morality and method
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Morality and Method in the Work of Barrington MooreAuthor(s): Dennis SmithSource: Theory and Society, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Mar., 1984), pp. 151-176Published by: Springer
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151
MORALITY AND METHOD IN THE WORK OF
BARRINGTON MOORE
DENNIS SMITH
Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy was
published in the United States in 1966, eight years after his collection of
essays entitled Political Power and Social TheorY Eight years represents,for Moore, a relatively long gap between major publications.2 During the
period since the end of the Second World War, books by Moore have
generally appeared at intervals of four to six years. The considerable
attention which has been devoted to Social Originshas tendedto hide from
view the range of the corpus of scholarship to which that particularbook
belongs. Although Moore's contribution to historicalsociology is still verymuch work in progress t may not be premature o look for some unifyingthemes in the enterpriseas a whole. These themes mayalso be located with
reference o a wider intellectual debate in progress.This articleis an attemptto begin that task of assessment.
Moore's work fascinatespartlybecause of therangeof intellectual nfluences
it expresses:for example, theanthropologicalwork of Sumner,Kroeberand
Keller,the philosophical writingsof MorrisCohen and George Santayanaand, not least, the variants of criticaltheoryrepresentedby Franz Neumann
and Otto Kirchheimer.Furthermore,during much of Moore's career, his
friend Herbert Marcuse has evidently provideda fertile source of creative
disagreement.3The excitement engenderedby Moore's work owes a greatdeal to the fact that whilebeingan authenticproductof Americanacademic
culture,rooted in the practicaland moralpreoccupationsof that society, he
has remained open to the influence of the critical tradition in twentieth-
century European thought. In this article, Moore'swork will be contrastedwiththat of E. P. Thompson and JiirgenHabermas n orderto demonstrate
some of its similaritiesto, and differencesfrom, certain aspects of recentwork in Europe.
Management Centre, UniversitY f Aston, UnitedKingdom.
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Before I develop the line of inquiry mentioned above, it will be useful to
present a brief summary of some central features of Moore's principalpublications.Intheirsubjectmatter the mainworkscomplementeach other
in ways that are not evident at first sight. For example, whereas Social
Origins is mainly concerned with the effects on the rural order of the
modernization of variouscommercializedagrariansocieties, Injusticedeals
with a similar theme from the point of view of the (German) industrial
proletariat.The latter book pays great attention to forms of consciousness
among the lowerorders.Bycontrast, Moore'searliestworks,Soviet Politics
and Terrorand Progress USSR, examine the content and consequencesofthe ways of thinking of the Soviet modernizing elite. The works justmentioned dealing with Germany and Russia help to make up for the
exclusion of two chapterson those societies which Moore had intendedto
include in Social Origins.4
Inmuch of hiswork Moorefocuses uponvarious modalities of theprocesses
whereby peasants or other kinds of workers become citizens. He is very
interested in the conditions under which they acquirean investmentin thesocial orderthroughtheirconnectionwiththemodernizing tate.Inhisview,in the modernworld,the existingstate has become the mainagency, indeed
the only agency for the achievement of all purposes by all sections of the
population. 5The processes ust mentioned are looked at froma numberof
anglesbutespeciallywith reference o changesin relationsbetweenthe rural
and social orders and between the masses and the elite.
The three major empiricalstudies considered in this article - the inquiriesinto Soviet Russia, Social Originsand Injustice- were punctuated by two
collections of essays, respectively Political Power and Social Theoryand
Reflections on the Causesof Human Misery A briefprogrammaticreview
of these books may be helpful.6The questions underlying he Soviet studies
are, respectively,how has the Soviet elite managedto cope withthe conflict
between the goals of its ideology and the means it has used in order to
exercisepowerin an industrializing ociety? Soviet Politics)and how is this
regime likely to change following the death of Stalin?(Terrorand ProgressUSSR). In Soviet Politics, Moore studiesthe tactics used by Leninand the
Bolsheviks to establishcontrol over the Russianstate,the dilemmasfacedbythe political elite duringthe 1920s and early 1930s,and the contradictions
inherent in Stalinist rule. Specifically, in a book appropriatelysub-titled
The role of ideas in social change, he argues that Marxist-Leninist deas
have imposed important constraints on the practical options open to the
leadership, for example during the period of the NEP. Moore pays most
attention to the difficulties encounteredby
the Stalinistbureaucracy
in
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maintaininga stablepolityand productiveeconomy but emphasizesthat, in
spite of these problems, the regime has been able to managean industria-
lizing society over several decades. More briefly, in Terrorand ProgressMoore pays particularattentionto the threat to the totalitarianbureaucracyof tendencies towards more developed social stratification(as an aspect of
tradition ) nd a more prominentrole for apolitical experts as an aspectof rationality ).
Political Powerand Social Theorycontainsa series of essays on topics such
as modes of acquiring political power, totalitarianism in pre-industrial
societies, the family,conformityin industrialsocietiesand the methodologyof the social sciences, in which Moore deals with aspects of the question:which elements of the social order in contemporaryindustrial societies are
both unique and necessaryto those societies? The issue implicit in his next
work, Social Origins, is: what forms of modernizing transformation in
commercializedagrariansocieties are favorable to democratic outcomes?
Although this is the most familiar of the major texts, it may be worth
recalling that Moore is especially interestedin two sets of relationships-
among landlords,urbanbourgeois interestsand state officials and betweenthe peasantry and their masters - and that he distinguishes between
democratic(England, France, United States), authoritarian-fascistJapan,
Germany)and peasantrevolutionary(Russia, China)routes to the modern
world.
Reflections on the Causesof Human Misery is largelyconcerned with the
problem:which aspects of human miseryare, in principle,unnecessaryand
what prospects, in fact, are there for eliminating them? The analysiscontained in those essays leads to the development of a model of rational
political authority whose implicationsareexplored further in Injustice.In
this latterwork Moore examines the developmentof the Germanindustrialworkforce from an age whenguild organizationwas predominant, hroughthe 1848crisis,the riseof the Social DemocraticParty,the FirstWorld Warand the unrest of 1918-20, to theemergenceof the Nazi Party.This historical
analysis is accompanied by a discussion of the thesis that a social contract
specifying norms of reciprocityand the principles of justice is practicallyuniversalwithinhumansocieties. Moore also examines thecircumstances nwhich apparently unjustified oppression acquires moral authority and
speculatesas to what conditions are likely to encourage moraloutrageandactive rebellionto takeplace. Itshould beevidentfromtheabove summariesthat moralconcernshave become increasinglyprominentin Moore'swork.The implicationsof this fact will shortly be explored.
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Democracy is in our American mores. It is a product of our physical and economic
conditions. It is impossible to discuss or criticise it. It is rhetoric. No one treats it with
complete candor and sincerity. No one dares to analyse it as he would aristocracy orautocracy. He wouldget no hearingand wouldonly incur abuse.... The mores contain the
normbywhich, if we should discuss the mores,weshould havetojudge the mores.Welearn
the mores as unconsciouslyas we learnto walkand eat and breathe.... Thejustificationof
themis that whenwe wake to consciousnessof life we findthemfactswhichalreadyhold us
in the bonds of tradition,custom,and habit. The mores contain embodiedin them notions,doctrines and maxims, but they are facts.7
Who now reads William Graham Sumner?We can be surethat BarringtonMoore has done so.8 The latter receivedhis originaltrainingin the social
sciences from Albert Keller, Sumner'sgreatest pupil and scholar. 9In
Social Originsof Dictatorship and Democracy, Moore has attempted to
conductthekindof analysis implied by Sumner'sremarksat thebeginningof
theabove quotation, in otherwords,a criticaldiscussion of thedevelopmentof democratic and non-democraticsocieties, including the United States.
