motivations and costs to contest uses of...

December 2017

MotivationsandCoststoContestUsesofSpace

DeeperAnalysesClarifyingInsightsBetterDecisions

www.NSIteam.com

AVirtualThinkTank(ViTTa)®Report

ProducedinsupportoftheStrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)Office(JointStaff,J39)

MotivationsandCoststoContestUsesofSpace 2

NSIRESEARCH ▪ INNOVATION ▪ EXCELLENCE

AuthorDr.JohnA.StevensonPleasedirectinquiriestoDr.JohnA.Stevensonatjstevenson@nsiteam.com

ViTTa®ProjectTeamDr.AllisonAstorino-CourtoisExecutiveVP

SarahCannaPrincipalAnalyst

NicolePetersonAssociateAnalyst

WestonAvilesAnalyst

Dr.LarryKuznarChiefCulturalSciencesOfficer

GeorgePoppSeniorAnalyst

Dr.BelindaBraggPrincipalResearchScientist

Dr.SabrinaPaganoPrincipalResearchScientist

Dr.JohnA.StevensonPrincipalResearchScientist

InterviewTeam1

WestonAvilesAnalyst

NicolePetersonAssociateAnalyst

SarahCannaPrincipalAnalyst

GeorgePoppSeniorAnalyst

WhatisViTTa®?NSI’sVirtualThinkTank(ViTTa®)providesrapidresponsetocriticalinformationneedsbypulsingourglobalnetworkofsubjectmatterexperts(SMEs)togenerateawiderangeofexpert insight.For this SMA Contested Space Operations project, ViTTa was used toaddress 23 unclassified questions submitted by the Joint Staff and US Air Force projectsponsors.TheViTTateamreceivedwrittenandverbalinputfromover111expertsfromNational Security Space, as well as civil, commercial, legal, think tank, and academiccommunities working space and space policy. Each Space ViTTa report contains twosections:1) a summary response to the question asked; and 2) the full written and/ortranscribed interview input received from each expert contributor organizedalphabetically.Biographies for all expert contributorshavebeen collated in a companiondocument.

1ForaccesstothecompletecorpusofinterviewtranscriptsandwrittensubjectmatterexpertresponseshostedonourNSISharePointsite,[email protected]:https://www.army.mil/article/152664/future_army_nanosatellites_to_empower_soldiers


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QuestionofFocus

[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspaceintimesofpeace,instability,andconflict?Whatarethepolitical,military,environmental,orsocialcostsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?

ExpertContributorsBrett Alexander (Blue Origin);Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Dr. GawdatBahgat(NationalDefenseUniversity’sNearEastSouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudy);MarcBerkowitz(LockheedMartin);BrettBiddington(BiddingtonResearchPtyLtd,Australia);CaelusPartners,LLC;Dr.DamonColettaandLieutenantColonel (ret.)Deron Jackson (USAFA);ColonelTimothyCullen,Ph.D.3(SchoolofAdvancedAirandSpaceStudies,AirUniversity);Dr.MalcolmDavis(TheAustralianStrategicPolicy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Dr. Namrata Goswami (Wikistrat and theAuburn University Futures Lab); Harris Corporation; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International andSecurityStudiesatMaryland);ChristopherJohnson(SecureWorldFoundation);Dr.MartinLindsey(USPacificCommand);SergeantFirstClassJerrittA.Lynn4(UnitedStatesArmyCivilAffairs);ColonelDavidMiller (United States Air Force); Dr. Deganit Paikowsky (Tel Aviv University); Dr. Edythe Weeks(WebsterUniversityandWashingtonUniversity,St.Louis);ViaSat,Inc.

SummaryResponseSubjectmatterexpertsgenerallyagreedthatthereweremultiplemotivepathwaysfornation-statestocontestuseofspace.Thesepathwayswere:

1. the vulnerabilities and sensitivities that come from increasing cross-domain dependence onspacesystems;

2. thenationalpursuitofspaceprogramsasaformof(majorpower)prestigeandstatus;and3. theyetunresolvedrulesabouthowtoprojectnationalsovereigntyintospace.

Experts also agreed that there are very high costs associated with acting on any of these motives,althoughtheydisagreedonwhetherhighcostsincreasedordecreasedthelikelihoodofconflict.MotivationstoContesttheUseofSpaceExperts proffered three baskets of motives for why an actor would contest space: space domaindependence, the prestige of space capabilities, and the lack of alternative dispute resolutionmechanisms.

2 The subjectmatter expert’s personal views, andnot thoseof his organization, are represented inhis contributions to thiswork.3Ibid.4Ibid.


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TheVulnerabilityofTerrestrialComponentsfromSpaceDomainDependenceDr.MalcolmDavisoftheAustralianStrategicPolicy Instituteobservesthat“spacesystemsarevital tothe functioning of the US economy and society.” In addition to the economic importance, Dr. Davisnotes that space systems also are thebedrockof a “Westernwayofwar,”which “exploits precision,highoperationaltempo,andjointmilitaryoperations.”

TheViaSat,Inc.teamconcludedsimplythat“themosteasilyidentifiablemotiveofnation-stateandnon-stateactorsagainstspaceecosystems…istodisruptmilitarycommandandcontrol.”Inotherwords,thecentralityofspacesystemstotheUnitedStates’economicandmilitaryoperationsmakesthosesystemsanattractivetargetforadversariesoftheUnitedStatesseekingtogainterrestrialadvantages.ColonelTimothyCullen5ofAirUniversitywarnsthatadversarieswouldtargetspacesystems“topunishtheUSand its allies economically, to demonstrate the vulnerability of US and allied space weapons orcommunicationssystems,tosimplytesttheeffectivenessofunfriendlyactions,oracombinationofalltheabove.”Targetingassets in thespacedomain isoneof themostcost-effectiveways toreduceUSmilitaryandinformationaladvantages,accordingtoDr.NamrataGoswamiofWikistratandtheAuburnUniversityFuturesLab.Dr.Goswaminotes,“Duringconflicts,spacebasedassets likemilitarysatellitescouldbetakendownbyanadversarytodenyprecisionguidancetomissilesystems,jamearlywarningforincomingmissiles,anddenydataandinformationonenemypositions.Non-stateactorswithaccesstospacebasedcapabilitiescouldutilizeittodenyaccesstodatalikejammingGPS,andreconnaissance.”

MajorGeneral(USAFret.)JamesArmor6highlightsthat“extremists”whoarenotdependentonspacewould risk targeting assets in space to harm terrestrial components that are dependent on spacesystems.Ratherthan“unsungnations”lookingforprestige,themainrisksofconflictinspacestemfromthe “unplugged actors” looking to level the playing field. Theresa Hitchens, of the Center forInternational and Security Studies at Maryland, buttresses this view that disconnected extremists—which she refers to as “outliers”—are the likely sources of contestations in space: “I don’t see anymotivation foranyone,withNorthKoreabeinganoutlierbecausewhoknowswhat theirmotivationsare, in actuallyharming spaceas anenvironmentbecause there’s toomuch social andeconomicandmilitary benefit coming from space for anyone to really want to contemplate ruining space foreverybodyelse.”

ThePrestigeofSpaceCapabilities

Dr. Deganit Paikowsky of Tel Aviv University proposes that “space capability became (and still is) animportantmark of great powers.” Space capability, therefore, is amarker of status and influence inworld politics. It provides tangible and intangible benefits; as such, it is also a source of prestige.SergeantFirstClassJerrittLynn,7UnitedStatesArmyCivilAffairs,observes:“Internationalprestigewasafactorduringthespacerace,anditcontinuestobeoneasotherstatesarepushingtheirwayintotheinternationalspotlight.”SimilarprestigemotivesanimateChina’snationalspaceprogram,accordingtoLynn: “China just recently finished construction on the Five-hundred-meter Aperture SphericalTelescope(FAST) inPingtung.This iscurrentlytheworld's largestradiotelescope…Astheinternationalscientific community uses this platform, itwill garner international prestige, grant the opportunity to

5 The viewsexpressed inColonelCullen’s answer to thisquestiondonot reflect theofficial policyorpositionof theUnitedStatesAirForce,DepartmentofDefense,orUSGovernment.6 The subjectmatter expert’spersonal views, andnot thoseofhisorganization, are represented inhis contributions to thiswork.7TheviewsexpressedinSergeantFirstClassJerrittLynn’sanswertothisquestiondonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesArmy,DepartmentofDefense,orUSGovernment.


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conduct cutting-edge research, and aid in China becoming a global leader in the space and sciencecommunity.”

Prestigemotives,however,arenotnecessarilyidenticaltothemotivestocontestothercountries’useofthedomaininwhichprestigeispursued.Inthespacedomain,thesemotivesforgreatpowerstatusarepart and parcel of the motives to contest, experts argue, because of the dual-use nature of spacesystems.Dr.GawdatBahgat,ofNationalDefenseUniversity'sNearEastSouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudy,notesthatthisdual-useisthesourceofspaceprograms’prestige:“Aspaceprogramconsistsofsatellitesandcommunicationsinfrastructure—ithasmanycivilianuses.Thisiswhyspaceprogramsarestill prestigious.” The dual-use nature of space systemsmeans that any pursuit of advantages in thespacedomainhasmajor cross-domain implications for the relative strengthof various instrumentsofnationalpower.

Prestige motives can play out regionally or globally. Dr. Martin Lindsey of US Pacific Commandcharacterized regional factors as being the chief drivers of the dynamics of national space programdevelopmentintheAsia-Pacific:“TherearevariousspaceracesgoingonintheAsiaPacificregion—thebig ones being betweenChina and India, and then to a lesser degree betweenChina and Japan, andthesearemoretiedupinnationalismandglobalprestige.”Theinterplayofthepursuitofprestigeandthe cross-domain effects of increased space capability leads Brett Biddington of Biddington ResearchPty,Ltdtolament:“IwouldsaythatIthinkthatwarisalreadyoninspace—it’sjustnotdeclared...Theprofoundissuehereis,ofcourse,thatalmosteverythingwedoinspaceisdual-useorcanbebadgedasbeingdual-use.”

PursuitofSovereigntyClaimsintheContextofUnclear/UnsettledRules

Ourexpertsgenerallyagreedthatonlycertainactorswouldhavethemeansandthemotivetocontesttheuseofspace.Thatcurrentsetisgenerallythe“BigThree”space-faringnations—theUnitedStates,Russia,andChina—althoughDr.BahgatalsoincludedIndiaasamajorspace-faringnation.

Dr. Goswami posits that the “lack of international regulatory framework that could adjudicate andestablishownership,adisputemaybreakoutduringpeacetime.”Dr.Bahgatprovidedthemostsuccinctsummaryof the fourpotential goals thatmight lead space-faringnations to contest countries’ useofspace:

1. Achieve space domain capability and advantage vis-à-vis adversaries by investing in researchanddevelopment.

2. Staketerritorialclaimsinouterspaceoncehumanitycracksthecodeofminingpreciousmetalsonthelunarsurfaceandbeyond.

3. Support growing commercialization of space activities and an emerging lucrative market forspacebasedactivities.

4. Build military capacity based on space based assets to sustain the trade links and establishsuperiorityonearth.

Ofthesefourgoals,thelatterthreerelatetohowthelackofrulesabouthowtoarticulatesovereigntyinspace also can lead these (generally sovereignty-obsessed) space-faring nations to contest the use ofspace.


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CostsAssociatedwithContestingUseofSpaceOfthesubjectmattersexpertswhoexplicitlyadvancedaviewofthecostsofcontestation,allwere inagreementthatcontestedspaceoperationsareveryexpensiveandhavehardtoanticipatesecond-andthird-order effects. The subjectmatter experts fromViaSat, Inc. suggested that contesting theuseofspacecouldoccurinanydomain,sincethespaceecosystemsexistinmultipledomains,andthemeanswould likely be the least attributable, most detrimental, lowest cost approach considering all theecosystemdomains.

Ingeneral,contributorstothisresponsesuggestedthreedistinctreasonswhycontestedusesofspace,inspace,wouldbe(potentiallyprohibitively)expensive:

1. The novelty of space contestation, according to Christopher Johnson of the Secure WorldFoundation,means that: "Interferingwithorhackinga spaceobjectwouldbeanew,unique,ground-breakingactivityandwouldthereforebeanefariouslyprestigiousaccomplishmentuntoitself.”

2. Dominance in space is fleeting given the technological potential of industrialized countries,making a thorough cost-benefit assessment unreliable. Colonel Cullen observes that“dominance in space may not be possible against aggressive and industrialized nations,regardless. It isdifficult toexpresshowexpensive thenetcostof thedevelopmentand large-scale employment of even ‘low cost’ access to space will be or how unforgiving, harsh, andcostly the space environment is to conduct operations, and the space industry has littleincentivetostatetheirnetestimateseither."

3. Thedomesticpoliticsofthemilitarizationofspace,especiallyinsocietieswithstarkinequalitiesin income andwealth, is a tricky set of optics for national elites tomanage, as Dr. Goswamidiscerns: “The desire to create space domain advantagewould require budgetary allocations,thereby taking away limited resources … from their poverty alleviation programs. This couldcreateabacklash insocietytherebyraisingquestionsaboutthefeasibilityofsuchouter-spacemotivations.”

Inconclusion,thecostsassociatedwithcontestingothercountries’useofspace,inspace,isextremelyhigh,while thecost tocontestaspaceecosystem in itsgroundorcyberdomainscouldbemuch less.Althoughmany experts thought that the costs to a country’s own space assetsmake contestation inspacetooriskyformostspace-faringnations,theydidagreethatthesamenationspossessedmultiplemotivesthatcouldleadthemtoconsiderit.Inaddition,ifanationstateornon-stateactor“considered”contestation,theymayalsoconsidertargetingthespaceecosysteminanon-spacedomain.

Themotives todosostem from: thevulnerabilitiesandsensitivities that come from increasingcross-domain dependence on space systems; the national pursuit of space programs as a form of (majorpower) prestige and status in the context of dual-use space capability; and the yet unresolved rulesabout how to establish sovereignty space in an environment with increasing demands for stablecommercialand/ornationalpropertyrightsinspace.


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SubjectMatterExpertContributions

MajorGeneral(USAFret.)JamesB.Armor,Jr.

StaffVicePresident,WashingtonOperations(OrbitalATK)7August2017

WRITTENRESPONSE

[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in timesofpeace, instability,andconflict? Whatare thepolitical,military,environmental,or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?

• Space is normalized part of Western civilization and is thus a target. To the extent that it is

celebratedintheWest,itisevenmoreofatarget.TotheextentthattheWestdoesnotunderstandthevulnerabilitiesofdependenceonspacesystems,theybecometheultimatetarget

• Extremistwanthisattackstohavethebiggestpublicimpactforthefewesteffort• Nation-stateactorsarelookingforleverageoverWestandwearedependentonspace

Dr.GawdatBahgat

ProfessorofNationalSecurityAffairs(NationalDefenseUniversity’sNearEastSouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudy)

7August2017

INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPT

Interviewer: [Q3]Okay.So,sortoftransitioninga littletoanotheroneofourquestions.YouspokeabouthowIranianprideisdrivingsomeofitsactivityandinterestinthespacedomain.ThesecondquestionIwashopingtoaskyouisaboutthemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactorsto contest the use of space, so please feel free to address this question with Iran and theMiddle East inmind. So,what are themotivations of nation states and non-state actors tocontesttheuseofspaceintimesofpeace,instability,andconflict,andwhatarethepolitical,military,environmental,andsocialcostsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?

G.Bahgat: [Q3]So,asImentioned,Ihavebeenworkingonweaponsofmassdestructionforaverylong

time. At one point, nuclear weapons were considered very prestigious and countries weretryingtomakethebombsotheycanjoinelitecountries.But,eventually,nuclearweaponslostthisattraction,butthisisdifferentfromspaceprogramsbecausespaceprogramsarenotonlyformilitaryuse.Aspaceprogramconsistsofsatellitesandcommunicationsinfrastructure—ithasmanycivilianuses.Thisiswhyspaceprogramsareisstillprestigious.

[Q3]TheonlytwocountrieswithspaceprogramsintheMiddleEastareIranandIsrael.ItalsohappensthatthesetwocountriesaremorescientificallydevelopedthantherestoftheMiddle


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Eastern countries. There is a lot of pride and prestige that comes with developing a spaceprogram.

