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ISRAELI UNILATERALISM:

A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

Idon Natanzon

Idon Natanzon is a 2010 graduate o Columbia University, where he majored in politicalscience with a ocus on the Middle East. He hopes to pursue a career in internationalconlict resolution ater graduation.

he sovereign state is a basic and amiliar unit o politicalorganization in the international system. It is oten consid-ered a stage in the evolution o territorial states in which

leaders are accountable or the security and well-being o their citi-zens (Weiss 2004, 44). In its essence, sovereigntys unction is tosecure power and order in the state. Tat power includes the abilityand the authority to exercise orce. o understand why sovereignactors choose to use orce rather than other tactics to meet theirgoals, Robert Art explains that although military power is moreuseul or realizing certain goals over others, it is generally consid-ered o some use by most states or many o their goals (Art and

Jervis 2005, 141).Te use o orce, a continuation o policy through militaris-

tic means, reects dierent perceptions o power among variouspolitical actors (von Clausewitz 1976, 27). Consequently, when astate acts, a balance o power schema emerges in which each actorhedges its own strength against all other actors within a given levelsphere o activity, be it domestic, regional or global. As Inis Claude

explains, the balance o power is designed to persuade actors tobehave in certain ways in order to limit conict. While Claudesanalysis helps predict the timing o conicts based on managingand elucidating power relationships (Claude 1962), Art suggeststhat a lack o transparency among potential combatants is the causeo dierent uses o orce.

Even the keenest understanding o the balance o power in

a given situation would not guarantee the ability to contain everyconict. In each situation there is a variety o tactics and strategies


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2 Natanzon Israeli Unilateralism

that actors may pursue, including unilateral, bilateral and multi-lateral action. Unilateralism, as understood in contemporary dis-

course, is a concept in which a given state engages in an act on itsown as an expression o its sovereignty. ypically these actions aremade without regard to other potentially aected parties, and areoten against the wishes o those parties (Kane 2006, 2). Commonunilateral actions include imposing economic sanctions on a bel-ligerent nation, invading a neighboring country, or creating an im-posed barrier between territories without the other partys consent.

Tis analysis will discuss the unilateral withdrawal rom ashared-border territory without a bilateral or multilateral agree-ment. In such a situation, the relatively stronger military powerdecides to unilaterally partition or to disengage rom a given con-ict area. ypically, this occurs ater political-military goals havenot been met and seemingly cannot be met without high risks orcosts. Although withdrawal does not terminate the conict, it canserve as a moderate development that expresses the goal o manag-ing violence without the direct use o orce (Bar-Siman ov, 262).Te mitigation o the conict is dependent on the other partiesavorable reception o the unilateral act.

In order to urther understand the decision-making processthat leads to unilateral withdrawal, this paper will ocus on two re-cent Israeli examples: the military pullout rom southern Lebanonin 2000 and the disengagement o settlers and military posts rom

the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank in 2005. An analysis andcomparison o Israeli leadership and discourse in the two episodeswill show the actors and common characteristics behind the re-peated Israeli decision to unilaterally withdraw as a means to lessenconict. It is important to note that this analysis will be largely re-stricted to the internal Israeli debate regarding its own policies, andthat only Israeli actors will be considered, insoar as they relate

to the specic concerns within decision-making processes. Furtherwork must be conducted in order to examine the concurrent debatethat unquestionably arose within Lebanese and Palestinian societ-ies.

In the two Israeli cases, unilateral withdrawal initially allowed


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3Journal of Politics & Society

or short-term gains or the state, but was ultimately responsibleor negative long-term results. Tough they may ulll their short-

term goals, policymakers hurt their broader ambitions o lastingpeace and stability. Te Israeli examples, then, must be understoodto have wider regional and global relevance. A deeper understand-ing o its usage is particularly relevant to the Middle East peaceprocess, in which unilateral action has been recurrent.