This analysis was one product of the pursuit of an ambition which has
informed much of Moore's work.Crudelystated,Moore'sobjectivehas been
to develop a strategyof social analysis which will enable valuejudgementsabout how men and women should behave towardsone another,especiallyin the political sphere, to be derived from the application of reason to
discoverable facts about the empiricalworld.
Moore has tendedto treatmoresor moralcodes as lodes of ore whichmight
eventually yield the treasurehe seeks. Sumneradopted a more pessimistic
approach.In Folkways,he concluded that anymorality s betterthan moral
anarchy. Mores, he observed, vary widely according to the stage of
civilisation and the fashions of reflection and generalization. They can
make anything right. However, despite their considerable variation in
content, mores always contain philosophical and ethical judgments as to
societal welfare that derive from the habitual or customary responses of
humanbeingsto needs definedbythe struggle or existence. Moralrules,the
product of human experience of the world as it is, become part of that
unquestionedexistingworld: The morescontainembodiedin themnotions,
doctrinesand maxims, but they are facts. 10
Moore is unsatisfiedby Sumner'smoral relativismwhichasserts the impos-
sibility (and sometimes the irrelevance)of attempts to make ethicaljudg-ments between moral codes arising in different social conditions. It was
under the guidanceof Sumner'sold pupil, Keller,that Moore encountered,in the context of his interestin Russianaffairs,an alternativeapproach to
moral codes whichhe finds not only unsatisfactorybut also abhorrent.This
is moralchauvinism, an approachwhichpredicates he ethicalsuperiority
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of a particularmoral code while treatingall previous moral codes as beingboth
historicallynecessaryor and
historicallysupercededbythat code. In
Moore's view the Soviet version of moral chauvinismillegitimatelyasserts
the mandateof historicalnecessityas a justificationfor immoralacts. 1
One object of this article is to consider Moore's attempts to establish a
position with respectto the analysis of human behavior which avoids both
moral relativism and moral chauvinism.A second object is to examine the
consequences of Moore's efforts in the above respectfor his practiceas a
historian and asociologist. Following
a briefcomparison
of his intellectual
enterprisewith those espoused by E. P. Thompson and Jurgen Habermas
respectively, I will suggest that Moore has drawn upon both the Hegelianand the Utilitarian raditionsin Western hought in hisattemptto bridgethe
gap between the is of the social scientistand the ought of the politicalor
moral philosopher. His three major enterprises- the Soviet studies (pub-lished during the 1950s), Social Origins (which appeared in 1966) and
Injustice (published in 1978) - are progressively more ambitious in this
regard.In his Soviet studies Moore identifies the structural limits and
potentialities (includingideologicalconstraintsand imperatives)which con-
ditioned the attempts of the Bolshevik regime to shape social reality. In
Social Originshe not only conducts a broadlysimilaranalysis of the devel-
opment of contrasting Western and Asian societies but also attempts to
evaluate in moral terms the political outcomes whose origins he has ex-
plained.In InjusticeMoore onceagainconductsanalysesof thekind indicat-
ed above. However, he also seeks to achieve two much more ambitious
objectives.First,he
attemptsto derivefromthe
empiricalanalysisof
pastand
presentmoralcodes a model of rationalpoliticalauthority which oughtto govern presentand futurepolitical behavior. Second, he tries to demon-
strate that the historical development of the Germanworking class was in
factprofoundly nfluencedbyitsmembers'adherence o the moralcode from
which his model of political authority is derived. In this latest work is
revealeda strong hankeringfor the marriagebetween moral certaintyand
scientific objectivitywhich was an ambition dear to the hearts of thephilo-
sophesof the
Enlightenment.
The reference to the Enlightenmentis worth developing briefly. Moore's
writings express a determined adherence to American aspirations whichwere fought for in the late eighteenth century and in the mid-twentieth
century.Ironically,although both the AmericanRevolutionand the SecondWorld War are neglected topics in his work, these conflicts have been
perceived by many of Moore's compatriots as successfulassertions of the
right to pursuehappiness
in ajust
and freesociety.
The Christian and
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classicaltraditions- reshapedby the Enlightenment,asserted n the Revolu-
tion, molded by the experienceof Americandevelopmentin the nineteenth
and twentiethcenturiesand defended in the 1940s- furnish culturalresour-
ces upon which Moore draws deeply. The Spencerianismof Sumner and
Kellerprovidesa sardoniccommentaryupon many of the deep-ingrainedAmericanaspirationsembeddedin this culture.However,certainaspectsof
Moore's early careersuggest some possible reasons why he has been veryreluctant to accept that any one moral code is as good (or as bad) as anyother.12Moore's nitial academictrainingat university evel wasin Greekand
Latin, the staple diet of the philosophes. He has had ready access to the
intellectualuniverse of men suchas Adam Smith, to whom, incidentally,he
makes quite frequent reference in his work.13Furthermore, during the
Second World War Moore served as a political analyst in the Office of
Strategic Studies and in the Departmentof Justice. The war was generallybelievedto be a militaryconfrontation between thedictatorships nd the
democracies. It is significantthat this terminologyappears n the title of his
most well-known book and that most of thechaptersare concernedwith the
major participants n that conflict.
Moore has been concerned with the interplay between the occurrence of
majorstructuralchangesin societies and theglobal orderand theexercise of
human influence within these processes.He has been in quest of two prizes.
First, by acquiring an accurate understandingof the world he wishes to
maximize the degree to which human beings may be made aware of their
capacity to influence the way in which it develops. Second, and more
ambitiouslystill,he wishes to establish with as muchcertaintyas is humanly
possible the moral criteria with reference to which human beings should
exercise their capacity for choice. Underlyingall of Moore's work is the
following question:how may historicaland sociological knowledge be ac-
quiredby men and women and usedin orderto comprehendand master heir
destiny, within the limits of their moral and rational developmentand the
stageof evolution reachedbythe societiesand theglobal orderto whichthey
belong?
In orderto emphasizethe distinctivestrategywhich Moore has employed it
will be useful to summarizebrieflythe approachesto this same issue which
have been taken by Jurgen Habermasand E. P. Thompson. In much of his
work Habermasis seekingto find ways of promotingthe liberationof men
and womenfrom ideological mystificationsso that they mayconfront what
he regardsas a primaryproblemin social theory:
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How is knowledge of the social interrelationshipsof life with a view to political action
possible?How, within a politicalsituation,can we obtain clarificationof what is practically
necessaryand at the same time objectively possible?'4
Habermas argues that the social sciences have been separated completelyfrom the'normative elements that were the heritage of classical politics.
Citing in particular the work of Aristotle, he asks:
How can the promiseof practicalpolitics- namely,of providing practicalorientationaboutwhat is rightandjust in a given situation - be redeemed without relinquishing,on the one
hand,the
rigourof scientific
knowledge,which modern social
philosophydemands
incontrastto the practicalphilosophy of classicism?And on the other,how canthe promiseofsocial philosophy, to furnish an analysisof the interrelationships f social life, be redeemedwithout relinquishing he practicalorientation of classicalpolitics?'5
E. P. Thompson has his own answer to the question of how objective
analysis of the interrelationships of social life may be reconciled with a
practical orientation to political action. In his Open letter to Leslek Kola-
kowski he argues that an historian may achieve objective knowledge about
historical processes, i.e., practices ordered and structured in rational waysand also about what he calls historically emergent potentia, i.e., the limits
upon human possibilities that are simultaneously disclosed and imposed in
given societies with given technological levels and given social systems.
