mowing down the grassroots: how grassroots lobbying disclosure suppresses political participation
TRANSCRIPT
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How
Grassroots
Lobbying
Disclosure
Suppresses
PoliticalParticipation
By Jeffey Myo, Ph.D.APril 2010
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Executive Summary
Grassrootslobbyingisanyefforttoorganize,coordinateorimploreotherstocontactpublicofficialsinordertoaffectpublicpolicy.Throughgrassrootslobbying,likemindedcitizenscanalertelectedofficialstoconstituentspreferences,educatefellowcitizensandmaketheirvoicesheard,andevenpersuadethepublictoadoptnewviews.Inshort,grassrootslobbyingisquintessentialrepresentativedemocracyinaction.
However,asthisreportdocuments,sweepinglobbyinglawsin36states
threatentostranglegrassrootsmovementsinredtapeandbureaucraticregulation.Twentytwostatesexplicitlyincludegrassrootslobbyinginthedefinitionoflobbying,whileanother14consideranyattempttoinfluencepublicpolicytobe
lobbying,aslongasacertainamountisspent.Thus,suchcommonactivitiesaspublishinganopenletter,organizingademonstrationordistributingflyerscantriggerregulationandforceorganizerstoregisterwiththestateandfiledetailedreportsontheiractivities,aswellastheidentitiesofsupporters.
Theseregulationsraisethecostsofpoliticalactivityandsetlegaltrapsfor
unsuspectingcitizens,thusmakingitmoredifficultforordinarycitizenstoparticipateinpoliticsallwithlittleornobenefittothepublic.Asthisreportfinds:
Lobbyingregulationsarenotintendedtobeunderstoodbyordinarypeople.
ThefirstparagraphofMassachusettsnewlobbyinglaw,forexample,scored0.9ona100pointscaleinareadabilitytest.Goingbysuchtests,itwouldtake34
yearsofformaleducationtounderstandthatparagraph;notevenadoctoratefromMITorHarvardwouldbeenough.
Theredtapewouldbegrassrootslobbyistsmustnavigatetoproperlydisclose
activitiesandfinancialsupportiscomplexandburdensome.Inpreviousresearch,ordinarycitizenswhotriedtofilloutsimilarformscorrectlycompletedonlyabout40percentoftasks.
Runningafouloftheseregulationscouldbringstiffpenalties,including
thousandsincivilfinesandinsomestatescriminalpenalties.InNewYork,themaximumcriminalpenaltyis$5,000andfouryearsinjail,equivalenttoarsonorriot;inAlabama,itis$30,000and20years,equivalenttokidnapping.
Thepubliclikelygainslittlefromtheseregulations.Previousresearchsuggests
fewwillseekoutthedisclosedinformation,butmanywillbedeterredfrompoliticalactivitybythepublicdisclosureoftheirpersonalinformation.
Thesefindingssuggestelectedofficialsshouldlistentoconstituentconcernsor
debateideasintheopen,ratherthanmowingdownthegrassrootswithregulation.
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Introduction
IsthereanythingmoredistinctlyAmericanthangrassrootspoliticalengagementandactivism?Fromtownhallmeetingsandstatehouseralliestotalkradio,blogsandmeetups,Americansfollowpoliticswithapassion;moreimportantly,wegetinvolvedandnotjusteverytwoyearsatelectiontime.Whetheritisdebatingcurrentissueswithcoworkers,contactingelectedrepresentativesorjustemailingnewsarticlesandpoliticalvideostofriendsandfamily,Americansmaketheirvoicesheard.Atleastthatistheidealthatweallrevere,butthesadtruthisthatnowadays,youneedmorethanthecourageofyour
convictionsandasoapboxifyoudaretospeakuponpublicissues.Thatisbecausetheactofpubliclydiscussingpendinglegislationorregulatorymattersforexample,publishinganopenletter,organizingademonstration,speakingatarally,distributingflyers,displayingayardsign,etc.fallsunderthelegaldefinitionoflobbyinginmanystates.Andlobbyists,eveninformalandamateurgrassrootsactivists,aresubjecttoamazeofregulationsandlegalrestrictionsiftheysimplyurgetheirfellowcitizenstotakepoliticalaction.
Inmoststates,groupsthatengageinthatkindofspeechandactivism,socalledgrassrootslobbyists,mustregisterwiththestateandfilefrequentanddetailedreportsontheiractivities.Thismeansitemizingexpendituresorcontributions,includingdonateditems(e.g.,theuseofawebsite,acaroroffice
equipment),anditmaymeanreportingthenamesandaddressesofsupporters.Suchregulationssetalegaltrapforunsuspectingcitizens:Otherthanprofessionalpoliticiansandlobbyists,whowouldthinktoconsultalawyerandregisterwiththestatebeforespeakingoutonapublicissue?Whowouldthinkthatspeakingoutconstitutesgrassrootslobbying?Worseyet,lobbyingregulationsarecomplexandnotwritteninamanneraccessibletolaypersons.Sonotonlyisiteasyforpeopletorunafoulofsuchlaws,theymaybeintimidatedbythem.Likewise,mandatorypublicdisclosureofcontributorstograssrootslobbyingmaydetersomepeoplefromgettinginvolvedoutoffearofretributionforsupportingacontroversialposition.
Inthisreport,Idescribeindetailhowexistingstatelawsonlobbyingareso
overbroadastoconstituteanassaultonpopularparticipationinpublicpolicydebate.
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Grassroots Lobbying: What It Is and Why It Matters
Simplyput,grassrootslobbyingisanyefforttoorganize,coordinateorimploreotherstocontactpublicofficialsforthepurposeofaffectingpublicpolicy.Grassrootslobbyingisthereforenotjusttheexerciseoffreespeechandassociation,buttheveryprocessbywhichlikemindedpeoplecoordinatetheireffortsandpetitiongovernmentfortheredressofgrievances.So,whetherittakestheformofapublicrallyonthestepsoftheCapitol,aletterwritingcampaignoranimpassionedblogentry,grassrootslobbyingisquintessentialrepresentativedemocracyinaction.
ThetraditionofgrassrootslobbyinginAmericahasitsrootsincolonialtown
hallmeetingsandanonymouspamphleteers;itwasfamouslylaudedin
TocquevillesDemocracyinAmericaandhassinceoftenbeencelebratedinAmericanart(e.g.,Mr.SmithGoestoWashington).Butthisisonetraditionthathasgrownimmenselymoreimportantascommunicationtechnologyhasadvanced,sothatnowjustabouteveryoneisoneemailortweetawayfromacalltoactionbyamultitudeofformalandinformalvoluntarymembershiporganizations.Tocitejustoneexample,thewebsiteoftheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofVirginiaencouragesmemberstosignupasgrassrootslobbyists;membersthenreceiveregularlegislativesummarieslistingthestatusofbillsidentifiedbytheACLUofVirginiastaffaspotentiallyimpactingourcivilrightliberties(and)asneeded,actionalertsonparticularbillsthatrequireimmediateattention. 1
Theeffectivenessofgrassrootslobbyingismanifestbytheeffortofevery
major(andnotsomajor)interestgrouptoinformandenergizeitsmembership.ElectedofficialspaysomuchattentiontogroupsliketheAARP,theNRA,MADDandtheSierraClubpreciselybecausethosearelargeassociationswithademonstratedabilitytomobilizetheirmembershiptoaction.2Thenumberandvarietyofgroupsthatutilizegrassrootslobbyingwouldbeimpossibletocataloguehere,butevenrelativelyminorgroupslikecatfanciersrecognizeitsimportanceandencouragetheirmemberstospeakoutonissuesofmutualconcern:
GrassrootslobbyingisthefoundationoftheAmericanpoliticalsystem.Throughthismedium,ourlawmakerslearnwhatthewilloftheirconstituentsis,andthemannerinwhichtheselawmakersrespondisthebasisonwhichtheyareheldaccountable.
