ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

SHAWNN R. BOLES, Case No. 2011-0808Appellant, On Appeal from the Fourth

Appellate District Court ofVs. Appeals for Ross County, Ohio

Case No. 11CA003201

ROBIN KNAB, Warden,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, SHAWN R. BOLES

Shawn R. Boles #A410-417Chillicothe Correctional InstitutionP.O. Box 5500Chillicothe, Ohio 45601

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT PRO-SE

Assistant Attorney GeneralElizabeth A. Matune*

423000150 E. Gay Street, 16th FloorColumbus, Ohio 43215-3130614-644-7233614-728-9327fax

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLEE*Counsel of record

MTM7M,--JUN 2 1 M1

CLERK OF COURTSUPREME COURT OF OHIO

TABLE OF CONTE11iTSPa¢e

TABLE OF AUTFIQRIES ...... .. ... ... .. . .. . ...................... ......ii-v

STATEMENT OF FACTS . 1ARGUMENT ....:.:. ............1

PROPOSTITON OF LAW I:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS THEAPPELLANTS' HABEAS PETITON- COMPLAINT ..................:.:. .....:....................................................1

PROPOSITION OF LAW II:

WHETHER THE APPEALS COURT ERRED WHEN TT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO WHETHER THE'RAINED OF HIS I.IBERTY AT THE PRESENT TINIE....... 5PETITONER IS BEING UNLAWFULLY RES`I

PROPOSITION OF T.AW III.

APPELLLANT'S RESTRAINT, AND WHETHER THE JUDGMENT WAS INVALID ON ITS FACE, AND WHETHERTHE APPELLANT WAS IMPRISONED BY DUE PROCESS .:::.:.:...................................................................7

WHETHER THE APPEALS COURT ERRED IN NOTCONDUCTING AN INQUIRY INTO THE VALIDTPI' OF

PROPOSITION OF LAW IV:

WHETHER THE APPEALS COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHEN ITDISMISSED THE VER4IED COMPLAIIVT UNDER CIVIL RUI:E 12Bi(6) FOR FAILIIRE TO STATE A CLAIMUPON WHICJ-I RELW, C OULD BE GR#1NTED ....::.. . ... . .. :: ....... ............ .. . .......... ... .... .. . . . ..... ... .. ..... 9

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS JUDOMENT IS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER PURSUANT TO Civ.R. 54(B)and R.C. 2505.02 ....: ....................... ...:...................... .......:. ................................................11

PROPOSITON OF LAW VI:

WHETHER THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCEOF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS .............................................: ....... .. ..........:......................................13

CERTIFICATE OF SERV ICE ...............................................................................................................................14

APPENDIX:

Notice of Appeal in the above styled cause Case No. 2011-0808

Judgment of the Fourth Appellate District Entered on March 29, 2011 Case No. 11CA003201

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESPaee:

FEDERAL CASES:

Brown V. Brown (9th Cir., 1966), 368 F. 2d 992 ......................................................................................................5

Conley V. Gibson (1957), 334 U.S. 41 ................................................................................................................L4,5

Cook & Nichol, Inc. V. Plimsol Club (5" Cir. 1971), 451 F. 2d 505 ......................................................................1, 4

Jenkins V. Mckeithen (1969), 395 U.S. 411 ........................................................................................................1, 4, 5

Madison V. Purdy (5m Cir., 1969), 410 F.2d 99 ..........................................................................................................5

Minkoff V. Stevens Jrs., Inc. (2nd Cir., 1958), 260 F. 2d 588 ......................................................................................4

N.A.A.C.P. V. Am. Family Mut, Ins Co. (C.A. 7 1992), 978 F. 2d 287 .....................................................................12

Sass V. District of Columbia (1963), 114 U.S. App. D.C. 365, 316 F. 2d 366 ...........................................................5

OHIO CASES:

Ball V. Maxwell (1965), 1 Ohio St. 2d 77 ..............................................................................................................5, 7

Bowen V. Sheldon, 124 Ohio St.3d 551 .....................................................................................................................8

Byrd V. Faber (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 56 ....................................................................................................................2

Chef Italiano V. Kent State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86 ...................................................................................12

Eisenberg V. Payton 91973), 56 Ohio App.2d 144 ....................................................................................................8

Fancher V. Fancher (1982), 8 Ohio App. 3d 79 .........................................................................................................5

Gaskins V. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St. 3d 149 ......................................................................................................13

Greeley V. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 228 .....................................................2

Hammond V. Dallman (1992), 63 Ohio St. 3d 666 ..................................................................................................11

Heddleston V. Mack, 84 Ohio St. 3d 213 ...................................................................................................................7

In re Lockhart, 157 Ohio St. 192 ..........................................................................................................................8, 13

In re McTaggert, 2 Ohio App. 2d 214 .......................................................................................................................7

Johsson V Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St. 3d 614 ................................................................................................13

Mitchell V. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St. 3d 190 ..................................................................................10, 11

Noble V. Colwell (1989), 44 Ohio St. 3d 92 ............................................................................................................12

O'Brien V. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 242 ...............................................2, 3, 10

ii

Cont.:

Paee:

Page V. Green (1963), 174 Ohio St. 178 ...................................................................................................................6, 7