Beyond this, however, Thompson enters a realm of faith. He has, he writes,a faith in the ultimate capacity of men to manifest themselves as rational and
moral agents. '6 He believes, on this basis, that within limits imposed by
given technological levels, it is possible to control nature and achieve human
emancipation.
In Thompson's opinion, value judgments have no objective basis. His posi-tion is that in evaluating the consequences of particular historical processesthe historian is at liberty to identify with one or other of the potentialoutcomes which the occurrence of those historical processes has made
possible or, perhaps, foreclosed. Objective knowledge and faith are com-
bined in this act of choice. He writes:
Imay sayas a matterof faith hat Ichoose to identifywith onepotentia and not theothers,and I maysay as a historicalinvestigator hat the chosen potentia is one of the historically-observable possibilities of choice, and I may add that I am, in my choosing and valuingnature,an outcome of thispotentia.l7
Immediately following this passage Thompson acknowledges that he is a
philosophical neophyte who is fumbling within the portico of one of the
most exacting of philosophical problems - the segregated domains of the 'is'
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and the 'ought. ' Although he speculates that with the advance of an
infinitely-subtle,empirically-foundedsocial psychology it might becomepossible to translate certain notions of value, of good and evil behaviour,into diagnosticnotions of psychichealth and neurosis, Thompsondoes not
pursuethis hazardousapproach.
He accepts that the evaluation of history is an inevitableactivity for the
historian.However,thisprocess s no more- and no less- than an act of faith
that is made against the background of achieved objective knowledge.
Thompson's more recent involvementin public campaignsagainst the nu-clear arms racemay be understoodas an extension of this logic. In 1973 he
wrote: we have seen the capacityto control natureas, simultaneously,the
capacityto lay naturewaste,bringingwithit simultaneousopportunitiesfor
humanemancipationandself-destruction. Heclearly dentifieshimselfwith
the former rather han thelatterpotentia. Heevidently hopesthat otherswill
join him in this act of faith when in possession of the relevant objective
knowledge.18
Habermas,who is certainlyno fumbling philosophical neophyte, also en-
counters the problem of the relationshipbetween the is and the ought.
However,hedealswithit in a differentwayas willbeseenshortly.Habermas
is centrally concerned with the process of self-reflection. In the course of
self-reflection men and women, the subjects of history, reconstructtheir
understandingof their past and present. Self-reflectionis the tool of the
emancipatorycognitiveinterest.In otherwords, it helpstowardsrealization
of the demand for material and intellectual conditions that will permitnon-alienatingworkand free nteraction.This demandstems romarecognition
that certainforms of social communication are necessaryfor the effective
pursuit of humankind's technical and practical interests. The activity of
reasoningand thepursuitof knowledge implya willto actualizeascomplete-
lyas possiblethe conditions underwhichreasonmaybe mostfully manifest:
that is, an open, inquiringand self-criticalcommunity. One aspect of the
process of self-reflection is the critical examination of assumptions em-
beddedin those historically-produceddisciplines,suchaseconomics, sociol-ogy and political science, which purport to explain the social order. An
important issue guiding this examination is the following: to what extent
must the pursuitof the emancipatorycognitive interestbe containedwithin
limits imposed by genuinely irremovablesocial constraints and what are
those limits?Habermasbelieves - as does BarringtonMoore - that many
constraintsimaginedto be inevitableare in fact removable.In Habermas's
opinion, a major concern of critical social science is to determinewhen
theoreticalstatementsgrasp
invariantregularities
of social action and when
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they express ideologicallyfrozen relationsof dependencethat can in princi-
ple be transformed. '9
UnlikeThompson, Habermasdoes not appearto believethat the criteriaof
valuejudgmentshaveno objectivebasis.In the latter'sview,theactualization
of reason- and, withit, the manifestationof truth,freedom andjustice- can
only occuramong the emancipatedcommunity of free inquirersmentioned
above. However,Habermasbelievesthat even the distorted communication
which we have alreadyachieved in a society, many of whose membersare
unfree,deceived and unjustlytreated,does in fact containimplicitlywithinitthe normative foundation which at some future time may become explicitwith the actualizationof idealspeech, .e., a form of discoursedrivensolely
by the compulsion of argument itself.20In other words, values may be
discoveredthrough the analysis of past and existing social forms. They are
not simply imposed by the analyst as an act of faith. This position is verysimilar to that proposed by Moore in Injustice.
Habermasbridgesthe gap between the is and the ought to some extentthrough his suggestionthat human aspirations necessarilytend towardsan
ideal that is, in principle,discoverableby empiricalinvestigation.However,he does not arguethat values which have an objectivebasis may be adduced
as a meansof legitimizingor prescribingany specificset of politicalactions.2'
As willbe noticed shortly, BarringtonMoorepaysconsiderableattention to
developing a form of moral calculus which may be used to evaluate the
comparativeworthof alternativepoliticalstrategies.In this regardhe differs
from both Thompson and Habermas. However, in his methodology as ahistorian Moore has manyresemblances o Thompson. Inhis orientation to
normative isses he moves closer in several respectsto Habermas. Moore's
approach will now be discusseddirectly.
Running through Moore's work is a strong Aristoteliantendencyto regardthe polity as the majordomain of moral action. At one point he comments
thatalthough someportionof personalunhappiness s probablyan inevita-
ble partof humanfate, a very large portionstems from institutionalcauseswhichare,to a degree,subjectto influenceby humanaction.22Suchaction in
the political sphere derives, in Moore's view, from moral understandingswhich ultimatelydetermine the kinds of social compromisethat are accept-able withinthe rangeof possibilitiesofferedby any givenlevel of technologi-cal and intellectualdevelopment. He is especiallyconcerned with the conse-
quences for human miseryand happinessof relations between the politicalrulerand his(or her)subordinates. Thisfocus is evidentin hisearliest books
on Soviet Russia and inreflected in the title of the second
-Terror and
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Progress USSR. How much authoritarian terror is justified in pursuitof
humanprogress? s an implicit question runningthroughmuchof Moore's
work.
On thequestionof whetherhumanbeingscaninfactsuccessfullymanagethe
moral arena of the polity through the application of reason, Moore veers
between,on the one hand,the resignedattitudeof Aristotleand theancients
who, in Peter Gay'swords, werealwaysaware of theubiquitousthreatof
tyranny or the savage power of the passions and, on the other hand, the
optimism of the Enlightenment, particularlyin its earlier phase.23Very
crudelystated,this optimismconsistedin theexpectationthatthepracticeof
Science, that is, the rational examination of data derived from the natural
and social worlds, would facilitatediscoveryof universal aws expressedin
thesespheres.Accordingto thisview,moral rulesabout interpersonalbehav-
ior and the regulationof society are grounded in the nature of humankind.
Thephilosophes combineda passionto discover whatthesemoral ruleswere
with a conviction that existing social arrangementswereneither moral nor
- and this would be to say the same thing - rational.