CatFanciersAssociation,Inc. 3
Grassrootslobbyingisthereforeonewayconstituentscaninformofficeholdersofwhatpeopleintheirdistrictthinkandspurthemtoaction.Insuchcases,everyparticipantinagrassrootslobbyingcampaignisapotentialvoteforacompetitorinthenextelection,andpopularleadersofgrassrootscampaignsoftenmakeeffectiveoppositioncandidates.Forthesereasons,incumbentlegislatorsare
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YOU MIGHT BE A LOBBYIST IF.You are paid to directly communicate to legislators for the purpose of influencing pending legislative proposals.
Every state regulates paid direct lobbying of this sort, but many states extend the list of covered
public officials and actions well beyond what reasonable people would consider lobbying.
You send e-mails to all your personal and professional contacts, informing them about a proposed state tax hike;
in the e-mail you suggest that recipients should contact their state legislator and make their voice heard.
Twenty-two states explicitly define lobbying to include soliciting others to contact public officials
for the purpose of influencing public policy.
You and your friends post flyers calling for a rally in support of anti-hate-crimes legislation; at the rally, you
distribute homemade signs and T-shirts with political slogans.
Another 14 states define lobbying as any attempt to influence public policy, as long as you
meet a certain threshold of compensation or expenditures (including the value of homemade
or donated items).
You invite a group of your neighbors to your home for light refreshments; you also circulate a petition to the town
council seeking an ordinance to require pet owners to pick up after their pets.
In several states, such as Georgia, Minnesota and New York, even communicating with local
officials about local matters may violatestate laws.
You post an open letter to public officials on a social networking webpage, or even in the window of your private
home or business.
There is no minimum compensation or expenditure threshold to be classified as a lobbyist in
North Dakota, Rhode Island or Wyoming; this means that just about any public statement on
legislative or regulatory matters is considered lobbying.
You prepare a report for your employer regarding the effects of a proposed change in state labor regulations; of
your own volition, you later write to your state representative about the proposed regulations.
In several states, including Connecticut and Vermont, the value of any research or planning
that is later employed in lobbying, or even being compensated for such research, counts
toward the threshold expenditure requirements for lobbying.
You even think about doing any of the above.
Most states allow lobbyists a few days grace period to register and start filing reports about
lobbying activities, but some states, like Idaho and Iowa, require that you register as a lobbyist
before you engage in any lobbying activities. But given the overbroad definitions of lobbying in
many states, this means you may not only be a lobbyist, you may already be subject to fines
and criminal prosecution.
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oftenveryresponsivetograssrootsactivity,whichinturnmakesgrassrootslobbyingcampaignsanimportantcheckontheabilityofpartyleaderstopressurelegislatorstoworkcontrarytotheinterestsoftheirdistricts.
Butgrassrootslobbyingismorethanjustanalarmbell;italsoservesan
importanteducationalfunction.Grassrootsgroupsexplainthecontentandeffectsofproposedlegislationthatwouldotherwisebecompletelyhiddenorincomprehensibletomostcitizens.Further,grassrootsgroupseducatepeopleaboutthelegislativeprocessandenablethemtodirecttheirconcernstotherelevantcommitteeandsubcommitteemembersortolegislatorswhomaywieldadecisivevote.Inthisway,grassrootslobbyingcanserveasapowerfulcheckonlegislativegatekeepersandagendasetterswhomightotherwisebottleuppopular
legislation.Asjustoneexampleofthiseducationalroleofgrassrootslobbying,considertheNationalVolunteerFireCouncil,anonprofitassociationofvolunteerfire,EMSandrescueservices,whosewebsiteincludestutorialsongrassrootslobbyingtechniques,howabillbecomesalaw,congressionalorganizationandthefederalbudgetprocess.4
Intheseways,thegrassrootslobbyingactivitiesofindustryandtrade
associations,unions,ideologicalinterestgroupsandpoliticalpartiesservetokeeppeopleinformedandalertregardingpolicyproposalsthataffectthemandfacilitatetheabilityofcitizenstoparticipateinthelegislativeprocessinamannerthatgivestheirvoicesmaximalimpact.Forexample,whensomelegislatorsinConnecticuttriedtopushthroughabilltopunishtheCatholicChurchforitssuccessfulactivism
inthatstate,theChurchwasabletoquicklymobilizeitsmembersandshinelightontheunsavoryactivitiesofthoselegislators(seeYoucanpetitionGod,butnottheConnecticutGeneralAssembly,nextpage).
Finally,grassrootslobbyingalsoincludesattemptstopersuadefellowcitizenstoadoptanewviewaboutpendinglegislationorregulation.Inademocracy,newideasandpolicyproposalsareimplementedonlyaftertheygainmajoritysupport;however,bydefinition,anynewideamustoriginatewithaminorityofcitizens.Therefore,inanywellfunctioningdemocracy,therewillalwaysbepassionateminorities(i.e.,specialinterests)thatworktoconvincefellowcitizensofthewisdomoftheirviews.Thisiswhyfreespeechandassociationiscrucialforthehealthofdemocracies;itisthroughthevigorousandfreeexchangeof
ideasthatnewpoliciesareintroducedandexplained,andperhapsacceptedbythelargercommunity.5
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YOU CAN PETITION GOD,BUT NOT THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY
In March 2009, state legislators in Connecticut tried to rush through a bill that was
widely recognized as a blatant act of retribution against the Roman Catholic Church. The
Bridgeport Diocese had previously been successful in fighting for a conscience-protection
amendment to gay marriage legislation. Elected officials responded with Raised Bill 1089.
This legislation would require lay people to govern corporations that own church property,
which would effectively strip Catholic bishops and pastors of control over Church finances.
The bill was introduced without notice and placed on the legislative fast-track. But state
legislators underestimated the Most Reverend William Lori, the blogging bishop of
Bridgeport.
Lori used his website to inform the faithful and send out a call to action. On just
four days notice, the Bridgeport Diocese arranged for buses to take parishioners to a
hastily scheduled hearing at the state Capitol in Hartford. The subsequent flood of phone
calls and e-mails, along with the prospect of an overflowing and hostile crowd led
legislators to cancel the hearing and abandon the bill (although the rally went on as
planned with the crowd estimated at more than 3,500 people). Six weeks after the rally,
the Office of State Ethics informed the Bridgeport Diocese that it may have violated state
lobbying regulations. Connecticut law defines lobbying as communicating or soliciting
others to communicate with any public official, or their staff, for the purpose of influencing
any legislative or administrative action. The next week, the OSE threatened the church
with a formal complaint and multiple fines of $10,000 each.
