multilateral collaboration in canadian intergovernmental ... · particular pattern of igr—what we...

Multilateral Collaboration in CanadianIntergovernmental Relations The Role ofProcedural and Reciprocal Norms

Robert Schertzer AndrewMcDougalldagger and Grace SkogstadDagger

University of Toronto and University of Toronto Scarborough robertschertzerutorontocadaggerUniversity of Toronto Scarborough andrewmcdougallutorontocaDaggerUniversity of Toronto and University of Toronto Scarborough skogstadchassutorontoca

This article investigates the conditions that facilitate multilateral collaboration in Canadianintergovernmental relations (IGR) It argues that durable patterns of multilateral collaborationrequire particular procedural and reciprocal norms These norms develop through structured andrepeated interactions among intergovernmental actors as they learn over time how to sharejurisdictional responsibility for a policy field to their mutual advantageWe trace the developmentof procedural and reciprocal norms of multilateral collaboration in three policy fields (agricultureimmigration and labor markets) and the role these norms played in constraining unilateralgovernment action in recent IGR We find that procedural and reciprocal norms of multilateralcollaboration are associated with intergovernmental agreements that combine an overarchingmultilateral framework to pursue commonpan-state priorities with supplementary bilateralagreements to accommodate more specific goals of different provincial governments

Whether governments opt to work in a collaborative manner has significant

consequences for the effective performance and legitimacy of federal and multilevel

systems Yet the conditions that push governments to collaboratemdashand to

continue doing so on an ongoing basismdashremain unclear within the study of

intergovernmental relations (IGR) This lack of clarity is particularly apparent

among those who work on Canada where patterns of interaction among the two

orders of government have ranged from being generally competitive usually

marked by governments acting independently to being more cooperative by

working together to design policies (Simeon and Nugent 2008)

Similar to developments in other federal systems such as the United States and

Australia (Stewart 1984 51ndash54 Painter 1991 1996) Canadian scholars identified

patterns of ldquocollaborative federalismrdquo emerging in the 1990s (Lazar 1998 111

Cameron and Simeon 2002) The emergence of this pattern of IGR has often been

linked to changing structural conditions the perceived policy problem these shifts

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present and a related incentive for cooperation (Zimmerman 2011 Feiock 2013)

At the same time scholars in Canada have described the collaborative model as

ldquofluid and ad hocrdquo ldquoheavily dependent on whether first ministers especially the

prime minister find it advantageous or notrdquo (Cameron and Simeon 2002 65 see

also Simmons 2017 574) To be sure there are considerable constraints to

sustaining intergovernmental cooperation in Canada besides embedded incentives

in all federal systems for governments to resort to unilateral action in order ldquoto

guard their turf and to exploit every opportunity to win credit and avoid blamerdquo

(Cameron and Simeon 2002 65) an additional hurdle to locking in collaborative

federalism is the generally weak institutionalization of Canadian IGR (Bolleyer

2009 Simmons 2017) This characterization appeared warranted when collabora-

tion between governments in the area of social policy was found to be weak over

the 1996ndash2006 period (Simmons and Graefe 2013) The fate and meaning of

collaborative federalism in Canada was further questioned with the 2006 election of

a Conservative federal government and Prime Minister committed to ldquoopen

federalismrdquo a central element of which called for governments to remain within

their assigned fields of jurisdiction and to minimize overlap (Young 2006

Bickerton 2010) Nevertheless as we demonstrate here collaborative IGR has

developed and remained resilient in a number of important policy fields in Canada

over the past three decades

Our objective in this article is to investigate the conditions that facilitate this

particular pattern of IGRmdashwhat we call multilateral collaborationmdashin Canada We

seek to build on existing accounts that view intergovernmental relations in Canada

as highly contingent on changing structural conditions and the strategic

motivations of the first ministers who head up Canadarsquos federal provincial and

territorial governments In this regard we show that structural conditions alone do

not explain whymdashand importantly howmdashgovernments choose to work together

over sustained periods of time More specifically we challenge the notion that

intergovernmental collaboration in Canada is solely contingent on the self-

interested calculations of political actors

Building on the above insights as well as a broader literature on the logic of

collectivecooperative action we provide a two-step account of the conditions

conducive to collaborative federalism that emphasizes the enabling and

constraining effects of norms First we examine how norms of multilateral

collaboration emerge Here we agree with the view that changing structural

conditions can incentivize governments to seek cooperative solutions when the

related policy problems are difficult for a single government to deal with on their

own These situations often lead to regular interactions among government actors

from both orders of government through various institutional mechanisms Such

dense patterns of interaction create opportunities for political actors to learn from

each other to recognize the validity of othersrsquo positions and thereby facilitate their

2 R Schertzer et al


agreement on broadly reciprocal outcomes In short structured interactions within

an institutional context lead to the development of procedural and reciprocal

norms Second we outline how multilateral collaboration emerges and remains

stable In particular we argue that the content of procedural and reciprocity norms

governing IGR must stress the equal status of governments and the need to find

mutually agreeable ways of instituting shared- and self-rule in a policy field When

these norms of multilateral collaboration are associated with a perceived record of

successful collaboration over time the procedural and substantive norms (the

expected behavior and ideal outcomes) act as a constraint on governments

breaking away from this pattern of IGR to act unilaterally

We develop this account of conditions conducive to multilateral collaboration

as follows The first section of the article elaborates on the two-step process that

leads to the emergence and stability of procedural and reciprocal norms focusing

on the role these norms play in shaping IGR toward a particular form (multilateral

collaboration as opposed to bilateral cooperation or unilateral action) The next

three sections test our theoretical propositions regarding these conditions by

investigating patterns of intergovernmental relations in three policy sectors

agriculture immigration and the labor market We conclude by reflecting on these

conditions and discussing important cases (eg healthcare and pensions) where

further research is needed to confirm our account

Method and Case SelectionThe policy sectors for our case studies have been chosen for two reasons First

these areas have a measure of shared or overlapping jurisdiction agriculture and

immigration are areas of concurrent constitutional jurisdiction whereas respon-

sibility for labor market policy overlaps extensively While this constitutional

feature means that we could expect governments to interact in the policy fields it

also means there is no clear central authority to legitimately dictate comprehensive

policy solutions Since both federal and provincial governments have legal

authority and extensive scope to undertake either coordinated or unilateral action

in these three areas evidence of multilateral collaboration cannot be explained

solely by a constitutional imperative for cooperation Thus while shared

constitutional jurisdiction may serve as an important factor incentivizing

interaction evidence that governments have moved toward particular patterns of

multilateral collaboration to resolve a collective action dilemma points to the need

to explore other (eg normative-based) theories of cooperation

Second patterns of intergovernmental relations in these three policy sectors

have shifted over time across a spectrum between unilateral and multilateral

collaboration This variance allows us to test our propositions regarding the factors

that affect the emergence and persistence of patterns of intergovernmental

The Role of Procedural and Reciprocal Norms in IGR 3


relations Notably we can investigate IGR in these sectors between 2006 and 2015

when Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party held office As

indicated Stephen Harper came to power in 2006 announcing a new era of ldquoopen

federalismrdquo a term he and others have used to describe a federal system in which

the two orders of government operate within their respective spheres of

responsibility in most areas and keep jurisdictional overlap to a minimum (Harper

2005 Young 2006 Harmes 2007 Bickerton 2010 Dunn 2016) Our empirical

documentation of policy developments in the three policy sectors before and

during this period thus allows us to examine the emergence and persistence of

norms of multilateral collaboration along with a consideration of the extent to

which they constrained the behavior of actors who do not subscribe to these same

norms

Our analyses in this study rely on two information sources The first source is

semi-structured interviews carried out between 2014 and 2016 with nineteen senior

federal and provincial public servants (with regional representation) in

departments responsible for agriculture immigration and labor market policy

The second source is publicly available primary documents including reports news

releases and speeches from both orders of government as well as a number of

jointly developed federalndashprovincialndashterritorial (FPT) communiques issued follow-

ing ministerial meetings

Multilateral Collaboration A Theoretical AccountOur objective is to identify the conditions under which multilateral

collaborationmdashone particular pattern of cooperative intergovernmental relations

in which actors representing all governments in the federation jointly develop

policy for a given issuemdashbecomes the dominant approach in place of a pre-existing

or alternative IGR pattern (for example unilateralism or bilateralism) A frequent

explanation for cooperative IGR patterns like multilateral collaboration is that

they serve the interests of political actors in helping solve collective action

dilemmas (Scharpf 1997 Feiock and Scholz 2010) These dilemmas arise in federal

and multilevel systems of government when decisions taken by one order of

government (whether they are in areas of shared or exclusive jurisdiction) affect

another order (Feiock 2013) Often scholars point to changing structural

conditions (for example economic and technological) as modifying the

calculations of government actors on how to achieve their goals increasing the

perceived benefits of coordinated action and aligning their policy programs to

solve such collective action dilemmas (Zimmerman 2011 Feiock 2013 Bolleyer

and Bytzek 2009 see also Cameron and Simeon 2002)

