mpi webinar j l 30 2009 july 30 , 2009 e verify · · 2009-12-29mi i p li i i migration policy...
TRANSCRIPT
Marc R. RosenblumMi i P li I i Migration Policy Institute
MPI WebinarJ l 30 2009
E Verify:July 30, 2009
E-Verify:Analysis and Recommendations
for Reform
Overview of TalkOverview of Talk
• Background on E-Verify g y
• Analysis of the current system• Analysis of the current system
T t f d ti• Two sets of recommendations• Short-term reforms to existing program• Long term pilot programs for next generation of E Verify• Long-term pilot programs for next generation of E-Verify
• Legislative/regulatory updatewww.migrationpolicy.org
Legislative/regulatory update
Before I BeginBefore I Begin
• Acknowledgmentsg
• The limits of electronic verification• The limits of electronic verification
F i f ti• For more information:• www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Verification_pap
er-071709.pdf• www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.
cfm?ID=726
Background on E-Verify Background on E-Verify
• Legislative historyg y
• Policy issues• Policy issues
H th t k• How the system works
• Current users
Background on E-Verify Background on E-Verify
• Legislative historyg y• 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)• 1994 US Commission on Immigration Reform report
1996 Ill l I i ti R f d I i t• 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
• 2003 Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act g p
Background on E-Verify Background on E-Verify
• Policy issuesy• Specific response to IRCA’s failures
• Document fraud• Discrimination• Discrimination
Background on E-Verify Background on E-Verify
• Policy issuesy• Specific response to IRCA’s failures• Verification tasks
• A th ti ti f id tit• Authentication of identity • Verification of work authorization
Background on E-Verify Background on E-Verify
• Policy issuesy• Specific response to IRCA’s failures• Verification tasks
Th l• Three goals• Employer neutrality • Protect privacy and worker rights (US citizens)• Test and evaluate
Background on E-Verify Background on E-Verify
• How the system works
Source: US Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-895T
Background on E-Verify Background on E-Verify Registered Basic Pilot/E-Verify Employers
160 000
120,000
140,000
160,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
0
20,000
40,000
,
0
Jul-9
9Ja
n-00
Jul-0
0Ja
n-01
Jul-0
1Ja
n-02
Jul-0
2Ja
n-03
Jul-0
3Ja
n-04
Jul-0
4Ja
n-05
Jul-0
5Ja
n-06
Jul-0
6Ja
n-07
Jul-0
7Ja
n-08
Jul-0
8Ja
n-09
Jul-0
9
Also see: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=726
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Introduction• What E-Verify does well• Limitations of E-Verify• Limitations of E-Verify • Analysis
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Introduction• Data limitations• Scope of planned expansion
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-VerifyExisting and Projected E-Verify Users, 1999-2013
7,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000 27-fold increase 1/2006 - 7/2009 is miniscule compared to planned expansion
0
1,000,000
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Jul-9
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-0
Jul-1
Jul-1
Jul-1
Jul-1
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Introduction• Data limitations• Scope of planned expansion
L t f t i t !• Lots of uncertainty!
