nancy love - epistemology and exchange: marx, nietzsche, and critical theory

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Epistemology and Exchange: Marx, Nietzsche, and Critical Theory

Author(s): Nancy S. LoveSource: New German Critique, No. 41, Special Issue on the Critiques of the Enlightenment(Spring - Summer, 1987), pp. 71-94Published by: New German Critique

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EpistemologyndExchange:Marx, ietzsche,ndCriticalheory*

byNancy .Love

JurgenHabermas arguesthat ritical heorists' nalysesofthedialecticofenlightenmentontain performativeontradiction.y

dentifyingreason with epression, hey ndermine thefoundations ftheir wncri-tique.' Habermas traces thisperformative ontradiction to FriedrichNietzsche'snfluenceponcriticalheory,uta significantapappearsinhis analysisof t.2Habermas arguesthatAdorno,byassociatingidentitywithexchange, extendsMarx's critique ofpolitical economyto instrumental reason. He also maintains that Adorno adopts thisMarxian critique too hastily, neglecting its instrumentalbiases. Yet

*My thanks to the American Council of Learned Societies whose

Fellowshipor he tudy fModern ocietyndValues upportedhe esearchor his r-tidcle.

1. Jiirgen abermas, The EntwinementfMythndEnlightenment:e-ReadingDialectic fEnlightenment,"ewGermanritique6 Spring/Summer982): 3-20.

2. By riticalheorists,refer ofirstenerationmembers fthe nstituteor ocialResearch. incemyprimaryoncern sepistemology,focusuponTheodorAdorno'snegativeialectics. alsoconsider is ollaborative orkwithMaxHorkheimer.orgen-eraldiscussions f heir elationshipee: SusanBuck-Morss,he riginsfNegativeialec-

tics: heodordorno, alterenjamin,ndthe rankfurtnstituteNewYork:The FreePress,1977);David Held,An ntroductionoCriticalheoryBerkeley: niversityfCaliforniaPress, 984);MartinJay,he ialecticalmagination:Historyftherankfurtchoolnd hen-stituteforocialResearch,923-1950Boston: ittle, rown,ndCo., 1973).

More pecific iscussionsfNietzsche'snfluenceponcriticalheoryppear nMar-tinJay,MarxismndTotality:heAdventuresf ConceptromukdcsoHabermasBerkeley:UniversityfCalifornia ress, 984);JamesMiller, Some ImplicationsfNietzsche'sThought orMarxism," elos7 Fall1978); eter iutz,Nietzsche ndCritical heory,"Telos0 (Winter981-82):03-114; illianRose,TheMelancholycience:n ntroductiono heThoughtfTheodorAdornoNewYork: olumbiaUniversityress, 978).OnlyJay,ho ug-gestshat dorno ndHorkheimer'snalysisf xchangenthe ialecticfEnlightenments

drawn s muchfromNietzsche'sGenealogyfMorals s Marx'sCapital, iscussesNie-tzsche's xchange rincipleThe ialecticalmagination,59).Fora morecomplete xamination fcontradictionsetweenMarxand Nietzsche

themselves,eemyMarx, ietzsche,ndModernityNewYork: olumbiaUniversityress,1986).

7'







72 EpistemologyndExchange

Adorno,aware of thosebiases,

complementsMarx's economic withNie-

tzsche's psychological critique of exchange. It is thisNietzschean ex-

change principlewhich Habermas ignores.3In this article I examine how Marxian and Nietzschean exchange

principles nteractn critical heory,wheretheydivergeand converge,andwhy hey imultaneously uggest nd subvert uchsyntheses. arguethat Habermas has identifieda performative ontradictionbetweenMarxian and Nietzschean principlesof exchange. By includingNie-tzschean exchange in critical heorists'genealogy,I clarifyhe conse-

quences ofthis ontradiction. portray ritical heorists' pistemologicalskeptism nd politicalsolipsismas products of logic as well as history.This supports Habermas' argumentthat anotherresponse to modern

society s possible. YetNietzsche's exchange principlealso revealsthelimitations f Habermas' alternative nd the need for more radicalre-

construction frationality.

TheContextforriticalheory

The performativeontradictionHabermas identifiesncritical heoryinvolves ogic,butitoriginatesnhistory.t s critical heorists' esponsetothecontinuedexistenceofcapitalism nd a series of socialist atastro-

phes. In "The AuthoritarianState," Max Horkheimer describes theproblem history oses for ritical heorists: Despite pious referencesothe Hegelian logic of leaps and reversals,transformation ppearedessentiallyas an extension of scale."4 Economic, political and psy-chological transformations have thwartedand deformed socialist

revolutions.Economically, the material preconditions Marx required forso-

cialismalreadyexist.However, ntheWest, tateplanninghascontrolledthe business cycles which were to precipitate revolution. Easterneconomic plans have also increased, notdecreased repression. State

capitalistand statesocialistexperiences suggestthatMarx's theoryofrevolution onflates wodistincttages: he mpositionof state conomiccontrol nd the iberationfrom t.The formermay nevitably ccur,but

3. Jiurgenabermas, hilosophical-PoliticalrofilesCambridge: he MIT Press, 985)111.

4. Max Horkheimer,"The Authoritarian tate," in The ssential rankfurtchool ead-er, d.byAndrew rato ndEikeGebhardtNewYork: ontinuum ooks, 982) 07.







Nancy.Love 73

whetheriberation

follows seems ultimately o depend more upon hu-man willthaneconomic progress.Domination,Adorno hardlyneeds toremindus,can outlast heplanned economy.

Domination has outlasted economic planningbecause instrumental

rationality etards evolutionarywill. nstrumental ationalitybjectifieslife: t"recognizes no function ther than thepreparationoftheobjectfrommere sensorymaterial n order to make itthe matterofsubjuga-tion" and itapprehends being "under theaspect ofmanufacture andadministration."6 Economically, capitalism and socialism similarly

objectifynature as matter,men as producers, and their nteractionasproducts. Politically,state capitalism and state socialism transformmarket freedoms into administrativeplans. Under the authoritarianstate, capitalist or socialist, repression becomes an administrative

necessity.Horkheimer says: "With each bit ofplanning completed, abit of repressionwas originally upposed to become unnecessary. n-stead, more repression has developed in the administration of the

plans."7 Potential pposition sources,e.g.,trade unions and proletarian

parties,become

cogsina bureaucraticmachine.Even

utopiafollows he

administrative tructure. enin's dream that ocietywillbecome a singleoffice nd a single factorywithequalityof labor and pay is a Weberian

nightmare.8n the authoritarian tate, ommoditiesand plans rule and"Men are]conceivedsobjects,fnecessarilys theirwn.""

