murphy, mark. custom, and the common good in aquin as's account of political authority.pdf

7/21/2019 MURPHY, Mark. Custom, and the Common Good in Aquin as's Account of Political Authority.pdf

1/29

Consent, Custom, and the Common Good in Aquinas's Account of Political AuthorityAuthor(s): Mark C. MurphySource: The Review of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring, 1997), pp. 323-350Published by: Cambridge University Pressfor the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf ofReview of PoliticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408092.

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2/29

Consent, Custom,

and

the

Common

Good

in

Aquinas's

Account

of

Political

Authority

Mark C.

Murphy

According

to

Aquinas's

view,

while the mandatethat

political authority

be

instituted and

exercised

is an

immediate

consequence

of the natural law

precept

that

the common

good

be

promoted,

the

question

of

who

possesses political

authority

s settled

by customary

aw. Samuel

Beer's

rival

interpretation,

ne of

the

few

attempts

o discern

Aquinas's

view

on

political

authority,

s

incompatible

with

Aquinas's

explicit

remarkson these matters.

The

present

account

provides

an

interpretation

hat

both

fits

Aquinas's

few

explicit

remarksabout the

source and

form

of

political authority

nd

explains

the

tersenessof his

remarks

n

that

subject.

Although

there

have been

innumerable

writings

on

Aquinas's

definition

of

law- [Law]

is

nothing

other than an ordinance of

reason for

the

common

good,

issued

by

one

who

has

care

of the

community,

and

promulgated '-there

has been

very

little

com-

mentary

on what

Aquinas

means when

he

says

that law

must

proceed

from one

who

has

care

of the

community.

In

the case of

the

eternal,

natural,

and

divine

laws,

it is

quite

clear who

has

care

of the community:God, who governs the entire community of

the

universe 2

by ordering

all creatures to their ends.3

Aquinas

provides

little

guidance,

however,

with

regard

to the

question

of

who has

the

authority

o

lay

down

dictates

for

the

human

politi-

cal

community;

I.

T.

Eschmann has

remarked that

Aquinas

often seems to

have

irritated,

as it

were,

his later

readers

by

his

laconic

statements

n

this

and

similar matters

regarding earthly

I

owe thanks to

Alasdair

Maclntyre

and

Paul

Weithman or

helpful

criticism.

I am

also

grateful

to the

Editors

and

the

anonymous

referees at

the

Review

of

Politics

whose careful and extensive

commentary

n an earlier draft of

this

paper

made

it

much

better than

it

otherwise would have

been.

1.

[Lex]

nihil

est

aliud,

quam

quaedam

ationis

ordinatio

ad bonum

commune,

ab

eo,

qui

curam

communitatis

habet,

promulgata

Summa

Theologiae

Ialae,

90,

4. Hereafter ited

as

ST.)

All

translations rom

Aquinas's

texts are

my

own.

2.

tota

communitasuniversi

ST

IaIIae

91,

1).

3. See STIa

22,

1.

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3/29

THE REVIEW

OF POLITICS

governance.4

The

aim

of

this article is show

that for

Aquinas

political authorityis best understoodnot in terms of any natural

hierarchy among

humans

but rather

in

terms of

customary

law

that is established

by

the

consent of the

community.

Beer

on

Aquinas's

Account of Political

Authority

Samuel

Beer has

recentlyargued

hat for

Aquinas

the

authority

to

legislate

resides

by

nature in

certain members

of the

political

community.5Beer's aim is to exhibit a mode of thinking about

political

authority

hat is

now

quite

uncommon,

a

political

theory

to

which the American

rebels turned heir backs

in

1776,6

and

which

is

most

ably

defended

by

Aquinas.7

Beer

holds that the

key

to

understandingAquinas's

account of

political authority

is the

doctrine of

the

hierarchy

of

being

which

Aquinas

advocated.

The

cosmos,

created

and

providentially governed

by

the Perfect Be-

ing,

exhibits

a

gradation

n

levels of

being

from

angels,

humans,

nonrational animals, vegetables, to inanimate beings. As for

Aquinas,

good

is

convertible

with

being-all

things

are

good

insofar as

they

exist8-the

descending

order of

being

is

also a

descending

order of value. The

hierarchy

is

inclusive in that

those

higher

in the

levels

of

being

and

goodness possess

all the

perfections

of those

who

hold a lower

place

in the

hierarchy.

Now,

each

being

in

the

hierarchy

s such that it is

subordinated

to that

which is above

it in

the

hierarchy,

and is such that

its

proper

activity preserves

that which

is below

it in the

hierarchy.

All these

different

orders of

beings

are directed

to

the

perfection

of the whole of the

cosmos;

the whole constitutes

an

economy 9

in which those

farther

up

in

the

chain of

being

rule over

that

which is lower.

This

kind of

inclusive

hierarchy

of value

is

also seen within

the human

order,

for Different men ... have

reason

in

different

4.

I. T.

Eschmann,

St. Thomas

Aquinas

on the Two

Powers,

Mediaeval

Studies20

(1958):

201.

5. Samuel

H.

Beer,

The Rule of the Wise and

the

Holy:

Hierarchy

n

the

Thomistic

System,

Political

Theory

14

(1986):

391.

6.

Beer,

Rule

of the

Wise

and

the

Holy,

p.

391.

7.

Ibid.,

p.

393.

8. See

ST

Ia

5,

1

and

5,

3.

9.

Beer,

Ruleof the Wise and the

Holy, p.

399.

324



4/29

AQUINAS

ON

POLITICALAUTHORITY

degrees

with

the result that the

higher

use and command

the

lower

while

the lower serve and defer to the

higher. '0

The

basis

of the ruler's

authority

within a

human

political community

is

his

or her intellectual

power, whereby

he or

she is

naturally

fitted to

rule those who have such

power

to a lesser

degree.

The

ruler's

virtue is both to know what is

good

for the

ruled and

to

understand

that

good

as

a harmonious

part

of the

common

good. '2

Hence,

Beer writes that

knowledge

of

this

kind,

arising

from the

ontological

tatusof

the

ruler,

cannot

be reduced to modern notions

of

greater intelligence,

more

good

will,

or

greaterexpertise.

To

try

to do

so would

gravely

distort

the vision

and

sadly

diminish

ts

grandeur... Exemplifying

he law

of

the

cosmos,

the

higher

order

differs from the lower order

among

men

not

merely

because ts members

are more

intelligent

or more

expert

or

more

altruistic,

but

because

they

embracea

higher

order

of

being,

a

more

comprehensive ange

of

the

stuff of

ultimate

reality.'3

What

is

the

status of

consent in

a world in which

those

who

excel in intellect are

naturally

rulers ?'4

Obviously,

it

must

play

a

very

limited

role.

