Case No. 2014 IL ________IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

People of the State of Illinois, ) Appeal from the Appellate Court, Second Appellee - Plaintiff ) Judicial District, Case No. 2-12-0688 ) ) Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial v. ) Circuit, Lake County, Illinois ) Case No. 07 CM 8549 )Christopher Briggs, ) Honorable Michael Betar, PresidingAppellant - Defendant ) Trial Judge.

MOTION TO DECLARE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT ACT AND SUPREME COURT RULE 317 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND MEMORANDUM OF

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

As a threshold matter the Appellate Court by not judicially hearing my appeal and allowing

a non-judicial ministerial court clerk to hear my judicial case, render judicial orders, and final

judgment has, at a bare minimum, violated my constitutional due process right to be heard

judicially. This is a question under the Constitution of the United States or of this State which arises

for the first time in and as a result of the action of the Appellate Court.

The clerk has no judicial power. Livingston County Building & Loan Ass'n v. Keach, 213 Ill.

59, 60, 72 N.E. 769, 770 (Ill., 1904); Ill. Const.1970, Article VI, § 18(b) (“clerks and other non-

judicial officers”).

Illinois Rules of Evidence Rule 201 imposes a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty on the

court requiring the court take judicial notice when Rule 201(d) states: “When Mandatory. A court

shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.”

Illinois Rules of Evidence, Article II, Rule 201(d) (West 2014).

Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of the fact that all

orders in case 2-12-0688 (Exhibit 1) are unsigned and appear in the name of Clerk Robert J.

Mangan.

1

This court's jurisdiction is defined by section 4 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution, which

is helpfully entitled “Supreme Court—Jurisdiction.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4. Subsection (a)

defines our original jurisdiction, subsection (b) defines our jurisdiction over direct appeals from the

circuit court, and subsection (c) establishes our jurisdiction to hear appeals from the appellate

court. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §§ 4(a), (b), (c). Therefore, because the instant case involves an

appeal from the appellate court, subsection (c) is the only relevant provision. Accordingly, I believe

it is worth setting out in its entirety: “Appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court are a

matter of right if a question under the Constitution of the United States or of this State arises for the

first time in and as a result of the action of the Appellate Court, or if a division of the Appellate Court

certifies that a case decided by it involves a question of such importance that the case should be

decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals from the

Appellate Court in other cases.” (Emphasis in original.) Wauconda Fire Protection Dist. v. Stonewall

Orchards, LLP, 214 Ill.2d 417, 444-45, 828 N.E.2d 216, 232 (Ill., 2005); Yellow Cab Co. v. Jones,

108 Ill.2d 330, 338, 483 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (Ill., 1985); Ill. Const. 1970, art. V I, § 4(c).

Our Constitution’s words are clear, unambiguous and need no interpretation. The

constitutional provision at issue here provides that: “The Supreme Court may provide by rule for

appeals from the Appellate Court in other cases.” Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(c). Stated differently:

When a constitutional question arises for the first time in and as a result of the action of the

appellate court an appeal to the Supreme Court is a matter of constitutional right and rules do not

apply and rules may not interfere with the constitutionally protected right.

The above provision is quite clear. “In other cases” than appeals as of right, we have

“jurisdiction” over appeals as we “provide by rule.” (Emphasis in original.) Wauconda Fire

Protection Dist. v. Stonewall Orchards, LLP, 214 Ill.2d 417, 445, 828 N.E.2d 216, 232 (Ill., 2005).

Constitutional provisions which are plain and explicit on their face, the meaning of which is

clearly apparent, permit of no construction by the courts. Yellow Cab Co. v. Jones, 108 Ill.2d 330,

336, 483 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Ill., 1985), citing DeBruyn v. Elrod , 84 Ill.2d 128, 134, 418 N.E.2d

413, 416 (Ill., 1981).

2

“[T]he doctrine is firmly established, that where the words employed, when taken in their

ordinary, natural signification, and the order of their grammatical arrangement given them by the

framers, embody a definite meaning which involves no conflict with other parts of the same

instrument, then that meaning which is apparent upon the face of the instrument is the only one we

are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed, and there is no room for construction. * * * When

a particular act is inhibited by the clear and unambiguous language of the constitution, the policy of

such inhibition, or the inconvenience that may ensue its enforcement, is a matter with which the

court has no concern; its duty is simply to reverently recognize and faithfully enforce.” DeBruyn v.

Elrod, 84 Ill.2d 128, 135, 418 N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill., 1981), quoting Hills v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. 86,

90-91 (Ill., 1871).

As this court has observed: ‘The constitution is the supreme law * * * and every court is

bound to enforce its provisions.’ Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 161 Ill.2d 502,

508, 641 N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ill., 1994), quoting Coalition I, 65 Ill.2d 453, 460, 359 N.E.2d 138, 141

(Ill., 1976), in turn quoting People ex rel. Miller v. Hotz, 327 Ill. 433, 437, 158 N.E. 743, 745 (Ill.,

1927).

However, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 317 entitled: “Appeals from the Appellate Court to

the Supreme Court as of Right”, unconstitutionally adds additional requirements not found in our

Constitution’s appeal as a matter of right contained in Article VI, § 4(c). Rule 317 unconstitutionally

adds pre-conditional appeal terms: “Appeals from the Appellate Court shall lie to the Supreme

Court as a matter of right in cases in which *** a question under the Constitution of the United

States or of this state arises for the first time in and as a result of the action of the Appellate Court.

The appeal shall be initiated by filing a petition *** If the court allows the petition, briefs, and

abstracts in cases in which they are required, shall be filed…” (Emphasis added.) ILCS S. Ct. Rule

317 (West 2014).

In Illinois, jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution. People v. Davis, 156 Ill.2d 149, 156,

619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ill., 1993).

3

A court cannot, by its rules, divest itself of, limit or restrict the jurisdiction conferred on it by

law. Pisa v. Rezek's Estate, 108 Ill.App. 198, 202 (1 Dist., 1903).

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 317 is facially unconstitutional, as requiring one with an appeal

as a matter of a constitutional right to petition the Supreme Court for permission to exercise the

right expressly granted by our Illinois Constitution of 1970 in Article VI, § 4(c).

[C]ourts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137, 180, 2 L.Ed. 60 (U.S., 1803).

The Illinois Judiciary, in enacting Supreme Court Rule 317, has unconstitutionally granted

itself arbitrary power to deny the constitutionally protected right to be heard on appeal at the Illinois

Supreme Court as granted by our Constitution in Article VI, § 4(c) thereby also interfering with the

Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be heard.

The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial

proceedings. Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 1765 (U.S.,

1996), citing Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 23 L.Ed. 914 (U.S., 1876), Louisville &

Nashville R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236, 20 S.Ct. 620, 622, 44 L.Ed. 747 (U.S., 1900),

Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436, 21 S.Ct. 836, 839, 45 L.Ed. 1165 (U.S., 1901).

‘An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law.’ Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 408, 83 S.Ct.

822, 832 (U.S., 1963), quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376, 25 L.Ed. 717 (U.S., 1879); Ex

parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248, 6 S.Ct. 734, 738, 29 L.Ed. 868 (U.S., 1886); Reynoldsville Casket

Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 760, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 1752, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (U.S., 1995) (a law

repugnant to the Constitution “is void, and is as no law.” (concurring opinion, quoting Siebold )).

‘Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether its proceedings are

in conformity with the Constitution and laws, because, living under a written constitution, no branch

or department of the government is supreme; and it is the province and duty of the judicial

department to determine in cases regularly brought before them, whether the powers of any branch

of the government, and even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws, have been

exercised in conformity to the Constitution; and if they have not, to treat their acts as null and void.’

4

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1956, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (U.S., 1969),

quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199, 26 L.Ed. 377 (U.S., 1880).

Our Supreme Court rulemaking authority arises from the Illinois Constitution of 1970,

Article VI, § 16, giving the Court constitutional power to modify its rules. See In re B.C.P., 2013 IL

113908, 8, 990 N.E.2d 1135, 1138 (Ill., 2013).

Rules of court must not be contrary to the constitution. Kinsley v. Kinsley, 388 Ill. 194, 198,

57 N.E.2d 449, 451 (Ill., 1944), citing People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Feinberg, 348 Ill. 549,

556, 181 N.E. 437, 440 (Ill., 1932) (Rules must, of course, be consistent with the law.)

Further, Illinois Appellate Court Act 705 ILCS 25/8.2 is also facially unconstitutional, with

the words of our Illinois Constitution’s Article VI, § 4(c) changed from “or” to “and”, thereby

requiring judicial approval of an appeal as a matter of constitutional right.

It should be noted at the outset that the supreme law of this State, the Illinois Constitution,

in Article VI, § 4(c) delineates an appeal as a matter of right as distinct and separate from a court’s

certification of legal questions, when the words of Article VI, § 4(c) use the disjunctive “or” and not

the conjunctive “and” as used in the Appellate Court Act (705 ILCS 25/8.2). The Act

unconstitutionally interferes by imposing additional conditions on an appeal as a matter of right

created by our Constitution’s Article VI, § 4(c).

The words of the Illinois Appellate Court Act in Section 8.2 track the words of our

Constitution’s Article VI, § 4(c) verbatim except for changing the word ’or’ to ‘and’: “Appeals from

the appellate court shall lie to the Supreme Court as a matter of right only (a) in cases in which a

question under the Constitution of the United States or of this state arises for the first time in and

as a result of the action of the appellate court, and (b) upon the certification by a division of the

appellate court that a case decided by it involves a question of such importance that it should be

decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals from the

appellate court in other cases.” Illinois Appellate Court Act (705 ILCS 25/8.2) (West 2014).

[c]onstitutional right cannot be made to depend upon a statute. People v. Hryciuk, 36 Ill.2d

500, 503, 224 N.E.2d 250, 251 (Ill., 1967).

5

The General Assembly cannot enact legislation that conflicts with specific provisions of the

constitution, unless the constitution specifically grants the legislature that authority. O'Brien v.