This self-objectifications the most insidious transformationwhichoccurs. Critical theoristsregard the subject itself s a psychological"object" prepared from "mere sensorymatter." We are quite literal-

ly subjected. However, according to Marcuse, liberalism at least

defended individuality,the assertion of selfagainst society. In con-trast,the technological societywhich has superceded it encouragescompliance and adjustment. Instrumentalrationalitys internalized:"Individuals arestrippedof theirndividuality, otbyexternal ompul-

5. TheodorAdorno,Negativeialectics,rans. . B.AshtonNewYork:ContinuumBooks, 983) 21.

6. TheodorAdorno ndMaxHorkheimer,ialecticfEnlightenmentNewYork: on-tinuum ooks,1972)84.7. Horkheimer12.8. V. . Lenin, tatendRevolution,elected orksnOneVolumeNewYork:nternation-

alPublishers,971).9. Horkheimer97.








sion,butbythevery ationalitynderwhichtheyive."'0Although theydescribe these transformationsifferently,riticizingone-dimensionality r instrumental eason or identity,ritical heorists

similarly egardobjectification,t east nmodern society, s alienation.

Adorno and Horkheimer characterize the contradictoryondition of

modern man: "The submission ofeverything aturalto the autocratic

subjectfinallyulminates n themastery f theblindlyobjectiveand nat-ural."" With his, hey ransformMarx's dialecticofproduction ntothedialecticofenlightenment.

What though does this transformationnvolve? Needless to say,Marx's conceptionofan inevitable, mminent revolutioncontains his-torical rrors.But do thoseerrors lso callfor econsideration fMarxist

theory?What stherelationship etweenpractical nd theoretical ausesofour contemporary ondition?Is Marxismimplicated n thedialecticofenlightenment?How does critical heory tandwithreference o theMarxian dialectic?

Marx'sDialectical aterialism

The primary roblemfor ttempts o articulate ritical heorists' ela-

tionshiptoMarxismis theirreluctancedirectly o attackMarx. Instead,they riticizehumanistic nd scientificMarxism. To make explicit heir

implicit ritiqueofMarx, I examine hisanthropologicaland anthropo-morphic tendencies. These tendencies inkthe so-called early nd late,humanistic nd scientific, arx.

Myfocus is epistemology,and this raises a second problem. In the

effort o defend his materialismagainst its dealist adversaries,Marxneglected epistemology.Engels' later ttempts o fill hisvoid are,to saythe least, controversial.Although I cannot explore their ntellectualcollaboration here, I address thisproblem by emphasizing passageswhereMarx, f nly ncidentally,orroboratesEngels'views. beginwith

Engels'famousquestion,"Arewe able in our ideas and notionoftherealworld to produce a correct eflection freality?," nd his infamous an-swer: Yes.''2 By examiningthecomponent partsofdialecticalmaterial-

10. HerbertMarcuse, Some Social mplicationsfModernTechnology,"n The s-sentialrankfuirtchool eader 45.

11. Adornoand Horkheimer vi.12. Fredrichngels, udwigeuerbachndtheAge fClassical ermanhilosophy,New

York:nternationalublishers,941)22.







Nancy.Love 75

ism, demonstrate hatMarx concurs with his nswerand how this m-

plicateshim nthedialecticofenlightenment.As a materialist,Marx argues thata materialworldobjectively xists,

that s, exists ndependentlyofknowing subjects: "To saythatman is a

corporeal,iving, eal, sensuous, objectivebeingfullofnaturalvigor s to

saythathe hasreal, ensuous,bjectss theobjectsof hisbeingor ofhis ife,or thathe can only express his life n real, sensuous objects."'" Our

thoughts eflect ur sensory xperienceofthismaterialworld. Marx re-fers o ideas as "the materialworldreflectedby thehuman mind and

translatedinto forms of thought" and to ideology as the "reflex,""echo," or "sublimate" ofmaterial ife.14

Although the objective existence of matterand the abilityof our

thoughtsto reflect t are premises of dialectical materialism,Marx

bypassesphilosophical arguments o thiseffect. ialecticalmaterialismis a "real,positive cience" where "real" and "positive" mean sensuous-

lyascertained:"This method ofapproach is not devoid ofpremises. Itstartsout from the real premises and does not abandon them for amoment. Its

premisesaremen,not n

anyfantastic solation and

rigidi-ty,but in their ctual, empiricallyperceptibleprocess ofdevelopmentunder definiteconditions."'5 These premises of dialectical material-ism areto be neitherunderstood nor defendedabstractly.n fact,Marx

argues thatphilosophical abstractionshave no value independent of

history.16He rejects the Kantian (as Engels later rejects the neo-

Kantian) incomprehensible "thing-in-itself,"and the related dis-tinctionbetween reality nd appearances, practicallynottheoretical-

ly.As Engels says,"If we are able toprove the correctnessof our con-

ceptionofa naturalprocessbymaking tourselves,bringingt ntobeingout of ts conditions nd using t forour ownpurposes nthebargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible'thing-in-tself'."7

13. KarlMarx,EconomicndPhilosophicalanuscripntsf1844,TheMarx-Engelseader,ed. Robert .TuckerNewYork: orton, 978) 15.

14. KarlMarx,Capital,NewYork: nternationalublishers, 967)1, 19. Also see:KarlMarx,TheGermandeology,d. C. J.ArthurNewYork: nternationalublishers,

1977)47.15. Marx, he ermandeology7-48.16. Ibid.17. Engels, udwigeuerbach,3.For detailed iscussion fpractical nowledge,ee

LenDoyalandRogerHarris, The Practical oundationsfHuman Understanding,"New efteview39July983).








In accord with this emphasis upon practical activity,Marx criti-cizes previous materialists. Like the idealists theycriticized,they re

metaphysicians. Theirs ismerelya metaphysicsofmatter,not mind.

Engels characterizes a metaphysician: "For him a thingeither existsor does not exist; a thingcannot at the same time be itself nd some-

thing else." Unlike metaphysicians, dialecticians "comprehendthingsand theirrepresentations, deas, in theiressential connection,concatenation, motion, origin,and ending."" Dialecticians explorehow man's productive and conceptual relations to nature and socie-

ty develop historically. They maintain that neitherobjects nor ourconceptions ofthemare immutable.

Marx's own critique ofprevious philosophical and social scientific

concepts illustrates thisdevelopment. Marx argues thatHegel (andpresumably Kant)were thephilosophers ofpolitical economy: "It is

self-evident.., that"spectres," "bonds," "the higherbeing," "con-

cept," "scruple," are merelythe idealistic, spiritual expression, the

conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of the

veryempiricalfetters nd

limitations,withinwhich themode of

pro-duction of ife nd theformof ntercoursecoupled with tmove."'9Contemplative materialistsanalogously expressed thestandpoint

ofcivilsociety: theyonlysubstituted the domination ofthingsfor hedomination of"Being."20 Politicaleconomy, thesephilosophers' so-cial scientific nalogue, also has done "no more than interpret, ys-tematize, and defend in doctrinaire fashion the concepts of the

agents ofbourgeois production who are trapped in bourgeois pro-duction relations.''21

Socialist science takesa "new standpoint," that of' social humani-

18. Friedrichngels, Socialism:Utopian ndScientific,"n TheMarx-Engelseader,ed.byRobert . Tucker,NewYork:W.W.Norton ndCo., 1978) 96.Although ngelsdevelops hedialecticsfnature nd Marxfocuses n man'sdialectic ith ature,Marxexplicitlygrees hat ature,ikehistory,erifiesialectics.his houldnotbe urprising,sincehispremises equire t.On theonehand, odeclare hatman mposesdialecticalstructureponnatures toreverto an idealistmetaphysics,odeclaremindpredomi-nant vermatter.n the ther and, odeclarenature ndialecticalstoreverto mate-

rialistne. Matter xists bjectively,utnot tructureds objects. electedorrespondence(NewYork:nternationalublishers),89;Capital,:309 nd3:373-375.19. Marx, heGermandeology2.20. KarlMarx, ThesesonFeuerbach," umberten.21. Marx,Capital : 817.He also makes he amepoint nthefinal ection f hapter

one, On Commodities,"fvolume ne.







