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  • 8/7/2019 Mowing Down the Grassroots: How Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure Suppresses Political Participation

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    How

    Grassroots

    Lobbying

    Disclosure

    Suppresses

    PoliticalParticipation

    By Jeffey Myo, Ph.D.APril 2010

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    Executive Summary

    Grassrootslobbyingisanyefforttoorganize,coordinateorimploreotherstocontactpublicofficialsinordertoaffectpublicpolicy.Throughgrassrootslobbying,likemindedcitizenscanalertelectedofficialstoconstituentspreferences,educatefellowcitizensandmaketheirvoicesheard,andevenpersuadethepublictoadoptnewviews.Inshort,grassrootslobbyingisquintessentialrepresentativedemocracyinaction.

    However,asthisreportdocuments,sweepinglobbyinglawsin36states

    threatentostranglegrassrootsmovementsinredtapeandbureaucraticregulation.Twentytwostatesexplicitlyincludegrassrootslobbyinginthedefinitionoflobbying,whileanother14consideranyattempttoinfluencepublicpolicytobe

    lobbying,aslongasacertainamountisspent.Thus,suchcommonactivitiesaspublishinganopenletter,organizingademonstrationordistributingflyerscantriggerregulationandforceorganizerstoregisterwiththestateandfiledetailedreportsontheiractivities,aswellastheidentitiesofsupporters.

    Theseregulationsraisethecostsofpoliticalactivityandsetlegaltrapsfor

    unsuspectingcitizens,thusmakingitmoredifficultforordinarycitizenstoparticipateinpoliticsallwithlittleornobenefittothepublic.Asthisreportfinds:

    Lobbyingregulationsarenotintendedtobeunderstoodbyordinarypeople.

    ThefirstparagraphofMassachusettsnewlobbyinglaw,forexample,scored0.9ona100pointscaleinareadabilitytest.Goingbysuchtests,itwouldtake34

    yearsofformaleducationtounderstandthatparagraph;notevenadoctoratefromMITorHarvardwouldbeenough.

    Theredtapewouldbegrassrootslobbyistsmustnavigatetoproperlydisclose

    activitiesandfinancialsupportiscomplexandburdensome.Inpreviousresearch,ordinarycitizenswhotriedtofilloutsimilarformscorrectlycompletedonlyabout40percentoftasks.

    Runningafouloftheseregulationscouldbringstiffpenalties,including

    thousandsincivilfinesandinsomestatescriminalpenalties.InNewYork,themaximumcriminalpenaltyis$5,000andfouryearsinjail,equivalenttoarsonorriot;inAlabama,itis$30,000and20years,equivalenttokidnapping.

    Thepubliclikelygainslittlefromtheseregulations.Previousresearchsuggests

    fewwillseekoutthedisclosedinformation,butmanywillbedeterredfrompoliticalactivitybythepublicdisclosureoftheirpersonalinformation.

    Thesefindingssuggestelectedofficialsshouldlistentoconstituentconcernsor

    debateideasintheopen,ratherthanmowingdownthegrassrootswithregulation.

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    Introduction

    IsthereanythingmoredistinctlyAmericanthangrassrootspoliticalengagementandactivism?Fromtownhallmeetingsandstatehouseralliestotalkradio,blogsandmeetups,Americansfollowpoliticswithapassion;moreimportantly,wegetinvolvedandnotjusteverytwoyearsatelectiontime.Whetheritisdebatingcurrentissueswithcoworkers,contactingelectedrepresentativesorjustemailingnewsarticlesandpoliticalvideostofriendsandfamily,Americansmaketheirvoicesheard.Atleastthatistheidealthatweallrevere,butthesadtruthisthatnowadays,youneedmorethanthecourageofyour

    convictionsandasoapboxifyoudaretospeakuponpublicissues.Thatisbecausetheactofpubliclydiscussingpendinglegislationorregulatorymattersforexample,publishinganopenletter,organizingademonstration,speakingatarally,distributingflyers,displayingayardsign,etc.fallsunderthelegaldefinitionoflobbyinginmanystates.Andlobbyists,eveninformalandamateurgrassrootsactivists,aresubjecttoamazeofregulationsandlegalrestrictionsiftheysimplyurgetheirfellowcitizenstotakepoliticalaction.

    Inmoststates,groupsthatengageinthatkindofspeechandactivism,socalledgrassrootslobbyists,mustregisterwiththestateandfilefrequentanddetailedreportsontheiractivities.Thismeansitemizingexpendituresorcontributions,includingdonateditems(e.g.,theuseofawebsite,acaroroffice

    equipment),anditmaymeanreportingthenamesandaddressesofsupporters.Suchregulationssetalegaltrapforunsuspectingcitizens:Otherthanprofessionalpoliticiansandlobbyists,whowouldthinktoconsultalawyerandregisterwiththestatebeforespeakingoutonapublicissue?Whowouldthinkthatspeakingoutconstitutesgrassrootslobbying?Worseyet,lobbyingregulationsarecomplexandnotwritteninamanneraccessibletolaypersons.Sonotonlyisiteasyforpeopletorunafoulofsuchlaws,theymaybeintimidatedbythem.Likewise,mandatorypublicdisclosureofcontributorstograssrootslobbyingmaydetersomepeoplefromgettinginvolvedoutoffearofretributionforsupportingacontroversialposition.

    Inthisreport,Idescribeindetailhowexistingstatelawsonlobbyingareso

    overbroadastoconstituteanassaultonpopularparticipationinpublicpolicydebate.

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    Grassroots Lobbying: What It Is and Why It Matters

    Simplyput,grassrootslobbyingisanyefforttoorganize,coordinateorimploreotherstocontactpublicofficialsforthepurposeofaffectingpublicpolicy.Grassrootslobbyingisthereforenotjusttheexerciseoffreespeechandassociation,buttheveryprocessbywhichlikemindedpeoplecoordinatetheireffortsandpetitiongovernmentfortheredressofgrievances.So,whetherittakestheformofapublicrallyonthestepsoftheCapitol,aletterwritingcampaignoranimpassionedblogentry,grassrootslobbyingisquintessentialrepresentativedemocracyinaction.

    ThetraditionofgrassrootslobbyinginAmericahasitsrootsincolonialtown

    hallmeetingsandanonymouspamphleteers;itwasfamouslylaudedin

    TocquevillesDemocracyinAmericaandhassinceoftenbeencelebratedinAmericanart(e.g.,Mr.SmithGoestoWashington).Butthisisonetraditionthathasgrownimmenselymoreimportantascommunicationtechnologyhasadvanced,sothatnowjustabouteveryoneisoneemailortweetawayfromacalltoactionbyamultitudeofformalandinformalvoluntarymembershiporganizations.Tocitejustoneexample,thewebsiteoftheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofVirginiaencouragesmemberstosignupasgrassrootslobbyists;membersthenreceiveregularlegislativesummarieslistingthestatusofbillsidentifiedbytheACLUofVirginiastaffaspotentiallyimpactingourcivilrightliberties(and)asneeded,actionalertsonparticularbillsthatrequireimmediateattention. 1

    Theeffectivenessofgrassrootslobbyingismanifestbytheeffortofevery

    major(andnotsomajor)interestgrouptoinformandenergizeitsmembership.ElectedofficialspaysomuchattentiontogroupsliketheAARP,theNRA,MADDandtheSierraClubpreciselybecausethosearelargeassociationswithademonstratedabilitytomobilizetheirmembershiptoaction.2Thenumberandvarietyofgroupsthatutilizegrassrootslobbyingwouldbeimpossibletocataloguehere,butevenrelativelyminorgroupslikecatfanciersrecognizeitsimportanceandencouragetheirmemberstospeakoutonissuesofmutualconcern:

    GrassrootslobbyingisthefoundationoftheAmericanpoliticalsystem.Throughthismedium,ourlawmakerslearnwhatthewilloftheirconstituentsis,andthemannerinwhichtheselawmakersrespondisthebasisonwhichtheyareheldaccountable.

