multifaceted nature of intrinsic motivation.pdf

Multifaceted Nature of Intrinsic Motivation:The Theory of 16 Basic Desires

Steven ReissThe Ohio State University

R. W. White (1959) proposed that certain motives, such as curiosity, autonomy, andplay (called intrinsic motives, or IMs), have common characteristics that distinguishthem from drives. The evidence that mastery is common to IMs is anecdotal, notscientific. The assertion that “intrinsic enjoyment” is common to IMs exaggerates thesignificance of pleasure in human motivation and expresses the hedonistic fallacy ofconfusing consequence for cause. Nothing has been shown scientifically to be commonto IMs that differentiates them from drives. An empirically testable theory of 16 basicdesires is put forth based on psychometric research and subsequent behavior validation.The desires are largely unrelated to each other and may have different evolutionaryhistories.

Motives are reasons people hold for initiatingand performing voluntary behavior. They indi-cate the meaning of human behavior, and theymay reveal a person’s values. Motives oftenaffect a person’s perception, cognition, emo-tion, and behavior. A person who is highlymotivated to gain social status, for example,may be observant of marks of social distinction,may think often about issues pertaining towealth, may especially enjoy the feeling of self-importance, and may behave in ways associatedwith upper-class status.1 By defining motives asreasons, we do not imply that motives are pri-marily cognitive, any more than establishing amotive for a crime in a court of law requiresconscious premeditation. A person can have areason to behave, and thus a motive, withoutnecessarily being aware of it.

Aristotle (330 BCE/1953) divided motives intoends versus means on the basis of the individ-ual’s purpose for performing the behavior. Endsare indicated when a person engages in a be-havior for no apparent reason other than that iswhat the person desires to do. Examples includea child playing ball for physical exercise and astudent reading a book out of curiosity. In eachof these examples, the goal is desired for its

own sake. In contrast, means are indicated whena person performs an act for its instrumentalvalue. Examples include a professional athletewho plays ball for a salary and a student whostudies to improve a grade. In each of theseexamples, the goal (salary, grade) is desiredbecause it produces something else. A personmight seek a salary, for example, as a means ofenhancing social status, or high grades as ameans of pleasing a parent.

An analysis of a person’s behavior may iden-tify a series of instrumental acts followed byone or more end goals that complete the “be-havior chain.” For example, a person may takea second job for the extra salary (instrumentalmotive), desire the extra salary to purchasehealth care (instrumental motive), and desire thehealth care to benefit his or her family (endgoal). This example of a simple behavior chainshows three behaviors, two motivated by instru-mental goals and a third motivated by an endgoal. Logically, only goals that are desired fortheir own sake can serve as the “end” of apurposeful explanation of a series of humanacts.

The number of instrumental motives is, forall practical purposes, unlimited. Only imagina-tion limits how many different ways individuals

1 This example is based partially on empirical findings ofa correlation between motivation for status and motivationfor wealth (see Reiss & Havercamp, 1998).

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to Steven Reiss, Department of Psychology, OhioState University, 321 McCampbell Hall, 1581 Dodd Drive,Columbus, OH 43210-1296. E-mail: [email protected]

Review of General Psychology Copyright 2004 by the Educational Publishing Foundation2004, Vol. 8, No. 3, 179–193 1089-2680/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1089-2680.8.3.179

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can pursue the end goal of, say, power. Gener-ally, there seems to be little or no point to listinginstrumental motives, because no matter howcomprehensive a list happens to be, somebodycan probably imagine an additional instrumen-tal motive that was overlooked and could beadded. In contrast, the number of ends is limitedby human nature. A central issue for psychol-ogy should be to identify and classify the endpurposes of human behavior, because ends in-dicate the ultimate goals of much of what peo-ple do.

Two theoretical perspectives have been ad-vanced concerning end goals. Multifaceted the-ory holds that the various end goals are largelyunrelated to each other, perhaps to the pointwhere they are genetically distinct sources ofmotivation with different evolutionary histories.Multifaceted theorists include philosophers whohave suggested lists of the most fundamentalmotives of human nature (e.g., Spinoza, 1675/1949), psychologists who have put forth evolu-tionary theories of motivation (e.g., McDougall,1926), and psychologists who have suggestedtheories of human needs (e.g., Murray, 1938).

In contrast, unitary or global theorists holdthat end goals can be profitably reduced to asmall number of categories based on commoncharacteristics. Unitary theorists seek the under-lying psychological principles that are ex-pressed by diverse motivational events. The an-cient Greek philosophers, for example, reducedend goals into categories expressing the needsof the body, mind, and soul (e.g., Plato, 375BCE/1966). Hedonists distinguished betweenend goals associated with pleasure enhancementand those related to pain reduction (Russell,1945). Freud (1916/1963) reduced motives tosexual and aggressive instincts.

Today, some social psychologists classifyend goals into two global categories, calleddrives and intrinsic motives (IMs). The distinc-tion has been influential—1,921 scholarly pub-lications on intrinsic motivation (IM) appearedduring the period of January 1967 to May 2002(source: PsycINFO). IM has been investigatedin social psychology (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000),developmental psychology (e.g., Harter, 1981),clinical psychology (e.g., Eisenberger & Cam-eron, 1996), organizational psychology (e.g.,Houkes, Janssen, de Jonge, & Nijhuis, 2001),and educational psychology (e.g., Kohn, 1993).

In this article, I examine how various endgoals relate to each other. I consider the mean-ing of the concept of IM and ask, What, ifanything, justifies classifying end goals into aunitary, global category of intrinsic motivation?In discussing this issue, I do not consider thephenomenon of “undermining effects,” inwhich extrinsic rewards decrease intrinsic mo-tivation. These effects have been discussed indetail in numerous prior publications (Deci,Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Eisenberger & Cam-eron, 1996; Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975). I pro-pose a theory of end goals, called the theoryof 16 basic desires, and summarize evidenceshowing the multifaceted nature of end motives.I begin the discussion by considering the behav-iorist concept of drive, because IM was devel-oped to show the limitations of this concept.