Nancy.Love 77

ty," to expose how these appearances distortreality.22Marx's cri-tique ofpolitical economy typifies hisstandpoint. Marx argues that

capitalist class relations alienate men from theirproductive activity,theirproducts, and their fellow men. Political economists objectifyeach aspect of thisalienation in a corresponding commodity fetish.First,men are alienated from theirproductive activity.The realityhere is that aborers sell their abor-power to capitalistswho controlwhether or not and the conditions under which theymaywork.The

corresponding commodityfetish s that all sortsof human labor have

a quantitative equivalent form or exchange-value. This fetish ob-scures the qualitatively different ocial utilityof various sorts of la-bor. Second, men are alienated fromtheirproducts. The realityhereis thatprivate laborers produce, private capitalists appropriate, andall men exchange products. The corresponding commodity fetish sthat,giventheequality of all sortsofhuman labor, all products havea quantitative equivalent from or exchange-value equal to the labor-

power required to produce them. This fetish obscures the qua-

litativelydifferent ocial use-value of various commodities.

Third,men are alienated fromtheirfellow men. The realityhere is that meninteractonly in exchange. The corresponding commodity fetish sthat"the mutual relations of theproducers, withinwhich the socialcharacterof their abour affirmstself, ake theform ofa social rela-tion between theproducts."23 This fetishobscures thesocial charac-terof human labor.

When Marx demystifies hese fetishesofpolitical economy byex-

posing theirorigins in capitalist class relations, his point is not that

political economists - or theirphilosophical compatriots - fail toreflect eality.Theydo reflect t.More precisely,theappearances theyportrayare distortionsonly because reality s itselfdistorted. Their

concepts are simply imitedbytheirhistoricalcontext.From a differ-ent,more advanced, standpoint scientific ocialists transcend thoselimits.

Yet socialist science onlyexposes, it does not overcome the diver-

gence ofappearance and reality ncapitalist society.Although theso-cialistscientistunderstands commodityfetishes s distortedappear-ances ofa distortedreality, hose distortionspersist.As G.A. Cohen

22. Marx, Theses"numberten.23. Marx,Capital :72.








expresses it, "Things do not seemdifferent o a workerwho knowsMarxism. He knows theyare different romwhat theycontinue toseem to be."24 As long as labor remains alienated, thingswill not beas they eem.

This introduces another, more profound Marxian relation be-tween theoryand practice. Man not only knows lifethroughlabor,and can therebyovercome the "incomprehensible thing-in-itself."Sciencealso can onlybecome true, eason canonlycorrespondtoreality,practically,hat s,through he creationofa societywherethings re as

theyppear.This s I understandt s Marx'spointnthe econd Thesison Feuerbach": "The questionwhether bjectivetruth anbe attributedto human thinkingsnota question ofthinking,ut isapractical uestion.Man mustprovethetruth, .e., thereality nd power,thethis-sidednessof his thinkingn practice."25ForMarx, the interrelatedmaterialandmentalseparationofsubjectand object in capitalist ociety s cause forrevolutionnotskepticism. ngels arguesthatwhat Marxcalls the"pure-ly cholasticuestion ofskepticism" ctually ignals ncipientrevolution:"The

growingperceptionthat

xistingocial institutions re unreason-

able andunjust, hat easonhasbecome unreason ndrightwrong,sonlyproof hatn themodesofproductionndexchange hangeshavesilentlyaken lacewithwhich he ocialorder, daptedtoearlier co-nomic onditions,s no ongernkeeping."'26

In a socialistocietywhere ubject ndobject orrespondmateriallytheywilldo somentallys well.Appearanceswillno longer istort e-causereality illno onger e distorted.ornow, ocialist ciencewithtspremises matter nd men) and its standpointsocial humanity)s

needed to reveal hedivergencefappearances rom eality. owever,afterealizingts ruth,ciencewillbecomesuperfluous.27he socialistnegationf henegationsclearlypositive:Thiscommunism..,.sthegenuineesolutionf he onflictetweenman andnature,ndbetweenman andman ... Communismstheriddle fhistoryolved, nd it

24. Thisdiscussion rawsheavily ponG.A.Cohen'sKarlMarx's heoryfHistory:

DefensePrinceton:rinceton niversityress, 978), ppendix1,"KarlMarxand theWitheringway f ocial cience."25. Marx, Theses,"number wo.26. Engels, Socialism:Utopian ndScientific"01.27. Marx ays hatAll ciencewouldbesuperfluousf hemanifestorm ndthe s-

sence f hings irectlyoincided."Capital,: 797.







Nancy.Love 79

knows tself o be this olution."28

In contrast, ritical heorists'dialectic lacks premises, a standpoint,and positivity. learly, heydisagreewithMarx on more than the mmi-nence and inevitabilityf revolution.Theyattack he dentityfobjects,includingthesubject,withthemselves nd one another. dentity-think-ing is "productive and conceptual species-imperialism" typical ofthedialectic ofenlightenment.29 uch species-imperialism links the

early and late, humanistic and scientificMarx. Since the charge of

species-imperialismpansthese tandarddivisions fMarxism, it s

best examined in terms ofhis anthropological and anthropomorph-ic tendencies.

AlthoughMarx rejectsFeuerbach's naturalanthropology,he positsa

self-proclaimedhistorical nthropology"of social producers.Whetherman's social "nature" isultimately"species-being" or an "ensemble ofsocial relations,"Adorno argues that the subsumption of empiricallyunique individuals under a collective ocial subject represses ndividual-

ity.30With thisemphasis upon individuality,Adorno distances critical

theoryfromproletariatand party;both are repressivecollectivities.

Adorno and Horkheimer also distance themselvesfromMarx's empha-sisupon our productivenature. "To make labor into a transcendent u-man activity," aysHorkheimer,"is an ascetic deology .... In thatso-cialists dhere tothisgeneralconcept,theymake themselves ntocarriersofcapitalist ropaganda."3' Onlybourgeois ideologists portrayabor asman's self-realization. nstead of production - a realm of necessitywhich persists nMarx's socialist society- critical theoristsproposevariousforms f"purposivepurposelessness."32

Production involves not only the anthropologicalobjectification fhumanity,but also man's anthropomorphic objectification fnature.An ontologyof abor epitomizes thisobjectification: ature existsto be

subjugated,to be made intoproducts.Adorno argues thatMarx's cri-

28. Marx, 844Manuscripts4.29. MartinJayses this hrase n"The Concept fTotalitynLukics ndAdorno,"

Telos2 Summer, 977).