Thats when the Diocese brought a federal lawsuit, which in turn prompted the
Connecticut Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal, to tell the Office of State Ethics to
back off. Unfortunately, Blumenthal did not issue a formal advisory opinion, which might
have offered some protection to future grassroots efforts, and his letter to the OSE made
clear that he still supports strict regulation of grassroots lobbying, even for churches
communicating to their members. For his part, the Reverend Lori was gracious and turned
the other cheek. He promptly posted a note on his blog thanking the Attorney General,
and even praised Blumenthal:
His opinion is a truly significant announcement that stands not just with our State's
Catholics but with all citizens of the State whose fundamental civil liberties were
placed in jeopardy by the application by the OSE of the State's lobbyingregistration requirements. It is essential that citizens have the right to organize and
communicate their views to their government without being required to register as
lobbyists.6
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Grassroots Lobbying and Political Entrepreneurship
Wouldbegrassrootslobbyistsfaceaninherentdifficultyknowninpoliticalscienceliteratureastheproblemofcollectiveaction:Oftentimes,selfinterestedindividualsdonothaveasufficientincentivetotakeactionsthatwouldbeintheinterestofagroupofpeople. 7Politicalparticipationisrifewithsuchproblems,fromvotingandcontributingtocandidatestocontactinglegislatorsaboutissuesofsharedconcern.Ineachofthesecases,isolatedindividualsmayrationallychoosetoslackoff;afterall,theincrementalvalueofjustonevoteoronevoiceissmall.Andthelargeragroup,thegreatertheincentivetofreeridelettingothersdotheworkforyouallelseconstant.
Onelessonthatemergesfromscholarlyresearchisthatpoliticalentrepreneurscansolvethecollectiveactionproblem.Moreeffectivegroupsarethosewheresomememberscareenoughaboutthegrouptotakeonthecostofcoordinating,communicatingandmobilizingotherindividuals.Thesegroupsbecomeorganizedandfunctionasinterestgroups.Electedpoliticiansoftenplaytheroleofpoliticalentrepreneur,butoutsideactors,betheyexistinginterestgroups,candidatesinwaitingorconcernedcitizens,mayalsoplaytheroleofpoliticalentrepreneur.8However,unlikeincumbentpoliticians,outsidepoliticalentrepreneursoftenlackapublicplatformfromwhichtocommunicateanddonothaveaprofessionalstafftohelporganizegroupmembers.Forthesereasons,grassrootslobbyistsrelyonpatronsandcontributorstoprovideresourcestoinform,coordinateandmobilizegroupmembers.
Seeninthislight,thefrequentassumptionthatauthenticgrassroots
lobbyingcanonlyoccurabsentpoliticalentrepreneursandprofessionalexpertiseissimplyridiculous.Unorganizedandordinarycitizenswithlegitimateandlatentpreferencesforpolicycannotbeexpectedtomonitorthelegislativecalendarconstantlyjustincaseanitemofconcernshouldpopup;norcanordinarycitizensbeexpectedtofullycomprehendthelegislativeprocesssothattheycancontacttheappropriatecommitteemembersattheappropriatetime.Advocacygroupsandotherentrepreneursprovideavaluablefunctionforunorganizedinterestsbymonitoringlegislationandsendingactionalertswhenappropriate,aswellashelpingtocoordinategrassrootsactionformaximumeffectbyinformingpeopleabouttheissuesathand,therelevantactorstocontactandthetimeframeforaction.
Farfrombeingasuspectenterprise,politicalentrepreneurshipisa
necessaryconditionforvigorousandrobustgrassrootslobbying.Ifanything,itistheabsenceofsuchactivitythatshouldcauseconcern,sinceitwouldmeanthatlatentgroupsareleftunorganizedandtheirpreferenceslikelyignoredbythe
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politicalprocess.Unfortunately,regulationsinnumerousstatesarecreatingjustsuchadynamic.How Overbroad Lobbying Regulations Hamper Grassroots Lobbying
TheSupremeCourthaslongrecognizedthatlobbyingisprotectedbythefundamentalFirstAmendmentrightsofspeech,associationandpetition;9nevertheless,thefederalgovernmentandall50statesregulatelobbyistsinsomefashion.Inmostcases,lobbyistsmustregister,payannualfeesanddisclosegiftsandexpendituresthroughouttheyear.Inaddition,severalstatesrequirelobbyiststoundergotrainingandprohibitlobbyistsfrommakingpoliticaldonations.Finally,lobbyistsfaceadministrativefinesandevencriminalpenaltiesforfailingtocomply
withtheseregulations.
Statementsofintentfromlobbyingstatutesinthestatesindicatethattheprimaryrationaleespousedforregulatinggrassrootslobbyingisthatthepublichasarighttoknowwhoisspeakingandaninterestinpreservingtheintegrityofdemocracy.10Forexample,RhodeIslandsdeclarationofintentstates:Publicconfidenceintheintegrityofthelegislativeprocessisstrengthenedbytheidentificationofpersonsandgroupswhoonbehalfofprivateinterestsseektoinfluencethecontent,introduction,passageordefeatoflegislationandbythedisclosureoffundsexpendedinthateffort. 11Similarly,thestateofWashingtondeclares:Thepublicsrighttoknowthefinancingofpoliticalcampaignsandlobbyingandthefinancialaffairsofelectedofficialsandcandidatesfaroutweighsanyrightthatthesemattersremainsecretandprivate. 12
Theseclaimsaredisturbinginseveralrespects.First,thevaguereferenceto
theintegrityofdemocracyisreminiscentofsimilarclaimsmadebyadvocatesofrestrictivecampaignfinancelaws.However,thereisnoscientificevidencethatrestrictivecampaignfinancelawshavemuchofanimpactoncitizenstrustingovernment;13andbyextension,lobbyingdisclosurelawsareunlikelytohaveanyimportanteffectseither.Second,giventheimportantroleofgrassrootslobbyinginfosteringcitizenparticipationandactingasacheckonlegislativegatekeepersandmalfeasantrepresentatives,lobbyingdisclosurelawsthatraisethecostsofsuchactivitymayactuallyunderminetheintegrityofdemocracy.Third,theseclaimsignoretheSupremeCourtsrepeatedrecognitionthatmandatorydisclosureimposesunacceptablyhighcostsoncertainunpopulargroupsandspeakers.14Finally,theverynotionthatdisclosureofgrassrootslobbyingactivitiesisnecessaryforthepublictoknowwhoisspeakingisquiteinsulting.Inessence,itassumesthatcitizenswhocontactalegislatoraspartofagrassrootscampaignarejust
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mindlessautomatonsrelayingthevoiceofthepoliticalentrepreneur,ratherthanconcernedcitizensexpressingtheirownviews.
Despitethedubiousrationalesforgrassrootslobbyingdisclosurelaws,only
14statesthinkenoughoftheircitizenstopermitunregulatedgrassrootslobbyingoflegislators,asshowninTable1;thesestatesregulatetraditionallobbyingperformedbypaidagentsthatcommunicatedirectlywithlegislatorsbutnotcommunicationsmadetothepublicregardinglegislativeproposals.Oftheremainingstates,22explicitlydefinelobbyingasdirect andindirectcommunicationwithpublicofficials,and14broadlydefinelobbyingasanyattempttoinfluencepublicofficials. 15Bothofthesedefinitionsaresobroadastocoverapersonorgroupreachingouttofellowcitizenstospurthemtopoliticalaction,althoughstate
enforcementoftheselawsagainstgrassrootslobbyingeffortsmayvaryacrossstatesandovertime.Finally,whilefederallawdoesnotcurrentlymandatedisclosureofgrassrootslobbying,in2007theU.S.Congressdidconsideraproposaltoregulateactivitiesthatwouldstimulategrassrootslobbyingoffederallegislators.Althoughthatmeasurewasdefeated,advocatescontinuetoargueforfederalregulation. 16
Table 1: Definition of lobbying
Directcommunicationwithpublicofficials
Arizona,Delaware,Illinois,Iowa(lobbyingtheexecutivebranch),Kentucky,Louisiana,Maine,Michigan,Nevada,Ohio,Oklahoma,SouthCarolina,Texas,Utah,Wisconsin
Directandindirectcommunicationwithpublicofficials
Alaska,Arkansas,California,Colorado,Connecticut,Georgia,Hawaii,Idaho,Massachusetts,Maryland,Minnesota,Mississippi,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,NewJersey,Pennsylvania,RhodeIsland,Tennessee,Virginia,Vermont,WestVirginia,Wyoming
Anyattempttoinfluencepublicofficials
Alabama,Florida,Iowa(lobbyingthelegislature),Indiana,Kansas,Missouri,Montana,Nebraska,NewHampshire,NewMexico,NewYork,Oregon,SouthDakota,Washington
Includesanyattempttostimulategrassrootslobbying
FederalgrassrootslobbyingproposalremovedfromtheHonestLeadershipandOpenGovernmentActof2007
Note:InOklahomaandIowa,lobbyingisdefinedbroadly;howeverOklahomaalsoexemptswidelydistributedcommunications,whileanadvisoryopinionbytheIowaEthicsCommission,whichhasjurisdictionoverexecutivebranchlobbyingbutnotlegislativelobbying,exemptssolicitingotherstocommunicatewithpublicofficials.