White, 219 Ill.2d 86, 100, 846 N.E.2d 116, 124 (Ill., 2006), citing See, e.g., Thies v. State Board of

Elections, 124 Ill.2d 317, 325–26, 529 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Ill., 1988).

Since Marbury v. Madison, 1803, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60, courts have recognized that

where the constitution and a statute are in conflict, the constitution prevails. People ex rel. Keenan

v. McGuane, 13 Ill.2d 520, 532, 150 N.E.2d 168, 175 (Ill., 1958).

Illinois Appellate Court Act (705 ILCS 25/8.2) violates an appeal as a matter of

constitutional right by granting the Illinois Judiciary discretion to deny certification thereby

circumventing a constitutional appeal as a matter of right created by our Constitution in Article VI,

§ 4(c). This is unequivocally unconstitutional on its face.

[t]he legislature cannot enact a statute that overrides or circumvents the constitution. Davis

v. Brown, 357 Ill.App.3d 176, 183, 827 N.E.2d 508, 515 (2 Dist., 2005), citing see Chicago Bar

Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 163 Ill.2d 290, 297, 644 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 (Ill., 1994).

Further, any legislative action which is contrary to the Constitution is void. Rockford

Memorial Hosp. v. Department of Human Rights, 272 Ill.App.3d 751, 763, 651 N.E.2d 649, 659 (2

Dist., 1995), citing See In re Tingle, 52 Ill.App.3d 251, 256, 367 N.E.2d 287, 292 (1 Dist., 1977)

(Any legislative action contrary to the constitution “is unconstitutional and void.”)

[w]here it is clear that a limitation or restriction imposed by the people in the fundamental

law has been violated or disregarded by the General Assembly or any other authority whatever, it is

the plain duty of the court to so declare, and that duty can neither be evaded nor neglected in the

case of an act of the General Assembly, no matter how desirable or beneficial the attempted

legislation may be. (Emphasis added.) Sutter v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 640-

41, 120 N.E. 562, 565 (Ill., 1918)

The Constitution is supreme, and, whatever the purpose of the people may have been in

imposing a restriction upon legislation, it must be obeyed. Board of Trustees of Jr. College Dist. No.

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521, Jefferson Counties, 24 Ill.App.3d 183, 185, 321 N.E.2d 127, 128 (5 Dist., 1974), quoting

Sutter v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 640-41, 120 N.E. 562, 565 (Ill., 1918).

A statute which is facially invalid has no force and effect upon any person or entity

regardless of the specific circumstances. People v. Nance, 189 Ill.2d 142, 146, 724 N.E.2d 889,

891 (Ill., 2000), citing In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill.2d 414, 439, 680 N.E.2d 380, 392 (Ill., 1997).

An unconstitutional legislative enactment is void. See, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159,

28 S.Ct. 441, 454, 52 L.Ed. 714 (U.S., 1908).

The Illinois Appellate Court Act (705 ILCS 25/8.2) unconstitutionally allows an appeal as a

matter of right, as expressly granted by our Constitution in Article VI, § 4(c) only after the very

same court, that has caused a question under our Constitution(s) or an important legal question to

be presented as a result of the action of the Appellate Court, certifies its own actions as legally

important. The Act unconstitutionally grants an appellate court discretion to interfere with or deny

an appeal in diametric opposition to an appeal as a matter of right as granted by our Constitution in

Article VI, § 4(c).

Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to

exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the

course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Osborn

v. Bank of U.S. 22 U.S. 738, 866, 6 L. Ed. 204 (U.S., 1824).

‘It is a most extraordinary doctrine that the court has a discretion to enforce or not enforce

a provision of the constitution according to its judgment as to its wisdom or whether the public good

will be subserved by disregarding it.’ Coalition I, 65 Ill.2d 453, 460, 359 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ill., 1976),

quoting People ex rel. Miller v. Hotz, 327 Ill. 433, 437, 158 N.E. 743, 745 (Ill., 1927).

The Appellate Court Act (705 ILCS 25/8.2) gives a court colorable authority to act in a

manner that causes a question under our Constitution(s), legally affecting a party, to then review its

own actions and/or deny certification unconstitutionally interfering with an appeal to the Illinois

Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional right.

7

‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75

S.Ct. 623, 625 (U.S., 1955), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (U.S.,

1954).

Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of

law. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2687 (U.S., 1980).

If one puts aside for a moment the legal issue that Supreme Court Rule 317 and the Illinois

Appellate Court Act unconstitutionally interfere with an appeal as a matter of constitutional right

and focuses their attention on the judicial conduct Canons found in our Illinois Code of Judicial

Conduct, ethical questions suddenly appear: Is it fundamentally fair to a party legally affected as a

result of the action of the appellate court to allow the same judges to decide whether their own

actions are important enough to them or it whether it advances their overall objective to be

reviewed by another court?

‘A fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46,

95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464 (U.S., 1975), quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625,

99 L.Ed. 942 (U.S., 1955); Scott v. Department of Commerce and Community Affairs, 84 Ill.2d 42,

54, 416 N.E.2d 1082, 1089 (Ill., 1981).