30. Adorno,Negative41-143.31. Max Horkheimer,dimmerung,ublishedunderthepseudonymHeinrichRe-gius Zurich1934),181, uoted byMartin ay n "The Frankfurtchool'sCritique fMarxist umanism," ocial esearch9:2 (Summer 972): 94.

32. Adorno nd Horkheimer 1.AlsoseeAdorno,Minima oralia, phorism# 44andMarcuse's iscussion fpolymorphous erversitynEros ndCivilization.








tiqueof alienated labor

"...confuses the need to

approachthe

heteronomousand thus rrationalworld ... with he archaicbarbarism

that he onging subjectcannot ovewhat s alien and different, ith he

cravingfor ncorporationand persecution." He concludes that"If thealienwereno longerostracized,therehardlywould be anymore aliena-

tion."33Other Marxistconceptsare equally anthropomorphic.Adornocriticizes "reification,"in part, because it restrictsdialectics to epi-phenomena, i.e., to symptoms,not causes, of human suffering. ut healso argues thatreification,ikealienation,presentsthingness s a "radi-

cal evil" to be annexed by "philosophical imperialism."34AttackingMarx's distinction etweenreality nd appearance, Adorno also charac-terizes the "image" or "reflection"theoryofknowledgeas a materialistreversionto idealism, even barbarism.35

Productive nd conceptual imperialism, nthropologism nd anthro-pomorphism,converge nMarx's notion thatpracticeprovesthetruth.As critical heorists ead it,the "second thesis" reduces truth o power.This makes scientificocialism theextension,not thetranscendence, f

objectification. ruerevolutionary racticedepends

notupon

scientificformula,butupon the ntransigence ftheory.n responsetothose whowould characterize hispositionas leftHegelian,Adorno says,

The callforunity ftheorynd practice as irresistiblye-gradedtheoryoa servant's ole,removinghevery raitstshouldhavebroughto that nity. hevisastamp fpracticewhichwe demandof lltheoryecarrie censor's lacet.Yetwhereas heoryuccumbednthevauntedmixture,racticebecamenonconceptual,pieceof hepoliticstwassupposed

to ead outof; tbecame heprey fpower.6

He suggests hat:

The remainingheoreticalnadequacies nHegel and Marxbecamepart fhistoricalracticend can thusbe newly e-flectedpon ntheory,nstead f hought owing rrationallytotheprimacyfpractice.racticetself as neminentlyhe-oreticaloncept.37

33. Adorno,Negative72.34. Ibid.191.35. Ibid. 205-207.36. Ibid. 143.37. Ibid. 44.







Nancy.Love 81

Aconcept,

heimplies,

whichuncritically

eflectednlightenment

eas-on.

In accord with this analysis, criticaltheoristsminimize not onlyhumanistic labor,alienation, nd reification)utalso scientificproduc-tionand reflection)Marxist ategories.These categories, nd Marx totheextent hathe adherestothem,are implicated n the dialecticofenlight-enment.To transcendthetheoretical imitations f Marxismtheydraw

upon anew conceptofexchange,that fFriedrichNietzsche.

Nietzsche'senealogyfMorals

Althoughhe is stilloftenomittedfromtheirgenealogy,critical heo-rists urn o Nietzsche to transcendMarx's complicitynthe dialecticof

enlightenment. dornoand HorkheimerpraiseNietzscheas a mercilesshistorianf thebourgeois atio ndbase their ritiques f tupon his

conceptofpsychologicalexchange.38n examiningthat xchange prin-ciple, also focusupon Nietzsche'sepistemology, xploring tsmaterial-istand dialectical

aspects.This

strategyllows me to demonstratewhy

critical heoristshinkNietzschecancomplementMarx.Nietzsche criticizedmaterialism, but he was stillfundamentallya

materialist. Like Marx, he maintains thata material world exists in-

dependentlyofknowing ubjects.But he differsromothermaterialists,

includingMarx, nhisconceptionofthatmaterialworldand man's placein t.WhatNietzsche riticizessmaterialisttomismwhichhemistakesformaterialism itself."9He argues that materialistatomists, like the

idealiststhey riticize, remetaphysicians. n their earchfor reality"

theymerelydescend tothingsrather hanascend tobeing. Contrary oboth, Nietzsche asks us to "Suppose nothingelse were given' as real

except our world of desires and passions, and we could notgetdown,

38. Adorno ndHorkheimer19.39. Nietzsche quatedmaterialismnd atomismnthefollowing assage: As for

materialisttomism,t soneof hebest efutedheoriesherere... thankshieflyothe

Dalmatian oscovich...Boscovich astaughts to bjure he eliefnthe astpart f heearth hat'stood ast' hebeliefn substance,'n matter,'n the arth-residuumndpar-ticle-atom:t sthegreatestriumphver he enses hat as beengained n earthofar."

(Nietzsche, eyondoodndEvil, phorism#12). lsewhere, eprobes he rudimentarypsychology"he aithnthe goas causeresidualnthe tom. Twilightfthedols, he orta-bleNietzscherans.Walter aufmannNewYork:heVikingress, 954] 95.)








orup, toanyother reality'besides therealityfour

drives."'4That

re-ality, esays,swill opower ndnothinglse:

... Onehas torisk hehypothesis hether illdoes not ffectwillwherevereffects'rerecognized andwhether ll me-chanical occurences are not,insofar s force s active nthem,will orce,ffectsfwi 1.41

With this concept of matter,Nietzsche reveals that he is also adialectician,despite his critiqueof dialectics.42His dialectic is simplymore radical thanthose - again,Marx's among them- which he crit-icizes. Marx also rejectsmaterialist atomism (he calls it empiricism)and argues that neither ubjects nor objects are entities.Yet forMarx,boundaries between man and nature,man and man persist.Socialist

production and socialist science as negationsof thenegation presumetheexistenceofopposition and the need tomaster t.Masteringoppo-sition,according toNietzsche, differs romtranscending t.His worldas willtopowerhas no boundaries tobe mastered.

Man as a subject is notrelatedto objects, even inMarx's dialecticalsense, but only to other congelations offorce: "The subject alone isdemonstrable; hypothesisthatonly subjects exist - that object' is

only kindof ffectroducedby subject pona subject a modus fthe ubject."'4 ven thesubjectdoes notexistas an entity.Nietzsche de-scribes thesubjectas "no subject,butan action,a positing,creative,no

40. Friedrich ietzsche, eyondoodndEvil,BasicWritingsfNietzsche,ranslatedyWalter aufmannNewYork:RandomHouse, 1966), phorism#36.Nietzsche xplicit-

lydistinguishesismonistmaterialismromdealism:Weare tosee theworld not as adeception,s mere ppearance,' n idea' (inthe enseofBerkeleyndSchopenhauer)but sholding he amerank frealitysour ffectsamoreprimitiveorm f heworldof ffectsnwhich verythingtilliescontainedn a powerful nity eforetundergoesramificationsnddevelopmentsntheorganic rocess." shouldnotethatNietzschecanconsistentlyspousematerialismndskepticism.he distinctionetweenmaterial-ist nd idealist ntologiesmustnotbe confusedwith hat etween kepticalndrealistepistemologies. orexample,Kant and Hume belongtogethers skeptics, hereasHegelandEngels elong ogethersrealists.