    CatFanciersAssociation,Inc. 3

    Grassrootslobbyingisthereforeonewayconstituentscaninformofficeholdersofwhatpeopleintheirdistrictthinkandspurthemtoaction.Insuchcases,everyparticipantinagrassrootslobbyingcampaignisapotentialvoteforacompetitorinthenextelection,andpopularleadersofgrassrootscampaignsoftenmakeeffectiveoppositioncandidates.Forthesereasons,incumbentlegislatorsare

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    YOU MIGHT BE A LOBBYIST IF.You are paid to directly communicate to legislators for the purpose of influencing pending legislative proposals.

    Every state regulates paid direct lobbying of this sort, but many states extend the list of covered

    public officials and actions well beyond what reasonable people would consider lobbying.

    You send e-mails to all your personal and professional contacts, informing them about a proposed state tax hike;

    in the e-mail you suggest that recipients should contact their state legislator and make their voice heard.

    Twenty-two states explicitly define lobbying to include soliciting others to contact public officials

    for the purpose of influencing public policy.

    You and your friends post flyers calling for a rally in support of anti-hate-crimes legislation; at the rally, you

    distribute homemade signs and T-shirts with political slogans.

    Another 14 states define lobbying as any attempt to influence public policy, as long as you

    meet a certain threshold of compensation or expenditures (including the value of homemade

    or donated items).

    You invite a group of your neighbors to your home for light refreshments; you also circulate a petition to the town

    council seeking an ordinance to require pet owners to pick up after their pets.

    In several states, such as Georgia, Minnesota and New York, even communicating with local

    officials about local matters may violatestate laws.

    You post an open letter to public officials on a social networking webpage, or even in the window of your private

    home or business.

    There is no minimum compensation or expenditure threshold to be classified as a lobbyist in

    North Dakota, Rhode Island or Wyoming; this means that just about any public statement on

    legislative or regulatory matters is considered lobbying.

    You prepare a report for your employer regarding the effects of a proposed change in state labor regulations; of

    your own volition, you later write to your state representative about the proposed regulations.

    In several states, including Connecticut and Vermont, the value of any research or planning

    that is later employed in lobbying, or even being compensated for such research, counts

    toward the threshold expenditure requirements for lobbying.

    You even think about doing any of the above.

    Most states allow lobbyists a few days grace period to register and start filing reports about

    lobbying activities, but some states, like Idaho and Iowa, require that you register as a lobbyist

    before you engage in any lobbying activities. But given the overbroad definitions of lobbying in

    many states, this means you may not only be a lobbyist, you may already be subject to fines

    and criminal prosecution.

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    oftenveryresponsivetograssrootsactivity,whichinturnmakesgrassrootslobbyingcampaignsanimportantcheckontheabilityofpartyleaderstopressurelegislatorstoworkcontrarytotheinterestsoftheirdistricts.

    Butgrassrootslobbyingismorethanjustanalarmbell;italsoservesan

    importanteducationalfunction.Grassrootsgroupsexplainthecontentandeffectsofproposedlegislationthatwouldotherwisebecompletelyhiddenorincomprehensibletomostcitizens.Further,grassrootsgroupseducatepeopleaboutthelegislativeprocessandenablethemtodirecttheirconcernstotherelevantcommitteeandsubcommitteemembersortolegislatorswhomaywieldadecisivevote.Inthisway,grassrootslobbyingcanserveasapowerfulcheckonlegislativegatekeepersandagendasetterswhomightotherwisebottleuppopular

    legislation.Asjustoneexampleofthiseducationalroleofgrassrootslobbying,considertheNationalVolunteerFireCouncil,anonprofitassociationofvolunteerfire,EMSandrescueservices,whosewebsiteincludestutorialsongrassrootslobbyingtechniques,howabillbecomesalaw,congressionalorganizationandthefederalbudgetprocess.4

    Intheseways,thegrassrootslobbyingactivitiesofindustryandtrade

    associations,unions,ideologicalinterestgroupsandpoliticalpartiesservetokeeppeopleinformedandalertregardingpolicyproposalsthataffectthemandfacilitatetheabilityofcitizenstoparticipateinthelegislativeprocessinamannerthatgivestheirvoicesmaximalimpact.Forexample,whensomelegislatorsinConnecticuttriedtopushthroughabilltopunishtheCatholicChurchforitssuccessfulactivism

    inthatstate,theChurchwasabletoquicklymobilizeitsmembersandshinelightontheunsavoryactivitiesofthoselegislators(seeYoucanpetitionGod,butnottheConnecticutGeneralAssembly,nextpage).

    Finally,grassrootslobbyingalsoincludesattemptstopersuadefellowcitizenstoadoptanewviewaboutpendinglegislationorregulation.Inademocracy,newideasandpolicyproposalsareimplementedonlyaftertheygainmajoritysupport;however,bydefinition,anynewideamustoriginatewithaminorityofcitizens.Therefore,inanywellfunctioningdemocracy,therewillalwaysbepassionateminorities(i.e.,specialinterests)thatworktoconvincefellowcitizensofthewisdomoftheirviews.Thisiswhyfreespeechandassociationiscrucialforthehealthofdemocracies;itisthroughthevigorousandfreeexchangeof

    ideasthatnewpoliciesareintroducedandexplained,andperhapsacceptedbythelargercommunity.5

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    YOU CAN PETITION GOD,BUT NOT THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY

    In March 2009, state legislators in Connecticut tried to rush through a bill that was

    widely recognized as a blatant act of retribution against the Roman Catholic Church. The

    Bridgeport Diocese had previously been successful in fighting for a conscience-protection

    amendment to gay marriage legislation. Elected officials responded with Raised Bill 1089.

    This legislation would require lay people to govern corporations that own church property,

    which would effectively strip Catholic bishops and pastors of control over Church finances.

    The bill was introduced without notice and placed on the legislative fast-track. But state

    legislators underestimated the Most Reverend William Lori, the blogging bishop of

    Bridgeport.

    Lori used his website to inform the faithful and send out a call to action. On just

    four days notice, the Bridgeport Diocese arranged for buses to take parishioners to a

    hastily scheduled hearing at the state Capitol in Hartford. The subsequent flood of phone

    calls and e-mails, along with the prospect of an overflowing and hostile crowd led

    legislators to cancel the hearing and abandon the bill (although the rally went on as

    planned with the crowd estimated at more than 3,500 people). Six weeks after the rally,

    the Office of State Ethics informed the Bridgeport Diocese that it may have violated state

    lobbying regulations. Connecticut law defines lobbying as communicating or soliciting

    others to communicate with any public official, or their staff, for the purpose of influencing

    any legislative or administrative action. The next week, the OSE threatened the church

    with a formal complaint and multiple fines of $10,000 each.

