POL 319India-China-USStrategic Interactions

China’s Shadow Foreign Policy: Parallel Structures Challenge the Established International Order By Sebastian Heilmann, Moritz Rudolf, Mikko Huotari and Johannes Buckow

China’s foreign policy is working systematically towards a realignment of the international order through establishing parallel structures to a wide range of international institutions. China has taken on a key role in financing these alternative mechanisms that are designed to increase China’s autonomy vis- à-vis U.S.-dominated institutions and to expand its international sphere of influence.

What are the arenas in which this is happening?

financial and monetary policy-

The financial structures advanced by China duplicate in part the Bretton-Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) or serve to internationalize the Chinese currency (Renminbi, RMB). In addition, companies such as UnionPay or United Credit Rating Agency are currently challenging the monopoly position of U.S. credit card companies (VISA, MasterCard) and rating agencies (Moody's, Fitch, S&P).

The Chinese government is striving towards a controlled internationalization of China's currency through a step-by-step expansion of the use of the RMB in Chinese foreign trade and investment. Towards this end, a worldwide network of agreements dealing with central bank currency swaps, the direct exchange of the RMB with other currencies, and RMB clearing hubs has been built.

trade and investment-

transregional infrastructure projects –

security policy-

technology, in particular ICT-

diplomatic forums.

Table 1

How can we best understand the nature of strategic interaction using Chinese behavior?

China’s Triangle Diplomacy

Mel Gurtov

What is the balance of conflicting and consistent interests between China and the US?

US-China-Taiwan relations?

Hong Kong democracy movement?

Climate change?

Obama-Xi meeting produced quite a number of other accords that are noteworthy. These are confidence-building measures to avoid potential air or naval confrontations, visa extension that will facilitate people-to-people exchanges, and broadening of trade in information technology. Needless to say, plenty of contentious issues remain unsettled besides the South China Sea territorial dispute, such as cyber hacking, human rights, and free-trade agreements in Asia. But on balance, the US-China agenda moved forward rather than backward as a result of the Obama-Xi meeting.

How do we understand US-China interactions in the SCS and ECS as part of this collection of strategic interactions?

China – Japan relations?

During the November summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Beijing, Xi Jinping met briefly with Abe Shinzo—a small breakthrough in China-Japan relations inasmuch as the Chinese had previously rejected such a meeting unless Japan acknowledged that their territorial dispute is in fact a dispute. Out of that meeting came a four-point agreement to promote mutual confidence and restore dialogue. () The two sides sidestepped the territorial dispute by acknowledging “different viewpoints” on the issue. More concretely, they agreed to set up a mechanism to avoid maritime conflicts in the East and South China

Seas. China showed its reasonableness when dealing with a potentially dangerous situation—a confrontation with Japan at sea that has seen several close calls between vessels in recent years.

Xi probably welcomed Abe’s post-meeting comment that China and Japan “need each other” and are “inseparably bound together.” Since then, in a sign that high-level Sino-Japanese diplomacy has indeed resumed, a senior Japanese advisory group, the 21st

Century Committee for China-Japan Friendship, visited Beijing on December 4 and met with two top officials, including Premier Li Keqiang.

How about China-Russia relations? Does even a little deal matter?

What do we make of this?

The Dragon’s Spear: China’s Asymmetric Strategy

As the world’s leading military powers invent new weapons systems, other nations develop countermeasures. “China has no illusions about its military inferiority via-à-vis the United States and knows that the status is likely to endure for at least two decades,” explains security analyst Loro Horta. “As such the PLA has been developing a full range of asymmetric strategies to deter the US until its military reaches maturity.” Horta describes the rapid modernization of China’s military and its study of history, especially the experiences of underdogs who prevailed in war. China's ambitious projects include anti-satellite missiles, lasers and the DF-21A anti-ship ballistic missile that could target aircraft carriers. Asymmetric strategies are the dominant force of China’s military, even as the country invests in and builds technological capability. Horta urges the United States and other nations to recognize and appreciate China's full range of asymmetric strategies even as technology matures.