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, MAY 2000

As Avraham Sela explains, the Israeli presence in southernLebanon and its security zone were products o an Israeli attemptto prevent Palestinian guerilla inltrations into Israeli territory.Only ater the 1982 war between Israel and Lebanon did indig-enous guerilla groups begin their eorts to drive the Israelis romSouthern Lebanon (Sela 2007, 60). o the Israeli public, the nan-cial and military burden o the Israeli-Lebanese conict remainedan issue ar removed rom everyday lie until 1997, when a militaryhelicopter accident killed 73 Israeli troops in transit to the securityzone (Clawson and Eisenstadt 2000, 89). Following the increase inmedia exposure and the development o grassroots protest orga-nizations, Israeli public opinion began to shit toward a reevalua-tion o the military presence in southern Lebanon. By 1999, publicopinion polls indicated that over 55 percent o the Israeli public

supported the withdrawal o Israeli troops rom Lebanon, and overtwo-thirds avored a reassessment o Israels military policies there(Sela 2007, 70). Additionally, lobbies and parliament members,known as Knesset Members (MK), began pressuring the govern-ment to remove troops rom the security zone.

In the 1999 parliamentary elections, candidate Ehud Barakran on a platorm o returning the boys home. Tis campaign

promise to withdraw troops rom the southern Lebanon securityzone marked a substantial shit in both Israeli public opinion andmilitary procedure. o many observers the impetus or withdrawalwas directly linked to the costs borne by the Israeli military andpsychologically stamped on the collective Israeli conscious. Since


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the ormalization o the security zone in 1982, over 850 Israeli sol-diers had been killed. As the Israeli government took responsibility

or unding the South Lebanon Army (SLA), its nancial commit-ment had increased by tens o millions o U.S. dollars (Clawsonand Eisenstadt 2000, 89). Struck by the high costs o the Israelioccupation, many Israelis began to question the purpose o the se-curity zone's existence . Te traditional Israeli stance emphasizedthe importance o a buer zone between Palestinian and Lebaneseguerillas in order to protect the northern Israeli border rom at-

tacks (Sobelman 2004, 9). However, multiple air raids and largercampaigns by the Israeli air orce to combat militant rocket attackschallenged the myth o a quiet border (Sela 2007, 65).

As Israeli withdrawal became more likely, Hezbollah leadersbegan emphasizing their role in the departure o Israeli orces romSouthern Lebanon. Tey pointed to their groups continued abilityto attrite Israeli orces as the key actor sparking Israels domesticdissatisaction with its military presence in Lebanon and the sub-sequent removal o Israeli troops.1 In light o this rhetoric, Israelipolitical and military leaders engaged in a robust debate regardinga potential withdrawal. Many in the military establishment, such asBrigadier General Shlomo Brom, strongly recommended Israelscontinued occupation o the security zone until a peace treaty withSyria is signed (Clawson and Eisenstadt 2000, 90). Daniel Sobel-man adds that much o the military brass was opposed to a unilat-

eral pullout that would allow militant groups, mainly Hezbollah,to gain strength and mobility closer to the Israeli border. Teir earwas grounded in an understanding that uture tensions with armedmilitants would create an escalation in violence leading to cross-border conict (Sobelman 2004, 30). Other critics eared that ithe security border zone were dismantled, groups such as Hezbol-lah would not end their resistance until all o Israel was destroyed

( Jacoby 2007, 121). While the security zone had not achieved aull cessation o violence, it successully halted cross-border guerillainltrations.

Yet these opinions hardly amounted to a consensuseventhe military was divided. Major General Amos Malka, head o Is-


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raeli Deense Forces (IDF) Military Intelligence, argued that an Is-raeli withdrawal would begin an era o mutual deterrence on both

sides o the border. Using the concept o sufcient gain, Malkaemphasized that each actor was committed to preventing civiliancasualties and avoiding a dangerous escalation. Leading Israeli MKYossi Beilins plan calculated that an Israeli withdrawal rom Leb-anon would address Syrian and Lebanese hopes or stability andprosperity. Assuming that Hezbollah had limited objectives thatwould be satised by an Israeli withdrawal, Beilin believed that the

group would restrain its uture operations (Sobelman 2004, 36).Te inevitability o an Israeli withdrawal became apparent as thedebate continued. Many leaders began to recognize that i Israelsactions [earned] regional and international legitimacy, there wouldbe a strong possibility o deterring urther attacks and limitingHezbollah (Sobelman 2004, 31). An Israeli withdrawal, many rea-soned, would deprive Hezbollah o its ideological motive or exis-tence (Jacoby 2007, 120).