Beer,

though

not

doubting

hat

the

good

consent

voluntarily

to the rule of the

wise, '5

considers the

possibility

that the ruled consent because

they

already accept

what

the

rulers

will

ask

of

them;

he

rejects

this

interpretation,

hough,

for

it would

deny

the hierarchical

principle

to hold

that all can

recognize what is necessary for the common good. On Beer's

view,

the

governed

consent to the

legitimacy

of

the source of

the

dictates, '6

ot the dictates themselves.

But once

more,

a

difficulty

appears:

how are

the

governed, being

less

perfect,

to

recognize

the

superiority

of the ruler?Beer's

answer

is

that

it

is

through

the

charisma

of the

ruler,

manifested

in

his or

her

being

clothed in

more

precious

garments

and

possessing

more beautiful

abodes,

that

the

governed

come to

recognize

the

authoritative status

of

10.

Ibid.,

p.

400.

11. Ibid.

12.

Ibid.,

p.

401.

13. bid.

14.

Aquinas,

Summa

Contra

Gentiles,

III, 81,

cited in

Beer,

Rule

of

the

Wise

and the

Holy,

at

p.

410.

15.

Beer,

Rule

of the Wise

and

the

Holy, p.

414.

16.Ibid.,p. 415.

325



5/29

326

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

the ruler.17 t should further be

noted

that,

on Beer's

account,

consent

plays

no causal role in the

generation

of

authority;

ather,

consent

consists

merely

of

recognition

of

and

deference to the

ruler's

natural

authority.'8 Though necessary

for the ruler's

authority

o be

efficacious,

consent does not

grant

a

right

to

rule;

the

right

to rule

is held

by

certain

persons by

virtue of their

having

a more

comprehensive

range

of the stuff of

ultimate

reality.

Brian Tiemey has argued both that Aquinas's account, even

if

interpreted ccuratelyby

Beer,

is

not

representative

f

medieval

political theory

in

general,

and that Beer's

interpretation

n

terms

of

natural

hierarchy

is a

very

one-sided

picture

of

Aquinas's

thought. 19

Unfortunately

or our

purposes,

the bulk of

Tierney's

article is devoted

to

showing

that

even

if

consent is not an

important

element

of

Aquinas's

political

theory,

it

plays

a

much

more

important

role in the whole

of medieval

thought

than Beer

accords it. He does raise a few important onsiderations, hough,

against

Beer's

interpretation.Aquinas's

claim

that in

any political

community

all should have

some

share

in

governance

seems to

fit

poorly

with Beer's

view that for

Aquinas

political authority

s

naturally

vested

in but a

few members

of the

community;20

nd

Beer's

emphasis

on the

ignorance

of the

governed

does not sit

well

with

Aquinas's

insistence that

subjects

are

obligated

to

disobey any

civil

law

that is

contrary

to the

law of

God.21On

Tierney's

view,

though,

these considerations

against

Beer's

interpretation

are

not

very

weighty:

I

do

not

want to labor these

points

too much.

The work of

Aquinas

is

like

the

Bible

in

this,

that

one

can

prove

anything

out of it

by

an

adroit

selection

of texts. The

interpretation

of

Aquinas's political theory

remains

controversial;

and his

thought certainly

did contain the

hierarchical doctrines

that

Beer

emphasizes.22

17. ST

Iallae

102, 4,

cited in

Beer,

Ruleof the Wise and the

Holy,

at

p.

417.

18.

Beer,

Rule

of

the

Wise and

the

Holy, p.

417.

19. Brian

Tierney, Hierarchy,

Consent,

and the

'Western

Tradition, '

Political

Theory

15

(1987):

646.

20. See ST

laIIae

105,

1.

21.

See

STIaIIae

96,

4.

22.

Tierney,

Hierarchy,

Consent,

and

the

'Western

Tradition, '

p.

647.



6/29


7/29


necessarily

carries

with it

inequality-that

places

the demons in

an orderof

authority.28

ut

Aquinas says

that such an order does

not exist

with

regard

to humans: the demons are not

equal

with

regard

to their

natures,

and thus

there is

in them a

naturalorder

of

authority;

his does not

happen

in

humans,

who are

naturally

equal. 29

Thus,

although

some

humans

are

superior

to others in

virtue,

Aquinas

holds that their

being

of the same

species

precludes

any

human from

having

natural

authority

over

another.

Aquinasalso denies that those who have authorityare always

superior

in

goodness

in

his

important

discussion of

political

au-

thority

in

his

commentary

on the Sentences of Peter

Lombard.In

that

commentary

Aquinas poses

the

question

whether

Christians

are bound

to

obey

the secular

authorities.

Aquinas

answers that

the

duty

of obedience arises because of

authority

which

has

constraining

force,

not

merely

temporally

but also

spiritually

on

account

of

conscience. 30

ow,

there are three

aspects

to

consider

in determining whether an authority has the power to bind in

conscience:

mode,

origin,

and

use.31The mode

of

authority-that

of

the

ordering

of

superior

to

inferior-is

always good,

and

hence

all authorities have

something

in them that

is

capable

of

binding.32

Authority

can be

deficient,

though,

in terms

of

origin

and use.

The

origin

of

authority may

be

deficient

in

that the

person

who

attains

authority

is

unworthy

or

in that

the manner

in which

he

or

she attains

authority

is

illicit;33

and the

use

of

authority

may

be deficient in

that

the

authority

commands what

is

outside

his

or

her

jurisdiction

r in thathe

or she

commands

what is

contrary

o

the

purpose

or which the

authority

was

established.34

28.

See

ST

la

47,

2.

29. Daemonesnon sunt

aequales

secundumnaturam: nde

in

eis est

naturalis

praelatio:

quod

in

hominibusnon

contingit,qui

natura unt

pares

ST

Ia

109,

2

ad

3).

30. Virtutem oactivam

habet,

non

tantum

emporaliter

ed

etiam

spiritualiter

propter

conscientiam.

See

Aquinas, Scriptum uper

Libros Sententiarum

Magistri

Petri

Lombardi

Episcopi

Parisiensis

Commentary

n

the

Sentences

of

Peter

Lombard),

Book

II,

Distinction

44,

Question

2,

Article 2.

Hereafter ited as

Commentary.