Although structural pressures arising at a point in time can provide a

(instrumental) rationale for cooperation a subsequent shift in external conditions

4 R Schertzer et al


can also alter the strategic interests of governments changing their perceptions of

the policy problem and undermining their earlier incentives to cooperate

Accordingly another mechanism other than strategic instrumental considerations

in response to external stimuli is needed to account for how patterns of

cooperation stabilize over time We argue that norms play this key stabilizing role

for collaborative relations

We define ldquonormsrdquo as expectations shared by members of a group or

community about prescribed and proscribed behavior (Brennan et al 2013 4) All

norms are partly constituted by principles of appropriate behavior and although

they do not dictate behavior they make some behaviors (those consistent with the

norm) more probable and others (those actions inconsistent with the norm) less

probable Following practice we distinguish between procedural and reciprocal

norms (Axelrod 1984 Ostrom 1990) Procedural normsmdashoften framed as working

rulesmdashhelp define the parties to a particular set of negotiations (boundary rules)

how these parties relate to one another (eg as combatants or collaborators) and

their roles and responsibilities in developing and implementing policies Reciprocal

norms relate to the substantive outcome of an interaction and the expectation that

it will account for the interests of the various parties involved In the specific case

of Canada both procedural and reciprocal norms reflect (contested) ideas

regarding how jurisdictional responsibility ought to be shared or exercised in a

federation that is variously understood as a pan-Canadian community a compact

between equal sub-state units and a system designed to accommodate multiple

nations within a single state (Rocher and Smith 2003 Schertzer 2016 47ndash58)

The development of these procedural and reciprocal norms of IGR takes place

through mechanisms of learning and feedback in the context of dense institutional

interactions among government actors Although norms can arguably be reduced

to the preferences of ldquomaximizing human agents and interactions among themrdquo

once norms are in place they are properly seen as ldquostructures in their own right

through and around which human agents exercise their agencyrdquo (Brennan et al

2013 9) It is the feedback effects of norms and their perception by political actors

as structures that constrain and enable agency that give norms their resilience and

power Accordingly procedural and reciprocal norms of cooperation can become

self-reinforcing when political actors behaving as expected by the norm learn that

the benefits of compliance outweigh the costs andor when they learn new reasons

to support the norm This feedback and learning mechanism within IGR has been

implicitly noted for example by Cameron and Simeon (2002 68) who suggest

that collaborative federalism can be reinforced by the success of early collaborative

achievements Inwood Johns and OrsquoReilly similarly argue that the ldquocapacityrdquo of

governments to work together (and the emergence of particular patterns of

relations) can develop through the repeated interactions of actors working through

institutions within a broader ideational context (Inwood et al 2011 14ndash22) In this



respect the more informal and regular relations and networks among officials can

be critical in building the trust that leads to more robust intergovernmental

cooperation and procedural norms (Inwood et al 2011 77ndash78 Benz 2000 25ndash26

36 Bakvis et al 2009 Ch 6) These interactions create opportunities for political

actors to recognize the validity of othersrsquo positions and to learn from each other

thereby facilitating shared understandings and agreement on reciprocal outputs

(Axelrod 1984 Biccheri 1993) Learning can result not only in agreement on

desirable policy outcomes and the instruments to realize them (Wallner 2014) but

also on desirable reinterpretations of the existing rules and new institutional

configurations to govern key policy areas (Paquet 2014) In other words

procedural norms of cooperation can be seen as learned behaviors more likely to

emerge in contexts of ongoing structured interactions among small groups of

actors

These mechanismsmdashcalculations of strategic actors in the face of changing

structuralenvironmental conditions feedback and learningmdashhelp explain why

governments cooperate in the face of a collective action dilemma but they fall

short in accounting for the emergence change and resilience of particular norms

informing different patterns of IGR Since we are seeking to explain why different

patterns of IGR have emerged and remained resilient it is important to clearly

distinguish multilateral collaboration from two other key patterns of IGR

bilateralism and unilateralism We distinguish between these patterns of IGR on

the basis of four criteria the constellations of government actors involved in the

policy process their procedural norms with respect to the process of interaction

their reciprocal norms with respect to how jurisdiction within the federation and a

given policy sector should be shared and their outputs (Alcantara Broschek and

Nelles 2016 Schertzer 2015)

Multilateral collaboration is characterized by procedural norms that reflect an

equality of status for the two orders of government and thereby stress the

importance of all governments being involved in developing policy where the

matter touches on their interests (Cameron and Simeon 2002 49 54 Lazar 2006

28-29 Simmons and Graefe 2013 30-32) Reciprocal norms of multilateral

collaboration entail a commitment to ldquodiffuse reciprocityrdquo that is to policy

outcomes that ldquoyield a rough equivalency of benefitsrdquo for all parties over time

(Schertzer 2015 Ruggie 1993 11 Keohane 1985) In Canada in line with different

conceptions of how the federal system should be organized (of how to institute

shared and self-rule) a commitment to diffuse reciprocity tends to manifest itself

through policy outcomes that attempt to reflect the pan-Canadian objectives of the

federal government and the unique needs of the different provinces involved

Diffuse reciprocity is thus the underlying logic for intergovernmental agreements

that consist of an overarching multilateral framework accompanied by supple-

mentary bilateral agreements1

6 R Schertzer et al


Bilateral negotiation also a cooperative approach to IGR is distinguished from

multilateral collaboration in that it entails interactions between the central

government and individual sub-state governments on a bilateral basis Procedural

norms of bilateral negotiation may like multilateral collaboration reflect a

measure of equality between the two orders of government but they denote

differences in the nature of the relationship between the central government and

one or more sub-state governments Norms of reciprocity in bilateral negotiation

reflect the particularities of the constituent units of the federation and thereby their

differential treatment in the federation Accordingly the defining feature of

bilateralism is a commitment to a norm of ldquospecific reciprocityrdquo in the form of a

mutually beneficial arrangement between the federal and sub-state parties involved

(Schertzer 2015 Ruggie 1993 11 Keohane 1985) The outcomes of bilateral

negotiationmdashoften signed agreements or memorandums of understanding between

two governmentsmdashtend to be tailored to the particularistic goals of the sub-state

governments with highly decentralized and asymmetrical outcomes The

archetypal example is the broad relationship between the Government of Canada

and Quebec which tends to run in parallel with multilateral relations across a host

of policy areas

These two cooperative patterns are distinguished from unilateralism whereby

governments operate largely independently of one another Unilateralism can take

two forms governments independently undertaking the development and

implementation of policy in an area understood as largely within their exclusive

responsibility (McRoberts 1985) or one order of government taking action on its

own even while recognizing that its actions will significantly affect the other order

of government In Canada such unilateral action is underpinned by a normative

position that stresses the importance and value of the formally exclusive and

autonomous nature of each governmentrsquos jurisdiction As practiced by the

Government of Canada unilateralism is also generally antithetical to asymmetrical

treatment of one or more constituent units the intention is to set and achieve pan-

