Munich Personal RePEc ArchiveAdaptingMudarabahFinancingtoContemporaryRealities: AProposedFinancingStructureBacha, Obiyathulla I.INCEIF the Global University in Islamic FinanceJune 1997Online athttp://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12732/MPRA Paper No. 12732, posted 14. January 2009 / 09:51ADAPTING MUDARABAH FINANCING TO CONTEMPORARY REALITIES:A PROPOSED FINANCING STRUCTURE Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha Department of Business Administration Kulliyyahof Economics & Managements International Islamic University Malaysia November 1996 (Published in THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, COMMERCE & FINANCE, Vol. 1, No.1, June 1997) 2 ADAPTING MUDARABAH FINANCING TO CONTEMPORARY REALITIES: A PROPOSED FINANCING STRUCTURE Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha Department of Business Administration Kulliyyahof Economics & Management International Islamic University Malaysia Abstract IslamicbankinginMalaysia,despiteitsrecentstart,hasseenveryrapidgrowth.Thisgrowth however has been uneven.While short-term trade financing has always been dominant and grown rapidly,MudarabahfinancingbyIslamicbanksinMalaysiahasreducedtoinsignificantly amounts.Yet, Mudarabah which is based on profit and loss sharing has always been considered tobeatthecoreofIslamicfinancingandintunewiththeshariahsinjunctionsagainstinterest based financing. The paper addresseswhy this has been the case. Using conventional finance theories itis shown that Mudarabah financing has serious agency problems, lacks the bonding effect of debt financing andcaninduceperverseincentives.FollowingananalysisoftheseproblemsinPartI.PartII compare: Mudarabah with conventional debt and equity financing within a risk-return framework.Usingscenarioanalysis,itisshownthatforaborrowerfacedwiththealternativeofusing Mudarabah, debt or equity financing, Mudarabah would be best in a risk-return framework. For a financierfacedwiththesamethreealternativeshowever,Mudarabahfinancingwouldbethe worst. Expected returns would be the lowest while risk highest among the three alternatives. This hastodowiththestructureofMudarabahfinancingwherestrictinterpretationoftheShariah requires the financier to absorb all losses, but profits to be shared. It is argued that this inequality in the distribution of risk and returns has caused Islamic banks to reduce Mudarabah financing. Part III proposes an alternative financial arrangement under Mudarabah. Using the principles of mezzanineandvertical-stripfinancing,currentlyinuseinventure-capitalandotherhighrisk financinglikeLeveragedBuyouts(LBOs),itisshownthatamoreequitabledistributionofrisk andreturnscanbeachieved.Theproposalrequiresthemudarib(borrower)toreimburse'the financierintheeventofcertainoutcomes.ThisreimbursementwillbeinformoftheMudarib givinguppartofhisequitytothefinancier.Whilethisreducestheagencyproblemsandthe downside risk faced by the financier it does not eliminate all such risk. Thus, both parties will be required to be responsible and cautious in undertaking new projects. Part IV concludes with an evaluation of the proposed arrangement in the context of the Shariah. 3 IslamicBankinginMalaysia,despiteitsrecentstart,hasseenveryrapidgrowth.Thisgrowth howeverhasbeenuneven.Whileshorttermtradefinancinghasalwaysbeendominantand grownrapidly,MudarabahtypeFinancingbyIslamicbanksinMalaysiahasreducedto insignificantamounts.Yet,Mudarabahfinancingwhichisbasedonprofitandlosssharinghas alwaysbeenconsideredtobeatthecoreofIslamicfinancingandintunewiththeShariah's Injunctions against Interest based financing. TheShariah'sprohibitionofconventionaldebtfinancingrestsontheinherentinequityofsuch lending. The lender is not exposed to any of the project/business risk yet receives a fixed return regardlessofoutcome.Thustheemphasisonamore'equitable'profitandlossbasedsystem. Despitethiscongruence,therehasbeenasteadydeclineintheproportionofMudarabahtype financing by BIMB (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad) the country's largest Islamic Bank. For the latest fiscal year 1994, Mudarabah