Drive Theory

Thorndike’s (1911) law of effect reduced hu-man motivation to categories of reward andpunishment. This law holds that responses arestrengthened when they lead to satisfaction andweakened when they lead to punishment. Psy-chologists studying learning soon realizedThorndike’s law is a tautology, or a propositionthat is circular (true by definition). The follow-ing statements, for example, are circular withrespect to each other: “Rewards strengthen be-havior” and “Any event that strengthens behav-ior is a reward.”

The concept of drive was introduced to es-cape from the circularity of the law of effect(Brown, 1961). Instead of identifying reward asany stimulus or satisfying event that strengthensbehavior, drive theorists defined it as a reduc-tion in a state of deprivation. The statements“Drive reduction strengthens behavior” and“Drive reduction occurs when a state of depri-vation is lessened” are not circular with respectto each other.

Hull (1943) recognized four types of drives:hunger, thirst, sex, and escape from pain. Inmany animal learning experiments, investiga-tors have induced drives by depriving animalsof an important need prior to the experiment.The deprivation of food, for example, estab-lishes food as a powerful reward, increasing theanimal’s motivation to learn responses that pro-duce food (Skinner, 1938). Much of animal

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learning theory is based on the results of psy-chological studies with food-deprived or water-deprived animals.2

Unitary IM Theory

The unitary construct of IM was put forth asan alternative to drive theory. The initial insightwas that many of the motives not explained wellby drive theory—motives such as exploration(curiosity), autonomy, and play—have com-mon properties. To a large extent, unitary IMtheory initially represented an attempt to showthe essential differences between drives andwhat psychodynamic theorists have called egomotives.

In the past, the distinction between drives andIMs has been thought to have a physiologicalbasis, at least according to some published re-marks. The general idea was that drives such ashunger and thirst arise from “tissue needs” in-volving “peripheral” components of the nervoussystem, whereas IMs arise from psychologicalor cognitive processes involving primarily cen-tral neural activity. Deci (1975), for example,wrote that the primary effects of IM “are in thetissues of the central nervous system rather thanin the non-nervous system tissues” (p. 61). Thisphysiological paradigm for distinguishingdrives from IMs always lacked scientific sup-port; indeed, we now know that it is physiolog-ical nonsense. Motives such as hunger andthirst, for example, involve significant centralnervous system or cognitive activity (Berntson& Cacioppo, 2000). Both the behaviorist con-cept of drive and the concept of IM as nondrivehave no precise physiological meaning andoriginally were put forth at a time when littlewas known about the physiology of motivation.

Mastery

White’s (1959) article on competence moti-vation (mastery) was arguably the start of thecurrent era of scholarship on IM. White (1959)asserted that exploration, manipulation, andplay are not drives originating from states ofdeprivation partially because they are not re-lated to “visceral needs comparable to hunger,thirst, or sex” (p. 301). Exploration and play“cannot be regarded as leading to any kind ofconsummatory response” (p. 301). He further

argued that motives that are not drives have“very vital common properties” (p. 318). Inparticular, such motives are concerned with “ef-fective interactions with the environment, underthe general heading of competence” (p. 317).White’s motive for competence has been vari-ously called effectance motivation, competencemotivation, and mastery. Deci (1975) later em-braced White’s hypothesis that competence mo-tivation is a common property of nondrives,defining IM as behavior “which a person en-gages in to feel competent and self-determin-ing” (p. 61).

White appreciated the need to validate hisidea of effectance motivation. He wrote, “Nodoubt it will at first seem arbitrary to propose asingle motivational conception in connectionwith so many diverse kinds of behavior. Whatdo we gain by attributing motivational unity tosuch a diverse array of activities?” (White,1959, p. 318). He cited both Piaget (1952) andanecdotal observations to support his hypothe-sis that effectance motivation is common toexploration, manipulation, and play.

White speculated on the development of ef-fectance motivation. He suggested that in bothinfants and young children,

it seems sensible to conceive of effectance motivationas undifferentiated. Later in life it becomes profitableto distinguish various motives such as cognizance,construction, mastery, and achievement. It is my viewthat all such motives have a root in effectance motiva-tion. (White, 1959, p. 323)

Some of the appeal of White’s (1959) theoryis suggested by the behavior of young animalsand children. Young lion cubs, for example,sometimes seem to be bursting with energy—they get into mischief, play with the other cubs,explore their environment, and have a tendencyto wander away from the group. In other words,they express self-assertive energy as play, ex-ploration, manipulation, a desire for physical

2 Inducing drive prior to experiments lessens the influ-ence of individual differences in motivation (trait motives),which I later argue is the key to understanding and predict-ing much of human behavior. If John has a much strongerappetite than Sam, for example, this may be evident undermany circumstances but less so when both John and Samare significantly deprived of food and extremely hungry.The typical behaviorist animal learning experiment waspoorly suited for observing the effects of individual differ-ences in motivation (Reiss & Havercamp, 1996).

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exercise, and a desire for autonomy. They createa strong impression that these behaviors arelinked by a common motive of self-assertion.

Anecdotal observations, however, do notconstitute scientific evidence. As far as I coulddetermine, no researcher has presented scien-tific tests of the hypothesis that mastery is theaim of exploration, autonomy, and play. White(1959) cited as evidence for his hypothesis an-ecdotal examples of children at play and hisinterpretations of what those children were re-ally aiming for with their behavior. Althoughhis interpretations were reasonable and perhapseven insightful, they did not rise to the stan-dards of scientific evidence. Part of the diffi-culty with White’s hypothesis is the lack ofquantification and measurement, which are twopillars of a scientific approach. As Harter (1981)put it, “The global nature of this construct [ef-fectance motivation] has made it difficult tooperationalize. White’s formulation does notreadily lend itself to an empirical test” (p. 301).