    Thats when the Diocese brought a federal lawsuit, which in turn prompted the

    Connecticut Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal, to tell the Office of State Ethics to

    back off. Unfortunately, Blumenthal did not issue a formal advisory opinion, which might

    have offered some protection to future grassroots efforts, and his letter to the OSE made

    clear that he still supports strict regulation of grassroots lobbying, even for churches

    communicating to their members. For his part, the Reverend Lori was gracious and turned

    the other cheek. He promptly posted a note on his blog thanking the Attorney General,

    and even praised Blumenthal:

    His opinion is a truly significant announcement that stands not just with our State's

    Catholics but with all citizens of the State whose fundamental civil liberties were

    placed in jeopardy by the application by the OSE of the State's lobbyingregistration requirements. It is essential that citizens have the right to organize and

    communicate their views to their government without being required to register as

    lobbyists.6

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    Grassroots Lobbying and Political Entrepreneurship

    Wouldbegrassrootslobbyistsfaceaninherentdifficultyknowninpoliticalscienceliteratureastheproblemofcollectiveaction:Oftentimes,selfinterestedindividualsdonothaveasufficientincentivetotakeactionsthatwouldbeintheinterestofagroupofpeople. 7Politicalparticipationisrifewithsuchproblems,fromvotingandcontributingtocandidatestocontactinglegislatorsaboutissuesofsharedconcern.Ineachofthesecases,isolatedindividualsmayrationallychoosetoslackoff;afterall,theincrementalvalueofjustonevoteoronevoiceissmall.Andthelargeragroup,thegreatertheincentivetofreeridelettingothersdotheworkforyouallelseconstant.

    Onelessonthatemergesfromscholarlyresearchisthatpoliticalentrepreneurscansolvethecollectiveactionproblem.Moreeffectivegroupsarethosewheresomememberscareenoughaboutthegrouptotakeonthecostofcoordinating,communicatingandmobilizingotherindividuals.Thesegroupsbecomeorganizedandfunctionasinterestgroups.Electedpoliticiansoftenplaytheroleofpoliticalentrepreneur,butoutsideactors,betheyexistinginterestgroups,candidatesinwaitingorconcernedcitizens,mayalsoplaytheroleofpoliticalentrepreneur.8However,unlikeincumbentpoliticians,outsidepoliticalentrepreneursoftenlackapublicplatformfromwhichtocommunicateanddonothaveaprofessionalstafftohelporganizegroupmembers.Forthesereasons,grassrootslobbyistsrelyonpatronsandcontributorstoprovideresourcestoinform,coordinateandmobilizegroupmembers.

    Seeninthislight,thefrequentassumptionthatauthenticgrassroots

    lobbyingcanonlyoccurabsentpoliticalentrepreneursandprofessionalexpertiseissimplyridiculous.Unorganizedandordinarycitizenswithlegitimateandlatentpreferencesforpolicycannotbeexpectedtomonitorthelegislativecalendarconstantlyjustincaseanitemofconcernshouldpopup;norcanordinarycitizensbeexpectedtofullycomprehendthelegislativeprocesssothattheycancontacttheappropriatecommitteemembersattheappropriatetime.Advocacygroupsandotherentrepreneursprovideavaluablefunctionforunorganizedinterestsbymonitoringlegislationandsendingactionalertswhenappropriate,aswellashelpingtocoordinategrassrootsactionformaximumeffectbyinformingpeopleabouttheissuesathand,therelevantactorstocontactandthetimeframeforaction.

    Farfrombeingasuspectenterprise,politicalentrepreneurshipisa

    necessaryconditionforvigorousandrobustgrassrootslobbying.Ifanything,itistheabsenceofsuchactivitythatshouldcauseconcern,sinceitwouldmeanthatlatentgroupsareleftunorganizedandtheirpreferenceslikelyignoredbythe

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    politicalprocess.Unfortunately,regulationsinnumerousstatesarecreatingjustsuchadynamic.How Overbroad Lobbying Regulations Hamper Grassroots Lobbying

    TheSupremeCourthaslongrecognizedthatlobbyingisprotectedbythefundamentalFirstAmendmentrightsofspeech,associationandpetition;9nevertheless,thefederalgovernmentandall50statesregulatelobbyistsinsomefashion.Inmostcases,lobbyistsmustregister,payannualfeesanddisclosegiftsandexpendituresthroughouttheyear.Inaddition,severalstatesrequirelobbyiststoundergotrainingandprohibitlobbyistsfrommakingpoliticaldonations.Finally,lobbyistsfaceadministrativefinesandevencriminalpenaltiesforfailingtocomply

    withtheseregulations.

    Statementsofintentfromlobbyingstatutesinthestatesindicatethattheprimaryrationaleespousedforregulatinggrassrootslobbyingisthatthepublichasarighttoknowwhoisspeakingandaninterestinpreservingtheintegrityofdemocracy.10Forexample,RhodeIslandsdeclarationofintentstates:Publicconfidenceintheintegrityofthelegislativeprocessisstrengthenedbytheidentificationofpersonsandgroupswhoonbehalfofprivateinterestsseektoinfluencethecontent,introduction,passageordefeatoflegislationandbythedisclosureoffundsexpendedinthateffort. 11Similarly,thestateofWashingtondeclares:Thepublicsrighttoknowthefinancingofpoliticalcampaignsandlobbyingandthefinancialaffairsofelectedofficialsandcandidatesfaroutweighsanyrightthatthesemattersremainsecretandprivate. 12

    Theseclaimsaredisturbinginseveralrespects.First,thevaguereferenceto

    theintegrityofdemocracyisreminiscentofsimilarclaimsmadebyadvocatesofrestrictivecampaignfinancelaws.However,thereisnoscientificevidencethatrestrictivecampaignfinancelawshavemuchofanimpactoncitizenstrustingovernment;13andbyextension,lobbyingdisclosurelawsareunlikelytohaveanyimportanteffectseither.Second,giventheimportantroleofgrassrootslobbyinginfosteringcitizenparticipationandactingasacheckonlegislativegatekeepersandmalfeasantrepresentatives,lobbyingdisclosurelawsthatraisethecostsofsuchactivitymayactuallyunderminetheintegrityofdemocracy.Third,theseclaimsignoretheSupremeCourtsrepeatedrecognitionthatmandatorydisclosureimposesunacceptablyhighcostsoncertainunpopulargroupsandspeakers.14Finally,theverynotionthatdisclosureofgrassrootslobbyingactivitiesisnecessaryforthepublictoknowwhoisspeakingisquiteinsulting.Inessence,itassumesthatcitizenswhocontactalegislatoraspartofagrassrootscampaignarejust

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    mindlessautomatonsrelayingthevoiceofthepoliticalentrepreneur,ratherthanconcernedcitizensexpressingtheirownviews.

    Despitethedubiousrationalesforgrassrootslobbyingdisclosurelaws,only

    14statesthinkenoughoftheircitizenstopermitunregulatedgrassrootslobbyingoflegislators,asshowninTable1;thesestatesregulatetraditionallobbyingperformedbypaidagentsthatcommunicatedirectlywithlegislatorsbutnotcommunicationsmadetothepublicregardinglegislativeproposals.Oftheremainingstates,22explicitlydefinelobbyingasdirect andindirectcommunicationwithpublicofficials,and14broadlydefinelobbyingasanyattempttoinfluencepublicofficials. 15Bothofthesedefinitionsaresobroadastocoverapersonorgroupreachingouttofellowcitizenstospurthemtopoliticalaction,althoughstate

    enforcementoftheselawsagainstgrassrootslobbyingeffortsmayvaryacrossstatesandovertime.Finally,whilefederallawdoesnotcurrentlymandatedisclosureofgrassrootslobbying,in2007theU.S.Congressdidconsideraproposaltoregulateactivitiesthatwouldstimulategrassrootslobbyingoffederallegislators.Althoughthatmeasurewasdefeated,advocatescontinuetoargueforfederalregulation. 16