constituted a mere 0.33 % of the bank's total customer financing. Objective and Justification of Study ThispaperexamineswhyMudarabahhasdeclinedinimportanceasafinancingvehicle.In addressing this, an evaluation is made of Mudarabah financing in the light of conventional finance theoriesandidentifyingtheunderlyingproblems.Analternativefinancingarrangementfor Mudarabahisthenproposedtoovercometheidentifiedproblems.Asidefrombeinganewand uniqueattempt,suchananalysiscanbeusefultoboththeIslamicandconventionalfinance theorist. It is hoped that with attempts such as this, the current dichotomy between Islamic jurists whose frequent abstraction from practical realities and finance professionals who have to grapple with contemporary issues can be bridged. Thepaperisdividedintofourparts.PartIexaminesMudarabahfinancinginthelightof conventionalfinancetheoriesandidentifiestheunderlyingproblemsofMudarabah.Part11 compares Mudarabah with conventional debt and equity financing within a risk-return framework. Part III proposes an alternative financial arrangement for Mudarabah financing.Part IV evaluates the proposed Mudarabah arrangement and concludes. Mudarabah; An Overview InMudarabahfinancing,oneparty,theRab-Ul-Malorfinancier,providesthecapital,whilethe otherparty,theMudarib,providestheentrepreneurshipandefforttorunthebusiness.The 4 underlyingcontractualrelationshipisthatofapartnership,withtheRab-Ul-Malasthesilentor sleeping partner. Profits derived from the business or investment are shared by the twoparties according to a predetermined profit-sharing ratio (PSR).This could be, say, 70:30, or 80:20, with thelargerportionaccruingtotheMudarib.Intheeventoflosses,theShariahstipulatesthatall losses must be borne by the financier. Any party may terminate the Mudarabah agreement at any time. Finally, in a Mudarabah arrangement, the financier is not allowed to interfere in the running of the business. Thus, a Mudarabah arrangement looks very much like an equity investment by a shareholder in a public listed company. In fact, Islamic banks consider Mudarabah financing to be the equivalent of equity financing. However,forreasonscitedbelow,giventhefeaturesandtheunderlyingShariahlaw,Islamic bankMudarabahfinancingisreallyahybrid.Itisneitherequitynordebtbecauseithastoa Mudarib,thefinancingthathegetsfromanIslamicbankislikeconventionalequityforthe followingreasons:(i)thereareno''Fixed''annualpaymentsthataredue(unlikeinterest);(ii) payments made to the Islamic banks come from profits, much like dividends -- they needbe paid ifandonlyif there areprofits; (iii)theIslamicbankcannot forecloseor takelegalaction ifthere are no profits and therefore nothing to be shared; and (iv) like equity, using Mudarabah financing does not increase a firm's risk the way debt financing does through increased financial leverage. Ontheotherhand,MudarabahfinancingcanappeartotheMudaribasaconventionaldebtfor the following reasons:(i)It represents a fixedclaim by the Islamic bank on his company, being the initial amount plus whatever accrued profits (or losses) that are due to the bank.(ii) Like debt, Mudarabahfinancingisterminal,thatis,thearrangementcanbeendedeitherbymutualprior agreement or by one party.The Mudarib can end the relationship by repaying the principal and accrued profits to the Islamic bank. So, unlike equity which represents an unlimited and perpetual claim on the company, Mudarabah,despite the features that make it seem like equity, represents a fixed and terminable claim, much like debt, hence the earlier, argument that Mudarabah is really a hybrid in the conventional sense. PART I: DEBT, EQUITY AND MUDARABAH THE AGENCY PROBLEM The Agency Problem Of Equity Financing IfMudarabahisahybridintheconventionalsense,whatdoesitimplyabouttheextentofits agency problems? An agency problem is really an incentive problem that arises from conflicts of 5 interestamongpartiestoatransactionorfinancialarrangement.Theagencyproblemofequity arises from the divergence between managers who is in the firm and equity holders who own it. Thisoftenleadstoadivergenceinobjectives.Whileanequityholdersobjectivewouldbefirm