By the mid-nineteenthcentury(if not before) Science, the supposed hand-
maiden of the philosophes, had helped to underminethe optimism of the
Enlightenment in three ways. First, as evidence accrued about different
societiesit becameapparentthat theirinstitutionalarrangementsand moral
understandingsdid not yield clearevidenceof universalmaxims but in fact
varied considerably through time and space. Second, the practitionersof
scienceincreasinglydefinedtheir taskas thediscoveryof the is as opposed
to the ought. Third, they performedthis function to an increasingextent
underthe patronageof governmentswhichcontinuedto displaymanyof the
characteristicswhich thephilosophes had consideredto be immoral.
Moorehas shrunk rom a viewof theworldwhichcombinesmoralrelativism
and scientificpositivism.Two philosophicaltraditions,bothemerging n the
wake of the Enlightenment,have offered him the bases for a strategyfor
reconcilingthe is and the ought. They are Hegelianismand Utilitarian-
ism. The former approach contains an assumption that although ways of
thinking and behaving differ between historical epochs, the moral order
appropriateto any particularsociety has a necessaryconnection with the
institutional forms within which thought and practice are expressed, for
example, the division of laborandforms of domination.The latter,Utilitar-
ian, approach derives from the psychological proposition that men and
women are self-seeking.In the well-knownwords of Bentham:
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Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,pain and
pleasure. It is for them to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determinewhat we
shall do. On the one hand the standardof rightand wrong, on the other hand the chain ofcauses and effects,are fastened to theirthrone.24
It is intriguing o noticethat Sumner'swritingcombines elements of both the
above approaches. For example, he writes:
The folkways are attended by pleasure or pain according as they are well fitted for the
purpose [of satisfying human interests]. Pain forces reflectionand observation of somerelationbetween acts and welfare. At thispoint the prevailingworldphilosophy ... suggests
explanations and inferences,which become entangledwithjudgmentsof expediency. How-ever,the folkwaystake on a philosophyof rightlivingand a lifepolicyforwelfare.Thentheybecomemores,and they maybedeveloped by inferencesfromthe philosophy or the rules nthe endeavour to satisfy needs without pain. Hence they undergo improvementand are
made consistent with each other.25
Moore has not adopted either approach uncritically.For example, on the
one hand he accepts the Hegelian assumption that the impulse towards
freedom in any particularsociety is relatedto its members'rationalanalysis
of the obstacles that existing social forms present to the realizationof thevalues and goals (such asjustice) possessed by members of that society. On
the other hand, he does not believe that succeeding epochs necessarily
manifest a progressiveunfoldingof reasonand its concretemanifestation n
institutionsexpressingever-higherprinciplesof freedom.26Moore'sviewson
this matterareconsistent with his perceptionthat social developmentis to a
significantextent affected by human choice.
Turningto Utilitarianism,Mooreadaptsitscentralpropositionto arguethathuman beings pursue happiness (rather than pleasure)and abhor misery(rather hanpain). Healso assertsthatalthoughdefinitions of happinessvaryalmost infinitely there is a broad, perhaps universal,consensus about the
undesirabilityof specific forms of miserysuch as war, hunger,crueltyand
intolerance.
Moore'smodified Hegelianismis orientedto the historicalanalysisof whole
societies, identifyingthe institutionaland normativeconstraintsand poten-tialities in terms of which choice has been exercised by individuals and
groups in the past. Moore has sometimesstressedtransformations n struc-turalconstraints at the societal leveland sometimes the processesof human
responseto suchtransformations.Moore'smodifiedUtilitarianism s orient-ed to the ahistoricalanalysisof thecosts and benefits of particularstructural
changesand specificationof the goals that menand women should strive torealize through social and political organization. The quasi-Hegelianap-
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162
proach predominates n Moore'searlierwritings, eadingupto andincludingSocial Origins.27 Utilitarian formulations, already implicit in this early work,
begin to surface in Social Originsand are made explicit in Reflections. His
latest work, Injustice,is in part an attempt to reconcile aspects of the two
approaches. These shifts of emphasis will be traced while pursuing the
furtherobjectiveof exploring the impact of Moore's moral concerns,uponhis practiceas a sociologist and a historian.
It should be stated immediatelythat Moore does not perceivesociologicalfacts as
havingan
ontologicalstatuswhichisdifferentfromthat of historical
facts. Facts about the characteristicsof types of social structure(includingforms of thought) and their modes of variation over time have the same
status as facts about the characteristicsof specific individualsand groups
(includingtheir beliefs and motivations).A factual statementconveys infor-
mation whose accuracycan be tested without referenceto the existence or
desiresof the personmakingthe statement.Facts have to be discoveredthat
are relevantto whateverquestion is being investigated.Various meansmaybe used. For
example, comparative analysisof social
arrangementsis an
indispensable procedurewhen seeking to establish factual generalizationsabout the characteristicsof types of social structure and social process.
Furthermore,painstakingresearch s indispensable n the search,one which
is rarelysuccessful,for all the facts which are relevantin any instance.
However, factual statements are not the only kind of statement that is
relevantto the questions which Moore asks. In his opinion, humanchoices
andchanges
insocialstructure houldbeevaluated n termsof theirtendencyto produceoralleviatehumanmisery, especiallyin so far as these tendencies
are expressed in relations between rulers and subordinates.28The preciseformulation of this issue varies in different parts of Moore's work. In his
earlierwork, leading up to and includingSocial Origins,he tends to frame
the question as: whatforms and what degreeof violence and repressionare
necessary n orderto produceor maintaina givendegreeof human freedom?
In Reflections and Injustice he tends to reformulate the issue as: what
combination of freedom andrepression
is necessary in order to reduce
human misery?
Apart from factual statementsand statementsabout the criteriaof moral
evaluation, a third kind of statement is, in Moore's view, relevant when
analyzinghumanchoices and transformation n social structure n the past
and present.These are statementsabout what islikelyto havehappened n
the past if certainantecedentconditions or specifichumanchoices had been
different;and statements about what is likely to happen in the future
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163
depending upon whether choice A or choice B is actually made or whether
structuraloutcome X or structuraloutcomeY actuallyoccurs. This kind ofstatement is neitherfactualnor does it involvea moralevaluation. However,
Moore argues that rational and objective proceduresexist on the basis of
which such statementsmay be madeand criticized.Indeed, such statements
are a necessary component of the process of morally evaluating social
processesand human choices with referenceto their costs and benefits.29
In all his work Moore has beenconcerned with the relationshipbetweenthe
threekinds of statementindicated above. It is convenient tobegin
the more
detailed analysis by examining some of his earliestattemptsat establishing
empiricalgeneralizationsabout social structuresand social processes.Dur-
ing the 1940s, Moore tried and quickly turned away from the statistical
procedures of a positivist version of social science.30He also resisted the
claims of normative functionalism. In 1953 Moore's article entitled Thenew scholasticism and the study of politics appeared.31It anticipatedC. Wright Mills's laterand more well-knowncritiqueof Parsonianism and
statisticalempiricism.32
heseviews weredeveloped
intheessays
collectedin
Political Powerand Social Theory.Inthisvolume Mooredisplaysconsider-able virtuosityinapplyingthestrategiesof comparativeanalysis,functional-ism and evolutionarytheory. For example, in his Notes on the process of
acquiringpower hedistinguishes eudalism,rationalbureaucracyand total-itarianismas modes of controlandcoordination,each withits own structuraldilemmas. The paper exemplifies the significance that Moore attaches to
recurringcyclesof similarstructurewithina broadevolutionaryschemeandalso his
sensitivityto the invariantcharacteristicsof the
rangeof
organiza-tional formswhichmaybe used to coordinate the behavior of largenumbersof human beings.