41. Nietzsche, eyondoodnd vil, phorism#36.42. WhatNietzsche riticizesnd understandssdialecticspersesa dialecticfreas-

on. See:Twilightfthedols,76-479). his argete shares o ome xtent ithMarx: othdeny hat easondetermineseality.urther,eitherrecludes he doption fa differ-ent,both wouldprobably ayde-mystified,ypothesishathistorys dialecticallyr-deredbyman's endencyo xpandhis reative producingrwilling powers.

43. FriedrichNietzsche,TheWillto Power, rans. Walter Kaufmann nd R.J.HollingdaleNewYork: andomHouse,1968),phorism#569.







Nancy. Love 83

causes and effects." hesubject

ismerely

n orderedplurality

fdriveswhich discharges itswill in relation to other such pluralities: "No

thingsremain but only dynamic quanta, in a relationof tension to allotherdynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other

quanta, in their effect' pon thesame."44ForNietzsche, the notion ofa world structureddialectically sprofoundlyundialectical; it s a con-tradiction nterms.A dialectical world isfundamentally haotic: "Thetotal characterof theworld..,. is in all eternityhaos - in the sense notof a lack ofnecessitybut of a lackoforder,arrangement,form,beauty,

wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aestheticanthropomorphisms."4"

According to Nietzsche, subject, object, and their dentity re aes-thetic anthropomorphisms which originate in a psychological ex-

change coterminouswithsocietyand humanity.He argues that con-sciousness, thecapacitywhichdistinguisheshumans fromnature,re-sultsfrom ocial repression.The "oldest state" was a "fearful yranny"which"broughtman to reason" bypunishinghimfordisobeying ocialnorms. The idea ofpunishmentdraws tspower"in the contractual ex-change]relationbetween creditornd debtor, hich s as old as the dea of

'legal subjects,'and... pointsback to the fundamentalforms fbuying,selling,barter, rade,and traffic."' The original nstinctual rtistswhoformed man exchanged the creditor'spsychological pleasure in inflict-

ing physicalpain forthe debtor's infractionof the communal con-tract. Later, theologians and moralists spiritualized punishment;they replaced physicalwithpsychic pain. The history f culture s the

spiritualizationofcruelty.Nietzsche regardsChristianitys itsculmi-

nation: man now owes a debt (sin)to a creditor God) whichcan neverbe repaid. Guilt,which also originates n the"verymaterialconcept ofdebts," is his torture.Needless to say,Nietzsche thinkshumanityhasbeen "dearly bought." Whenman became reasonable, he also becameascetic. Preventedbysocietyfromhurting thers,he hurthimself.Heinternalizedhis nstincts.

It s thesubject's imposed identity,tsequivalence to an internalizedcommunal contract,which man projectsoutward n attemptstomake

44. Nietzsche, heWilltoPower,phorism#635.45. Friedrich ietzsche, heGay cience,rans.WalterKaufmannNewYork:Ran-

domHouse,1974),phorism#109.46. Nietzsche, he enealogyfMorals,art ,aphorism#4.








realityequivalent to reason. Nietzsche argues that.onceone sees thesubject as a fictionmanyotherrealizationsfollow.With ubjectand ob-

ject,the dea oftheir dentity,ndeed distinctions etweentruth nd illu-sion,realitynd appearance, disappear.

It sonly fter hemodel of he ubject hatwe have nventedthe ealityf hingsndprojectedhem nto hemedleyf en-sations.fwe no longer elieve n theeffectiveubject, henbelief lsodisappearsneffectivehings... At ast he thing-

in-itself'"lso disappears, ecausethis s fundamentallyheconceptionf "subject-in-itself."utwehavegrasped hatthesubject s a fiction. he antithesisthing-in-itself"nd"appearance" s untenable;with hat, owever,heconcept"appearance" lsodisappears.47

Subject, object, and their identity re fetishesof psychological ex-

changes.Man has projectedhis self-denial utward,denying ife s willtopower.

Withhisnotion ofpsychologicalexchange,Nietzscheannounces the

death notonlyofGod, butalso oftruth s manhasknown t.Theism andatheism,Christianitynd science,rest on the same shakyfoundation,"on the same overestimation f truthmore exactlyon thesame beliefthat ruths inestimableand cannotbe criticized)."48Foralthoughsci-entists emystify etaphysical ruths,hey etain metaphysical aith ntruth. heyexpose successive horizons as illusions,but eaveman withhorizon - thevalue of truth whichpresumesthat heresultingworldwithouttruth s valueless. Their nihilismmerely expresses a different

pole of man's mistakenfaithn truth: he Christian'sheavenis true;thescientists'world sfalse.By showing hepyschological xchange nwhichtruthoriginates,Nietzsche demystifiesboth poles. He says, "The

categories im,unity, eingwhichwe used toproject ome value intotheworld we pull out again; so theworld looks valueless." And, he con-cludes: "Faith nthecategories freasonisthe cause ofnihilism.We havemeasured thevalueoftheworldaccordingtocategories hat efero purelyfictitiousorld ... What we findhereis still hehyperbolicaiveteofman:

positinghimself s themeaningand measure ofthevalue ofthings."49

47. Nietzsche, heWilltoPower,phorism#552.48. Nietzsche,heGenealogyfMorals, art ,aphorism#25.49. Nietzsche, heWilltoPower,phorism#12.







Nancy.Love 85

Since Christianitynd scienceexpressasceticpsychology,iberationre-quires thatboth be overcome together.This Marx failsto do. With his

conceptsofsubject, object, and their ventual dentity, e continues to

deny ife nd refuses o affirm he "innocenceofbecoming."YetNietzsche's lternative,isconception f ife s willtopower s

equally, ifdifferently,epressive.That conception contains two para-digmsofpower:poweras recurring nergy nd poweras domination.50Criticaltheorists dopt the formerparadigm to expose the originsofMarxianidentity-thinkingnpsychologicalexchange,butthey eject he

latter aradigmas expressive feconomic exchange.It sthebourgeoisiewho posit a pre-social man, see society as an exchange, respondskepticallyo truth, nd counsel love offate.5'Nietzsche is a profoundcriticof the bourgeois ratio,but he too conformsto it.AccordingtoAdorno,Nietzsche'sphilosophy sprofoundly ositivistic.52ritical he-orists' ask s toturnhisreactionary rgument gainstWestern ulture o-wardprogressive nlightenment,o combine Nietzsche's psychologicalwithMarx's economic critiqueofexchange.