Canadian goals Unilateral IGR demonstrates a lack of commitment to procedural

norms of intergovernmental cooperation or norms of reciprocity between the two

orders of government The associated processes and outcomes of unilateral action

within IGR are readily identifiable announcements programs policy or legislation

directed by a single government and undertaken without clear regard for how these

actions may impact the interests of other governments

In summary we have distinguished multilateral collaboration from other

patterns of IGRmdashwith a focus on their different procedural and reciprocal

normsmdashand proposed a set of conditions under which we expect norms of

collaborative intergovernmental relations to emerge and remain stable The

conditions that lead to the emergence of these norms are (a) structural shifts that

create incentives for governments to work together in order to realize their



preferred goals and overcome a collective action dilemma and (b) interaction

between government actors that over time normalize cooperative practices and

create procedural expectations of continued cooperation Further we argue that

these emergent procedural norms are likely to stabilize multilateral collaboration

when (a) government actors learn that this form of working together allows them

to achieve their goals and (b) the processes and outputs of their relations find

ways of reflecting their different normative understandings of federalism In the

next three sections we apply this theoretical framework to explain how procedural

and reciprocal norms of multilateral collaboration have developed over time in

three policy sectors

Agriculture The Development of lsquolsquoFlexiblersquorsquo MultilateralCollaborationStarting with agriculture policy we show how a shifting perception of agricultural

policy and its role in domestic and global economies over the 20th century

incentivized governments to work together to their mutual benefit At the same

time these interactions brought to the fore competing federal and provincial

interests Accordingly additional factors beyond shifting structural conditions and

strategic responses actually explain why IGR in the field has evolved from one

marked initially by federal dominance then to a patchwork of bilateral federalndash

provincial agreements to finally a stable pattern of multilateral collaboration In

short through repeated interactions a set of procedural and substantive norms

emerged that pushed FPT governments to find a flexible collaborative approach to

jointly managing agriculture policy in a way that balanced federal and provincial

interests in the field

The perceived role of federal and provincial governments in agriculture policy

has shifted considerably over the past 150 years Despite Canadarsquos 1867 constitution

formally allocating jurisdiction for agriculture to both orders of government

multilateral collaboration among governments in the field is a relatively recent

development Federal dominance over policy in the agri-food sector was

the traditional norm Beginning in the Great Depression and well into the

1970s the Government of Canada assumed almost exclusive responsibility for farm

income support However in the 1970s the perceived importance of agriculture to

province-building enterprises and economic development goals shifted in a number

of provinces Alongside a perception that the existing federal program was

inadequate in stabilizing farm incomes their altered policy goals led several

provinces including those with the largest agricultural sectors to unilaterally

introduce programs to support their farmersrsquo incomes Although these changes

turned farm income support programs into a policy area of shared federalndash

provincial responsibility for some provinces several provinces still maintained that

8 R Schertzer et al


farm income stabilization was a federal responsibility The uncoordinated nature of

provincial and federal programs created pressures for program harmonization

which was eventually achieved through federalndashprovincial deals to share program

costs These arrangements were based on a model whereby provinces received

federal payments that they could top-up provided they met certain conditions

(Skogstad 1987 Ch 4)

Structural changes in the global agricultural economy and agricultural markets

which became evident by the late 1980s created further incentives for

intergovernmental cooperation and for potentially closer alignment of FPT

agricultural policy goals The critical elements of this changing structural context

were heightened global competitiveness fiscal and budgetary pressures fluctuating

and frequently depressed agricultural commodity prices and liberalizing interna-

tional trade agreements In response to these conditions FPT government agendas

began to converge more closely on goals of stabilizing farm incomes and rural

economies increasing the international competitiveness of the agricultural and

food sectors and avoiding trade-distorting programs inconsistent with the terms of

international trade agreements all while reducing government program costs

These structural shifts and broadly aligning policy agendas drove considerable

federalndashprovincial interaction Beginning in the late 1980s committees of federal

and provincial officials usually also including representatives of the agricultural

and food sector met to re-design the cost-shared programs in the field aimed at

helping farmers manage their income and business risks while also being

compatible with international trade agreements A series of agreements followed

these negotiations in the early 1990s The 1996ndash1999 Safety Net Framework

Agreement was succeeded by the 2000ndash2003 Framework Agreement on Agricultural

Risk Management and subsequently three five-year agreements were concluded

the 2003ndash2008 Agricultural Policy Framework Agreement 2008ndash2013 Growing

Forward and 2013ndash2018 Growing Forward 2 These five-year agreements

including the most recent FPT agreement the Canadian Agricultural Partnership

(2018ndash2023) are comprehensive agreements They consist of several elements

besides income (or business) risk management programs to include programs

geared to goals of competitiveness and profitability in the agriculture and food

sector The focus here is narrowed to programs to assist producers manage income

risks the major cost-shared expenditure of both orders of government in these

agreements

Despite the broadly shared FPT goals of competitiveness and supporting farm

incomes in response to external economic pressures exogenous shifts alone cannot

explain the evolution toward multilateral collaboration in the sector A structural

and strategic account ignores that the more specific FPT goals and interests in the

agricultural sector weremdashand are notmdashfully compatible There are differences

often substantial between provincial agricultural economies in terms of the major



commodities produced the extent of commodity specialization versus diversifi-

cation the significance of the processing sector and the dependence on domestic

versus international markets Such structural differences result in significant

disagreements across governments regarding how to increase the global compet-

itiveness of the agri-food sector and how to do so within the parameters of

international trade agreements (Skogstad 2008 Ch 3) The resulting different

perceptions of what is in the interest of each province and the federal government

become particularly significant for producers and provincial economies when

seeking to develop jointly managed or national programs that treat producers and

sectors the same way in every province Accordingly when programs are proposed

to help farms manage their income risks across the country competing

conceptions of how to design these programs to reflect different provincial needs

can be a significant barrier to collaboratively developing pan-Canadian programs

Many provinces thus have considerable incentives to resist national programs in

favor of preserving more bilateral modes of interaction and provincial flexibility

In order to better explain how and why multilateral collaboration developed

and remained stable in the agriculture sector we have to also look at how norms

emerged and pushed actors toward this particular form of IGR From this view we

can see that the repeated interactions among FPT officials associated with the

ongoing evolution of joint policy development over more than three decades

created a dense pattern of institutionalized relationships Multilateral FPT meetings

are routine and frequent Ministers responsible for agriculture meet at least

annually deputy ministers meet face-to-face at least twice a year and assistant

deputy ministers meet four to five times a year and converse by phone even more

often These interactions are governed by core procedural norms that recognize the

equal status of the two orders of government FPT senior official meetings are co-

chaired and usually entail a jointly developed formal agenda and presentations

Feeding into this process of collaborative policy development is the work of a

plethora of regulatory and policy committees staffed by lower-leveltechnical FPT

officials

Norms of reciprocity consistent with multilateral collaboration have also

gradually evolved over time via mechanisms of policy learning and incremental

adjustments of earlier policies The 1996 Federal-Provincial Safety Net Policy

Framework laid out the principle of shared responsibility of the two orders of

government to help farmers manage income risks Notwithstanding provincial

resistance the Framework also operationalized shared responsibility in a 6040 FPT

funding ratio for joint programs More controversial were two other normative

goals that were in tension with one another the principle of national programs

characterized by common goals and instruments across provinces and territories

that treat Canadian farmers in all provinces equitably and the principle of

provincial flexibility with respect to how and when to achieve objectives in

10 R Schertzer et al


framework agreements To deal with these tensions the 1996 agreement entailed

ten separate bilateral agreements that gave provinces some flexibility for example

to decide which farmers were eligible for what amount of program funding These

bilateral agreements represented a victory for provinces like Alberta and Quebec

They were resisted but eventually conceded by the government of Canada which

had sought national programs that treated producers in all provinces equally

(Skogstad 2008 82) Over subsequent FPT agreements respect for the principle of

diffuse reciprocitymdashand its instantiation via provincial program and budget

flexibility in a framework of common nation-wide program objectivesmdashgradually

took hold The 2003 Agricultural Policy Framework (APF) was recognized by FPT

ministers ldquoas an important step forward in coordinating an integrated federal

provincialterritorial approachrdquo to policy and programs (Agriculture and Agri-

Food Canada nd 11) In 2007 FPT ministers agreed to build on APFrsquos success

and concluded an agreement in principle on the broad parameters of its successor

Growing Forward ldquodefining common objectives ensuring the benefits of a

common approach while recognizing the need for flexibility in achieving these

objectives and respecting the jurisdiction and responsibilities of each Partyrdquo

(Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada nd 11)

The design of both Growing Forward (2008ndash2013) and Growing Forward 2

(2013ndash2018) shows how norms of diffuse reciprocity were shared among federal

and provincial officials The agreements consist of an overarching multilateral

framework applying to all provinces and supplementary bilateral agreements

specific to individual provincesterritories The multilateral frameworks establish a

set of shared goals and programs for the sector as well as a formula for sharing

program costs The significant federal financial transfers to provinces and

territories are an important inducement to their agreement but even more so is

the principle of provincial and territorial flexibility that is ldquoflexibility in

approaches program design implementation and in the management of the

framework to facilitate governmentsrsquo efforts to adapt to new priorities and

respond better to provincial and territorial needsrdquo (Government of Canada 2011