31. See

Commentary,

I

44, 1,

2.

32.

I

will

consider

why

the mode

of

authority

s

always good

in

the

following

section.

33. See

Commentary,

I

44,

2,

2.

34. See Commentary,I44, 2, 2.

328



8/29

AQUINAS

ON POLITICAL

AUTHORITY

When

a certain

authority

exhibits

a defect

in

one of these

aspects,

it

may

cease

in some

way

to have

constraining

force.

Now,

if

Beer's

interpretation

s

right,

then

those who attain to

authority

who are

unworthy-who

are too low in

the

hierarchy

of

being,

to

put

it

in

Beer's terms-are not

deserving

of obedi-

ence,

and hence

one would not be

obligated

to

obey

laws issued

by

them.

However,

this conclusion

is not drawn

by Aquinas.

With

regard

to one

who is

unworthy

of

obtainingauthority,

he

writes:

[he

or

she]

is not

precluded

from

attaining

the

right

of

authority,

and

because

authority

with

regard

to its form is

always

from God

(which

generates

the

debt of

obedience),

subjects

must

obey

such

authorities,

though unworthy.3

Unlike

the other defect

in

the

origin

of

authority,

in

which au-

thority

is obtained

improperly,

he

unfitness of the ruler does not

release the

subject

from

his

obligation

to

obey.

Thus,

Beer's

inter-

pretation

of

Aquinas

is

explicitly rejected

by Aquinas

himself.

Beer

might,

of

course,

respond

to

these

objections

that one

ought

not

rely

on

Aquinas's

early writings,

among

which the

commentary

on the

Sentences is

obviously

included,

in

order to

make

claims

against

Beer's

interpretation

f

Aquinas's

later and

more

mature view.

To this

response

it

may

be

said that

nowhere

in the Summa

does

Aquinas

repudiate

this account

of the

three-

fold aspect of authority and the ways that defects in one or

another of these

aspects

affect the authoritative status

of the

ruler.

Further,

much of

his

discussion of

political

authority

n

the

sentential

commentary

hows

up

in

the

Summa,

where

its content

is

for

the

most

part

identical

to

the discussion

in

the

commentary

on the Sentences.

Finally,

the

account of the

threefold mode

of

authority

does

appear

n

Aquinas's

commentary

n

Paul's

epistle

to

the

Romans-a

commentary

which

belongs

to the

period

in which

Aquinaswas at work on the Summa-and that accountis substan-

tially

the same

as that offeredin the

commentary

n the Sentences.3

35.

Non

impeditur

quin jus praelationis

ei

acquiratur;

t

quoniam praelatio

secundum suam formam

semper

a

Deo

est

(quod

debitum

obedientiae

causat);

ideo talibus

praelatis, quamvis

indignis,

obedire tenentur subditi

(Commentary,

II,

44,

2,

2).

36.

See

Aquinas's

commentary

n

Paul's

Epistle

to the Romans 13:1-7.

329



9/29

THE REVIEW

OF POLITICS

In addition

to

these

explicit

rejections

of

Beer's

thesis,

Aquinas's

discussion of the

proper

definition of law

makes

that

interpretation

more

implausible.

There

Aquinas says

that to

or-

der

things

to the common

good

belongs

to

the

people

or the

viceregent

of

the

people,

and therefore

legislating

pertains

ei-

ther to the whole

people

or to

the

public

person

who has care of

the whole

people. 37

Now,

on Beer's

view,

the notion of

having

the care

of the

people

must be

interpreted

n

terms

of

deference

to

already existing natural authority. But in what sense can the

making

of

law ever

pertain

to the

people,

if Beer

is

right?

Would

not the

making

of law

belong by

nature

o certainmembers

of the

community,

the

only

pressing

issue

being

the

epistemic

problem

of

discovering

to which members this

power

belongs?

As the

directing

of

something

to an end

belongs

to the

one to whom

the

end

belongs, 38

t must be

that

Aquinas

holds that the

power

to

make

laws

belongs primarily

in

the

political community,

not in

certainmembersthereof. And, finally, as to Beer's claim that the

populace

recognizes

the

superiority

of

the

natural

ruler

by

his

or

her

possession

of

beautiful

dwellings

and

garments,

we

may

simply

note

the

absence

of

anything

n

Aquinas's

texts that would

support

this claim.39

Beer's

interpretation

f

Aquinas

on

political authority

is un-

tenable,

but it is clear that he

is

right

to

say

that there exists

within human communities some order of

goodness.

What

I

want

to

suggest

is that

two

questions

are

kept

distinct

by

Aquinas

that are not

distinguishedby

Beer: Whatkinds of

persons

should

hold

authority

within

a

political community?

and How

does

a

person

come to hold

authority

within

a


Beer's

interpretation

seems to

provide

an accurate

reading

of

Aquinas's

answer

to the

former

question:

those who are

natu-

rally

fitted to be rulers should have the

lawmaking

authority.

Hence, Aquinas affirms that those who excel in intellect are

37.

Ideo

condere

legem

vel

pertinet

ad

totam

multitudinem,

el

pertinet

ad

personampublicam,

quae

totius multitudinis uram

habet

(ST

IaIIae

90,

3).

38.

Est

ejus, cujus

est

proprius

lle finis

(ST

Iallae

90,

3).

39. The text that

Beer

cites

in

favor of this view-ST

laIIae

102,

4-provides

no evidence that

Aquinas thought

that the

ruler's

having

such

possessions

is

a

sign

of natural

authority.

330



10/29

AQUINAS

ON POLITICALAUTHORITY

naturally

ulers.But the sense

in which

those who

excel

in

intellect

are

naturally

rulers

is the same sense in

which,

for

example,

those

who excel

physically

are

naturally Olympic

champions.

Their

physical prowess

is

such that

it

makes them

particularly

apt

to

excel in athletic

activities,

but more than

physical

prowess

is

required

or one to be

an

Olympic champion: just

as

Olympic

prizes

are not

for

the finest and

strongest,

but

for

contestants,

since it is

only

these who

win, 40

t is not the

intelligent

who hold

political authority,but those who attain to political authority in

the

proper

way.

If

my reply

to Beer rests on an

accurate

interpretation

of

Aquinas,

then

it

follows that the

possession

of

political

authority

results

from

receiving

it

by

a lawful

method.