As we perceive the overarching issue on appeal impacts the actions of the judges

involved, we are compelled to consider the Code of Judicial Conduct and its canons provided in the

supreme court rules. Recognizing that the canons are incorporated in the supreme court rules we

are mindful of the supreme court's directive that its rules are not aspirational, have the force of law,

and should be adhered to as written. Stewart v. Lathan, 401 Ill.App.3d 623, 627, 929 N.E.2d 1238,

1242 (1 Dist., 2010), citing See Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill.2d 204, 210, 652 N.E.2d 275, 277–78 (Ill.,

1995).

Supreme Court Rule 63, Canon 3, provides: “(4) A judge shall accord to every person who

has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.”

Stewart v. Lathan, 401 Ill.App.3d 623, 627, 929 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (1 Dist., 2010).

8

The legal mind will ask: What Illinois court that intentionally fails to apply our

Constitution(s) and Laws during its proceedings by having its non-judicial ministerial clerk hear

judicial matters, create judicial orders, and final judgment as evidenced case 2-12-0688, will

suddenly become law abiding, reverse course, and certify their constitutional violations to a higher

court for review? Both the law and equity know the answer, and of course provide rights and

remedies for the injuries.

The Appellate Court is equally bound with every other court to observe and regard

constitutional rights of a litigant, and a writ of error from this court to the Appellate Court will lie on

the ground that it has disregarded or violated constitutional rights. People v. Powers, 283 Ill. 438,

440, 119 N.E. 421, 422 (Ill., 1918), citing Sixby v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 260 Ill. 478, 481, 103 N.E.

249, 250 (Ill., 1913).

What person could be surprised by the fact that my MOTION TO CERTIFY LEGAL

QUESTIONS THAT SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT, filed in the Appellate

Court, was denied by an unsigned order (Exhibit 2) created by a non-judicial Appellate Court Clerk

with the legal effect of denying certification of important legal questions and thereby denying our

Constitution’s Article VI, § 4(c) due process right to be heard by the Illinois Supreme Court? It

would appear that the judges and clerks of our Illinois courts are the foxes acting as gatekeepers

guarding against access to our courts.

“[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of

government” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 140

L.Ed.2d 1043 (U.S., 1998), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2976, 41

L.Ed.2d 935 (U.S., 1974).

Our Illinois Constitution in Article VI, § 4(c) has made an appeal to the Supreme Court a

matter of right if a constitutional question arises for the first time in and as a result of the action of

the Appellate Court. That is, a party has a right to have his case heard by the Illinois Supreme

Court and “need not petition that court for an exercise of its discretion to allow him to bring the case

9

before the court.” See e.g. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441-42, 82 S.Ct. 917, 919, 8

L.Ed.2d 21, 26 (U.S., 1962).

With the Appellate Court Act and Rule 317 the sovereign has usurped our Illinois

Constitution by giving itself the discretion to deny an appeal as a matter of constitutional right, by

withholding certification at the Appellate Court or by requiring a petition for leave to appeal at the

Supreme Court. This is factually exactly what has occurred in this case. The Appellate Court has

been motioned to certify legal questions and has denied certification (Exhibit 2), violating my

constitutional right to be heard on appeal. Further, after my Notice of Appeal was filed, the Illinois

Supreme Court in direct violation our Constitution’s appeal as a matter of right as granted in Article

VI, § 4(c) has refused to docket or hear my case.

“[f]or an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a

person's reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently unconstitutional.’ ” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434

U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (U.S., 1978), quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,

412 U.S. 17, 32–33, n. 20, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 1986, n. 20, 36 L.Ed.2d 714), see U. S. v. Goodwin, 457

U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2488 (U.S., 1982).

An appeal is perfected when the notice of appeal is filed in the lower court, and no other

step in the perfecting of an appeal is jurisdictional. People ex rel. Sandberg v. Grabs, 373 Ill. 423,

427, 26 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Ill., 1940).

Jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine; not to determine without hearing. Windsor v.

McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 284 (U.S., 1876).

In a noncapital case, an appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal, and “The only

requirements a defendant must meet for perfecting his appeal are those expressed as time

limitations within which various procedural steps must be completed” People v. Ross, 229 Ill.2d

255, 263, 891 N.E.2d 865, 871 (Ill., 2008), quoting Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 442,

82 S.Ct. 917, 919, 8 L.Ed.2d 21, 26 (U.S., 1962). People v. Lewis, 234 Ill.2d 32, 37, 912 N.E.2d

1220, 1223 (Ill., 2009); Brehm v. Piotrowski, 409 Ill. 87, 90, 98 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ill., 1951) (Filing of

10

a notice of appeal within due time causes jurisdiction of the reviewing court to attach instanter and

deprives the lower court of jurisdiction).

Therefore, by operation of law, the Illinois Supreme Court in the instant case has

jurisdiction that has been transferred to it from the Appellate Court pursuant to the Notice of Appeal

(Exhibit 3) filed as a matter of constitutional right.