Pegan V. Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St. 3d 97 .........................................................................................................8, 13

Petrey V. Simon (1983), 4 Ohio St. 3d 154 ..................................................................................................................2

Phung V. Waste Management, Inc. (1986), 23 Ohio St. 3d 100 ...................................................................................3

Pratts V. Hurtley, 102 Ohio St. 3d 81 ...........................................................................................................................6

Rash V. Anderson (1977), 80 Ohio St.3d 349 ............................................................................................................13

Ridenour V. Randle, 96 Ohio St. 3d 90 .......................................................................................................................6

Royce V. Smith (1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 106 .................................................................................................................2

Shockey V. Fouty (1995), 106 Ohio App. 3d 420 .....................................:...............................................................10

Slife V. Kundtz Properties (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 179 ........................................................................................4, 9

Spalding V. Coulson (1995), 104 Ohio App. 3d 62 ...................................................................................................2

State V. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420 .......................................................................................................................8

State V. Sonnie (1975), 46 Ohio App. 2d 164 ...............................................................................................................9

State ex rel. Alford V. Willoughby (1979). 58 Ohio St. 2d 221 ...............................................................................2, 9

State ex rel. Beil V. Dota (1958), 168 Ohio St. 315 ...........:.........................................................................................8

State ex rel. Carrion V. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1998) 80 Ohio St. 3d 637 ............................................................14

State ex rel. Dotson V. Rogers (1993), 69 Ohio 3d 25 ................................................................................................6

State ex rel. Hanson V. Guernsey Cty Bd. Of Commrs. (1992), 65 Ohio St. 3d 545 .................................................2

State ex rel. Hickman V. Capots (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 324 .....................................................................................2

State ex rel. Hoorwitz V. Cuyahoga Cty., Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., (1992), 65 Ohio St. 3d 323.......10

State ex rel Jackson V. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 185 ................................................................................13, 14

State ex rel. Lincoln Tavern, Inc. V. Sanders (1956), 165 Ohio St. 61 ........................................................................8

State ex rel. Pirman V. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St. 3d 591 .........................................................................................6

State ex rel. Smirnoff V. Greene, 84 Ohio St. 3d 165 ................................................................................................14

State ex rel. The V. Cox V. Marshall, 81 Ohio St. 3d 467 ..........................................................................................9

Tomkalski V. Maxwell (1963), 175 Ohio St. 377 ....................................................................................................5, 7

Taylor V. London, 88 Ohio St.3d 137 ........................................................................................................................10

Wilson V. Rogers (1993), 68 Ohio St. 3d 130 .......................................................................................................6, 13

iii

Cont.: Paee:

UNREPORTED CASES:

First Michigan Bank & Trust V. P & S Bldg (Feb 16, 1989), Meigs App. No. 413 .......................................................9

Rowe v. Brunsman, 4th Dist. No. 06CA2891 ................................................................................................................6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) .....................................................................................................................................................12

OHIO CIVIL RULES:

Civ R. 8 .:..............................................................................................................................................................4, 5, 10

Civ. R. 8(A) ................................................................................................................................................................4, 5

Civ. R. 10(D)(1) ............................................................................................................................................................10

Civ. R. 12(B) .................................................................................................................................................................10

Civ R.12(B)(6) .....................................................................................................................................1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11

Civ. R. 56 ......................................................................................................................................................................10

Civ R. 56(c) ....................................................................................................................................................................9

Civ R. Civ. R. 54(b) .................................................................................................................................................11, 12

OHIO CRIMINAL RULES:

Crim. R. 52(B) ...............................................................................................................................................................8

OHIO REVISED CODE:

R.C. 2505.02 ..........................................................................................................................................................11, 12

R.C. 2705.06 ................................................................................................................................................................11

R.C. 2725.05 ......................................................................................................................................................6, 11, 13

R.C. 2945.73(d) ........................................................................................................................................................3, 9

iv

Cont.:

Page:

OTHER SORCES:

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal. Practice & Procedure, Sec. 1357, at 594 (1969) .....................4

McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules Practice (2 Ed.1992) 102, Section 5.01 ....................................4, 5

10 Wright, Miller & Kane;Federal aactiCe and Procedure (2 Ed.1983) 63, Section 2657.......12

4 Anderson's Ohio Civil Practice (1987) 272-273 :.:...:.. ...:::..:.....:... ................................ 5

10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure (2 Ed.1983) 63, Section 2657........5

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Pe6tioner, Shawn R. Boles on January 27, 2011 filed his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the Ross County Court of Appeals in Case No. 11CA003201. On March 29, 2011 the

Court of Appeals granted the respondent's motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(6). and the

case was sua sponte dismissed by the Court of Appeals due to Boles' Failure to state a claim.

Appellant now presents his arguments for consideration and review:

ARGUMENT

PROPOSITION OF LAW I:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEES'MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE APPELLANTS' HABEAS PETITON- COMPLAINT.