In another paper, on the basis of a comparativeanalysis of Totalitarian
elements in pre-industrialsocieties, Moore arguesthat repressionwith the
objective of maintaining irrationalstandards of behaviour is a typicalresponseto problemsfor which a culturehas no solution.Totalitarianism,he
concludes, is not confined to industrial societies and has nonecessaryconnection with the mode of production. Having made the case that totali-
tarianism is a phenomenon recurring hroughtime and space and not con-fined to industrialsocieties,he goes on in his Thoughtson the future of the
family to make a contrastingargument.According to Moore, the family,which is widely considered to be universal, is threatened with extinctionbecause it is losingitstraditional unctions inthecourseof evolution. Finally,in his Reflections on conformityin industrialsociety, Mooreidentifiesfiveforms of conformity whichare
inescapablynecessaryn such a society.
They
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164
include:conformityto the logical principlesof the world aroundus;confor-
mityto some form of
managerialdecision-making concerningthe
produc-tion and allocation of resources;conformityto a degreeof social control to
cope with basically selfish, aggressive and evil tendencies in biologicalhumannature ; onformityto some set of non-empiricalbeliefs since this
hasempiricallybeen oneof the main basesof social cohesion ;and confor-
mityto the basic cultural rules whichmake socialcommunicationpossible.33
In these papers Moore's underlyingstrategy,which is implicit rather than
explicit, is to employ conventional techniquesof evolutionary,functionalist
and comparative analysis in order to obtain provisional answers to three
questions. They are: Which elements of the social order in contemporaryindustrial societies are unique and necessaryto those societies? Which ele-
ments are sharedwithothertypesof society, possiblybecausetheybelongto
a limited range of workable solutions to problemsencounteredin similar
forms in many kinds of society? And, finally, are there any elements of
industrialsociety commonly assumed to be necessarywhichare in fact not
necessaryand which could
disappearwithout the disintegration of that
society following as a necessaryconsequence?
Moore's unidentifiedadversary n this book is, one may surmise,his friend
and formercolleague, HerbertMarcuse,whose book Eros and Civilization
had appeared three years previously.34Marcuse argues that the formal
freedomsof bourgeois society disguisean apparatusof repressionwhichhas
in-built tendencies towards totalitarianism. Repression was, in Marcuse's
opinion, requiredn
less-developedsocietiessince enforced
conformitywasa
necessary aspect of the mode of production. However, in advanced bour-
geois society the demand for conformity extends far beyond the limits
necessaryto producethe material bases of civilization. In such a society, he
believes, the possibility of happinessis denied to its membersby the use of
oppressivetechniquesfor producingconformity.
Moore regardsthe position to which Marcuse'swork leads as being one of
merepeevishness
about thepresent,
which isperceived
as being totally
repressive,and sheeroptimismabout the future which is seen as being a
realm of complete freedomwhose achievementdependsupon the superces-sion of capitalism.35In response Moore attempts to determine, through
functionalistanalysis,the minimumdegreeof conformitythat is necessary n
industrialsocieties.Healso, through comparativeanalysis,arguesthatmanyinstitutionalarrangementsand politicalcycles,suchas thoseassociatedwith
totalitarianism, thought to be peculiar to industrial societies are in fact
sharedby others. Finally, throughan exploration of evolutionaryideas, he
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165
infers that the limits within which change may be possible within a society
depend upon the consequencesof its priorhistoricaldevelopmentin closing
off certain options and opening up others.
Although he rejects Marcuse'sdevelopment of Hegel, Moore presentshis
own position on values in the late 1950s as being basicallythe conclusion
that Hegeloffers us at the end of hiscontradictions,whentheyarestrippedof
their mystical and quasi-mysticalovertones. He argues that the rational
frameworkunderlyingthe externalworldmaybe discoveredby disciplinedand rational thinking. His hope is that the concept of a perfect society
might be reached, takingoff from real societies, to reacha critical stand-ard. 36 He adds:
Perhapsthe bestwecan do atany givenmomentinhistoryis to drawout the potentialitiesof
the social forms that exist before us in such a way as to set up a critical standard for
evaluatingthe status quo.37
Unfortunately, although Moore is able to imagine such a procedure in
principlehe does not find a way of applying it in 1958.The prospect he isforced to envisageis of the intellectualhaving togo down withhisship,with
all bannersflyingand steam hissingfrom the boilers,on behalfof principlesabout which absolute certaintyis impossible. 38At this point Moore's ap-
proachto valuesisverysimilar o Thompson'spositionasdescribedearlier n
this paper.
Moore's books on the Soviet Unionwrittenat about this time arenot unduly
inhibited by what he clearly recognizes as a lacuna in his methodological
armory because in these studies he is concerned not to specify how that
society should develop but ratherto identify, first, the causes of its political
development up until 1950and, second, the most likely (as opposed to the
most desirable)futuredevelopmentsin its politicalstructureafterthe death
of Stalin. The values relevant to these tasks were not his own but those
embedded in the chartermyth of Soviet communism.39Moore mobilizesa
greatdeal of historicaland contemporarydata to which he appliesmany of
theanalyticaltechniquessubsequentlyoutlinedin Political Power and SocialTheory.In Soviet Politics Moore emphasizesthreeaspects of post-revolu-
tionary Russia: first, the restrictions that the functional requirementsof
industrialsociety and the pressuresof external relationsimposed upon the
attempted realization of an utopian ideology; second, the functions that an
ambiguousideology could performfor a totalitarianregime n an industrial-
izing society;and third, the dilemmas and costs unavoidablyimposed uponsuch a regime and members of the society in which it holds power. The
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166
achievement of this book is to have cut through the distorted perceptions
producedin the United States
byfear of the Soviet Union and to have
produced a rational and empirically-basedanalysis of the structuralcon-
straintsand opportunities in terms of which the Soviet leadershiphad to
make its politicalchoices.40
In Terrorand Progress USSR Moore applies a similar strategy in his
assessment of the likely costs and benefits to the Soviet regimeof possible
changes in ideological emphasis and forms of social control tending awayfrom totalitarianterrorand towards either
greaterbureaucratic
rationalityora greateremphasis upon tradition.Moorearguesthatthe relevantconsid-
erations include not only the continuing functional requirementsof an
industrialsocietybut also the implicationsof thesepossibletendencies both
of which have beento some extent realized- forthe powerand legitimacyof
the politicalelite.41
In passingfrom his Soviet studiesto theanalysiscontainedin Social OriginsMoore makes two
importanttransitions.