White (1959) did not develop a measure ofcompetence motivation. He did not assess cor-relations between competence motivation andvarious IMs, showing that they are significantlyhigher than correlations between competencemotivation and drives. White did not proposespecific studies to test his concept. He did notsay what might falsify his theory. He developedsome interesting ideas, but he did not put forthscientific support for those ideas.

Kagan (1972) recognized the need to developmeasures of effectance motivation. He sug-gested that they be developed on the basis ofprinciples similar to those used in the ThematicApperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943). Nosuch measure, however, has been validated. Thevalidity of the TAT, moreover, has been calledinto question (Zubin, Eron, & Schumer, 1965).Today, few researchers use the TAT or otherstorytelling techniques to measure motivation.

White’s (1959) argument that mastery is acommon element of the IMs is based on a verybroad interpretation of competence motivation.He defined competence motivation so broadlythat it includes nearly all motives. One couldargue, for example, that drives also express adesire to interact effectively with the environ-ment. In hunger, for example, people want tobecome effective hunters to find food. Somepeople spend a considerable amount of energy

to become sexually effective in attracting oth-ers. By putting forth a sufficiently general def-inition of competence motivation, it seems pos-sible to argue that nearly any collection of di-verse motives may have common elements.

The hypothesis that effectance motivation isundifferentiated at birth and later differentiatesinto the various IMs has not been tested. No-body has observed the predicted process of dif-ferentiation of mastery motivation. Nobody hasconducted measurements of effectance motiva-tion in an undifferentiated state and in its pre-dicted differentiated form, showing that theformer is linked to the latter.

In conclusion, children show a need to feelcompetent and master their environments. Thisneed, called mastery, is important in childhooddevelopment and in human behavior generally.The relationship between mastery and other egomotives, however, is not well understood. Re-searchers need to develop methods to exploremore fully White’s hypothesis that mastery isthe aim of important ego motives such as ex-ploration, manipulation, and autonomy.

Intrinsic Pleasures

Intrinsic pleasure is another common charac-teristic of IMs, according to unitary theorists.This viewpoint holds that people are motivatedto engage in activities they expect to experienceas pleasurable. When the pleasures are inherentto the behavior or activity itself—such as draw-ing for its own sake—IM is imputed (Ryan &Deci, 2000; Weiner, 1995). When the pleasuresare external to the behavior or activity—such asdrawing for a good player award—extrinsicmotivation is imputed. As Deci and Ryan(1985) put it, “When people are intrinsicallymotivated, they experience interest and enjoy-ment, they feel competent and self-determining,they perceive the locus of causality for theirbehavior to be internal, and in some instances,they experience flow” (p. 34). Weiner (1995)defined IM as a source of motivation arisingfrom the enjoyment of an activity.

Are IMs pleasurable? IM theorists mayhave erred in embracing hedonism, the philos-ophy that pleasure motivates behavior. Over thecenturies, scholars have shown a number ofsignificant limitations of pleasure theories. Ap-plied to the concept of intrinsic pleasures, for

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example, we may question whether IM theoristshave exaggerated the extent to which certainactivities really are pleasurable.

IM theorists arguably have exaggerated themotivational significance of intellectual plea-sures. They have held that everybody is bornwith the potential to enjoy learning (e.g., Kohn,1993). When students do not enjoy learning, asin the example of high school underachievers,IM theorists blame ineffective teaching, boringcurricula, and the widespread use of extrinsicincentives such as grades (Kohn, 1993). Tomotivate students in school, unitary IM theoristsadvise teachers to find ways to make learningfun (Lepper & Cordova, 1992) and to tap intostudents’ natural curiosity.

IM theorists have presented little scientificevidence to support the hypothesis that every-body is born with the potential to enjoy learn-ing. Anecdotal examples of adolescents andadults show that many people react to intellec-tual activities as if they were unpleasant. Peopleoften sustain thought on a problem for no morethan brief periods of time; the overwhelmingmajority of adults do not read books; documen-taries are among the least popular forms of film;and even many academics reduce intellectualactivity soon after they earn a tenured teachingposition. These examples are arguably signsthat intellectual activity is naturally unpleasantunder many circumstances or if engaged in formore than a few minutes at a time.

IM theorists may have put forth a misleading,almost romanticized description of the inquiryprocess. The inquiry process is not always plea-surable and often involves significant negativeemotions. Many scientists have written aboutthe agony of the creative inquiry process and theemotional ups and downs of research.

Whereas IM theorists have said that the psy-chological aim of inquiry is intellectual plea-sure, the multifaceted theory I propose later inthis article implies that aims of inquiry arelearning and knowledge. Under my viewpoint,highly curious people desire knowledge andunderstanding so strongly they pursue the in-quiry process even when they must endure anx-ieties, severe criticism, devastating failures, andother frustrations. Knowledge is the end goal ofcuriosity, but thinking, exploration, and prob-lem solving are not necessarily pleasurable.Thinking can be frustrating, exploration can

arouse fear (James, 1890/1950), and problemsolving can be frustrating.

In conclusion, one problem with the conceptof intrinsic pleasures is that it implies that in-trinsically motivated behavior is more enjoy-able than it seems to be. Intrinsic pleasure maynot be a common characteristic of IMs becausesometimes IMs are not necessarily pleasurable.

Does intrinsic pleasure motivate much be-havior? Even when the performance of anintrinsically motivated behavior is enjoyable,we cannot assume that the behavior was moti-vated by the anticipation of such pleasure. Plea-sure can be a consequence of behavior ratherthan a motivating cause.

According to philosophical critiques of hedo-nism (e.g., Russell, 1945), pleasure is a conse-quence of gratification of a motive other thanpleasure seeking. Please consider Csikszentmi-halyi’s (1990) hypothesis that intrinsically mo-tivated people climb mountains in order to ex-perience a special kind of pleasure called flow.Reiss (2000a) suggested that flow is a conse-quence of satiating the desire for physical ac-tivity, not an intrinsic property of climbing.Csikszentmihalyi (2000) replied that peoplewho have never climbed before may not knowthe joys of climbing but that after a personlearns that climbing is pleasurable, that individ-ual subsequently climbs in order to experiencesuch pleasures. “If I feel happy after hiking inthe mountains,” argued Csikszentmihalyi(2000), “chances are I will want to experiencethat happiness again and take another hike” (p.1163). Pleasures are both “causes and conse-quences” of behavior, according to Csikszent-mihalyi (2000).