If

not,

both

Aquinas's

insistence on

the

importance

of

the

way

that

authority

is ac-

quired

in

determining

whether

one

is

bound

by

a ruler's dictates

and

his claim that

those

who

acquire

authority by

an

illicit

method are not deserving of obedience would be mysterious.41

Further,

given

that

Aquinas speaks

of

political

authority

as a

right

(jus

praelationis),

and for

Aquinas every

right

is

derivative

from some

law

(either

natural or

human),

it would

seem that

it

must be some

law that

provides

the

basis

for

a

particular

ruler's

holding political

authority.

The

remainder of this

article is de-

voted to

making good

this

claim.

40.

Aristotle,

Nicomachean

Ethics,

trans.

TerenceIrwin

(Indianapolis:

Hackett,

1985),

1099a3-5.

41.

See

Commentary,

I

44,

2,

2. A

rejoinder

similar in

form can be made

against

those who hold that for

Aquinas

the

legitimate

title to

authority

rests on

the

authority's

ssuing proper

dictates, i.e.,

those

that are directed at

the common

good.

(Arthur

Monahan

approaches

this view when

he

claims,

Aquinas

could

afford o be

indifferent-seeming

n

this matter

of

how one

comes

to

hold

legislative

authority]...Whatdid interesthim was how a ruler exercised his authority, ather

than how

he

came

by

it

(Monahan,

Consent, Coercion,

and Limit:

The

Medieval

Origins of ParliamentaryDemocracy [Montreal:McGill-Queen's

University

Press,

1987],

p.

172).

If

the title to

authority

ested

wholly

on substantive

onsiderations-

the

quality

of a

king's

rule-rather than

partly

on

procedural

onsiderations-the

method

by

which one

comes

to

hold the

right

to rule-then no sense

could

be

made of

Aquinas's

references in

the

commentary

on

the Sentences to both

the

origin

and the use of

authority

as

determining

actors of

whether such

authority

has the

power

to bind

in

conscience.

331



11/29


Political

Authority,

the

Common

Good,

and the Law of Nations

Consider the

following

claim

that

Aquinas

makes concern-

ing

political

authority:

it

is

of

the law

of

nations,

which is a

human law. 42What

is the law

of nations

(jus

gentium)?

Ulpian

had

distinguished

between the

natural

law,

the

law

of

nations,

and the civil

law

on the basis of the breadth

of their

respective

jurisdictions:

the natural law

is that

which

nature teaches all

animals; the law of nations is the law which is common to all

nations;

the civil law is the law which is

particular

o a certain

political community.43

Although

this

tripartite

division was al-

tered

by

Isidore in the

compilation

of his

Etymology-natural

law

is no

longer

seen

as

governing

nonrational

animals-the

division

of the human aw

into the law of

nationsand the civil

law,

and

the

justification

for that division

based

on

the breadthof

jurisdiction,

remained intact.44

n

treating

of

human

law,

Aquinas

turns

to

the

question

of whetheror not the divisionof human law into the law

of nations and

the civil law as

proposed

by

Isidore

is

appropriate.45

Aquinas accepts

the

division and

agrees

that the breadth of

jurisdiction

of each is as Isidore

describes

it,

but

he

rejects

the

use

of

the breadth

of

jurisdiction

as the

differentia

by

which

the

genus

of human law is divided into the law of nations and the

civil law.

Rather,

he

distinguishes

the

law of

nations and civil

law on the basis of the procedure whereby these precepts are

derived

from the first

principles

of the natural

law:

to the law

of

nations

pertain

those

things

which

are derived

from

the

natural law as conclusions from

principles,

such as

just purchases

and

sales,

and other

things

of

this

sort,

without

which

humans cannot live a

common

life. This

belongs

to

the

natural

law,

because man

is

by

nature

a social

animal,

as is

proven

in

the first book of the

Politics.

Those

things,

however,

which are derived from the natural law

by way

of

particular determination pertain to the civil law, inasmuch as each

community

determines what

is

suitable to itself.46

42. Est

de

jure gentium,

quod

est

jus

humanum

ST

IIallae

12,

2).

43.

For a

perspicuous

discussion

of

Ulpian's

account

see

M.

B.

Crowe,

The

Changing

Profile

of

the Natural

Law

(The

Hague:

Martinus

Nijhoff,

1977),

p.

45.

44.

Ibid.,

p.

69.

45. See

ST

IaIIae

95,

4.

46. Ad jus gentium pertinent ea quae derivanturex lege naturae, sicut

conclusiones

ex

principiis;

ut

justae emptiones,

venditiones,

et

alia

huiusmodi,

I I

I

332



12/29

AQUINAS

ON POLITICAL

AUTHORITY

The

distinction

between

the law

of nations and the civil

law,

then, corresponds o the distinction between those preceptswhich

are derived

from the

natural

aw

by way

of

logical

deduction and

by way

of

determination,

respectively.

In

logical

deduction,

one

derives

precepts

from the natural law

in

a

way

similar

to that

method

in the sciences

by

which demonstrative

conclusions are

drawn from

first

principles ;47 quinas

cites as an

example

of the

former

type

of derivation

the

conclusion that one must not kill

from

the

principle

that one should do harm to no

one.

In

determination, one derives precepts from the natural law in a

way

similar to

that

method

in

the arts

by

which

general

forms

are

determined

with

regard

to

detail ;48

Aquinas

cites as an

example

of determinationthe

specification

of what

punishment

should be

given

to

a

convicted evildoer.49

Aquinas,

then,

preserves

the views of

Ulpian

and Isidore that the

law

of

nations

is

com-

mon to all nations and

that

the

civil

law is

peculiar

to

a certain

community by relying

on

the distinction between

precepts

that

are

derived

by way

of deduction and

those

that

are derived

by

way

of determination:

s the

law of nations is derived from

the

natural

aw

by way

of a

conclusion

that

is not

far

removed from

its

principles, 50

umans

easily recognize

it as

binding,

and thus

great

uniformity

n this kind

of law is to be

expected;5'although

Aquinas

does not

provide

a

similar

explanation

in

the case

of

civil

law,

we

can

safely say

that

his

account of

why

nations

do

not agree in civil law would refer to the differingconditionsthat

obtain

in

different communities.52

sine

quibus

homines ad invicem

convivere

non

possunt:quod

est de

lege

naturae;

quia

homo

est naturaliter

animal

sociabile,

ut

probatur

n

I. Polit.:

quae

vero

derivantura

lege

naturae

per

modum

particularis

determinationis,

pertinent

ad

jus

civile,

secundum

quod quaelibet

civitas

aliquid

sibi

accommode determinat

(ST

IaIIae

95,

4).