3) The principle of flexibility is operationalized through the supplementary

bilateral agreements that give provincesterritories scope to tailor national

programs to the distinct needs and goals of their local agri-food sectors In

interviews provincial officials described the commitment to this reciprocal norm

of flexibility as vital to securing agreements and ldquoallowing provinces to realize they

were equal partnersrdquo

The emergence of a norm of diffuse reciprocity represents strategic learning on

the part of provinces and the Government of Canada regarding the substantive

parameters of shared responsibility Shared jurisdiction and shared financing of

programs have given provinces substantial say over the contents of FPT agreements

in agriculture The five-year FPT Agreements have taken effect only with the



consent of six provinces accounting for half of Canadarsquos net eligible sales This

formula gives provinces like Ontario Quebec and Alberta with large agricultural

economies as well as budgets the capacity to undermine federal harmonization

goals should their own provincial goals not be met Provinces have used their

leverage to secure budget and program flexibility2 Ontario for example delayed

implementation of the 2003ndash2008 and 2013ndash2018 agreements until concessions

were made to satisfy its provincial flexibility concerns And both Ontario and

Quebec have retained provincial risk management programs that have required

Ottawa to accept more bilateralism than it would like

The reality of hard bargaining in FPT agricultural agreements stemming from

competing interests shows the important role that procedural norms of

collaboration and substantive norms of reciprocity play in securing these

agreements Procedural norms are described by different FPT officials as

ldquoabsolutely criticalrdquo to collaborative relations giving rise to ldquoa mode of

cooperatingrdquo and of ldquotrying to solve certain problems togetherrdquo especially at

the level of officials Ongoing work through these multilateral institutions has

enabled participating officials to develop trust and respect for one anotherrsquos

expertise They have also crucially facilitated development of norms of diffuse

reciprocity by helping FPT officials come to mutual understandings of one othersrsquo

different positions In short a shift toward multilateral collaboration in farm

income risk management has occurred incrementally over time as FPT

governments have learned how to reconcile their disparate goals in order to

advance their shared goals

Immigration Emerging Multilateral CollaborationLike agriculture immigration is an area of concurrent federalndashprovincial

jurisdiction under the constitution Also like agriculture shifts in domestic and

global economic conditions drove FPT governments to engage with one another

However in the face of divergent specific interests and policy goals these external

factors and self-interest are not on their own sufficient explanations for the

emergence of a growing pattern of collaborative IGR in the field

In recent years particularly from 2006 to 2015 multilateral collaboration has

become an important approach to managing economic immigration policy

marking a shift away from the more traditional patterns of IGR in the field

Although the federal government largely dominated the policy field until well after

the mid-20th century provincial involvement increased over time Quebec led

provincial engagement negotiating a series of bilateral agreements beginning in

1971 and ultimately securing greater autonomy in immigrant selection and

settlement through the 1991 Canada-Quebec Accord (Kostov 2008) Following

Quebecrsquos lead since the mid-1990s all the other provinces have increasingly



engaged in the field (Paquet 2014) Provincial engagement is largely based on three

related pillars (a) bilateral agreements clarifying their roles in the field (b)

Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs) that allow them to select permanent

economic migrants and (c) different models of managing federally funded

settlement services (Schertzer 2015 390ndash1 Paquet 2014 Banting 2012 Seidle

2010)

The initial turn toward a more cooperative approach to establishing these pillars

of the provincial role in immigrationmdashand the subsequent emergence of

multilateral collaborationmdashwas largely driven by (changing) structural conditions

The constitutional allocation of concurrent responsibility provided the foundation

for entrepreneurial provincial actors to assert their authority over immigration

Quebecrsquos role as the driving force of provincial engagement in the field can be

clearly linked to the importance of immigration in protecting and promoting the

francophone identity of the province Quebecrsquos continued mobilization in defence

of its distinct status in the federation led to the development of shared norms

around its place in the system and its powers in selecting and settling immigrants

The extension of a provincial role in the field beyond Quebec was driven by the

incentives for provinces to gain their share of the economic social and

population-growth benefits from immigration Economic immigration was seen as

a way to support growing economies (in the western provinces largely related to

resource extraction) address shifting labor market needs (across the country but

principally in Central Canada) and reverse population decline (in the eastern

provinces) At the same time the differing needs of provinces across the country

combined with a longstanding overall cap on the number of immigrants the federal

government would admit gave few incentives for widespread provincial

coordination in the field Accordingly a practice of bilaterally negotiating

agreements around the different needs of the provinces in the immigration sector

developed throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s (Seidle 2013 Banting

2012)

While these changing structural factors help explain initial FPT engagement the

shift from a bilateral approach of setting federalndashprovincial roles in the field

toward multilateral collaboration requires us to consider how other factors drove

actor behavior The divergent interests of the provincesmdashthat stem from their

particular economic and social contextsmdashraise questions about why they would

band together to negotiate common positions with the federal government and

further why the federal government would agree to engage in multilateral IGR

(which can lessen its material power and status advantage that comes with bilateral

negotiation) Here we can see the power of norms looking at the field from the

early 2000smdashand particularly after 2006mdashnorms played an important role in the

shift toward a more multilateral collaborative approach to IGR Repeated

interactions through institutional networks led to shared understandings among



government actors of the respective roles and responsibilities of the two orders in

the immigration fieldmdashand eventually to clear procedural and reciprocal norms

consistent with multilateral collaboration

Throughout the duration of the Harper government and particularly between

2008 and 2013 the federal government pursued an aggressive reform agenda with

respect to immigration policy Among the key actions here were changes to the

funding and management of immigrant settlement services and a general

realignment of selection policy to privilege economic migration It is in the reforms

to the selection of economic immigrants where we can see the emergence of

multilateral institutions as a key means of policy development a commitment to

an equality of status between the orders of government and related procedural

norms and reaching policy outcomes that demonstrate adherence to norms of

diffuse reciprocity

This shift began in 2002 when following bilateral interactions with the

provinces over the previous decade all FPT ministers responsible for immigration

met together for the first time in a century At this meeting ministers noted ldquothe

need for stronger federal-provincial-territorial partnerships on a multilateral and

bilateral basisrdquo agreeing two years later to ldquowork together to develop a shared

vision for Canadarsquos immigration systemrdquo (SCICS 2002 2004) Over the subsequent

decade officials and FPT ministers worked closely to reach a common

understanding of the goals for the immigration program This shared

understanding took the form of a Joint FPT Vision for Immigration announced

in 2012 This Vision calls for a system that ldquoattracts welcomes and supports

newcomers to join in building vibrant communities and a prosperous Canadardquo

along with a series of high-level objectives related to common economic objectives

and sharing the benefits of immigration across the country (SCICS 2012) As a

senior provincial official explained the Vision and the multilateral work to

establish it gave rise to a new ldquonorm of shared jurisdictionrdquo that elaborated

ldquocommon FPT interestsrdquo particularly in the area of selecting economic migrants

Federal actors shared this view of the Vision Mark Davidson then Director

General of Intergovernmental Relations at Citizenship and Immigration Canada

(CIC) framed it as a novel agreement with the provinces (outside Quebec) ldquoon

common priorities for where we mutually want the immigration program to gordquo

(Davidson 2014) The Vision and the views of the actors involved in its creation

show congruent understandings of the parameters of shared government

responsibility in economic immigration

In working to establish this Vision and in the subsequent efforts to find ways to

bring it to fruition intensive interactions between government officials became

commonplace A defined hierarchy of multilateral FPT committees charged with

policy development and program management at both the political and officialsrsquo

levels emerged (Schertzer 2015 393ndash5) These committees operated under



principles of equality between the orders with federalndashprovincial co-chairs The

level of interaction through these multilateral forums was significant for example

between 2006 and 2015 FPT ministers met five times and their Deputy Ministers

seventeen times Moreover in 2011 and 2012 Assistant Deputy Ministers met forty

times This dense network of relations carried out through an increasingly

institutionalized structure in the 2006ndash2015 period led to the emergence of clear

procedural and reciprocal norms in relation to the sharing of jurisdiction over

economic immigration

The emergence of procedural norms relating to the very conduct of IGR in the

field is clearly captured through the FPT Vision Action Plan (VAP) The VAP is a

framework agreement announced in 2012 that identified three areas for

multilateral collaboration between 2012 and 2015 (SCICS 2012 including

Backgrounder) The VAP also included a supplementary FPT agreement on ldquoroles

responsibilities and accountabilities to inform work under the Vision Action Planrdquo

(SCICS 2012) Together these multilaterally negotiated framework agreements as

some senior provincial officials noted laid the groundwork for success in jointly

developing policy in the identified areas (particularly in the development of a new

approach to selecting economic immigrants ldquoExpress Entryrdquo) This is a view

shared by federal officials who indicated that the VAP was a joint FPT agenda of

priorities the mechanism to guide work on these priorities and the way to

measure results These agreements are clear examples of how working rules can

help to establish the groundwork for norms of reciprocity these procedurally

based agreements are guided by ldquoprinciples which specify appropriate conduct for

a class of actions without regard to the particularistic interests of the partiesrdquo

(Ruggie 1993 11)