First,he shifts from the
relativelyfamiliarcompany - familiar to a Harvard intellectual- of urban politicalelites to the much less familiar ruralenvironmentof the peasantcommunityand its aristocratic overlords. Second, he directs his attention away from
Soviet Russia, which he had been able to analyze as a knowledgeableand
insightfuloutsider,and towards the Westerndemocratic societies of which
he is so clearlya product.Itmust beacknowledgedstraightaway hat Moore
manages the first transition with far greater success than he manages the
second. In Social Originshe triesto introduce the
processof
systematicmoralevaluation into his analysis to a degreewhich he does not attempt in
his Soviet studies. It is a disappointment that in his specification of the
characteristicsof democratic polities which are worthy of our approvalMoore should limithimselfto itemizingthefamiliarlist of formallegislativeandjudicial institutions,apparentlyassumingalmost without questionthat
they realizein practicetheir claimto guarantee freedom. 42n otherwords,
the claims of democratic ideology are denied the clear-sightedscrutinyto
whichSoviet communismis subjected.Instead,Moore
beginshis book with
a short chapter on England whose development after about 1830, when
parliamentary emocracyestablished tselfpeacefullyand broadeneddown
from precedentto precedent, s presented, mplicitlyat least, as a hallowed
example by which other societies should bejudged.43
I have deliberately begun with the most serious of my criticismsbecause I
thinkthat,despitethis weakness,Social Origins s a considerable ntellectual
achievement whose flaws are a consequence of its Herculean ambition,
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167
In this book the results of prolonged and detailed historical researchare
presented hrougha subtleinterweavingof narrativeandcomparativeanaly-sis. Moore explorestwo modalities of the rural order'sresponseto commer-
cialization and bureaucratization.These are: first, its confrontation with
modernizing urban society; and, second, the transformation of forms of
domination in the countryside. In respectof both Moore is concernedwith
the costs and benefits of particular sequences of modernizationand their
implicationsfor the developmentof repressionand freedom.
The heart of the book consists of a comparativeanalysis of the moral and
material conditions of existence of groups belonging to the configurations
binding togetherpeasants,landlords,merchants,rulersand publicofficials.
On the basis of a masterlyexposition, deployedover severalchapters,Moore
sets out to build two complementaryintellectual structures.The first is a
series of causal explanations of a number of rapidand dramaticstructural
transformations,entailing considerableviolence and suffering,such as the
French and Chinese Revolutions. The second is a series of analyses of the
morally-relevantconsequencesof theprocesseswherebymodernizing
urban
society has impingedupon the ruralorder. The analyticalstrategiesareverydifferent in the two cases.
In constructinghis causalexplanations Moore typically presentshisempiri-cal findings with respectto the following: 1)the potentialitiesfor and limits
upon structuralvariations in the society concerned at its specific stage of
development;2) the tendenciestowardscohesion and disintegrationwhich
areactually present n thatsociety,
withparticular
reference o thedivision of
labor and forms of domination; 3) the perceptions of their material andmoral interests manifested by specific groups within the society; 4)theoccurrence of specific events or tendencies which presenta threat to those
perceived interests sufficiently sudden or drastic to stimulate people into
action;5) the identityof thepotentialallies,opponentsandvictims of specificgroupswhoseperceived nterestsarethreatened;and6) the options in histor-ical development which have been closed off in that society as a result of
precedingsequencesof historicalchange.
Data is also presentedwith respectto how peopleactuallybehaved afterthethreat had occurred and with respect to the structuraloutcomes to whichtheirbehaviorcontributed.Thesetwo finalcategoriesof data areinterpretedwith referenceto the findings listed above. In other words, the responses(activeor passive)of threatenedgroupsareinterpretedwithreference o their
perceptions, ncludingtheirperceptionsof the penaltiesof failingto respond.The structuraloutcomes of the interplaybetween the processes that were
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168
perceivedas threateningand the responses of threatenedgroups are inter-
pretedin terms of the following factors: the society'spotentialfor structural
variation, the strength and character of tendencies towards cohesion and
disintegrationwithinthe society,and the options for structuraldevelopmentthat areavailableinthe society in the lightof its previoushistoricaldevelop-ment.44
This strategyof causalexplanation is broadlythe same as that employedbyE. P. Thompsonin his workon eighteenth-andnineteenth-centuryEngland.In Social Origins,as in TheMakingof the English WorkingClass,explana-tions depend upon detailed knowledge about particulargroups or even
individuals.Inboth worksspecifichistoricaloutcomes such as the American
Civil War and the Reform Act of 1832are accounted for with referenceto
structuralconditions and human motivations interactingwitheach other.45
Moore'sanalysesof causation arecomplementedbyan assessmentof moral-
ly-relevant political outcomes of modernizingprocesses. His overarching
typologyof modernizing routes sbaseduponthe latterand not the former.
A brief consideration of the very differentcausal processes responsiblefor
the American Civil War and the French Revolution, both of which had
democratic outcomes, makes this point immediatelyobvious. Indeed,the
lack of symmetrybetweenMoore's treatmentof causes and his treatmentof
outcomes may be responsible in large measurefor the deeply ambiguouscriticalresponsewhich Social Originscalled forth.46 n this respect,Theda
Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions has done more to satisfy conven-
tional expectations while being less ambitious in its objectives.47
Although Mooresuggeststhat eventssuch as the French Revolutionand the
American Civil War clearedthe way for democratic outcomes in those
societies, he should not be understood to mean that violence as such caused
those outcomes.48Hisprocedureof moralassessment s to setthese costs on a
balance sheet alongside the benefits, if any, obtained in terms of human
freedom. Also relevantare the costs and benefits (in terms of miseryand
freedom)whichhavenot been incurredas a resultof a failureto developin an
alternative way which was genuinely in the cards. In other words, an
element of opportunitycost entersinto moralassessment.
Theabove procedure,whichis fundamentalto Moore's orientationto social
analysis,is disabledin Social Origins n a numberof ways. First, Moorefails
to distinguishhis proceduresof moral assessmentfrom his causal explana-tions with sufficientclarity.The distinctionand its significanceonly become
evident when Moore'swritingsare consideredas a whole. Second, as argued
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169
previously, he fails to define democracy or specify its morally-approvedcharacteristics
xceptin a mannerthat leaveshim
opento a
chargeof
naivetywhich neitherhis previousnor his subsequentwork would support.Third,Moore tends, especially in the chapter entitled The democratic route to
modernsociety, to reifychangesin the credit balanceof his moralledgerso
that they appearas the index of a benevolent force located in the historical
process, expressing itself in successive societies. He writes that it makes
sense... to regardthe English Civil War, the French Revolution and the
AmericanCivil Warasstages nthedevelopmentof thebourgeois-democraticrevolution. 49On
readingthis one has a sense that
Hegeliantendenciesare
momentarilysurfacingin Moore's mindin resistance to the ahistoricalbias
of a quasi-Utilitarianmoralcalculus.
In Reflections and InjusticeBarringtonMoore finally conducts a seriesof
frontalattacks upon the problemof derivingthe criteriaof valuejudgmentsfrom objective knowledge about human societies. In the former book he
develops a moralcalculuson the basis that Theevidence is reasonablyclear
that humanbeings
do not want a life ofsuffering,
at least not for its own
sake. 50He confrontsa number of difficultiesin applyinga calculus of costs
and benefits,difficultieswhichwould have been farless acuteif theyhadbeen
encountered within a Hegelianframework.Threeexamples may be given.First, Mooreasks how long one would have to wait after an event such as the
FrenchRevolution beforedrawingup the moralledgerof costs andbenefits.
