narratives of low-carbon futures in land transport felix creutzig mercator research institute on...
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Narratives of low-carbon futures in land transport
Felix CreutzigMercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change
Lead Author, IPCC
Disclaimer: NOT representing the IPCC
Science-policy interface
• Purpose of report is to give policy advice and stimulate public discussion
• In technocratic, or decisionist models of policy advice normative assumptions (world views) are often underspecified, alternatives remain unexplored
• A pragmatic-enlightened model of policy advice is recursive between scientific results and normative spaces, narratives
• Here: What are the narratives of low-carbon policy futures?
Ottmar Edenhofer, Martin Kowarsch: A Pragmatist Approach to the Science-Policy Interface, MCC-Working Paper 2012-1
Decomposing GHG emissions of transport
Total emissions
Carbon intensity
Energy intensity= x xActivity
A SI FActivity
Modal
Structure
Energy Intensity
Fuels
Schipper, L., Unander, F. and Marie-Lilliu, C. (2000) ‘The IEA Energy Indicators Effort: Increasing the understanding of the energy/emissions link’, IEA Public Information Office, Paris
Creutzig, F., McGlynn, Minx, J. and Edenhofer, O. (2011) ‘Climate policies for road transport revisited (I): Evaluation of the current framework’, Energy Policy, 39(5), 2396-2406
The short-term perspective
Total emissions =
Fuel producers
Car producersCar drivers
10% reduction 2020 in EU regulation, but doubtful due to LUC effects of biofuels
ca. 40% reduction in 2030 in EU/US due to 2020/2025 regulation
15-20% reduction by congestion charge (Stockholm, London)
Carbon intensity
Energy intensityx xActivity
Two narratives of mitigation
A SI FActivity
Modal
Structure
Energy Intensity
Fuels
Promethian focus on technologies
Behavior/ demand is not part of the game
Change in mobility pattern is necessary for mitigation
Technologies are insufficient on their own
pessimistoptimiststructuralbehavioral
The Promethian-liberal view
• Global warming can be mitigated by technologies, result of human ingenuity and individual drive.
• In transport, this translates to a focus on fuel efficiency, electric cars, hydrogen, and biofuels.
• Notably, transport behavior and mobility patterns remain unchanged, or are projected as a continuation of trends.
• Underlying norms: revealed preferences (“positivist”); utilitarian
Federal Ministry of Transport(Dr. Andreas Scheuer):
“everyone shall be mobile according to their facon”
Pessimist and optimist view of technological change (Worldbank report)
Transport is really the hardest sector to decarbonize (Clarke and Calvin, 2008)Mostly top-down view from Integrated Assessment models
Fuel efficiency standards and electric car market penetration (IEA 2009)Mostly bottom-up view of transport experts
IPCC AR4 also lives in technological world
Creutzig et al., (Nature Climate Change, 2012), based on Wise et al., 2009; Melillo et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2010)
IPCC (AR4, SRREN) suggests a high reliance on biofuels for mitigation.
If there is no perfect forest protection, ILUC emissions can result in a catastrophic outcome of bioenergy deployment.
The risk is so high that bioenergy deployment alone can eat up the remaining GHG budget.
Qualifying technological optimism: the bioenergy case
A Copernican-welfarist view
• Copernican in starting with observations on ground.
• Welfarist in not equating revealed with normative preferences.
• Suggesting that a system change can improve well-being, at least from a social cost perspective, perhaps even from an individual perspective.
Key messages World Bank Report
1. Embed low-carbon policies into a co-benefit framework
2. Synergies in policies: Mode shift along with demand measures
3. Explicitly consider infrastructure lock-ins4. Technical AND behavioral change is needed
Bill. RMB Creutzig, F. and He, D., Climate Change Mitigation and Co-Benefits of Feasible Transport Demand Policies in Beijing Transportation Research D 14, 120 (2009)
Creutzig, F., Thomas, A., Kammen, D. M., and Deakin, E., in Low Carbon Transport in Asia: Capturing Climate and Development Co-benefits, edited by Eric Zusman, Ancha Srinivasan, and Shobhakar Dhakal (Earthscan, London, 2009)
Net accounting of car traffic in Beijing 2005: Costs are at least 7.7% of Beijng‘s GDP
1. Embed into co-benefit framework
2. Synergies of urban transport policies
Push policies• Car traffic restrictions• City toll• Reduce available lanes• Parking fees• Speed limits
Pull policies• Better public transport• Safe space for cycling and
walking• Prioritisation of bicycles• Bicycle racks
Land use policies• Compact cities• Polycentric cities• Avoid urban sprawl• No greenfield development• Mixed use neighbourhoods
Objectives
- A- B- C- D
Policies
- 1- 2- 3- 4
Pareto gain 13.2 to 16.2
billion Y
Elast: 0.61.0
Synergy between public transit supply and congestion charges in Beijing
Creutzig, F. and He, D., Climate Change Mitigation and Co-Benefits of Feasible Transport Demand Policies in Beijing Transportation Research D 14, 120 (2009)
Adding public transit capacity increases the efficiency of a congestion charge.
3. Consider infrastructure lock-ins
• Marginal costs of use are smaller on existing infrastructures.
• Calls for explicit infrastructure policy investment, in addition to pricing.
• In the transport context: Integrate land-use and transport policies (Jose Viegas’ point).
• Relatively few economic analysis of the “social optimal infrastructure investment”.
Creutzig, Mühlhoff, Römer, Decarbonizing Urban Transport in European Cities Concurs with Possibly High Co-Benefits, submitted
Demand policies have a stronger marginal effect than public transit supply, but only subsequent to public transit supply.
Land-use policies contribute significantly in the long run.
Co-benefits are high enough to motivate policies
Creutzig, Mühlhoff, Römer, Decarbonizing Urban Transport in European Cities Concurs with Possibly High Co-Benefits, submitted
Narratives and their norms
Promethian-liberal• Demand is given and there is no
reason to mess up with it• Utilitarian and liberal: the
individual comes first• Social costs are best treated with
price instruments
• Revealed preferences are conditional on given infrastructures
• If social costs are revealed, infrastructures should be modified to reduce costs
Strong Copernican-welfarist• Divergence of normative and
revealed preferences (Beshears et al., 2008):– passive choice, – complexity, – limited personal experience, – third-party marketing, – and intertemporal choice.
• Consideration of status, norms, and habits for policy making
Weak Copernican-welfarist