    Table 1: Definition of lobbying

    Directcommunicationwithpublicofficials

    Arizona,Delaware,Illinois,Iowa(lobbyingtheexecutivebranch),Kentucky,Louisiana,Maine,Michigan,Nevada,Ohio,Oklahoma,SouthCarolina,Texas,Utah,Wisconsin

    Directandindirectcommunicationwithpublicofficials

    Alaska,Arkansas,California,Colorado,Connecticut,Georgia,Hawaii,Idaho,Massachusetts,Maryland,Minnesota,Mississippi,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,NewJersey,Pennsylvania,RhodeIsland,Tennessee,Virginia,Vermont,WestVirginia,Wyoming

    Anyattempttoinfluencepublicofficials

    Alabama,Florida,Iowa(lobbyingthelegislature),Indiana,Kansas,Missouri,Montana,Nebraska,NewHampshire,NewMexico,NewYork,Oregon,SouthDakota,Washington

    Includesanyattempttostimulategrassrootslobbying

    FederalgrassrootslobbyingproposalremovedfromtheHonestLeadershipandOpenGovernmentActof2007

    Note:InOklahomaandIowa,lobbyingisdefinedbroadly;howeverOklahomaalsoexemptswidelydistributedcommunications,whileanadvisoryopinionbytheIowaEthicsCommission,whichhasjurisdictionoverexecutivebranchlobbyingbutnotlegislativelobbying,exemptssolicitingotherstocommunicatewithpublicofficials.

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    Regulation of Grassroots Lobbying in the States

    Amongthe36statesthatregulategrassrootslobbyinginsomefashion,mostexemptincidentalactivityfromreportingrequirements.AsTable2shows,thethresholdforreportinggrassrootslobbyingactivitymeaningthepointatwhichcommunicationsqualifyaslobbyingregulatedunderthelawvariesconsiderablyacrossstates,butinmostinstancesparttimeemploymentorexpendituresof$500oncommunicationseffortsissufficienttotriggerreportingrequirements.Consequently,anyonethatreceivesormakesapaymentforthepurposeofcommunicatingwithfellowcitizensaboutpendingorproposedlegislationispotentiallyinviolationofstatelaws,evenifsuchpaymentsarelimitedtoreimbursements.

    Inthe22statesthatdefinelobbyingasdirectorindirectcommunicationto

    publicofficials,thelowdollarandhourlythresholdsmeanthatanypersonorgroupthatissufficientlymotivatedtopurchaseadvertising,payforawebsiteorhirepeopletomakephonecalls,knockondoorsorprepareapolicyreportmayalsobeconsideredalobbyist,justaslongasthepurposeofthatactivityistotrytoconvinceotherpeopletomaketheirvoiceheardbycontactingapublicofficial.Infact,threestates,NorthDakota,RhodeIslandandWyoming,donotevendefineadollarthresholdforlobbying,sointhosestates,anyattempttoinducefellowcitizenstocontactlegislatorswouldbeconsideredlobbying.

    Further,directcompensationisnottheonlytriggerforbeingdesignateda

    lobbyist;statestypicallydefinecontributionsandexpendituresasanythingofvalue,sodonateditems(officemachinesorspace,photocopying,theuseofpersonalvehicles,etc.)andevenvolunteeringprofessionalservicesmaycountasinkindcontributionstowardagrassrootslobbyingcampaign.Severalstatesalsoexplicitlyincluderesearchexpenses,suchasopinionpolling,consultingandthelikeaspartoftheexpensesassociatedwithgrassrootslobbying.Thus,itisnotdifficultforevenadhocandinformalgrassrootsgroupstoqualifyaslobbyistsinmoststates.Forexample,theConnecticutOfficeofStateEthicsinformedtheBridgeportCatholicDiocesethatitcrossedthe$2,000thresholdforlobbyingbyprovidingbustransportationforparishionerstoattendarallyinthestatecapital.

    Furthermore,inthe14statesthatdefinelobbyingasessentiallyanyattempt

    toinfluencepublicofficials,itiseveneasiertocrossthelineintolobbying.Inthesestates,whichincludeFlorida,Missouri,NewYorkandWashington,justaboutanyformofparticipationinpublicdebatewillbeconsideredlobbying,aslongastheminimumthresholdismet.Andinsuchlargestates,itisdifficulttoconceiveoforganizingandmountingasuccessfulgrassrootslobbyingeffortwithoutexpendingseveralthousanddollars.Anadvertisementfeaturingasingleopenletterinamajornewspapercanbeenoughtotransformapersonintoalobbyist.

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    Table 2: Thresholds for reporting grassroots lobbying activityAlabama Anyemploymentor$100inexpenses

    Alaska 10hoursemploymentina30 dayperiod

    Arkansas $400incompensationorexpensesina90dayperiod

    California $5,000incompensationorexpenses

    Colorado Anyemployment

    Connecticut $2,000incompensationorexpenses

    Florida Anyemployment

    Georgia $250incompensationorexpenses

    Hawaii 5hoursemploymentpermonthor$750inexpensesina30dayperiod

    Iowa Anyemploymentor$1,000inexpenses

    Idaho $250incompensationina90dayperiod

    Indiana $500incompensationKansas Anyemploymentor$100inexpenses

    Maryland $2,000incompensationorexpenses

    Massachusetts $250incompensationorexpenses

    Minnesota $3,000incompensation,or$250inexpenses

    Mississippi $200incompensationorexpenses

    Missouri Anyemployment

    Montana $2,500incompensation

    Nebraska Anyemployment

    NewHampshire

    Anyemployment

    NewJersey $100compensationorexpensesina90dayperiod

    NewMexico Anyemployment

    NewYork $5,000incompensation

    NorthCarolina $3,000incompensationorexpensesina90dayperiod

    NorthDakota Nothreshold

    Oregon $200incompensationorexpensesina30dayperiod(or$500in90days)

    Pennsylvania $2,500incompensationor20hourslobbyinginanyquarter

    RhodeIsland Nothreshold

    SouthDakota Anyemployment

    Tennessee Anyemploymentor10dayslobbying

    Virginia $500incompensationorexpenses

    Vermont $500incompensationorexpenses

    Washington $500incompensationorexpensesinany30dayperiod(or$1,000in90days)

    WestVirginia $200incompensationorexpensesinany30dayperiod(or$500in90days)

    Wyoming Anycompensationorexpenses

    Federal(proposedin2007)

    Federalgrassrootslobbyingproposal$25,000perquarterincompensationorexpensesbothintendedtostimulategrassrootslobbyinganddirectedat500ormorepeople.

    Note:Annualthresholds,unlessotherwiseindicated.

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    Onceclassifiedasalobbyist,anindividualorgroupmustnotonlyregisterandpayalicensingfee,butmustalsosubmitperiodicreports;however,thereportingrequirementsforgrassrootslobbyingdifferdramaticallyacrossstates.Insomestatesfinancialdisclosureisminimal(e.g.,SouthDakota,whichonlyrequiresannualregistration),butinothers,grassrootslobbyistsmustfilequarterlyorevenmonthlyexpensereports,detailingthingssuchasalllegislationthatisrelevanttothegroupsactivities,theamountsofcontributions(includingdonateditems),thenamesandaddressesofcontributorsanditemizedexpenditures.Forsophisticatedprofessionaladvocacygroups,mostofthesereportingrequirementsarelikelyjustanuisance,butforordinarycitizenstheycanbequitedaunting.