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Regulation of Grassroots Lobbying in the States
Amongthe36statesthatregulategrassrootslobbyinginsomefashion,mostexemptincidentalactivityfromreportingrequirements.AsTable2shows,thethresholdforreportinggrassrootslobbyingactivitymeaningthepointatwhichcommunicationsqualifyaslobbyingregulatedunderthelawvariesconsiderablyacrossstates,butinmostinstancesparttimeemploymentorexpendituresof$500oncommunicationseffortsissufficienttotriggerreportingrequirements.Consequently,anyonethatreceivesormakesapaymentforthepurposeofcommunicatingwithfellowcitizensaboutpendingorproposedlegislationispotentiallyinviolationofstatelaws,evenifsuchpaymentsarelimitedtoreimbursements.
Inthe22statesthatdefinelobbyingasdirectorindirectcommunicationto
publicofficials,thelowdollarandhourlythresholdsmeanthatanypersonorgroupthatissufficientlymotivatedtopurchaseadvertising,payforawebsiteorhirepeopletomakephonecalls,knockondoorsorprepareapolicyreportmayalsobeconsideredalobbyist,justaslongasthepurposeofthatactivityistotrytoconvinceotherpeopletomaketheirvoiceheardbycontactingapublicofficial.Infact,threestates,NorthDakota,RhodeIslandandWyoming,donotevendefineadollarthresholdforlobbying,sointhosestates,anyattempttoinducefellowcitizenstocontactlegislatorswouldbeconsideredlobbying.
Further,directcompensationisnottheonlytriggerforbeingdesignateda
lobbyist;statestypicallydefinecontributionsandexpendituresasanythingofvalue,sodonateditems(officemachinesorspace,photocopying,theuseofpersonalvehicles,etc.)andevenvolunteeringprofessionalservicesmaycountasinkindcontributionstowardagrassrootslobbyingcampaign.Severalstatesalsoexplicitlyincluderesearchexpenses,suchasopinionpolling,consultingandthelikeaspartoftheexpensesassociatedwithgrassrootslobbying.Thus,itisnotdifficultforevenadhocandinformalgrassrootsgroupstoqualifyaslobbyistsinmoststates.Forexample,theConnecticutOfficeofStateEthicsinformedtheBridgeportCatholicDiocesethatitcrossedthe$2,000thresholdforlobbyingbyprovidingbustransportationforparishionerstoattendarallyinthestatecapital.
Furthermore,inthe14statesthatdefinelobbyingasessentiallyanyattempt
toinfluencepublicofficials,itiseveneasiertocrossthelineintolobbying.Inthesestates,whichincludeFlorida,Missouri,NewYorkandWashington,justaboutanyformofparticipationinpublicdebatewillbeconsideredlobbying,aslongastheminimumthresholdismet.Andinsuchlargestates,itisdifficulttoconceiveoforganizingandmountingasuccessfulgrassrootslobbyingeffortwithoutexpendingseveralthousanddollars.Anadvertisementfeaturingasingleopenletterinamajornewspapercanbeenoughtotransformapersonintoalobbyist.
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Table 2: Thresholds for reporting grassroots lobbying activityAlabama Anyemploymentor$100inexpenses
Alaska 10hoursemploymentina30 dayperiod
Arkansas $400incompensationorexpensesina90dayperiod
California $5,000incompensationorexpenses
Colorado Anyemployment
Connecticut $2,000incompensationorexpenses
Florida Anyemployment
Georgia $250incompensationorexpenses
Hawaii 5hoursemploymentpermonthor$750inexpensesina30dayperiod
Iowa Anyemploymentor$1,000inexpenses
Idaho $250incompensationina90dayperiod
Indiana $500incompensationKansas Anyemploymentor$100inexpenses
Maryland $2,000incompensationorexpenses
Massachusetts $250incompensationorexpenses
Minnesota $3,000incompensation,or$250inexpenses
Mississippi $200incompensationorexpenses
Missouri Anyemployment
Montana $2,500incompensation
Nebraska Anyemployment
NewHampshire
Anyemployment
NewJersey $100compensationorexpensesina90dayperiod
NewMexico Anyemployment
NewYork $5,000incompensation
NorthCarolina $3,000incompensationorexpensesina90dayperiod
NorthDakota Nothreshold
Oregon $200incompensationorexpensesina30dayperiod(or$500in90days)
Pennsylvania $2,500incompensationor20hourslobbyinginanyquarter
RhodeIsland Nothreshold
SouthDakota Anyemployment
Tennessee Anyemploymentor10dayslobbying
Virginia $500incompensationorexpenses
Vermont $500incompensationorexpenses
Washington $500incompensationorexpensesinany30dayperiod(or$1,000in90days)
WestVirginia $200incompensationorexpensesinany30dayperiod(or$500in90days)
Wyoming Anycompensationorexpenses
Federal(proposedin2007)
Federalgrassrootslobbyingproposal$25,000perquarterincompensationorexpensesbothintendedtostimulategrassrootslobbyinganddirectedat500ormorepeople.
Note:Annualthresholds,unlessotherwiseindicated.
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Onceclassifiedasalobbyist,anindividualorgroupmustnotonlyregisterandpayalicensingfee,butmustalsosubmitperiodicreports;however,thereportingrequirementsforgrassrootslobbyingdifferdramaticallyacrossstates.Insomestatesfinancialdisclosureisminimal(e.g.,SouthDakota,whichonlyrequiresannualregistration),butinothers,grassrootslobbyistsmustfilequarterlyorevenmonthlyexpensereports,detailingthingssuchasalllegislationthatisrelevanttothegroupsactivities,theamountsofcontributions(includingdonateditems),thenamesandaddressesofcontributorsanditemizedexpenditures.Forsophisticatedprofessionaladvocacygroups,mostofthesereportingrequirementsarelikelyjustanuisance,butforordinarycitizenstheycanbequitedaunting.