Prime Minister Barak used this division among the elites toadvance his withdrawal plan in spite o the ailed diplomatic eortswith Syria that dominated much o his rst year in ofce. Ratherthan back away rom his campaign promise, Barak used the ailedpeace initiatives as urther support or a new direction in conictresolution, making the nal decision in March 2000 (Sela 2007,71). Responding to concerns among military leaders, Barak noted

that it is incumbent on Military Intelligence to envision worst-case scenarios, but that as a political leader he was orced to makedifcult decisions that corresponded to changing political realities(Sobelman 2004, 31). Te decision to unilaterally withdraw all Is-raeli soldiers rom southern Lebanon without a ormal agreementor understanding rom a regional actor continued to raise debatesand concerns about the consequences and atermath o such an ac-

tion. Nevertheless, on May 24th, 2000, the last Israeli soldier letLebanon in a hastily-conducted withdrawal that shut down theborder between the two countries (Blum 2007, 201). Crucially, Is-raeli orces only withdrew rom territories it considered part o thesecurity zone that was created as a result o the 1982 war. Another


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22 square kilometers o territory captured during the 1967 cam-paign known as the Shebaa Farms remains under Israeli control.

Unlike the security zone, the Shebaa Farms are contested by Israel,Lebanon and Syria.

DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE GAZA STRIP, AUGUST 2005

Drawing on Israels experience o withdrawing rom southernLebanon as well as the removal o Israeli settlers rom the Sinai

desert in the late 1970s, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announceda new unilateral plan involving the Israeli-Palestinian conict in2003. At the Herzliya Conerence on Israeli National Security inDecember o that year, Sharon embraced the idea o unilateral dis-engagement and warned the Palestinian leadership, particularly thePalestinian Authority, that a ailure to cooperate and move towardpeace would lead Israel to initiate the unilateral step o removingall settlers rom the Gaza Strip and dismantling our settlements inthe northern West Bank (Zelnick 2006, 35). Although an Israeliwithdrawal would be a rst step in the long-desired reestablish-ment o Palestinian sovereignty in a territory controlled by Israel,many Palestinians were wary o Sharons decision. o many Arableaders, Sharons hawkish history o supporting settlements in oc-cupied land and his notorious military background did not quali-y him to be a partner or peace (Zelnick 2006, 65). Comments

made by Sharon prior to the disengagement ueled Arab ears thatthe Israel prime ministers calls or withdrawal were being used tomanipulate the situation to Israels benet. At an internationally-sponsored peace initiative proposal in 2003, or instance, Sharonwarned that continued hesitation to cooperate would lead the Pal-estinian people to receive ar less than they could obtain in directnegotiations based on the Road Map (Bar-Siman-ov 2007, 262).

While the disengagement plan allowed Israel to retain strate-gic powers in the territories by preserving its military power, bor-der control, and water rights, disengagement was also seen as a wayto lessen the enormous military and nancial costs o maintainingthe Gaza settlement. By the time o Sharons announcement in De-


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cember 2003, there were only eight thousand Jewish settlers resid-ing in the Gaza Strip among over 1.3 million Palestinians. Jewish

settlers, under the protection o the Israeli military, controlled over40 percent o arable land and 50 percent o the available water re-sources (Baylis 2009, 151). Under these circumstances, many Is-raeli leaders viewed disengagement as a way or Israel to dene itsown borders by its own terms (Pressman 2006, 360).

Much like Baraks action on Lebanon in 2000, Sharons deci-sion to disengage drew heavy criticism. Many among the military

establishment elt that leaving Gaza would strengthen the myth thatterrorism can deeat national armies. Retired Israeli Major GeneralYaakov Amidor labeled the operation a strategic error o historicalmagnitude, arguing that Palestinian militants had witnessed theeects o Hezbollah violence in southern Lebanon and emulatedtheir tactics to achieve the same outcome. Amidor claimed thatdisengagement would establish a state in which Hamas will havereedom o action and be joined by the umbilical cord to Hezbol-lah, thus increasing the security threat on multiple borders (Zel-nick 2006, 35). Yet despite heavy criticism, particularly among hisown party, Sharon executed his plan. By the summer o 2005, thelast Jewish settler was removed rom Gaza.

