more succession digests
TRANSCRIPT
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Case no. 13/26
PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, et al., petitioners, vs. HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, et
al.,respondents.
[G.R. No. L-29300; June 21, 1978]
FACTS:
Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned
61 parcels of and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon.
In his will, he bequeathed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and
if she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses
Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3
parcels of land to Adolfo, his protg. The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa
as executor. In 1952, the legal heirs filed an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of
land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate,
another action against Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging
fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled
RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution of the will. Due execution means that the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time of the execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud
or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities
provided by law. The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the
judgment may only be set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due
process of law, and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud
(which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery). Finally Article 1410 cannot apply
to wills and testament.
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Case No. 14/26
In reWill of the deceased Silvestra Baron. VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, petitioner
appellant, vs. FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO BARON, oppositors-appellees.
[G.R. No. L-41947; January 16, 1936]
FACTS:
Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933. The death certificate recites that she waseighty-six years of age and died of heart failure. The petition further recites that she left an
estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated
December 17, 1932, that she died single without forced heirs. The will appointed Vivencio
Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The original of this will is signed "Silestra On" and the
copy is signed "Silestra Baron. Both copies are written in the Pampanga dialect and
consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David, Valeriano Silva and
Zacarias Nuguid (known to the testator). The amended oppositions of Guillermo Baron,
brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substancefirst, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and
physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and
alleged consent to the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document
and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.
An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the
formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the
burden of the evidence passed to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible
evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentarycapacity at the time or that the document was not the free and voluntary expression of the
alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law. The evidence shows
that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she suffered a physical
collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in.
By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything
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for herself. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving, Vivencio Cuyugan, with an attorney
and three witnesses, entered the house prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron.
Neither the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by the proponent. Epifania
Sampang, admittedly an intelligent young woman, who was the first to reach Silvestra
Baron and remained throughout the morning attended to her, testified that when she
reached the house she found her grandaunt lying in bed, very pale and unconscious; that
she called to her but she did not answer and only groaned; that her mouth was twisted and
her lower lip swollen.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there should be disallowance of the will for it lacks the capacity of
the testator
RULING:
The Court ruled that there is a valid disallowance in this case standing at her
bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the chief beneficiary, Vivencio
Cuyugan, and yet so far as this record shows, not a word was exchanged between any of
them and the suffering old woman. We don't know what drug the doctor administered but
it is clear to us from the evidence that in her dazed physical and mental condition she had
no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could not even sign her
name to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was noted by one of
the astute subscribing witnesses, he suggested that they have her sign another copy (t.s.n.
page 109) which was done. She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her
death which occurred forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney
who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There
is, however, credible evidence in the record that before her death she had denied to
several persons that she made any will.
This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any
act of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life. The doctrine
that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the
operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts
will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no
application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has
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no application, moreover, where from the day of execution until the death of the testator
his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. Nor
obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that he had
not executed the will in question.
15
NERI,petitioner, vs. AKUTIN, respondent.
74 PHIL 185; May 21, 1943: MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Testator Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his properties by
universal title to his children by his secondmarriage with preterition of his children by his
first marriage.- Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapita, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina are all Neris
children by his first marriage. The trial court annulled the institution of the heirs and
declared total intestacy. The children by the second marriage filed a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that there is no preterition as to the children of the first
marriage have received their shares in the property left by the testator assuming that there
has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but
simplyt he reduction of the bequest made to them.
