multilateral export control regimes

8/13/2019 Multilateral Export Control Regimes

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Multilateral Export Control Regimes

1. Nuclear Suppliers GroupNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multinational body concerned with reducing nuclear

proliferation by controlling the export of materials applicable to nuclear weapon development

and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials.

Established: 1975; also called the London Club Comprised of: 48 nuclear supplier states, including U.S., Russia, China, European

Union countries and some others

The Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna serves as the NSG point of contact. Voluntary agreement for export controls; not bound by a treaty; no formal mechanism

to enforce compliance (Because the regime is voluntary, NSG members mayultimately make a political calculation to proceed with a transfer that violates the

guidelines. Russia transferred nuclear fuel to India in January 2001 even though

majority of NSG members declared it contradictory to NSG)

NSG decisions are made by consensus. Aim is to prevent nuclear exports for commercial and peaceful purposes from being

used to make nuclear weapons

Two parts guidelines that cover: i) Trigger List Goods- materials and technologydesigned specifically for nuclear useFor e.g. fissile materials, nuclear reactors and

equipment, reprocessing and enrichment equipment ii) dual-use goods-- non-nuclearitems with legitimate civilian applications that can also be used to develop weapons.

For e.g. Machine tools and lasers

NSG members periodically review the Guidelines to add new items that poseproliferation risks or to eliminate goods that no longer require

An annual plenary, which is chaired on a rotating basis among members, is held The IAEA is charged with verifying that non-nuclear-weapon states are not illicitly

pursuing nuclear weapons.

IAEA also safeguards to prevent nuclear material or technology from being stolen ormisappropriated for weapons include inspections, remote monitoring, seals, and othermeasures.

Members are supposed to report their export denials to each other NSG states are expected to refrain from making exports identical or similar to those

denied by other members.

Indias waiver

- On 6 September 2008, at an NSG meeting in Vienna, India was granted a waiver fromthe NSG guidelines that require comprehensive international safeguards as a condition

of nuclear trade.- The waiver came after three years of intense US diplomacy


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- In 2006, US Congress had amended US law to accommodate civilian nuclear tradewith India

- Consensus was achieved after overcoming concerns expressed by a number ofcountries, but especially by Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand

-The NSG agreed to several minor changes to the waiver text proposed by the UnitedStates.

- The most important was the incorporation of a reference to statement made by India'sMinister of Foreign Affairs, highlighting India's moratorium on nuclear testing and its

no-first-use policy.

- A number of countries stated that their understanding of the waiver was that theywould not transfer ENR (enrichment and reprocessing technology) equipment to

Indiaand that all members of the NSG would take India's compliance with its

commitments into account before agreeing to any nuclear transfers.

- This has diluted Indias waiver significantly- Safeguard Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009

o Already put 12 out of [the] 14 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards. Onlytwo reactors are required to be notified by 2014

- India has now signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with France, the U.S.,Russia, Canada, Argentina, the U.K., Namibia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan.

Negotiations taking place with Japan on a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement

Indias Membership

- US, UK, France, Russia support Indian membership in the NSG- In May 2012, Australia also publicly supported Indian membership in the NSG- China & smaller European states such as Ireland, Netherlands & Switzerland have

reservations

- China stresses need for equal treatment in South Asia, an apparent reference to its allyPakistan (also Israel?)

- China has helped Pakistan in setting up & operating Pakistans Chashma I & II civilnuclear plants. Plans to build 2 more. (THE BASTARDS!)

- Similarly, Russia had in the 90s helped Indias civil nuclear energy programmedespite NSG objections (THE AWESOME GUYS! )

- Those for India joining the group say it is better if the country is inside thanoutsidethe NSG as it is already an advanced nuclear energy powerand will in

future become a significant exporter as well

- Those countries which are sceptical argue the move could undermine the NPT, whichis a cornerstone of global nuclear disarmament efforts.

- If India joins, it will be NSGs only member outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)

New Members

- Any state that conducts exports appearing on the Guidelines may apply for NSGmembership.


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- A potential member is evaluated on its proliferation record, adherence to internationalnon-proliferation treaties and agreements, and national export controls.