[Q3] In Israel, the program is funded mainly by the United States. We contribute a lot ofmoney to developing Israel’s space program. Iran does not have these same financialresources. Iranhadplannedtosendhumanbeingstospace,buttheycancelledthisprogrambecauseoflackoffunding.So,thesearesomeoftherecentdevelopmentsaboutIran’sspaceprogram. Probably evenwith all the pride involved, one of the big challenges for Iran is tosecure funding for the spaceprogram.With the currentoil prices, Irandoesnothavemuchavailablefunding,sotheyaretryingtobalancethepridetheywanttogetbydevelopingthisprogramwiththeshortageoffundingtheyhave.

Interviewer: [Q3] Do any otherMiddle Eastern countries, beyond Iran and Israel, have interest in or are

workingtowardsfurtherdevelopmentoftheirspaceprogram?

G.Bahgat: [Q3] FormostMiddle Eastern countries, there are twomain requirements:money and thescientificinfrastructure.TheGulfStates—SaudiArabia,UAE,Qatar,Kuwait—havethemoney,buttheydonothavethetechnicalinfrastructure(e.g.,scientists).Countrieswithmorehumanresourcesandbetter technical infrastructure—likeEgypt, Jordan,andLebanon—donothavetherequiredfinancialresources.So,thisiswhytheonlytwoMiddleEasterncountries—basedonopen source information—with spaceprograms are Israel and Iran. Evenwith respect toTurkey,IhavenotreadanythingthatTurkeyhasdevelopedaspaceprogram,andtothebestofmyknowledge,Turkeystilltodaydoesnothaveaspaceprogramanddoesnothaveplanstodevelopone.

MarcBerkowitz

VicePresident,SpaceSecurity(LockheedMartin)25August2017

WRITTENRESPONSE[Q3a]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspaceintimesofpeace,instability,andconflict?Nation-statesandnon-stateactorsaremotivatedtoconductspaceoperationsforprestige,influence,prosperity,power,andsecurity.Nation-statesandnon-stateactorsaremotivatedtocontesttheuseofspaceinpeace,crisis,and conflict to: undermine political will, societal cohesion, and morale; harm economic vitality; counterintelligencecapabilities;andreducetheoperationaleffectivenessofmilitaryforces.[Q3b]Whatarethepolitical,military,environmental,orsocialcostsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?Thepotential political costs are: international opprobrium, diminishedprestige and influence, domestic unrest,and reduceddecision-making flexibility.Thepotentialmilitary costs are:military responses (including vertical orhorizontal escalatory responses) that inflict punishment or deny benefit, and collateral damage or (unintendedsecondaryor tertiary) effects that constrain futureoperationsor create fratricide. Thepotential environmentalrisks (dependingon thenatureof theweapons effect, the target, and its location) include generatingdebris orothercollateraleffects thatcouldcreate fratricideaswellasreducingorprecludingtheability toconductspaceoperationstemporarilyorformillennia.


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BrettBiddingtonPrincipal(BiddingtonResearchPty,Ltd)

9August2017


Interviewer: [Q3] Okay. That’s very interesting. And I think that segues nicely in to the first that I washoping to ask you,which has to dowith howother actors conceive of spaceoperations forbothmilitaryandcommercialpurposes.So,howdoesAustraliaconceiveofspaceoperationsforbothmilitaryandcommercialpurposes?

B.Biddington: [Q3] Again, all of the questions that you're asking are things I’ve been battling with for a

decade, so they're goodquestions. Firstly, Iwould say that I think thatwar is already on inspace—it’s justnotdeclared. Iwasat the space symposium inColoradoSprings inApril andwenttotheAGIstandandofcoursegotthebriefingabouttheRussiansatellitethatcoziedupagainstaNROasset,andthiswasallpresentedattheunclassified level.Equally,theChinesesatellite that cozied up against an Optus commercial satellite, which is an Australiancommunicationsatellite.

[Q3] However, this is just not well-known. What’s happening in space is not in the publicconsciousness.There’salittlebit,ofcourse,aboutdebris,whichhasbeenpopularizedbyfilmslikeGravity,butthisisstillaveryarcaneandprivateconversationamong,relativelyspeaking,averysmallgroupofpeople(i.e.,policymakers,lawyers,technicians,andengineers).Thisisjustnot really something that the restof theworldhascoherenceandunderstandingabout. So,that’sthefirstpointI’llmake.

[Q3]ThesecondpointisaboutspaceoperationsfromtheAustralianperspective.Australiaisatiny nation when it comes to investing in space. Australia has, I believe, the 14th largesteconomyintheworld,but it isnot investingmuchinspaceinGDPterms—Australia isaboutjustunder2%,Ithink,ofglobalGDP.Australiadoesn’tinvestanythinglikethatproportionofitstreasureinspaceactivities,soitunderperformsagainstthatverycrudemeasure.Butthen,becauseofAustralia’s alliance relationshipwith theUnitedStates, it effectivelyhad, ifnotafreeride,thenonethat’sbeenverygoodvaluefromataxpayer’sperspective.But,ifIliftthatup a little bit, the entire world benefits from GPS, which, of course, is now a global utilitycourtesyof theUStaxpayer.So,Australiahastobalance, I suppose, justhowmuch it reallyshouldbeinvestingasasmallormediumpower.

[Q3] TheAustralianparadox is thatwehave twonumbers thatmatter: a big number and asmallnumber.[Q3]ThebignumberisthatAustraliaisresponsible,onewayoranother,forabout15%oftheEarth'ssurface.That’sournational territory,plustheoceansthatwehavesearchandrescueresponsibility for, and plus Antarctica, of which Australia claims about two-thirds of thecontinent.Togiveyouapictureofwhatthatmeans,andthis iswhereMercator’sprojectiondoesn’t helpus,but think of the map you have in your minds of Australia. The piece ofAntarcticathatAustraliaclaimsisthesamesizeastheAustraliancontinentbutminusthestateof Queensland. In summary, 15% of the Earth's surface. And, of course, Earth observationsatellites and communication satellites are very helpful in regulating, governing, andunderstandingwhat’sgoingon.


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[Q3] The small number is Australia’s population—about 25 million people trying to run acontinentthesizeofthecontinentalUnitedStates.Sure,Australiadoesn’thavealloftheinfillcities like the US does, but it gives you a sense of the paradox of having a massive globalresponsibilitybeingmetfromataxbaseofaboutthesizeofNewYorkstate.So,askyourselfthequestion,“Howwouldyoualldothatinyourcountry?”Andtheansweris,ofcourse,“withalotofdifficulty."Therefore,Australiahashadtomakesomeverybigdecisionsaboutwhereitplaces its investments,andspacehas justnotbeenoneofthose.Andabigreasonforthis isbecauseofAustralia’salliancerelationships.[Q3]Movingtotheoperationspoint.Ifspacegoestohell inahandbasket,there’sverylittlethatAustraliacandoabout itotherthan,ofcourse,helpingtheUnitedStates,andtheWestmoregenerally,andmaybetheglobalcommunitybecause,ultimately,allofusstandtoloseifwemuckupthespaceenvironmentmorethanwealreadyhave—itaffectsChinaandRussiajust asmuch as it affects the United States in terms of satellites. So, Australia has to thinkreally hard, I think, becauseof its strategic geographyabouthow it can contribute to, and Ihesitate to use the word the “order of space,” but at least to the regulation of space toensurethat’sit’sthereforalltouse.

Interviewer: [Q3] So, you started off by saying that “war is already on in space—it’s just not declared.”

That’saninterestingstatement,andonethatIwouldthinkwouldbesomewhatcontroversial,right?

B.Biddington: [Q3] Yes, that is a controversial statement. Of course, the euphemism we use isproximity

operations. And, of course, we do proximity operations every time we supply the SpaceStation.Theprofound issuehere is,ofcourse, thatalmosteverythingwedo inspace isdualuseorcanbebadgedasbeingdualuse.And,Ihavenodoubtatall—andIhavenoinsightintothe classifiedworld—that there are nations, particularly theUS, Russia, and China, that areessentiallytestingeachothers’boundaries.They’renotyetblowingthingsup,becausethat’sto nobody’s interest, but, certainly, there’s very intense competition within the spaceenvironment,Iwouldsuggest,simplyonthebasisoftheexamplesIgavetoyou.

[Q3]Thebig three nations (theUS, Russia, China) are really trying to understand very, verycarefullywhateachof theothers isdoing,withaviewtobeable toshut these thingsdownvery, very quickly in the event of conflict.Of course, this iswhere you get the relationship,then,betweenspaceoperationsandcyberoperations.

Interviewer: [Q3]Okay.YoutalkedalittlebitthisAustralianparadoxandsomeoftheissuesthatAustralia

encounterswithdeterminingwhereitinvestsitsmoney,so,I’mwondering,whatdoyousortofseeasAustralia’skeyambitionandinterestswithrespecttospacedomain,andwhatsortofactionhasthecountryhastakeninpursuitofthoseambitionanditsinterest?

B.Biddington: [Q3]ThefirstpointtomakeisthatAustraliaisaverylowandflatcountrywithlargeareasof

landthataremostlyemptyofpeople.Thismeansthattherearelargeareasofthelandscapewhere radio frequency interference isminimal, and that’swhy, for example,we do a lot oftesting of really interesting electronic warfare capabilities out of the Woomera test range,whichisfivetimesbiggerthanChinaLakejusttogiveyousomeperspective.

[Q3]SinceWorldWar II,Australiahasmadeacoupleofbigbets inresearchnationally.Onehas been in immunology, and the other has been in astronomy, and especially in radioastronomyand radio astrophysics. Australia has used its landscapehere, of course, becausebeingquietelectronicallymakesAustraliaagreatplaceforradiotelescopes.So,Australiadoesthatverywell.AustraliacameoutofWorldWarIIwithalotofradarresearch,andthenoutof


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Australia’s radio astronomy capabilities, cameWiFI,whichwas an invention15-20 years agobutthat’swhereitcamefrom.

[Q3]Australiacontinuesto invest, inparticular, inradioastronomyandradioastrophysicsattheresearchlevelandtheoperationallevel.[Q3]Movingtotheoperationssideofthings.Australia,again,becauseofitsgeography,hostsimportantgroundstationsfortheUnitedStates,theEuropeanSpaceAgency,andothers.AndIthinkthatthatwillcontinue.Whilstitcertainlyisthecasethatitisnowtechnicallypossibletosimplyhaveconstellationsofsatellitestalktoeachother,soyoudon’tnecessarilyneedgroundstations inothercountries,I thinkthatprudenceandredundancyandresiliencefornetworkswill give some of these ground station long lives. And, of course, for the very deep spacemissions, like those that theNASAstationnearCanberra,Australiahelps tomanageyoustillneedthreegroundstationsspreadaroundtheworldtoensurethattheprobeisalwaysinviewofoneofthem.Becauseofthis,Australiawillcontinuetosupportgroundstations.[Q3]AninterestingquestionforAustraliaandtheUnitedStatesiswhetherornotwewillstarttosupportgroundstationsfromRussiaandChina.RussiaandChinaarecertainlyaskingiftheycanputgroundstationonAustralianterritory.Sofar,Ithinkwehavesaid“no,”althoughthereis a commercial Swedish organization, that has a ground station in Western Australia, andthereiscertainlyaChinesecommercialleaserunningthroughthatgroundstation.So,already,because of the way the world works, we are supporting Chinese space activities through athirdpartycommercialarrangement.[Q3]IfIturntospaceregulationandspacecontrol,therearenowfacilitiesatNorthwestCape,whichisatthewesternextremityoftheAustraliancontinent.Thereiscurrentlyaspaceradar,aC-Band radar, thathasbeenbrought fromAntiguadownrange fromCapeCanaveral (CapeKennedy)toNorthwestCape.Therewillalsosoonbeanoperationalspacetelescopesthat isbeing relocated to Northwest Cape as well. So, Australia is starting to build some ground-basedspacesurveillancecapability,andIthinkAustraliawillcontinuetodothat.Thereisalsoacooperative researchcenter,which isa joining togetherofuniversitiesandcompaniesandother research organizations based in Canberra, that is looking at how we can improvespacesituationalawareness, tracking, and prediction, particularly of space debris. This willthenneedtobefedintoanationaland,ultimately,analliedandeveninternationalsystemsothatwecanmakesenseofitforthewholeworld.

[Q3]ThesearethesortsofthingsthatIthinkAustraliawilldo.[Q3] In terms of its own space activities, Australia has nogovernment-ownedEarthobservation satellites at themoment. The only satelliteswith anAustralian flag on the sidethatareregisteredwiththeUnitedNations,arecommunicationssatellites,whicharefromtheOptus company and also from the National BroadbandNetwork company, which isagovernment-ownedbusinessenterprise. In the current Australian defensewhite paper andinvestment plan, there is a $3-4 billion project for space-based remote sensing—now, justwhat translates to,whoknows? It couldbea combinationof commercial leases tobuydatathatsomebodyelsehasalreadygot,but,almostcertainly,IthinktherewillbesomeAustraliancapability as well—in other words, Australia will start to run its own Earth observationsatellites.

Interviewer: [Q3]Okay.So,whatdoestheAustraliancommercialspaceindustrylooklikeincomparisontomaybesomeothercountries’commercialspaceindustries?


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B.Biddington: [Q3]TheAustralian commercial space sector is fragmented. There is no center of gravity ofcompaniesthatself-identifyasbeingspacecompanies.Whatthereare,aresomecompaniesthat run satellites aspartof their telecommunicationsbusiness, and they see themselves astelecommunication supplierswhohappen touse satellites forpart of their business.On theEarth observation side, we have a number of companies that sell or re-sell data that comefrom satellites owned by foreign entities, but they don’t identify themselves as spacecompanies,theyidentifythemselvesasdatacompanies.PartofthechallengethatwehaveinAustraliaistosaytotheseorganizations,"Look,youdoneedtostarttoatleastthinkalittlebitaboutthedependenciesthatthebreadandbutterthatyouputonyourtableshasonsecureandassuredaccesstospaceandtosatelliteservices.Andyouneedtoinvestinthinkingabouthow tohelp government, andhow tohelp yourselves, ensure thatwemake thenear spaceenvironmentassafeandsecureaspossible.”

[Q3]Thisbringsusbacktothequestionof,“Sowhatshouldasmalltomediumpowerdothatis realistic and helpful, without falling into the trap of over-stating our capabilities and oursenseofimportanceandinfluenceinthesematters?”

Interviewer: [Q3]Sure.So,whatistherelationshiplikebetweentheAustraliangovernmentandAustralia’s

commercial space entities?Arethere any key noticeable hurdles in the relationship thatweshouldbeawareof?

B.Biddington: [Q3] Civil and commercial space in Australia is the responsibility of the Commonwealth

Department of Industry, Innovation, and Science, and responsibility is buried in thedepartmentatthelevelofmiddle-rankingbureaucrats.ThereisnospaceagencyinAustralia.Thereisnocentralsortofcoordinationoffice.There’snoidentifiableleaderingovernmentofAustralian space activities at a level that is recognizedbothnationally and globally (i.e., youcannotsimplysay,"This is thepersonwho looksafterspace inAustralia").TheresponsibilityforspaceinAustraliabeendissipatedandspreadaroundmanydepartmentsovermanyyears.

[Q3]Now, in part, that'sbecause, at the national strategy level, the big questions of spacehavebeenansweredbyAustralia’s alliance relationships.Australiahasn’t really had to thinkaboutspaceissuestoohardbecausepeopleintheUKor,sincethe1960s,theUS,havereallylookedafterthebigquestionsforAustralia.And,asIsaidbefore,ifspacegoestohellinahandbasket,there’snotmuchthatAustraliacandotomitigatethatotherthanpotentiallyprovideits realestate tohelp theUnitedStates.ThishasmadeAustraliamassivelydependenton itsallieshere,particularlytheUS—Imean,$1ofevery$2spentintheworldonspaceisspentbytheUS,sothemerefactofthesizeofthisUSinvestmentisagoodreasontostickcloselytotheUnitedStates.Itjustmakesgoodsenseeconomicallyandstrategically.