    Forexample,considerthatthestateofWashington,whichtheCampaign

    DisclosureProjectrecentlyawardedthehighestgradeoutofall50statesforitscampaigndisclosurelawsandpractices,17definesnolessthan11differenttypesoflobbyists.Inparticular,grassrootslobbyingisdefinedasaprogramaddressedtothegeneralpublic,asubstantialportionofwhichisintended,designedorcalculatedprimarilytoinfluencestatelegislation. 18Anypersonororganizationthatsponsorsgrassrootsactivitiesthatarenototherwisereportableunderoneoftheotherdefinitionsoflobbyingmustthenfileaninitialgrassrootslobbyingreportwithin30daysofinitiatinganygrassrootsactivity.Grassrootssponsorsarethenrequiredtofilemonthlyactivityreports,aswellasafinalreportoncethatparticulargrassrootscampaigniscompleted.Thesemonthlyreportsrequirethatgroupsidentifynotonlythetopiconwhichtheyarefocused,buttheactualbill,ruleorratenumber,aswellasthenamesandaddressesofallprincipalsormanagersoftheorganization.

    Grassrootsgroupsmustalsodisclosethenamesandaddressesofallemployeesorfirmshiredbythegroup,includingthetermsoftheircompensation.Thesemonthlyreportsalsorequirethedisclosureofcontributornamesandaddresses,aswellascontributionamounts.Finally,grassrootslobbyingorganizationsmustreportexpendituresdisaggregatedby10differentcategories,withseparateentriesforradio,televisionandprintadvertising,aswellasforsignsandmailings.

    Red Tape, Compliance Costs and Legal Traps

    Oneobviousproblemwithlobbyingregulationsliketheseisthattheyclearlyarenotintendedtobeunderstoodbyordinarypeople.Regulationsarewrittenin

    legaleseimpenetrabletomostcitizens,andinstructionsforcompletingdisclosureformscanbeintimidating,asillustratedbyMassachusettsnewlobbyinglaw(seeAmIalobbyist?Massachusettsanswerssortof,nextpage).ItestedthereadabilityofMassachusettsregulationspertainingtograssrootslobbyingbyrunningthetextofthefirstparagraphofthegrassrootsregulationsthroughseveraldifferentautomatedreadabilitycalculators.19Forexample,theFleschReadingEase

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    Scoreisoneoftheoldestsuchmethodsforjudgingwhetheratextcanbecomprehendedbyadults;thesescoresrangefromzero(leastreadable)to100(mostreadable),withscoresbelow30consideredVeryConfusing.TheGettysburgAddresshasareadabilityscoreof70;thefirstparagraphoftheMassachusettsgrassrootslobbyingtextscores0.9onthe100pointscale.Infact,accordingtotheAutomatedReadabilityIndexemployedbytheU.S.militaryforimprovingtechnicalmanuals,apersonwouldneed34yearsofformaleducationtounderstandthatoneparagraphongrassrootslobbying.Incontrast,theparagraphyouarereadingnowrequireslessthanacollegedegreebythesamemeasure.ThesescoresimplythatevenadoctoratefromHarvardorMIT(i.e.,20yearsofformaleducation)isnotsufficienttocomprehendgrassrootslobbyingregulationsinMassachusetts.Whatsworse,consultingstateregulatorsdirectlyforclarificationsaboutwhetheryouarea

    lobbyistmayevendomoreharmthangood.

    Irecentlyconductedahighlyinformalexperimentbycontactingtherelevantregulatorybodiesintwodifferentstatestoinquirewhethertheactofsolicitingotherpersonstocontactstatelegislatorstopromoteoropposeapieceoflegislationissubjecttolobbyingregulationsinthatstate;inbothcases,thecorrectanswershouldhavebeenyes,atleastaccordingtotheplainlanguageoftheexistingstatelaws.Inonestate,theregulatoryofficialprovidedthecorrectanswer.ButthestaffpersonthatIwasreferredtointheotherstatesoundedlikeagameshowcontestant:IwouldhavetosaaaaayyyyyNo!Anyonerelyingonsuchadvicesubsequentlycouldbefineduptoseveralthousanddollarsforviolatingthatstateslobbyingregulations.Ifstateofficialswithresponsibilityforenforcementcanbe

    unclearaboutthelaw,thenwhathopedoordinarycitizenshaveinunderstandingandcomplyingwiththeseregulations?

    Inearlierresearch,Iconductedaformalexperimentontheabilityof

    ordinarycitizenstocomplywithstatedisclosureformsforgrassrootsgroupsthatadvocatefororagainstballotmeasures;theresultsofthatworkaredescribedinCampaignFinanceRedTape:StranglingFreeSpeechandPoliticalDebate ,whichwaspublishedbytheInstituteforJusticein2007.22Becausethedisclosurelawsforgrassrootslobbyistsaresimilarinmanyrespectstothoseforpoliticalcommitteesexaminedinmyearlierresearch,severallessonsfromthatworkapplyhereaswell.

    Intheredtapestudy,Ipresented255peoplewithasimplescenarioof

    grassrootspoliticalactivitiesrelatedtosupportingaballotmeasure(organizingneighbors,makingplacards,holdingarally,etc.),andthenaskedthemtocompleteactualstatedisclosureformsforballotcommitteesinCalifornia,ColoradoorMissouri.Whiletheseformsarenotidenticaltolobbyingdisclosureforms,theyareequallyunfamiliartomostpeople.Inbothcases,ordinarycitizensareunlikelytobeawareoftheexistenceofsuchlaws,letalonehaveanyexperiencewithcompliance.Further,thelegaljargonrelatingtopoliticalexpenditures,contributionsandinkind

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    contributionsiscommontobothcases,asistheintimidatingstatutorylanguageandterseinstructionsforindividualswhomustcomplywiththeselaws.

    Subjectswererecruitedfrommychurchandlocalneighborhood,from

    universityadministrativestaff,graduatestudentsinpoliticalscienceandpublicaffairs,aswellasafewgraduatingseniorsattheUniversityofMissouri.Inordertoencouragesubjectstomakeagoodeffortatcomplyingwiththedisclosureregulations,theywerepaidnotonlyforparticipation,butcouldlosesomeofthatmoneyforeacherrorthattheymade.Thesubjectsweregiven90minutestocompletetheexercise,althoughsomequitinfrustrationwellbeforetimewasup.

    Thefirstlessonfromtheredtapeexperimentwasthatmorethan90

    percentoftheparticipantshadnoideathattheyhadtoregisterwiththestateinordertoengageinpoliticalspeech;thereislittledoubtthatmostpeoplearesimilarlyignorantaboutgrassrootslobbyingrestrictions.Consequently,inmoststates,assoonasordinarycitizensdecidetoengageingrassrootsactivity,theyarelikelytoviolatestatelawsoutofsheerignorance.

    Oncesubjectswereinformedabouttheexistenceofregistrationand

    disclosurelaws,theywerepresentedwithasimplehypotheticalscenarioofagroupofneighborsorganizinganinformalrallyagainstalocalballotmeasure.Thesubjectswerethenaskedtofillouttherequiredpaperworkforthisgroup;thescenarioincludedonepurchaseofaprintadvertisement,thepurchaseanddistributionofTshirtswithpoliticalslogans,thedistributionofhomemadesigns

    andatotaloftencontributionsofvaryingsizes.Theresultswerenotpretty.InTable3,Ilistdisclosuretasksrequiredforgrassrootslobbyinginthestate

    ofWashingtonalongsidesimilartasksrequiredbyCalifornialawthatwereexaminedinthedisclosureexperiment.InthelastcolumnofTable3,IreportthepercentagesofexperimentalsubjectsthatcouldactuallyperformthosetasksusingtheCaliforniaforms.Nearlyallthesubjectsincorrectlyhandledalarge(illegal)anonymouscontribution,whilemostneverrecognizedthatnonmonetarydonationswerealsosupposedtobetreatedascontributionstotheirgroup.However,manysubjectscouldnotevencorrectlyaccountfordirectcashcontributionsandexpendituresbecausetheysimplycouldnotunderstandorfollowthecomplicatedformsandinstructions.Subjectsfaredslightlybetteratthesetasks

    whengivendisclosureformsforColoradoandMissouri,butoverall,subjectswereonlyabletocompleteabout40percentoftheassignedtasks.Noonereceivedaperfectscore.