With regard to reciprocal norms a number of the key policy outcomes reached

through multilateral collaboration from 2006 to 2015 also displayed elements of

adherence to the principle of diffuse reciprocity Notable here is the development

of a new selection system for economic immigration (Express Entry launched in

early 2015) and the provincial role in that system (see CIC 2012 2014) Express

Entry shifted from accepting on a first-come first-served basis all applications for

permanent residency that qualified to an approach centred on a pool of candidates

who pass a threshold and a more direct role for governments and employers in

identifying and selecting economic immigrants This move from a supply-side to a

demand-side model was part of a wider set of explicitly federal objectives the

pooling of applications that are ranked for selection uses a set of criteria related to

their ability to meet national labor market shortages possession of a job offer and

high ldquohuman capitalrdquo The key elements of the system were negotiated over a two-

year period by a multilateral working group that reported through the institutional

hierarchy of FPT tables (as part of the VAP priorities) Stemming in large part

from this work the end product reflects both federal and provincial interests



Express Entry certainly signals a shift toward greater similarity in the particular

profile of economic migrants selected by provinces however provinces helped to

shape the eligibility criteria and retained both the ability to select migrants through

their PNPs and to use Express Entry at their discretion (Mas 2014)

The emergence of procedural and reciprocal norms in economic immigration

policymdashand their role in the shifting patterns of IGRmdashis evident While the shift

toward intergovernmental cooperation (through bilateral channels) can be traced

back to structural conditions the development of multilateral collaboration was

driven by these emerging procedural and reciprocal norms Structural conditions

and divergent self-interest among the provinces cannot on their own explain why

these particular patterns of IGR emerged Through repeated interactions between

FPT officials understandings developed of what is truly shared (and not shared) in

the immigration field Over time these understandings were codified informing

institutional development and policy outcomes related to the selection of economic

immigrants Federal and provincial actors confirmed this trajectory continually

noting the importance of the developing sense in this period that both orders

shared responsibility for the selection of economic immigrants These shared

understandings exerted influence on actor behavior by shaping the views of what

was appropriate and possible in pushing ahead on policy development in the field

and particularly the necessary approach to intergovernmental negotiations to

implement policy reforms

Labor Market Policy Constraining Unilateral ActionThe ambiguity in Canadarsquos constitution with regard to the allocation of

jurisdiction over labor markets and the national scope of the related policy

problems that come with the changing dynamics of the workforce provide the key

structural factors driving governments to cooperate in the field At the same time

with both orders of government able to claim jurisdiction and pursue policies that

serve their particular interests understanding how governments have reconciled

their often-competing positions to cooperate over time requires us to look beyond

these structural incentives In this regard explaining the move toward multilateral

collaboration in Canadarsquos labor market policymdashand how it has constrained

attempts to break from this pattern of IGRmdashrequires a consideration of how the

two orders have sought to balance their interests For provinces cooperation

ensures provincially led programs for skills development are properly funded with

federal help for the Government of Canada cooperation can ensure that federally

administered Employment Insurance benefits are effectively deployed across the

country when needed Reconciling the provincial and federal views of the purpose

of labor market policy in Canada has largely been done through the development

of a set of norms that govern IGR in the field



The procedural and substantive norms related to the sharing of jurisdiction over

labor market policy have evolved over the various agreements that have shaped

policy related to labor market training in Canada (Wood and Hayes 2016)

Although labor markets were traditionally an area of federal responsibility

throughout the twentieth century provincesrsquo interest in managing their own labor

markets grew over this period in response to shifting economic conditions and

workforce needs The policy focus for the two orders however was different

addressing local labor market shortages for key sectors was the primary concern for

the provinces and territories while Ottawa focused on building a flexible and

mobile national workforce that could respond to market shocks The different

provincial and federal perspectives on the appropriate policy response to shifting

structural conditions resulted in a period of policy fragmentation as both orders of

government sought to play a role in program development starting in the early

1980s The result of this fragmentation and overlap was that government actors

learned the benefits of intergovernmental cooperation in labor market policy in

order to avoid working at cross-purposes

In the subsequent three decades although the provinces have taken a leading role

in the development and implementation of labor market policy the Government of

Canadarsquos role in providing funding and setting national objectives is vital to

understanding labor market policy At the outset of increased engagement federal

and provincial governments sought to find common solutions through largely

bilateral mechanisms as a way to address federal objectives the broadly similar

shared provincial position and the unique needs of different provinces Over time

this cooperation has in turn led to the creation of institutionalized procedural and

substantive norms to govern IGR in the sector Through years of interaction these

norms and institutions became deeply rooted and operate within well-understood

parameters in particular in the apex organization the Forum of Labour Market

Ministers (FLMM) which oversees a set of related policy forums Much of this

intergovernmental collaboration has taken place under the auspices of the

multilateral FLMM Meeting frequently through the FLMM longstanding

expectations have developed regarding the need for Ottawa and the provinces to

work together to effectively manage the field and the conditions under which they

should cooperate3

One of the clearest reciprocal norms established through intergovernmental

interaction is that while both orders of government are involved the provinces are

recognized as having a clear leadership role in the development and implemen-

tation of workforce training programs Following the 1995 Quebec secession

referendum the federal government made a commitment to devolve control over

aspects of labor market training to the provinces Accordingly a series of bilateral

agreements was struck (Haddow 2012) The first the Labor Market Development

Agreements (LMDAs) began with an Alberta pact in 1996 before spreading to all



provinces LMDAs were aimed at supporting programs for workers eligible for

federal Employment Insurance (EI) (FLMM 2013 8) The bilateral approach to

negotiating the LMDAs led to considerable asymmetry in their design and

implementation to reflect the different conditions in each provincial jurisdiction

(with the details shifting according to whether the federal government would

completely devolve its responsibilities or maintain a role in service delivery) (Bakvis

and Aucoin 2000 2 Lazar 2002 10 Wood and Hayes 2016) These LMDAsmdashwhich

over time were signed with all provinces and territories and shifted more fully toward

a norm of devolving responsibility for the policy sector to the provinces (Wood and

Hayes 2016 9)mdashexisted alongside a series of other bilateral agreements (eg Labor

Market Agreements for Persons with Disabilities introduced in 2004)

In 2007 the Harper government announced a new set of shared-cost agreements

with the provinces to further augment labor market training supports largely

building on and supplementing the existing model (Hayes 2014 2) These new

agreements called Labor Market Agreements (LMAs) began in 2008ndash2009 and

lasted for six years until 2014 While the LMAs were technically still a set of

bilateral agreements the FLMM provided a multilateral forum for discussion

coordinating the different provincial and federal actors and acting as a body

through which provincial governments could speak collectively on shared

positions Through the negotiation of these new LMAs Harperrsquos government

acknowledged the established norm that the provinces ought to be the lead players

in the field of active labor market supports largely to reflect the diverse needs of

the provinces and to avoid program duplication The 2007 federal budget

recognized the ldquoprimary role and responsibility that provinces and territories have

in the design and delivery of training programsrdquo (Department of Finance Canada

2007 32) Underpinning this statement was the shared commitment to the

principle of flexibility that is despite the actorsrsquo shared goals and responsibilities

the suite of programs across provinces should be tailored to their individual needs

Given the evolution of the policy and program delivery models in this field there

was no expectation that the federal government would upset these understandings

built as they were on a mutual commitment to diffuse reciprocity in the (federal)

funding and (provincial) management of labor market training

This context of established procedural norms surrounding deep consultation

before policy change is introduced and the substantive norm of provincial

leadership explains why Ottawa surprised its provincial partners when it announced

without any prior consultation the creation of the Canada Job Grant (CJG) in its

2013 budget Justified by the federal government as necessary to change the model

of labor market training in Canada in response to shifting economic conditions the

CJG initiative proposed a radical transformation from the approach established

through the LMDAs and LMAs into a new employer-driven model for training

The key aspect of the CJGrsquos original vision was a grant program for labor market



training whereby the provinces and territories were responsible for matching federal

and employer contributions to support job seekers in acquiring new or upgraded

skills (Hayes 2014 1)

This unanticipated unilateral announcement ran counter to provincial

normative expectations on several fronts The federal press release summarized

the motivation for the shift stating (without evidence) that ldquotraining in Canada is

not sufficiently aligned to the skills employers need or to the jobs that are actually

availablerdquo (Department of Finance Canada 2013 Hayes 2014 2) The announce-

ment violated the expectations of multilateral collaboration that existed for

developing shared-cost programs In addition as initially presented the CJG

program was to be national in scope and uniformly delivered across the countrymdash

features that provinces perceived as violating the norms of their leadership role in

the sector and the principle of flexibility There were also ideological objections to

the grant since the program was designed to offer help to those perceived by the

provinces to be least in need of active labor market supports It would privilege

those already attractive to employers rather than those in need of assistance in

joining the labor market The CJG thus breached a number of the well-established

procedural and substantive norms that had been built up over thirty years of

intergovernmental work in the field

In the face of considerable provincial mobilization against the perceived breach

of the existing procedural and reciprocal norms Ottawa eventually backed down

from its initial plan (Hayes 2014 3) Negotiations with the provinces resulted in a

multilateral model known as the Canada Job Fund This fund has a common

overarching framework applicable to all jurisdictions with related agreements that

allow for variation from province to province (Government of Canada 2015)