value maximization, managers being utility maximizes might want to increase benefits that accrue to them and not that of shareholders. In its mild form this divergence could be in the form of increased pay and fringe benefits or perks thatmanagersgivethemselvesfromcorporateresources.Amoreacuteformoftheagency problemcouldbeintheformofextremewastage,effortstoentrenchthemselvesandtheir interest through the use of such instruments as golden parachutes, issuing of poison pills, or even theacceptance of negative net present value (NPV)projects that harm the corporation over the longer term but enhance management's position in the short term. The Agency Problem of Debt Financing Theagencyproblemofdebtfinancingreallyarisesintwoforms:FirstintheformofLevered Equity as a Call Option on the firm and second in the form of Moral Hazard.Levered Equity as a Call Option on the firm refers to the resulting payoff to an equity holder when he combines his equity with debt financing.Since equity represents a residual claim whereas debt a fixed claim on a firms assets, an equity holder who uses large amounts of debt to finance a project gets to keepallaccumulatedvaluebeyondthefixedclaimofthedebtholder.Shouldtheprojectbe successful, this residual value that accrues to equity holders alone could be really large.On the otherhandshouldtheprojectfailtheequityholderslossislimitedtotheamountofhisequity.The payoff to such a situation resembles the payoff to a call option. Sinceleveragingtheirequitywithdebtcanpotentiallyenablethemtoreaphugeprofitswhile limitingtheirdownsiderisk,theincentiveforequityholderswhouseborrowedfundswouldbe take on high risk, high return projects.This incentive to take on veryrisky projects is the Moral Hazard problem.It happens because equity holders get to keep everything beyond debt-service requirementsifaprojectsucceedsbutwouldloseonlytheirequityifitfails.Thesmallerthe proportion of equity to debt the more acute would this agency problem be. The Agency Problems of Mudarabah Financing Havingoutlinedtheagencyproblemsofconventionalequityanddebt,wenowexaminethe agency problems associatedwith Mudarabah financing. As Mudarabah has the features of both 6 debtandequityandtheShariahprohibitstheRab-Ul-Malfrominterferinginthebusinessbut requires him to absorb all losses, it can be shown that the agency problems of Mudarabah will be higher than debt or equity. DoesMudarabahhavetheagencyproblemofequity?Yes.Because,profitswillbesharedand profits are revenues less costs, the Mudarib will have every incentive to increase those costs that accrue to him as benefits. For example, every one dollar increase in fringe benefits or perks that theMudarib provides for himself from the business will mean a one dollar increase in his utility. Though profits would reduce as a result by one dollar, his share of the profit (if any) would be less - perhaps 70 cents. (Assuming PSR of 70/30).Thus, it will always be in the Mudarib's interest to keep increasing his benefits until the marginal utility from increased benefits equals the reduction inhisshareofprofits.Ifwebrineintothistherealityoftaxes(wherefringebenefitsarenot taxableoratleastatalowerrate)andthefactthattheRab-Ul-Malcan-notinterfereinthe business and therefore cannot put in place the internalcontrols that conventionalequity holders can, it is clear this type of agency problem would remain in Mudarabah. In addition to the benefits problem just described, there is another more serious kind of problem with Mudarabah that does not exist with conventional equity. This has to do with cost allocation. Imagine a company that resorts to Mudarabah financing to finance a single project or to establish a new subsidiary. Then the Islamic bank that Provides the financing has claims to only the profits earnedbytheprojectorsubsidiary,notthatoftheoverallcompany.Sincetheprofitstobe sharedwilldependoncosts,thecompanywillhavealltheincentivetoallocateasmuch overhead and other costs to the Mudarabah financed project or subsidiary. Aside from allocation