    Theresultsofthisexperimentunambiguouslyrevealthatsubjects,regardlessofageoreducationalattainment,weresimplyflummoxedwhenconfrontedwithreallifedisclosureformsandinstructions.Ialsooffered

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    participantsintheexperimenttheopportunitytowriteabriefcommentabouttheirexperience.Notsurprisingly,manysubjectsexpressedfrustration,callingtheprocessconfusing,ridiculousandworsethantheIRS!Severalsaidtheywouldneedalawyertocompletetheforms,includingthelawyerwhoparticipatedintheexperiment.Finally,nearly90percentoftheparticipantsagreedthatthespecterofcomplicatedredtapeandlegalpenaltieswoulddeterordinarycitizensfrompoliticalactivity.

    Table 3: Disclosure tasks for grassroots lobbying and the compliance experiment

    Tasksrequiredbystatedisclosureregulations

    Grassrootslobbying

    (Washingtonstate)

    Ballotcommittees

    (California)

    Compliance

    experiment

    (%correct)

    Requiredtoregister Ifspending$500inone

    monthor$1,000in

    threemonths

    Ifreceiving$1,000in

    anycalendaryear

    7%

    Reportexpenditures Ineachoften

    categories

    Itemizeifover$100 49%

    Reportmonetarycontributions Itemizeifover$25 Itemizeifover$100 56%

    Reportnonmonetarycontributions Itemizeifover$25 Itemizeifover$100 18%

    Anonymouscontributions Prohibitedover$25 Prohibitedover$100 2%

    Notes:PercentofsubjectscorrectlyreportingcontributionsandexpendituresistheaveragescoreforeachtypeoftaskforsubjectsusingCaliforniaforms(scoresareadjustedforsubjectcharacteristicstoreflecttheperformanceofanonstudentregisteredvoterwithacollegeeducation).

    Asidefromthesecompliancecosts,grassrootslobbyingregulationsset

    numeroustrapsforhaplesscitizensthatseektoexercisetheirconstitutionalrights.Itstrainscredulitytothinkthatordinarycitizenswouldhavethefaintestideathattheyshouldregisterwiththestateandconsultalawyerbeforespeakingtofellowcitizensaboutpublicissues.Second,myreadingoftherulesforeverystatethat

    regulatesgrassrootslobbyingconfirmsthattheselawsareascomplexasthoseforballotmeasuredisclosure;itissimplyinconceivablethattheseregulationswerewritteninamannerintendedtobeaccessibletoanordinarycitizen.Itseemsclearthattheimplicitassumptionbehindtheselawsisthatpoliticsisforprofessionalsonly.23Third,severalstatesrequirethatlobbyistsregister priortoengaginginanygrassrootsactivities(whichcanincluderesearchorotherpreparationcosts).Combinethiswiththeoverbroaddefinitionsoflobbyinginmoststatesanditiseasy

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    Table 4: Examples of penalties related to grassroots lobbyingMaximumadministrativeandcivilfinesState

    Latereports Otherviolations

    Maximumcriminal

    penalties

    Alabama $10,000 $30,000and20years

    Alaska $10/day $1,000and1year

    Arkansas $25$200/day $1,000 $1,000and1year

    Colorado $10/day $5,000and1year

    Connecticut $10,000

    Hawaii $2,000perviolation

    Idaho $2,500and6months

    Indiana $100 $100forlatereports

    $500and3years

    Kansas $5,000 $1,000and6monthsMassachusetts $100/day $10,000and5years

    Minnesota $100perviolation $3,000and1year

    Missouri $5,000and4years

    Mississippi $5,000and3years

    Montana $2,500perviolation

    NorthCarolina $5,000perviolation 6months

    NorthDakota $1,000and30days

    Nebraska $750perreport

    NewJersey $1,000perviolation

    NewMexico $50/day $5,000

    NewYork $50,000 $5,000and4years

    Pennsylvania $50/day $2,000perviolation $25,000

    RhodeIsland $2,000 $10,000

    Tennessee $2,000 $10,000 $2,500and1year

    Virginia $2,500and10years

    Vermont $4,175 $10,000perviolation

    WestVirginia $5,000perviolation

    Washington $10,000

    Federalproposal(2007)

    $100,000

    Notes:Thislistisnotexhaustive,butrepresentsonlythosepenaltiesthatarereadilyidentifiablefromstatestatutesandregulations.

    toseehowordinarycitizensmightrunafouloflobbyinglawsthattheydidnotknowexistedandcannotunderstandanyway.

    Notonlyisiteasyforordinarycitizenstoviolatelobbyingdisclosurelawsbyengagingingrassrootslobbying,thepenaltiesfordoingsocanbequitesevere,asshowninTable4.Whilesomestatessetamaximumforlatefeesandfines,severaldonot.Butwhatshouldbemostdisconcertingisthatmanystatesallowfinestobeleviedonaperviolationbasis;givenmultipleandcomplicatedreports,itiseasyfor

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    suchfinestomountquickly.Inaddition,severalstatesimposecriminalpenaltiesfordisclosureviolations,rangingashighas20yearsinprisoninAlabamaforintentionalmisreporting.Finally,severalstatesalsobanlobbyistsfrommakingcampaigncontributions,sosomeoneengagingingrassrootslobbyingcannotonlyviolatelobbyingrules,butcampaignfinancelawsaswell.

    Unintended Consequences of Lobbying Disclosure

    Thecostsofdisclosurelawsarenotlimitedtothehassle,frustrationandpenaltiesassociatedwithredtaperequirements.Theexistenceofoverbroadandvagueregulationsonpoliticalactivities,coupledwithsteepcivilandcriminalpenalties,isaninvitationforabuseatthehandsofunethicalandpartisanregulators,

    astheplightofReverendLoriinConnecticutillustrates(seepage5).Furthermore,lobbyingdisclosurerequirementsignoretheimportantandlongacceptedroleofanonymityinpublicdebate.

    Itseemsunlikelythatknowledgeaboutwhocontributed$20toagrassroots

    campaignisofmuchbenefittothepublic,especiallycomparedtothecostsimposedonthosewhowishtospeakout.Infact,thereisgoodreasontobeskepticalabouttheefficacyofdisclosurelaws;inarecentexaminationofmandatorydisclosurelawsinballotinitiativecampaigns,DickCarpenterfindslittleevidencethatvotersmakeuseofmandatorydisclosure.24Forexample,arepresentativesurveyofcitizensinsixstateswithballotinitiativesrevealsthatonlyabout27percentofrespondentsclaimthattheysoughtoutinformationondonorstopoliticalcampaigns,andfewerthanhalfexpressedmuchawarenessoftheleadingdonorstoballotmeasurecampaigns.Theseselfreportsbysurveyrespondentsarealsoconsistentwithcontentanalysesofcampaignmaterialsandnewscoverageofcampaignsthatfindfewinformationsourcesavailabletovotersnamelynewspapersandothermediamakeuseofmandatorydisclosureofcontributoridentitieseither.25

    Carpenteralsofindsthatupwardsof80percentofrespondentsbelievethat

    mandatorydisclosureisacceptablewhenappliedtoothers,butonly40percentsupportsuchlawswhenframedasapplyingtothemselves.Infact,whensuchdisclosurelawsaredescribedasalsorequiringrespondentstodivulgetheiremployersname,supportformandatorydisclosurefallstojust25percent.Given

    thisdiscomfortfordisclosingpersonalinformation,itisnotsurprisingthatabout60percentofthesurveyrespondentsalsoagreethatthepresenceofmandatorydisclosurelawswouldbeadeterrenttotheirownpoliticalactivity.Thereasonsgivenbyrespondentsincludeadesiretoremainanonymous,fearofharassmentandprivacyconcerns.

