treaty, without holding a referendum, ‘as the classic pathto dictatorship’. What is revealing is not Jenkins’ criticisms of the EU and the Britishgovernment, but his use of the kind of language usually found in the more extremeelements of the Eurosceptic press. Commentary of this kind stands out all the more in thecontext of The Guardian’s remaining coverage.

In The Mirror, columns by Tony Parsons and Paul Starling on the EU treaty reformprocess are equally noteworthy, both because of the similarities they share with the RWPand the fact that they run counter to the editorial line of the newspaper. Their prominenceis particularly significant given the low overall coverage of the EU in The Mirror. Likecommentators in the RWP, Parsons (2003) is convinced that Commission officials draftingthe TCE are plotting to turn the EU into a state:



British independence would be over. Sovereignty would be deferred to an unelectedofficial who probably can’t even speak English. Certainly the interests of the Britishpeople would not be paramount in their minds.

Parson’s sceptical rhetoric is evident throughout the articles he published during theperiod examined here. The terminology he employs, and the underlying assumptions onwhich his arguments are based, reflect the positions articulated by the shrillest critics ofthe EU in the Eurosceptic press.

The penetration of the Eurosceptic discourse into titles broadly supportive of the EUdemonstrates the predominance of the Eurosceptic discourse in the British print media,and within British debates on the EU more generally. Consequently, pro-EU commenta-tors feel obliged to respond to claims about the EU within the RWP and to position theirarguments in opposition to those Eurosceptic voices (see Toynbee, 2003; Kettle, 2007;The Mirror, 2004). A similar engagement by Eurosceptic commentators with the counter-discourses evident in the LWP is simply not necessary.

It can be argued that the Eurosceptic discourse dictates the terrain on which debatesabout the EU are conducted. It is the default position against which other accounts of theEuropean integration process must position themselves. Those advocating a positiveengagement with the EU must first counter the claims of the Eurosceptic discourse, beforepresenting their own arguments. However, there is no such imperative for opponents of theEU writing in the RWP. In reproducing elements of the Eurosceptic discourse, and inpositioning themselves in direct opposition to them, commentators in the LWP serve tounderline the predominance of the hegemonic discourse.

Conclusions

The current article presents the findings of a qualitative discourse analysis of the cov-erage of the treaty reform process in the British print media. It builds on and developsthe insights gained from existing studies of the EU in the media. It sets out the way inwhich Britain’s affairs with the EU are framed within the Eurosceptic discourse. Thereare two principal images of the EU which emerge from this discourse: the EU as aforeign power, and the EU as a forum for inter-state bargaining. Whilst it may appearthat there is a contradiction between these two images of the EU, both are structuredaround the ideas of separation and threat. The United Kingdom is seen as somehowexcluded or marginalized from the EU mainstream and its interests undermined by thevery process of European integration. Furthermore, both elements of the Euroscepticdiscourse are underpinned by a nationalist meta-narrative, which privileges the nationas a political community and sees the nation-state as the optimum form of politicalorganization.

Whilst the clearest articulation of the Eurosceptic discourse is to be found in the RWP,its influence is also evident in those titles which are broadly supportive of the Europeanintegration process. Coverage of the EU in the LWP is reactive to an agenda set by theEurosceptic discourse. The terms in which the debate is couched in these titles, and theassumptions on which it is based, are derived from the Eurosceptic discourse. Further-more, space within these titles is afforded to Eurosceptic commentators.

The findings presented here are of great relevance to scholars of the European inte-gration process. Given the reticence towards the EU evident in both surveys of public



opinion and British government policy towards the EU, a clearer understanding of thediscursive terrain on which debates about the EU are conducted is of crucial importance.Furthermore, the political and economic importance of the United Kingdom means thatthese issues have potentially far-reaching ramifications for the future development of theEuropean integration project.

The structure of the Eurosceptic discourse echoes the sense of separation and apartnesswhich characterizes citizens’ attitudes towards the EU and their underlying politicalidentities. The Eurosceptic discourse facilitates the emergence of exclusively nationalidentity associated with opposition towards the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). It cuescitizens to see their political identity in terms of the nation and defines British identity inopposition to a quasi-imperial EU or a hostile coalition of powerful Member States. In sodoing, it positions other Europeans as part of a hostile out-group – a tendency associatedwith opposition to the EU (Azrout et al., 2010; McLaren, 2002). The language of conflictwhich permeates the Eurosceptic discourse is also associated with opposition to theEU (De Vreese, 2007), as is the framing of the EU in terms of costs versus benefits(Vliegenthardt et al., 2008) and risks versus opportunities (De Vreese and Kandyla, 2009).

In searching for answers as to why British citizens remain so ill-reconciled to the UnitedKingdom’s position as a European country, it is necessary to understand the complexinterrelationship between citizens’ attitudes and broader social discourses. Similarly, wemust take account of how both public opinion and media debates in turn influence thecontent and presentation of government policy towards the EU. By examining the structureof the Eurosceptic discourse – and highlighting the parallels which exist between citizens’attitudes and the representation of the EU in the print media – this article hopes to functionas a catalyst for future research on the connections between these areas.