ofoverheads,thecompanycouldalsousefull-costingasopposedtoincrementalcostsas'it really should. Furthermore, if the subsidiary does any transaction with other divisions of the same company,thentransferpricingcouldalsobeusedtoreduceprofitsintheMudarabahfinanced subsidiary.Ineachcase,profitswillbesiphonedfromtheMudarabahfinancedunittoother units.Thisshufflingofprofitsfromoneunittoanotherdoesnothappeninconventionalequity financing since equity has an unlimited and perpetual claim on all the companys assets. As Mudarabah financing constitutes a fixed and terminal claim as does debt, much of the agency problems of debt remain in Mudarabah. Levered equity as call option on the firm remains, albeit inaslightlyalteredform.Thoughtheprofitpotentialisslightlydiminished(since30%ofprofits goes to Rab-Ul-Mal), the downside risk is now also smaller, as the Rab-Ul-Mal absorbs all losses. Overall, levered equity as call option on firm remains very much intact. And as such, so does the 7 MoralHazardproblem.Theincentivetotakeonriskyprojectswouldbeevengreaterin Mudarabah than debt financing since Rab-Ul-Mal absorbs all losses. In concluding on the agency problems associated with Mudarabah financing, it is quite clear that compared to either conventional equity or debt, Mudarabah financing in its current form will have much higher agency problems1. PART II:MUDARABAH, DEBT & EQUITY A RISK-RETURN ANALYSIS HavingestablishedtheagencyproblemassociatedwithMudarabahfinancingwenowexamine Mudarabah,debtandequityfinancinginacomparativerisk-returnframework.Usinga hypotheticalexampleandscenarioanalysiswelookatthepayoffstoboththeborrowerand financierundereachofthreefinancingtechniques.Suchananalysiscouldbeusefulin determining. Supposethereisacompany,XYZCorporationwhichiscurrently100%equityfinanced.The current market value of the company is $4.2 million.Assume that the company is now faced with undertakinganewinvestment,thetotalinitialinvestmentofwhichis$1million.Thecompany wants to set aside $0.2 million from internal funds as its stake in the new project.The remainder $0.8millionistobefinancedwithexternalfinancing.Withthenewproject,thecompanys financial situation would be as follows: -$4 mil. of company value in current line of business or existing projects. -$0.2 mil. of company value invested in new project. -$0.8 mil. of new external financing. As such, the new total value of the firm would be $5 million2.The current shareholders stake in thecompanyisstill$4.2million.Howshouldthecompanyfinancethe$0.8millionexternal funding?Let us say the company has the following three alternatives: i)Raise $0.8 mil. of equity by issuing 800,000 shares at $1 each.

1For a further elaboration and indepth discussion of agency problems see; Obiyathulla Bacha, 1995 Conventional Vs Mudarabah Financing:An Agency Cost Perspective. 2 Note:Total value of firm = value of equity + value of external financing. 8 ii)Borrow $0.8 mil. at 10% interest per year. or iii)Arrange for Mudarabah financing of $0.8 mil.. with a standard profit sharing ratio (PSR) of 70/30. In order to examine the resulting payoffs to each alternative for the company and the provider of the new financing, we need to make three additional assumptions. a)The new project has a one year economic life.That is, the outcome would be knownin one year following investment3 b)There are five (5) possible scenarios of overall economic performance4. Each economic scenario has an equal 20% probability Of Occurrence. c)The percentage returns for the company's existing projects and the new project under each economic scenario is as shown in Table I below5. The percentage returns are assumed independent of the financing alternative, Table 1: Expected (%) Returns From Existing and New Project Econ. Scenario Probability Value = $4 mil. % Return to Current Projects Value = $1 mil. % Return New Proj. 1.202440 2.201830 3.201220 4.20610 5.20-12-20 Given this information set, we are now ready to determine the payoffs to both par-ties under each of the three earlier mentioned financing modes. We begin with an analysis of the first alternative - Equity Financing.