Forexample,considerthatthestateofWashington,whichtheCampaign
DisclosureProjectrecentlyawardedthehighestgradeoutofall50statesforitscampaigndisclosurelawsandpractices,17definesnolessthan11differenttypesoflobbyists.Inparticular,grassrootslobbyingisdefinedasaprogramaddressedtothegeneralpublic,asubstantialportionofwhichisintended,designedorcalculatedprimarilytoinfluencestatelegislation. 18Anypersonororganizationthatsponsorsgrassrootsactivitiesthatarenototherwisereportableunderoneoftheotherdefinitionsoflobbyingmustthenfileaninitialgrassrootslobbyingreportwithin30daysofinitiatinganygrassrootsactivity.Grassrootssponsorsarethenrequiredtofilemonthlyactivityreports,aswellasafinalreportoncethatparticulargrassrootscampaigniscompleted.Thesemonthlyreportsrequirethatgroupsidentifynotonlythetopiconwhichtheyarefocused,buttheactualbill,ruleorratenumber,aswellasthenamesandaddressesofallprincipalsormanagersoftheorganization.
Grassrootsgroupsmustalsodisclosethenamesandaddressesofallemployeesorfirmshiredbythegroup,includingthetermsoftheircompensation.Thesemonthlyreportsalsorequirethedisclosureofcontributornamesandaddresses,aswellascontributionamounts.Finally,grassrootslobbyingorganizationsmustreportexpendituresdisaggregatedby10differentcategories,withseparateentriesforradio,televisionandprintadvertising,aswellasforsignsandmailings.
Red Tape, Compliance Costs and Legal Traps
Oneobviousproblemwithlobbyingregulationsliketheseisthattheyclearlyarenotintendedtobeunderstoodbyordinarypeople.Regulationsarewrittenin
legaleseimpenetrabletomostcitizens,andinstructionsforcompletingdisclosureformscanbeintimidating,asillustratedbyMassachusettsnewlobbyinglaw(seeAmIalobbyist?Massachusettsanswerssortof,nextpage).ItestedthereadabilityofMassachusettsregulationspertainingtograssrootslobbyingbyrunningthetextofthefirstparagraphofthegrassrootsregulationsthroughseveraldifferentautomatedreadabilitycalculators.19Forexample,theFleschReadingEase
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Scoreisoneoftheoldestsuchmethodsforjudgingwhetheratextcanbecomprehendedbyadults;thesescoresrangefromzero(leastreadable)to100(mostreadable),withscoresbelow30consideredVeryConfusing.TheGettysburgAddresshasareadabilityscoreof70;thefirstparagraphoftheMassachusettsgrassrootslobbyingtextscores0.9onthe100pointscale.Infact,accordingtotheAutomatedReadabilityIndexemployedbytheU.S.militaryforimprovingtechnicalmanuals,apersonwouldneed34yearsofformaleducationtounderstandthatoneparagraphongrassrootslobbying.Incontrast,theparagraphyouarereadingnowrequireslessthanacollegedegreebythesamemeasure.ThesescoresimplythatevenadoctoratefromHarvardorMIT(i.e.,20yearsofformaleducation)isnotsufficienttocomprehendgrassrootslobbyingregulationsinMassachusetts.Whatsworse,consultingstateregulatorsdirectlyforclarificationsaboutwhetheryouarea
lobbyistmayevendomoreharmthangood.
Irecentlyconductedahighlyinformalexperimentbycontactingtherelevantregulatorybodiesintwodifferentstatestoinquirewhethertheactofsolicitingotherpersonstocontactstatelegislatorstopromoteoropposeapieceoflegislationissubjecttolobbyingregulationsinthatstate;inbothcases,thecorrectanswershouldhavebeenyes,atleastaccordingtotheplainlanguageoftheexistingstatelaws.Inonestate,theregulatoryofficialprovidedthecorrectanswer.ButthestaffpersonthatIwasreferredtointheotherstatesoundedlikeagameshowcontestant:IwouldhavetosaaaaayyyyyNo!Anyonerelyingonsuchadvicesubsequentlycouldbefineduptoseveralthousanddollarsforviolatingthatstateslobbyingregulations.Ifstateofficialswithresponsibilityforenforcementcanbe
unclearaboutthelaw,thenwhathopedoordinarycitizenshaveinunderstandingandcomplyingwiththeseregulations?
Inearlierresearch,Iconductedaformalexperimentontheabilityof
ordinarycitizenstocomplywithstatedisclosureformsforgrassrootsgroupsthatadvocatefororagainstballotmeasures;theresultsofthatworkaredescribedinCampaignFinanceRedTape:StranglingFreeSpeechandPoliticalDebate ,whichwaspublishedbytheInstituteforJusticein2007.22Becausethedisclosurelawsforgrassrootslobbyistsaresimilarinmanyrespectstothoseforpoliticalcommitteesexaminedinmyearlierresearch,severallessonsfromthatworkapplyhereaswell.
Intheredtapestudy,Ipresented255peoplewithasimplescenarioof
grassrootspoliticalactivitiesrelatedtosupportingaballotmeasure(organizingneighbors,makingplacards,holdingarally,etc.),andthenaskedthemtocompleteactualstatedisclosureformsforballotcommitteesinCalifornia,ColoradoorMissouri.Whiletheseformsarenotidenticaltolobbyingdisclosureforms,theyareequallyunfamiliartomostpeople.Inbothcases,ordinarycitizensareunlikelytobeawareoftheexistenceofsuchlaws,letalonehaveanyexperiencewithcompliance.Further,thelegaljargonrelatingtopoliticalexpenditures,contributionsandinkind
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contributionsiscommontobothcases,asistheintimidatingstatutorylanguageandterseinstructionsforindividualswhomustcomplywiththeselaws.
Subjectswererecruitedfrommychurchandlocalneighborhood,from
universityadministrativestaff,graduatestudentsinpoliticalscienceandpublicaffairs,aswellasafewgraduatingseniorsattheUniversityofMissouri.Inordertoencouragesubjectstomakeagoodeffortatcomplyingwiththedisclosureregulations,theywerepaidnotonlyforparticipation,butcouldlosesomeofthatmoneyforeacherrorthattheymade.Thesubjectsweregiven90minutestocompletetheexercise,althoughsomequitinfrustrationwellbeforetimewasup.
Thefirstlessonfromtheredtapeexperimentwasthatmorethan90
percentoftheparticipantshadnoideathattheyhadtoregisterwiththestateinordertoengageinpoliticalspeech;thereislittledoubtthatmostpeoplearesimilarlyignorantaboutgrassrootslobbyingrestrictions.Consequently,inmoststates,assoonasordinarycitizensdecidetoengageingrassrootsactivity,theyarelikelytoviolatestatelawsoutofsheerignorance.
Oncesubjectswereinformedabouttheexistenceofregistrationand
disclosurelaws,theywerepresentedwithasimplehypotheticalscenarioofagroupofneighborsorganizinganinformalrallyagainstalocalballotmeasure.Thesubjectswerethenaskedtofillouttherequiredpaperworkforthisgroup;thescenarioincludedonepurchaseofaprintadvertisement,thepurchaseanddistributionofTshirtswithpoliticalslogans,thedistributionofhomemadesigns
andatotaloftencontributionsofvaryingsizes.Theresultswerenotpretty.InTable3,Ilistdisclosuretasksrequiredforgrassrootslobbyinginthestate
ofWashingtonalongsidesimilartasksrequiredbyCalifornialawthatwereexaminedinthedisclosureexperiment.InthelastcolumnofTable3,IreportthepercentagesofexperimentalsubjectsthatcouldactuallyperformthosetasksusingtheCaliforniaforms.Nearlyallthesubjectsincorrectlyhandledalarge(illegal)anonymouscontribution,whilemostneverrecognizedthatnonmonetarydonationswerealsosupposedtobetreatedascontributionstotheirgroup.However,manysubjectscouldnotevencorrectlyaccountfordirectcashcontributionsandexpendituresbecausetheysimplycouldnotunderstandorfollowthecomplicatedformsandinstructions.Subjectsfaredslightlybetteratthesetasks
whengivendisclosureformsforColoradoandMissouri,butoverall,subjectswereonlyabletocompleteabout40percentoftheassignedtasks.Noonereceivedaperfectscore.