The children by the second marriage anchor their argument on the concept of heir
whose A814 definition is deemed repealed by that of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is
maintained that the word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with the
term "heir" under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter Code is
no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased as was the "heredero" under the
Civil Code
ISSUE/S:
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Whether or not there is preterition which will lead to total intestacy
RULING:
The Court ruled that there is indeed preterition in this particular case. According to
the courts findings, none of the children by the first marriage received their respective
shares from the testators property. Even if clause 8 of the will is invoked (said clause
states that the children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his
property excluding what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the
money they had borrowed from him, the Court can rely only on the findings of the trial
court that the inventory indicates that the property of Neri has remained intact and that no
portion has been given to the children of the first marriage.- Neri left his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage and did not expressly disinherit his
children by his first marriage but did not leave anything to them. This fits the case of
preterition according to A814, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled
and intestate succession should be declared open.2. YES- The word "heir" as used in A814
of the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code of Civil Procedure,
but this does prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in substance the
subject-matter of A814 of the Civil Code.- It may also be true that heirs under the Code
of Civil Procedure may receive the bequest only after payment of debts left by the
deceased and not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing only
upon the question as to when succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the
fact that succession may still be by universal or special title.- Since a bequest may still be
made by universal title and with preterition of forced heirs, its nullity as provided in
article814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil
Procedure. The basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its
possible name under the Code of Civil Procedure.- In addition, Secs. 755 and 756 of the
Code of Civil Procedure affected A814 and A851 of the Civil Code. But these sections have
been expressly repealed by Act No. 2141, thus restoring force to A814 and A851.
16
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA
MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 113725; June 29, 2000
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FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and
admitted in Special Proceedings.
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by TransferCertificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at
the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla
shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic
sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the
obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to
whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot,
the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly
ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each
month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of
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Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of
this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the
latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then
have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina
shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this
Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease,
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister."[4]
the plaintiff(private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein
petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs,
arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the
obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar. However, there was no compliance with
the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of
sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is modal substitution
RULING:
The Court ruled that the disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to
stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil. It is a general rule under the law on succession that
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are
compulsory heirs.[11]
Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of
the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without
need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from
the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Under Article 776 of the New
Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not
extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue
of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
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corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. In the said Codicil,
testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition
that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year.
Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and
title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver
the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted
heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the
fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the
institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against
petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below. Substitution is the
designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should
die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. In the
interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the
words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.[23] Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred
(100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on
the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil
further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected,
Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of
seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the
said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on
his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment
of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
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17
AURO G. VIZCONDE,petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
FATCS:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings
of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and
Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas,
an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow,
Zenaida, and their four children. Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of landevidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO.
T-36734. Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad
Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos
(P3,405,612.00).
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and her
two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly
known as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation conducted by the
NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer andherein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and
Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner
entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde With Waiver of Shares with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-
judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two
daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud, settlement gave fifty percent
(50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael,
except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves atoken amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque
property and the car were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their
claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs[7] in the said properties.
ISSUE/S:
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Whether or not the probate courts Order, which respondent Court of Appeals
sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and
declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation is valid
RULING:
The Court ruled that the basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the
outset. Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in
the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property
which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the
will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other
compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title
during the lifetime of the decedent. The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the
testator or predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced
heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the
predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the
contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of
collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but
rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, [27] the rationale being that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any
increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. The Court finds that the probate
court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels
compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
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(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and ascendants;(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in
Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a
creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. [29]As such, petitioner may not
be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed
to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, [30] which petitioner
correctly argued in his manifestation.[31]
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title orownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings.[32]Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a
separate action to resolve title. [33] In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate
court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity
of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the
transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The
interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the probate courtsjurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action.
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation
is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory
stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has
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been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59
Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the
provisions of article 1035[35] of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to
allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants were inofficious
in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate or hereditary portion to which
they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought
is untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate
court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque
property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the
Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by
reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis.[36]The
order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property
was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to
Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who
inherited and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels
heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the
obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who
does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque
property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by
the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent
the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument,
voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation as
heir[38]in the Paraaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died
ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than
the value of the Valenzuela property.[39] Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property
may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118449.htm#_edn39 -
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long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate
court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
18
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown.
More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she
was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing
her estate among her heirs. Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-
third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less,
and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding. The deceased Melodia Ferraris
left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by
collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two
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classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate
of said Melodia Ferraris.
ISSUE/S:
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is
survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who
predeceased him or her?