BEIJING: Over a decade ago the Federation of American Scientists described the Chinese missile program as a pocket of excellence in an otherwise problematic indigenous military industry. In 2010 the Chinese military was reported to have started tests on its most ambitious missile project, the DF-21A, an anti-ship ballistic missile. In early 2013 several reports claimed that the missile had begun to be deployed in small numbers in Southern China. The DF-21A is reportedly designed to be an aircraft carrier killer aimed at deterring US aircraft-carrier battle groups from interfering in case of conflict over Taiwan and other flashpoints like the South China Sea.

China’s decision to use ballistic missiles for anti-ship warfare is unusual considering that targeting moving ships with a missile on a ballistic trajectory is much harder and requires more sophisticated navigation than cruise missiles. The People’s Liberation Army decision to opt for an anti-ship ballistic missile, or ASBM, reflects the growing confidence and sophistication of its military industries.

Analysts are divided over the implications of the new system for the US military. Some, not surprisingly, claimed that it is a game-changer and a threat to US forces in the region. Other analysts observed that the US military has several ways of defeating the ASBM such as using decoys and by targeting Chinese support and communication systems. While both sides of the debate have raised valid points, one should not see the Chinese ASBM in isolation, but as part of larger process of military modernization and a

changing doctrine in the PLA.

The PLA’s asymmetric warfare strategy is not limited to the domain of outer space, but extends to the other domains of battle – land, sea, air and cyberspace. For instance at sea, the Chinese PLA Navy is not focusing on matching the US carrier for carrier or ship for ship as some might expect.  China has been deploying a growing number of attack submarines, both conventionally powered and nuclear powered, with submarines accounting for 45 percent of its naval combatants, the highest percentage among the world’s major navies. In addition to submarines, the Chinese navy is deploying thousands of land-based missiles, both ballistic and cruise types. The navy is also developing dozens of stealth fast-attack missile craft and corvettes such as the Hubei class catamaran. In narrow seas and close coastal environments, these vessels can be quite effective against larger craft, particularly if deployed in swarm tactics.  

Another area fast emerging as a pocket of excellence in the PLA is cyberwarfare. Since 2000 Chinese military scholars have discussed the concept of total war or unrestricted warfare in which the PLA would use asymmetric tactics in all domains of the battle space.

How does the Chinese military see the US?

Is the Chinese military a “loose canon” in the Chinese system?

An Emerging Consensus on the USThreat: the United States according toPLA officersYAWEI LIU* and JUSTINE ZHENG REN

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China’s strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwanand the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China’s national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China’s strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping.

China’s top civilian leadership, when talking about Sino–US relations in the era ofJiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, always seems to be consolatory, emphasizing theimportance and mutual benefits of the bilateral relations. While they do not likecertain aspects of US policies, such as selling arms to Taiwan, even their repudiationof Washington is always couched in very dry and non-inflammatory language. Theapproach taken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of lashing out at the United

States, however, is vivid and vehement. In the first four years since President Obamacame into office in 2009, Washington and Beijing have been trying to manage theirvolatile bilateral relations, but the rhetorical interventions by these PLA officers havemade it hard for the Chinese leadership to present a coherent and cohesive policytowards the United States.

All these attempts to have tighter control over the military reflect the factthat, to the top leadership of the CCP, the PLA is not a uniformed and subordinateorganization that unconditionally complies with the will of the leadership. Instead,the top leadership needs to use all available resources to keep the military in check.

Is the best way to see the Chinese military as composed of many extreme nationalists who see the world through that lens? Does traditional communist ideology contribute to this form of thinking?

An example:

Since we have decided that the United States is bluffing in the East China Sea, we shouldtake this opportunity to respond to these empty provocations with something real . . .This includes Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, who are the three running dogs of the United States in the Asia Pacific region. We only need to kill one, and it will immediately bring the others to heel.

While PLA officers share the conviction that the United States is behind the recent territorial disputes between China and neighboring states at sea, they also seem to believe the effective way to force Washington to back off is to teach American ‘running dogs’ a lesson.