Not so. If I am physically tired, for example,I will not enjoy climbing mountains. The enjoy-ment does not arise from the act of climbing perse, only from the act of climbing while satiatingthe motive for physical exercise. The pleasure isnot inherent to the activity but is a nonmotiva-tional byproduct of satiating the desire for phys-ical activity.

Suppose that Mary is a curious person whoreads, learns, and then experiences pleasure.Suppose that Susan is an active person whoclimbs a mountain and then experiences plea-sure. In predicting and explaining the behaviorof these two people, we need to know that oneperson is motivated by curiosity and the other is


motivated by fitness. We add nothing significantby invoking unitary IM theory and arguing thatit was “anticipated pleasure” or “flow” that mo-tivated each.

Individual Differences

Unitary theory seems inconsistent with indi-vidual differences regarding different IMs. Ifcompetence motivation is the developmental or-igin of both autonomy and curiosity, peoplewith above average competence motivation alsoshould develop above average autonomy andcuriosity, and so trait autonomy and trait curi-osity should be significantly correlated. Highlyautonomous people should be highly curious.These implications of unitary IM theory areunsupported by scientific evidence. In factorstudies of the Reiss Profile psychometric instru-ment (Reiss & Havercamp, 1998), moreover,the correlation between factors assessing traitautonomy (independence) and trait curiositywas virtually nil (r � .05, N � 1,154). Becausehighly autonomous people are not necessarilyhighly curious, how can autonomy and curiositybe about the same thing (mastery)?

Conclusion

White (1959) put forth the thesis that IMssuch as curiosity, autonomy, and play havecommon characteristics justifying a “singlename” (p. 317), meaning a single category ofmotivation. No common characteristics havebeen shown scientifically. Neither competencemotivation nor intrinsic pleasure has beenshown to distinguish IMs from drives. White’shypothesis lacks adequate scientific support andseems inconsistent with individual differences.White himself admitted that his hypothesis wasspeculative in that the IMs appear to be toodiverse to have significant commoncharacteristics.

Multifaceted Nature of End Goals

Throughout history many scholars have ex-pressed a multifaceted theory of end motivation(“doing something for its own sake”). Aristotle,for example, identified 12 end motives: confi-dence, pleasure, saving, magnificence, honor,ambition, patience, sincerity, conversation, so-

cial contact, modesty, and righteousness. Des-cartes (1637/1958), on the other hand, listed six“passions of the soul.” He wrote, “There areonly six [intrinsic motives] which are simpleand primitive, viz., wonder, love, hatred, desire,joy and sadness. All others are composed ofthese six” (Descartes, 1637/1958, p. 291).James (1890/1950) and McDougall (1926) rec-ognized between 8 and 20 “instincts.”3 Whenpsychodynamic psychology gained influence,Murray (1938) reinterpreted McDougall’s listof instincts into a list of 20 basic psychologicalneeds.4 Maslow (1943) also put forth a theoryof diverse human motives.

Some psychologists have taken strong excep-tion to efforts to develop lists of end motives.Critics have argued that 8 to 20 fundamentalmotives are too many to be studied profitably(Freeman, Anderson, Azer, Girolami, & Scotti,1998). Biologists study scores of enzymes, andchemists study 115 elements. Because we donot say that biologists study “too many” en-zymes or that chemists study “too many” ele-ments, why should we think that 8 to 20 basicmotives are “too many” for psychologists tostudy? Scientific rules permit psychologists tostudy as many fundamental motives as can beidentified. We do not want to invent a motivefor every behavior, of course, but we also do notwant to proceed according to invalid, precon-ceived notions of how many motives there are.

Evolutionary theory suggests a multifacetedmodel of IMs. When we consider the variousIMs, they seem relevant to different survivalneeds, suggesting possibly distinct motives con-trolled by different genes. Efficacy, for exam-ple, motivates building nests and other forms ofshelter, which have the survival value of pro-

3 In the James–McDougall theory, a human instinct is anautomatically occurring desire or motive, not a rigid patternof unlearned behavior. The idea is that people do not de-liberately choose their psychological needs. As Aristotle(330 BCE/1953) put it, people choose means, not ends.Aristotle was making a valid point in logic (if an individualattempted to choose an end, the option chosen would beinstrumental to the criteria on which the choice was based).In contrast, James and McDougall were reporting anecdotalobservations of human behavior.

4 Henry A. Murray (1938) acknowledged the origin of hisfamous list of needs when he wrote, “This classification ofneeds is not very different from lists constructed by Mc-Dougall, Garnett, and a number of other writers” (p. 84).

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tecting animals from harsh environmental ele-ments. Autonomy—the desire for freedom—motivates animals to leave the nest when theycome of age, spreading the search for food overa larger geographical area. These considerationssuggest at least a possibility of separate evolu-tionary histories, which supports the idea thatIMs are multifaceted.

Factorial Studies of End Motivation

Since 1995, I have been developing a list ofdiverse IMs, variously called the theory of 16basic desires or sensitivity theory. My graduatestudents and I have been gathering evidenceshowing the reliability, factorial validity, andbehavioral validity of this list. By validating avariety of largely unrelated end motives (whatpeople seek for its own sake), my colleaguesand I have sought to show that end motivationis, in fact, multifaceted.