REASONS FOR ISRAELI UNILATERALISM

Beore analyzing and comparing the motives underlying eachcase o unilateral action, it is necessary to rst understand the gen-eral dierences in their implementation. In its May 2000 with-drawal rom southern Lebanon, Israel ended a longstanding mili-tary presence in a oreign, hostile land by removing its posts andinstallations rom a security zone that had been created to buerIsrael proper rom militant activity. In Gaza, on the other hand, the

Israeli army undertook a much larger operation: they not only dis-mantled military positions that had been held or almost our de-cades, but were also charged with the removal o eight thousand Is-raeli citizens. Although dierences abound, Israel acted unilaterallyin both cases, and examining common variables will help us better


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understand Israels reliance on this method. And though each situ-ation presented unique difculties, and, as indicated, drew unique

criticism, both withdrawals achieved the similar result o ormallyending the permanent Israeli presence in those areas. Tis analysiswill highlight three actors that inuenced Israeli decision-makingin both 2000 and 2005: the increase in violence, the perceived lacko political openings and partnership, and the latitude to use thewithdrawal to strengthen claims to other disputed territory.

In July 2000 a poll was conducted among Palestinians on

the role that violence played in Israels decision to withdraw romsouthern Lebanon. Sixty-three percent o respondents believedthat Palestinians should emulate Hezbollahs violent tactics. Amajority o Israelis has consistently agreed that armed conronta-tions have helped them achieve national rights in ways that nego-tiations could not (Shamir 2007, 37). Tese sentiments echoedthe Israeli criticism that withdrawal could strengthen the bases osupport or militant activities. Yet by 2000, over 850 IDF soldiershad been killed as a result o violence in southern Lebanon (Claw-son and Eisenstadt 2000, 89). Similarly, in Gaza, the asymmetricwar against guerilla-style militants continued to cause Israeli mil-itary and civilian casualties. In the second intiada, which beganin 2000 and spanned six years, over one thousand Israelis werekilled (Smith 2010, 498). Te growing perception o the cost owar among Israelis was a potential limit to Israels military options.

Jeremy Pressman writes that ongoing conicts showed that Israelcould not bring about an end to the conict short o wiping out thePalestinians, something Israel was not prepared to do (Pressman2006, 370).

Israeli public opinion began to reect a new understandingo violent conict. Te Israeli public grew tired o prolonged con-icts. Many began to see the IDF presence in southern Lebanon as

more o a war and less o a security operation (Blum 2007, 237).By 1999, over 55 percent o the Israeli public supported the with-drawal o Israeli troops.2 Similarly, 60 percent o Israelis were inavor o Gaza disengagement by 2004, as other strategies aimedat ending the conict appeared unsuitable (Bar-Siman-ov 2007,


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160). In the late 1990s, grassroots organizations such as Yesh Gvul(Tere is a limit), a group o army reservists, and Four Mothers,

amilies who had lost relatives as a result o the conict, began criti-cizing the military establishments decision to remain in Lebanon.Tese groups represented growing support behind the emergentopinion to leave Lebanon (Jacoby 2007, 124). A growing numbero causalities, dramatically increased by a helicopter collision thatkilled dozens o soldiers, kept the issue in the public spotlight andreminded Israelis that unilateral withdrawal was a means to end

the violence. Te IDF received an increasing number o letters re-garding the occupied territories, as well as requests by soldiers whoreused to serve in the West Bank and Gaza (Bar-Siman-ov 2007,264).