47. Similis est ei, quo in scientiis ex principiisconclusiones demonstrativae

producuntur

ST

IaIIae

95,

2).

48. Simile

est,

quod

in

artibus

formae communes

determinantur

d

aliquid

speciale

ST

IaIIae

95,

2).

49. For an

interesting contemporary

discussion of determination

see John

Finnis,

Natural Law and

Natural

Rights

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,

1980),

pp.

284-89.

50.

Derivatur

lege

naturali

per

modum

conclusionis,

quae

non est multum

remota

a

principiis.

51. See ST IaIIae95, 4 ad 1.

52. See

ST

IaIIae

95,

3.

333



13/29

THE REVIEW

OF POLITICS

What

Aquinas

means

by

saying

that

political authority

exists

by the law of nations, then, is that it is such a straightforward

implication

of

the natural law that

political

authority

be insti-

tuted

and exercised that such

institutions of

governance

are

features of

almost

every

known

human

community.

For the

natural law

dictates not

only

that each

of us

pursue

his

or her

particular

good

but also that

we

promote

the common

good

of

our

communities.

But

the

institution

and exercise of

political

authority

are

necessary

for the

achievement

of

the common

good.

Thus,

political

authority

s of the law

of nations.

Why,

precisely,

is

political authority

necessary

for

the achieve-

ment

of

the common

good,

and therefore

part

of

the law

of

nations?

Aquinas

writes that even had there

been

no

Fall,53

politi-

cal

authority

would have come into

existence,

for

Humans

are

naturally

social

animals;

thus,

in

the state of

innocence,

they

would have

lived

socially. However,

a

social life cannot be had

by

many

unless there

is

someone

in

charge

who aims at the

common

good:

for

many,

as

such,

aim at

many things,

whereas one aims

at one.54

53.

Aquinas's

view on

political authority

thus

contrasts with

Augustine's,

who had held that

political authority

is

a

product

of human

sinfulness. The

entrance

of sin into the

world

brought

with

it

as

punishment

the institution of

slavery,

and it

is

difficult

not to read

Augustine

as

likening

the

condition of

slavery to that of being subject to political authority.Althoughthis condition of

servitude

is much worse than the

freedom

that would

have

existed

had

the Fall

not

occurred,

it does have

one

beneficial

result,

and that

is

the

fostering

of

humility,

which is as

salutary

or the

servantsas

pride

is harmful

o

the

masters ;

Augustine

admonishes hose

in

such a condition o maketheir

slavery,

in

a

sense,

free,

by

serving

not with the

slyness

of

fear,

but with the

fidelity

of

affection,

until

all

injustice

disappears

and all human

lordship

and

power

is annihilated

City

of

God,

trans.

Henry

Bettenson

[New

York:

Penguin

Books, 1984],

bk.

XIX,

chap.

5).

Although

Augustine

emphasizes

the

punitive

aspect

of

political authority,

he also

ascribes

to

authority

another

purpose:

he

preservation

f

a kind of

earthly peace,

which,

though perhaps

unstable and

uncertain,

s the best

that can be had

in

this

life

(City of

God,

XIX.

6).

To securethis

aim,

politicalauthority ttempts

o

generate

a

kind of

compromise

among

citizens

concerning emporal

goods (City of

God,

XIX.

17).

This

purpose

of

political authority

would also not have

existed had the

Fall not

occurred;

he

conditionsthat

make

earthly

peace

so

precarious

came into

being

with

sin.

For a fuller discussionof these

issues,

see Paul

Weithman,

Aquinas

and

Augustine

on

Original

Sin

and the Functionof Political

Authority,

ournal

of

the

History

of Philosophy

30

(1992):

353-76.

54.

Homo naturaliter st animal sociale: unde homines

in

statu innocentiae

socialiter vixissent: socialis autem vita multorum esse non

posset,

nisi

aliquis

l

334



14/29

AQUINAS

ON

POLITICALAUTHORITY

Insofar as humans

are individual

beings,

each

with

his

or her

own

proper

good

to

pursue, they

will seek

many

ends. But

to

seek

a

good

which is

common

to

all

requires

something

which

directs

all

these

individuals

to that end.

Hence,

Aquinas

writes

that if

persons

were to live

alone,

Each would be a

king

unto

him- or herself. 5

But

this condition is not

natural to

humans;

humans

naturally

live

socially.

Therefore,

It is

proper

that

there

be

something,

beyond

that which

directs toward

the

particular

good of each, that directstowardthe commongood of the many. 56

Political

authority,

hen,

is needed to direct

individuals

in

pursuit

of a

good

that is not

particular

o

any

of

them.

The considerations that have been

adduced so far seem

to

show

merely

that the institution

and

exercise of

political

author-

ity

are

instrumentalmeans

to

the

promotion

and

preservation

of

the common

good. Authority

is needed

if

persons

with their

own

particulargoods

to

seek

are to be

directed to the common

good.

But while this instrumentalustification for political authorityis

plain,

the role of

political

authority

with

regard

to the

common

good

is for

Aquinas

more

extensive than these remarks

suggest.

It is

compatible

with

an

instrumentalist

ustification

of

political

authority

that the end that

political authority

promotes

be

wholly

specifiable

independently

of the

institution and

exercise of

that

authority.

But this is not

Aquinas's

view. On

Aquinas's

view,

one

cannot

specify

what the

common

good

of

a

politicalcommunity

s

without

making

reference to

political authority.

Thus,

the need

for

political authority

n

the achievementof the

common

good

is

far

more radical on a

Thomistic view than

the

instrumentalist

justification implies.

In

order to see

why

the

common

good

is

dependent

in

this

more extreme

way

on the

institution and

exercise of

political

authority,

we need to

get

a

clearer idea of what

Aquinas

takes the

common good of a political community to be. Contemporary

commentators have

complained

that

although

Aquinas

often

praesideret,qui

ad bonum

commune

intenderet:multi enim

per

se intenduntad

multa,

unus

vero

ad unum

ST

Ia

96,

4).

55.

Ipse

sibi

unusquisque

sset rex

(De

Regno

ad

regem

Cypri

On

Kingship],

bk.

I,

chap.

1).

56.

Oportet

gitur, praeter

d

quod

movet ad

proprium

bonum

uniuscuiusque,

esse aliquid, quod movet ad bonumcommunemultorum De Regno, I. 1).