[Q3]Australiahascivilandcommercialspaceburied,fromapolicyperspective, inthemiddleofarelativelysmallgovernmentdepartment,whichdoesnotwieldhugeinfluenceandwhoseministerisnotamemberoftheNationalSecurityCommitteeofCabinet.Thedefaultpositionof the Australia government fora long timehas been, “how little canwe invest,” not “howmuchcanweinvest.”

[Q3]Withthatsaid,ofcourse,technologyischangingthisworldrapidly,andsmallstartupsinAustraliaandelsewherearestartingtosay,"Well,guesswhat?Wecannowaffordsatellites.We can launch satellites. We can make money in a way that previously we could not," sogovernmentishavingtoreacttothat.Australiaevenhasacompanythat I thinkhasa50/50chanceofsettingupasuccessful launchbusiness innorthernAustralia, lookingspecificallyatequatorial launches intolowerEarthorbits inthefirst instance,whichisofcoursesomethingofgreatinterestfromasecurityperspectivetoAustralia.


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Interviewer: [Q3] Okay. So, to transition into the next question I was hoping to ask, what are the

motivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactorstocontesttheuseofspaceintimesofpeace,instability,andconflict?

B.Biddington: [Q3]Myviewon this is veryold-fashioned. I see space still as thepreserveofnation states.

And that’s because launch is sodifficult, and, therefore,relatively easy to regulate by thenationstate.Unliketheinternet,wherenation-stateshavebasicallylostcontrol,thisisnotthecasewithrespecttospace.It’svery,verydifficulttolaunchanythinginspace,andthatallowsgovernments to maintain close rein on whatgetslaunched and by whom within their ownjurisdictions.That,tome,plustheadvantagesthatsatellitesgivenationstates,Ithinkimpliesthatspaceisthehighgroundofpeaceandwar.AndIthinkthatitwillremaineverthus.

[Q3]Whatthatmeansisthatdespitetherecordpaceofcivilandcommercialentrantsintothedomainandincreasinglycomplicatedlandscapethatisemerging,ultimatelygovernmentswillbeinthepositiontocalltheshotsandpreventlaunchesifthey'renotperceivedtobeintheirnationalinterests.Thismeansthatsmallandmediumpowersthatdon'tlaunchthemselveswillbe dependent on others to launch for them, and, ofcourse, that means that thosedependencieswillleadtovulnerabilities.

[Q3] I really see the future in space as one that's run bynation states acting in their owninterests, and because ofwhat satellites can and can’t do, theywillmake a very importantcontribution tonational security.Tome, thequestion ishowyoubuild sufficient consensus,especiallybetweenthe big three space actors (the United States,Russia, and China), andsufficient trust andunderstandingso that everyone actually works to keep the spaceenvironmentaccessibletoall,ratherthancompletelytrashingit—aswehavestartedtodointhelowerEarthorbits.Assuch,howwebegintocleanspaceup,tome,iswherethischallengeimmediatelycomestothefore.AsmuchasIapplaudthepeoplewhosay,“Let’sgochasethedebris and catch it," the engineers and the technologists who are runningtheseconversationssimplystrugglewiththeconceptthatyourgarbagetruckismyspaceweapon—theyeitherignoreorseemreluctanttoacknowledgethepolicyconsequencesofwhattheyaresaying.So,mypleaisforalotmorepeopletostartthinkingaboutspacepolicyandtheissuesaroundpolicyandlawthanisthecaseatpresent.

CaelusPartners,LLC

JoseOcasio-ChristianChiefExecutiveOfficer

24August2017WRITTENRESPONSE[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in timesofpeace, instability,andconflict? Whatare thepolitical,military,environmental,or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?Caelus Partners chooses not to answer this question in detail at this time. However, consider the previousdiscussionpointsprovidedforgeneralguidelinestoourthinkingonthisquestion.


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Dr.DamonColetta&LieutenantColonel(ret.)DeronJackson

UnitedStatesAirForceAcademy

DamonColetta;ProfessorofPoliticalScienceDeronJackson;Director,EisenhowerCenter

8August2017INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPTInterviewer: [Q3]Okay,great.So, let’smoveontosomeof themorenationalsecurity-focusedquestions

thatIsentovertoyouguys.I’mhopingtorunthroughthesequestionswithyouandthenopentheconversationupformorediscussionswithsomeofmyothercolleagues,sopleaseforgivemeifI’mjumpingaroundalittlebit.Let’sjuststartwiththefirstonefromthelistthatIsentyou,whichis:Doessubstantialinvestmentandheaviercommitmentbybothgovernmentandcommercial interests provide an avenue of approach for space security and disincentive forkineticmilitaryaction?

D.Jackson: [Q3]Well,Ithinkitcan.Whetherwecandeterministicallysayitdoeshappen,dependsontheactorsandthecontestedrelationship.Therearetwocategoriesofdisincentives.First,thereisthevalueofcurrentandfutureinvestmentandthetimesinvolvedreplenishingspaceassetsiftheywere lost.Second, thereare, theenvironmentalconditions (debris)wouldmake itevenmore challenging to reconstitute if you went kinetic. Most established and some emergingspace-faringstatesshare theseconcerns,so ifyouare lookingat thiswithrespect tocertainglobalregimes,theremaybesharedconstraintsthatapplytosomeactorsbutmaybenotall.Aswewatchotherplayersaround theworld, likeNorthKorea, start todemonstrategreatermissile capability, who are not as equally “invested” in terms of current on-orbit assets orshared concern for the longer-term viability of the orbital environment, then they are in apositiontocausetroubleinthespacedomaindisproportionatetotheirsize.Thus,verythfactthatyoudohaveconsiderableinvestmentbysomeplayersgivesthemacertainsharedinterestin avoiding kinetic conflict provides the incentive to do the exact opposite amongst otheremergingactors.

D.Coletta: [Q3] Again, what I’m hearing from Deron is consistent with what I’ve seen. Ultimately, itdepends.Thinkingaboutthisintermsofpoliticalscience,oneofthevariablesitdependsonistheasymmetryofinvestment.

[Q3]Anothervariable that I’veheard thatmightmatter is theexistenceofcommonrulesofthe road. We are aware of efforts, some of which involve DoD and others not necessarilyinvolvingDODbutmaybejustindustry,aretryingtocomeupwithrulesoftheroad.Theideaisthat if therewerea roughconsensusonsuch rulesof the road, thatcommercial investmentwouldactuallybeapositivefordeterrence.Evenifyouhad,say,asymmetricskininthegame,having rules of the road that were generally agreed upon would help strengthen therelationshipbetweencommercialinvestmentandsuccessfuldeterrence.

Interviewer: [Q3]Okay.So,couldyoumaybeprovideorplayoutascenariowithaspecificactorthatyoumighthaveinmindandaspecifictypeofinvestmentthatyoumighthaveinmind,whichyouthinkmightbeagoodexampleofascenarioinwhichincreasedinvestmentandcommitmentprovidesanavenueforincreasedspacesecurity?

D.Coletta: [Q3] I don’t have a historical scenario, but letme just give you a preliminary answer. Ifweapproachedthisquestion,whatwewoulddoiswewouldsay,well,havetherebeensituations


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where a foreign satellite, maybe a military satellite, has maneuvered in a way that wasn’texpectedorhasmaneuveredclosetoanon-militarysatellite in lowEarthorbit?Thatcanbeseenasathreattospacesecurity,anditcouldbeseenasabadprecedent,sowewouldwanttoknowifthisscenarioisthetypeofsituationwhererulesoftheroadwouldhelpreducetheambiguity of these types of incidents or reduce the sort of testing of the waters throughsatellitemaneuvers—let’s say, reduce this testing of thewaters that generally leads to lessspacesecurity.

[Q3] Then, wewould scour the unclassified sources for situations that fit this scenario andmakeargumentsaboutwhatsortofrules,whetherthoserulesarebeingworkedonrightnowornot,wouldmakethistypeofinsecuritylessofanissue.

[Q3]Overall, though,we’d startoutwitha scenario, ahypothetical scenario, and thenwe’dsee if there’s anything in the unclassified record that backs that up. But, unusual satellitemaneuverswouldbeaplacetostart.

[Q3]I’msorrythatdoesn’tansweryourquestionaboutinvestment.I’mthinkingmoreintermsofwhererulesoftheroadcouldcomein,but,obviously, inthisscenariotherewasan initialinvestmentfromthecommercialsectortoputthesatelliteupthereinthefirstplace.Asyougetmoresatellitesinorbit,andthat’scertainlyexpectedtoincrease,soitseemslikethissortofscenariowouldbemorelikely.

D.Jackson: [Q3]Letmemakeupa scenarioon the fly. For yourpurposes, ifwe takea state that’s justgoing to be an operator, so we don’t presume launching space capabilities. There is aproliferationofstatesthatcanbeoperators,sothechosenstatewouldneedtoconformtoarules of the road type of approach. Let’s takeNigeria for example. If Nigeria contractswithsomebody,thentheyarenowaspacefaringstatebecausetheygotasatelliteinorbit.Then,going back to the idea of contesting regimes or contesting international institutions, thechallenge there is to have a set of rules or relationships (e.g., an agreement to share somelevel of situational awareness data), so that they then have a habit of cooperating withAmericanorientedfavoredsystems,ratherthanrespondingto,say,anotherbigcountry(e.g.,China) that would maybe want to set up its own set of rules that are maybe more lax orgenerousorinsomewaymorefavorabletotheChineseinterests.

[Q3]So,whattheyarecontestingis:Whodoyouworkwith?Whatnormsandwhattraditionsget established that suggest what the international community’s preferred options are fordoing maneuvers and the like? Who do you know and who do you trust? So, as you aretheorizing about a country—whatever one itmight be—that is trying to build towards thatgreaterlevelofinvestment,theycanbedoingitunderacertainsetofrules.So,itiscrucialtounderstandwhowrites those rules,whomaintains them,andwhosustains themwith somelevel of coordination or information sharing? Is it going to be the United States, or is thecontestgoingtobesomethinglesskineticbutmorepoliticalsothatanothercenterofpower,Beijingforexample,setsthoserulesandhelpstoenforcethoserules,whichmayormaynotbemorepermissiveofdangerousmaneuversorkineticactivity.

D.Coletta: [Q3] There’s another scenario that could be interesting—that is, the idea of as investmentincreases,perhaps thechanceofcollision increases.We’vehearda lotabout theconcernofcollision forensics. If somethingwere tohappenanda satellitewere togooutofoperation,howlongwouldittakeUSauthoritiestofigureoutwhathappened(i.e.,ifitwasanattack,orifitwasanaccident)?

[Q3]Asinvestmentgoesup,thechancesforthatkindofproblemprobablyincrease.Then,tobring in that second variable, could a more elaborate crash protocol—and I gather, for


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insurancereasons,therearealreadysomeprotocolsoutthereintermsofwhat’ssupposedtohappenafteracollision—thatcouldassistmultiplecountries intheir forensicswere inplace,would that improve space security fromwhat it otherwise would be if these collisions justsimplybecamemorefrequentunderthecurrentarrangement?This isascenariothatrelatestoincreasedinvestmentsandtheimportanceoflet’scallitacollisionprotocol.

Gen.Elder8: [Q3]Sure,Iwilljumpinwithaquestion.I'mgladtohearyoubothtalkaboutdeterrence,andI'm glad to hear you both recognize that when we talk about deterrence against spacebehaviors,we'renot talkingaboutmutual assuredestruction,we're talkingaboutescalationcontrol,crisismanagement,etc.

[Q3]So,letmeaskyouaboutthewarfightingcomponentofthis.Whenwetalkaboutmakingspaceawarfightingdomain,wewouldn'tjustbesayingthatit’sawarfightingdomainfortheUS—itwouldbethewarfightingdomainforourcompetitorsaswell.Hasyourteamtalkedatallaboutwhattheimplicationsareofourcompetitorstreatingspacenotonlyasaplacethatthey contest, but as one that they actually do warfight in, and how that would affect theUnitedStates?

D.Jackson: [Q3]Atthetimewhenweweredoingthisstudy,whichisnowcomingupon10yearsago,thetemperatureofthewholewarfightingdomaindiscussionwasalotlower.So,weweretryingtodeal with it in more of a truly hypothetical situation where hopefully with sufficient andengagementattheearlyend,therewouldnotbeanyneedtoescalateall thewayuptothewarfighting level.OtherthanattheASAT level,whichwaskindofacrudebutsimplewaytoorganize thinking around,weweren'tworried about fleshing out particularwarfighting-typebreadth.

[Q3]Astheintervening10yearshavespunon,Ithinkthelevelofpotentialsophisticationforwarfightingeffectshas increased inwhat'sdiscussedpublicly—and,again,we're constrainedby operating justwithin the unclassifiedworld, so our ability to speculate is limited by thatenvironment.

[Q3]Ithinkifyoureallygetintoconcernsaboutwarfighting,andiftheadversaryisconfidentthat theycangeta returnontheir investment forgoing thatway, thenyoumayneedtoupyouranteinhowyouwanttodeterthemfrombreakingthesealonthat.Thismightbedonethrough an intervention at the very earliest level, so that you threaten to escalate andemphasizethatwhatevergoesonwillclearlynotbeconstrainedtothespaceenvironment.Isthatconnectiontogeneraldeterrencegoingtobetheessentialelementhere?This,again,wasoneofthecriticismsofthenarrownessofourstudy,basedonthenarrownessofthequestion.So, itmaybe the time to revisithowspace iswired in to theoverall theatersordomainsofwarfare,sothatanadversarycan'tseeitselfasbeingabletosuccessfullyfightandachieveanoutcome.

Gen.Elder: [Q3]IthinkoneoftheissueshereisthattodaywheneverwetalkaboutwarfightingintheUS,it isalwaysanawaygameexcept forhomelanddefense.Oncewemakespaceawarfightingdomain,thenwebasicallysetourselvesuptohavewhatI’dcallahomegametypeofsituation,andthat'sonethepiecesofthisthatI’mnotsurewe'vereallythoughtthrough.

[Q3]Wehave three legs of this thing—we’re looking at thedeterrencepiece, the resiliencypiece, and the norms piece. Once you declare something a warfighting domain, then thatimplies that you accept that in times of crisis, actors would be able to do things that they

8LieutenantGeneral(ret.)Dr.RobertElder


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wouldn't do in peace time to advance their interest. If we don't consider it a warfightingdomains,thenthenormswouldbedifferentaboutthetypesofthingsthatyoucoulddo.

Thesearejustthekindsofthingswe'vebeentryingtoworkourwaythrough.So,ifyouhaveanythoughtsonthis,itwouldbegreattohearthem.

D.Jackson: [Q3]Oneofthethingsthatcomestomindhereistogobacktosomeoftheearlierquestionsand look at the investment and engagement of the commercial sector. It's a very aptdescription to say it’s ahomegame forus,but that alsomakes it ahomegame for a lotofotherpeople.So,conveyingtothathostileactorthat,iftheypickafightanddecidetoengageinwarfighting inspace, then the limitation isnotgoing tobe to thespace realmexclusively,nortotheUSasacompetitorinthat,becausethey'regoingtobemakingahomefieldattackonanynumberofotherplayers.

[Q3] So, the greater interconnectivity—entanglement as we called it—ought work to ouradvantageifwecanpersuasivelyimposeuponthathostileactorthecertaintythatthey’renotgoingtobeabletorestrictthingsweneed.Theirabilitytobediscreetandsurgicalmay leadthemtocalculatethattheycangetawaywith it.Well, ifwecanmuddythatcalculationandintroduce ambiguity favorably, in this case on our side, that they can't get away with itdiscreetly,Ithinkitwouldenhancedeterrenceanddissuadethemfromtryingtotheirhandatspacewarfighting.

D.Coletta: [Q3]Justtoaddsomeadditionalthoughts.Firstofall,youguysaregoingtowayaheadofuson that issue. I can tell you thatwhatwe've seen is that there's a thoughtout there that itmatterswhethertheweaponsareactuallyoperatingfromspace.So,Iwouldthinkthatoneofthe things that you are thinking aboutwhen you think of space as awarfighting domain, iswhat sort of cost could you impose should another state base weapons in space? Can youmaintain space itself weapon free? I'm not surewhat the implications of that are, becausesomeofthesatellitesaregoingtobevulnerableineithercase.Mysenseofitisthatyouwantto try do that, so if youwant to try to keep spaceweapons free as it has been, then thereoughttobeplansforwhattheresponsewillbe,andcrediblecommunicationthatwoulddeterothersfromputtingtheirweaponthere.