“The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it.” Howlett By

and Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2440 (U.S., 1990), quoting

Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 58, 32 S.Ct. 169, 178, 56 L.Ed. 327 (U.S.,

1912), further citing see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 (U.S., 1947),

Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M.R. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 208, 45 S.Ct. 47, 48, 69 L.Ed. 247

(U.S., 1924), Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637, 4 S.Ct. 544, 551, 28 L.Ed. 542 (U.S., 1884).

The Court with jurisdiction transferred to it pursuant to an appeal filed as a matter of right

as granted by our Illinois Constitution in Article VI, § 4(c) is the Illinois Supreme Court. The Justices

of the Illinois Supreme Court have not docketed or heard my case in direct violation of my due

process right to be heard on appeal as granted by our Illinois Constitution in Article VI, § 4(c).

[t]he Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government officials “ ‘ “from abusing

[their] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.” ’ ” Collins v. Harker Heights, 503

U.S. 115, 126, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1069, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (U.S., 1992) (quoting DeShaney v.

Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1003 (U.S., 1998) (in

turn quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670–671 (U.S., 1986). County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1716-1717, 140 L.Ed. 1043 (U.S.,

1998).

After filing my Notice of Appeal (Exhibit 3) as a matter of constitutional right and by

operation of law transferring jurisdiction, the Illinois Supreme Court Justices with Clerk ‘Lisa’ acting

as their proxy, telephoned me on April 23rd at 10:33AM with the ‘legal advice’ that, quote: “my

appeal was not proper” and subsequently the Court mailed to me a letter that states: “we [the

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Clerk] are enclosing a pro se template to guide you while preparing your petition for leave to

appeal.” (Exhibit 4)

In other words, according to our Illinois Supreme Court’s Justices unsupported legal

conclusions, masquerading as ‘legal advice’ emanating from their non-judicial ministerial Court

Clerk, a party with an appeal as a matter of constitutional right must first petition the Illinois

Supreme Court for permission to exercise that constitutional right. Fascinating.

Jurisdiction is the right to hear and decide, and it must be exercised. Overby v. Gordon,

177 U.S. 214, 221, 20 S.Ct. 603, 606, 44 L.Ed. 741 (U.S., 1900).

I must thank the Justices of our Supreme Court for their irrational exuberance and

unsupported ‘legal advice’ attempting to dissuade me from exercising my appeal as a matter of

constitutional right coming from a Court with jurisdiction that refuses to acknowledge our

Constitution’s appeal as a matter of right as evidenced by it enacting and enforcing its own facially

unconstitutional Supreme Court Rule 317 and by refusing to docket or hear this judicial matter in

violation of our Federal Constitution’s due process right to be heard. With the filing of the Notice of

Appeal the Illinois Supreme Court acquired jurisdiction, and just as the Appellate Court did in this

case, this Court is attempting to convey its will through a non-judicial, ministerial clerk. Our

Constitution forbids such bad acts.

Clerks of the circuit courts are nonjudicial officers of the judicial branch of state

government. Pucinski v. County of Cook, 192 Ill.2d 540, 545, 737 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ill., 2000);

Kane County v. Carlson, 116 Ill.2d 186, 200, 507 N.E.2d 482, 487 (Ill., 1987); Drury v. County of

McLean, 89 Ill.2d 417, 420, 433 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Ill., 1982)(We hold that under our constitution of

1970 the clerks of the circuit courts in this State *** are nonjudicial members of the judicial branch

of State government.); Ill. Const.1970, Article VI, § 18(b) (“clerks and other non-judicial officers”).

The Illinois Supreme Court’s ‘legal advice’ comes not directly from any Justice but in the

form of a letter (Exhibit 4) from its Clerk stating: “You are advised that a ‘notice of appeal’ cannot

be filed to bring a case from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court.” Fascinating. But of course

12

just as with any order, judgment or decree emanating from a non-judicial ministerial clerk it is a

legal nullity.

The employees of the Office of the Clerk simply fill clerical positions. see, Keim v. U.S., 177

U.S. 290, 293, 20 S.Ct. 574, 575 (U.S., 1900).

The law is clear that when one acts upon the advice of a deputy clerk, he does so at his

own peril. Libert v. Turzynski, 129 Ill.App.2d 146, 152, 262 N.E.2d 741, 743 (1 Dist., 1970), citing

Bernier v. Schaefer, 11 Ill.2d 525, 530, 144 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ill., 1957) (It is no part of a deputy

clerk's task to give litigants legal advice.)

This court has jurisdiction on direct appeal of all cases involving a substantial constitutional

question. People v. McGhee, 35 Ill.2d 302, 303, 220 N.E.2d 205, 206 (Ill., 1966); Ill. Const.1970,

art. VI, § 4(c). (Entitled: “Supreme Court—Jurisdiction.”); Illinois Appellate Court Act 705 ILCS

25/8.2 (West 2014).

[t]his court has repeatedly stressed that a hearing is required whenever the petitioner

makes a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d

366, 381, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1072 (Ill., 1998) (Citations omitted.)