Funding support from Ottawa flows in three streams the CJG the employer-

sponsored training stream and the employment services and supports stream This

revised model reflects both national-level objectives promoted by the Harper

government (an employer role in training) and provincial flexibility in tailoring

programs to their own service-delivery approaches and needs (in some cases

retaining existing programs) (Hayes 2014 5ndash6)

Because IGR cooperation in labor markets is longstanding and the potential

break the CJG represented was so unexpected the situation presents a useful test of

norms of multilateral collaboration The Harper Governmentrsquos initial unilateralism

reflected its desire to bring labor market policy more in line with its ideological

preference for introducing market principles into publicly run programs However

the method of its introduction violated longstanding procedural norms of

collaboration in the field and disregarded the institutions that had previously been

trusted to produce outputs that offered diffuse reciprocity for all the actorsrsquo

different interests Ultimately the federal government found that it could not

simply ignore these norms A bargaining context thus arose that required some



recognition of the pre-existing norms and collaborative institutions Recognizing

that the CJG as originally designed could not proceed without provincial help

the federal government embraced the best alternative available to achieve its

objectives retreating to a more collaborative stance Institutionalized procedural and

substantive norms as embedded in the FPT forum proved important mechanisms

for provinces to confront Ottawa on the changes proposed through the CJG

Explaining Collaboration The Power of NormsDevelopments in the three policy fields surveyed here particularly between 2006 and

2015 provide clear indications of procedural and reciprocal norms shaping both

IGR dynamics and related policy outcomes Across agriculture immigration and

labor markets similar conditions led to multilateral collaboration as a key pattern of

IGR Shifting structural factors incentivized intergovernmental cooperation to deal

with new collective action dilemmas in fields of shared or overlapping constitutional

jurisdiction As government actors worked together to solve these dilemmas

expectations grew around cooperative behaviors and processes Dense networks

(formal and informal) built up over time facilitating learning from successes and

failures and helping to build trust and mutual understanding among government

actors of their respective goals in the policy fields With the establishment of

procedural norms built upon an equality of status for the two ordersmdashand the need

to involve all parties where issues touch upon their interestsmdashreciprocal norms

followed These substantive norms largely demonstrated adherence to principles of

diffuse reciprocity searching for means of sharing jurisdictional responsibility that

balanced the goals and interests of federal and provincial governments

The further development and resilience of these norms of multilateral

collaboration during the period of Prime Minister Harperrsquos government is

particularly noteworthy A core principle in Stephen Harperrsquos open federalism was

respect for the division of powers between the orders of government and their

autonomy to act within these spheres (Harmes 2007 418ndash422 Dunn 2016 3ndash5) This

principle has likely obscured the room that open federalism left for intergovernmental

cooperation (Harper 2005 Department of Finance 2007 6ndash8) As Christopher Dunn

has shown considerable intergovernmental cooperation did take place during the

later stages of Harperrsquos tenure His preferred method was bilateral discussions with his

provincial counterparts he held over 250 reported bilateral discussions but only two

multilateral first minister meetings during his tenure in office (Dunn 2016 8) In his

reading of open federalism Adam Harmes (2007) offers a plausible explanation for

Harperrsquos bilateral cooperation as a form of strategic action responding to the

perceived need to address changing conditions in Canadarsquos economy Harperrsquos open

federalism was a means to preserve free markets in line with his neo-liberal ideology

(2007) Reinforcing autonomous spheres of authority decentralization to provinces



in certain areas and maintaining federal control or coordinate action in others were

ways to implement his preferred ldquomarket-preserving federalismrdquo (ibid 423ndash427)

Harmesrsquo reasoning applies to our cases to some extent Cooperation across

governments was encouraged to keep the agri-food sector competitive in a shifting

global trade market In the immigration and labor market fields the perceived need

for a greater employer role to bring about a flexible competitive workforce was a key

motivation for FPT action In short the nature of the collective action dilemmas

(necessitating FPT coordination to ensure functioning liberal markets) pushed the

federal government to cooperate with the provinces in these areas notwithstanding its

preference to avoid coordinate action to the extent possible

Although these insights into Harperrsquos open federalism doctrine help us

understand what motivated cooperation during the Harper era as noted above an

account based on strategic responses to perceived shifts in external conditions falls

short in explaining the particular patterns of IGR that were adopted Our analysis

shows that other conditions were critical in the development and resilience of

multilateral forms of collaboration These conditions included dense formal and

informal networks of government actors operating under procedural norms of

equality and working toward outcomes consistent with principles of diffuse

reciprocity And because these procedural and reciprocal norms began to form in

many sectors before Harper took office in 2006 the continuation of multilateral

collaboration during his tenure is consistent with the logic of normative and

institutional legacies constraining the ability of political actors including the Prime

Minister to establish a ldquonewrdquo approach to federalism (Bickerton 2010)

The self-enabling power of the norms of multilateral collaborationmdasheven in the

face of shifting structural conditions or actors seeking changemdashis of course reliant

on shared acceptance of these procedural and reciprocal norms A critical factor

that gave power to these norms in our case studies was the extent to which they

were shared both between the two orders of government and among the provinces

In the agriculture and immigration sectors the FPT vision statements and related

five-year framework agreements for joint action provided the parameters of what

was truly understood as shared in the fields In labor market policy the areas of

work carried out under the auspices of the FLMM and the established norms of a

strong provincial role in the delivery of programs played a similar role structuring

subsequent interactions and outputs

Additionally in each policy field there was a strong consensus among the

provinces on the scope of their role In agriculture the provinces and Ottawa shared

the belief that their collaboration on integrated (Canada-wide) and complementary

(provincial) policies was needed for the competitiveness and profitability of the

sector In immigration the provinces largely initiated the turn toward multilateral

collaboration by coming to a consensus on the economic and demographic

objectives of selecting immigrants In labor market policy a provincial bloc formed



in the aftermath of the initial unilateral announcement of the CJG Normative

congruence among the provinces was necessary for their engaging the federal

government on a collective multilateral front to pursue their common goals (on the

importance of such provincial congruence in collaborative relations see Wallner

2017 424ndash425) And in each field it appears that this provincial unity operating in

line with procedural norms of collaboration pulled the federal government into

multilateral negotiations

The importance of intergovernmental normative congruence in explaining IGR

dynamicsmdashlooking beyond structural conditions and strategic actionmdashis illustrated

by an additional example within the immigration field where a lack of agreed

substantive norms on the roles and responsibilities across governments resulted in a

different IGR pattern In the 2012 federal budget the federal government unilaterally

announced it was resuming control of the management of federally funded

settlement services for immigrants in British Columbia and Manitoba (then the only

two provinces outside Quebec with devolved control) The decision was taken

without any prior consultation with either province and against their wishes All of

the same structural conditions noted above that provide incentives for cooperation

in the selection of economic immigrants were present when it came to delivering

settlement services for recent migrants However the difference that facilitated

federal unilateral action here was the lack of shared substantive norms among the

provinces and with Ottawa on the role of the provinces in managing settlement

services An initial federal offer to devolve control over settlement to the provinces in

the 1990 s beyond Quebec was only taken up by British Columbia and Manitoba

leaving a patchwork of approaches across the country Over time the federal position

shifted away from offering devolution towards seeking greater accountability for the

resources it invested And so by 2012 there was a lack of consensus among the

provinces and between the two orders of government on their respective roles and

how to share jurisdiction in this aspect of the policy field This lack of consensus on

how to share jurisdiction opened the door for federal unilateral action

Our analyses are limited to patterns of IGR in three concurrent or overlapping

policy fields that are principally economic in nature Our ability to generalize

about the power of norms and the conditions shaping IGR dynamics in other

policy fields and outside Canada is therefore limited However our analyses

present an opportunity for future research to test our theoretical propositions by

investigating other policy areas where multilateral collaboration was or was not

adopted during the Harper era

Such studies would investigate whether similar procedural and reciprocal norms

existed in other areas and to what extent their presence or absence influenced IGR

patterns While such additional analyses are beyond the scope of a single article

the dynamics of other policy fields during the Harper governmentrsquos tenure in office

show the potential of focusing on norms as important drivers of patterns of IGR



For example social policy developments in healthcare and public pensions could

provide important cases to test the conditions we have identified as necessary for

multilateral collaboration In pension policy our analyses point to the absence of a

shared perception between the orders of government on the need to enhance

Canadarsquos public pension system as an explanation for why Ottawa was able to

stymy calls from Ontario for intergovernmental cooperation over this period

(despite clear robust norms and institutions facilitating multilateral collaboration

in the field) In health care a conflict prone policy area that lacks a common

federal-provincial vision on how to share jurisdiction (Maioni 2012 170ndash171

Inwood Johns and OrsquoReilly 2011 Ch 7) our analyses suggest the absence of

procedural and reciprocal norms facilitated the significant federal unilateralism in