Appellant asserts that the appeals court did err in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss the

appellant's habeas corpus petition-complaint, where sufficient facts were alleged in his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus setting forth a claim(s) requiring a hearing on the merits, and negating a

dismissal on a Civil Rule 12(B)(6) ruling.( See Preliminary Statement, at pg. 2, Factual Background at

pg. 3, Claim I at pg. 4, and Claim II at pg.6 of Petitioner's Writ for a Habeas Corpus. )

Moreover, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is to be liberally construed in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the material allegations are to be taken as admitted. See

Jenkins v. McKeithen (1969), 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404: 5 C. Wright & A.

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Sec. 1357, at 594 (1969). The `complaint should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson (1957). 355 U.S. 41, 45-46. 78

S.Ct. 99. 102. 2 L.Ed.2d 80. See also Cook & Nichol, Inc., v. Plimsol Club (5th Cir.. 1971). 451 F.2d

505. 506.

1

Therefore, the factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, "[u]nsupported conclusions

of a complaint are not considered admitted, and are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss."

State ex rel. Hickman v. Canots ( 1989). 45 Ohio St.3d 324. 544 N.E.2d 639. In light of these guidelines,

and in order for a court to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it must appear "beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief." O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union. Inc. (1975). 42 Ohio St.2d 242. 245 71 O O 2d

223. 224. 327 N.E.2d 753. 755. See, also, Spaldin¢ v. Coulson (1995). 104 Ohio App.3d 62. 661 N.E.2d

197.

Further, Appellees' motions to dismiss pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(6) asserted appellants' habeas

corpus-complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. When reviewing an

appeal's court's grant of a Civ. R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, this court's standard of review is de novo.

Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs.. Inc. (1990). 49 Ohio St.3d 228. 229 551 N E 2d 981. A

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is procedural and tests

the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Gtternsey Ctv. Bd. of Commrs. d(1992) 65

Ohio St.3d 545, 548. 605 N.E.2d 378. Therefore, this court must determine only whether the allegations

contained in the complaint are legally sufficient to state a claim. Id. Under a de novo analysis, this court

must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn

in favor of the nonmoving party. Byrd v. Faber (1991). 57 Ohio St.3d 56. 60. 565 N.E.2d 584. See,

a1so,Preliminary Statement, at pg. 2, Factual Background at pg. 3, Claim I at pg. 4, and Claim II at pg.6

of Petitioner's Writ for a Habeas Corpus.

In addition, the standard of review of a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(6) is

well established. The judgment of the lower court dismissing a complaint will not be upheld unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief. See Rovice v. Smith (1981). 68 Ohio St. 2d 106: Petrey v. Simon (1983), 4 Ohio St.

3d 154^ and State, ex rel. Alford, v. Willouehbv (1979). 58 Ohio St. 2d 221.

2

Furthermore, Appellant asserts that the standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was set out in O'Brien v. University Community Tenants Union.. Inc. (1975). 42 Ohio

St.2d 242 as follows:

"In order for a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted (Civ.R. 12(B)(6)), it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts entitling him to recovery."

In Phung v. Waste Manaeemettt. Inc. (1986). 23 Ohio St.3d 100, the court held:

"In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the material allegations of the complaint

are taken as admitted. (citation omitted) In the context of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the court is obliged

to assume as true the factual allegations of the complaint. (citation omitted) An appellate court may not

assume as true or even consider facts alleged in a party's brief or attachments thereto. (citation

omitted): "

In the instant case, appellant's complaint contained specific factual allegations that:

"Appellant's sentence is in violation of R.C. 2945.73(D); that the trial courts failure to follow the

statute violated the defendant's due process where the trial court was prohibited from entering the

judgment, and lacked jurisdiction to act, and did not have jurisdiction over the subject-matter. The trial

courts actions constituted a breach of a known duty under R.C. 2945.73 (D) which states in part:

" when a charge of felony is dismissed pursuant to division (A) of this section, such dismissal

has the same effect as a nolle prosequi. When an accused is discharged pursuant to division (B) or (C)

of this section, such discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings against him based on the

same conduct. " Therefore, the respondent does not poses legal authority to restrain him of his liberty

where the judgment of the trial court entered on October 24, 2008 is unambiguously void on its face.

3

Although, appeIlee conceded where it did not allude to,or admit, nor deny appellant's claim in

each of those allegations in its motion to dismiss, there was evidence presented concerning the factual

allegations. In considering appellee's motion to dismiss, the court was required to assume the

allegations were true. Phung, supra. If the allegations were true, relief could be granted on claims one

and two.

However, the Ohio Suprenie Court held in the case of Slife v. Kundtz Properties (1974), 40 Ohio

App. 2d 179, at paeg 1$2,that:

avorabl

"For purposes of a motion to disniiss, the complaint is to be liberally construed in a light most

e to the plaintiff, and the material allegations are to be taken as adn3itted ***[A] court

inqixires whether the allegations constitute a staterrient of claim underCiv. R. 8(A). Actually ft;w

complaints fail to meet the liberal standards of Rule 8 and become subject to dismissal. Minkoff v.

StevenJrs., Inc. (2nd Cir., 1958). 260 F. 2d 588. All that the civil rules require is a short, plain

statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiffs claim and the grounds

upon which it is based."