RULING:
The Court ruled that that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and
aunts may not succeed ab intestatoso long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive
and are willing and qualified to succeed. The trial court ruled that the oppositors-
appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt
(petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer in
degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of
representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent, and
that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code. Against the
above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is of the same or
equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees removed from the
decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of representation could
take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or
aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their own right. The Court
agrees with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews
from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of
relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then
descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention
that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes)
unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article
975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
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Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares.
ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces,
who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the
former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to
the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952
and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of
the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not
separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato aheadof the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded onlyafterthe widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
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SIMEON CAPUNO, DOMINGA COSICO, GERARDA COSICO, MARGARITA COCOLE,
ANICETO CAPUNO, ALBINA AQUINO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-55373; July 25, 1983
FACTS:
A complaint for annulment of a Donation Inter Vivosexecuted by the late Josefa
Capuno on March 6, 1970, in favor of defendants-appellants (petitioners herein) namely,
Gliceria Carandang-Collantes and Luz Carandang, was filed by plaintiffs-appellees (private
respondents herein), four parcels of real property, including a residential house.
Private respondents, alleged in their complaint, that upon the death of Josefa Capuno on 8
April 1970, she left as her only heirs plaintiffs herein, Felix Capuno, Lydia Capuno, and
Simeon Capuno, being her nephews by her deceased brother Silverio, and Gerardo
Capuno and Aniceto Capuno being also her nephews, by her deceased brother Juan
Capuno. That the thumbmark appearing on the instrument, allegedly that (of) the
deceased Josefa Capuno, was not hers, and granting arguendo, that it was, she did not
intend to convey said properties to defendants herein under said deed, her consent
thereto having been secured either through undue influence or fraud; there being no
relation between them . . ." They then prayed that the donation inter vivosbe declared
annulled and of no force and effect and they be declared true owners of the properties
entitled to the possession thereof and the reasonable value of the fruits realized therefrom
from 8 April 1970 up to the time of actual delivery with legal interest thereon until fully paid
plus attorney's fees and costs of litigation. In their Answer, petitioners, defendants-
appellants below," specifically deny the allegations of par. 6, the truth being that the
thumbmarks on the document (Annex "A", Complaint) are actually that of the deceased
and that the said document purports to be what it represents and states and the donor's
consent thereto was given freely and voluntarily without undue influence, fraud, or any
vice which will vitiate the agreement. "
As Defenses, defendants plead under par. 8 that "(d)uring practically all their lifetime,
defendants have lived with Josefa Capuno who has treated defendants as the former's own
blood relatives-in-fact, as her own grandchildren. Considering defendants' relations with,
and the services rendered to, Josefa Capuno during her lifetime, it is natural that
defendants should be the recipient of the deceased's liberality and generosity;" and under
par. 9, "(t)aking into account the services rendered by the defendants during her lifetime,
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the donation inter vivos (Annex "A", Complaint) actually is based on valuable
consideration and, on this further ground, the document accordingly should be upheld as
valid." Defendants further set up that plaintiffs have no cause of action and in any event,
plaintiffs are guilty of laches.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is forgery of the said signature
RULING:
The Court ruled that it must first be noted that the complaint filed by private
respondents which was for annulment of the deed of donation inter vivosand attaching a
true copy of the instrument marked as Annex "A" alleged two grounds for annulment. The
first ground is the allegation that the thumbmark appearing on the instrument was not the
thumbmark of the donor, Josefa Capuno. The second ground, or more correctly the
alternative ground, is based on the allegation that "granting arguendo that it was, she
(Josefa Capuno) did not intend to convey said properties to defendants herein under said
deed, her consent thereto having been secured either through undue influence or fraud,
there being no relation between them." The first ground raises the question of the
genuineness or authenticity of the thumbmark affixed to the deed of donation.The second
raises the issue whether there was undue influence or fraud exercised or committed to
obtain the consent of the donor in the execution of the donation.