2011 that reformed the funding of provincial services

Additional comparisons with other policy fields are desirable in order to

confirm or invalidate our claim that norms play a crucial role driving multilateral

collaboration We believe this article in tracing the development and stability of

intergovernmental norms in three different fields has provided a model for how to

conduct additional comparative studies Exploring agriculture immigration and

labor market policy in Canada we have shown the common conditions that are

conducive to actors adopting a particular pattern of IGR The first condition is a

shift in the structural conditions that leads to a common perception among federal

and provincial governments of the need for some form of cooperative action

Critically we have shown that structural shifts on their ownmdashand accounts that

stress their role in collaborative IGRmdashare insufficient for explaining the emergence

of particular patterns of cooperative relations after the initial period of

engagement A second conditionmdashclear procedural and reciprocal normsmdashis

necessary for the emergence and stability of multilateral collaboration These norms

arise from consistent structured interactions among officials which over time

result in actors learning the value of each otherrsquos perspectives procedural norms

related to the equality of status of the two orders of government and reciprocal

norms on how to share jurisdiction in the different areas

NotesThis article draws on research previously published in an Institute for Research on Public

Policy Study (No 62) We are grateful for the helpful comments from the editor peer-

reviewers and the participants of a CPSA workshop on ldquoContext Mechanisms and Process-

Tracingrdquo in 2016 organized by Jorg Broschek and Mireille Paquet

1 Multilateral collaboration is not inherently a means to achieve policies that treat

constituent governments asymmetrically however the constitutive character of Canadian

federalism does mean that coordinate action involving multiple governments will tend to

produce some measure of asymmetry in the design and implementation of a policy



2 Appearing before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and

Agri-food (1st session 41st Parliament November 15 2011) Assistant Deputy Minister

of Agriculture and Agri-food Canada Greg Meredith acknowledged that the Government

of Canada had to change its plans when provincial ministers collectively said no to its

proposals with respect to Growing Forward 2 Wilson (2012) reports that provinces

secured a higher threshold figure to trigger government payments in the event of a farm

income drop than that proposed by Ottawa

3 Established in 1983 the FLMM is co-chaired by the federal minister responsible for

employment and a provincial-territorial co-chair the latter rotates every two years The

FLMMrsquos work is divided into four policy areas the mobility of workers employment

services labor information and workforce development and training (FLMM 2016) All

four areas are richly populated with working groups and procedural norms related to

the role of government collaboration

ReferencesAgriculture and Agri-Food Canada nd Growing forward A federal-provincial-territorial

framework agreement on agriculture agri-food and agri-business products policy

Available at www5aagrgccaresourcesproddocapfpdfGFFA_epdf

Alcantara Christopher Jorg Broscheck and Jen Nelles 2016 Rethinking multilevel

governance as an instance of multilevel politics A conceptual strategy Territory

Politics Governance 4 (1) 33ndash51

Axelrod Robert 1984 The evolution of cooperation New York Basic Books

Bakvis Herman and Peter Aucoin 2000 Negotiating labour market development agreements

Research no 2 March Ottawa Canadian Centre for Management Development

Bakvis Herman Gerald Baier and Doug Brown 2009 Contested federalism Certainty and

ambiguity in the Canadian federation Toronto Oxford University Press

Banting Keith 2012 Remaking immigration Asymmetric decentralization and Canadian

federalism In Canadian federalism Performance effectiveness and legitimacy ed Herman

Bakvis and Grace Skogstad 216ndash282 Don Mills Oxford University Press

Benz Arthur 2000 Two types of multi-level governance Intergovernmental relations in

Germany and EU regional policy Regional and Federal Studies 10 (3) 21ndash44

Biccheri Cristina 1993 Rationality and coordination Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Bickerton James 2010 Deconstructing the new federalism Canadian Political Science

Review 4 (2ndash3) 56ndash72

Bolleyer Nicole 2009 Intergovernmental Cooperation Rational Choices in Federal Systems

and Beyond Oxford Oxford University Press

Bolleyer Nichole and Evelyn Bytzek 2009 Government congruence and intergovernmental

relations in federal systems Regional and Federal Studies 19 (3) 371ndash397

Brennan Geoffrey Lina Eriksson Robert Goodin and Nicholas Southwood 2013 Explaining

Norms Oxford Oxford University Press



Cameron David and Richard Simeon 2002 Intergovernmental relations in Canada

The emergence of collaborative federalism Publius The Journal of Federalism 32 (2)

49ndash71

CIC 2014 Offering lsquoexpress entryrsquo to qualified economic immigrants New release April 8

2014 httpnewsgccawebarticle-endo nidfrac14836509

mdashmdashmdash 2012 Building a fast and flexible economic immigration system News release April

17 2012 httpnewsgccawebarticle-endo mthdfrac14advSrchampcrtrmnthndVlfrac144ampcrtr

mnthStrtVlfrac141ampcrtrpagefrac141ampnidfrac14669419ampcrtryrndVlfrac142014ampcrtrkwfrac14ImmigrationthornVis

ionampcrtryrStrtVlfrac142002ampcrtrdyStrtVlfrac141ampcrtrdyndVlfrac1429

Davidson Mark 2014 Interview with author Ottawa April 23

Department of Finance Canada 2007 Restoring fiscal balance for a stronger federation Aspire

to a stronger safer better Canada Budget 2007 Ottawa Department of Finance Canada

httpwwwbudgetgcca2007pdfbkfbsfepdf

mdashmdashmdash 2013 Jobs growth and long-term prosperity the top priority of Canadarsquos Economic

action plan 2013 News release March 21 Ottawa Department of Finance Canada http

wwwfingccan1313-040-engasp

Dunn Christopher 2016 Harper without Jeers Trudeau without cheers Assessing 10 years

of intergovernmental relations IRPP Insight 8 Montreal Institute for Research on Public

Policy

Feiock Richard 2013 The institutional collective action framework Policy Studies Journal

41 (3) 397ndash425

Feiock Richard and John Scholz ed 2010 Self-organizing federalism Collaborative

mechanisms to mitigate institutional collective action dilemmas New York Cambridge

University Press

FLMM 2016 Current FLMM activities and initiatives FLMM httpwwwflmm-fmmt ca

englishViewasp xfrac14908

mdashmdashmdash 2013 Building skills together A report from the provincial and territorial labour

market ministers FLMM

Government of Canada 2015 Canada job fund agreementsmdashESDC [Employment and

Social Development Canada] Ottawa Government of Canada httpwwwesdcgccaen

training_agreementscjfindexpage

Haddow Rodney 2012 Federalism and economic adjustment Skills and economic

development in the face of globalization and crisis In Canadian federalism

Performance effectiveness and legitimacy ed Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad

223ndash240 Don Mills Oxford University Press

Harmes Adam 2007 The political economy of open federalism Canadian Journal of

Political Science 40 (2) 417ndash437

Harper Stephen 2005 Yes Mr Martin there is a better approach to federalism Globe and

Mail December 22



Hayes Brigid 2014 What you need to know about the Canada job fund Caledon

Commentary December Ottawa Caledon Institute of Social Policy wwwcaledoninstorg

PublicationsPDF1058ENGpdf

Inwood Gregory Carolyn Johns and Patricia OrsquoReilly 2011 Intergovernmental policy

capacity Inside the worlds of finance environment trade and health Montreal and

Kingston McGill-Queenrsquos University Press

Keohane Robert 1985 Reciprocity in international relations International Organization 49

(1) 1ndash27

Kostov Chris 2008 Canada-Quebec immigration agreements (1971-1991) and their impact

on federalism The American Review of Canadian Studies 38 (1) 91ndash103

Lazar Harvey 1998 The federal role in a new social union Ottawa at a crossroads In

Canada The state of the federation 1997 non-constitutional renewal ed Harvey Lazar

