mythologies of intergovernmental cooperation (and competition) in canada
TRANSCRIPT
Mythologies of intergovernmentalcooperation (and competition) in Canada
David Péloquin
Presentation to the2nd Annual Horizontal Policy Management Conference
Ottawa, April 16-18, 2007
Contents
Cooperation and / or competition
Cooperation: from spontaneous to structured
Accountability: a double-edged sword?
Key messages
1
2
3
4
Cooperation and / or competition1
The myth of the “benevolent central government”: no distinction made between the broad public interest and that of
the central government central government viewed as principal – not as agent sub-national governments viewed as agents of central government
under its ultimate control
Implications: supremacy of central government accountability of sub-national governments to central government
44
Who are the clients? (and who are their agents?)
The myth of the “unworthy servants of the people”: governments (central and sub-national) viewed as largely
self-interested – not primarily motivated by the public interest governments as (untrustworthy) agents of “the people” requiring
close supervision through a system of “checks and balances”
Implications: inter-governmental competition (both horizontal and vertical) as a
supplementary “check and balance” primary accountability of all governments to “the people”
55
Who are the clients? (and who are their agents?)
The reality of multiple “publics” and their many “agents”: multiple stakeholders – electorates, media, academics (and
civil society generally) as well as governments – with overlapping (and often shifting) identities and allegiances
governments as composite entities with multiple centres of power – most motivated by the “public interest” (but some maybe not)
inevitable competition among governments, their various agencies and organizations within civil society for support / legitimacy among subsets of the population
66
Who are the clients? (and who are their agents?)
Significant economic literature on the existence, advantages and challenges of competition between and within governments: governments not benevolent dictators but complex organisms that
pursue an amalgam of private and public interests for the citizen – as for the consumer – a multitude of suppliers of
public services (and competitors for their allegiance) is potentially beneficial as a source of “checks and balances”
But: citizens also want order, clarity in roles/responsibilities and intergovernmental harmony (as public goods in/of themselves)
Intergovernmental cooperation within an (inherently) competitive dynamic
77
There is no necessary contradiction between: an underlying competitive dynamic between governments the much-observed phenomenon of governments cooperating
(usually in the public interest)
However, this happy outcome of a (different kind of) “invisible hand” depends crucially on: a high degree of (overlapping) policy autonomy on the part of more
than one level of government (not a “joint decision trap” !) an engaged electorate (supported by media and “public academics”)
willing and eager to hold them accountable
No necessary contradiction between cooperation and competition
88
Provincial-local
Federal
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350CAD millions
99
Income support / Income support / social servicessocial services
SupportSupportto industryto industry
EnvironmentEnvironment
Educationand researchHealthHealth
Transport /communication
Areas of overlapping federal and provincial expenditures Policing /Policing /protectionprotection
Debt Debt serviceservice
Defence /Defence /foreignforeign
Transfers to otherTransfers to othergovernmentsgovernments
Debt Debt serviceservice
OtherOther
Significant overlap in Canada:in both expenditures …
Significant overlap in Canada:
Significant overlap in Canada:… and in access to revenuesSignificant overlap in Canada:
Provincial-local
Federal
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350CAD millions
Property taxesProperty taxes
FederalFederaltransferstransfers
OtherOther
Investment Investment incomeincome
User feesUser fees
Payroll taxes
CorporateCorporatetaxestaxes
Sales and consumption
taxes
PersonalPersonalincome taxincome tax
1010
Jointly occupied tax fields
Cooperation Cooperation and / orand / or competition competition 11
Cooperation: from spontaneous to structured2
“Natural sorting” of roles and responsibilities, reflecting: “first mover” / “follow the leader” public aversion to “wasteful” overlap and duplication
Regular exchanges of information and informal-to-formal meetings of first ministers, ministers and officials (hundreds annually)
Semi-codified “rules of the game” (e.g. the 1999 “Social Union Framework Agreement” or SUFA)
Hundreds of actual agreements on specific policy issues A few examples of highly formalized joint decision-making
(e.g. the Canada Pension Plan)
The many faces of cooperation
1212
Intergovernmental cooperation in Canada ranges from:
Main forms of cooperationMain forms of cooperationNature of policy Nature of policy jurisdictionjurisdiction Example(s)
Informal information sharing, Informal information sharing, consultations and coordinationconsultations and coordination
Parallel jurisdiction Parallel jurisdiction (with “spillovers”)(with “spillovers”)
Employment insurance / social assistance;
many regulatory matters
Informal information sharing, Informal information sharing, consultations and coordinationconsultations and coordination