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• What E-Verify does welly• Prevents common document fraud• Why this matters
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Limitations of E-Verify y• Identity fraud• Erroneous nonconfirmations
D l d ifi ti• Delayed verification • Employer misuse and abuse
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Limitations: identity fraudy• Why the problem occurs• Scope of the problem
• FTC: 318 000 identity theft complaints• FTC: 318,000 identity theft complaints• Javelin Research and Strategy: 9.9 million cases total• No estimate for E-Verify
• Efforts to correct• Efforts to correct• Projected scope in universal system
• Increased marketI d• Increased access
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Limitations: Erroneous nonconfirmations• Why the problem occurs• Scope of the problem
• Minimum: 0 3%• Minimum: 0.3%• Best guess: about 1%
• Efforts to correct• P j t d i i l t• Projected scope in universal system
• 1% → 600,000 false nonconfirmations per year• Likelihood the error rate could increase, at least initially
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Limitations: delayed responsey p• Why the problem occurs• Scope of the problem
• Average time to tentative nonconfirmation resolution: 39 7 days• Average time to tentative nonconfirmation resolution: 39.7 days• Efforts to correct• Projected scope in universal system
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Limitations: employer misuse and abusep y• Why the problem occurs• Scope of the problem
• Westat self reported data: 9 47%• Westat self-reported data: 9 – 47%• AFSC survey
• Efforts to correct• P j t d i i l t• Projected scope in universal system
Analysis of E-VerifyAnalysis of E-Verify
• Bottom line• Inherent uncertainty in EEVS
• Authentication of identity • Verification of authorization to workVerification of authorization to work
• E-Verify’s “employer-centric” design exacerbates these problems
• R i t t k• Raises costs to workers• Raises costs to employers
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Short-term improvementsp• Long-term reforms
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Short-term improvementsp• Prevent erroneous nonconfirmations• Prevent employer misuse• Better auditing and oversight for enforcement• Better auditing and oversight for enforcement
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Short-term improvementsp• Prevent erroneous nonconfirmations
• Allow workers to correct own records• Mechanism for appeal and redress for errorsMechanism for appeal and redress for errors
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Short-term improvementsp• Prevent employer misuse
• Education• OversightOversight• Penalties for noncompliance (§274B of INA)
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Short-term improvementsp• Better auditing and oversight for enforcement
• Auditing for misuse/nonuse• Office of database accuracyOffice of database accuracy• Coordination among enforcement agencies• Limited data sharing with IRS/SSA
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• Enrollment process• Three options (not mutually exclusive)
• Card based system• Card-based system• PIN self-verification system• Biometric scanning
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• Enrollment process
• All workers eventually required to visit USCIS or other government agencygovernment agency
• Accommodate ~ 22 million citizens without documents • Prevent fraudulent enrollments by unauthorized immigrants
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• Card-based system
• Overview• Secure card is proof of identity and work authorization p y
• Advantages • Disadvantages
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• Card-based system
• Overview• AdvantagesAdvantages
• Secure card as alternative to E-Verify • Expectations for cards
• Disadvantages
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• Card-based system
• Overview• AdvantagesAdvantages • Disadvantages
• No fraud-proof card• Suspicion of cards• Mission creep• Photo cards require user judgment
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• PIN pre-verification system
• Overview• Worker’s record locked during enrollmentg• First stage: Worker uses PIN to check in with system; resolves
any data errors and receives confirmation code• Second stage: Worker provides employer with confirmation code;
/employers gets red-light/green-light response• Advantages • Disadvantages
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• PIN pre-verification system
• Overview• AdvantagesAdvantages
• Prevents ID theft• Prevents false nonconfirmations• Prevents delayed response• Limits employer misuse• Limits privacy threat
• Disadvantages
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• PIN pre-verification system
• Overview• AdvantagesAdvantages • Disadvantages
• Vulnerable to ID sharing• Complexity • Photo sharing relies on judgment
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• Biometric scanning
• Overview• Worker provides biometric during enrollment; biometric stored on p g ;
card or in database • Employer must capture biometric again to authenticate identity at
point of hire• Advantages • Disadvantages
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• Biometric scanning
• Overview• AdvantagesAdvantages
• Prevents ID theft and ID sharing• Shifts employer judgment to government
• Disadvantages
RecommendationsRecommendations
• Long-term reforms g• Biometric scanning
• Overview• AdvantagesAdvantages • Disadvantages
• Cost increase • Technological limitations (false nonconfirmations)• Political/philosophical barriers; threat of noncompliance
State of playState of play
• FAR regulationsg• Reauthorization• NEVA (H.R.2028)( )• SAVE (H.R.3308)• Schumer’s principlesSchumer s principles
ConclusionConclusion
• Recall limits of EEVS; burden will fall on US citizens
• Need for comprehensive policy p p y• Likelihood of unintended consequences;
should test multiple programs whileshould test multiple programs while phasing in new mandates
For more information,contact:contact:
Marc R. RosenblumSenior Policy AnalystMigration Policy InstituteMigration Policy Institute
1400 16th StreetWashington D C 20036Washington D.C. 20036
(202) 266-1917(202) [email protected]