Theresultsofthisexperimentunambiguouslyrevealthatsubjects,regardlessofageoreducationalattainment,weresimplyflummoxedwhenconfrontedwithreallifedisclosureformsandinstructions.Ialsooffered
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participantsintheexperimenttheopportunitytowriteabriefcommentabouttheirexperience.Notsurprisingly,manysubjectsexpressedfrustration,callingtheprocessconfusing,ridiculousandworsethantheIRS!Severalsaidtheywouldneedalawyertocompletetheforms,includingthelawyerwhoparticipatedintheexperiment.Finally,nearly90percentoftheparticipantsagreedthatthespecterofcomplicatedredtapeandlegalpenaltieswoulddeterordinarycitizensfrompoliticalactivity.
Table 3: Disclosure tasks for grassroots lobbying and the compliance experiment
Tasksrequiredbystatedisclosureregulations
Grassrootslobbying
(Washingtonstate)
Ballotcommittees
(California)
Compliance
experiment
(%correct)
Requiredtoregister Ifspending$500inone
monthor$1,000in
threemonths
Ifreceiving$1,000in
anycalendaryear
7%
Reportexpenditures Ineachoften
categories
Itemizeifover$100 49%
Reportmonetarycontributions Itemizeifover$25 Itemizeifover$100 56%
Reportnonmonetarycontributions Itemizeifover$25 Itemizeifover$100 18%
Anonymouscontributions Prohibitedover$25 Prohibitedover$100 2%
Notes:PercentofsubjectscorrectlyreportingcontributionsandexpendituresistheaveragescoreforeachtypeoftaskforsubjectsusingCaliforniaforms(scoresareadjustedforsubjectcharacteristicstoreflecttheperformanceofanonstudentregisteredvoterwithacollegeeducation).
Asidefromthesecompliancecosts,grassrootslobbyingregulationsset
numeroustrapsforhaplesscitizensthatseektoexercisetheirconstitutionalrights.Itstrainscredulitytothinkthatordinarycitizenswouldhavethefaintestideathattheyshouldregisterwiththestateandconsultalawyerbeforespeakingtofellowcitizensaboutpublicissues.Second,myreadingoftherulesforeverystatethat
regulatesgrassrootslobbyingconfirmsthattheselawsareascomplexasthoseforballotmeasuredisclosure;itissimplyinconceivablethattheseregulationswerewritteninamannerintendedtobeaccessibletoanordinarycitizen.Itseemsclearthattheimplicitassumptionbehindtheselawsisthatpoliticsisforprofessionalsonly.23Third,severalstatesrequirethatlobbyistsregister priortoengaginginanygrassrootsactivities(whichcanincluderesearchorotherpreparationcosts).Combinethiswiththeoverbroaddefinitionsoflobbyinginmoststatesanditiseasy
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Table 4: Examples of penalties related to grassroots lobbyingMaximumadministrativeandcivilfinesState
Latereports Otherviolations
Maximumcriminal
penalties
Alabama $10,000 $30,000and20years
Alaska $10/day $1,000and1year
Arkansas $25$200/day $1,000 $1,000and1year
Colorado $10/day $5,000and1year
Connecticut $10,000
Hawaii $2,000perviolation
Idaho $2,500and6months
Indiana $100 $100forlatereports
$500and3years
Kansas $5,000 $1,000and6monthsMassachusetts $100/day $10,000and5years
Minnesota $100perviolation $3,000and1year
Missouri $5,000and4years
Mississippi $5,000and3years
Montana $2,500perviolation
NorthCarolina $5,000perviolation 6months
NorthDakota $1,000and30days
Nebraska $750perreport
NewJersey $1,000perviolation
NewMexico $50/day $5,000
NewYork $50,000 $5,000and4years
Pennsylvania $50/day $2,000perviolation $25,000
RhodeIsland $2,000 $10,000
Tennessee $2,000 $10,000 $2,500and1year
Virginia $2,500and10years
Vermont $4,175 $10,000perviolation
WestVirginia $5,000perviolation
Washington $10,000
Federalproposal(2007)
$100,000
Notes:Thislistisnotexhaustive,butrepresentsonlythosepenaltiesthatarereadilyidentifiablefromstatestatutesandregulations.
toseehowordinarycitizensmightrunafouloflobbyinglawsthattheydidnotknowexistedandcannotunderstandanyway.
Notonlyisiteasyforordinarycitizenstoviolatelobbyingdisclosurelawsbyengagingingrassrootslobbying,thepenaltiesfordoingsocanbequitesevere,asshowninTable4.Whilesomestatessetamaximumforlatefeesandfines,severaldonot.Butwhatshouldbemostdisconcertingisthatmanystatesallowfinestobeleviedonaperviolationbasis;givenmultipleandcomplicatedreports,itiseasyfor
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suchfinestomountquickly.Inaddition,severalstatesimposecriminalpenaltiesfordisclosureviolations,rangingashighas20yearsinprisoninAlabamaforintentionalmisreporting.Finally,severalstatesalsobanlobbyistsfrommakingcampaigncontributions,sosomeoneengagingingrassrootslobbyingcannotonlyviolatelobbyingrules,butcampaignfinancelawsaswell.
Unintended Consequences of Lobbying Disclosure
Thecostsofdisclosurelawsarenotlimitedtothehassle,frustrationandpenaltiesassociatedwithredtaperequirements.Theexistenceofoverbroadandvagueregulationsonpoliticalactivities,coupledwithsteepcivilandcriminalpenalties,isaninvitationforabuseatthehandsofunethicalandpartisanregulators,
astheplightofReverendLoriinConnecticutillustrates(seepage5).Furthermore,lobbyingdisclosurerequirementsignoretheimportantandlongacceptedroleofanonymityinpublicdebate.
Itseemsunlikelythatknowledgeaboutwhocontributed$20toagrassroots
campaignisofmuchbenefittothepublic,especiallycomparedtothecostsimposedonthosewhowishtospeakout.Infact,thereisgoodreasontobeskepticalabouttheefficacyofdisclosurelaws;inarecentexaminationofmandatorydisclosurelawsinballotinitiativecampaigns,DickCarpenterfindslittleevidencethatvotersmakeuseofmandatorydisclosure.24Forexample,arepresentativesurveyofcitizensinsixstateswithballotinitiativesrevealsthatonlyabout27percentofrespondentsclaimthattheysoughtoutinformationondonorstopoliticalcampaigns,andfewerthanhalfexpressedmuchawarenessoftheleadingdonorstoballotmeasurecampaigns.Theseselfreportsbysurveyrespondentsarealsoconsistentwithcontentanalysesofcampaignmaterialsandnewscoverageofcampaignsthatfindfewinformationsourcesavailabletovotersnamelynewspapersandothermediamakeuseofmandatorydisclosureofcontributoridentitieseither.25
Carpenteralsofindsthatupwardsof80percentofrespondentsbelievethat
mandatorydisclosureisacceptablewhenappliedtoothers,butonly40percentsupportsuchlawswhenframedasapplyingtothemselves.Infact,whensuchdisclosurelawsaredescribedasalsorequiringrespondentstodivulgetheiremployersname,supportformandatorydisclosurefallstojust25percent.Given
thisdiscomfortfordisclosingpersonalinformation,itisnotsurprisingthatabout60percentofthesurveyrespondentsalsoagreethatthepresenceofmandatorydisclosurelawswouldbeadeterrenttotheirownpoliticalactivity.Thereasonsgivenbyrespondentsincludeadesiretoremainanonymous,fearofharassmentandprivacyconcerns.