335



15/29

336

THE

REVIEWOF

POLITICS

invokes the

common

good

in

his moral and

political theory,

he

does little to tell us what thatgood consists in;57Aquinas'sdoctrine

of

the common

good

must be

gathered

rom his terse and scattered

remarks

on the

subject.

One

of

the difficulties involved in

gathering

such

a doctrine from

Aquinas's

remarks is that

he

refers

to so

many

disparate

items

as

common

goods

or the

common

good: money,

honor,

victory, justice, peace, happiness,

the

perpetuation

f

the

species,

the

order

of the

universe,

he

good

convertible

with

being,

and even children are all labeled

by

Aquinas as bonumcommune or bona communia.58While Aquinas

undoubtedly

does

employ

the

term common

good

in

a number

of

analogous

ways,

the relevantsense of that term for our

purposes

concern those

goods

labelled

by

Gregory

Froelich as

goods

common

by

way

of

causation,

by

which

he

means those

goods

which

while

remainingnumerically

one extend

to

many

effects. 59

In this sense

of common

good,

what is

the

common

good

of

the


At one

point Aquinas

remarks

that

the

common

good

consists of

justice

and

peace

(justitiae

et

pacis), 60

and

it

seems clear that the sense of common

good

in

57.

[A]

reader of

Thomas's

political

works

will find

nothing resembling

a

Tractatus

de

bono

communi.

When the

common

good

is referred o we are

usually

being

presented

with

an

example

of it and are assumedto have

already

a

grasp

of

its

essential

features

Gregory

Froelich,

The

Equivocal

Statusof Bonum

Commune,

New Scholasticism63 (1989): 38-57). Froelich also rightly points out the stark

contrast

between

Aquinas's

detailed

treatment of the individual

good

at the

beginning

of

the

Secunda

Pars

and

his near

silence on the issue of

what

the

common

good

consists in.

58.

Ibid.,

p.

42.

59.

Ibid.,

p.

48. Froelich contrasts

goods

common

by

way

of causationwith

goods

common

by

way

of

predication

and

goods

common

by way

of distribution.

Suppose,

for

example,

that both

you

and

I

each have a

twenty

dollar bill. There is

no

actually

existing good possessed

by

both of

us;

money

is

a

good

common to us

by way of predication n that each of us possesses a good to which a common

predicate

a

predicate

relevantto the

object's

goodness)

is attached.

Next

suppose

that we have baked a

pie

that is

sitting

on the table before us:

unless it is divided

between

us,

neither of us

can

enjoy

it.

The

pie

is a

good

common

by way

of

distribution:

rior

o

division,

its

goodness

is

enjoyed by

neitherof

us;

it

is

only

by

distribution

that its

goodness

is

available to us.

A

good

common

by

way

of

causation

s,

by

contrast,

common

precisely

as it

is

individual

ibid.,

p.

48):

it is

numerically

one but

good

for

more

than one

person.

The

victory

by

an

army

or

athletic team

might

be

an

example

of

a

good

which extends to

many

in this

way.

60. ST

IaIIae

96,

3.

Aquinas

also

refers to

justice

as

part

of the common

good

at ST

IaIIae

19,

10 and

IIaIIae

33,

6;

he

refers to

peace

as

the

good

of the



16/29

AQUINAS

ON POLITICALAUTHORITY

which

justice

and

peace

are constituentsof that

good

must

be

by

way of causation.6 If we conceive of the common good of the

political

community

as

consisting,

at least

in

part,

of

justice

and

peace,

we are

able to

provide

an

explanation

or the

radical sense

in which the institution and exercise

of

political

authority

is

necessary

for the achievementof

the

common

good:

the institution

of

political

authority

s itself a

constituentof the common

good

as

regards peace;

and

a

particular

kind

of

exercise of

political

authority-that

of

legislating-is

needed

to

make

determinate

the content of the common good as regards ustice.

Aquinas

is

quite

explicit

that the

requirements

of

justice

depend

at least in

part

on human

specification:

he

refers

to

the

determination

f those

things

that

are

just according

to

human or

divine

institution,

nd makes

it

clear that it is

contrary

o

justice

to act

against

certain

humanly

determined norms

of

justice.62

In

order

to understand

why

it would be the case

that exercise of

legislative authority

within

a

political

community

would

be

required

to

specify

the content of

justice,

it will be

helpful

to

consider

by

comparison

how for

Aquinas

the exercise of the

virtue

of

prudence

is related to the individual's

proper good.

On

Aquinas's

account,

the

end

of

the moral

virtues is the human

good,

and as the human

good

is in accordance with

reason,

the

end

of the moral virtues

pre-exists

in

reason;

the

manner in

which these

ends

pre-exist

in

reason is

through

the natural

habit

of synderesis, which grasps the first principles of practical

reasoning.63

Hence,

prudence,

an

intellectual

virtue,

does not

determine the end of the moral

virtues,

but

only

determines the

means

for

attaining

hat end. Jean

Porter

has

recently

pointed

out

the

ambiguity present

in

the claim

that

prudence

determines

only

the means toward the human end.64On one

reading

of

this

multitude t ST Ia 103, 2, obj. 1 (not denied),and calls the peaceof the stategood

in

itself

(and

presumably

common

good)

at ST

IIaIIae

123,

5,

ad

3.

61. We

may

also note that

Aquinas

mentions no other

goods

besides

justice

and

peace

that are common to

persons by

way

of

causationand are such that

they

pertain

particularly

o the

political community.

62. Determinatio orum

quae

sunt iusta secundum

institutionemhumanum

vel divinam

ST

IaIIae

104,

3,

ad

1).

63. ST

IIaIIae

7, 6;

see

also ST

Ia

79,

12

and

Quaestiones

Disputatae

de

Veritate,

Question

16,

Article

1.

64. Jean

Porter,

The

Recoveryof

Virtue:The

Relevance

of Aquinas or

Christian

Ethics

(Louisville,

KY:

Westminster

John

Knox

Press,

1990),

pp.

156-62.

337



17/29


claim,

the end for which

prudence

seeks means is

already fairly

determinate...prior to the working of prudence itself. 65 On

another,

however,

the

end is not

determinate

n

that

way;

the role

of

prudence

would not be

merely

to

figure

out what sort of

causal chain

could

produce

an

independently specifiable

end,

but would also determine

what

in

concrete

circumstanceswould

count as

achieving

the end

sought.

Porter

claims that

for

Aquinas,

the latter

reading

must be the

more accurate.

The

goal

of

acting virtuously

s not

the sort

of

goal

that lends itself to

means/end

analysis,

because

this

goal

cannot

be

specified

indepen-

dently

of

some

specification

f the kind

of

action or

actionsthat would

bring

it about.