I relish the predictable logic of the law. I realized the first time that I received an unsigned

‘order’ in about 2002 created by a Clerk appointed for life by the Judges of the same Appellate

Court, that it was not within a clerk’s power to render judicial orders because a clerk is a not a

judicial officer. Earlier this year I immediately observed that the Appellate Court Act and Rule 317

unconstitutionally interfered with a constitutional appeal as a matter of right. That is why in my filed

Notice of Appeal (Exhibit 3) I specifically appealed pursuant to the unconstitutional Illinois Appellate

Court Act. The Justices of our Illinois Supreme Court are now proffering that its rules take

precedence over an appeal as a matter of constitutional right. Fascinating.

Now the constitutionality of the Rule, the Act, and the Appellate Court Clerk’s illegal acts

are all at legal issue in the Illinois Supreme Court that currently has jurisdiction pursuant to the

Notice of Appeal filed as a matter of constitutional right.

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We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp

that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123, 142-143, 28 S.Ct. 441, 447 (U.S., 1908).

I now have been directly legally injured. I have legal standing, and justiciable issues have

been presented to the Illinois Supreme Court with jurisdiction transferred to it from the Appellate

Court pursuant to a Notice of Appeal filed as a matter of constitutional right.

The good news is that I have had the absolute pleasure of doing the Justices legal

research already. The bad news is the King has moved itself into Checkmate. Just as pure logic

dictates our constitutions and laws along with a sound and uniform body of uncontroversial legal

precedent state that: 1) A clerk does not have judicial power, and 2) Any Act or Rule that interferes

with a constitutional right is void ab initio.

My legal advice in response to the Supreme Court’s unsolicited and unsupported ‘legal

advice’ to me: Start your temerarious legal research with Miranda and never forget that you swore

in your Oath of Office to uphold the Constitutions and Laws of Illinois and the United States. That is

your fulltime duty.

Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or

legislation which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491, 86 S.Ct. 1602,

1636, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (U.S., 1966).

Only last year this Court in Blair once again affirmed the applicability our U.S. Supreme

Court’s Norton rule: The void ab initio doctrine is based on the theory that " ‘An unconstitutional act

is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it

is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.' " People v. Blair,

2013 IL 114122, ¶ 28, 986 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ill., 2013), quoting Perlstein v. Wolk, 218 Ill.2d 448, 454,

844 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ill., 2006), in turn quoting Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct.

1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (U.S., 1886); People v. Schraeberg, 347 Ill. 392, 394, 179 N.E. 829, 830 (Ill.,

1932); City of Ottawa v. Hulse, 332 Ill. 286, 293, 163 N.E. 685, 688 (Ill., 1928); Chicago,

Wilmington & Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 454, 73 N.E. 770, 780 (Ill., 1905).

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[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law, and can neither confer a right or immunity nor operate

to supersede any existing valid law. Chicago, I. & L.R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566, 33 S.Ct.

581, 585 (U.S., 1913), citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 1125, 30

L.Ed. 178, 186 (U.S., 1886); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 376, 25 L.Ed. 717, 719 (U.S., 1879).

The validity of a rule adopted by this court should be tested by the same standards as are

applicable to a statute. Yellow Cab Co. v. Jones, 108 Ill.2d 330, 338, 483 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (Ill.,

1985).

[pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Norton rule, supra] an unconstitutional statute is

void ab initio, i.e., void “from the beginning.” People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 28, 986 N.E.2d 75,

81 (Ill., 2013).

[a] law repugnant to the Constitution “is void, and is as no law,” Reynoldsville Casket Co.

v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 760, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 1752 (U.S., 1995) (concurring opinion), quoting Ex

parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376, 25 L.Ed. 717 (U.S., 1879); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,

180, 2 L.Ed. 60 (U.S., 1803).

Unlike the Miranda right however, this Court does not have the right to remain silent, in fact

each Justice of our Illinois Supreme Court has a fulltime duty. The Justices of our Supreme Court

have sworn upon oath to uphold and enforce our constitutions and laws.

“the judicial branch may, indeed must, intervene in matters generally reserved to the other

branches of state government when an action of the executive or legislative branches offends the

Illinois or United States Constitutions.” In re Adoption of L.T.M., 214 Ill.2d 60, 71, 824 N.E.2d 221,

228 (Ill., 2005), quoting In re Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill.2d 448, 458, 763 N.E.2d 741, 747 (Ill.,

2002).

It is the duty of the judiciary to construe the Constitution and determine whether its

provisions have been disregarded by the actions of any of the branches of government. Rock v.

Thompson, 85 Ill.2d 410, 418, 426 N.E.2d 891, 896 (Ill., 1981), citing People ex rel. Harrod v.

Illinois Courts Com., 69 Ill.2d 445, 458, 372 N.E.2d 53, 59 (Ill., 1977), see also Powell v.

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1956, 23 L.Ed.2d 491, 508 (U.S., 1969).

15

A void act [or rule] can afford no protection to the officers who execute it. See, Osborn v.

Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 868 (U.S., 1824).