Correspondence:Benjamin HawkinsLondon School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM)15–17 Tavistock PlaceLondon WC1H 9SHUKemail [email protected]

References

Anderson, P. and Weymouth, A. (1999) Insulting the Public: British Press and the European Union(Harlow: Longman).

Aspinwall, M. (2004) Rethinking Britain and Europe: Plurality Elections, Party Management andBritish Policy on European Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Azrout, R., Van Spanje, J. and De Vreese, C. (2010) ‘Talking Turkey: Anti-immigrant Attitudes andTheir Effect on Support for Turkish Membership of the EU’. European Union Politics, Vol. 12,No. 1, pp. 3–19.

Boomgaarden, H., Schuck, A., Elenbaas, M. and De Vreese, C. (2011) ‘Mapping EU Attitudes:Conceptual and Empirical Dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU Support’. European UnionPolitics, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 241–66.

Carey, S. and Burton, J. (2004) ‘The Influence of the Press in Shaping Public Opinion towards theEuropean Union in Britain’. Political Studies, Vol. 52, pp. 623–40.

Cecil, N. (2003) ‘EU “to Seize Control” of UK’s Taxes’. The Sun, 5 June.



Clark, D. (2005) ‘A Dream Jettisoned, like Ballast, to Keep Him Afloat’. The Guardian, 2 May.Clark, D. (2007) ‘Brown Risks Isolation if He Plays Veto Politics in Europe’. The Guardian, 29 May.Cook, R. (2004) ‘A Strong Europe – or Bush’s Feral US Capitalism’. The Guardian, 29 October.Daily Mail (2005) ‘Is This the End of Europe’s Dream?’, 28 May.Daily Telegraph (2004) ‘After Europe, It’s Time to Face some Home Truths’, 15 June.De Vreese, C. (2007) ‘A Spiral of Euroscepticism: The Media’s Fault?’ Acta Politica, Vol. 42,

pp. 271–86.De Vreese, C. and Boomgaarden, H. (2005) ‘Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and

Support for European Integration’. European Union Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 59–82.De Vreese, C. and Kandyla, A.-A. (2009) ‘News Framing and Public Support for a Common

Foreign and Security Policy’. JCMS, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 453–81.De Vreese, C., Banducci, S., Semetko, H. and Boomgaarden, H. (2006) ‘The News Coverage of the

2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries’. European Union Politics,Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 477–504.

De Vreese, C., Boomgaarden, H. and Semetko, H. (2008) ‘Hard and Soft: Predictors of PublicSupport for Turkish Membership in the EU’. European Union Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 511–30.

De Vreese, C. Boomgaarden, H. and Semetko, H. (2011) (‘In)direct Framing Effects: The Effectsof News Media Framing on Public Support for Turkish Membership in the European Union’.Communication Research, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 179–205.

Diez, T. (1999) Die EU Lesen (Opladen: Leske + Budrich).Diez-Medrano, J. (2003) Framing Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Duval-Smith, A., Watt, N. and Temko, N. (2005) ‘Inside the Battle of Brussels’. The Observer, 19

June.Eurobarometer (2003) Standard Eurobarometer 60, Autumn. Available at: «http://ec.europa.eu/

public_opinion/index_en.htm».Eurobarometer (2007) Standard Eurobarometer 68, Autumn. Available at: «http://ec.europa.eu/

public_opinion/index_en.htm».Evans-Pritchard, A. (2004) ‘EU Leader must be from Old Europe, Insist the Germans’. Daily

Telegraph, 22 June.Evans-Pritchard, A. (2007) ‘EU Treaty Threatens Thatcher Revolution’. Daily Telegraph, 20

October.Evans-Pritchard, A. and Jones, G. (2004) ‘Blunkett Draws Line on Border Controls’. Daily

Telegraph, 26 October.Firmstone, J. (2004) ‘Final Case Report on Analysis of Newspaper Editorials’. Europub, WZ Berlin.Firmstone, J. and Statham, P. (2007) ‘Mediated Debates about the EU and Ratification of the

European Constitution in the British Public Sphere’. European Political CommunicationWorking Paper 15/07. Available at: «http://www.eurpolcom.eu/exhibits/paper_15.pdf».

Gavin, T. (2000) ‘Imagining Europe: Political Identity and British Television Coverage of theEuropean Economy’. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.352–73.

Geddes, A. (2004) The European Union and British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Gleissner, M. and De Vreese, C. (2005) ‘News about the EU Constitution’. Journalism, Vol. 6, No.

2, pp. 221–42.Green, A. (2004) ‘Absurd, Naive and Just Wrong’. Daily Mail, 26 October.The Guardian (2003) ‘A Blueprint for Tyranny’, 8 May.The Guardian (2005) ‘EU Constitution: Europe on a Knife Edge’, 23 May.The Guardian (2009) ‘National Daily Newspaper Circulation, October 2007’. Available at: «http://

media.guardian.co.uk/presspublishing/table/0,,2211640,00.html».