105ndash136 Kingston Institute of Intergovernmental Relations

mdashmdashmdash 2002 Shifting roles Active labour market policy in Canada under the labour market

development agreements Canadian Policy Research Networks (CPRN) Conference

Report Ottawa CPRN

mdashmdashmdash 2006 The intergovernmental dimensions of the social union A sectoral analysis

Canadian Public Administration 49 (1) 23ndash45

Mas Susana 2014 Skilled immigrants to be offered lsquoexpress entryrsquo to Canada in 2015 CBC

Online April 22

McRoberts Kenneth 1985 Unilateralism bilateralism and multilateralism Approaches to

Canadian federalism In Intergovernmental Relations ed Richard Simeon 71ndash130

Toronto University of Toronto Press amp Royal Commission on the Economic Union

and Development Prospects for Canada

Maioni Antonia 2012 ldquoHealth Carerdquo in Canadian Fedearlism Performance Effectiveness and

Legitimacy ed Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad 165ndash182 Don Mills Oxford

University Press

Ostrom Elinor 1990 Governing the commons New York Cambridge University Press

Painter Martin 1991 Intergovernmental relations in Canada An institutional analysis

Canadian Journal of Political Science 24 (2) 269ndash288

mdashmdashmdash 1996 The council of Australian governments and intergovernmental relations A

case of cooperative federalism Publius The Journal of Federalism 26 (2) 101ndash120

Paquet Mireille 2014 The federalization of immigration and integration in Canada


Rocher Francois and Miriam Smith 2003 The four dimensions of Canadian federalism In

New trends in Canadian federalism ed Francois Rocher and Miriam Smith 21ndash44

Peterborough Broadview

Ruggie John 1993 Multilateralism The anatomy of an institution In Multilateralism

matters The theory and Praxis of an institutional form ed John Ruggie 3ndash47 New York

Columbia University Press



Schertzer Robert 2015 Intergovernmental relations in Canadarsquos immigration system From

bilateralism towards multilateral collaboration Canadian Journal of Political Science 48

(2) 383ndash412

mdashmdashmdash 2016 The judicial role in a diverse federation Lessons from the supreme court of

Canada Toronto University of Toronto Press

Scharpf Fritz 1997 Games real actors play Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research

Boulder Westview Press

SCICS (Secretariat des conferences intergouvernementales canadiennes j Canadian

Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat) 2012 Federal provincial and territorial

governments envision Canadarsquos future immigration system Joint FPT News Release

and Backgrounder November 16 2012 httpwwwscicsgccaenglishconferencesasp

afrac14viewampidfrac142846ampyfrac14ampm

SCICS 2004 An immigration framework for Canada Joint FPT News Release November

15 2004 httpwwwscicsgccaenglishconferencesasp afrac14viewdocumentampidfrac14932

mdashmdashmdash 2002 Ministers agree to work together to share the benefits of immigration Joint

FPT News Release October 16 2002 httpwwwscicsgccaenglishconferencesasp

afrac14viewdocumentampidfrac141224

Seidle Leslie 2010 Intergovernmental immigration agreements and public accountability

Policy Options JulyndashAugust 49ndash53

mdashmdashmdash 2013 Canadarsquos provincial nominee immigration programs Securing greater policy

alignment IRPP Study 43 Ottawa Institute for Research on Public Policy

Skogstad Grace 1987 The politics of agricultural policy-making in Canada Toronto

University of Toronto Press

mdashmdashmdash 2008 Internationalization and Canadian agriculture Toronto University of Toronto

Press

Simeon Richard and Amy Nugent 2008 Parliamentary Canada and intergovernmental

Canada Exploring the tensions In Canadian federalism Performance effectiveness and

legitimacy ed Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad 89ndash111 Toronto Oxford University

Press

Simmons Julie 2017 Canadian multilateral intergovernmental institutions and the limits of

institutional innovation Regional and Federal Studies 27 (5) 573ndash596

Simmons Julie and Peter Graefe 2013 Assessing the collaboration that was ldquocollaborative

federalismrdquo 1996-2006 Canadian Political Science Review 7 (1) 25ndash36

Stewart William 1984 Concepts of federalism Lanham University Press of America

Wallner Jennifer 2014 Learning to school Federalism and public schooling in Canada

Toronto University of Toronto Press

mdashmdashmdash 2017 Cooperation without the Leviathan Intergovernmental policymaking in

Canadian education Regional and Federal Studies 27 (4) 417ndash440

Wood Donna and Brigid Hayes 2016 The labour market agreements What did they really

do Ottawa Caledon Institute of Social Policy



Young Robert 2006 Open federalism and Canadian municipalities In Open federalism

Interpretations significance ed Keith Banting 7ndash24 Kingston Ontario Institute of

Intergovernmental Relations

Zimmerman Joseph 2011 Horizontal federalism Interstate relations Albany State

University of New York Press



present and a related incentive for cooperation (Zimmerman 2011 Feiock 2013)

At the same time scholars in Canada have described the collaborative model as

ldquofluid and ad hocrdquo ldquoheavily dependent on whether first ministers especially the

prime minister find it advantageous or notrdquo (Cameron and Simeon 2002 65 see

also Simmons 2017 574) To be sure there are considerable constraints to

sustaining intergovernmental cooperation in Canada besides embedded incentives

in all federal systems for governments to resort to unilateral action in order ldquoto

guard their turf and to exploit every opportunity to win credit and avoid blamerdquo

(Cameron and Simeon 2002 65) an additional hurdle to locking in collaborative

federalism is the generally weak institutionalization of Canadian IGR (Bolleyer

2009 Simmons 2017) This characterization appeared warranted when collabora-

tion between governments in the area of social policy was found to be weak over

the 1996ndash2006 period (Simmons and Graefe 2013) The fate and meaning of

collaborative federalism in Canada was further questioned with the 2006 election of

a Conservative federal government and Prime Minister committed to ldquoopen

federalismrdquo a central element of which called for governments to remain within

their assigned fields of jurisdiction and to minimize overlap (Young 2006

Bickerton 2010) Nevertheless as we demonstrate here collaborative IGR has

developed and remained resilient in a number of important policy fields in Canada

over the past three decades

Our objective in this article is to investigate the conditions that facilitate this

particular pattern of IGRmdashwhat we call multilateral collaborationmdashin Canada We

seek to build on existing accounts that view intergovernmental relations in Canada

as highly contingent on changing structural conditions and the strategic

motivations of the first ministers who head up Canadarsquos federal provincial and

territorial governments In this regard we show that structural conditions alone do

not explain whymdashand importantly howmdashgovernments choose to work together

over sustained periods of time More specifically we challenge the notion that

intergovernmental collaboration in Canada is solely contingent on the self-

interested calculations of political actors

Building on the above insights as well as a broader literature on the logic of

collectivecooperative action we provide a two-step account of the conditions

conducive to collaborative federalism that emphasizes the enabling and

constraining effects of norms First we examine how norms of multilateral

collaboration emerge Here we agree with the view that changing structural

conditions can incentivize governments to seek cooperative solutions when the

related policy problems are difficult for a single government to deal with on their

own These situations often lead to regular interactions among government actors

from both orders of government through various institutional mechanisms Such

dense patterns of interaction create opportunities for political actors to learn from

each other to recognize the validity of othersrsquo positions and thereby facilitate their

2 R Schertzer et al





















































norms



























4 R Schertzer et al

























































actors





























6 R Schertzer et al



















of policy areas































































8 R Schertzer et al




































agreements






































officials






































































































2010)























2012)



























diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press








































































norms



























4 R Schertzer et al

























































actors





























6 R Schertzer et al



















of policy areas































































8 R Schertzer et al




































agreements






































officials






































































































2010)























2012)



























diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press












































































actors





























6 R Schertzer et al



















of policy areas































































8 R Schertzer et al




































agreements






































officials






































































































2010)























2012)



























diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press






































of policy areas































































8 R Schertzer et al




































agreements






































officials






































































































2010)























2012)



























diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press


























































8 R Schertzer et al




































agreements






































officials






































































































2010)























2012)



























diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press























































agreements






































officials






































































































2010)























2012)



























diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press


















































officials






































































































2010)























2012)



























diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press













































































































2010)























2012)



























diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press

































diffuse reciprocity























































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press













































(Ruggie 1993 11)



























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press





























































































should cooperate3

















































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press



























































































































































































































































































































49ndash71
















Policy


41 (3) 397ndash425



University Press















Mail December 22










(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press




























(1) 1ndash27








Report Ottawa CPRN




Online April 22







University Press


















(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press























(2) 383ndash412






















Press




Press





















multilateral collaboration in canadian intergovernmental ... · particular pattern of igr—what we...

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