Reiss and Havercamp (1996, 1998) definedbasic or fundamental motives to have three fea-tures: (a) end purposes (IMs), (b) universal mo-tivators, and (c) psychological importance. Thecriterion of psychological importance is in-tended to focus multifaceted theory on behav-iors that historically have been central to psy-chological personality theory. Eating, for exam-ple, is considered to be psychologicallyimportant because aspects of culture, many ev-eryday activities, and some clinical disordersare concerned with food and food preparation;on the other hand, thirst is not considered to bea fundamental motivator because it does notaccount for a significant amount of everydaybehavior of interest to psychologists. Withoutthe criterion of psychological significance, theremay be scores of basic motives additional tothose considered in this article, including onefor each biological need.

We began our effort to identify the basicmotives of human behavior by developing a listof every motive we could imagine. We con-sulted a variety of reference sources and askedcolleagues for suggestions. We obtained ideasfrom Murray’s (1938) theory of needs, motiva-tional studies, psychopathology articles andbooks, and psychiatric classification manuals.We pared down our initial list of items byeliminating redundancies and motives that haverelatively little psychological significance. As a

result of this process, an initial list of nearly 500items was reduced to 328 items.

Reiss and Havercamp (1998) asked researchparticipants to rate how important each of themotives we identified was in determining theirbehavior. Initially, we conducted four factorstudies (three exploratory studies and one con-firmatory study), each with a different sample ofparticipants. The combined total of 2,554 peo-ple included people of diverse ages (12 to 76)and stations in life (e.g., high school students,college students, military people, fast foodworkers, seminary students, human service pro-viders, nursing home residents). The results ofan initial confirmatory factor study supported a15-factor solution. On the basis of these results,we constructed a self-report instrument, calledthe Reiss Profile of Fundamental Goals andMotivational Sensitivities. The initial version ofthe instrument assessed 15 fundamentalmotives.

We developed a scale to assess saving, or thedesire to collect, which was added as a 16thfactor because we became convinced that col-lecting is an end motive we had overlooked. Ina study of 512 adults solicited from sources inurban and rural Ohio, Havercamp (1998) con-firmed the 16-factor solution (the original 15factors plus saving) to the revised 128-itemReiss Profile instrument.

In conclusion, when people were asked toself-report their motives, they reported 16 fac-tor-distinct categories of psychologically signif-icant end motives (IMs). Any effort to reducethis list to only a few categories would result inthe loss of significant information, and thisshould produce a vastly inferior system (com-pared with the full 16 basic desires) for analyz-ing and predicting people’s behavior.

Reliability of factors. Test–retest reliabili-ties for the Reiss Profile have been reported(Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; Reiss & Haver-camp, 1998), with mean correlations of .83(range � .80 to .96) for 2-week reliability and.80 (range � .69 to .88) for 4-week reliability.These test–retest reliabilities exceed those re-ported for some personality tests such as theMinnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2(Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, &Kaemmer, 1989). They support the hypothesisthat the Reiss Profile assesses trait motives.

Reiss and Havercamp (1998) reported Cron-


bach’s alpha coefficients of internal reliabilityfor each of 15 scales (all except saving). Themedian alpha value was .86 (range .70 to .92),suggesting good internal reliability for the ReissProfile scales.

Social desirability. Havercamp and Reiss(2003) assessed the social desirability of theReiss Profile with a sample of 171 undergradu-ate student volunteers, who completed both theReiss Profile and the Marlowe–Crowne SocialDesirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & Mar-lowe, 1960). The correlations computed be-tween the MCSDS and each of the Reiss Profilescales ranged in absolute value from .01 to .39(Mdn � .09, M � .16). For sake of comparison,Jackson (1984) reported correlations betweenthe Personality Research Form (PRF) and socialdesirability scales ranging from .01 to .44(Mdn � .20, M � .22). These results show thatthe Reiss Profile self-reports are minimally af-fected by social desirability.

Universal values. Additional support for themultifaceted model comes from research on val-ues. Factorial studies of values should produceresults similar to factorial studies of end goalsbecause, as a matter of logic, all end goals arevalues, and ultimate values are potentially moti-vating, or reasons to instigate behavior. (Becauseends and values are logically related ideas, forcenturies motivation was studied under the topicof ethics—for example, Aristotle’s lecture noteson motivation were published in his book Nicho-machean Ethics; Aristotle, 330 BCE/1953.)

These considerations imply that empiricallyderived lists of basic desires and universal hu-man values should be similar. In a series ofstudies analyzing survey data from 97 samplesfrom 44 countries, Schwartz (1994) identi-fied 10 universal values. All 10 of Schwartz’suniversal values correspond to basic motives inReiss’s system. Schwartz’s value of power, forexample, falls under Reiss’s motive calledpower. Additional “matches” are Schwartz’svalue of achievement and Reiss’s motive ofpower; Schwartz’s hedonism and Reiss’s socialcontact are similar because each includes fun-loving behavior; Schwartz’s excitement is theopposite of Reiss’s tranquility (the same motivebut assessed from different ends of a contin-uum); Schwartz’s self-directing falls underReiss’s motive of independence; Schwartz’svalue universalism is Reiss’s motive of ideal-

ism; Schwartz’s benevolence falls under Reiss’smotives of family and social contact;Schwartz’s tradition falls under Reiss’s honor;the value of conformity as defined by Schwartzfalls under Reiss’s motive for vengeance; andSchwartz’s value of security falls under Reiss’smotive of order. The two bodies of research,thus, produced significantly similar results,showing the multifaceted nature of ultimate val-ues or IMs.

Theory of 16 Basic Desires

Reiss’s theory of 16 basic desires, which issummarized in Table 1, is put forth as a multi-faceted model of IM, alternative to the unitarymodels of IM. Hypothesis 1 is that each ofthe 16 basic desires is a trait motive. With thepossible exceptions of the motives of idealismand acceptance, the 16 basic desires motivateanimals as well as people (Hypothesis 2). The-oretically, the 16 basic desires are considered tobe genetically distinct with different evolution-ary histories (Hypothesis 3). The satiation ofeach basic desire produces an intrinsically val-ued feeling of joy, a different joy for each basicdesire (Hypothesis 4). Loosely speaking, peoplebehave as if they are trying to maximize theirexperiences of the 16 intrinsic joys.