A Hegelian would surelyjust keep his ears open for the beating wings of
Minerva'sowl, in the meantimerepeatingthe reputedanswer of a Chinese
communist leader to thisveryquestion
that it is tooearly
to tell.Second,Moore asks how one assesses, in moral terms,humanactions such as those
carriedout by the Inquisition.Its tortures and punishmentsare indefensible
in the light of Moore's own values but they wereinflictedin the sincerehopeof deflectingvictimsand potentialvictimsfrombeliefsandpracticeswhich,it
was widely assumed, would damn them to an eternity of misery. Again, a
Hegelianwouldpresumablyhavelittledifficulty nlocatingthe Inquisitionata relativelyearlystage withinthe dialecticalprocessof reasons'unfolding.51
Third,Moore is forced to
acknowledgea contradictionbetween two
princi-ples: on the one hand, intellectual speculation and innovation should be
controlled in orderto protect the stability of a society's moral orderand to
avoid thediversion of resourcesfrom the task of reducingthe level of miserywithin the limits of existing knowledge; on the other hand, he insists, it is
impossibleto relinquish he principlethat thedisinterestedpursuitof truthand beauty should continue even though new knowledge might be pro-duced whichunderminesbeliefs whichsupportthe moralintention of reduc-
ing misery na particular ociety.52OurHegeliantheoristwould, however,be
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170
well awarethat the dialectical contradictionsexpressedin part throughthe
aspirationstowards freedomandjustice would tend to undermine he exist-
ing order in preparationfor the higher synthesisof a succeeding epoch. In
fact, Moore takes some cold comfort from his perception, as a critical
rationalist, hat inanycase the most likelyoutcome of existingtrendswithin
andbetween societies is thecollapseof politicalauthorityandacceptedcodes
of behavior.53
Moore snatches four sets of positive conclusions from his rathergloomy
analysis in Reflections.First,in his two essays on predatorydemocracy n
the contemporary United States, he effectively disposes of the charge of
naivety by subjectingliberalism,the current ideology of capitalist demo-
cracy, to criticalscrutiny.54Moore arguesthat both the supportersand the
opponentsof liberal deologytend to assume,quite mistakenly,thatmanyof
the features of Americansocietywhichproducehumanmiseryareinevitable
aspectsof capitalism.Instead,Mooresuggests,men and womenmaychoose
to reformaspects of this society, without alteringits capitalisticnature, in
such a way as to reduce the miserywhich is a consequence of war, poverty,
hunger, injustice,oppressionand intolerance.Adopting a strategyreminis-cent of his analysis in Terrorand Progress USSR, he itemizesthe costs and
benefits of various potential means of pursuingthis desirablegoal.
Second, Moore sets out the conditions which,in hisview,arenecessary or a
society to permitfull and freediscussion of any and all sorts of viewpointson all subjects. 55 hese conditions, which may be recognizedas a compro-mise betweentherequirements f Habermas's idealspeechcommunity and
Moore'sperceptionsof the minimumrequirements or socialstability,are as
follows: a rational consensus should exist on the need to forbid the use of
technical meansfor primarilydestructivepurposes andalso on the needto
control the rate of intellectual innovation and the direction of research
investment; he societyshouldbe made safefromforeignthreats; ts inhabit-
antsshouldbeemotionallysecure,rationalandin possessionof the technical
and intellectualcompetence providedbya broad andcoherent liberaleduca-
tion;and a roughsocio-economicequalityshouldexist to inhibit theappear-
ance of a powerfulestablishmentcontrollingthought.56
Third, Moore identifiestwo seriousobstaclesto the establishmentnot onlyof the intellectually reesocietydescribedabove but also of a societydedicat-
ed to minimizinghuman misery.These obstaclesare: the irreducibleuncer-
tainty and insecurity stemming from competition between individuals,
groups and states;and the constant temptationfacing individualsto avoid
the sanctionsand commands of moral rules for their own advantageand to
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171
the detrimentof others.57This conclusion is positive insofar as by acknowl-
edgingthe
inevitabilityof the above factors efforts
maybe concentrated
upon pursuingthe implications of his final conclusion. This is that a majorsource of social conflict is moral disagreementabout the principles thatshould be expressed within political orders. This conclusion leads him to
devote his attention to establishing, through a combination of reason and
empiricalevidence,thebasesof a legitimateform of politicalauthoritywhich
may, he hopes, be acknowledged as an appropriate replacementfor the
defunct modes of liberalismand communism.58
The task of specifyingthe principlesof what Moore calls rationalpolitical
authority, which was begunin Reflections,is carried urther n Injustice.In
the former work he deduces from the application of his quasi-Utilitarianmoral calculus that rulers should govern in such a way as to minimize
suffering within their societies insofar as this is humanly possible.59In
Injustice he attempts to demonstrate that his view of the ought in this
matterexpressesa consensusabout the natureof political rightsand obliga-tions which is
universallyassumed in fact.
Furthermore,he
arguesthat
failureto enacttheseprinciplesproduces moraloutrage. Theexperienceof
misery,he suggests,only fails to elicitsuch outrage when it is thoughtto be
inevitable, beyond human control.60
The maindevelopmentin Moore'sintellectualposition in Injustice s his new
emphasisupon the redefinitionof inevitability whichoccurs in succeedingepochs. An importantconsequenceof this processof redefinition s that the
potential scopeof human control and hence human choice is
perceivedas
becoming greater.61This new intellectualemphasis permits Moore to copewith evidence that the actual expectations of subordinates about rulers'behaviorhavediffered ndetailbetweensocietiesandepochs. Indeed,Mooremobilizes an impressivenumberof data on the developmentof the German
workingclass whichtends to show that although the aspirationfor decenthumantreatment remainedconstant, changingperceptionsof theextent towhich the society's rulerscould provide it gradually led to an increase in
expectations.62
Bystressing,on the one hand,theconstancyof humanaspirationsand, on theother hand, the transformabilityof human perceptions of the scope foreffectiveaction, Mooreproducesa reconciliationbetweenhisquasi-Utilitar-ianism, which assumes a universalpsychology, and his quasi-Hegelianism,which assumes that political ideologies undergochange over time. On thisbasishe reaches or the prizewhichSumnerhad beenable to describebutnotachieve:
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A reallygreatand intelligentgrouppurposefoundedon correctknowledgeand reallysound
judgment,can infuse into the mores a vigorand consistentcharacterwhich will reacheveryindividual with educativeeffort. The essential condition is that the group purposeshall be
founded on correctknowledgeand reallysoundjudgment. The interestsmustbe real and
theymust be the interestsof the whole,andthejudgmentas to meansof satisfying hem must
be correct.63
Thebigquestionraisedby Injustice s whether nfact Moorehassuccessfullyanchored his moralcalculusand his model of rationalpoliticalauthorityin
anthropologicalevidence that demonstrates their imperativecharacterand
universalapplicability.
The readercertainly
closes the bookfeeling
well
travelled. For example, visits are made to the TrobriandIslands,classical
Greece,the Semai of Malaya, eighteenth-centuryEngland,the Barotse,the
Kapauku Papuans, the Ming Empire, the Lovedu people and the North
Alaskan Eskimos - all before page 37.64 This inductivist approach, which
bracketsor sets aside considerations of historicaldevelopment in order to
discover constants that transcendgeography and history, has recurred n
Moore'swork from the beginning.65nthis case, does hisevidenceprovehis
point?
It mustfirst be recognizedthat it is not surprising hat an Americanscholar
should find congenial resonances in a Germanculturewhich has played a
large part in gestating the values to which he is committed. However, the
intellectualgroundwork orconcludingthat similarmeaningsabout political
obligation may be inferredfrom societies much moreestranged n time and
place does not appear in Injustice.Indeed, one may readilyconclude from
theargumentsof,
forexample, Quentin Skinner,
that the intended illocu-
tionaryforce of statementsderivingfrom suchcultures cannot be identified
without considerable nvestigationof contemporarydebates,includingtheir
repeatedemphases and significantsilences.66Moore does not attempt this
exercise- apartfrom his discussionof Germanmaterials.Inview of this the
case must remain,at best, non-proven.