[Q3]ThenyoustillhavetheproblemofvulnerabilitytoEarth-basedweapons.AndIdon’tthinkthatwehavegottenveryfaronthat,butwegobacktowhatDeronjustsaid,whichisifyougoaheadandusethoseagainstus,therearegoingtobeconsequencesinotherdomains.But,toourknowledge,there'snotaveryspecificpolicyaboutthat.So,Ithinkit'sarealhardproblemthat'sjustasetofquestionsthathavecomeacrossourdesk.

Gen.Elder: [Q3]So,you'regettingintothecruxoftheissuehere.Realistically,youdohavesomethoughtsthatthepreemptiveapproachmightberequiredtobeeffective,and,bytheway,Ithinkthat'spartiallywhat's driving this line of thinking thatwe need to start thinking about space as awarfighting domain, and in the way that we would of a conventional type domain. Forexample, if we thought that someone was posturing to take out our ability to defendourselves, thenwewould feel compelled to take some kind of action. I think there's somereasonabletothat,butthatisstillactuallyalittlebitdifferentthanthewaywewouldtreatawarfightingdomain.Thefactthatwewouldtakeactiontodefendourselvesisonething,butonce we start talking about preemptively operating that space, that's where it gets a littlemurky,Ithink.

[Q3]So, I’mjustpointingoutwhat I thinkcouldbethe issue.Thereasonwe’rehavingtheseconversations is to try andhelpusbetter understand the issues, andoneof the things thatwe're looking at is the implications on the United States of treating space a warfighting


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domain.So,we'retryingtounderstandallaspectsofthis,andmyearlierquestioncomesfromthestandpointofenablingustostartthinkingaboutthepreemptive-typeactivitiesfordefensethatworkwell.Ifweinadvertentlydosomethingthatleadsanactortothinkthatwe'reaboutto take away something of theirs, howdoes the escalation controlwork?Wehaven't reallytalkedthatthrough,soIdon'tknowifyouguyshavethoughtaboutthat.

D.Jackson: [Q3]Thiswas actuallypartof the first about15 yearsofdebatewithin thenuclear strategycommunity,whentheyweretryingtograpplewithalltheseideasthatwenowcomebacktolook on as being deterrence theory. There is an article byGlen Snyder from the 1960s thatcontrastsdeterrenceanddefense,andpointsoutadilemmathatasyouarebuildingupyourforcestructures,therearesomethingstohelpyoudefendandthentherearesomethingstohelpyoudeter,butthey'renotthesamesystems,noraretheynecessarilyinterchangeable.

[Q3]Thedilemma is that inorder todeteranadversary,at somepointdoyoumayneedtohavebroadrangeofcapabilities. Somesystemsdon'thaveanydefensivevalue,butare justpurely offensive to threaten retaliation.Othersmay be needed to protect your own forces.Howdoyoumanagethatmix,settingprioritiesforlimitedresources?Whileyou’redoingthat,howdoesyouradversaryseeyourmovesastheyarebuildingup?Canthisrelationshipinanywaybeconstruedasbeingstable?Ithinkforthefirstatleast15yearsofthenuclearera,thescholarsofthattimeweretryingtowrestlewiththeseproblems,justaswenowaretryingtoapply them inspace.There'snotauniformcontinuumofoptions forpeople tochoose frombetweendeterrenceononeendanddefense,orwarfighting,ontheotherend.Itcomesdowntothefactthatatsomepointwemayneedtobepreemptive,andthusthetoolsyouneedtodothatwillbedifferentfromwhatyoureliedonfordefense(self-protection)orcertainlayersof thedeterrence framework. Preemptionwas on the table in the early ages of thenuclearconfrontation. So, ultimately, this problem may be new in this domain, but it's not a newproblem for us overall. The classic dilemma emerges of how to manage the relationshipbetweenstatesasitgoesthroughacertainphaseinhistory.

D.Coletta: [Q3]Onthenuclearside,thewayitgetsresolvedisthatyouendupmovingtowardslaunchonwarningandtheso-calledhairtriggerstrategy,soitmakesthewholethingIguesslessstable—youhavelowercrisisstability.Iguessoneofthethingsthatyou'reliabletorunintoifyou'reresponsiblefortreatingitasawarfightingdomainis,atwhatpointisitworthit?Howunstableareyouwillingtogo,andhowunstableistheothersidewillingtogo,becausetheyhavevoiceinthistoo?

[Q3]Justtherecognitionthatifyoucan'thardensatellites,ifyoucan'tbuildthetechnologytoallowthemtorunaway,and ifyoustartmoving towardpreemption, thenyou'restarting tochange the levelof stability, andyou'reprobably going toenter a competition in risk takingthere.Inthenucleardomain,youhaveagreementstokindofstopthatcompetition—youhavemoves to reduce crisis stability on both sides, and then recognition that it’s probably not agoodidea,atleastinthenuclearrealm(itwouldprobablyalsonotendupbeingagoodideainthespacerealm,either).Then,eventually,youcometosomekindofverifiableagreementtokeepthatinstabilityincheck.So,that'swherethateventuallygoes.

D.Jackson: [Q3]So,tocomebacktoLtGen(ret)Dr.Elder’sexampleofthehomegameforspace,citiesweretheearlytargetsandtheycouldn'tbehardenedormoved,sotheyhadtocometothegripswiththatdilemma.

[Q3]Spacewasessential inproviding stability in thatera,because it gaveyou some ideaofwhattheotherside’scapabilitywaswhentheearlyreconnaissanceprogramscameonboard.As surface-to-air missiles were deployed by the Soviet Union, enabling attacks on aerialreconnaissance, the space domain was a necessary evolution for awareness of the other


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actor’scapability,deploymentpatterns,andultimatelywarningoflaunch.Thiswasimportantsoyouweren'tblindand, therefore, stucknotbeingable to identifyanattackbefore itwasreallytoolatetodomuchaboutit.Maintainingthatrolewithregardtospacerequirescirclingbackontheideaofsituationalawarenessandsurveillanceandmaintainingagoodpictureofwhat'sgoingon.Thiswill,likeitwasduringthenuclearera,probablybeabsolutelyessentialtomaintainingsomesortofstablerelationshipamongstpowersinthespacecontext.

D.Coletta: [Q3] Just to dovetail on that, space was part of moving toward that so called verifiableagreement, and “verifiable” being one of those ambiguous terms, but space was the keyelementofthat.So, ifyou'regoingtodefendassets inspace,treatingspaceasawarfightingenvironmentbyreducingcrisisstability,thenthenextstep,aslongastheadversaryalsofeelstheheat,ismovingtowardssomekindofverifiableagreement,nottoeliminateinstabilitybuttosomehowholditincheck.There'sonlysofarthatcangobeforeit'sagainsttheinterestsofbothsides. Iguess, lookingbackatthenuclearera,that'swherewewouldseethatdynamicgoingovertime.

ColonelTimothyCullen,PhD9CommandantandDean(SchoolofAdvancedAirandSpaceStudies,AirUniversity)

15August2017WRITTENRESPONSE[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in times of peace, instability, and conflict?What are the political,military, environmental, or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?Whetheritbeintimesofpeace,instability,orconflict,stateandnon-stateactorscontestUSanditsallies’useofspacetodegradeordenytheirabilitytoobserveunfriendlybehaviororcoordinatealliedactivities,topunishtheUSanditsallieseconomically,todemonstratethevulnerabilityofUSandalliedspaceweaponsorcommunicationssystems,tosimplytesttheeffectivenessofunfriendlyactions,oracombinationofall theabove.TheUSand itsallies should expose aggressive and belligerent actions threatening allied assets in the space domain to imposepolitical and social costs of the actions and to educate the public and the international community on theenvironmental, economic, and societal costs of the behavior. Militarily, the US and its alliesmust continue todevelop redundant tactical, operational, and strategic approaches where the continuous access and control ofspace is not essential to the successful employment of lethal and decisive force. Fortunately, redundantapproacheswill bemuchmore economical and effective in the long term than the development of the robustspace infrastructure andweapon-systemarchitectures thatwould be necessary to assure access and control ofspaceagainstanear-peeradversary in timesof lethal conflict.Dominance in spacemaynotbepossibleagainstaggressive and industrialized nations, regardless. It is difficult to express how expensive the net cost of thedevelopmentand large-scaleemploymentofeven“lowcost”access to spacewillbeorhowunforgiving,harsh,andcostlythespaceenvironmentistoconductoperations,andthespaceindustryhaslittleincentivetostatetheirnetestimateseither.ItisintheinterestoftheUSgovernmenttoincentivizecommercialinvestmentinlaunchanorbital systems, but due to the incredible cost, risk, and efficacy of the approach, the US military should notunderwritetheseinvestmentscompletelybyattemptingtophysicallydominatethedomainwithforce.

9TheviewsexpressedinCol.Cullen’sanswertothisquestiondonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesAirForce,DepartmentofDefense,orUSGovernment.


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Dr.MalcolmDavisSeniorAnalyst—DefenceStrategyandCapability(theAustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute)

21August2017WRITTENRESPONSE[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in times of peace, instability, and conflict?What are the political,military, environmental, or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?TheUnitedStatesapproachtowarfightingisbasedaroundexploitingprecisioneffect,speedofengagement,andmost importantly, gaining andmaintaining a ‘knowledge edge’ over all potential opponents to fight wars in amanner thatminimisescostandrisk todeliver rapiddecisiveoutcomesandensuremilitarysuperiority.Space iscrucial inenabling this ‘WesternWayofWar’ thatexploitsprecision,highoperational tempo,and jointmilitaryoperations within US forces and highlights coalition interoperability with allies. Space capabilities provide theinformationbackplanetoUSmilitarypowertoenablethiswesternwayofwar,andrepresentsakeyfoundationforUSmilitarysuperiorityoverpotentialadversaries.Morebroadly,spacesystemsarevitaltothefunctioningoftheUSeconomyandsociety.Thereareobviouscivilianapplications for satellite communications,using satellitesbased inGeosynchronousOrbit (GEO)andalso in LowEarthOrbit(LEO).Effectivemonitoringofglobalweathercannotbeeasilydonewithoutaccesstometeorologicalsatellitesinorbit.ThereisarapidgrowthinthemarketforremotesensingandEarthmonitoringtoaideverythingfromagriculturethroughtocityplanning,andtomonitortheeffectsofclimatechange.ThedevelopmentoftheUSGlobal Positioning System (GPS) satellite network, and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) hasenabled the rapid growthof globalisation in interdependent economies through inter-linked stockmarkets, therapid growthof the Internet, andmakespossible a future ‘Internetof Things’, aswell as being vital to supporttransportationnetworks.Now, imagineadaywithoutSpace. Imagineanadversarybeingable to threatenor takeawayUS spaceaccess,eitherbyattackingsatellitesdirectlywithASATweapons,orthrough jammingorspoofingthedatabetweenthesatellitesandtheterrestrialgroundsegment,orattackingthegroundsegmentdirectly,includingsatellitecontrolfacilitiesaswellaslaunchsitesintheUSandelsewhere.InlosingaccesstoSpace,theUSwouldrapidlylosetheadvantagesandbenefitsitgainsfromSpace,bothintermsofbeingabletowagewardecisively,quicklyandwithahighdegreeof confidence inoutcome,whilst theUSeconomicandsocial foundationswould fallapart.SuchanattackwouldstrikeattheveryheartofUSglobalpowerandinfluence,anderodethatpowerrapidly(inthespaceofhoursordays). InattackingUSspacesystemsinwhathasbeenreferredtoasa ‘SpacePearlHarbour,’apeeradversarylikeChinaorRussiawouldleveltheplayingfieldinmilitary,economicandtechnologicalterms.Thismaythenenable that themtobringasymmetricadvantage tobearandexploitmass (in regions likeEastAsiaor theEuropean Near Abroad). They could then more effectively employ a suite of ‘anti-access and area denial’capabilitiesagainstUSandalliedforcesthatsuddenlyhadbeenleft ‘deaf,dumbandblind’,andindoingso,gainthe operational and tactical initiative early in a conflict. The result could be heavy US and allied losses in theopeningphaseofanyfuturemajorpowerconflict,particularlyforforward-deployedforces,andconversely,rapidadvancesbytheadversarytoachievemilitaryandstrategicobjectives.Theoutcomewouldthenbeapolitical‘faitaccompli’fortheUSanditsalliesthatwouldbecostlytochallenge.Certainlythisscenarioofa‘SpacePearlHarbour’ iswellknowninthecontextofaclashwithapeercompetitor,suchasChinaorRussia,with the conceptdatingback to theRumsfeld Space Commission report10 in 2001,butchangesinthenatureofspacecapabilitiesmeansthereisaproliferationofcounter-spacecapabilitiesandgrowingpotentialrisk.In2017,thecommercialisationofSpaceandthegrowthof‘Space2.0’technologyandthebroader

10https://fas.org/spp/military/commission/report.htm


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paradigmforitsuse, isseeingaccesstospacedemocratise,whichmeansthatabroaderrangeofpotentialstateandnon-state actors can access spacemoreeasily, and at lower cost. Twodevelopmentsbearwatching in thisregard.Morestates,andalsocommercialcompanies,aredevelopinglow-costspacelaunchcapabilitiesdesignedto launchsmallsatellite (upto500kg),micro-satellite (upto100kg)or ‘CubeSat’ type(below100kg)payloadsatrelativelylowcostandinanincreasinglyresponsivemanner.Atthesametime,theproliferationofballisticmissilecapabilities is occurringat a steadypace,withNorthKoreaand Iranbeing keyproliferators in this regard. If anadversarycandevelopitsownballisticmissilesystems,itcanalsolaunchpayloadsintoSpace,includingpotentiallydirect-ascent or co-orbital ASATs that could then threaten US and allied satellite systems. Miniaturisation ofsatellites epitomised by CubeSat technologies, together with low-cost 3D printing technologies, means that anadversarycouldmanufactureasuiteofASATcapabilitiesforreadyusepriorto,orattheoutsetofaconflict.Non-stateadversariesmightbeabletopurchaseorbuildlow-costGPSjammingorspoofingsystemsthatcaninterferewithGPSsignalstodeflectGPS-guidedmunitions,orinterferewithaircraftorshipnavigation.Futuredevelopmentof cyberwarfare capability for both states and non-state adversaries will see increasing threat of usingcyberattack11 against the ground segment, or directly against the satellites themselves. This could see datamanipulationtoprovidefalseormisleadinginformation,monitoringofcommunicationstraffic,spoofingofsignals,andevenseizingcontrolofasatellitenetworkanddenyingittoUSforces.Obviously there are potential costs in launching attacks against US and allied space capabilities. There is anenvironmentalriskifkinetic-killASATswereemployedthatphysicallydestroyedtheirtarget,withChina’sJanuary2007 ASAT test12 leaving a cloud13 of debris that over time threatened other spacecraft in other orbits. Thepotential for a ‘Kessler Effect’ scenario14 emerging from an ASAT campaign of rapid expansion of cascadingcollisions that produce ever more space debris generating additional collisions (popularised in the 2014 film‘Gravity’)15must be a real concern, and suggests one reasonwhy China andRussia are both pursuing ‘soft kill’options such as jamming, electronic attack and cyber-attack against satellites. If ASATs are to have operationalutility theymustbeusable. TheUSmayalso respondasymmetrically to anyASAT campaign, regarding suchanattackasastrategicstrike,16particularly ifUSmissileearlywarningsatellites(SBIRSandDSP)arehit.Theriskofescalation17would be on theminds of Chinese and Russian planners. Furthermore, any ASAT campaign, unlesstightlycontrolled,couldseethreatsemergetocivilianspacesystems(particularlythoseusedbytheUSmilitarytosupplementbandwidthofmilitarysatellitesystems) thatcouldhaveseriouseffectsonUSandalliedeconomies.This may be an intent for the adversary such as North Korea. However, the world is globalised and based oninterdependent economic systems. China and Russia would need to consider the risk of economic ‘blowback’againsttheirownfinancialsystemsbeforelaunchinganASATcampaigninaconflict.Therewould be understandable political and social costs in decisively violating a perceived (rightly orwrongly)‘norm,’18whichsuggestsSpaceisaglobalcommonsopentotheuseofall.Onceviolated,suchanormcouldnotbeeasilyrestored–inthesamewaythatfirstuseofnuclearweaponsinangersinceNagasakiin1945wouldundoakeynormagainstnon-useofsuchweapons.Therewouldbeanobviouspoliticalblow-backagainstthesidewhichinitiatesspacewarfareusingASATs.However,forauthoritarianregimes,thismaynotmattergreatly,particularlyiftheyhaveinitiatedwarfareinthefirstplace,andgiventheyarenotaccountabletochecksandbalances intheirpolitical system,or indeed, to theirpeople.Fornon-stateactors suchasextremistgroups, therewouldbeevenlessconcernoverthepolitical,economicorsocietalconsequencesoffirstuseofspaceweapons.Thisisoneissuewherewestern liberal democracies,whoare accountable to their people andmust fightwars in amanner thatacknowledges their value systems that are based on known legal and ethical constraints, are at a relativedisadvantagetoauthoritarianstatesorextremistnon-stateactors.11https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/space-final-frontier-cybersecurity12https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf13https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html14http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering_Technology/The_Kessler_Effect_and_how_to_stop_it15https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OiTiKOy59o416http://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/the-united-states-china-and-anti-satellite-weapons17http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-272.pdf18https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/


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FaulconerConsultingGroup

WaltFaulconerPresident

MikeBowkerAssociate

MarkBittermanAssociate

DanDumbacherAssociate

15August2017WRITTENRESPONSE

[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in times of peace, instability, and conflict?What are the political,military, environmental, or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?Excellentquestion, requires researcheffort toaddress fully,and likelycontinuingassessmentas thegeopoliticalenvironmentevolves.Thiswouldtakesomestudy,butcouldbecompiledasafollow-onstudytasktoaddthisdatatothetaxonomydatabasementionedbefore.Example:NationStateMotivations

PEACE INSTABILITY CONFLICT

Political Prestige,respect,negotiationleverage,influence.Better“seatatthetable”.BlackmailtheU.S.