Although everybody embraces the 16 basicdesires, individuals prioritize them differently(Hypothesis 5). Generally, the most importantbasic desires for explaining a person’s behaviorare those that are unusually strong or unusuallyweak compared with appropriate norms. Forexample, some people devote much of theirtime to satiating their desire for curiosity, othersseek power, and still others are out for revenge.Those basic desires that are neither strong norweak compared with appropriate norms are gen-erally less important in explaining a person’sbehavior. The satiation of a basic desire is al-ways temporary; soon after we satisfy a basicdesire, the motive reasserts itself and needs tobe satisfied again. After we socialize, for exam-ple, the desire for social contact may reassertitself within hours.

Each basic desire is theoretically regarded asa continuum of potential motivation anchoredby opposite values (Hypothesis 6). As shown inFigure 1, the theory of 16 basic desires holdsthat individuals are motivated to aim for a point

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of moderation (called a set point or sensiti-vity)—in other words, people generally are mo-tivated to experience what Aristotle called amoderate mean. Most people aim for a moder-ate degree of power, a moderate degree of sta-tus, a moderate degree of knowledge, and so onfor each basic desire. Individual differences,however, are significant (Hypothesis 5). In Fig-ure 1, for example, Henry aims for a lowerdegree of social contact than does Jake. When

the amount of social contact Henry or Jakeexperience is less than they desire, they aremotivated to socialize. When the amount ofsocial contact they experience is about whatthey desire, they are temporarily satiated. Whenthe amount of social contact is more than theydesire, they are motivated to be alone to balanceout their experiences.

Suppose that Henry and Jake attend a partythat lasts 3 hours. Henry enjoys the party at first

Table 1Reiss’s 16 Motives

Motive name Motive Animal behavior Intrinsic feeling

Power Desire to influence (including leadership;related to mastery)

Dominant animal eats more food Efficacy

Curiosity Desire for knowledge Animal learns to find food moreefficiently and learns to avoidprey

Wonder

Independence Desire to be autonomous Motivates animal to leave nest,searching for food over largerarea

Freedom

Status Desire for social standing (includingdesire for attention)

Attention in nest leads to betterfeedings

Self-importance

Social contact Desire for peer companionship (desire toplay)

Safety in numbers for animals inwild

Fun

Vengeance Desire to get even (including desire tocompete, to win)

Animal fights when threatened Vindication

Honor Desire to obey a traditional moral code Animal runs back to herd whenstared at by prey

Loyalty

Idealism Desire to improve society (includingaltruism, justice)

Unclear: Do animals show truealtruism?

Compassion

Physicalexercise

Desire to exercise muscles Strong animals eat more and areless vulnerable to prey

Vitality

Romance Desire for sex (including courting) Reproduction essential forspecies survival

Lust

Family Desire to raise own children Protection of young facilitatessurvival

Love

Order Desire to organize (including desire forritual)

Cleanliness rituals promotehealth

Stability

Eating Desire to eat Nutrition essential for survival Satiation (avoidanceof hunger)

Acceptance Desire for approval Unclear: animal self-concept? Self-confidenceTranquility Desire to avoid anxiety, fear Animal runs away from danger Safe, relaxedSaving Desire to collect, value of frugality Animal hoards food and other

materialsOwnership

Figure 1. The basic desire for social contact as a continuum of end motivation.


but then feels uncomfortable because he is ex-periencing much more social activity than hedesires. Jake, on the other hand, still wants morefun when the party ends. After the party, Henrygoes home and spends the next morning aloneto balance his experience toward a low averageamount of social contact, whereas Jake goes tothe nearest bar to keep the party rolling.

The theory of 16 basic desires holds that whatis motivating are discrepancies between theamount of an intrinsic satisfier that is desiredand the amount that was recently experienced(Hypothesis 7). When a person experiencesmore power than he or she desires, the individ-ual is motivated to be submissive for a period oftime to balance experience toward the desiredrate. When a person experiences less powerthan he or she desires, the individual is moti-vated to be domineering for a period of time.Thus, a person who generally has a powerfulpersonality may at times be motivated to besubmissive, and a person with a submissivepersonality may at times be motivated to bedominant.

According to the theory of 16 basic desires,vengeful people are motivated to experiencehigh degrees of vindication, competition, con-tentiousness, conflict, and aggression, whereaspeacemakers are motivated to experience lowdegrees of these experiences. When a vengefulperson experiences a period of time—say, a fewdays—that is conflict free, the individual is mo-tivated to get into arguments, fights, and com-petitions. The longer the period of time that isconflict free, the stronger becomes the motiva-tion to pick a fight with somebody. If the indi-vidual “goes too far” and provokes more of afight than he or she had anticipated, the personbecomes motivated by peacemaking behavior tobalance experience back toward the individual’sAristotlean mean (de Waal, 1989). On the otherhand, peacemakers are generally conflictavoidant and motivated to experience a belowaverage degree of strife. When peacemakersexperience even ordinary amounts of everydaystrife and conflict, they become motivated tomake peace. Their tolerance for strife is muchbelow that of the average individual.

As was noted previously, basic desires orga-nize our attention, cognitions, feelings, and be-havior into a coherent action or whole (Hypoth-esis 8). We pay attention to stimuli that are

relevant to the satisfaction of our desires, andwe tend to ignore stimuli that do not satisfy ourdesires. A person with a strong desire for ven-geance, for example, is attentive to possibleinsults or provocations, whereas a person with aweak desire for vengeance may not even noticean insult. A person with a strong desire for orderpays attention to how neat and clean a room isand notices when things are out of place. Incontrast, a person with a weak desire for ordermay not even notice when dirty dishes are in thesink or the house is a mess.