The Court further held thatFor the purposes of a motion to disnliss, the complaint is to b

451 F:2d 505 50,6.."_^

liberally construed<in a light most fauorable to the plairitaff anil the material allegations are to be taken

as admitted. See Jenkins v. McKeithen (19691. 395 U.S. 411. 421,89 S.Ct. 1843. 23 L.Ed.2d:404: 5 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Sec.1357, at 594 (1969). The `complaint sho`uld not

be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyonddoubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Conlev v. Gibson (1957). 355 U.S. 41,

45-46. 78 S.Ct. 99,102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. See also Cook & Nichol, Inc., v. Plimsol Club (5th Cir., 1971).

Nonetheless, Civ.R. 8(A) requires only that a pleading contain a short and plain statement of the

circumstances entitling the party to relief. A party is not required to plead the legal theory of recovery

or the consequences which naturally flow by operation of law from the legal relationships of the parties.

"The rules make clear that a pleader is not bound by any particular theory of a claim but that the facts: .-. w .. ;..,... . ^^ . ..:,. .. _

of the elaim as developed by tlie proMof establ'ish the right to relief." MeCormac, Ohio Civil Rules

4

Practice (2 Ed.1992) 102, Section 5.01. See, also, Fancher v. Fancher (1982). 8 Ohio App.3d 79, 82. 8

OBR 111, 115, 455 N.E.2d 1344. 1347-1348: 4 Anderson's Ohio Civil Practice (1987) 272-273.

In addition, in ruling on a Rule 12(B)(6) motion, a court inquires whether the allegations

constitute a statement of claim under Civil Rule 8(A). Again, actually few complaints fail to meet the

liberal standards of Rule 8 and become subject to dismissal. Minkoff v. Steven Jrs., Inc. (2d Cir.. 1958).

260 F.2d 588. All that the civil rules require is a short, plain statement of the claim that will give the

defendant fair notice of the plaintiffs claim and the grounds upon which it is based. Conley v. Gibson,

supra, at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99. Moreover, the motion to dismiss is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be

granted. See, e. g., Madison v. Purdy (5th Cir.. 1969). 410 F.2d 99. 100-101.

Finally, Appellant's habeas action should not have been dismissed merely because the court

doubts the plaintiff will prevail. Cf. Brown v. Brown (9th Cir., 1966). 368 F.2d 992, cert. denied 19( 66).

385 U.S. 868. 87 S.Ct. 133. 17 L.Ed.2d 95. Whether the plaintiff can prevail is a matter properly

determined by the proof and not the pleadings. See, e. g., Sass v. District of Columbia (1963). 114

U.S.AM.D.C. 365. 316 F.2d 366.

PROPOSITION OF LAW II:

WHETHER THE APPEALS COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN

INQUIRY INTO WHETHER THE PETITONER IS BEING UNLAWFULLY RESTRAINED

OF HIS LIBERTY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

Appellant asserts that the Court of Appeals did err in not conducting an inquiry into whether he

is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty at the present time. Therefore,The purpose of a habeas

corpus proceeding is for the court to conduct an inquiry into whether the petitioner is being unlawfully

restrained of his liberty at the present time. Ball v. Maxwell (1965). 1 Ohio St.2d 77. 78, 204 N.E.2d 62

("To entitle one to relief by habeas corpus a determination of the action in petitioner's favor must

effectuate a release from present confinement."); Ton2kalski v. Maxwell (1963). 175 Ohio St. 377. 378,

194 N.E.2d 845 ("Habeas corpus is directed only to present confinement. "); Page v. Green (1963). 174

Ohio St. 178. 179. 187 N.E.2d 592 ("The purpose of a proceeding in habeas corpus is to inquire into the

legality of the present restraint of the petitioner."). In other words, habeas corpus will not lie if the

petitioner is not presently confined.

Moreover, Since the goal of a habeas corpus petition is to effectuate a release from present

confinement, the petitioner must still be subjected to some form of custodial detention at the time the

petition is adjudicated. If the petitioner's confinement in prison or jail has terminated, then the legality

of such restraint can no longer be determined in a habeas corpus proceeding.

However, In order to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, a prisoner must generally be able to

establish that his present incarceration is illegal because the trial court which rendered the conviction

lacked jurisdiction over the criminal case. R.C. 2725.05; Wilson v. RoQers (1993). 68 Ohio St.3d

130.131. Stated differently, a writ of habeas corpus will not lie when the prisoner only asserts that the

trial court committed a non-jurisdictional error in the underlying case, since such an error can be

adequately reviewed in a direct appeal of the conviction. State ex rel. Dotson v. Rogers (1993) 66 Ohio

St.3d 25. 26. 607 N.E.2d 453. The sole exception to the "jurisdictional error" requirement is that a

viable claim for the writ can be based on a non-jurisdictional error when there are no other adequate

legal remedies the prisoner can pursue to protect his rights. State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994). 69

Ohio St.3d 591, 593, 635 N.E.2d 26. See, also, Preliminary Statement, at pg. 2, Factual Background at

pg. 3, Claim I at pg. 4, and Claim II at pg.6 of Petitioner's Writ for a Habeas Corpus.

Nevertheless, Habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ which is only available in cases. "`where

there is an unlawful restraint of a person's liberty and no adequate remedy at law.' " Rowe v. Brunsman.