Hannan, D. (2004) ‘Now I Can Get Back to the Business of Ignoring You’. Daily Telegraph, 13June.

Heffer, S. (2003a) ‘In Come the Cronies, Out Goes History’. Daily Mail, 12 July.Heffer, S. (2003b) ‘The Lies that are Killing Democracy’. Daily Mail, 14 June.Helm, T. (2007) ‘Labour MPs Fear EU wants Control over Justice’. Daily Telegraph, 12

October.Hennessy, P. (2005) ‘No Comment, No Opinion and No Advice, because People are Obviously Not

Interested in My Advice’. Daily Telegraph, 19 June.Hinsliff, G. (2004) ‘Labour Voters Oppose Europe Deal, Says Poll’. The Observer, 20 June.Hitchens, P. (2005) ‘Just Say Non!’ Daily Mail, 15 May.Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2005) ‘Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion and Euro-

pean Integration’. European Union Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 419–43.Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) ‘A Postfunctional Theory of European Integration from Permis-

sive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 1,pp. 1–23.

Ichijo, A. (2002) Nation and Europe in the British Public Discourse: The Cases of Media andPolitical Elite Debates (Firenze: European University Institute, EURONAT Project).

Jenkins, S. (2007) ‘This Broken Promise is Part of a Wider Fear of Democracy’. The Guardian, 24October.

Kandyla, A.-A. and De Vreese, C. (2011) ‘News Media Representations of a Common EU Foreignand Security Policy: A Cross-National Content Analysis of CFSP Coverage in National QualityNewspapers’. Comparative European Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 52–75.

Kavanagh, T. (2005) ‘France will Say NON!’ The Sun, 26 May.Keegan, W. (2004) ‘Stop Courting the Sun King over Europe’. The Observer, 27 June.Kettle, M. (2005) ‘Germany and France are Struggling with a New World’, The Guardian, 24 May.Kettle, M. (2007) ‘The Stage is Set for Blair and Brown’s Last Argument’. The Guardian, 16 June.Kirkup, J. and Waterfield, B. (2007) ‘Brown to Deny Labour MPs Free EU Treaty Vote’. Daily

Telegraph, 24 October.Mail on Sunday (2005) ‘We Bar the Door, so Europe Climbs in the Back Window’, 12 June.Mayer, C. (2005) ‘The Europeanization of Media Discourse: A Study of Quality Press Coverage of

Economic Policy Co-ordination since Amsterdam’. JCMS, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 121–48.McLaren, L. (2002) ‘Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived

Threat’. Journal of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 551–6.McLaren, L. (2007) ‘Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU’. European Union

Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 251–78.The Mirror (2004) ‘Blair has to take on the Euro Haters’, 21 June.Oliver, J. (2007) ‘Blair Hands Brown an EU Time Bomb as Treaty Starts to Unravel’. Mail on

Sunday, 24 June.Parsons, T. (2003) ‘Will EU be Our Judas, Mr Blair?’ The Mirror, 19 May.Peter, J. and De Vreese, C. (2004) ‘In Search of Europe: A Cross-National Comparative Study of

the European Union in National Television News’. Press/Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 3–24.Phillips, L. and Jorgensen, M. (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage).Phillips, M. (2003) ‘Going, Going, Gone! Or how Labour is Selling off 1,000 Years of British

History’. Daily Mail, 12 May.Rennie, D. (2005) ‘Eurosceptics are Unlikely Source of Sympathy for Lofty Giscard’. Daily

Telegraph, 26 May.Schuck, A. and De Vreese, C. (2006) ‘Between Risk and Opportunity: News Framing and Its

Effects on Public Support for the EU Enlargement’. European Journal of Communication, Vol.21, No. 1, pp. 5–32.



Statham, P. and Gray, E. (2005) ‘The Public Sphere and Debates about Europe in Britain’.Innovation, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 61–81.

Steyn, M. (2004) ‘Reagan Knew why the EU Won’t Work’. Daily Telegraph, 8 June.Sunday Telegraph (2006) ‘Tories Warn of EU Constitution Revival’, 25 June.Taylor, S. (2001) ‘Locating and Conducting Discourse Analytic Research’. In Wetherell, M. et al.

(eds), Discourse as Data (London: Sage).Toynbee, P. (2003) ‘Press Ganged: Blair’s Tragedy is that, in the End, it is Murdoch, Rothermere

and Black who Write British History, Not He’. The Guardian, 21 May.Toynbee, P. (2004) ‘Amidst the Sour Self-Seeking, Europe is Falling into Decay’. The Guardian,

2 June.Utley, T. (2005) ‘We Keep on Mentioning the War because We Treasure Our Freedom’. The

Telegraph, 15 May.Vliegenthardt, R. et al. (2008) ‘News Coverage and Support for European Integration, 1990–

2006’. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 415–39.Watt, N. (2004) ‘Blair U-turn on EU Referendum’. The Guardian, 19 April.White, M. (2004) ‘Blair in a Quandary over Prodi’s Successor’. The Guardian, 1 June.



nation, separation and threat: an analysis of british media discourses on the european union treaty...

Documents