Validation of 16 Basic Desires

In science we choose the competing theorythat potentially explains the most data. Multi-faceted theory seems to have significant gener-ality of application: Reiss (2000b) has shownhow it is at least theoretically possible to holdthat human relationships, careers, family life,sports, and spirituality are organized to satiatethe 16 basic desires. The 16 basic desires alsohave been applied to psychopathology (Reiss &Havercamp, 1996) and to mental retardation(Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Wiltz & Reiss, 2003).Reiss’s model of 16 basic desires was devel-oped in the tradition of comprehensive person-ality theories, but unlike previous global per-sonality theories, Reiss’s model is testable.

Is self-report a valid basis to determine thatmotives are multifaceted? Do people validlyself-report their motives? Are they just “talk-ing”? Validation research on the 16 basic de-sires has produced significant evidence thatwhat people say motivates them is consistentwith how they behave in the “real world.”

Convergent validity. The convergent valid-ity of the Reiss Profile is the extent to whichindividual factors correlate with other scalesintended to measure the same or similar con-structs. Havercamp and Reiss (2003) showedthat the Reiss Profile power and order scalescorrelated .55 and .60, respectively, with thedominance and order scales of the PRF. This isnoteworthy because the PRF scales have beenvalidated against the Strong Vocational InterestBlank. For college student populations, the PRFscale for dominance predicts social behavior(Jaccard, 1974) and participation in student ac-tivities (Pierce & Schwartz, 1971). Further, theReiss Profile scale for tranquility has been cor-

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related with the Reiss–Epstein–Gursky AnxietySensitivity Index (Peterson & Reiss, 1992) be-cause of significant overlapping item content(Havercamp & Reiss, 2003).

Validated profiles. A series of studies wereconducted to evaluate how the 16 motives arerelated to behavior. Because motivation has di-verse applications, these studies evaluated is-sues as varied as spirituality, sports, and choiceof club or college major.

In a study of religious motivation, Reiss(2000c) tested 558 adults who had identifiedthemselves as very, somewhat, or not religious.How religious a person identified himself to be(called religiosity) was associated with aboveaverage (high) Reiss Profile motivational scoresfor honor and family and with below average(low) scores for vengeance and independence(autonomy). The study showed that religiosityis a valid predictor of how people self-reporttheir 16 basic desires.

The finding that religiosity is associated withhigh honor suggests that people choose a reli-gion partially out of a desire to be loyal to one’sparents and heritage. People overwhelminglychoose the religion of their parents. The findingthat low vengeance is associated with religiositymay reflect the Christian value of kindness and“turning the other cheek.” Family values alsodrive people to religion, suggesting that religionprovides a psychological means of strengthen-ing family life.

The finding that religiosity is associated witha desire for low independence (low autonomy)is particularly interesting. Many religious writ-ings encourage “opening one’s heart to God.”Under the theory of 16 basic desires, this mes-sage expresses a desire for psychological sup-port, which plays a central role in the universalhuman need to moderate the psychologicalsense of autonomy (existence as an independentbeing). The results of testing with the ReissProfile in fact showed that the more religious aperson was, the greater was the individual’smotivational score for psychological support(low independence). The results implied thatpeople embrace images of supportive and atten-tive deities not because they fear death butprimarily because images of these gods moder-ate feelings of autonomy, which many peopleexperience as aversive when the feelings are toostrong.

Although turning to god images for psycho-logical support is sometimes misunderstood as aweakness of religious people (hence, the criti-cism that people use God as a “psychologicalcrutch”), the results of testing with the ReissProfile showed that, at least for the sample ofpeople tested, the religious desire for psycho-logical support was unrelated to any desire forweakness. Although religious people had a lowscore for independence (probably reflecting thedesire for support from God), they had an av-erage score for power (implying they do notseek submission to secular leaders). Hence,many religious people find appealing the mes-sage that opening oneself to God is a sign ofstrength. The Bible, for example, teaches thatsubmission to God can produce such strengththat the faithful will be able to toss mountainsinto the sea.

Since antiquity, religious leaders have taughtthat autonomy needs to be moderated; in Budd-hism, for example, the ultimate aim is to be-come One with the Nirvana. The theory of 16basic desires recognizes a human need to mod-erate autonomy to an individually determinedsensitivity level, so that too much autonomyrelative to the sensitivity point is experienced asaversive. In unitary IM theory, however, auton-omy is explicitly regarded as a joy and implic-itly regarded as an infinite joy. As we have seen,the results of studies of spirituality support mul-tifaceted theory.

If the 16 basic desires are truly fundamentalto human behavior, however, they should beable to explain not only deeply meaningful ac-tivities such as religion but also recreationalactivities such as sports. Reiss, Wiltz, and Sher-man (2001) administered the Reiss Profile to415 college students who had participated inzero, one, or two or more varsity sports at thehigh school or college level. How many sportsthe student participated in, called athleticism,was found to be associated with motivationaltraits for physical exercise, social contact, fam-ily, vengeance, power, and low curiosity. Aswas expected, the single most important corre-late of sports participation was the intrinsic en-joyment of physical exercise. The difference inthe strength of the motive for physical exercisebetween students who had played zero versustwo or more varsity sports was about a fullstandard deviation. Although the association be-


tween intrinsic enjoyment of physical exerciseand athletic participation may strike some asobvious, actually it is inconsistent with unitaryIM theory, which has held that mastery is theprimary intrinsic motivation shown by athleticparticipation (Deci & Ryan, 1985).

Havercamp and Reiss (2003) showed moti-vational profiles for eight interest groups, pro-viding additional evidence linking the 16 basicdesires to real-world behavior. The groups werecollege students who joined fraternities and so-rorities at a state university, philosophy majors,Reserve Officers’ Training Corps students, vol-unteers, culinary students, dieters, seminarians,and varsity athletes.

P. Kavanaugh (personal communication, De-cember 2002) tested on the Reiss Profile a groupof 49 high school sophomores who were doingpoorly in school. They scored low for curiosity,honor, and idealism and moderately high forvengeance and social contact. This pattern ofresults suggests that the students were easilyfrustrated by intellectual effort and that theywere psychologically disconnected from theirparents (low honor) and community (low ideal-ism) but were connected to peers (high socialcontact). How these students self-reported theirmotives was consistent with what was knownabout their behavior in terms of their lowachievement and high rate of disciplinaryproblems.