- All existing members must approve an applicant for it to join the regime.- Countries with nuclear programs who are outside the NSG: India, Pakistan, Israel &

NK

June 2013: 23rdPlenary Meeting in Prague, Czech Republic

- Chaired by Czech Republic- adopted 28 amendments to the NSG Control List- Mexico and Serbia attended as NSG Participating Governments for the first time- NSG noted the proliferation implications of the DPRKs nuclear program, the

DPRKs 12 February nuclear test, and Irans nuclear program with grave concern

- considered implementing the 2008 Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India-

agreed to launch a new and revised NSG public website, and discussed NSG outreachefforts

June 2012: 22ndPlenary Meeting in Seattle

- Chaired by Netherlands- Mexico and Serbia attended as observer states- NSG noted concerns regarding the nuclear proliferation programs of Iran and the

DPRK, approved a paper to outline outreach to non-party states, discussed the NSGs

relationship with India, and reiterated the importance of keeping its lists updated in

accordance with technological developments.

Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT)

- Negotiated in 1968, the NPT granted non-nuclear-weapon states access to nuclearmaterials and technology for peaceful purposes as long as they committed not to

develop nuclear weapons.

- Signed by 189-nations. Not signed by India, Israel & Pakistanall 3 atomic states- To determine what specific equipment & materials & conditions under which to be

sharedNPT supplier states formed the Zanger Committee in 1971

- States outside the NPT were reqd to institute IAEA safeguards before allowed imports- These items were collectively referred as the Trigger List.- NSG had accepted and incorporated the Zanger Committees Trigger List

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

P.S.Indias nuclear tests in 1974 were one of the main reasons for NSG to come into

existence. Hehe, who says we dont exert enough influence in world polity

2.

Missile Technology Control Regime


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- informal and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass

destruction (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological)

- seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts-

Category I and II items: i) Rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (includingballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, target

drones, and reconnaissance drones) ii) less-sensitive and dual-use missile related

components

- Originally for stopping proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles to non NPTcountries: able to travel at least 300 km with a 500-kilogram payload. Later agreed (in

1993) to also apply to missiles & related tech designed for chemical & biological

weapons

- NOT a treaty; NO legally binding obligations- originally established in 1987 by the G-7Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

UK, US

- Now comprises of 34 countriesall have equal standing in the regime- Holds annual policy-level Plenary meeting; No formal secretariat; France serves as

formal point of contact; Chairmanship rotates on an ad hoc basis

- China is NOT a member (Phew!); nor is India of course and Pakistan (Lol )- MTCR members spearheaded a voluntary November 2002 initiative, the Hague Code

of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (formerly known as the

International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation), calling on all

countries to show greater restraint in their own development of ballistic missiles

capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their existing missilearsenals if possible.

- The Hague Code of Conduct has 134 member states, including all MTCR membersexcept Brazil. Brazil has expressed concerns about how the initiative might affect its

space program.

How does MTCR achieve its objectives?

- Export Controlscommon export policy; applied to a common list of items- MeetingsRegularly exchange info about relevant missile non-proliferation issues- Dialogue and Outreachto keep non-Partners informed about groups activities &

provide assistance in non-proliferation efforts

INDIA and MTCR

- In 2008 India voluntarily committed to following the MTCR export control guidelines- Since that time the United States has been working to secure India's membership in

the regime

China (the bitch!) and MTCR

- key contributor to Pakistan's missile development- provided sensitive technology to countries like North Korea and Iran


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- In 2004, China applied for MTCR membership, and, at the time, voluntarily pledgedto follow the regime's export control guidelines (Hahahahaha..)

- its membership was rejected due to concerns that Chinese entities continued toprovide sensitive technologies to countries developing ballistic missiles, such as

North Korea- China says it no longer sells complete missile systems and has tightened its export

controls

3. Australia Group for Chemical and Biological Controls- Established in 1985, the Australia Group is a voluntary, informal, export-control

arrangement

- Comprises of: 40 countries as well as the European Commission- Yes, yes to coordinate their national export controls (boringggg)- to limit the supply of chemicals and biological agents-as well as related equipment,

technologies, and knowledge

- To who? - countries and non-state entitiessuspected of pursuing chemical orbiological weapons (CBW) capabilities

- All participants are members of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

- Yes, yes, it establishes "control lists," and its members are expected to deny exportlicense requests for items on the lists

- Each year meet in Paris to coordinate these export control policies, discuss revision oflists, share intelligence etc.

- No charter or constitution, and each country uses its own discretion whenimplementing national export controls (LOL!!); though of course the control lists

are the baseline

- Accepts new members only by consensus- New members should meet certain criteria, including proven compliance with the

CWC and the BWC, established, effective national export control and enforcement

mechanism for control lists items

Control Lists

Can be divided into 5 categories (unlike the 2 categories in the NSG and MTCR):

- Chemical weapons precursors-chemicals used in the production of chemical weapons.- Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment, and related technology-items

that can be used either for civilian purposes or for chemical weapons production, such

as reactors, storage tanks, pumps, and valves.