Certainly,

he individualwho wants to act

virtuously

n

a

given

situation will

presumably

have

a

formal idea

of

what the

virtues means and will

thereforehave a

general

idea of what virtue

would

require

in

this

particular

ituation. But

formal

notions of the

virtuesrelevant o

a

given

situation

will

not

necessarily

be sufficient o

determinewhat sort of

action,

concretely,

will

embody

the

virtue

or

virtuesin

question.66

Surely

Porter

is

right

to

say

that

prudence

is

not

merely

instru-

mental

reasoning

about a

predetermined

end. She

prefers

to

contrast

a means-end

reading

of

Aquinas's

account

of

prudence

with an account

in which

prudence

determines the course of

action

which

counts

as

instantiating

he virtues.

I

will

contrast

these

by using

the

terms

instrumentalmeans and constitutive

means

respectively,

but

this

terminological

difference of

course

does

not affect

my

endorsementof Porter's claim.

The role of

prudence

as

determining

constitutive means

for

the attainment

of the individual's

good

can

help

us to see

why

the exercise

of

political authority

determines

constitutive

means

for

the attainment

of the common

good.

For

Aquinas,

prudence

extends

to the

governing

of

many,

and the

end with which

this

kind of prudenceis concernedis the commongood;67t is called

regnal prudence,

denominated

by

the form of

government

which

is

unqualifiedly

best.68

Regnal prudence

is

exercised,

then,

by

those

that

govern political

communities.

As we

have

seen,

justice

65.Ibid.,

p.

157.

66.

Ibid.,

p.

159.

67.

ST

IIallae

7,

10.

68.STIIaIIae0, 1,ad2.

338



18/29

AQUINAS

ON POLITICAL UTHORITY

is

one

aspect

of the

common

good.

As

prudence

determines

not

only

instrumentalbut also constitutive means of the individual

good,

then,

it would seem

that the

exercise of

regnal

prudence

would not be concerned

merely

with

coming up

with

instrumental

means

to achieve

justice,

but also to some extent with determin-

ing

what is

just.

For

Aquinas,

the virtue of

justice

is

what

directs humans in

their

relations with

others,

in

contrast

to

the other

moral

virtues,

which perfect humansprimarily n relation to themselves.69What

is

right,

then,

as

regards

justice

is what

preserves

the

proper

relation

between

different

persons,

and this

proper

relation

consists

in a kind of

equality.70

ow,

the

right

or

the

just

consists

in

a

kind of

equality;

but there exists

both natural and

positive

right.71

A

relation

preserves

equality by way

of

natural

right

if

the

equality

holds

by

the

very

nature of

the

thing,

as for

example

when one

gives

a certain amount so that he

or she

may

receive

just as much. 72On the other hand, a relationpreserves equality

by

way

of

positive right

if

the

equality

holds,

not

by

nature,

but

by

way

of

agreement,

or

common

acceptance,

such as when

one

considers

him- or herself content

to

receive a certain

amount. 73

Positive

right

comes into

being

either

by

private

agreement,

as

when two

individuals make a

contract,

or

by

public

agreement,

such

as when the whole

people

consent to a

thing's

being

treated

as

if

it were

equal

to

and

commensurate

with

another,

or

when such is ordained

by

the

prince,

who has care of the

people

and who acts

in

its stead. 74 ot

every

kind of

proportion

an be

made

by

agreement

into an

object

of

positive right,

though;

a

proportion

can be

just by way

of

positive right only

if

such a

determination

s

in

accordance

with

natural

ustice.75

The

naturally

69.

ST

IlIaIIae

7,

1.

70. ST IIaIIae

57,

1.

71.

ST IIaIIae

57,

2.

72.

Ex

ipsa

natura

rei;

puta

cum

aliquis

tantum

dat,

ut tantumdem

ecipiat

(ST

IIalIae

57,

2).

73.

Ex

condicto,

sive ex communi

placito; quando

scilicet

aliquis reputat

se

contentum,

i tantum

accipiat

ST

IIaIIae

57,

2).

74. Puta cum totus

populus

consentit,

quod

aliquid

habeatur

quasi

adaequatum,

t commensuratum

lteri;

vel cum hoc

ordinat

Princeps,

qui

curam

populi

habet,

et

ejus personam

gerit

(ST

IIaIIae

57,

2).

75. STIIaIIae57, 2, ad2.

339



19/29

340

THE REVIEWOF

POLITICS

just

alone

would, however,

be insufficient for

ordering

the

relationships

within a human

community,

and

thus recourse to

positive right

is

needed;

if

the

common

good

of

justice

is

to

be

achieved,

that

which is an instantiation

f

a

just

relation between

individuals

will have to be

determined.

Aquinas

is

most clear

on

the need for determination f

principles

of

justice

in his

discussion

of the

judicial

precepts

of

the Old Law.

There

was need

for such

precepts,

writes

Aquinas,

because

It

belongs

to the divine law to

order humans to one

another and to

God.

Both of

these,

however,

pertain

in

general

to

the dictates of the

natural

law,

to

which

the moral

precepts

are

to

be

referred;

yet

both of

these have to be determined

by

the

divine

and human

law,

because

naturally

known

principles

are

general

in both

speculative

and

practi-

cal matters.

Therefore,

just

as the

determination of

the

general

precepts

of divine

worship

is

done

by

the ceremonial

precepts,

so

also

the

determination

of

the

general precepts

of

justice

to

be

observed

among

humans is determined by the judicial precepts.76

Hence,

the

exercise of

regnal prudence,

issuing

in

human

laws,

does

not aim

merely

to secure means

to

an

independentlyspeci-

fiable

end,

but also to

give

content to that end.

Because the

common

good

is

in

part

constituted

by

the

securing

of

justice,

and what

just

relations consist

in must

be

determined

by

political

authority,

the

legislative

exercise

of

political

authority

is

not

merely an instrumentalmeans to the common good, but deter-

mines the constitutive means thereof.77

76. Ad

legem

divinam

pertinet

ut ordinet homines ad invicem et ad

Deum.

Utrumque

autem

horum in communi

quidem

pertinet

ad dictamen

legis

naturae,

ad

quod

referunturmoralia

praecepta;

sed

oportet quod

determinetur

utrumque

per legem

divinam vel

humanum,

quia principia

naturaliternota sunt communia

tam

in

speculativis

quam

in activis. Sicut

igitur

determinatio ommunis

praecepti

de cultu divino fit per praeceptacaeremonialia,sic et determinatiocommunis

praecepti

de

iustitia observanda inter

homines,

determinatur

per

praecepta

iudicialia

ST

IaIIae

99,

4).