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THINKING ABOUT GETTING INVOLVED?DONT DO THE CRIME IF YOU CANT DO THE TIME
Failure to properly disclose grassroots lobbying activity is punishable by
administrative fines, suspension of lobbying privileges and in some states even
criminal penalties. For example, in the following states, disclosure violations for
grassroots lobbying carry the same maximum criminal penalty as:
North Dakota Driving under the influence
$1,000 and 30 days in jail
Tennessee Negligently discharging raw sewage into public
waterways
$500 and 6 months in jail
Indiana Receiving stolen property
$500 and 3 years in jail
Minnesota Repeated assault against the same person
$3,000 and 1 year in jail
Missouri Sexual misconduct with a minor
$5,000 and 4 years in jail
New York Arson or riot
$5,000 and 4 years n jail
Massachusetts Maintaining a house of prostitution
$10,000 and 5 years in jail
Virginia Hit and run resulting in serious injury or death
$2,500 and 10 years in jail
Alabama Kidnapping
$30,000 and 20 years in jail
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Thesefindingsunderscoretheshallownessofpopularsupportfordisclosureregulationsintheabstract,andtheveryrealdiscomfortthatmanypeoplehavewithhavingtheirownpoliticalactivitiesannouncedinpublic.Consequently,concernsthatmandatorydisclosuremayhaveachillingeffectongrassrootspoliticalactivityarewellfounded.So,whilemandatorydisclosureappliedtograssrootslobbyingcampaignsatbestsatisfiesthecuriosityofafewpoliticaljunkies,italsoatworstempowerstheenemiesoffreeandopendebatetomakecrediblethreatsofretaliationagainstunpopularvoices.
Grassroots Lobbying Versus Astroturf Lobbying
CriticsofgrassrootslobbyingoftenusethedisparagingtermAstroturf
lobbyingtoimplythatsomegrassrootseffortsareinauthentic,butwhenitcomestosuchcharges,authenticityisintheeyeofthebeholder.WhetheritisgrassrootsactivismdirectedattheIraqwar,healthinsurancereform,campaignfinancereformorjustaboutanyotherissue,antagonistsonbothsidesoftheissuetrytounderminethecredibilityoftheiropponentsbyexaggeratingtheextenttowhichpublicconcernontheothersideisartificiallystimulated. 26Forthisreason,attemptstocurbsocalledAstroturflobbyingthroughincreasedstateandfederalregulationsandevenpublicoutingandshamingofaccusedringleadersmustbetreatedwithhealthyskepticism.
Itiseasytounderstandwhyincumbentpoliticiansandpartisansattemptto
dismissdemonstrationsofcontraryviewsasinsincereandillegitimate:pureselfpreservation.Hardertofathomiswhysomanyprogressivemindedandselfdescribedgoodgovernmentreformersareoftenfoundonthefrontlinesseekingtocurbgrassrootslobbying.Suchactionsbetrayafundamentalmisunderstanding,sincetheveryideathatcoordinationandleadershipmakesapopularmovementsuspectfliesinthefaceofdecadesofpoliticalscienceresearchonpoliticalentrepreneurshipandcollectiveaction.
Inthecaseofactualfraud,thedistinctionbetweenauthenticand
inauthenticpoliticalpressuremakessense,butbeyondthatthedistinctionbecomesmeaningless.Forexample,iflegislatorsreceivefraudulentmessagesfromasinglesourceposingasmultipleconstituents,suchanactivitydoesnotrepresent
publicsentiment,regardlessofhowitwasstimulated.Ofcourse,itisnotnecessarytoregulategrassrootslobbyinginordertodetersuchfraud.Lawsforbiddingidentitytheft,fraudorfalsestatementstogovernmentofficials,aswellasthepossibilityofdiscoveryandtheattendantharmtothesourcescause,shouldkeepthispractice,evenwhenitisnotobvious,toaminimum.
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Evenso,actualinstancesoffraudulentlobbyingappeartobeextremelyrareandeasilydiscovered,whileaccusationsofAstroturflobbyingareubiquitous.ThisisbecauseAstroturflobbyingisnearlyalwaysusedtorefertoinstancesofcitizenlobbyingthathavesomehowbeeninducedbytheparticipationofanadvocacygroup,lobbyist,publicrelationsfirmorsomeotherartificialmeans.Thisjaundicedviewdeniestheimportantrolethatpoliticalentrepreneursplayinfosteringgrassrootsactivism,whileatthesametimedisparagingthecompetenceandautonomyofpeoplewhochoosetojoinsuchgrassrootscampaigns.Butmorethanthis,thenotionthatgrassrootscampaignsarelegitimateonlyiftheyareunsophisticatedandamateurishisakintosaying,Youhavetherighttopetition,justaslongasyourenottooeffectiveatit.
Conclusion
Thetwopillarsofrepresentativedemocracyarefreeandopenelectionsandfreeandopendebate.PopularpoliticalparticipationissofundamentaltoAmericandemocracythattheBillofRightsenshrinescitizensrightstospeech,associationandpetitionintheFirstAmendmenttotheConstitution.EveryschoolchildistaughtthatAmericaisgreatbecausecitizensspeakoutonissuesofpublicconcernandbringtheirargumentsdirectlytopoliticians.Infact,manyprobablystillrecalltheclassic1975SchoolhouseRock!segmentonhowabillbecomesalaw(ImJustaBill),inwhichlegislationrequiringschoolbusestostopatrailroadcrossingsstartswithjustanideauntilsomefolksbackhomedecidetheywantalawpassedandcontacttheircongressman.Buttoday,shouldyoudecidetoexerciseyourrightsasanAmericanwithonlycivicslessonsandtheBillofRightsasyourguide,beware.
Therightsofcitizenstoparticipateintheirgovernmenthavebeenerodedto
thepointthatevenprofessionalpoliticiansandlobbyistsoftenmustrelyonastaffofdedicatedlegalexpertstonavigatethemazeoffederalandstateregulationsthatnowgovernpublicdiscourse.Regulationofgrassrootsactivisminthestatesstandsinstarkcontrasttothebasicprincipleaffirmedintherecentlydecided CitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionCommission:
TheFirstAmendmentdoesnotpermitlawsthatforcespeakerstoretainacampaignfinanceattorneyorseekdeclaratoryrulingsbeforediscussingthemostsalientpoliticalissuesofourday.Prolixlawschillspeechforthesamereasonthatvaguelawschillspeech:Peopleofcommonintelligencemustnecessarilyguessat[thelaws]meaninganddifferastoitsapplication. 27Nevertheless,undertheguiseofpreservingtheintegrityofdemocracy,
misguidedpopulistsandcynicallyselfinterestedpoliticianshavesuccessfully
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Endnotes
1www.acluva.org/pages/grassrootslobbyform.html.