4th Dist. No. 06CA2891, 2006-Ohio-1964, 9( 4. quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81 2004-

Ohio-1980, at 18. Moreover, "[h]abeas corpus is generally appropriate in the criminal context only if

the prisoner is entitled to immediate release from prison." Ridenour v. Randle. 96 Ohio St.3d 90. 2002-

Ohio-3606. 9f 7. "For example, a writ of habeas corpus will generally lie to compel a defendant's release

6

from prison when he will be able to prove that the trial court in the underlying criminal case lacked the

jurisdiction to enter the conviction." Rowe, supra,

Uhio-32t):

PROPOSITION OF LAW III:

ting Hdddleston v. Mack. 84 Qhio St.3d 213, 1998-

WIiETIIkR THE APPEALS COURT ERRED IN NOT CONDUCTING AN INQUIRY INTOTHE VAI,IDITY OF APPELLL,ANr'S RESTRAINT, AND VVIIET,IIER THE JUDGMENT

WAS INVAI:ID ON I'lfS FACE, ANII W^IETIlliti TIIE APPEI.LANT- WAS IMPRISONED I3YI)IJE PRO^L^^

(A) Apgellant asse"rks thatit was critical en•zir"on; #Tie"isart of the appeals couxtin not conducting

the court to conduct an mquiry into whether the pehtioner is being unlawfully restratned of his or her

an inquiry into thhe validity of his restram;t. Tlier`efore,, ft, purpose of a habeas corpus groeeeding is for

("Habeas corpus is directed only tq"present confrnement'}, Pa^e "v 'irreen (1.963k: 174 Ohia St. 178...179.

187 N.E .2d'592'("The purpose ©f"a proceeding in liabeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the

presentrestraint of the petitioner"). In other words, habeas corpus will not lie if the petitioner is not

liberty at the present time Ball v. Maxwell (1965). 1 Ohio St.2d 77. 78. 204 N.E.2d 62 ("To entitle one

to relief by habeas corpus a determination of the action in pctitioner's favor must effectuate a release

from present confinement"); Tomkalskl v. Maxwell (19631 175 Ohio St. 377 378, 194 N.E.2d 845

presently confined., and;

,as'grave ertor tor tne appeals ct7urt not to,inquire into the matters ot whether ttte.

judgment was valid on its face, See, In re 1kleTaggurf. 2 Qhio App. 2d 2W: 207 N.E.2d 562 Ohio App.

1965^ where thecou'rtheld "thaf`thie`priirie issue in suclrcase is whether theperson named therein is mm

illegally restrained of his liberty by the respondent. If the respondent contends that the custody of the

person named is derived through an order of some other court, the Court of Common Pleas is required

to inquire into the validity of the order. Upon such inquiry the court may find ( 1) that the other court

was in fact without jurisdicfion; or (2) that the other court, having jurisdiction, has issued an order that, <...

is void upon its face. In either event, the Court of Common Pleas may then proceed to dispose of

7

the issue on its merits. But where the court finds that the other court had jurisdiction, but in the exercise

of such power has issued an erroneous order, it may not substitute an action in habeas corpus for an

appeal. The question as to whether the Franklin County Court had jurisdiction or issued an order void

on its face would have a hearing upon the remedy, if any, that the Common Pleas Court might afford,

but certainly not as to whether the Common Pleas Court could entertain an action in habeas corpus :'

and;

(C) It was plain error for the appeals court not to ascertain whether the appellant was

imprisoned by due process. See, In re Lockhart. 157 Ohio St. 192, 105 N.E.2d 35 Ohio 1952.

Therefore, there is a genuine material fact, that still remains, that the judgment in the case sub judice is

a void judgment. Thus, it is obvious that if.a trial court did not have jurisdiction, that judgment

rendered when jurisdiction was not present is void. A judgment is, for example , a judgment based on a

proceeding in which the court lacked jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or jurisdiction over

the subject-matter of the action. One takes nothing under a void judgment . See, State ex rel . Lincoln

Tavern. Inc. V. Sanders (1956). 165 Ohio St. 61; See, also State ex rel. Beil V. Dota (1958). 168 Ohio St.

315.319.320, where a judgment is defined as one entered without jurisdiction; See, also, Eisenberg V.

Payton (1973). 56 Ohio App. 2d 144,147,152, where the use of jurisdiction in this context refers to

subject matter and personal jurisdiction. See, also, Crim. R. 52(b).

Further, appellant request that the remaining majority of this Honorable Court join Justice

LANZINGER, J., dissenting Opinion in Bowen v. Sheldon. 124 Ohio St.3d 551. 925 N.E.2d 129

Ohio,2010. at 124 holding that "This court's decision to label these judgments "void" opens the door to

the habeas remedy. To call a judgment void is to state that it is a legal nullity, issued by a court lacking

jurisdiction. A void judgment is not a final, appealable order. "A judgment declared void is susceptible

to collateral attack at any time, and a defendant has a right to a writ of habeas corpus when a judgment

is void due to lack of jurisdiction despite the availability of alternative remedies such as appeal. Peean-

v. Crawmer (1996). 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99-100. 666 N.E.2d 1091." State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420,

2008-Ohio-1197. 884 N.E.2d 56& q( 47 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting)." When the trial court sentenced

8

Boles in 2008 to ten years' imprisonment it was an unauthorized sentence for the purpose of R.C.