Epistemology,xchange,nd Criticalheory

This combination ofMarxian and Nietzschean exchange-principlesappears inAdorno and Horkheimer's"primeval history fthesubject,"which links economic and psychologicalexpressions of equivalence.Adorno triesto transcendthose equivalences by establishing he non-

identityfsubjectsand objectswith hemselves nd one another.He ar-

gues hatranscendingquivalencenvolves hree elatedoncerns:ndi-

viduality,particularity, nd non-conceptuality.Adorno and Hork-heimerdefend individuality y attacking ubjectivity. hey argue that

historicallyMen havealwayshad to choose between their ubjectionto

50. OfeliaSchutte evelops his istinctionnherBeyondihilism: ietzscheithoutMasksChicago:UniversityfChicago ress, 984).

51. Forthese criticismsfNietzsche ee: DialecticfEnlightenment,7-99;MinimaMoralia,phorisms 59#60#61.

52. Adorno rgues hatNietzsche ltimatelys positivist:Nietzsche,he rreconci-lableadversaryfourtheoreticaleritagenmetaphysics,ad ridiculed hedifferencebetween ssenceand appearance.He had relegated he backgroundworld'to the'backwoodsman,'oncurringerewith ll ofpositivism... famanrates llphenomenaalikebecausehe knows fno essence hatwould allowhimtodiscriminate,e will nafantasizedoveoftruth ake ommon ausewith ntruth."Negative69).








natureorthesubjectionof nature totheSelf."53

earingbondage to na-ture,men havechosen tosubject t othemselves.Yet norder tosubjectnatureto themselves,men first ad to differentiatehemselvesfrom t.Like Marx and Nietzsche, Adorno and Horkheimer claim that

rationalityistinguishesman fromnature.But their nalysis f tsoriginsparallelsNietzsche's not Marx's. Adorno arguesthatrationalityesultsfromfearofsociety s well as nature. ndividuals became subjects, .e.,they nternalized social norms, to avoid ostracizationand/orpunish-ment. He claimsthat ivilizationwas "unimaginablyhardforpeople to

bring themselvesto undergo": "The instinctual nergyof the homoeconomicuswholords tover the homo psychologicus sthecompulsivelove forwhatwasonce hated; thad tobe hammeredin.''54Psychologicaland economic exchange coincide, and both are coterminous with hu-

manity.Adorno and Horkheimerargue that therationalitywithwhich man

subjectsexternalnaturerevealshis internal ubjection.As conceptsre-place the"primal cry"and objectify ature, o the"I" breaks the "im-

mediacyofprimary elations"and objectifies heself.s5 dorno says hatthe "unityof consciousness" is itself a reflection f thelogical identi-ty."56He concludes thatconsciousness notonlycreatessubjects, talso

destroys hem,by makingthemobjects.57 o escape this ubjection,the

ego must become the ocus of social oppositionnotsocial oppression.5This is themeaningofAdorno's assertion f ndividualitynstead of ub-

jectivity.Unlikesubjects, ndividuals are not monads but pluralitiesofdrives.Theyare"boundlesslyelastic, ubjectless ubjects."59

Adorno arguesthat ubjectivityeniesparticularitys well as individ-

uality: The superiorityfobjectificationnthesubjects,notonlykeepsthemfrombecoming subjects; tequally prevents cognitionofobjec-tivity."60dealists and materialists xternalize the ego, projectingits

53. Adorno ndHorkheimer,ialecticfEnlightenment,2.54. TheodorAdorno, SociologyndPsychology,"ew efteview, 46-47Decem-

ber67andJanuary8):71-72.55. Adorno, egative76.56. Ibid. 72.57. Ibid. 42.58. Adorno, Sociology ndPsychology"6 and"Subject ndObject"504. In the

latter assage,Adorno ays, Theself-positingubjects an llusion nd atthe ametimehistoricallyery eal. t ontainshepotentialf ublatingts wnrule."

59. Adorno,Minima oralia,phorism#23.60. Adomrno,egative71.







Nancy.Love 87

identity pon objects.Theirrespective onceptsofbeingand things tyr-annize overreality nd failto reach it.Reality, ontrary o their oncep-tions of it, s incomplete, contradictory,nd fragmented.Adorno says"While our images ofperceived realitymay verywell be Gestalten,heworldnwhichwe ive snot; t s constitutedifferentlyhan utofmereimages ofperception."6'Unlikepreviousmaterialists, dorno respectstheconcreteparticular'snon-identitywith tself nd his concepts.The

particular sthatwhich cannotbe named: "The conceptoftheparticularisalwaystsnegationt the ametime; t uts hortwhat heparticulars

and what nonethelesscannot be directly amed, and itreplacesthiswithidentity."62 e concludes that he iberatedsubjectwill also liberateob-

jects;hewillbe their gent,not their onstituent.As theobject's gent,Adorno s a dialecticianswell s a materialist.

But,again ikeNietzsche,he would transcend ialectics angerouslyundialecticaltructure.63on-conceptualityust eplace he onceptu-al correspondencef subjectand object.Adornoacknowledgeshedifficultieshis reates: We can seethroughhe dentityrinciple,utwecannot hinkwithoutdentifying."64e concludes hat ialecticiansmust thinkgainst hought."Asthinking,"esays, dialecticalogicrespectshatwhichstobethoughthe bject venwhere he bjectdoesnotheedthe ules f hinking."65

Dialectical hought espects bjects byexcluding ntological on-cepts, .g.,premises, tandpoints,ndpositivity,nd focusingnsteadupon "inner-historicalomplexes."Likeontological heorists,riticaltheoristsistinguishetween ssence ndexistence,ut na profoundlydifferentay. he formereek oncealed rmanifestntentionsyposit-

ing metaphysicalealityeneath rbeyond henomena. he attern-terpretnintentionalealities ithinhenomena hemselves,reating"nonmetaphysicalmetaphysics."Adorno describeshis dialecticalmethod,whichhe saysMarx "largely" an important ualification)shares, s immanentritique.mmanence lluminatesssencesbyex-posing the contradictionetweenwhat hingsre andwhat hey laim

61. TheodorAdorno, TheActualityfPhilosophy,"rans. enjamin now,Telos 1

(Spring 977): 26.62. Adorno,Negative73.63. Adornosays, The polarityfsubject nd objectmaywellappearto be an

undialecticaltructurenwhich lldialectics akes lace,"Negative74.64. Ibid. 49.65. Ibid. 41.








tobe."66 Such illuminationsdo requireexternality,utas thecreationofconstellationsnot the mpositionofconcepts.Constellations econstruct

aphenomenon so that tsessence becomes visible within t.Adorno ar-

gues that"By themselves constellationsrepresentfromwithoutwhattheconcepthas cutawaywithin: he more' which theconceptisequallydesirous and incapable of being."'67Because they transcend con-

ceptualization, these "inner-historical omplexes" representa third

possiblitybeyond positivismand idealism.68Adorno exemplifiesthismethod in his critiqueofidentity-thinking.mmanentcritiquereveals

that hemore he ubjectsobjectified,he ess t sconstitutive.hatrev-elationappears through heconstellation fproductive nd conceptualexchange.

Accordingto critical heorists,ndividuality, articularity,nd non-

conceptualityavoid extending the "coercion of conscience" to the"realm oftheory."These "concepts" allow theirdialectic to transcendMarxian and Nietzschean limitations, o overcome economic and psy-chological exchange.