2Thepoliticalscienceliteraturealsosupportsthenotionthatgrassrootslobbyingcaninfluencepolicy,althoughtheconcernisthatthepresenceofreversecausalitymayexaggeratetheperceivedeffectofgrassrootslobbying.Inotherwords,becausepeoplearemorelikelytojoinandactivelyparticipateinpowerfulgroups,thetrueimpactofgrassrootslobbyingislessthanwouldbecommonlyperceived.However,recentfieldexperimentsconfirmthepotentiallylargeimpactofgrassrootslobbyingonstatelegislators(Bergen,DanielE.,2009.DoesGrassrootsLobbyingWork?AFieldExperimentMeasuringtheEffectsofaneMailLobbyingCampaignonLegislativeBehavior,AmericanPoliticsResearch ,37(2):327352).
3http://www.cfainc.org/articles/legislative/grassrootslobbying.html.4http://www.nvfc.org/page/684/Volunteer_Fire_Service_Advocacy_Center.htm.5E.g.,Hayek,FriedrichA.1960. TheConstitutionofLiberty.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.6Carney,Timothy.Connecticutuseslobbyinglawstomuzzlepriests,Washington
Examiner,July9,2009,viewedat:
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/Connecticutuseslobbyinglawstomuzzle
priests47458612.html.Dixon,Ken.ThousandsinHartfordtoProtestBill,ConnecticutPost
Online,March11,2009,viewedat:http://www.ctpost.com/default/article/ThousandsinHartfordtoprotestbill114166.php.GrassrootsLobbyingtoProtecttheSeparationof
ChurchandState,HoltzmanVogelLawandPolicyUpdate ,Summer2009,viewedat:
http://www.holtzmanlaw.net/upload_files/Law%20&%20Policy%20Update%20
%20Summer%202009.pdf.ThankYou!CatholicsacrosstheStateofConnecticutmobilize
anddefeattheirrational,unlawful,andbigotedProposedBill#1098,RomanCatholic
DioceseofBridgeport,viewedat:http://www.bridgeportdiocese.com/Fight_1098.shtml.
7E.g.,Olson,Mancur,1965.TheLogicofCollectiveAction:PublicGoodsandtheTheoryofGroups.HarvardUniversityPress.8Denzau,ArthurandMichaelMunger,1986.LegislatorsandInterestGroups;How
UnorganizedInterestsGetRepresented,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,80(1):89106.9UnitedStatesv.Hariss ,347U.S.612(1954)andEasternRailroadsPresidentConferencev.NoerrMotorFreight,Inc .365U.S.127.10Alsosee,Maskell,Jack,2008.GrassrootsLobbying:ConstitutionalityofDisclosureRequirements,CongressionalResearchService(updated),RL33794.
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11RhodeIslandGen.Laws1956,2210.12RCW42.17.010(10).13Primo,DavidandJeffreyMilyo,2006.CampaignFinanceLawsandPoliticalEfficacy:EvidencefromtheStates,ElectionLawJournal,5(1):2339.14Thomasv.Collins ,323U.S.516(1945);NAACPv.Alabama,357U.S.449(1958);Talleyv.California,362U.S.60(1960);andMcIntyrev.OhioElectionsCommission ,514U.S.334(1995).15Iclassifystatesthatregulategrassrootslobbyingbasedontheplaintextofexistingstate
statutes.Forexample,bystatute,Alaskadefineslobbyingascommunicatingwithpublicofficialseitherdirectlyorthroughanagent(AS24.45.171(11)(A));further,thedefinitionofpaymentsorexpendituresforlobbyingincludesthecostofsolicitingorurgingotherpersonstoenterintodirectcommunicationwithalegislatororotherpublicofficial(AS24.45.171(13)(E)).Therefore,IclassifyAlaskaamongthosestatesthatregulategrassrootslobbying.However,enforcementofsuchprovisionsisalwayssubjecttothediscretionofstateregulators,socurrentpracticemaynotbeconsistentwiththetextofstatelawsinanygivenstateandatanygiventime.16http://www.creators.com/opinion/jacobsullum/astroturfandsunlight.html.17http://www.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/wa.html.
18LobbyistReporting:January2009InstructionManual,WashingtonStatePublicDisclosureCommission.19Onlinereadabilitycalculatorsareavailablefromseveralsources;fortheexamplesinthetext,Iusedtheautomatedcalculatorfoundat:www.editcentral.com.20RegisteredlobbyistsinMassachusettsarerequiredtocompleteanonlineLobbyistEducationalSeminarasindicatedhere:http://www.sec.state.ma.us/LobbyistWeb/Common/Signin.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fLobbyistWeb%2fdefault.aspx.However,thesocallededucationalseminarconsistsofsimplythetextofthelobbyingstatuteitself(M.G.L.Chapter3:sections3950),albeitprecededbythisdisclaimer:ThisEducationalSeminarisapresentationoftheMassachusettslobbyinglawanditsrequirements.Itisnotmeanttoserveasanadvisoryopinionorasasubstituteforan
officialeditionoftheMassachusettsGeneralLawsortheadviceofcounsel.http://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/OnlineSeminar_V1.pdf.Inotherwords,theSecretaryofStatewillnotevencommittocuttingandpastingthetextofthelawcorrectly.21Flowchartavailableathttp://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/areyoulobbying.pdf.
22Milyo,Jeffrey,2007.CampaignFinanceRedTape:StranglingFreeSpeechandPoliticalDebate,InstituteforJustice(Washington,D.C.).
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
JEFFREY MILYO, PH.D. JeffreyMilyoistheHannaFamilyScholarintheCenterforAppliedEconomicsattheUniversityofKansasSchoolofBusiness;aprofessorinthedepartmentofeconomicsandtheTrumanSchoolofPublicAffairsattheUniversityofMissouri;aseniorfellowattheCatoInstituteandanacademicadvisortotheCenterforCompetitivePolitics.MilyopreviouslywasonthefacultyattheUniversityofChicagoandatTuftsUniversity;hehasalsobeenavisitingscholarattheMassachusettsInstituteforTechnology,StanfordUniversity,WashingtonUniversityinSt.LouisandYaleUniversity.
Dr.MilyosresearchexpertiseisinAmericanpoliticaleconomicsandpublicpolicy;hehas
beenstudyingthefieldofpoliticalcampaignfinancefor18years.Milyosworkhasbeenpublishedinseveralleadingscholarlyjournals,suchatheAmericanEconomicReview,theQuarterlyJournalofEconomics ,theJournalofLawandEconomics ,theJournalofPolicyAnalysisandManagement,ElectionLawJournal,PublicChoice,andStatePoliticsandPolicyQuarterly.Inaddition,hisscholarlyresearchhasbeenrecognizedandsupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundationandtheRobertWoodJohnsonFoundation.Dr.Milyosresearchisalsofrequentlycitedinthenationalmedia,includingTheNewYorkTimes ,TheWashingtonPost,LosAngelesTimes ,ChicagoTribune,USAToday,BusinessWeek,NationalReview,TheWeeklyStandard,CNN,FOXNewsandNationalPublicRadio.
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICETheInstituteforJusticeisanonprofit,publicinterestlawfirmthatlitigatestosecureeconomicliberty,schoolchoice,privatepropertyrights,freedomofspeechandothervitalindividuallibertiesandtorestoreconstitutionallimitsonthepowerofgovernment.Foundedin1991,IJisthenationsonlylibertarianpublicinterestlawfirm,pursuingcuttingedgelitigationinthecourtsoflawandinthecourtofpublicopiniononbehalfofindividualswhosemostbasicrightsaredeniedbythegovernment.TheInstitutesstrategicresearchprogramproduceshighqualityresearchtoinformpublicpolicydebatesonissuescentraltoIJsmission.