3Thisissimplifyingassumption.AswillseeninPartIII,whenprojectlifeislengthened,givenprobabilitiesthe number of permutations of possible outcomes increases substantially. 4 The five economic conditions can be thought of in the following order, very good, good, normal, bad and very bad. 5 Note that the correlation of returns (existing and new) is 1.0.The returns were set as such in order to eliminate diversification benefitsfrom the analysis. 9 New Project Financed with Equity Regardlessofwhethernewequityisofferedintheformofrightstoexistingshareholdersor issued to a new set of equity holders, the returns to new and old equity will be the same.This is duetothefactthatequityhasaperpetualandresidualclaimonallassets.Thus,thereturnto both sets of equity holders, current and new can be determined as follows; NiFNoiFEFR xVVR xVVR + =0.(1) where: EFR =% return from using equity financing for New Project. F NV V V , ,0 =are Value of Old (Current) Investment, Value of New Project and Value of Firmrespectively. oiR =% return from old project under ith. scenario. NiR =% return from New Project under ith scenario. Using Equation 1, the return to equity holders under each scenario would be as shown in Table 2 below: Table 2: Percentage Returns Using Equity Financing Econ. Scenario % Ret. To Current & New Equityholders 127.2 220.4 313.6 46.8 5-13.6 New Project Financed With Debt 10 Whatifthenewprojectisfinancedwithdebtinsteadofequity?Sincethereturnstothe debtholder(creditor)isfixed,unliketheearliercase,therewillbeadivergenceinthereturns received by the current equityholders and the debt financier. The debt financier's returns will be limited to the interest (and principal) regardless of the outcome of the project. Thus, going back to thescenarioprovidedinTable1,thedebtholdersreturnwillbe10%undereachofthefive scenarios.WhatwouldtheXYZCorp.equityholder'sreturnsbe?Theirreturnswouldequalthe return from the existing and new project under each scenario less the principal and interest due to the debt financier.The equityholder's return would therefore be given by; where; [ ]FIFI Ni N oi O DFVx V R V R V R1] )] 1 ( ( ) ( [ + + + = .(2) DFR=% return to equityholders of XYZ with debt financing ofnew project. Ni N OI OR and V R V=are as previously defined. =Amount due to debt financier; principal + interestamount. FIV =Initial Value of Firm ($4.2 mil). Using Eq. 2, the resulting returns to equityholders from using the debt financing alternative is showninTable3below.Therightmostcolumnalsoshowsthe%returntothedebt financier. Table 3: Percentage Returns To Equity and Debt Holders with Debt Financing Of New Project. Scenario% Ret. To Equityholders% Ret. To Debtholders 130.4810 222.3810 314.2910 46.1910 5-(18.10)10 11 New Project Financed With Mudarabah Financing WenowconsiderthethirdalternativeavailabletoXYZCorporation,thatisfinancingthenew projectwithMudarabahfinancing.Whatwouldthereturnstothecompanysequityholdersand Rab-Ul-Malbe?Wewillonceagainusethescenariosandpossiblepayoffsoftheexistingand newprojectshowninTable1.DespitetheoftenstatedargumentthatMudarabahisequity financing we will see here that there is a huge divergence in the returns tothe Mudariband the Rab-Ul-Mal,ThisdivergenceresultsfromthecharacteristicsofMudarabahfinancing.Inour examplehere;thecurrentequityholderofXYZCorp.willgetthefollowingsourcesofreturns when Mudarabah is used; (i)All the returns from the existing projects. (ii)All the returns earned in the new project from their portion of financing (The $0.2 mil. that they put up for new project). (iii)70% of the returns from the Mudarabah financed portion of the new project. (Since PSR is 70 / 30). The Rab-Ul-Mal on the other hand only gets 30% of the profits earned from the Mudarabah financed portion of the new project- Yet, he bears 100% of any losses incurred in the new project. Given these differences, in order to arrive at a generalized model of returns, we need to make one more denotation. NV which is the value of the new project is denoted as; NV = +where; =the equityholders' investment in the new project($0.2 mil. at time of initial investment). And =the amount of Mudarabah financing in the new project($0.8 mil. initially). Thus,thepercentagereturnstoXYZequityholdersfromusingMudarabahfinancingforthe new project would be;12 ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]FIFI Ni Ni Oi O MFVx V R R R V R1) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ( + + + + + = ..(3) s. t. = for0 ; . 2 . 0 $ Ni NR mil V where; MFR=% returntoequityholders of XYZ with Mudarabah financingof new project. =the % of profits to be received by the Mudarib given by PSR (70% in this case) Note, the constraint in Eq. 3; for any new project value greater than $0.2 mil. the minimum value for NiR cannotbelessthanzero.ThisisbecauseinMudarabahfinancingtheRab-Ul-Mal absorbs all the losses.The maximum loss that the Rab-Ul-Mal can absorb however, will be given bytheamountofhisinvestmentof$0.8mil.Onlywhenlossesaregreaterthanthisamount would the owners of XYZ Corp. begin losing. WhatwouldtheRab-Ul-Malspercentagereturnsbe?Usingthesamenotations,hisreturns would be as: ( ) [ ] 11 ( ) 1 ( ( x R RNi RAB + = (4) Where ; RABR =% return to Rab-Ul-Mal ) 1 ( =Rab-Ul-Mals share of PSR Note:SincetheRab-Ul-Malabsorbsalllosses,when , 0