Opticsofpower.Buildsympathyandformalliances.

Alliances,createanadvantage.Negotiateabetteroutcome.

Military Opticsofpowerforleverageandinfluence

TemporarydenialofU.S.advantage

EliminateU.S.advantage

Environmental PotentialincreaseinspacedebrisandEMI.

Increasedspacedebris.Denysomeorbitstoall

SocialCosts Canprovidedistractiontootherissues.

Economicembargos Lossofinfrastructure


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Dr.NamrataGoswamiSeniorAnalyst(Wikistrat);SubjectMatterExpert(AuburnUniversityFuturesLab)

15August2017

WRITTENRESPONSE

[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in times of peace, instability, and conflict?What are the political,military, environmental, or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?Nationstates,liketheU.S,Russia,China,andIndia(majorspace-faringnations),havefourgoalsthatcouldresultincontesteduseofspace.

1. Achieve space domain capability and advantage vis-à-vis adversaries by investing in research anddevelopment.

2. Stake territorial claims inouter spaceoncehumanitycracks thecodeofminingpreciousmetalson thelunarsurfaceandbeyond.

3. Supportgrowingcommercializationofspaceactivitiesandanemerginglucrativemarketforspacebasedactivities.

4. Buildmilitarycapacitybasedonspacebasedassetstosustainthetradelinksandestablishsuperiorityonearth.

Intimesofpeace,contesteduseofspacecouldoccuriftwocountriesdiscoverpreciousmineralsonanasteroidoron the lunar surface. Given the lack of international regulatory framework that could adjudicate and establishownership,adisputemaybreakoutduringpeacetimes.Duringconflicts,spacebasedassetslikemilitarysatellitescouldbetakendownbyanadversarytodenyprecisionguidance tomissile systems, jamearlywarning for incomingmissiles,anddenydataand informationonenemypositions. Non-state actors with access to space based capabilities could utilize it to deny access to data likejammingGPS,andreconnaissance.PotentialpoliticalcostsofactingonmotivationstocreateanadvantageinspaceorengageinconflictcouldresultinregimechangeespeciallyindemocraciesliketheU.S.orIndia,orcreateadomino-effectwherethespacebasedconflictwouldtrickledowntoearthresultinginseveraljumpsintheescalationladderinanuclearizedworld.Suchaconflictwouldhavedirectnegativecosts,politicallyandsocially.Thedesire to create spacedomainadvantagewould requirebudgetary allocations, thereby takingaway limitedresources, especially in countries likeChina and India, away from their poverty alleviationprograms. This couldcreate abacklash in society thereby raisingquestions about the feasibility of suchouter-spacemotivations. Forinstance,therewasintensedebateinIndiaastowhether itsMARSorbiterexpensewaslegitimateornecessary,given the elevated levels of poverty in the country. Several leading Chinese academics also argue that China’sincreasing space expenditure is not judicious given the country’s need to develop in other areas. Theenvironmental impact of a conflict in spacewould be detrimental, creating ‘space debris’, further enhanced inimpactduetothelackofanymechanismtoclearitout.


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HarrisCorporation

BrigadierGeneral(USAFret.)ThomasF.GouldVicePresident,BusinessDevelopment,AirForcePrograms

Colonel(USAFret.)JenniferL.MooreSeniorManager,StrategyandBusinessDevelopment,SpaceSuperiority

GilKlingerVicePresident;SeniorExecutiveAccountManagerfor

NationalSecurityFutureArchitectures

15August2017

WRITTENRESPONSE[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in times of peace, instability, and conflict?What are the political,military, environmental, or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?

AnyU.S.adversarywithacapabilitytodoso ishighly likely, ifnotcertain,toattackU.S.spacecapabilitiesor itsability to utilize space services. As mentioned above, any state or non-state adversary clearly recognizes theasymmetric advantageUS space capabilitiesbring toU.S. forces supportingmilitaryand intelligenceoperations.MostU.S.adversariesareequallyawarethat thehighandever-increasing levelofdependenceonspacebyU.S.militaryforcesisalsoauniqueasymmetricvulnerability.SinceU.S.spacecapabilitiesweredesignedtosupportawareffortfromspaceversusfightoneinspace;andbecausethecosttodisruptspaceoperations(viaelectronic,cyberandkineticattacks) is far lower than thecost toachievespacesuperiorityagainst theU.S. there isaverystrongincentiveforstateandnon-stateaggressorsaliketoattackUSspacecapabilitiesincrisisorwartime.

Because“attacks”on spacecapabilitiesneednotbekinetic,directedatanorbiting satellite,or result inhumancasualties or collateral damage, some adversaries also may view attacks on U.S. space capabilities as lowerrisk/higherrewardoptions,believingthereisalowerprobabilitythattheseactionswouldresultinaU.S.militaryresponse.

ExistingU.S. declaratorypolicy about attacks against space systemsare ambiguous.As a result,weare sendingmixed/conflicting messages regarding potential U.S. responses to an attack on our strategic and/or dual use(strategic/tacticalapplications)spaceassets.ThisambiguityunderminesthecredibilityofU.S.deterrenceinspace.

SomeadversariesmaybelievethatattackingU.S.spacecapabilitiescoulddetertheU.S.fromenteringaconflictforfearofevengreater lossesto itsspacecapabilities.Othersbelievethat thedifficulty inattributingthesourceofsomeattacks,e.g.,cyber,jamming,etc.,posessignificantchallengesandcouldgreatlydelayorparalyzetheUSG’snationalsecuritydecisionmakingprocess.

To effectively deter adversaries from targeting our space assets, it will be essential for the USG to establish adeclaratorypolicy at a strategic level, tied to anoverall national strategy,with classified/unclassifiedmessagingthatstateshowwewouldreacttoanadversary’sattack.Ourdependenceonspaceandlate-to-needinvestmentsintheprotectionorresiliencyofthesecapabilitiespresentasignificantchallengegoingforward


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TheresaHitchens

SeniorResearchScholar(CenterforInternationalandSecurityStudiesatMaryland[CISSM],theUniversityofMaryland)

19July2017(WrittenSubmission)30June2017(Interview)

WRITTENRESPONSE[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in timesofpeace, instability,andconflict? Whatare thepolitical,military,environmental,or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?Again, this is practically a research paper by itself as motivations vary state to state. Russia and China havemotivations for counterspace vice US because of force asymmetries. One might assume Iran/NK would havecounterspaceaspirationsreUSAiftheyevergottheirspaceacttogether,forpoliticaldeterrenceifnothingelse.IsraelandIndiahaveshowninterestincounterspacecapabilities–becausetheyfeelthreatened/wanttokeepupwith the Joneses.UK,Australia likely tobe integrated in anyUS counterspaceoperations. I don’t see any statehavingmotivationssimplyto“messupspace.”AsforNSAsIpersonallydon’tthinkbesideshackingwebsitestheyhavemuchmotivationto“contest”theuseofspace,eitherviceanindividualnationoringeneral(i.e.debris/EMPtoharmenvironment.)It’stoohard,doesn’treallyhelpthemintheirgoals.INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPT

Interviewer: [Q3]Okay.Oneotherquestion.Areanyoftheseofthesecountriesthatwelistedcollaboratingand/orcooperatingwitheachothertoadvancetheirinterestsinthespacerealm?And,ontheother end of the spectrum, are any of these countries sort of openly hostile towards eachotherwithrespecttotheirspaceinterestsandactivity?

T.Hitchens: [Q3]Wellofcourse theEuropeansallworkwitheachotherandareallprettywellawareof

each other’s interests and activities. In Europe, you’ve got the European SpaceAgency, andeven in the military realm—although they are little more secretively—the Europeans areworking together on various aspects of various satellite programs (e.g., Galileo), variousgroundsystems,etc.

[Q3] The Chinese are very interested in satellite cooperation. They see their satellitecapabilitiesasaformofsoftpower,andthereforetheyaredoingalotofmarketinginplaceslikeAfricaandLatinAmerica,andhelpingothercountriesownandoperatetheirfirstsatelliteor their first satellite systemsprimarily in theEarthobservationarena.TheChineseareveryinterestedinmarket—theyhaveacapitalist-hybridcommunisteconomy,sotheyhavealotofinterestinplayingabiggerroleintheworldmarket.ChinaisalsoworkingveryhardtodevelopcooperationwiththeEuropeansinspace.[Q3]TheRussians,Idon’tknow.TheRussiansarejustinsuchabadspacerightnowacrossthegeopoliticalspectrum,sotheyarekindofcurrentlynotreallycooperatingwithanybodyotherthanalittlebitofcooperationwithIndiaandChinaoverall.[Q3] Putting North Korea, which is an outlier problem set here, to this side, I don’t thinkthere’sactuallyhostilityinspacethatI’mawareofbetweenthesecountries.Imean,indeed,Iwould say at least based off of my interactions internationally, there is a lot of concernamongst other countries, who are not Russia, China, and the United States, about growing


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hostility between China, Russia, and the United States because they see those geopoliticalhostilitiesandthepotentialrisksinvolvedinrisksofconflictasbeingdetrimentaltotheirownambitionsinspace.

Interviewer: [Q3]So,Theresa,wealwaysaskthisquestionattheendofourinterviews:Isthereanythingthat I haven’t asked you that I should have, or is there any final point you would like toconcludewith?

T.Hitchens: [Q3]Okay,interesting.Ihavealotofthoughtsonsomeoftheotherquestionsfromyourfulllistofquestions.IwantedtojustbrieflyaddressQ3fromyourlistofquestionsbecauseIthinktheframingofthisquestionisreallyimportant.

[Q3]So,whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspaceintimesofpeace,instability,andconflict?Whatarethepolitical,military,environmental,orsocialcostsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?[Q3] I mean, again, this is a state-by-state question—you have to look at each stateindividually, different states have differentmotivations, and that’s going to be pretty clear.There are some countries that have motivations for counter-space operations against theUnited States, andmaybe there’smore. That’s not a surprise. Thenmaybe India and Israelhave shown an interest in counter-space capabilities because they feel threatened by theirneighborsandinsomewaysjustwanttokeepupingeneral.[Q3]Iwanttoaddresstheissueofthenon-stateactors.Ipersonallydon’tseenon-stateactorshavinganyinterestinmessingwithspace,sotospeak.Ijustdon’tseeit.Idon’tthinknon-stateactorshaveanymotivationtodoso,Idon’tthinktheywouldwanttospendthemoney,andIdon’tthinkithelpsthemachievetheirgoals.Ithinkthiswouldbekindofsilly.[Q3]Iactuallythinkthisquestioniskindofamootquestion.Idon’tseeanymotivationstherefornon-stateactorstocontestspace.[Q3]Ialsoseenomotivations,perhapswiththeexceptionofNorthKoreawhoisanoutlier,onthe part of any other states to mess up space in general. In other words, they might notcontest the use of space in a conflict, particularly in a conflictwith theUnited States. But Idon’t see them having motivation to do something stupid like launching an EMP. This isbecauseof the fact these countries are investingmoney in improving their use of space, sothere’snothinginitforthem,atleastinpeacetime.Intimesofconflict,theyhavemotivationsandtheymighthavemotivationeventodothingslikecreatingspacedebrisorcreatingspaceweaponsiftheyfeelasthoughtheyarelosingawar.Theymighthavemotivationstodothatbecausetheyhavethosecapabilities.

[Q3]Indeed,withtheUnitedStatesunderTrump,thisalsomightnotactuallybeofflimitsfortheUS ifwewere in a conflict.We’ve said thatwe don’twish to use space debris creatingweapons,thatwehavenodesiretoseethosekindsofweaponsdeployedanddeveloped,andthatwehaveno intentionofproducingthosekindsofweapons,butwe’veneveroutlined inanydoctrinalpaperoranypolicypapersthatweneedtohaveinstitutedthatself-imposedbanonthesekindsoftechnologies—we’venotdonethat.[Q3]So,allI’msayingisthatIdon’tseeanymotivationforanyone,withNorthKoreabeinganoutlier because who knows what their motivations are, in actually harming space as anenvironmentbecausethere’stoomuchsocialandeconomicandmilitarybenefitcomingfromspace foranyone to reallywant tocontemplate ruining space foreverybodyelse. I think it’sreally importantthatthisunderstandingunderliesthisquestionaboutmotivationstocontestspace.


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ChristopherJohnsonSpaceLawAdvisor(SecureWorldFoundation)

11September2017

WRITTENRESPONSE[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in timesofpeace, instability,andconflict? Whatare thepolitical,military,environmental,or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?ThisquestionisoutsidethescopeofmyexpertisesoIcouldnotofferananswerwithoverwhelmingconfidenceinitsaccuracy. Iwouldhazardaguess thatactorsmightcontest theuseofspaceatvarious timesduetoamixofvariouscontributingcharacteristicsthatsuchactionsencompass.Interferingwithorhackingaspaceobjectwouldbeanew,unique,ground-breakingactivityandwouldthereforebeanefariouslyprestigiousaccomplishuntoitself.Secondly, interfering with space activities offers disproportionately large effects compared to the time andresourcesrequired.Thirdly,asattributionwouldbedifficult,thelureofanonymityisalsoanattractiveaspect.Regardingthepolitical/military/environmental/socialcostsofactingonthesemotivations,theysetaprecedenceandopenthedomaintothesetypesofactions.

Dr.MartinLindseyAerospaceEngineer(USPACOM)

7July2017


Interviewer: [Q3]Okay.So,youmentionedsomecollaborationeffortsbetweenEuropeancountries,theUS,Canada,andAustralia,but,beyondsomeofthatcollaboration,areanyofthesebigcountriesworkingtogetherbilaterallyinclosecollaborationwhenitcomestothespacedomain?And,onthe other hand, do the space interests and space-related actions of any of these countriesopenlyconflictwiththoseofanyothercountries?

M.Lindsey: [Q3] I would argue that there’s a lotmore cooperation going on in the space domain than

competition.Idon’tknowhowyouwanttodefine“conflict,”butthere’sreallynotanykindofovert or even covert conflict that I’m aware of right now in space—though, there iscompetition.But,overall,Ithinkthere’salotmorecooperationgoingoninspace.Again,alotofthatisdonemultilaterallyonthecommercialsideorbilaterally.

[Q3]SomeexamplesofmultilateralcooperationwouldbetheUShasaFiveEyesrelationship,

right? That relationship spills over into cooperation on technology development, and spacetechnologydevelopment,betweenthefivecountriesinthatpartnership.