Criticalontradictions

We have seen thatMarxian and Nietzscheanexchangeprinciplesare

incompleteand that ach illuminates he other's imitations.A Marxian

critiqueof Nietzsche exposes his denial ofthe identity,ven the exist-ence, ofsubjectsand objects as bourgeois. Nietzsche's skepticismmayaccurately xpress thereal separationofsubjectand object (forcriticaltheorists heirdisappearance) in capitalist society.StillNietzsche, like

politicaleconomists,mistakes his"given" reality fexchangerelationsamong egoistic ndividualsfornature.Marx says, For thebourgeoisit sso much the easier toprove on thebasis of hislanguage,the dentity fcommercial and individual,or even universal,human relations, incethis anguage itselfsa productofthebourgeoisie,and thereforenactu-

ality s in language the relationsofbuyingand sellinghave been madethebasis ofallothers."69When Nietzscherejects ruth s equivalence,he

66. Ibid. 67.67. Ibid. 62.68. Ibid. 66.For discussion fhowAdorno reatesonstellationseeBuck-Morss,

The riginfNegativeialectics,hap.6.69. Marx, he ermandeology02.







Nancy. Love 89

also reinforces hebourgeois separationofsubjectand object.He deniesthat hat eparationand thesufferingt causes can be overcome,and he

accepts separation and suffering y affirmingife.Unlike Nietzsche,Marx regardsman's alienation under capitalismas an argumentnot

against ruth, utagainst lifewhichfails o conform o t.

AccordingtoNietzsche,thisMarxianposition sascetic, n expressionof the life-denyingwill to truth. Marx does demystifymetaphysicaltruths, eings and things.Buthis conceptsofsubject, object, and theireventual identity nder socialism stillexpress a metaphysicalfaith n

truth.Marx toohasmistakenhis"given" reality, sychological xchangerelations mong egoistic ndividuals,fornature.By denying ifebecauseitdoes not conform to truth,Marx reinforcesman's psychologicalre-

pression.He creates new secular "willtonothingness."Nietzschesaysof scientific ocialism: "In summa: ne has tranferred he arrivalof the

'kingdomofGod' into thefuture, n earth, n human formbut funda-

mentally ne has held fast o the belief n theold deal."'7 UnlikeMarx,Nietzsche regardsman's asceticpsychologicalsickness s an argument

notagainst ife, utagainst ruthwhichdenies it.The mutual imitations fMarx's and Nietzsche'sexchangeprinciplessuggestthatsyntheses f themmighttranscendeconomic and psycho-logical oppression. Yet thismutual critiqueshows what subverts such

syntheses.Marx and Nietzsche each succumb to theexchangerelationwhichthe otherattacks:Marx criticizes apitalist conomics from n as-ceticpsychological perspective;Nietzsche criticizes sceticpsychologyfrom capitalist conomic one. Theirperspectives ontradict, ot com-

plement,one another, nd this s not a dialecticalcontradiction.Combi-

nations of their ritiques lluminate,but do notobviate,this contradic-tion.Theyend inschizophrenia,notsynthesis.

The contradiction etween Marxian and Nietzscheanexchange prin-ciples appears in critical heorists' nsistence hat ubjectand object are

separated both historicallynd ontologically.Adorno expresses both

positions n thefollowing uotation: "The subjecterects hatblock [be-tweensubject and object] by claiming supremacyover the object and

thereby efrauding tself ftheobject.As truly on-identical, heobjectmoves the

fartherrom he

subjectthemore the

subjectconstitutes he

object.))71

70. Nietzsche, heWilltoPower,phorism#339.71. Adorno, Subject ndObject," nThe ssentialrankfurtchooleader07.








Adorno'sinsistence hat

ubjectand

objectare

only separatedhistori-

cally is ascetic: he continues to deny life for truth.Along these lines,

Adorno arguesthat ssociatinghiscritiqueof dentity ith rrationalismis "horridsophistry."72houghtiscurrently commodity, utultimate-

lyit is inseparable fromfreedom. When Adorno associates rationalityand freedom,he abandons Nietzsche for Kant. He claims that Nie-tzsche's mercilessexposure of the identity f domination and reason

"implicitly iberatesfrom tshiding place the utopia contained in theKantiannotionofreason as inevery reatphilosophy:theutopia of hu-

manitywhich, itselfno longer distorted,has no furtherneed to dis-tort."73Adomno cknowledgesthe question he raises here: Do criticaltheoristshave a hidden conceptionofBeing?But he refuses o answer,maintaining nlythat uch a conceptionofBeingisunnecessary ocriti-cal theory.'7fsuch a conceptionis present, trepresents reversion o

species-imperialism.If a conceptionofbeingisabsent, f ubjectand objectare"trulynon-

identical,"Adorno becomes bourgeois. He also acknowledgesthis ob-

jectionto critical

heory.Some he

sayswill accuse him of "unfruitful

negativity."''75his accusation arises because Adorno's attack pon iden-

titynvolvesmore than a critiqueofcommodity xchange. Negativedia-lectics, sAdorno describes t, s a critiqueof"constitutive onsciousness

itself."'76ut, if rationality nd societyare repressive,then only the

speechless solipsist sfree.Adorno does arguethat he solated ndivid-ual nowperceivesreality etter han a functional ollectivedoes. He also

saysthatdirect communication is no longera criterion f truth. ince

conceptsestablishequivalences, the isolated individual's freedom can-

not be communicated. Adorno criticizeseven proletarianwriting orcodifying oppression, and characterizes writing,now that demy-thologizationhas destroyed anguage, as a Sisyphean task.77Adorno

72. "Adorno'sRadicalism: wo Interviewsrom heSixties" rans.RussellBerman,Telos 6 (Summer1983).

73. AdornoandHorkheimer19.74. Adorno, ActualityfPhilosophy" 32. I willnotdecide whether particular

conceptionfmanandbeing ies tthebaseofmy heory,ut do deny henecessityfresortingothis onception.t san idealist emand, hat f n absolutebeginning,s

only ure hought y tselfanaccomplish."75. Ibid.76. Adorno,Negative48.77. Adorno,Minima oralia, phorisms#65 nd#142. or moredetailed iscus-

sion see:SeylaBenhabib, ModernityndtheAporias fCritical heory," elos9 (Fall1981).








tiverationality

tselfscapes psychologicalexchange.

Habermasarguesthatthe dialecticofenlightenmenteveals "coerciverelationships fsys-

tematically istorted ommunication."82 oweverAdorno, by refusingo

groundcriticalheory,onceals theconceptofnon-coercive ommunica-tionupon whichthisrevelation ests.Tracesofcommunicative ationalitynonetheless ppear inAdorno's philosophy, pecifically,nhisconceptofreconciliation.AccordingtoHabermas, reconciliation has the structureof a life together n communication that is free from coercion."83Habermas arguesthat his ife santicipatednspeechwheneverwe try o

speakthe truth: Critique laysclaim to no more than what s impliedineveryday iscourse,but also to no less."s4Habermas' ideal speech situa-tionclarifies hepragmatic resuppositions f peech,thecriteria ornon-coercive communication. Communicativera-tionality equires "inter-

subjective ymmetry"n "assertion nd dispute,revelation nd conceal-ment, prescription nd conformity."Habermas refers o these three

symmetries s "a linguistic onceptualizationofwhat are traditionallyknown s the deas of ruth, reedom, nd ustice.''"85

But arethesepresuppositions

fspeech adequate

foundations or riti-caltheory? nd issymmetricalntersubjectivitynadequate imageofnon-coercive ommunication?AlthoughNietzsche'sanalysis fpsychologicalexchange stooradical, tdoes suggest hatHabermas' alternativesn't ad-ical enough.86 ymmetricalntersubjectivitystablishes quivalencesbe-tween ndividuals.An instructivearallelappearshere betweenproletari-an dictatorship nd ideal speech. Theyrepresent ealizations, conomicand psychological, espectively,fexchange.Marx saysthat hedictator-

Without evolution? abermas'Theorieeskommunikativenandelns,"abermasndMo-dernity,d. RichardBernsteinCambridge: he MIT Press,1985)95-119 nd ThomasMcCarthy,ComplexityndDemocracy,rThe Seducementsf ystems heory," ewGermanritique5 Spring/Summer985): 7-53.