2945.73(D), therefore the trial court did lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence, and consequently,

the sentence is void. Boles is unable to appeal from the trial court's 2008 entry. See, State v. Sonnie

(1975). 46 Ohio Ap .p^ 2 164, and he is left without any adequate remedy at law. Based on this

understanding, habeas relief is proper in this situation, and this case should be reversed and remanded

to the appeals court for a hearing on this matter.

PROPOSITION OF LAW IV:

WHETHER THE APPEALS COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHEN IT DISMISSED THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT UNDER CIVIL RULE

12(B)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BEGRANTED.

Appellant asserts when reviewing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, courts are confined to the

allegations contained in the complaint. State ex rel. Alford v. Willoughby Civil Service Comm. (1979)

58 Ohio St.2d 221. 223. 390 N.E.2d 782. But courts may consider written instruments if they are

attached to the complaint. First Michigan Bank & Trust v. P. & S. Bldg. (Feb. 16 1989) Meigs App

No. 413. citing Slife v. Kundtz Pronerties. Inc. (1974). 40 Ohio App.2d 179. 318 N.E.2d 557. However,

courts should avoid interpreting these written instruments at the pretrial stage unless the instrument is

clear and unambiguous on its face. Slife. 40 Ohio App.2d at 184-85. 318 N.E.2d 557. If the written

instrument is unclear or ambiguous, trial courts are forced to look outside the pleadings in order to

interpret the written instrument. If a motion to dismiss refers to, or depends on matters outside the

pleadings, the motion to dismiss must be converted to a motion for summary judgment under Civ.R.

56(C). See Civ.R. 12(B); State ex rel. The V. Cos. v. Marshall 81 Ohio St.3d 467. 470, 1998-Ohio-329

692 N.E.2d 198. If the court converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, the

parties must be given notice and a reasonable opportunity to present all of the available evidence that

Civ.R. 56(C) permits. Id.

9

Moreover, the appellant herein, did attach evidence, and documents pursuant to Civ. R. 10(d)( I),

for the sole purpose of advancing, and forming the basis of his claim(s). However, the appellee in its

motion to dismiss alluded, that Boles was raising claims of " fast and speedy trial and Double

jeopardy. " However, it must be advised, that for the " sole " purpose of demonstrating and showing

cause Boles only used R.C. 2945.73(d) and Appendix A in reference to, and in support of his claims

with particularity as set forth under Civ. R. 8. that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to act or enter

judgment as described in exhibit A of Petitioner's habeas petition. Therefore, appellee's assertion that

Boles is simply raising the issues of " fast and speedy trial and Double jeopardy. " dehors the record,

and are outside the four corner's of said petition, and is without merit. Thus, the appeals court erred

when it did not convert appellee's motion to dismiss into Summary Judgment under Civ. R. 56.

Thus,when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must accept the facts stated

in the complaint as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190. 192, 532 N.E.2d 753.

Furthermore, appellant request that this court review the appeal court's decision to grant a

motion to dismiss on a de novo basis. See Shockekv. Fouty (1995). 106 Ohio A.pp.3d 420, 424,

666 N.E.2d 304. Moreover, Civ.R. 12(B)(6) permits a party to file a motion to dismiss a

complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. However, Civ.R. 12(B) states: "Every defense, in

law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counter claim, cross-claim, or

third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except

that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion, Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions test the

sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Horwitz v. Cuvahoga Ctv. Court of Coinmon Pleas. -

Probate Div. (1992). 65 Ohio St:3d 323. 325: 603 N.E.2d 1005. In order for a court to dismiss a

complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that the moving party can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Taylor v. London 88 Ohio St.3d

137, 139, 2000-Ohio-278 723 N.E.2d 1089 citing O'Brien v. University Community Tenants-

Union. Inc. (1975). 42 Ohio St.2d 242. 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus. Again,when reviewing a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must accept the facts stated in the complaint as true

10

and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson-

Milk Co. (1988). 40 Ohio St.3d 190. 192, 532 N.E.2d 753.

Nevertheless, Boles' petition for a writ of habeas corpus was sufficient to withstand a

dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). In other words, in order to avoid disniissal under R.C. 2705.06 a

petition filed or on behalf of a petitioner " alleged to be restrained of his liberty who is in custody

of an Officer under process issued by a Court or Magistrate or by virtue of the Judgment or Order

of a Court of record ( R.C. 2725.05 ) must particularly state why the Court lacked jurisdiction to

enter process, Judgment or Order. " Hammond V. Dallman (1992), 63 Ohio St. 3d 666.668. 590

N.E. 2d 744.746.

PROPOSITION OF LAW V.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS JUDGMENT IS A FINAL APPEALABLEORDER PURSUANT TO Civ. R. 54(B)and R.C. 2505.02.

Appellant asserts that the judgment of the court of appeals is not in compliance with the

provisions of R.C. 2505.02 or Civ. R. 54(B), Civ.R. 54(B) provides:

"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a claim,

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate

transactions, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the

claims, only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of

a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however

designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims, shall not terminate the action as to any of

the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time

before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the

parties."