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    THINKING ABOUT GETTING INVOLVED?DONT DO THE CRIME IF YOU CANT DO THE TIME

    Failure to properly disclose grassroots lobbying activity is punishable by

    administrative fines, suspension of lobbying privileges and in some states even

    criminal penalties. For example, in the following states, disclosure violations for

    grassroots lobbying carry the same maximum criminal penalty as:

    North Dakota Driving under the influence

    $1,000 and 30 days in jail

    Tennessee Negligently discharging raw sewage into public

    waterways

    $500 and 6 months in jail

    Indiana Receiving stolen property

    $500 and 3 years in jail

    Minnesota Repeated assault against the same person

    $3,000 and 1 year in jail

    Missouri Sexual misconduct with a minor

    $5,000 and 4 years in jail

    New York Arson or riot

    $5,000 and 4 years n jail

    Massachusetts Maintaining a house of prostitution

    $10,000 and 5 years in jail

    Virginia Hit and run resulting in serious injury or death

    $2,500 and 10 years in jail

    Alabama Kidnapping

    $30,000 and 20 years in jail

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    Thesefindingsunderscoretheshallownessofpopularsupportfordisclosureregulationsintheabstract,andtheveryrealdiscomfortthatmanypeoplehavewithhavingtheirownpoliticalactivitiesannouncedinpublic.Consequently,concernsthatmandatorydisclosuremayhaveachillingeffectongrassrootspoliticalactivityarewellfounded.So,whilemandatorydisclosureappliedtograssrootslobbyingcampaignsatbestsatisfiesthecuriosityofafewpoliticaljunkies,italsoatworstempowerstheenemiesoffreeandopendebatetomakecrediblethreatsofretaliationagainstunpopularvoices.

    Grassroots Lobbying Versus Astroturf Lobbying

    CriticsofgrassrootslobbyingoftenusethedisparagingtermAstroturf

    lobbyingtoimplythatsomegrassrootseffortsareinauthentic,butwhenitcomestosuchcharges,authenticityisintheeyeofthebeholder.WhetheritisgrassrootsactivismdirectedattheIraqwar,healthinsurancereform,campaignfinancereformorjustaboutanyotherissue,antagonistsonbothsidesoftheissuetrytounderminethecredibilityoftheiropponentsbyexaggeratingtheextenttowhichpublicconcernontheothersideisartificiallystimulated. 26Forthisreason,attemptstocurbsocalledAstroturflobbyingthroughincreasedstateandfederalregulationsandevenpublicoutingandshamingofaccusedringleadersmustbetreatedwithhealthyskepticism.

    Itiseasytounderstandwhyincumbentpoliticiansandpartisansattemptto

    dismissdemonstrationsofcontraryviewsasinsincereandillegitimate:pureselfpreservation.Hardertofathomiswhysomanyprogressivemindedandselfdescribedgoodgovernmentreformersareoftenfoundonthefrontlinesseekingtocurbgrassrootslobbying.Suchactionsbetrayafundamentalmisunderstanding,sincetheveryideathatcoordinationandleadershipmakesapopularmovementsuspectfliesinthefaceofdecadesofpoliticalscienceresearchonpoliticalentrepreneurshipandcollectiveaction.

    Inthecaseofactualfraud,thedistinctionbetweenauthenticand

    inauthenticpoliticalpressuremakessense,butbeyondthatthedistinctionbecomesmeaningless.Forexample,iflegislatorsreceivefraudulentmessagesfromasinglesourceposingasmultipleconstituents,suchanactivitydoesnotrepresent

    publicsentiment,regardlessofhowitwasstimulated.Ofcourse,itisnotnecessarytoregulategrassrootslobbyinginordertodetersuchfraud.Lawsforbiddingidentitytheft,fraudorfalsestatementstogovernmentofficials,aswellasthepossibilityofdiscoveryandtheattendantharmtothesourcescause,shouldkeepthispractice,evenwhenitisnotobvious,toaminimum.

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    Evenso,actualinstancesoffraudulentlobbyingappeartobeextremelyrareandeasilydiscovered,whileaccusationsofAstroturflobbyingareubiquitous.ThisisbecauseAstroturflobbyingisnearlyalwaysusedtorefertoinstancesofcitizenlobbyingthathavesomehowbeeninducedbytheparticipationofanadvocacygroup,lobbyist,publicrelationsfirmorsomeotherartificialmeans.Thisjaundicedviewdeniestheimportantrolethatpoliticalentrepreneursplayinfosteringgrassrootsactivism,whileatthesametimedisparagingthecompetenceandautonomyofpeoplewhochoosetojoinsuchgrassrootscampaigns.Butmorethanthis,thenotionthatgrassrootscampaignsarelegitimateonlyiftheyareunsophisticatedandamateurishisakintosaying,Youhavetherighttopetition,justaslongasyourenottooeffectiveatit.

    Conclusion

    Thetwopillarsofrepresentativedemocracyarefreeandopenelectionsandfreeandopendebate.PopularpoliticalparticipationissofundamentaltoAmericandemocracythattheBillofRightsenshrinescitizensrightstospeech,associationandpetitionintheFirstAmendmenttotheConstitution.EveryschoolchildistaughtthatAmericaisgreatbecausecitizensspeakoutonissuesofpublicconcernandbringtheirargumentsdirectlytopoliticians.Infact,manyprobablystillrecalltheclassic1975SchoolhouseRock!segmentonhowabillbecomesalaw(ImJustaBill),inwhichlegislationrequiringschoolbusestostopatrailroadcrossingsstartswithjustanideauntilsomefolksbackhomedecidetheywantalawpassedandcontacttheircongressman.Buttoday,shouldyoudecidetoexerciseyourrightsasanAmericanwithonlycivicslessonsandtheBillofRightsasyourguide,beware.

    Therightsofcitizenstoparticipateintheirgovernmenthavebeenerodedto

    thepointthatevenprofessionalpoliticiansandlobbyistsoftenmustrelyonastaffofdedicatedlegalexpertstonavigatethemazeoffederalandstateregulationsthatnowgovernpublicdiscourse.Regulationofgrassrootsactivisminthestatesstandsinstarkcontrasttothebasicprincipleaffirmedintherecentlydecided CitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionCommission:

    TheFirstAmendmentdoesnotpermitlawsthatforcespeakerstoretainacampaignfinanceattorneyorseekdeclaratoryrulingsbeforediscussingthemostsalientpoliticalissuesofourday.Prolixlawschillspeechforthesamereasonthatvaguelawschillspeech:Peopleofcommonintelligencemustnecessarilyguessat[thelaws]meaninganddifferastoitsapplication. 27Nevertheless,undertheguiseofpreservingtheintegrityofdemocracy,

    misguidedpopulistsandcynicallyselfinterestedpoliticianshavesuccessfully

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    Endnotes

    1www.acluva.org/pages/grassrootslobbyform.html.