82. Habermas,Philosophical07.83. Ibid. 09.84. Ibid.85. Jiurgenabermas, Towards Theory f Communicative ompetence,"n-

quiry3(1970): 72.86. I want, hen, odistinguish y riticismsf ymmetricalntersubjectivityrom

poststructuralists'ietzschean-inspiredttemptso bolish ubjectivity.hose ttemptsmanifesthe ameperformativeontradictions criticalheory.oststructuralists,ow-ever, ddress his aradoxoftotal ritique ather ifferently:heyffirmpluralismfmeaningsndpowers.Habermashasargued hat oststructuralists'seofNietzsche asconservativemplications.ee his"Modernityersus ostmodernity,"ewGermanri-tique2 Winter 981): -14 nd"TheGenealogicalWritingfHistory: n SomeAporias







Nancy.Love 93

shipof the

proletariatrecognizesno class differences. here are no

laborers,no capitalists ecause all are laborers, ll are capitalists: Bothsides of therelationshipre raised to an imaginedniversality labor s astate nwhichevery erson sput,andcapital s theacknowledgeduniver-

sality nd powerofthecommunity.""7he ideal speech situation nalo-

gouslyrecognizesno communicationdifferences.n Nietzschean lan-

guage,there reno debtors,no creditors ecause all are debtors,all arecreditors.Again, both sides oftherelationship ssumean imagineduni-

versality:peech s a state n which very ersonisput,and truth rjustice

aretheacknowledgeduniversalitynd powerofthecommunity.The problemwith heseequivalences- or symmetries is that hey

applya universal rinciple oparticularndivdiuals. n constructingocial

relationships,hey bstract rom oncrete ndividualsdifferingeeds and

capacities.For thisreason,Marxarguesthat qual right,ike very ight,s

inevitably nequal. "Rightby ts ery ature an consist nly nthe pplica-tionof an equal standard;butunequal individuals andtheywould notbedifferentndividuals f heywerenotunequal) aremeasurable only byan

equal standard nso far s they rebroughtunder an equal pointofview,are takenfrom ne definite ideonly... everythinglsebeing gnored."88Freedom s notthis ealization fequal exchange,butthe ranscendence f

exchange ltogether.To transcend exchange, critical theoristsmust pursue what Seyla

Benhabibhas called radical ntersubjectivity.adical intersubjectivityn-volves therecognition fconcrete, pecific, otabstract, eneralized ndi-viduals.This recognitions not found n the formalreciprocityfrights,but in a norm of complementary eciprocity. enhabib's definition f

complementaryeciprocitys worth uotingat ength: Each isentitled oexpect nd to assumefrom heother orms fbehavior hroughwhich heotherfeelsrecognizedand confirmed s a concrete,ndividualbeingwith

specific eeds,talents,nd capacities.Our differencesn this ase comple-mentratherhan xcludeone another."89heargues hat uch a normcon-firms otonlyour sharedhumanity,ut lso our human ndividuality.

inFoucault's heory fPower," anadianournalf oliticalndSocial heory0:1-21986).AlsoseeKenneth sher,Deconstruction'sse andAbuseofNietzsche," elos2 (Win-

ter 984-5): 69-178.87. Marx, conomicnd hilosophicanuscripts3.88. Marx,Critiqueftheotharogram,heMarx-Engelseader 30.89. Critique,orm,topia: Studyf he oundationsf riticalheoryNewYork: olum-

bia Universityress,1986)341. Benhabibdoes not,however, rawhercritique fHabermas'universalismrom ietzsche'sxchange rinciple.








Radical intersubjectivitysnotabsentfrom hehistoryfcritical heory.Indeed,elements f t ppear intheworks fthese uthors.Marxsays hatthe"higherphase" of communist ociety rosses"thenarrowhorizonof

bourgeois rightn ts ntirety"nd inscribes n itsbanner: "Fromeach ac-

cording o hisability,oeach according ohisneeds!"'9Nietzschepraisesthe transcendenceof ustice: "Justicewhich began with, everythings

dischargeable, everythingmust be discharged,'ends by winkingand

lettinghose ncapableofdischargingheir ebtsgofree."He callsthis elf-

overcomingof ustice "mercy"; t s "theprivilege fthe mostpowerful

man,orbetter, is- beyondthe aw."9' Adorno's conceptofreconcilia-tionaffirmsnterrelatednessithoutdentity:The reconciled tatewouldnot annex thealienwith philosophical mperialism, utwould find ts

happiness nthefact hat he lien remaineddistinct nd remotewithinhe

preserved roximity,eyond beingeither eterogeneous rone's own."92

Thoughhemisinterpretsdorno on thispoint,Habermas' linguisticon-

ceptoffreedom s "significantapportdespitethe nviolabledistancebe-tweenthepartners," apportwhich he describesas "communicationun-der conditions of

individuation,"does include

aspectsof radical

intersubjectivity.93ikeNietzsche,Habermas also recognizesthe imita-tions of ustice. He arguesthat a gain in rationalityccurswhen moral

questionsare transformedntoproblemsofjustice.But thistransforma-tion lso involves loss of ensitivityospecific ontexts.He concludesthat"This necessary isregard or hecomplexity fconcrete ife..,. calls for

specific ompensationsthatmakegood thedeficits ithregard o theap-plication nd realization fmoral nsights."94

Critical heoristsmustdevelop these elements of radical intersubjec-

tivity. heymust redirect ationalityromrights oneeds,fromustice tomercy, rom dentityointerrelatedness.hispath eads beyondpsycho-logicaland economicexchange.Since Nietzscheprompts ur searchfor t,Habermas is wrong to reject his challenge to Enlightenment.ButHabermas rightlyefuses o followhim,forradical intersubjectivitys a

pathNietzschefailedto find.Nietzsche'spath,thepathofnon-identity,leadsbeyondrationalitynd society,nd leavesexchangebehind.

90. Marx,Critiqueftheotharogram31.91. Nietzsche, he enealogyfMorals,econd ssay,ection#10.92. QuotedbyHabermas, hilosophical08.93. Habermas, TowardsTheory fCommunicativeompetence" 72.94. Jiurgenabermas, Questions ndCounterquestions,"abermasndModernity

(Cambridge: heMITPress, 985) 10.

nancy love - epistemology and exchange: marx, nietzsche, and critical theory

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