According to David Lague,

In a political system where civilian officials hew to tightly-scripted public positions, theseuniformed pundits, both serving and retired, appear free to go well beyond the official line. . . Foreign military analysts are uncertain if the hawks represent a majority opinion in the2.3 million-strong military or exercise real influence over foreign policy. It is also unclearif operational commanders share the views of these so-called ‘activist officers’.57

Lague has made a good point that these outspoken military men cannot be taken onthe surface as indicative of changes in China’s national policies, but we should alsopay attention to other important dimensions of this new phenomenon. First, as Nathanand Scobell state in China’s Search for Security, even though Chinese civilian leadershave been responsible for making decisions on matters of war and peace, many crisis leading incidents may be linked to the invisible hand of the Chinese military.

From Nathan and Scobell:

The military’s relations with the civilian authorities strike a balance seldom seen elsewhere. A bedrock principle of CCP ideology is that “the party controls the gun.” Military officers sit as symbolic but not powerful presences in the party Central Committee and the NPC. The army holds two seats in the Politburo, enough to exchange information but not to influence outcomes. Since the Deng period, no military officers have been appointed to the

most powerful decision-making body, the PBSC. Senior officers serve in the relevant CLSGs, where they provide information and coordinate actions, but so far as we know, they do not tend to use these positions to lobby for a distinct institutional point of view. Except when summoned, the PLA intervenes little in civilian affairs. Unlike some armies, the PLA does not promote an ideology of its own such as corporatism or military nationalism. It has remained loyal to the civilian regime’s conception of socialism as this conception has evolved under successive leaders. It promulgates the party’s ideology in its ranks through a hierarchy of political commissars. The PLA used to raise much of is own budget from farms and enterprises. In 1998, Jiang Zemin decided to divest the PLA of these independent sources of income, a decision apparently taken with the military leadership’s concurrence.27 Since then, military expenditures have been allocated by the state, including some significant allocations outside the official defense budget. In all these ways, the Chinese political system is characterized by civilian control.

Yet in its own area of responsibility, the PLA operates with a high degree of autonomy. Once overall defense expenditures have been set by the state, military officials decide how to spend the money among competing needs. Civilian leaders lay down a vision of likely enemies and probable foci of future world tension, but the military decides how to equip and train itself for future contingencies, handles military tensions with other countries, and conducts military diplomacy. The civilian leaders decide when to go to war, but the military manages the war. Such a division of labor stands in sharp contrast to the way the U.S. system works, in which civilians in White House, the Pentagon, the intelligence community, and the Congress play key roles in deciding how war will be prepared for and how it is fought.

The crucial channel for high-level civilian control over the military is a narrow one: the chairmanship of the CMC. There are formally two such commissions, one within the party apparatus and, since 1982, another one within the state. In reality, they are the same body. The commission’s chairmanship has been occupied successively by Mao, Hua Guofeng, Deng, Jiang, and Hu. The CMC’s civilian leader appears to have few civilian staff to advise him on his work in the commission (except that Hua, Jiang, Hu, and Xi Jinping served as CMC vice chairs in their capacities as heirs apparent); rather, he is assisted by a staff in uniform, beginning with the generals who serve as CMC vice chairs and moving down the ranks from there.

Under Mao and Deng, the civilian–military imbalance may have been less important because both of them had served in the military, understood the military technology of their day, and commanded deep personal loyalty among the officers. Later CMC chairs, however, have had no military background, and at the same time China’s strategic problems and military technology have become more complex. The later chairmen have therefore been increasingly captive to the PLA for expertise in military matters. The civilian chair’s chief tool of influence has been his jealously guarded control of senior promotions. Nathan, Andrew J.; Scobell, Andrew (2012-09-18). China's Search for Security (p. 58). Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition.

China nuclear strategy

Minimal nuclear deterrenceCredible minimal deterrenceRisk Taking deterrence

First strike

India and ChinaHimalayan obstacles

How can we describe the strategic interactions between China and India relating to the disputed border areas?

What does it tell us about conflict and cooperation?