At the same time, Israels adversaries began to understand theconnection between increased violence and political gain. Hezbol-lah leaders pointed to their groups ability to attrite Israeli orces asthe key actor behind the Israeli debate over unilateralism (Claw-son and Eisenstadt 2004, 8). For Palestinians, military resistancebrought benets that decades o negotiations and diplomatic ar-rangements had ailed to produce. Te Israeli explanations o vol-untary withdrawal and strategic disengagement did not seem toconvince the Palestinians and Lebanese. Instead, they believed thattheir own actions were the leading cause o Israeli unilateral with-drawal (Erat 2006, 190). In both cases, the costs o a continued

Israeli presence, most notably Israeli casualties, had outweighedthe benets o remaining, even i not all o Israels strategic objec-tives had been met. Critics have debated the amount o politicalexibility that the Israeli government had in withdrawing. Sela hasemphasized in his analysis the role o public opinion and grassrootspressures, while Bar-Siman-ov has ocused on military maneu-vering o a disengagement that retained Israeli preponderance at a

signicantly reduced risk (Bar-Siman-ov 2007, 261).Although the increase in violence suggests a motive and jus-

tication or withdrawal and separation, that conclusion ails tohighlight the impetus or acting unilaterally. As Bar-Siman-ovindicates, it is extremely rare to nd a situation where the initiat-


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ing side preers, rom the outset, unilateral disengagement withoutan agreement as a conict management strategy (Bar-Siman-ov

2007, 262). Tereore, it becomes necessary to replace the respec-tive withdrawals within the larger political ramework o theirtime. Although Barak ran or ofce under a platorm o withdraw-ing the troops rom Lebanon, he spent much o his rst year inofce seeking peace with Israels Arab neighbors. During that time,there was a ocused attempt or an agreement with the Syrians thatwould involve both the return o the Golan Heights and the with-

drawal o IDF troops in exchange or peaceul relations with Israel.However, negotiations halted ater ten months when Syria provedunwilling to accept Israeli demands (Sela 2007, 71). Meanwhile, Is-raeli leadership continued to ignore Hezbollah as a suitable partneror negotiation. Tese events, coupled with the protracted violence,eroded public support or a prolonged occupation and orced Barakto deliver his campaign promise without a Syrian or non-state part-ner (Clawson and Eisenstadt 2004, 89).

In the Palestinian context, Israeli leadership looked at thebreakdown o peace talks ollowing the Camp David summit andaba in 2000-2001 as evidence that the Palestinian Authority didnot want a negotiated settlement (Pressman 2006, 369). In the eyeso the Israelis, the outbreak o the second intiada and the years opersistent violence and terrorism indicated a lack o morality andthat there was no true Palestinian partner ready to negotiate (Bar-

Siman-ov 2007, 264). Israel chose to isolatenot work withPalestinian Authority leader Yasser Araat. o many Israeli leaders,Araat represented a Palestinian eort dedicated to the destructiono Israel through both violence and demographic pressure (Zelnick2006, 26). Tey pointed to his insistence on the Palestinian righto return, his reusal to disarm militant groups such as Hamas andthe Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and his tampering with other elected

ofcials such as Abu Mazen. Even ater Araats death in 2004, theSharon government reused to recognize a Palestinian partner dueto Mazens inability, or possibly his reluctance, to end media andeducational propaganda against Israel (Bar-Siman-ov 2007, 271).Tis denial o any potential partner is best exemplied in a letter


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sent rom Sharon to U.S. President George W. Bush, in which Sha-ron explains the rationale o disengagement because there exists

no Palestinian partner with whom to advance peaceully toward asettlement (Bar-Siman-ov 2007, 268).Unilateral withdrawal represents a decision among Israeli

leaders to avoid being orced into untenable political scenarios,or to wait indenitely or partners they perceive to be genuine; itwas hailed by the international community as a creative response.It is important to note that both Hezbollah and the Palestinian

Authority regularly blame Israel or the increased violence, and re-ject the idea o a lack o partner as an Israeli reusal to restart thepeace process. Te Israeli government was skeptical, i not unin-terested, in small condence-building attempts by the Palestinians,such as small shits in policy and temporary cease-res (Pressman2006, 372). In Lebanon, Israel overlooked discredited local par-ties, choosing instead to work solely with the United Nations. YetIsraels unilateral behavior was grounded in its implicit coopera-tion with other parties. Te withdrawals were conducted under in-ternational guidance and with international support. And in bothLebanon and Gaza, the adversarial Arab actions drew down orcompletely halted attacks to allow or the removal o an Israeli pres-ence rom their lands (Makovsky 2005, 26).