[Q3] In Asia, the Asian nature is to bemore bilateral thanmultilateral across the board in

everything. So, a lot of the relationships inAsia are bilateral in nature—so, you see a lot oftimeswherecountrieswillgotoJapanorgotoChina,orincreasinglythey’regoingtoIndiaorEuropeancountries, togettheir firstexposuretodevelopment inspace.So,yousee like, forexample,theChinesewillflycountryX’ssatelliteforverylowprices,andinreturnthey’llworkout some agreement maybe for ground station access in that country. There are some


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multilateralspaceinstitutionsintheAsiaPacific.Thesearemostlyonthecivilsideofthehouseorthecivil/commercialside.I’mnotreallyawareof,otherthantheFiveEyespartnership,anyrealnationalsecurity-relatedrelationshipsbetweencountriesintheregion—though,withtheone exceptionbeing thatUSSTRATCOM isworking a series of a space situational awarenessagreements throughout the world, and these are bilateral agreements with countries thatincludeseveralcountriesintheAsiaPacific(e.g.,Australia,Japan,Korea).

Interviewer: [Q3]Okay.So,fromalonger-termperspectivewithrespecttosomeofthesecountries’space

interests and where they see themselves going, while you think things seem to be mostlycollaborative at the moment, do you foresee any sort of situation in which some of thesecountries’ interests might drive things to become more competitive or possibly evenconflictual? And, if so,what types of things in particular do you thinkmight be the leadingdriversofincreasedcompetitionandconflict?

M.Lindsey: [Q3]Sure.So,asImentionedearlier,therearevariousspaceracesgoingonintheAsiaPacific

region—the big ones being between China and India, and then to a lesser degree betweenChinaandJapan,andthesearemoretiedup innationalismandglobalprestige—they’renothead-to-head competitions for their own sake. But, having said that, of course there arecountries in the region that do have military space capabilities and military counter-spacecapabilities, so I think it is a logicalextension to say thata conflicton thegroundcaneasilyextend into the space domain if it involves those countries, and, arguably, a conflict couldbegininthespacedomainandthenspillovertotheterrestrialside.Imean,certainlyleadersinourowncountryoverthepastcoupleofyearshavebeenexpressingconcernswiththeriskofthathappeningandtheneedtobereadytodealwiththat.

[Q3] So, I think that’sa real concern,and I think it’sa concern for countries throughout the

world because there’s a recognition that any type of kinetic conflict in space doesn’t getlimitedtothepartiesthataredirectlyinvolved;itspillsovertoeverybodythatusesthatregionofspace.So,Ithinkcountriesareconcernedaboutit,andIthinkalotofcountriesarestillinapositionofknowingthattheycan’treallydomuchaboutitdirectly.

[Q3]So,istheriskincreasingordecreasing?Well,Ithinkit’sdouble-edged.It’sincreasingfrom

thestandpointthatthetechnologyisimprovingandmakingiteasiertogetintospaceanddothingsinspacewhereyoucoulddoactionsthatwouldconstituteconflict.Ontheotherhand,Ithinkthere’sagrowingrealizationthatthethingsthathappeninspaceaffecteverybodyandthe risks of escalating a terrestrial conflict go up exponentially because of the increasingdependence on space. So, I think it’s double-edged, and, at this point, I’m not sure whichdirection a lot of countries are going to go in. From observation, again, we see things thatdisturbuswithcertaincountries,butwe’dhavetotalksomewhereelseaboutthat.

SergeantFirstClassJerrittA.LynnCivilAffairsSpecialist(UnitedStatesArmyCivilAffairs)

17August2017WRITTENRESPONSE[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in times of peace, instability, and conflict?What are the political,military, environmental, or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?


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Whilethemilitaryapplicationofspaceactivitieswasadrivingfactorduringthefirstspaceraceandcontinuestobeofconcern,thereisanothermotivatorthatisalmostasimportanttorecognizeininternationalpolitics.Theroleofprestige in influencing a state's actions cannot be overstated. Theway states perceive one anotherwithin theinternationalsystemisamotivatorthatcanliterallysendamantothemoon.Internationalprestigewasafactorduring the space race, and it continues to be one as other states are pushing their way into the internationalspotlight.ChinajustrecentlyfinishedconstructionontheFive-hundred-meterApertureSphericalTelescope(FAST)inPingtung.Thisiscurrentlytheworld'slargestradiotelescopeandissupposedtoenableresearchofthefurtheststars, search forextraterrestrial life, anddetectnewgalactic andextragalacticpulsars (Williams II 2015).As theinternationalscientificcommunityusesthisplatform,itwillgarnerinternationalprestige,granttheopportunitytoconductcutting-edgeresearch,andaidinChinabecomingagloballeaderinthespaceandsciencecommunity.InDecember2016,China’sInformationOfficeoftheStateCouncilreleasedawhitepaperdetailingChina’sspacestrategy and principles of development (David 2016). Wu Yanhua, deputy chief of the China National SpaceAdministration (CNSA) stated thegoalsare to landa roveron thedark sideof themoonby2018, its firstMarsprobeby2020,andtobecomeamongthemajorspacepowersoftheworldby2030(Jiang2017).TheseareclearlyarticulatedgoalsforChinatoreachparitywiththeU.S.withinarelativelyshorttimeframe.China’sfirstsuccessfulsatellitelaunchwasin1970,ayearaftertheU.S.landedthefirsthumanonthemoon.Despitethatgap,Chinaisproving its willingness to allocate resources to become a global leader in space. In August 2016, the PeoplesRepublicofChinalaunchedthefirstprototypequantum-communicationssatelliteintoorbit(Chin2016).Theintentistousesubatomicparticlestosendsecurecommunicationsbetweentwopoints,oneinspaceandoneonland(Merchant2017).AlthoughthisextraordinaryleapinsciencereceivedlittleinthewayofheadlinesintheUnitedStates,itssignificanceisnoteworthy.Thesciencebehindquantumcommunicationsisstillinitsinfancy,butitcanchangethefieldofsecurecommunications.Researchershavebeensuccessful insendingquantumcommunicationsbutonlyby land (Merchant2017). If theChinesearethefirsttoprogress inquantumcommunicationsviaspace,theywillhaveamarkedadvantageoverthe U.S. If they are successful the quantum communications system would secure their data and render ittheoreticallyunhackable,givingthemasizeableleadindefensivecommunicationsmeasures(Chin2016).Althoughthespaceraceinthesecondhalfofthe20thcenturywasbipolarinnature,theproliferationofspacetechnologyandassetsinthe21stcenturyhasallowedforamultitudeofparticipantsinthecontemporaryenvironment.Achieving such a feat only garners Chinamore notoriety andprestige for accomplishing somuchwithin such asmall amount of time. This can assist the Chinese government in reaping domestic and international support.Prestigeitselfmaynotbeeasilyquantifiable,butitisaresourceastatemustcapitalizeontotheirownadvantage.Theallocationofresources isalsomanifesting itself inthedevelopmentofanewspacestation.Launchedinthefallof2016,theChinesecurrentlyhavethethirty-four-foot-longTiangong-2spacelaborbitingEarth.China’svisionis to commission theTiangong-3 space station in2022 (Nowakowski2016).This launchcoincideswith the2024retirementdateof the InternationalSpaceStation (ISS),which is theorbiting laboratoryutilizedby theU.S.andother international space partners. Currently, neither the U.S. nor any other state has planned to construct oroperateaspacestation.IftheISSisretiredandgoesintodisrepair,theChinesewouldbetheonlystatewithanoperational space station. They have already begun to leverage this position by signing agreements with theUnited Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). This is going to have further implications for U.S., asUNOOSAannouncedarecentagreementwiththeChinaMannedSpaceAgency(CMSA)toconductspaceactivities.Inadditiontotheplannedspaceflightmission,theUNOOSAandCMSAagreementallowforUNmemberstatestoapply for permission to conduct research and experiments aboard China’s planned space station, Tiangong 3(UnitedNationsInformationService2016).Itisunknownwhatthelong-termeffectsofthiswouldbe,butitwouldbe hard to argue that China owning and operating the sole space stationwould be beneficial to U.S. strategicconcernsoreasediplomatic relationsbetween the two. It is tooearly to tellwhetherornot theChinese spacestationwillbesuccessful.But,ifso,theChinesewillhaveanadditionalstrategicmeanstocreatepartnershipsontheirterms.


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Even though one could argue the current international system favors the U.S., they have only been successfulbecauseof the internationalpartnershipsandalliancesshe isable tomaintain.Theseareat riskasother statesbecomemoredominantand findmeans (i.e. suchasspaceactivities) toenticeotherstates traditionallyalignedwiththeU.S.toreconsidertheirstrategicpartnerships.OneofthewaysspaceactivitiesprovideotherstateswiththeopportunitytosubvertU.S.diplomaticeffortsaretheU.S.’sTechnologySafeguardAgreement(TSA),whichhaslimited itswillingness to share technology anddevelopment in the realmof space activities, particularly orbitalsatellites.Thisapproachhascreated frictionbetween theU.S.andmany foreignnations,whichhasopened thedoorforChinatobuildstrategicrelationshipswithstates lookingtodeveloptheirspacecapabilities:“TheCMSAgivesa lotofcountriesaniceopportunitytodevelopnewpartnershipstostayactive inspaceexploration,“saysAlannaKolikowski,anexpertinChinesetechnologypolicyandvisitingprofessorattheUniversityofGottingeninGermany (Dillow, Lin, and Singer 2016). China has assisted countries like Venezuela, Laos, Nigeria, Belarus,Pakistan,andBrazilwithsatellite launchesandmilitarygradehardware(Dillow,Lin,andSinger2016).Currently,China is constructinga space telemetry, tracking,andcontrol facility inArgentina thatwillprovideChinawithanodeintheSouthernHemisphere,allowingittoretrievedatafromsatellitesbeforetheypassovermainlandChina(EconomicandCommission2016).BrazilisparticularlyofnotebecauseoftheleadershippositionitplaysinSouthAmerica.AstrategicpartnershipwithBrazilprovidesaccessandplacementtothemajorityofSouthAmericaandtheirresources.Sincethebeginningofthespaceraceinthelate1950's,Brazilianleadershaverecognizedthatthedevelopmentofaspaceprogramwasintegraltoachievingastatusasaneconomicanddiplomaticleader.Brazil’scurrentpositionastheprimaryleaderinSouthAmericanspaceactivitiesalsoputspressureonthemtoachievesuccessinordertoremain the continents de facto leader. Brazil has been developing its Agencia Espacial Brasilieria (AEB), (theirnational space agency) because they believe space is intertwined with their national defense and economicprosperity(Anderson,Conrad,andGamberini2014).Duetoaseriesofsetbacks,suchasfailedlaunchesresultingin the deaths of technicians, tensions between military and civilian agencies, and unsuccessful cooperationbetween theprivateandgovernmental sectors,Brazilhashad to look internationally forassistance.Since1999,China and Brazil have worked in tandem, successfully putting the CBERS-1 satellite into orbit in 1999 withoutrelying on technology or support from the dominant space powers (US, Russia). Since then there have beenmultiplelaunches,allwithChineserockets(Anderson,Conrad,andGamberini2014).MovingfromSouthAmericatotheMiddleEast,theUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)hasafewgoalsthattheyhavesettheir sights on achieving, such as establishing the first space center in theMiddle East (MohammedbinRashidSpaceCenter(MBRSC),conductingthefirstmissiontoMarsbyanArab/Islamiccountry,andbecomingoneoftheprimary leaders in space by 2021 (UAE Space Agency 2016). The expanse of space activities within the globalcommunityhasthechanceofexpandingthebreadthofscientificknowledge,butitalsoaddsadditionalactorsintospace, increasing the chance for diplomatic andmilitary opportunities and conflict. The UAE has also signed aMemorandumofUnderstandingwithChinatodefineaframeworkforcollaborationinspacescience,aswellasthepeacefulexplorationofouterspace(UAESpaceAgency2015).InadditiontosecuringapartnershipwithChina,theUAEandtheU.S.havealsoenteredanagreementtocooperateinaeronauticsresearch,andtheexplorationanduse of airspace and outer space for peaceful purposes (NASA 2016). This is but one example of how theproliferationof spaceactivities is influencing the internationalpolitical environmentand is setting the stage forcooperation,competition,andpotentiallyconflict.TheU.S.hasbeenthehegemonicleaderinspacefordecades,soitisunderstandablethatpolicy-makerswouldbeconcernedabouttheproliferationofspaceactivitiestootherstates.SpacehastraditionallybeenadomainfortheU.S. that had little competition; therefore, it required littlemaintenance. It is no surprise then that there is aconcern every time a newspaper reports that the Chinese space program isworking on sending a rover to themoonorthattheyarebuildingtheirownspacestation.ThisdynamicchallengestheunquestionableholdtheU.S.has on hegemony in space, and because power is relational, it directly affects U.S. power in diplomacy,information, military, and economics (DIME). The domain of space is integral to the ability to project nationalpower ineachoftheDIMEcategories.Therefore,achallengetospacesupremacy isachallengetoU.S.nationalpowerwrit large.Thegrowingnumberof stateactorswith spaceprograms is changing the internationalpower


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dynamicandalteringinternationaldiplomaticrelations.Insteadofthemorepredictablebipolarspacecompetitionwith the SovietUnion, the contemporary environment is comprisedof a growingnumberof actors in space, inwhicheachentityhastheirspecific interests inmind,creatingboththechanceforopportunityandconflictwiththeUnitedStates.ReferencesAnderson,D.J.,Conrad,D.W.,&Gamberini,S.(2014).SpaceandDefense.SpaceandDefense,7(1),6–25.Chin,J.(2016,August20).China’sLatestLeapForwardIsn’tJustGreat—It’sQuantum.TheWallStreetJournal.Retrievedfromhttp://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-latest-leap-forward-isnt-just-greatits-quantum-1471269555David,L.(2016,December28).China’sLoftySpaceAmbitionsInclude2018LandingonMoon’sFarSide.RetrievedFebruary25,2017,fromhttp://www.space.com/35156-china-moon-far-side-landing-space-goals.htmlDillow,C.,Lin,J.,&Singer,P.W.(2016).China’sracetospacedomination: let’sgotothemoon!Spacestations,moonwalks,andspy-proofsatellites--Chinaleavesnodoubtaboutitssoaringambitions.PopularScience,(5),64.Economic, U.-C., & Commission, S. R. (2016). 2016 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and SecurityReviewCommission.USGovernmentPrintingOffice.Jiang, S. (2017, January 5). China: We will be on Mars by the end of 2020. Retrieved January 7, 2017, fromhttp://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/asia/china-space-program-white-paper/index.htmlMerchant,N.(n.d.).China’s launchofquantumsatellitemajorstep inspacerace.RetrievedApril24,2017,fromhttps://phys.org/news/2016-08-china-quantum-satellite-major-space.htmlNASA. (2016, June12).NASA,UAE Sign SignificantOuter Space,Aeronautics CooperationAgreement. RetrievedFebruary 25, 2017, from https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-uae-sign-significant-outer-space-aeronautics-cooperation-agreementNowakowski,T.(2016,May22).ChinarevealsdesignforplannedTiangong3spacestation.RetrievedFebruary25,2017, from http://www.spaceflightinsider.com/missions/human-spaceflight/china-reveals-design-planned-tiangong-3-space-station/UAESpaceAgency.(2016).Missions.RetrievedNovember22,2016,fromhttp://www.space.gov.ae/United Nations Information Service. (2016, June 16). Press Release: United Nations and Chinahttp://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2016/unisos468.htmlWilliams II,R. L. (2015). Five-HundredMeterApertureSphericalRadioTelescope (FAST)Cable-SuspendedRobotModel and Comparison with the Arecibo Observatory. Retrieved fromhttp://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.727.1253&rep=rep1&type=pdf


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ColonelDavidMiller

Commander,460thSpaceWing(USAirForce)7July2017

INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPTInterviewer: [Q3]Perfect.So,myfirstquestioniswhatarethemajor,centralthingsthatweshouldknow

aboutthesecountries’spaceprograms,theirspace interests,andtheirspaceambitionsbothwithrespecttogovernmentandcommercialrealms?Though,asyounoted,pleasefeelfreetofocusonthegovernmentandmilitaryrealmshere.