    2Thepoliticalscienceliteraturealsosupportsthenotionthatgrassrootslobbyingcaninfluencepolicy,althoughtheconcernisthatthepresenceofreversecausalitymayexaggeratetheperceivedeffectofgrassrootslobbying.Inotherwords,becausepeoplearemorelikelytojoinandactivelyparticipateinpowerfulgroups,thetrueimpactofgrassrootslobbyingislessthanwouldbecommonlyperceived.However,recentfieldexperimentsconfirmthepotentiallylargeimpactofgrassrootslobbyingonstatelegislators(Bergen,DanielE.,2009.DoesGrassrootsLobbyingWork?AFieldExperimentMeasuringtheEffectsofaneMailLobbyingCampaignonLegislativeBehavior,AmericanPoliticsResearch ,37(2):327352).

    3http://www.cfainc.org/articles/legislative/grassrootslobbying.html.4http://www.nvfc.org/page/684/Volunteer_Fire_Service_Advocacy_Center.htm.5E.g.,Hayek,FriedrichA.1960. TheConstitutionofLiberty.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.6Carney,Timothy.Connecticutuseslobbyinglawstomuzzlepriests,Washington

    Examiner,July9,2009,viewedat:

    http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/Connecticutuseslobbyinglawstomuzzle

    priests47458612.html.Dixon,Ken.ThousandsinHartfordtoProtestBill,ConnecticutPost

    Online,March11,2009,viewedat:http://www.ctpost.com/default/article/ThousandsinHartfordtoprotestbill114166.php.GrassrootsLobbyingtoProtecttheSeparationof

    ChurchandState,HoltzmanVogelLawandPolicyUpdate ,Summer2009,viewedat:

    http://www.holtzmanlaw.net/upload_files/Law%20&%20Policy%20Update%20

    %20Summer%202009.pdf.ThankYou!CatholicsacrosstheStateofConnecticutmobilize

    anddefeattheirrational,unlawful,andbigotedProposedBill#1098,RomanCatholic

    DioceseofBridgeport,viewedat:http://www.bridgeportdiocese.com/Fight_1098.shtml.

    7E.g.,Olson,Mancur,1965.TheLogicofCollectiveAction:PublicGoodsandtheTheoryofGroups.HarvardUniversityPress.8Denzau,ArthurandMichaelMunger,1986.LegislatorsandInterestGroups;How

    UnorganizedInterestsGetRepresented,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,80(1):89106.9UnitedStatesv.Hariss ,347U.S.612(1954)andEasternRailroadsPresidentConferencev.NoerrMotorFreight,Inc .365U.S.127.10Alsosee,Maskell,Jack,2008.GrassrootsLobbying:ConstitutionalityofDisclosureRequirements,CongressionalResearchService(updated),RL33794.

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    11RhodeIslandGen.Laws1956,2210.12RCW42.17.010(10).13Primo,DavidandJeffreyMilyo,2006.CampaignFinanceLawsandPoliticalEfficacy:EvidencefromtheStates,ElectionLawJournal,5(1):2339.14Thomasv.Collins ,323U.S.516(1945);NAACPv.Alabama,357U.S.449(1958);Talleyv.California,362U.S.60(1960);andMcIntyrev.OhioElectionsCommission ,514U.S.334(1995).15Iclassifystatesthatregulategrassrootslobbyingbasedontheplaintextofexistingstate

    statutes.Forexample,bystatute,Alaskadefineslobbyingascommunicatingwithpublicofficialseitherdirectlyorthroughanagent(AS24.45.171(11)(A));further,thedefinitionofpaymentsorexpendituresforlobbyingincludesthecostofsolicitingorurgingotherpersonstoenterintodirectcommunicationwithalegislatororotherpublicofficial(AS24.45.171(13)(E)).Therefore,IclassifyAlaskaamongthosestatesthatregulategrassrootslobbying.However,enforcementofsuchprovisionsisalwayssubjecttothediscretionofstateregulators,socurrentpracticemaynotbeconsistentwiththetextofstatelawsinanygivenstateandatanygiventime.16http://www.creators.com/opinion/jacobsullum/astroturfandsunlight.html.17http://www.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/wa.html.

    18LobbyistReporting:January2009InstructionManual,WashingtonStatePublicDisclosureCommission.19Onlinereadabilitycalculatorsareavailablefromseveralsources;fortheexamplesinthetext,Iusedtheautomatedcalculatorfoundat:www.editcentral.com.20RegisteredlobbyistsinMassachusettsarerequiredtocompleteanonlineLobbyistEducationalSeminarasindicatedhere:http://www.sec.state.ma.us/LobbyistWeb/Common/Signin.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fLobbyistWeb%2fdefault.aspx.However,thesocallededucationalseminarconsistsofsimplythetextofthelobbyingstatuteitself(M.G.L.Chapter3:sections3950),albeitprecededbythisdisclaimer:ThisEducationalSeminarisapresentationoftheMassachusettslobbyinglawanditsrequirements.Itisnotmeanttoserveasanadvisoryopinionorasasubstituteforan

    officialeditionoftheMassachusettsGeneralLawsortheadviceofcounsel.http://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/OnlineSeminar_V1.pdf.Inotherwords,theSecretaryofStatewillnotevencommittocuttingandpastingthetextofthelawcorrectly.21Flowchartavailableathttp://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/areyoulobbying.pdf.

    22Milyo,Jeffrey,2007.CampaignFinanceRedTape:StranglingFreeSpeechandPoliticalDebate,InstituteforJustice(Washington,D.C.).

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    ABOUT THE AUTHOR

    JEFFREY MILYO, PH.D. JeffreyMilyoistheHannaFamilyScholarintheCenterforAppliedEconomicsattheUniversityofKansasSchoolofBusiness;aprofessorinthedepartmentofeconomicsandtheTrumanSchoolofPublicAffairsattheUniversityofMissouri;aseniorfellowattheCatoInstituteandanacademicadvisortotheCenterforCompetitivePolitics.MilyopreviouslywasonthefacultyattheUniversityofChicagoandatTuftsUniversity;hehasalsobeenavisitingscholarattheMassachusettsInstituteforTechnology,StanfordUniversity,WashingtonUniversityinSt.LouisandYaleUniversity.

    Dr.MilyosresearchexpertiseisinAmericanpoliticaleconomicsandpublicpolicy;hehas

    beenstudyingthefieldofpoliticalcampaignfinancefor18years.Milyosworkhasbeenpublishedinseveralleadingscholarlyjournals,suchatheAmericanEconomicReview,theQuarterlyJournalofEconomics ,theJournalofLawandEconomics ,theJournalofPolicyAnalysisandManagement,ElectionLawJournal,PublicChoice,andStatePoliticsandPolicyQuarterly.Inaddition,hisscholarlyresearchhasbeenrecognizedandsupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundationandtheRobertWoodJohnsonFoundation.Dr.Milyosresearchisalsofrequentlycitedinthenationalmedia,includingTheNewYorkTimes ,TheWashingtonPost,LosAngelesTimes ,ChicagoTribune,USAToday,BusinessWeek,NationalReview,TheWeeklyStandard,CNN,FOXNewsandNationalPublicRadio.

    ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICETheInstituteforJusticeisanonprofit,publicinterestlawfirmthatlitigatestosecureeconomicliberty,schoolchoice,privatepropertyrights,freedomofspeechandothervitalindividuallibertiesandtorestoreconstitutionallimitsonthepowerofgovernment.Foundedin1991,IJisthenationsonlylibertarianpublicinterestlawfirm,pursuingcuttingedgelitigationinthecourtsoflawandinthecourtofpublicopiniononbehalfofindividualswhosemostbasicrightsaredeniedbythegovernment.TheInstitutesstrategicresearchprogramproduceshighqualityresearchtoinformpublicpolicydebatesonissuescentraltoIJsmission.