11

Moreover, appellant, in his complaint at the court of appeals seeking a writ of habeas

corpus and release from prison, styled his two arguments as two "claims for relief' See Claim I at

page 4, and Claim II at page 6 of Petitioner' original petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

However, the court of appeals granted appellee's motion to disrniss without entertaining either of

petitioner's Claims. Therefore, a Civ.R. 54(B) analysis, must determine if appellant's arguments

were two distinct "claims for relief, " in Civ.R. 54(B) parlance, if appellant did present two

distinct claims for relief, this court should examine the way the court of appeals handled them to

deternune if it was necessary for the court to include Civ.R. 54(B) language, indicating that "there

s no just reason

eals court to enter Civ.R. 54(B) laneuaee in its judement for there to be a Final Appealable

narties• and multiple claims, this court must consider the application of Civ R 54(B) given that

the conclusion of Civ.R. 54(B) applies. The Court must reverse and remand this case back to the

Colwell (1989) . 44 Ohio St.3d 92 540 N.E.2d 1381, syllabus. This case does involve multiplg

or delay" in order to make the order appealable.

However, Civ.R. 54(B) is based on Fed:R.Civ.P. 54(b), see Staff Notes to Civ:R. 54(B) therefore,

this court can look for guidance to authorities interpreting the federal rule. If claims are factually

separate and independent, multiple claims are clearly present. 10 Wright, Miller & I£ane, Federal

Practice and Procedure (2 Ed.1983) 63, Section 2657. Two legal theories that require proof of

substantially different facts are considered separate claims for purposes of Civ.R. 54(B). See N.A.A. C.E _

v. Am. Familv Mut. Ins. Co. 1992). 978 F . 2d 287: 292. Civ.R. 54(B) was amended, effective July

1, t992,;to expr'essl^'state that it doeg apply to multiple claims ttiat arise out of the same transaction, as

well as separate transactions (just as Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b] has been construed to apply). See Staff Note to

July 1; 1992 Amendment to Civ.R. 54(B).

Finallv Once applicable Civ R 54(B)must be followed, by its terms, when a case

involves multiple claims and/or multi2le parties. An order adjudicating oneor more but fewer

than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties must meet the

reauirements of R C 2505 . 02 and Civ.R. 54(B) in order to be final and appealable. Noble v.__,_

Order pursuant toR C.= 2505.02. An order of a court;is a finalappealable order onl if the

12

requirements of both R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B), are inet. Chef Italiano v. Kent

State Univ. (1989). 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64.

PROPOSiTON OF LAW VI:

WHETHER THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCEOF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Appellant asserts whether he was entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner

did present operative facts in support of Claims One and Two in said petition. Therefore, a writ of

habeas corpus will generally lie to compel a defendant's release from prison when he will be able to

prove that the trial court in the underlying criminal case lacked jurisdiction to enter the conviction.

However, in order to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, a prisoner must generally be able to

establish that his present incarceration is illegal because the trial court which rendered the conviction

lacked jurisdiction over the criminal case. R.C. 2725.05; Wilson v. Rogers (1993). 68 Ohio St.3d

130.131.

Moreover, when a court's judgment is void because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction,

habeas corpus is generally an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal. Gaskins v. Shiplevy

(1995). 74 Ohio St.3d 149. 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282, 1284, citing In re Lockhart (1952). 157 Ohio St. 192,

195, 47 O.O. 129, 131. 105 N.E.2d 35, 37,. See, also. Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d

614, 757 N:E.2d 11.53 Ohio,2001. Where the Supreme Court of Ohio held that " a writ of habeas corpus

is warranted in certain extraordinary circumstances, where there is an unlawful restraint of a person's

libertv and there is no adecLuate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Pegan v. Crawmer (1996). 76

Ohio St.3d 97, 99, 666 N.E.2d 1091, 1094.The most common of these extraordinary circumstances in

which the writ of habeas corgus will issue is when the petitioner successfully attacks the jurisdiction of

the sentencing court. State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul (1995). 73 Ohio St.3d 185. 187, 652 N.E.2d 746,

748. " Boles challen e s the jurisdiction of his sentencing court here. Therefore. When a court's

judgment is void because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, habeas corpus is generally an

avnropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal." Rash v. Anderson (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 349,

13

350. 686 N,E.2d 505. 506. See, also, In re Lockhart (1952). 157 Ohio St. 192. 195. 47 0.0. 129. 131.

105 N.E.2d 35. 37, and .aragrraph three of the,s llv abus,

Finally. Boles is entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus based on the claimsalleged

as set forth in his petition. Therefore, habeas corpus in Ohio is eng ^ erally abpronriate in the criminal

context only if the petitioner is entitled to innnediate release from prison or some other type of physical

con€inement. See. e.Q., State ex rel. Carrion v, Ohio Adult Parole Auth; ( 1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 637, 638

687 N.E.2d 759, 760; State ex rel. Jackson v: McFaul (1995). 73Ohio St.3d 185. 188, 652 N,E.2d 746,.

749• See Also State ex rel. Smirnoff v. Greene 84 Ohio St 3d 165 702 N E 2d 423 Ohio 1998

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Appellant for the above-mention and stated reasons moves this HonorableCourt to reverse and remand this case back to the Fourth Appellate District Court of Appeals, for theIssuance of a writ of habeas corpus, or grant such relief as the nature of this cause may require.