- Biological agents-disease-causing microorganisms, whether natural or geneticallymodified, such as smallpox, Marburg, foot-and-mouth disease, and anthrax.


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- Dual-use biological equipment-items that can be used for both peaceful research andbiological weapons production, such as fermenters, containment facilities, freeze-

drying equipment, and aerosol testing chambers

- Toxins-poisonous substances either made by living organisms or producedsynthetically that adversely affect humans, animals, or plants, such as botulinum toxinand ricin

Criticism

- criteria for membership are excessively strict- Denying a country membership implicitly accuses that applicant of pursuing chemical

or biological weapons

- at odds with the BWC provision for the "fullest possible technical exchange" for theadvancement of peaceful scientific endeavours

- Countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), for instance, have repeatedlyasserted that they already made legally binding commitments not to acquire CBW by

signing the biological and chemical weapons conventions

- Participants of the Australia Group, however, maintain that the group complementsCWC and the BWC and serves the same goals

4. Wassenaar Arrangement- Established in 1996, is a voluntary export control regime- 41members. Usual suspects: US, UK, France, Germany, Japan. Lots of European

Countries. Australia, NZ, , South Korea, Japan, Mexico, Argentina. NO CHINA.

- calls on states to make a series of voluntary information exchanges and notificationson their export activities related to weapons and items appearing on the arrangement's

two control lists

- aims to promote "greater responsibility" among its members in exports of weaponsand dual-use goods and to prevent "destabilizing accumulations."

- not targeted at any region or group of states, but rather at "states of concern" tomembers

Control Lists

i) Conventional Weapons:- eight broad weapon categories:battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), large-

caliber artillery, military aircraft/unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), military and

attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, and small arms and light

weapons

- Every six months, members exchange information on deliveries of conventional armsto non-Wassenaar members

ii) Dual-use goods and Technologies:- Basic Items, Sensitive Items and Very Sensitive Items eg. Stealth technology and

advanced radar systems


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Problems/Criticisms

- No consensus among members on which countries are "states of concern" or whatconstitutes a "destabilizing" transfer

- And because Wassenaar operates by consensus, a single country can block anyproposal

- In earlier years, a few members consistently refused to fully participate in voluntaryinformation exchanges and notifications on dual-use goods

- Some major arms exporters, such as Belarus(who?), China, and Israelare notmembers

Relevance for modern times (even after the days of cold war)

Apart from the obvious points on world peace and arms race and hunger, blah blah..

- Important to prevent non-state actors (terrorist groups and individuals) from acquiringconventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies- "responsible export policies" needed even for small arms and light weapons in the

wake of civil wars in Africa and middle east

P.S./ Fun InfoDuring Cold War days, there was a Coordinating Committee for Multilateral

Export Controls (COCOM), which was created to restrict exports to the former Soviet Union

and Eastern bloc. Wassenaar arrangement is kind of successor to that though not aimed at any

particular region or state.


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Now. Perhaps the most important part:

Indias stand on all the export control regimes- Let us in please!!!Wants full membership of all the four export-control regimes- Will apply for membership when the necessary preparations have been completed,

and the ground has been prepared

- Engages with all the four groups via outreach meetings- India has always demonstrated responsible non-proliferation and export control

practices for all the pertinent control lists and is confident of fulfilling all

requirements

- Has the ability to produce, manufacture or supply a vast majority of items controlledby these regimes

- Ability and considerable experience in enforcing a legal export control system-

NSG via its waiver has already recognised our impeccable non-proliferation recordand the Safeguard Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

in 2009

o Already put 12 out of 14 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards. Only tworeactors are required to be notified by 2014

- Non-proliferation: As a responsible state, we continue policy of refraining fromtransfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)technologies to states that did not

possess them

- remain committed to a voluntary and unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosivetesting

- commitment to complete, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination ofnuclear weapons in a time-bound manner

Reference:

1. The Hindu articles and news reports2. Websites of these regimes

Personal Info:

NameAshish Sheoran

Email:[email protected]

Address: 737/10 Ram Gopal Colony; Sonepat Road; Rohtak124001

Contact Number: 08468821004

Prize Preference: spectrum>Bipin >Economics>war (Dont need GSM Hindi, Thanks.)
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