Te nal, and perhaps most pertinent, actor was Israelschoice to withdraw rom certain areas in order to successully de-

end other territory under its control. During the Israeli-Syrianpeace negotiations prior to the Israeli withdrawal, it was widelybelieved that the removal o troops would be tied to the return omuch, i not all, o the Golan Heights to Syria. Troughout the ne-gotiations, Hezbollah, acting as Syrias proxy, continued its armedstruggle in the hopes o pressuring Israel into giving up other ar-eas such as the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms (Sobelman

2004, 68). By acting unilaterally, but still having its withdrawalinternationally recognized by the United Nations, Israel not onlywedged a divide between Syria and Lebanon, but also shited thetalking points in the negotiations with Syria. Prior to 2000, it wasexpected that a peace deal with Syria (including the Golan) would


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lead Syria to exert its inuence over Lebanon and ollow suit withan additional peace deal (Ho 2000, 3). Te unilateral withdrawal

changed this equation so that the ate o the Golan Heights now re-sided squarely with Israel (Blum 2007, 237). Should Israel chooseto transer the Golan Heights to Syria, it will likely do so on itsown terms.

Similar motivations and goals seemed to have been behindthe disengagement rom Gaza. Tat move, combined with a physi-cal security barrier under construction in the West Bank, has con-

tributed to a growing consensus that Israels move in 2005 signaleda shit in the geographic ocus o settlement, rather than a totalabandonment (Pressman 2006, 370). Palestinian leader and Fatahmember Mohammed Dahlan blasted Sharon over his West Bankintentions and argued that disengagement was nothing more thana ploy to strengthen other settlements (Zelnick 2006, 63). At thesame time, President Bush responded to Sharons explanation othe disengagement by afrming the Israeli point o view. In his aletter he wrote: In light o new realities on the ground, includingalready existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic toexpect that the outcome o nal status negotiations will representa complete withdrawal to the armistice line o 1949 (Smith 2006,530). o the Israelis, this constituted a milestone in U.S.-Israelirelations, conrming in writing that the United States understoodIsraels strategic and demographic realities.

In such a ramework unilateral withdrawal allowed Israel todictate the terms under which land was being transerred. Israelwas not orced to withdraw by violence or a political dead-end.As a result, these moves relieved international pressure or a morecomprehensive and expansive land transer (Bar-Siman-ov 2007,265). Unilateral action was an attractive option, as it not onlysought to stabilize areas o conrontation and reduce military ex-

penditures, but also preserved valuable Israeli territorythe GolanHeights and the West Bank (Hovsepian 2008, 282). Leaving theseterritories with an understanding o retaining others was strategicand came at a reasonable cost to much o the Israeli public, sincepractically no uture peace plan included the Gaza Strip or south-


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ern Lebanon in Israel (Erat 2006, 184).

CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

In eect, the two withdrawals have come to be understoodas down payments on the respective territories Israel retained. Bywithdrawing, Israel has delayed the political processes in both are-nas or the oreseeable uture (Tomas 2009, 152) and strength-ened its own position domestically and internationally. As Dov

Weisglas, the senior advisor to Sharon during the disengagement,explained in an interview, With the proper management we suc-ceeded in removing the issue o the political process rom the agen-da. And we educated the world to understand that there is no oneto talk to (Shavit 2004). Fundamental to this line o thought isthe idea that unilateral withdrawal provides added security. In itsessence, unilateral disengagement aims more to minimize damagesand losses than to maximize gains (Bar-Siman-ov 2007, 263).As such, it is chosen only when it makes a situation less dangerousthan alternative conict-resolution tactics.