77. The

importance

of

political authority

n

determining

he constitution

of

justice

explains

why

Aquinas

held

that even

though

some

persons

are

more

worthy

to

govern

than

others,

the

unworthiness f some rulers does not

ipso

facto

preclude

their

possessing

legitimate

authority.

For there must be some

determination

f

rules

of

justice

if

the common

good

of

justice

is

to be

achieved;

so

long

as the ruler's

prudence

s sufficient

for

issuing

at

least

minimally

acceptable

determinationsf justice,his or her rulershipwill be effective for the promotionof



20/29

AQUINAS

ON

POLITICALAUTHORITY 341

Aquinas

also holds that the

institution of

political authority

is a

constituent

of the common

good,

that

is,

of

peace.

Why

would one

think that the existence of

political authority

is a

component

of

peace,

rather

than,

say,

merely

an

instrument of

peace?

Peace

within a

human

community,

for

Aquinas,

is

more

than the absence

of

war,

though

it

certainly

is

a

necessary

condi-

tion of

peace

that such

disturbance not

be

present.

In

order

to

understand

what

Aquinas

takes

peace

within

a human

commu-

nity to be, we shall first examinewhat Aquinastakes peace to be

between one

person

and another. Concord between the

two

is

necessary

for

peace-concord

exists between two

persons

when

they

are such

that the wills of

distinct hearts unite

in

consent to

the

same

thing 78-but

such

unity

is not sufficient for

peace.

One

can

be

at

peace

with

another

only

when his

or her

appetites

are

not

tending

to diverse

objects,

so

that

they

are not at war with

each other. This

sort of

failure

of

peace

can occur

in

two

ways:

in one

way,

with

regard

to

diverse

appetitive powers,

as

the sensitive

appetite

often tends to

the

contrary

of that to which the

rational

appetite

tends...in

another

way,

insofar as one and the same

appeti-

tive

power

tends to different

objects

of

appetite,

which it cannot

acquire

at one

time,

with the result that there is

necessarily

strife in the

move-

ments of the

appetite.79

For

peace

to exist between two

persons,

then,

each

person's

appetites

must be ordered so that

they

do not tend to diverse

things,

and the two

persons

must

be

in

concord. This inclusion of

the

ordering

of

the

passions,

it should be

noted,

excludes

from

peace

any relationship

in which

the

agreement

between

the

two

persons

is

coerced,

for

the common

good.

(If

the ruler's

prudence

s

radically

deficient,

however,

it

is

not

his or her unworthiness s such thatreleasesthe

subject

from

being

bound

by

their

pronouncements,

ut his or her

poor

use of the

legislative power.)

78.

Diversorum

ordium

voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt

(ST

IIaIIae

29,

1).

79. Uno

quidem

modo

secundum

diversas

potentias

appetitivas:

sicut

appetitus

sensitivus

plerumque

endit

in

contrarium ationalis

appetitus

. . . alio

modo,

inquantum

una

et

eadem

vis

appetitiva

n

diversa

appetibilia

tendit,

quae

simul

assequi

non

potest;

unde necesse

est,

esse

repugnantiam

motuum

appetitus

(ST

IIaIIae

29,

1).



21/29

342


if one

person

be

in

concord

with

another,

not

of his or

her

own

volition,

but is coerced, as it were, by fear of some imminent evil, such concord

is not

truly peace,

because

the

order

of

the concordant

persons

is

not

preserved,

but rather is disturbed

by something

fearsome.80

All

things

desire

peace,

for

from the

very

fact

that a

person

desires

something,

it follows that that

person

desires to obtain

that

which

he

or she

desires,

and,

it

follows,

to remove those

things

that

prevent

his or her

obtaining

it. 8'

As

having appetites

which tend to diverse and incompatible objects precludes one

from

having

all that

one

desires,

one

must of

necessity

desire

peace.

As the disorder

of the

appetites

is

a hindrance

to

peace,

Aquinas

follows

Augustine

in

calling peace

the

tranquility

of

order

(tranquillitatem

ordinis). 82

It is

important

to

note

the role that

orderliness

plays

in

Aquinas's

account

of

peace.

For

one's

appetites

to be

in

agreement

is for them

to be

well-ordered.

As

Augustine,

whose discussion of

peace Aquinas closely follows, writes:

The

peace

of the

body,

we

conclude,

s a

tempering

f

the

component

parts

in

duly

ordered

proportion;

he

peace

of the irrational oul

is a

duly

ordered

repose

of the

appetites;

he

peace

of the

rationalsoul

is

the

duly

ordered

ife and health of

a

living

creature;

peace

between

mortal man

and God is an ordered

obedience,

in

faith,

in

subjection

to

an

everlasting

law;

peace

between

men is

an

ordered

agreement

of

mind

with

mind;

the

peace

of a home is the ordered

agreement mong

those who live

together

about

giving

and

obeying

orders;

the

peace

of

the

Heavenly

City

is

a

perfectly

ordered and

perfectly

harmonious

fellowship

in

God;

the

peace

of

the

whole universe is the

tranquility

of

order-and

order

is the

arrangement

of

things equal

and

unequal

in

a

pattern

which

assigns

to each its

proper

position.83

The

peace

of a human

community,

then,

includes both

concord

with

other

communities-the

absence of war-as well as the

80.

Si enim homo concordatcum

alio non

spontanea

voluntate,

sed

quasi

coactus

timore

alicujus

mali

sibi

imminentis,

alis concordia

non est vere

pax:

quia

non servatur

ordo

utriusque

concordantis,

sed

perturbatur

ab

aliquo

timorem

inferente

ST

IIaIIae

29,

1,

ad

1).

81.

Ex hoc

ipso

quod

homo

aliquid

appetit, consequens

est,

ipsum

appetere

ejus quod appetit

assecutionem,

et

per

consequens

remotionem

eorum,

quae

assecutionem

mpedirepossunt

(ST

IIaIIae

29,

2).

82.

ST

IIaIIae

29,

2.

83.CityofGod,XIX.13.



22/29

AQUINAS

ON

POLITICAL

AUTHORITY

proper

ordering

within that

community.

And,

if

Aquinas

does

follow

Augustine

here,

this

murphy, mark. custom, and the common good in aquin as's account of political authority.pdf

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