Col.Miller: [Q3] From a big-picture perspective, the reasons why various nations go to space are notfundamentallydifferent.Thewherewithalthesenationshavetopursueactuallygoingtospaceand,asaresult,theareasthattheyfocusonwillbedifferent.Butthebasicreasonsforgoingtospacehaven’tchanged,andthisiscertainlythecasefortheUnitedStatesinthe60+yearswe’vebeeninterestedinspace.

[Q3]WecantracethisbacktothefirstmonthsaftertheAirForcebecameaseparateservicein1947.Wehadadedicatedfocusongoingtospace,andthereasonhadtodowiththephysicsoftheEarth.Ifyouwanttosee,shoot,move,orcommunicateoverthehorizon,there’sonlysomuchyoucando lineof sightwith terrestrial-basedsystems.So, fromamilitaryperspectiveand a national security perspective, afterWorldWar II,with the ColdWar ramping up, andconcernedaboutmissilegapsandthingslikethat,wewenttospace—toseeoverthehorizon.Andwhenyou’retalkingaboutpotentialadversariesorpotentialhostilestates—atthattimetheSovietUnion—youhavea lotofdeniedareas.Youhavea lotofareaswhereyou’renotgoing to be able to fly an aircraft, place a radar or be able to do the surveillance andverificationyou’dneedtoassurebothyourowncivilianorpoliticalpopulation,aswellasallies,whatthe levelofsecuritywas.So, Idon’tthinkthatthat is fundamentallyanydifferentthanwhy the UK, Australia or Canada or any other very strong partners of ours is interested inspace.Theyrecognizethatadversariesorpotentialadversariesorjustnationsingeneraldon’twantyouflyingovertheirterritoryorbasingterrestrial-basedsurveillancesystems.Ifyouwantto provide some level of security as to the intent and capability sets of potential securitychallengesonthehorizon,you’regoingtoneedawaytogetthatinformation—spaceprovidesawaytodothatandhashistoricallybeenrelativelysecurefromadversaryinfluenceordenial.

[Q3]Asyoucansee,themostvisiblemanifestationnow,certainlycommercially,isinremotesensing and navigation to communicate and navigate over the horizon. The Europeansobviously have their own global positioning or position navigation and timing efforts thatthey’repursuing.TheRussianshavetheirs.TheChinesehavetheirs.TheneedtoprovidetheabilityfornotjustpeopleintheirArmedForces,butforeverybodyforcommercialciviluseaswellasnationalsecuritymissions. Hence, therequirement tobeable tonavigateandmoveoverthehorizondrivesyouintocertainareasofoperationornewdomains,andthosetendtobe, like I said, remote sensing and satellite communications. You’re not going to be able tostringfiberandwireeverywhereacrosstheglobe—there’s,numberone,securityreasonswhypeoplewouldn’t let you do that, but also it just doesn’tmake sensemonetarily. Therefore,actorstendtogotospacetoensureglobalcommunicationsaswell.So,asyoucansee,Idon’tthink that those space mission sets we have pursued over the past 60+ years havefundamentallychangedreally.

[Q3]IntheDefenseDepartment,wetypicallylumpthosemissionsetsfromanationalsecurityperspective under the term “force enhancement.” That those capability sets (intelligence,


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surveillance and reconnaissance; positon navigation and timing for GPS; military satellitecommunications;etc.)provideourmilitaryforcesanunmatched,asymmetricadvantagewhichallows that our military leaders to see the battlespace with clarity, provide earlywarning, strikewith precision, navigatewith accuracy, communicatewith certainty,understand weather impacts and operate anywhere on the globe—which ultimatelyresultsinfewercausalitiesforus,aswellasfewercasualtiesfromcollateraldamage.Andtheprinciplereasonswe’reabletodothissoeffectivelyarethecapabilitiesIjustdescribedtoyouthat we derive from space. We know where the adversaries are. We can mass quickly ifneeded.Wecancommunicateoverthehorizonandfight in largeformationsonascalethat,frankly,nobodyhaseverseenbefore.Wecandoallofthissoefficientlythatourdecisionloopfortargetingisofteninsideapotentialadversary’sdecisionloop,andwecanassesshowwe’vedoneandensureweminimizeciviliancausalitiesaswellasthreatstoUSforcesoralliedforcesonalevelthatwehaveneverbeenonbefore.That’swhythefocusinrecentyearshasbeensomuchonprotectingourspacecapabilitiesintheUnitedStates.

[Q3]Over the past 25 years since Desert Storm, whenwe first really started to see this inearnest, adversaries have started to seek the ability to 1) obtain their own capability to dowhattheUSisdoingand2)looktodenythatcompetitiveadvantagethattheUSorallieshaveifasecuritychallengearises.

[Q3]So,ifyoulookatanyofthosenationstatesthatyouhavelistedinyourquestion,Ibetyoutheywanttobeabletocommunicateoverthehorizon.Ibetyouthey’dwanttohave,fromasecuritystandpoint,indicationsandwarningofthreatstotheirstatebecause,ultimately,theyhavealotofsecurityconcerns.Maybetheyhaveadversariesorpotentialadversariesintheirregion contesting, or at least concerned about, airspace in the ocean areas off their coast.Those are all things that they’re interested in, so the things that they want to derive fromspaceare those samecapability sets. Fromamilitary standpoint, you say theywant to: see,shoot,move, and communicate over the horizon. But if you’re a civilian, obviously, it’s notnecessary to shoot over the horizon, instead those other capability steps are fundamentalreasons for their interest in space, and certain things have developed certain levels ofexpertise. I thinkyoucansee that theseotheractorsareable to invest incertainaspectsofthattoallowthemtobepre-eminent,insomesense,oratleastgloballycompetitive.

[Q3] For example, some British firms are really good at building small satellites. Astechnologies have improved, and as the need for bigger sensor and/or communicationspackages has been reduced to smaller requirements, you start to see things like SurreySatelliteTechnology,whichisanexampleofawholelotofcapabilityinaverysmallsatellite.Differentstatesordifferentcompanieshavedifferentstrengthsthatcertainlyplaytothebasethattheyhave,typicallywithintheirowngovernment,butonaninternationalscaletheycancertainlysellthosetoanybody.

Interviewer: [Q3]Atamorecountry-specificlevel,howdothesecountries’spaceinterestsandinvestmentsdifferincomparisontoeachother?Whatarethekeydifferentiatorsbetweenthesecountries’interestsandinvestmentsinthespacerealm?

Col.Miller: [Q3]Idon’tknowthatI’mcapableofansweringthatquestionforanyothercountry.Though,Ithink,obviously,alotgoesintothat—eachofthesecountrieshastomakeitsownveryspecificcalculations.Undoubtedly,factorslikegeography,theenvironment,andthecountry’sspecificneighborsareimportant.Certainly,thecountry’shistorymattersaswell—whathashappenedandthecountry’sperspectiveonthingsisdrivenbythathistory.

[Q3]Ultimately,acountry’sinterestswilldrivewhatitincentivizeswithinitsowncommercialorcivilindustriesinordertosupportitsspecificdevelopmentefforts.Idon’tthinkthisgeneral


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processisdifferentforanyparticularnation,butitcertainlyexplainsmaybewhyagivennationoraconsortiumofnationswouldinvestincertainthingsversusothers.

Interviewer: [Q3]Okay. So, are there any glaringly obvious differences in the types of things,materials,and/or activities that some of these countries have been investing in or focusing on in thespacedomain?

Col.Miller: [Q3]Of late, I think there’s pretty good documented unclassified evidence—and you couldlookatthereportsoftheDefenseIntelligenceAgencyortheDepartmentofDefensereleasesformoredetails—thattheRussiansandtheChinesehaveinvestedheavilyinallofthoseforceenhancement capabilities that I described to you earlier. Whether it’s remote sensing,navigation and timing, communications, etc., both Russia and China have been investingheavily in order to improve their military capabilities. Russia and China are doing so fordifferent reasons, because they’re at different stages in their development, but they’veinvestedcertainlyheavilyinthose.

[Q3]ChinaandRussiahavealsoinvestedheavily,particularlylatelyinthelastdecadeorso,incounter-space capabilities. They are investing in the capability to deny, disrupt, defeat,degrade US or allied space capabilities, in particular, in an effort to deny us our militaryadvantage. A lot of Russia’s and China’s capability sets are linked between both space andcyber,soyou’llseecommonalitiesintheirinvestmentportfolios.

[Q3]It’snosecretthatwehavepartneredwithalliestoinvestincertaincapabilitysets.We’vepartnered with some allies for investments in satellite communications, for example.Australianshavemadeinvestmentsinthingslikewide-bandglobalsatellitecommunications.

[Q3]We,astheUnitedStatesmilitary,looktoensureinteroperabilityofourmilitaryweaponssystemswithourallies. It’snotaverygoodcoalition force if theequipmentandcapabilitiescan’t talk to eachother. So, aswemove forwardwithourNATOalliesorothers,we like toensure that our capabilities are interoperable (i.e., the capability to process and receiveremote sensing information, the capability to leverage different navigation and timingcommunications, etc.). Making sure that we are interoperable is a priority for us—it’sobviouslyonadifferentscalewithdifferentallies,butinteroperabilitybringsalotofcredibilitytothecoalitionorthealliedmilitaryforceyou’retryingtogenerate.

[Q3]Theseare the typesof investments that I’veseen.Whatyoucansee isa lotofnationsthathavethecapabilitytolaunchsatellitecapabilities—theJapanesehavethecapability,theIndians have the capability, the French have the capability, etc. Likewise, the Russians andChineseobviouslyhavethatcapabilityaswell.Havingthecapabilitytodoyourownlaunchandreconstitution ifneeded,orcertainlygenerationofcapability, ispartoftheconsiderationforclassificationasa“spacefaringnation”fromanationalsecurityperspective.

[Q3]Why does thatmatter?Well, in order to do that, you’vemade investments in launchvehicle delivery to orbit, typically ballistic missile technology or missile technology overallwhether liquid or solid fuel; you’ve made investments in navigation; and you’ve madeinvestmentsintechnologyforoperationsinorbit,batteries,etc.,andyou’vemadeinvestmentsingroundinfrastructureandlaunchrangecapability.

[Q3]So, there’s industries that all supportnations thatoperate in, throughand fromspace,andinordertosustainyourselfasacrediblenationstatedoingthat,you’dneedinvestmentsinallthoseindustries.

Interviewer: Okay great. I promised you that this discussion would only be 30-minutes and we areapproaching that half-hour mark right now. So, I just want to conclude by asking one last


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generalquestion.IsthereanythingthatIhaven’taskedyouthatyouthinkIshouldhave?Oristhereanyfinalpointthatyou’dliketoconcludewithasclosingremarks?

Col.Miller: [Q3 indirectly] I guess the only point I would add is one to help provide some additionalcontext.There’sbeenalotofinterestlatelyinhavingdiscussionsabout1)whattrendswe’reseeing in terms of space, 2) the implications of those trends toUS national security, and 3)whattheUSneedstodoinordertoensurethat itmaintainacompetitiveadvantagefortheAmericanmenandwomenwhoareinuniform.

[Q3] Several years ago there was a lot of hesitation to talk about space as a war fightingdomain. In fact, I think you’d probably hear from some leaders that they probably couldn’tevenusethatterminologysomeyearsago.AndIdon’tthinkatallthattheDepartmentortheAirForce,inparticular,islookingforconflictinspace,butmyconcernafterdoingthisbusinessnowfor24-years is that Idon’tknowthattheAmericanpeopleorevensomeinthemilitaryappreciatetheuniqueadvantagethattheyderivefromspace.Thisadvantagesimplycannotbeprovidedbyterrestrialmeans—there’snoaircraftthat’sgoingtoreplacespacebecausethereare denied areas and there’s no radar or suite of radars that’s going to be close enough toreplacethecapabilitiesyouhavefromspace,particularlyintermsofgeospatialaccuracyoverthe horizon. All of these systems need to be developed to be complementary….all arenecessaryandneitheraloneissufficient.

[Q3] So, if you value the speed, precision, and force protection, aswell as the limitation incasualtiesthatwederivefromspace,thenyouneedtomakeinvestmentsinordertoprotectanddefendit.Ithinkthesoonerwestarttohavethatdiscussionaboutwhatthatneedstobeandtowhatextentwewanttodothat,whichIthinkneedstobeanationaldiscussion,notjustamilitarydiscussion,Ithinkthebetteroffwewillbe.Thereisonlysomuchthatwe’regoingtobe able to protect anddefendwith the current architecture and environment thatwehaverightnow.A lotof thesesystemsareyears toacquisitioncycles. Ithasbeen20-yearssince IfirstcameheretoBuckleyAirForceBaseasaCaptain,butit’sthesameweaponssystemthatwewereacquiring then that is being fieldednow. It is capable andneedsupgrades, but it’sbasicallythesamething.Theassumptionsabouttheneedtoprotectanddefendatthattimewereminimaltonone.Itwaslargelya“benignenvironment.”

[Q3] There needs to be a strategic level discussion on what is the advantage that the USderives fromspace?Andhowmuchdoyouvalue that?Whether it canbe replacedorwhatothermitigationstrategiescanbeput inplace,andthenmakeadeterminationofwhereweneedtogointhefuture.Wecan’tkeepstudyingthisanddebatingitforthereasonsItriedtodescribe to you today at the unclassified level. The pace of development for counter-spaceactivity issignificantand ifwe,asanation,don’tactquicklyenough,wejustmayjeopardizetheasymmetricadvantagethatourspacecapabilitiesprovidewhichourjointwarfightershavebecomesorelianton.Wereallyneedtostarthavingthediscussionabouttheadvantagewederivefromspaceandhowmuchwewanttoprotectitinthefuture.


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Dr.DeganitPaikowskyTelAvivUniversity11September2017

WRITTENRESPONSE

[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in times of peace, instability, and conflict?What are thepolitical,military, environmental, or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?

“MotivationsofNation-StatestoContestSpace”**Myanswertothisquestionisbasedonmynewlyreleasedbook:Paikowsky,Deganit.ThePoweroftheSpaceClubinWorldPolitics(CambridgeUniversityPress:2017).Mainargument:Nationsdevelopindigenousspaceprogramsbecausetheyassumethatthisisexpectedoftheminordertomaintaintheirpowerand internationalstanding,orbecausetheyaspiretohigherpowerandstatusforgeo-politicalanddomesticreasons,regardlessofcleartangiblecost/benefitconsiderations.Indifferenterasinhistory,certainqualitiesorareasofexpertiseareidentifiedasindicatorsofpowerandsymbolsofhighstanding.Usually,acquiringanddevelopingthesequalitiesrequiremassive investmentsofresourcesandlarge-scalenationalefforts.Despitethedifficulties,risks,andhighcosts,orbecauseofthem,nationsthataspiretopower and high standing often invest valuable resources and efforts in acquiring expertise in these areas. Thenationsthathavesucceededinthistaskarerecognizedbymanyasanelitegroup—aclub.UndertheaxiomdevelopedintheColdWarspaceracethatthe“Controlofspacemeanscontroloftheworld,”thecountriesreaching outer space were recognized as a superior and exclusive group.19Inlinewiththisreality,decision-makers and state officials often choose to emphasize the political aspect of their country’saccomplishmentsandjustifynationaleffortstoacquiresuchqualitiesbyarguingformembershipintheclub.Upuntiltoday,thespaceclubisnotaformalinternationalorganization.Nevertheless,despitetheabsenceofaformalorganization,ithasanactualandsignificantroleinworldpolitics.Acceptedexplanationsforthemotivationofstatesintheirquestforspacecapabilityaretangiblematerialisticorpractical, functional reasons,which fall into threemaincategories:nationalsecurityandmilitaryconsiderations;economicgrowthandprosperity,development,andbenefittosociety;and/orthedesireforinternationalprestige.Theseconsiderationsmaybeintuitivelyappealing;nevertheless,theyarechallengedbyempiricalevidence.Theseconsiderationsmayexplainnations’interestinusingspaceapplications.However,theyareinadequateforsolelyexplainingnationaldecisionstoundertakelarge-scalespaceprogramsandtodevelopindigenouscapacitiesinspacetechnology,letaloneprojectsthatdonotprovideimmediatetangiblebenefits.Carryingoutanindigenousspaceprogramrequiresenormousefforts,massiveinvestmentsofresources,ahighleveloftechnologyandalargescientificinfrastructure.Relyingonthepurchaseofsatellitesandservicesforspaceapplicationsismuchcheaper,especially as space technology becomes a commodity and many space applications that providetangible/functionalbenefitscanbepurchasedatasensibleperunitcost,orareavailablethroughcooperation.Thedecision to indigenouslydevelop space technology isnot trivial.Nevertheless, a largenumberof statesareactive in space and seek their own capabilities. They attribute strategic value to a variety of technological andscientificmissions,aswellastonationalrecordsandvisibleachievements.Furthermore,theirdecision-makersand

19Johnson,LyndonB.,SummaryStatement,HearingsofthePreparednessSubcommittee,SenateArmedServicesCommittee,SenateInquiryonMissiles,January8,1958.