Shawn R. Boles #A410-417C.CLP.O. Box 5500Chillicothe, Ohio 45601

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing pleading was sent to the Assistant AttorneyGeneral,, Elizabeth A. Matune (0078544), for Rcspondent at.the.Ohio Attorney General's Office;Criminal Justice Section (Section Code 42300 Matune), 150 East Gay Street, 16 Floor, Columbus, Ohio43215 by regular U.S. Mail on )Jn2 17+" ,2011.

Shawn R. Boles #A410-417

14

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

STATE EX REL. SHAWN R. BOLES, CASE No.INMATE NUMBER A410-417, On Appeal from the Fourth Appellate

Plaintiff-Petitioner, District Court of Appeals For RossCHILLICOTHE CORRECTIONAL INST., County, Ohio.P.O. Box 5500, Case

No. I 1 CA3201C^Lzc^zco7y o {toC I -1 lVs.

ROBIN KNAB, Warden-Guardian,Defendant-Respondent,

CHILLICOT.HE CORRECTIONAL INST.,15802 St. Rt. 104 North; P.O. Box 5500,CHILLICOTHE, OHIO 45601.

NOTICE OF APPEAL OF APPELLANT

SHAWN R. BOLES

Notice of Appeal of Annellant Shawn R. Boles

Appellant, Shawn R. Boles hereby, gives notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio fromthe judgment of the Fourth Appellate District Court of Appeals, entered in Court of AppealsCase No. 1ICA3201 on March 29, 2011.

It is further given notice, that this is an appeal of right from an action in habeas corpus, thatoriginated in the Fourth Appellate District Court of Appeals.

EL' C^MAY i i 201!

CLERK OF vOURTSUPRE'NlE COURT OF OHIO

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregosanie date of filing by regular U.S.Mailsoon thereafter.

A,}nt r}6S'44++ 940r•nEy Crtner4laIizkbt4 K1. r1'1a-fan2Lla3dcosts ^t- 6ay Sireet-f 16A Ploo"

Ce1on,6oS1648`0 93a1s-3i3o

Respectfully Submitted,

Shawn R Bo es #A410417C.C.I.P.O. Box 5500Chillicothe, Ohio 45601

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ng pleading was sent to the Attorney focthe respondent at the Ohio Atto^y Generai's Office on the

L/iZ;%ll

.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIOFOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ROSS COUNTY

Shawn R. Boles,

Petitioner,

V.

Robin Knab, Warden,

Respondent.

?03'.`;i f;uCase No. 11CA320'GL

DECISION ANDJUDGMENT ENTRY

Petitioner, Shawn R. Boles, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to

compel respondent, Chillicothe Correctional Institution Warden Robin Knab, to release

him from prison. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other

things, that that Boles' claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus. Because we

conclude that Boles has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted,

respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The writ of habeas corpus is DENIED

.and the petition is sua sponte DISMISSED.

Habeas corpus is the proper remedy when seeking release from prison. State

ex rel. Nelson v. Griffin, 103 Ohio St.3d 167, 2004-Ohio-4754, at ¶5. As an

extraordinary writ, however, habeas corpus is available only "where there is an unlawful

restraint of a person's liberty and no adequate remedy at law." Pratts v. Hurley, 102

Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, at ¶8. Moreover, "[h]abeas corpus is generally

appropriate in the criminal context only if the prisoner is entitled to immediate release."

Ridenour v. Randle, 96 Ohio St.3d 90, 2002-Ohio-360, at ¶7. For example, a writ of

habeas corpus will generally lie to compel a defendant's release from prison when he

Ross App. No. 11 CA3201 2

will be able to prove that the trial court in the underlying criminal case lacked the

jurisdiction to enter the conviction. Habeas corpus also will be available if a defendant's

maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully. Heddleston v. Mack,

84 Ohio St.3d 213, 214, 1998-Ohio-320.

Although not entirely clear from his petition, Boles appears to argue that his

conviction is void and he is entitled to immediate release from prison because he either

was subjected to double jeopardy or his right to a speedy trial was violated. Ultimately,

however, it does not matter which argument Boles is making because neither claim is

cognizable in habeas corpus. See Elersic v. Wilson, 101 Ohio St.3d 417, 2004-Ohio-

1501, at ¶3 ("speedy-trial and double-jeopardy claims are not cognizable in habeas

corpus").

Accordingly, because Boles has not stated a claim upon which relief can be

granted, respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED and the petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. ANY PENDING

MOTIONS ARE DENIED AS MOOT. COSTS TO PETITIONER. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Abele, J., Kline, J.: Concur.

FOR THE COURT

William H. HarshaPresiding Judge

NOTICE

This document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period forappeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.

Ross App. No. 11CA3201 3

Pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B), the clerk is ORDERED to serve notice of thejudgment and its date of entry upon the journal on all parties who are not indefault for failure to appear. Within three (3) days after journalization of thisentry, the clerk is required to serve notice of the judgment pursuant to Civ.R.5(B), and shall note the service in the appearance docket.