Correlation Matrix

Evidence that the 16 basic desires are largelyunrelated to each other supports multifacetedtheory. Havercamp (1998) calculated the aver-age correlations among the 16 factors of theReiss Profile at about .15. More than 81% of thevalues in the intercorrelation matrix had an ab-solute value of less than .20, indicating that thescales were largely unrelated. The most stronglyrelated scales are power and status (r � .58),vengeance and status (r � .54), and honor andidealism (r � .48). These results support a mul-tifaceted approach to end motivation and argueagainst unitary theories.

Conclusion

Since antiquity, scholars have debatedwhether human motives can be reduced to a few

global categories. Ancient Greek philosophers,for example, distinguished between motives as-sociated with the body (such as hunger andthirst) and those associated with the intellect(such as curiosity, morality, and friendship). Inthe early part of the 20th century, Freud (1916/1963) argued that all motives are ultimatelyabout sex. Hedonists, on the other hand, re-duced all motives to pleasure seeking versuspain avoidance.

The concept of IM can be viewed as a mod-ern example of the effort in motivational reduc-tionism. IM theorists divide motives into twoglobal categories: drives (also called extrinsicmotivation) and intrinsic motivation. Drives areabout biological survival needs, whereas IMspertain to what some have called ego motives.Hunger, thirst, and pain avoidance are paradigmexamples of drives, whereas curiosity, auton-omy, and play are paradigm examples of IMs.

White (1959) put forth the thesis of common-alities among IMs; specifically, he argued thatIMs are about competence (mastery). In ad-vancing his idea of competence motivation,White explicitly acknowledged that his thesisseems implausible because he was assertingcommonalities among a diverse collection ofmotives. Although many embraced White’sideas because they seemed to broaden the studyof motivation to include ego motives, Whiteoffered no scientific evidence to support histheory of competence motivation—he devel-oped no measure, conducted no studies to testhis idea, and did not suggest any specific studiesthat might confirm or falsify his hypothesis. Inthe 50 years since White wrote his article, noscientific evidence has emerged directly show-ing that competence motivation is the underly-ing theme of diverse ego motives such as play,curiosity, and autonomy. Further, no scientificevidence has been put forth directly supportingWhite’s hypothesis that IMs have a commonorigin: There is no direct scientific evidence forthe hypothesis that people are born with “undif-ferentiated” competence motivation that later ismanifested as the motives of mastery, auton-omy, play, and curiosity. Further, the distinctionbetween drive motivation arising from the or-gans or periphery and intrinsic motivation aris-ing from the central nervous system or brain isphysiological nonsense.

190 REISS

The hypothesis that “intrinsic enjoyment” iscommon to IMs also remains unproved. Argu-ably, this hypothesis implies significant similar-ities between global IM theory and the flawedphilosophy of hedonism. It is unclear whether“intrinsic enjoyment” is a unitary phenomenon:Ancient Greek philosophers, for example, ar-gued that pleasures differ in kind (Aristotle, 330BCE/1953), implying that pleasure theory cannotsupport unitary or global theories of motivation.Further, logicians have identified errors in plea-sure theory, noting that pleasure theorists some-times confuse consequence for cause. Pleasureis often not intrinsic to an activity; it occurs asa consequence of satiating motives (Russell,1945). Whether pleasure is experienced de-pends on a person’s motivation; for example,mountain climbing can be pleasant when onedesires physical exercise but unpleasant whenone is tired and desires rest. Thus, it is notmountain climbing per se that is pleasurable butthe potential the activity holds for satiating mo-tives, such as the motive for physical activity orthe motive for achievement. Logicians say thatpleasure is usually a nonmotivational byproductof satiating motives, not the aim of the motive(Russell, 1945).

A number of empirical considerations argueagainst unitary theory and in favor of multifac-eted theories. Human individuality may be toodiverse to be described adequately in terms ofglobal categories such as IM and extrinsic mo-tivation. Many people who are strongly moti-vated toward play are not necessarily stronglymotivated by intellectual curiosity or autonomy.If curiosity and autonomy both are motivationalbecause of a universal desire for competence,why are some people motivated much more bycuriosity than autonomy or vice versa? It isunclear how observations of such individualdifferences can be made consistent with thetheory that play, curiosity, and autonomy arereally about the same motive, a desire forcompetence.

Reiss and Havercamp’s research on 16 fun-damental desires provides additional evidenceof the multifaceted nature of end motivation.This theory provides a comprehensive analysisof individual differences in trait motives. Aseries of factorial studies have confirmed the16-factor model (Reiss & Havercamp, 1998);similarly, values (logically, values express end

motives) also have been shown to be multifac-eted (Schwartz, 1994). Competence is only oneof the values people hold—it is not the commonroot of diverse values. People also value endssuch as status, social contact, revenge, physicalactivity, and autonomy.

Evidence for multifaceted theory extends sig-nificantly beyond the initial factorial studiessuggesting 15 and 16 factor solutions for basicmotivation. All 16 basic motives have beenvalidated against criterion behavior outside lab-oratories and experiments (see Havercamp &Reiss, 2003). Concurrent validity and social de-sirability studies also support the multifacetedmodel.

The sensitivity model holds that 16 geneti-cally distinct desires (IMs) combine to deter-mine many psychologically significant motives.The model supports numerous predictions aboutbehavior and provides standardized measures(such as the Reiss Profile self-report version)needed to test the validity of the predictions.Future research is indicated to study this modeland the role of the 16 basic desires in humanbehavior. This theory, if valid, shows the mul-tifaceted nature of human IMs. Researchersstudying unitary IM theory need to show theycan predict behavior as well as or better thanReiss’s model by reducing the 16 motives toone or two categories. In contrast, multifacetedtheorists need to continue to show that behavioris better predicted and explained with a com-prehensive, multifaceted list of IMs than is pos-sible with a reductionism approach.

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