ODDLY, for a democratic country in the midst of an election, India this week held its sixth “strategic dialogue” with China. The talks in Beijing, between the two countries’ most senior diplomats, at least show how keen their foreign ministries are keen to maintain the long, slow rapprochement they have been pursuing for nearly three decades. They are still working to heal the scar in the relationship left by a brief but bloody border war in 1962.

It was also odd that a Chinese spokesperson said that the Indian side at the talks had said that the outcome of the election will not change India’s China policy. The favourite to be India’s next prime minister is Narendra Modi, of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP. He would presumably not be pleased if civil servants were committing him to following in the footsteps of his predecessors from the Congress party. 

He has two advantages over the incumbent prime minister, Manmohan Singh, in dealing with China. One is his reputation as a hardline defender of Indian rights, in contrast to Mr Singh, mocked by his opponents as a mild-mannered weakling.

The second is that Mr Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, the BJP, has less reason to be traumatised by the humiliation India suffered in 1962. Congress was in government then, and the prime minister was Jawaharlal Nehru, great-grandfather of Rahul Gandhi, Congress’s figurehead in this campaign.

The report is still classified as top secret, and the government still refuses to release it. But one of Mr Modi’s BJP colleagues, Arun Jaitley, has called for it to be published. He asked whether it is still classified because the war was “a Nehruvian blunder”. The suggestion is that it paints Mr Nehru, and hence by implication his party, Congress, and his dynasty, which is still leading it into the latest election, in a bad light.

The BJP itself refrained from publishing the report when it was in power, as recently as 2004, perhaps because it blames not so much Mr Nehru personally, as the army high command and intelligence services, who are portrayed as myopic, deluded and incompetent. It also undermines what remains the official version of events: that the war was provoked by an aggressive China to reinforce an illegitimate land-grab, against all the best endeavours of the idealistic and betrayed Nehru, who coveted nothing more than solidarity between Indian and Chinese “brothers”.

In fact, by 1962, brotherhood had already been tested by the uprising in Tibet in 1959, and the hospitality India afforded the Dalai Lama and 80,000 other Tibetans who fled into exile. Also, India had noticed that two years earlier China had built a road across the Aksai Chin, an area India claimed as part of its Ladakh region of Kashmir.

But Henderson Brooks made plain that the conflict was provoked in part by a botched “forward policy” adopted by India to position small garrisons along the disputed borders in both the Aksai Chin, where an area the size of Switzerland is contested, and in the eastern sector, where territory three times larger—what is now Arunachal Pradesh—is at stake.

China overran Indian forces in both places. But, having made its point, it abruptly declared a ceasefire after a month and  withdrew, restoring the pre-war status quo. Since then it has been threatened at times by skirmishes or incursions, most recently in April 2013, when Chinese troops intruded well into Indian-held Ladakh. But since 1988, when the two countries agreed to get on with improving relations in other spheres, they have been inching painfully towards a solution.

The two sides are working to demarcate the de facto border—more than 3,000km long. China has never recognised the “McMahon Line” that India inherited as the frontier in the eastern sector from a treaty signed between a Scot representing the British raj and an independent Tibet. And both understand the “package deal” that could be done: in essence, the two sides simply keep what they have.

Two big obstacles stand in the way. The first is that China no longer seems content with what it has. Of 14 sections of the border where agreement is elusive, one seems to matter very much: around Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. It was there that the 1962 war started. It is also the site of an important Tibetan monastery.  Facing uncertainty in Tibet when the present Dalai Lama (the 14th) dies, China now seems intent on incorporating Tawang, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama, and, it argues, central to Tibetan Buddhism.

The second obstacle is the political difficulty both countries would have in persuading public opinion that big, if notional, territorial concessions were justified. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, may feel secure enough in his power to do so. But for India it would mean flouting a parliamentary resolution passed after the defeat in 1962 that “India will recover each inch of territory lost to the Chinese”.

Nobody expects India ever to mount an invasion of the Aksai Chin. But formally giving up the claim is something no Indian prime minister could contemplate—unless he was absolutely sure that no one would impugn him as weak, unpatriotic or pro-China. Narendra Modi might fit that bill. But reaching a formal settlement with China is probably a long way down his list of policy priorities.