Many critics o the Lebanon withdrawal warned that Israelwould create a power vacuum, which would lead to a large-scaleintensication o the conict. Fearing ar reaching consequencesrom both the Syrians and the Iranians, military and political lead-ers alike assailed the initiative (Sobelman 2004, 11). Similar ar-

guments were levied against the government ve years later as thedisengagement was charged with strengthening Palestinian mili-tancy and Arab solidarity against Israel. Yet in Gaza, the continuedmilitary and civilian presence had led Sharon to believe that notto disengage was actually more dangerous to Israel (Bar-Siman-ov 2007, 273). Te redeployment o troops to the Israeli side othe border in each area has both reduced sources o riction and

provided ewer targets or attacks (Erat 2006, 187). While Israelremoved its troops rom within the Gaza Strip, it maintained itsposition o ensuring security or Israeli citizens and, as such, re-served the right o uture military engagements within the terri-tory--a position markedly dierent rom its complete withdrawal


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rom southern Lebanon (Hovsepian 2008, 283). Tat strategy wasstrengthened by a signicant reduction o violence over a six-year

period rom 2000 to 2006 in southern Lebanon (Hovsepian 2008,282). In Gaza, removing Israeli troops was also a removal o poten-tial targets or Palestinian militants.

In choosing to act unilaterally, Israel appeared to orsake bilat-eral and multilateral approaches in avor o an understanding thatseparation creates the least-negative results. As each withdrawalapproached, some analysts began touting the idea o mutual deter-

rence, since Israels opponents might also be nervous about upset-ting the newly-dened status quo. (Sobelman 2004, 33). Tese an-alysts saw the lack o large-scale attacks ollowing the withdrawalas afrmation o their hypothesis. Withdrawal was a calculationby Israel, a bet that the risk o having dangerous neighbors is pre-erable over a costly, and potentially deadly, continued occupation(Zelnick 2006, 29).

Between 2000, the year o the withdrawal rom southern Leb-anon, to 2006, the year ollowing the disengagement rom Gaza,there was a steady decline in Israeli public support or the notion oa Greater Israel (Shamir 2007, 34). Tis unilateral mentality con-rms a new point o view among Israeli leadership known as thedemographic sense argument, which justies withdrawal basedon current demographic realities and uture trends (Tomas 2009,152). Te argument prioritizes an Israel that has an overwhelm-

ing majority o Jewish citizens rather than a larger geographic areathat also includes non-Jews. Tis shits the impetus or peace andconict-resolution away rom humanitarian concerns and inter-national pressure toward an inward looking understanding o theconict. By disengaging rom Gaza, the Jewish state sidelined 1.3million non-citizens, placing them under their own Palestiniangovernance. Similar withdrawals rom parts o the West Bank may

ollow in order to advance this line o thought to its logical conclu-sion: an Israeli state entrenched in its own territory with only alimited amount o non-Jewish citizens (Brom 2007, 15). An addedincentive to this schema is that it allows Israel to put pressure onPalestinian leaders to showcase their own leadership abilities and


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assume more direct responsibility or their people, a eat that hasbeen hard to achieve due to international isolation and an econom-

ic blockade on Gaza (Bar-Siman-ov 2007, 274).Although U.S. policy is that no action should be taken byany party to the peace process that would prejudice the outcomeo nal status negotiations (Muasher 2008, 206), the Israelis ap-pear to be lowering the expectations o the Palestinians (Zelnick2006, 65). Withdrawal represents an internalization o the two-state solution and a reluctance to ght a demographic battle with

the Palestinians, while the process o disengagement enabled theIsraelis to redene the physical and metaphorical boundaries o ne-gotiations. Te current Israeli position has become very clear: De-ense and security preclude a complete return to the 1967 borders(Zelnick 2006, 65).

WILL UNILATERALISM CONTINUE?

By withdrawing rom Lebanon and disengaging rom Gaza,the Israeli leadership was able to gain international support, reduceits nancial liabilities, and dramatically reduce violence in the shortterm. Israel has maintained its military superiority through incur-sions and its economic power through its heavy blockade o Gaza.Yet two questions remain.

First, will Israeli leaders continue to implement unilateral

withdrawals as a means o addressing conicts in the uture? Andsecond, will other actors adopt similar actions when aced with apolitical stalemate? o answer these questions, we must rst lookat the longer-term eects and outcomes o the two prior examples.