““Coordinate” Coordinate” jurisdictionjurisdiction
Criminal law / administration of justice
Joint decision-making (CPP) and Joint decision-making (CPP) and informal coordination (QPP)informal coordination (QPP)
Concurrent Concurrent jurisdictionjurisdiction
Public contributory pension plans (i.e. CPP/QPP)
1313
The form of cooperation varies by policy area… Constitutionally “fixed” jurisdictions
Main forms of cooperationMain forms of cooperationNature of policy Nature of policy jurisdictionjurisdiction Example(s)
Harmonized tax collection agreements Harmonized tax collection agreements (TCAs);(TCAs);
“first mover” / “follow the leader”“first mover” / “follow the leader”Taxing powerTaxing power Management of jointly
occupied tax fields
Specific-purpose transfersSpecific-purpose transfers(with few conditions);(with few conditions);
non-binding commitments;non-binding commitments;“first mover” / “follow the leader”“first mover” / “follow the leader”
Spending powerSpending power
Most major programs(e.g. health, education);
income support through tax expenditures; support to industry and to the arts
1414
The form of cooperation varies by policy area…Constitutionally “fluid” jurisdictions
… in accordance with comparative advantageGovernment-funded
policy “pillars”(usually highly subsidized)
Income Income supportsupport
e.g.: pensions,e.g.: pensions,socialsocial
assistanceassistance
NoNo clear clear comparative comparative advantageadvantage
Services & Services & “in-kind” “in-kind” benefitsbenefits
e.g.: education, e.g.: education, health care,health care,
social servicessocial services
Clear Clear provincialprovincial advantageadvantage
“Assisted self-help”policy pillars
(unsubsidized or partly subsidized)
Tax-Tax-assisted assisted savingssavings
e.g.: private e.g.: private retirement retirement
savings planssavings plans
StrongStrongfederalfederal
advantageadvantage
Contributions-Contributions-funded funded
insuranceinsurance
e.g.: CPP, e.g.: CPP, employment employment insuranceinsurance
MostlyMostlyfederalfederal
advantageadvantage
Direct or Direct or assisted assisted lendinglending
e.g.:e.g.:studentstudentloansloans
Modest Modest federalfederal
advantageadvantage
1515
… and (in some cases) according to certain rulesExample: Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA)
In 1999, federal government and nine provinces committed to: “social union principles”: equality, accessibility, citizen participation,
partnerships with stakeholders, sustainable funding removing barriers to inter-provincial labour mobility transparency and public accountability to citizens (not to each other)
through measuring and reporting on social program results “working in partnership” (including joint planning and collaboration,
reciprocal notice and consultation) guidelines on use of federal spending power (when new federal transfers
created or new direct federal spending in areas affecting provinces) dispute avoidance and resolution
1616
Accountability: a double-edged sword?3
22 Cooperation: from spontaneous to structuredCooperation: from spontaneous to structured
Cooperation Cooperation and / orand / or competition competition 11
1818
Does anyone here like being held accountable?
Probably not (in most cases) …
… though most of us instinctively grasp its broad benefits: maximizing public benefits of government actions (and minimizing
private “capture” of public funds or the benefits they generate) responsiveness to evolving needs/demands of citizens pressure to constantly improve programs/policies through
experimentation and emulation of “best practices” ability to identify/redress errors sooner, rather than later
1919
Need to be aware ofwhat makes for effective accountability
“Critical political mass”: engaged electorates, journalists, “public” academics and a vigorous
civil society engrained habits of public inquiry and discourse
Transparency: public access to information that is relevant, timely and comparable
across jurisdictions open fora to enable stakeholders to defend their interests (relative) policy simplicity
Free entry by alternative providers of public services
Need to be aware of when accountability can be dysfunctional
Need to be aware of
2020
“Self-appointed guardians of virtue”: de facto accountability to more powerful government (usually the
central government), rather than to local citizenry especially problematic when “senior” government doesn’t
understand the policy area
Absence of “critical political mass”: inadequate local “checks and balances”
Unrealistic or unattainable targets: may foster widespread sense of ongoing policy failure
Key messages4Accountability: a double-edged sword?Accountability: a double-edged sword?33
22 Cooperation: from spontaneous to structuredCooperation: from spontaneous to structured
Cooperation Cooperation and / orand / or competition competition 11
2222
Key messages Cooperation across orders of government is not inconsistent with
the reality of intergovernmental competition …… and can even be a sign of a healthy competitive dynamic between
(in Canada) highly autonomous public policy entrepreneurs Cooperation does not imply “joint decision-making” and can take
many forms Governments should focus on what they do best (“comparative
advantage”) – though this can/does evolve over time Need realistic accountability based on clear roles/responsibilities,
transparent policy-making and timely, relevant information