Under the first issue, the evidence for the private respondents consisted of the
testimonies of Aniceto Capuno, Albina Capuno and Lydia Capuno, three of the several
private respondents. Specifically, Aniceto Capuno testified that on March 14, 1970, Josefa
Capuno told him, " Sito these lands are the ones which will be inherited by you from me
and these four parcels of land will pertain to Felix and his brother". He also declared that
on March 17, 1970 at the Perpetual Hospital, Josefa Capuno told him while she was on his
lap, "Sito, do (not) forget what I have told you as to what pertains to Felix, Lydia and
Simeon and what pertains to you and your brother, and I do not want that you will have an
argument on the matter because it is bad and I wish that you should follow that
arrangement. Albina Capuno, wife of witness Aniceto Capuno, testified that from February
23 to March 14, 1970 when Josefa Capuno was treated at the Community Hospital, she did
not leave the hospital and did not see Atty. Gertrudo B. Flores during that time and that on
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March 6, 1970, no document was executed by said Josefa Capuno during her stay thereat.
In addition thereto, Lydia Capuno testified that her aunt, Josefa Capuno, knows how to
write her name and when asked if she knows how to read, the witness answered: "She
(Josefa) could try to read, sir.
Since the burden of proof lies on the plaintiffs, private respondents herein, to prove
affirmatively the truth of their allegations in the complaint that the donation, a public
instrument duly acknowledged before a notary public, bears a thumbmark which is not
that of the donor, and therefore forged, fictitious or fraudulent, it is their duty to present
strong, complete and conclusive evidence in support thereof, and not merely by
preponderance of evidence. Plaintiffs have not presented any proof in support of the
alleged forgery or fictitiousness of the thumbmark in question, neither by an expert or by
comparison with the true thumbprint of the donor, Josefa Capuno. The testimony of
Aniceto Capuno that his aunt, Josefa Capuno, had indicated to him shortly before her
death the division of the donated properties among the nephews and niece of Josefa is no
proof that Josefa did not execute the deed of donation in favor of the defendants. Neither
are the declarations of Albina and Lydia Capuno who claimed to be taking care of Josefa at
the hospital from February 13 to March 14, 1970 and were always with her, prove that the
deed in question was not executed by the donor. For these witnesses are parties to the
case, biased and stand to benefit from the annulment of the deed. Their testimonies are
inherently weak as against the testimony of the notary public who notarized the document
and declared that the document was acknowledged before him and the thumbmark was
that of the donor, Josefa Capuno.
The Court ruled that the evidence of the plaintiffs in support of the first ground for
annulment is insufficient. They have not established the first cause of action by strong,
complete and conclusive evidence which is the rule established in this jurisdiction.
While the case at bar is not for reformation of contract but is for annulment of a donation to
which a fictitious or false thumbmark not belonging to the donor had been affixed thereto,
which is a criminal act and may cause the prosecution and conviction of the notary public
as well as his disbarment as a lawyer. With respect to the alternative ground of undue
influence or fraud, the codal provision, Articles 1337 and 1338 N.C.C. are clear and explicit
in defining that-
Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage
of his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable
freedom of choice. The following circumstances shall be considered: the
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confidential, family, spiritual and other relations between the parties, or the
fact that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering
from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.
Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of
one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
The records disclose that the defendants presented Attorney Gertrudo B. Flores, the
notary public who notarized the deed of donation in question. He testified on direct
examination and was cross-examined by opposing counsel, and the trial court, assessing
his testimony, said "it (is) hard to believe the document was ratified by the deceased
before him or in his presence."
The positions of the donor, whether in her bed lying, or raised by the two girls, or seated in
a chair during the execution and notarization of the deed are immaterial for what is
important is the genuineness of the thumbmark of the donor which the notary public
positively affirmed to be that of the donor as he helped her affix her thumbmark on the
document on the left hand margin and on the printed name on the second page. On the
essential and material facts, the testimony of the notary public who is also a lawyer is
satisfactory and must be given more credence than the testimonies of the Capuno
witnesses which merely implied that the thumbmark on the deed of donation was not
affixed by Josefa Capuno since no deed was notarized during her confinement at the
hospital. The Complaint should be dismissed.