Although the rst six years ater the withdrawal rom Leba-non yielded substantial short-term security and economic gainsor both Lebanon and Israel, the outbreak o large-scale violence

in the summer o 2006 casted signicant doubt on the prudence ounilateralism. Te border with Lebanon remained hostile due tothe Lebanese governments inability to disarm militant groups suchas Hezbollah, as well as the occurrence o skirmishes and Israeliair-raids. Limiting Israels deterrent capability, Hezbollah had ree-


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dom o travel throughout Lebanon and gained much closer accessto Israeli population centers (Brom 2007, 9). Finally, in response

to an increase in rocket attacks and the kidnapping o soldiers, Is-rael engaged Hezbollah in a 35-day military conict, known as theSecond Lebanon War, which resulted in the deaths o hundredsand the destruction o civilian inrastructure along the Lebanese-Israeli border. o many, the war demonstrated Israels vulnerabilityto a guerilla movement in an area that it had evacuated withouta security arrangement (Jacoby 2007, 112). Many critics directly

attributed the 2006 war and Hezbollahs growing military capabili-ties to the hasty May 2000 withdrawal.A similar power vacuum arose in the Gaza Strip ollowing

the Israeli disengagement. Ater Israeli orces withdrew, it becameincreasingly clear that true power resided with Hamas and not theonce-dominant Fatah party. In the year ollowing the disengage-ment, Hamas succeeded in making dramatic political gains by par-ticipating in elections and, through a military putsch, consolidatedits power over the entirety o the Gaza Strip. Many Israeli criticso disengagement have pointed to Israels perceived weakness in re-treating as the main cause or the groups successes. Tis reects alarger trend among Arab media and political outlets to rame boththe 2000 withdrawal and the 2005 disengagement as Arab victoriesover Israeli aggression. Militant gures, such as Hassan Nasrallah,head o Hezbollah, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadine-

jad, have become amous as a result o their deance and militancyagainst Israel (Indyk 2009, 388). Some have even linked Hezbol-lahs success in 2000 to the outbreak o the second intiada onlya ew months later (Blum 2007, 241). As a result o the Hamaselections, Israel blockaded the Gaza Strip in an eort to isolate thenew government. Further aggression between Hamas and Israelhas resulted in a continued military presence in and around Gaza,

and multiple are-ups have inicted extreme consequences, such asthe continued loss o lie.

Despite the ambiguous, i not outright negative, long-termtrack record o unilateral withdrawal, the Israeli public appearssteadast in its desire to end the territory dispute. Over sixty per-


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cent o Israelis still preer reconciliation, although public opinionin avor o a two-state solution with the Palestinians dropped ten

percent ater the Hamas elections, (Shamir 2007, 23). Many hadhoped that disengagement would lead to a new dynamic or thepeace process. Indeed, beore violence erupted in 2006, Sharonssuccessor, Ehud Olmert, proposed a broad withdrawal plan romthe West Bank known as convergence. Te stated goal o this planwas to withdraw 70,000 additional settlers rom the West Bankand to dismantle a vast majority o the settlements (Jacoby 2007,

44) with the understanding that the remaining settlements wouldbe incorporated into the nal borders o the State o Israel (Zel-nick 2006, 154). While some settlements would be dismantled, thevast majority o settlers would be retained. However, the ensuingevents and a dramatic increase in violence ended much o the opti-mism and stalled urther unilateral eorts (Erat 2006, 187).

Te Second Lebanon War eectively shelved all urther uni-lateral action. While Olmerts convergence plan shares character-istics with the two prior withdrawalssuch as the reocusing onimportant territory and a perceived lack o responsible partner-shipthe increase in violence as a result o unilateral withdrawalhas shown the counterproductive and dangerous nature o conictreduction via separation (Shamir 2007, 57). Current Israeli leader-ship appears unwilling to subjugate itsel to urther criticism andpotential violence without assurances or agreements rom other

parties (Zelnick 2006, 136). Although violence has dropped inboth magnitude and requency, periodic escalations remain a loom-ing threat in Gaza and on Israels northern border. Unilateral with-drawal has ailed to usher in a renewal o peace talks or even osecurity arrangements; joint management o the conicts has notbeen established (Bar-Siman-ov 2007, 278). Instead, unilateralwithdrawal has indicated solely that Israel has a propensity to act

on its own. Tese actions have not only silenced other interestedparties but have led to spikes in violence as Israel sidelines othertracks o diplomacy. Israeland other powersshould avoid u-ture unilateral withdrawals given that they may instigate increasesin violence.


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