Our Illinois Constitution of 1970 is the supreme law of Illinois. Our Illinois Constitution in

Article VI, § 4(c) specifically states: “Appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court are a

matter of right if a question under the Constitution of the United States or of this State arises for the

first time in and as a result of the action of the Appellate Court”. No one, without violating S. Ct.

Rule 137 or their Oath of Office, can attempt to support the legal position that a non-judicial

ministerial clerk can hear legal matters or render judicial orders. (Exhibits 1 and 2)

An order void upon its face and requiring only an inspection of the record to demonstrate its

invalidity is a mere nullity, in legal effect no order at all, conferring no right and affording no

justification. See, Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241, 51 N.E.2d 277, 280 (Ill., 1943) citing, Voorhees

v. Jackson ex dem. Bank of United States, 10 Pet. 449, 475, 35 U.S. 449, 477, 9 L.Ed. 490, 501

(U.S., 1836).

[i]t is well settled that “[a] judgment, order or decree entered by a court *** which lacks the

inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, is void, and may be attacked at any

time or in any court, either directly or collaterally.” Sarkissian v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 201 Ill.2d 95,

103, 776 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ill., 2002), quoting Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135, 63 N.E.2d 858,

861-62 (Ill., 1945). See also City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill.2d 504, 510, 705 N.E.2d 81, 85 (Ill.,

1998); People v. Wade, 116 Ill.2d 1, 5, 506 N.E.2d 954, 955 (Ill., 1987); R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied

Programs Corp., 111 Ill.2d 304, 309, 489 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ill., 1986); City of Chicago v. Fair

Employment Practices Com., 65 Ill.2d 108, 112, 357 N.E.2d 1154, 1155 (Ill., 1976); People ex rel.

Nordlund v. Association of the Winnebago Home for the Aged, 40 Ill.2d 91, 95, 237 N.E.2d 533,

536 (Ill., 1968); Buford v. Chief, Park District Police, 18 Ill.2d 265, 271, 164 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ill.,

1960); Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 369 Ill. 334, 339, 16 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Ill., 1938).

The Act and the Rule interfere with the well settled due process right to be heard to attack

a void order at any time or in any court.

16

It is also well settled that a void judgment, order or decree may be reviewed by appeal or

writ of error. People ex rel. Thaxton v. Coal Belt Electric Railway Co., 311 Ill. 29, 142 N.E. 495;

People v. Evans, 262 Ill. 235, 104 N.E. 646; Hunter v. Hunter, 100 Ill, 519; Goodsell v. Boynton, 1

Scam. 555. A judgment, order or decree of a court that lacked jurisdiction or one that is void for any

other reason will be reversed by this court whenever the same is brought before us by any means

possible in the particular case. Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 397 Ill. 196, 201, 73

N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ill., 1947).

This Court in Moffat recognized the well settled principle of law that a void judgment, order

or decree may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally and therefore

‘will be reversed by this [Supreme] court whenever the same is brought before us by any means

possible in the particular case.’ That is the procedural due process of law required. An appeal as a

matter of right to the Illinois Supreme Court as granted by our Illinois Constitution of 1970 in Article

VI, § 4(c) includes the due process right to be heard ‘by any means possible’ and, to attack a void

order ‘at any time’.

Procedural due process rights are triggered when fundamental right is being denied. East

St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. E. St. Louis School Dist., 178 Ill.2d 399, 422, 687

N.E.2d 1050, 1063 (Ill., 1997), citing People v. R.G., 131 Ill.2d 328, 342, 546 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Ill.,

1989), Tiller v. Klincar, 138 Ill.2d 1, 13-14, 561 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Ill., 1990), Cleveland Board of

Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 503 (U.S.,

1985).

To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due

process violation “of the most basic sort.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663,

668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (U.S., 1978). In a series of cases beginning with North Carolina v. Pearce and

culminating in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court has recognized this basic—and itself

uncontroversial—principle. For while an individual certainly may be penalized for violating the law,

he just as certainly may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.

U. S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2488 (U.S., 1982).

17

Supreme Court Rule 317 and Illinois Appellate Court Act (705 ILCS 25/8.2) are facially

unconstitutional as interfering with an appeal as a matter of constitutional right and the

constitutional right to transfer jurisdiction and be heard at the Illinois Supreme Court as expressly

granted by our Illinois Constitution in Article VI, § 4(c) and are a corresponding violation of the U.S.

Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be heard and are therefore void and

present no law at all.

Federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice. Brown v. Western Ry. of

Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296, 70 S.Ct. 105, 106 (U.S., 1949).

The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial

proceedings. Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 1765

(U.S.,1996), citing Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 23 L.Ed. 914 (U.S., 1876); Louisville &

Nashville R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236, 20 S.Ct. 620, 622, 44 L.Ed. 747 (U.S., 1900);

Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436, 21 S.Ct. 836, 839, 45 L.Ed. 1165 (U.S., 1901).

A denial to a party of the benefit of a hearing would be in effect to deny that he is entitled to

hearing at all, and a sham and deceptive proceeding altogether. See, Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S.

274, 277-278, 23 L.Ed. 914 (U.S., 1876).