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stateofficialsoftenemphasize thepoliticalachievementof theircountry’saccomplishments inspacebyarguingformembershipinthespaceclub.Basedonarichanddetailedanalysisofarangeofspaceprogramsofstateswhicharenotusuallyatthefocusofworld politics and its research, comes out that joining the space club is a legitimate and rational decision. Thestrategic significanceof space technologyand itsdual civil-militarynaturemade the space challengeverymuchappealingtomanynation-states.Asaresult,spacecapabilitybecamean importantmarkofgreatpowers.SincetheearlydaysoftheRacetospace,joiningthespaceclubisalegitimateandrationaldecision.Acountrythatseesitself asapowerdeservingofa seatat the tableofworldgovernance isexpected to race for space.Therefore,states often engage in indigenous development of large-scale space programs with no direct cost-benefit tosecurity or economic considerations. This is not to say that tangible security and economic considerations areirrelevant to states’ decisions to embark on large-scale projects. In most cases, these considerations do exist.Nevertheless, states are unlikely to pursue the development of indigenous capacity only for clear tangiblecost/benefitconsiderations.Asnotedabove,theyarelikelytodosowhensuchbehaviorisconsistentwithawidersetofdomesticandnationalperceptionsofwhatisexpectedofthem,giventheirpowerandposition.

Dr.EdytheWeeks

AdjunctFullProfessorandFullbrightSpecialistinInternationalRelations,InternationalSpaceandOuterSpaceDevelopment,WebsterUniversityandWashingtonUniversity,St.Louis)

16August2017(Interview)INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPTInterviewer: [Q3 indirectly] So, let’s jump into those specific questions from our list that you identified.

Let’s start with Q11 first. So, what opportunities are there to leverage ally and commercialcapabilities to enhance the resilienceof space services for commercial andnational securitycriticalspaceservices,andwhatarethemajorhurdlestodoingso?

E.Weeks: [Q3 indirectly]Okay. Inpreparingmyanswer to thisquestion, I kindof tried to identifyandaddressthemainproblems.So,itseemslikethepurposeofyourstudyistoexaminehowtheUSgovernment can retain initiative in the spacedomainand counter any intent todenyUSand partner freedom of action in this vital domain, which has become critical to militaryoperationsandothernationalsecurityactivitiesacrosseverydomain.Assuch,beforeIanswerthisspecificquestion,I’dliketoprovideaninsighttoyou:Idon’tbelievetheUSgovernmenthaslostitsinitiativeinthespacedomain.Then,whatI’mcuriousaboutisthatthiseffortseemstohaveatwo-prongedpurpose.TheotherhalfofthepurposeistocounteranyintenttodenytheUSanditspartnersfromfreedomofaction.So,I’msuspectingthattheremaybeaconcernthatifmaybeChinaorRussiadecidetogoinandpartitionoffacertainareaofspaceanddonotallowtheUStocomethrough,perhapstheUSGandmilitarywantstoknowwhattypeofprotection theyhave (i.e.,what theOuter SpaceTreatywould sayabout that, or somethinglikethat).

[Q3indirectly]Okay,so,inlightofmycuriosityaboutthemainpurposeofyourstudy,here’smyanswertoyourspecificquestion.

[Q3 indirectly] Ibelieve thataonce ina lifetimeopportunityexists forAmerica to regain itsimage as a great leader. Once upon a time, the US was seen as a great nation. EveryonewantedtocometotheUnitedStates.TheUnitedStatesofAmericawasseenasstartingtolosethatpower,bytheway,butatonepoint,afterWorldWarIIupuntilabout10yearsago,the


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UnitedStateswas seenas like theDisneylandof theworld—thenewworld, thegreatplacewheremagicalthingscouldhappen.And,inmyexperiencetravelingtovariouscountries,mostpeople throughout the world feel like they have some vested interest to protect Americabecause, In my opinion, people tend to see America not just as another country but aseveryone’scountry,solongastheycouldfigureoutawaytogetthere.But,we’restartingtolosethat.

[Q3 indirectly] I believe that outer spacewill be developed, and this is certainly in processnow,andtheUnitedStateshasanopportunitytoremainasbeingseenasaleaderinspace,aswellasacrossotherrealms,bycreatinganewvision—avisionthatwouldincludetheUnitedStates as the great giver, who cares, and who wants to include every single person in theplanet to somehow connect themselves to contribute to and, therefore, also find a way tobenefitfromthisgrandnewdevelopmentopportunitythat’sinprocess.

[Q3indirectly]Onethingweknowisthatthere’sadirectlinktoinequality,realorperceived,andconflict.So,ifwearetalkingaboutreducingconflict,orwinningconflict,wemustconsiderthepowerof ideology. ImaybetheonlypersonintheworldthatrealizesjusthowpowerfultheUnitedStatesstill is intermsof itssoftpower ideology(i.e.,blue jeans,MichaelJackson,McDonalds,CocaCola,etc.).

[Q3 indirectly]Okay, so in termsof space, I believe theUS can reshape its vision as theUSleadingtheworldintothisdomaincalledspace.Ithinkthiscouldpropelitself likeaglueandevenattract thenations thatwehaveplacedon the list asbeingouradversary,becausenoleaderwantstolosecontroloftheirpopulation.Noleaderwantstoriskthat.So,whatdomostpeopleintheworldwant?Mostpeopleintheworldwantsomesortofeconomicopportunity,security that translate to a place to live, cleanwater, food, taking care of themselves, theirfamily, health, etc. So, this tends to be linked to opportunities, career, or economicopportunities,andspace,givenitsnatureofunlimiteduntapped“resources”(i.e.,notjustoneplanet, but possibly many planets, particularly given the Kepler discovery that I thinkconfirmed that their up to 30 Earth-like planets). This vision, to feel good at a time whenthere’snothingelsetomakepeoplefeelgood,ispowerful.

[Q3 indirectly]So, toanswer thequestion.Whatopportunities thatare to leverageally andcommercial capabilities? So, this would include the private sector, the commercial sector,government, allies, the international community, etc.—it would include everyone. And, I’msuggesting teaching on, as an ideology, an invitation to other peoplewho currently just seespaceas something for richwhitemaleelites.Because thiswhatpeople say, “Space?!Whatare you doing in space? Isn’t space just for rich white male elites?” And as long as thatperceptionof space continues, theNASA is in jeopardyevery year and the same is the casewith space programs throughout the world. There’s been a missed opportunity to actuallyaccept a broader range of people throughout the globe into space in a way that meanssomethingsociallyrelevantfortheirreallives.

Interviewer: [Q3 indirectly]Okay.So, it sounds likeyou’resuggesting theUSsortof take the initiative toleadaglobaloutreachcampaigntypeefforttoemphasizethemutualbenefitofinvestmentinspace.Sortoflikea“oneforall,allforone”typeofinitiativewhereeveryonecanbenefitfromtheUSleadingtheefforttocreateglobalcooperation.

E.Weeks: [Q3indirectly]Yes.Ilovethewayyousaidthat.Now,ifwewereinaroomwithpeoplefromall around theworld, youmight be attacked. These peoplemay say, “What? That’s naïve.”WithintheUS,somepeopleoperatingwithinthespacecommunityarenotAmerican,perse,orcometotheUSbecausetheUSistheleaderwhenitcomestospace.ThereisadiscourseintheUSthatwewill losethat leadership ifwedon’tdosomethingsoon,though Idon’tknow


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where this fear and suspicion is coming from. But, right now, we have the leadership, sothere’s a rhetorical truth and a discourse coalition that tends to raise concerns aboutsuggestions thatweshare resources,wonderwhyweshouldshare,andraiseconcernaboutredistribution,but that isn’twhat I’mtalkingabout.Howmuch is thecost toshareavision?Motivational speakers do this all the time, and they’re not sharing theirmillions of dollars,they’redoingmotivationaltalksandshowingothersopportunitiesandthenwhatcanbedonetocapitalizeonthoseopportunities.

[Q3indirectly]I’vebeendoingthisnowforseveralyearsmyselfonbuses,toschoolchildreninthrowawaycommunities,onairplanes,inclasses,andwitheverydaypeopleallovertheworld.What I’ve found is thatpeople justhaven’tbeen invited to allow themselves to think aboutspace,and,therefore,that’stheonlyreasonthey’renottranslatingallofthistothemselvesinsomerealizablepersonalway.That,Ithink,isamissedopportunitythatcanbecapitalizedtoleverage ally and commercial capabilities, and it can also enhance the resilience of nationalsecurity.

[Q3 indirectly]Forexample, let’s lookatthe Iraqwarsituationandthe insurgenciesandtheIEDs, so let’s take that scenario. So,watching that playout over the years, several thoughtscomeintomymind.One,youhavesomeobviouslybrilliantpeoplewhohavenomoneyorverylittle money that came up with some very powerful things that were causing the mostpowerful military force on Earth not to win as eagerly as it had anticipated. So, what wasbacking that?Well, I’ve come up with a term that I use in teaching international relationscalled “brewing resentments.” This concept points to the existence of repressed hostilities,which have been allowed to remain unaddressed. There’s some hatred, and there isresentmentagainsttheUnitedStatesbecauseofperceptionsregardingthingsthatoccurredinthepast.Tome,thisseemedtohappenduringthedevelopmentandmodernizationparadigmafterWorldWarIIandupuntiltheColdWarperiod.So,peopleintheworldarestillwaiting.Theyarewaiting forAmerica tobegreat.Theyarewaiting for things that theybelievewerepromisedwouldhappenbutneverhappened.AdversariesoftheUnitedStatescanusethesesentimentstoturnpeopleagainsttheUnitedStates,andifwedon’tdosomethingquickly,thissentiment is likely to spread, aswe saw in the case of Iraq, Afghanistan, andmore recentlywiththeSyrianrefugeecrisisandall themillionsofpeoplewhoare leavingNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEastandrunningintovariousplacesinEurope.Thesethingsarecausedbywhatwecall“inequality”ininternationalrelations.Nomatterwho’sfaultitis,wheninequalityexistsitcausespeopletofeeldesperateandtobemorelikelytododesperatethings,andbecausetheUnitedStatesisstillaunipolarpower,it’seasyforpeopletodirecttheirattentionandfocustothatunipolarpower.

[Q3indirectly]MyconcernisthatwecouldseesituationssimilartotheIEDphenomenonbutinthespacedomain—newpeople,newgroups,evenpeoplewithintheUnitedStatesfocusingtheir attentionon the spacedomain. So,why are somanypeople upset?Why are somanypeople trying todestroyotherpeople?Forme, thekey isaperceptionthat there’sa lackofrealizableeconomicopportunitiesforthem.Inaddition,anotherkeymaybethatpeoplefeelaninjusticehasoccurredthathasbeendirectedatthem,andthosetheylove.Real,historicalor imagined, these psychological factors can be built into ideologies by key actor to amasspower tremendous amounts of power to trigger large populations to consent to specificactionsortotakespecificactionsthemselves.

[Q3 indirectly] So, if the proponents for the development of outer space are correct, outerspacedevelopment,asteroidminingandotherindustries,canbecomethenewgamechanger-notjustfor200or2000people,butagamechangerforeverysinglepersonintheworld.So,wouldn’t it be wonderful if outer space activities did actually create situations to produceeconomicprosperity foreveryone.Wouldn’t itbewonderful if theUnitedStatescould lead?


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MygrandmotherwasafirmbelieverintheAmericanDream—anybodycanbelikeEdisonandinventsomethinggreat—so,whataboutthat?We’velostthat.TheUnitedStatesseemstobelosingthatpreciousthingthatonlyithad,andthat’sthisvisionandtheabilitytomakepeoplefeelgreat.

[Q3indirectly]WhenIwasabout23yearsold,IwasalawstudentandItraveledaroundtheworld,andsomanypeoplecameuptomeandsaid,“Whereareyoufrom?Wow!You’refromAmerica?!Wow!Whyareyouhere?”Andthefeelingthen inthe1980swasstillanextremeinterestandhopeintravelingtoAmericaandtherestoftheworld.Mostofthepeopleintheworldcan’tleavetheircountry,andiftheycan,theycan’tgetintoothercountries.Thathasalwaysstayedinmymind.

[Q3indirectly]America isstillaveryspecialplace,andit isa landfullofopportunities. Ifwelose this, then the whole world loses this forever, and there is no telling where things willdevolveto.But,wecansavethisnowwithspace.

[Q3indirectly]Inreadingthroughyoureffort’svariousdocuments,IsawRussia,China,NorthKorea, Iran, etc. listed as adversaries, but if you deconstruct the discourses of negativestatements towards theUS from some of these leaders, it’s nomysterywhat is driving theresentment.It’sthesamethingthatdrivesyoungpeopleintheMiddleEasttofeeltheneedtocreate IEDs. People resent the United States because they feel like it hasn’t lived up to itspromises.Peoplefeelkindoftrickedbythefeel-goodideologyandtheyaretiredofwaiting.

[Q3indirectly]So,IseespaceasanopportunityfortheUStoemulateandtomakegoodonthepromisesmade.TheUSisinspace,anditstillgetsthegreenlightandinternationalsalutefrompeoplethroughouttheinternationalspacecommunitybecauseofwhathasresultedwithrespect to sharing technology. People admire the way the United States encouragesbusinessesthroughtechnologytransfers,contract loans,researchanddevelopment,etc.Thewaywesharethosekindsofthingswiththeworldandwiththeprivatesectorisreallyadmiredbypeoplethroughouttheworld.


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ViaSat,Inc.

RichardA.VanderMeulenVicePresidentofSpaceandSatelliteBroadband

KenPetermanPresident,GovernmentSystems

ShannonO’MearaSmithExecutiveDirectorofStrategicInitiatives

FredTaylorVicePresident,SpaceandCyberApplications

BruceCathellVicePresidentofGovernmentOperations

15August2017WRITTENRESPONSE

[Q3]Whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)tocontestuseofspace in times of peace, instability, and conflict?What are the political,military, environmental, or social costsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?Economic,societal,andevenmilitaryactivitiesinland,sea,andairdomainsdependonspaceecosystems;thus,amotivetodisrupteconomic,societal,ormilitaryactivitiescould leadtoacontestagainstspaceecosystems.Themosteasily identifiablemotiveofnation-stateandnon-stateactorsagainstspaceecosystems, includingSSA,EO,PNT, and Satcom is to disruptmilitary command and control (C2). In order to disrupt these capabilities, theseactorswillmost likely focus theiractionson those thatafford the leastattribution,provide themost significantdetrimentaleffects,andareimplementedatthelowestcostandwithintheshortestamountoftimepossible.Forexample,significantdamagetothegroundsegmentmaycreateanequallyorevenmoredetrimentaleffecttotheecosystemthancontestingassetsinSpace.Actions takenagainst these spaceecosystems innon-spacedomains, can reduce,deflect,oreveneliminate thepolitical,military,environmental,orsocialcostsassociatedwithpotentialnation-stateandnon-stateactoractionsormotivationsagainsttheseecosystems.EscalationintotheSpacedomainmuststillbeconsidered;butshouldbeconsidered along with an analysis of the full ecosystem in order to understand the least attributable, mostdetrimental,lowestcostthreatsthatexistinalldomains.To optimize military/government performance and threat defense and deterrence, all the elements Spaceecosystemsmustbeharmonizedacrossallofthedomainstheyoperatein.WebelievethevalueswegainfromourNational Security Space systemswill continue tobe at higher risk until the leadership andoperationsof all theelementsordomainsoftheseecosystemsarealignedandharmonized.