Under our Constitution no court, state or federal, may serve as an accomplice in the willful

transgression of ‘the Laws of the United States,’ laws by which ‘the Judges in every State (are)

bound. ...’ ”’” U.S. v. Peltier 422 U.S. 531, 537, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2317 (1975), quoting Lee v. State of

Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-86, 888 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 20 L.Ed.2d 1166 (U.S., 1968) (footnotes

omitted); Art. VI, cl. 2, U.S.Const.

‘The general doctrine of Osborn v. Bank of United States, that the circuit courts of the

United States will restrain a state officer from executing an unconstitutional statute of the state,

when to execute it would violate rights and privileges of the complainant which had been

guaranteed by the Constitution, and would work irreparable damage and injury to him, has never

been departed from.’ The same principle is decided in Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58–67, 41 L.Ed.

632, 633, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265. And see Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Missouri R. & Warehouse

18

Comrs. (Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Hickman) 183 U. S. 53, 46 L.Ed. 78, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18. Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 152, 28 S.Ct. 441, 451 (U.S., 1908), quoting Pennoyer v.

McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 9, 11 S.Ct. 699, 35 L.Ed. 363, 365 (U.S., 1891), in turn citing Osborn v.

Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 846, 857, 6 L.Ed. 204 (U.S., 1824).

Check is a foreseeably avoidable predicament in Chess in which those who fail to

comprehend or apply the rules judiciously place their King in a position that is checked by

operation of law and the only move remaining to avoid the inevitable Checkmate is to follow the

clear path of the law to avoid the labyrinth of perplexities that arise from the right to attack void

orders, acts, and rules at any time, in any court, eternally. That right of course is unlimited in scope

and includes a federal injunction and a mandamus proceeding before the U.S. Supreme Court.

It [Illinois Courts] may not, however, shut its doors entirely to federal constitutional claims.

The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2) requires state

courts to enforce federal law and state court judges to be bound by it. As the United States

Supreme Court held more than a century ago, “Upon the State Courts, equally with the Courts of

the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce and protect every right granted or secured by the

Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, whenever those rights

are involved in any suit or proceeding before them; for, the Judges of the State Courts are required

to take an oath to support that Constitution, and they are bound by it and the laws of the United

States made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made under their authority, as the supreme law

of the land, ‘anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’ ”

People v. Lawton, 212 Ill.2d 285, 301, 818 N.E.2d 326, 336 (Ill., 2004), quoting Robb v. Connolly,

111 U.S. 624, 637, 4 S.Ct. 544, 551, 28 L.Ed. 542, 546 (U.S., 1884); McKesson Corp. v. Division of

Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept., 496 U.S. 18, 31, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 2247 (U.S., 1990); Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 176-77, 28 S.Ct. 441, 461 (U.S., 1908); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v.

Fitzgerald, 160 U.S. 556, 583-84, 16 S.Ct. 389, 396 (U.S., 1896) “If they fail therein, and

withhold or deny rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of

the United States, the party aggrieved may bring the case from the highest court of the State

in which the question could be decided to this court for final and conclusive determination.”

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(Emphasis added.) McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept., 496

U.S. 18, 31, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 2247, 110 L.Ed. 17 (U.S., 1990), quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S.

624, 637, 4 S.Ct. 544, 551, 28 L.Ed. 542 (U.S., 1884); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 177, 28 S.Ct.

441, 461, 52 L.Ed. 714 (U.S., 1908); Gibson v. State of Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 586, 16 S.Ct.

904, 908, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (U.S., 1896); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U.S. 556, 584, 16

S.Ct. 389, 396-97, 40 L.Ed. 536 (U.S., 1896); Wood v. Brush, 140 U.S. 278, 286, 11 S.Ct. 738,

741, 35 L.Ed. 505 (U.S., 1891).

“Under these circumstances, the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohen v. Virginia, 6

Wheat. 264–404, 5 L.Ed. 257–291, is most apposite. In that case he said: ‘It is most true that this

court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it

should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the

confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts,

with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We

have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is

not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which

we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment,

and conscientiously to perform our duty.’ ” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 142-143, 28 S.Ct. 441,

447 (U.S., 1908); U. S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 481 (U.S., 1980).

The Illinois Supreme Court acquired jurisdiction contemporaneously with the filing of the

Notice of Appeal in case 2-12-0688. This Court has a duty to docket this case, assign a case

number, hear this case in a judicial manner, and declare Illinois Supreme Court Rule 317 and

Illinois Appellate Court Act (705 ILCS 25/8.2) unconstitutional.

Respectfully submitted

______________________________ Christopher A. Briggs 809 N. County Street Waukegan, Illinois 60085 847-687-5590June 4, 2014 rodgerollie@yahoo.com

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Case No. 2014 IL ________IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

People of the State of Illinois, ) Appeal from the Appellate Court, Second Appellee - Plaintiff ) Judicial District, Case No. 2-12-0688 ) ) Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial v. ) Circuit, Lake County, Illinois ) Case No. 07 CM 8549 )Christopher Briggs, ) Honorable Michael Betar, PresidingAppellant - Defendant ) Trial Judge.

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