However, Injustice may usefully be consideredas being composed of two
books, one a speculativeessayin
philosophical anthropology,the other a
highlyskilledand successfulenterprise n historicalsociology. Inhisstudyof
themakingof the Germanworkingclass, Moore explicitlyacknowledges
the influenceof Thompson, whose workwas discussedearlier. Heattributes
to the English scholar the perception that workers in an industrializing
society werecapableof developingthroughtheirownexperiencestheirown
diagnoses and remedies for the ills which afflicted them. 67 n his own
attempts to draw out the social ideals implicit in the German workers'
consciousness,Moore isalsoengaging nanenterprise loseto theintellectual
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173
concerns of Jurgen Habermas. However, Moore goes beyond both writers
by carefully analyzingthe interplaybetweenhumanagencyand the structu-
ralconstraintsderivingfrom, for example, the mode of production. In this
way he not only explores morethoroughlythan does Thompson the objec-tive coordinates within which working-classconsciousnesstakes shapebutalso pays more attention than does Habermasto the concretedynamics ofthe process of strivingtowards an ideal community life. 68
Finally, the historical methodology adopted in Injustice may be brieflycontrasted with Moore's approach in his own earlier work. In his Soviet
studies he gives equal emphasis in his analytical narrative to structuralconstraints and human choice; in Social Origins he tends to place more
emphasis upon the structuralconstraints that made revolutions and civil
warspossible;in Injusticehe drawsspecialattention to the scope for human
choice whichattended the behavior of Ebert and the SPD in Germanyafter
the First World War.69Moore's particularinterest in this last issue stems
from an observationhe madein Soviet Politicsnearlythirtyyearspreviously.If the revolutionary uprisingin the Ruhr had produceda left-wing govern-
ment in Germany,would Stalin have risen to power in the Soviet Union?Would the Third Reichhave come into existence?Would the Second World
War have occurred?70Once again we are remindedof the unity of Moore's
workover morethan threedecades and of the moral concernwhichhasbeen
its drivingforce.
In drawingthe argumentto a close, threeconclusions may be offered aboutthe relationship between morality and method in the work of Barrington
Moore. First,hedoes not finallypersuadeus thatthe moralcriteriawhich he
applies have an imperativecharacterderiving from the very nature of hu-
mankind and social relationships. Despite his reluctance to retreat to
Thompson'sposition that a commitment to specificvaluesinvolves an act of
faith, Moore is unable to derive the ought from the is. Second, even
though we may readily subscribe, as an act of faith, to the assumptionsexpressed in his moral calculus and the model of rational authority whichderivesfrom it, the lattermodel is verydifficultto applyto modernWestern
societies. Itassumes theexistence of a unitaryrulingelitewithresponsibilityfor the welfare of all citizens. Neither Britainnor the United States in the
early 1980s- to take two relevantexamples - appear to meet these condi-tions. Furthermore,how can this model cope with multinationalcorpora-tionsandtradeunions(forexample)whichhavesuccessfullyclaimedauthori-
ty over the welfare of constituencies which rarelycoincide with that of thenation-state?The model may well work betterwhen applied to the classicalGreekpolis or even the Soviet Union but outside such spheres it is a very
impracticalmoral blueprint.
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However, a third - and much more positive - conclusion is that Moore has
demonstrated that it ispossible systematically
toincorporate
a consideration
of human motivations, perceptions and choices at the very heart of our
attempted explanations. Furthermore, he has persuasively insisted that the
social processes most worth examining are those which have not only deeply
affected the values and aspirations which we hold but have also circum-
scribed the means and opportunities that we have to pursue them. By placing
the ought at the center of his concerns he has maintained a consistent
objective in his work which has minimized the need or inclination to seek
securityin a
single sociologicalscheme or tradition. In his
borrowingfrom
functionalism Moore has not lost his concern for social change; he has
employed the idea of evolution without neglecting the importance of persist-
ing characteristics of organizational forms: he analyzes structural constraints
in the same breath as he insists upon the part played by human motivations;
in his concern with structures he recognizes the mutual interplay between
material and normative conditions; his narratives are interwoven with subtle
comparisons which help to generate rather than simply to illustrate his
arguments;and his causal
explanationsare
closelyinterlocked with
carefullyargued moral evaluations. This article has been largely concerned with the
difficulties which Moore has encountered in establishing an intellectually
satisfying basis for his moral evaluations. However, through his dogged
pursuit of the ought Moore has told us a great deal that we did not realize
before about the is. It would, finally, be misleading to attempt to assimilate
Moore to any single disciplinary school or academic tradition. Not the least
of the merits of his books and essays is that they spring from the heart of
Americanculture. His work
expressesthe
aspirationsand
ambiguitiesof a
society whose members obstinately seek moral significance in human expe-
rience and the realization of ideals in human action.
NOTES
1. An earlier version of this paper was deliveredto the History and Sociology seminar at
Oxford University organizedby Frank Parkin and R. W. Johnson of MagdalenCollege. I
am gratefulfor thecommentsof both the above-namedandalso for the usefulobservations
of Val Riddell.2. The works by Moore to which referencewill be madeare as follows: Soviet Politics - The
Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1950; hereafter Soviet Politics); Terrorand Progress USSR: Some Sources of
Stability and Change in the Soviet Dictatorship(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press,
1954; hereafter Terrorand Progress); Political Power and Social Theory (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1958;hereafterPolitical Power);Social Originsof Dictatorshipand Democracy:Lordand Peasant in the Makingof the Modern World(London: Penguin,1969; hereafterSocial Origins);Reflections on the Causes of Human Miseryand uponCertain Proposals to Eliminate Them (London: Penguin, 1972; hereafter Reflections);
Injustice:TheSocial Basesof Obedienceand Revolt (London: Macmillian,1978;hereafter
Injustice).Unfortunately,this article was written before the publication of Moore's mostrecentwork on
privacy.
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3. See D. Smith, BarringtonMoore Jr: A CriticalAppraisal (White Plains: M. E. Sharpe,1983; published in Britain by Macmillan with the title Barrington Moore: Violence,Moralityand Political Change;hereafterBarringtonMoore),7,43,47,53-4,58-61,87, 109,
115, 132, 145, 154, 162, 164, 172, 177.4. Social Origins,viii-ix. 5. Reflections,35.6. More detailed accounts may be found in Smith, BarringtonMoore.7. The quotation is from W. G. Sumner, Folkways (New York: Mentor, 1960, with an
introductionby W. L. Phelps;originally publishedin 1906),81.8. References to Sumner are scatteredthroughout Moore'swork, e.g., Reflections,55; Injus-
tice, 12,85,435.9. Phelps, introduction to Folkwals, xi; Soviet Politics, xiii.
10. Folkways,539, 49, 438ff, 81.11. Soviet Politics, xiii; Injustice,434-5.12. Cf. Injustice,3; M. Harris,TheRiseof Anthropological Theory London: Routledge,1968),
608-11.13. E.g., Soviet Politics,298; Social Origins,8; Injustice,85, 128, 135.
14.J. Habermas, Theoryand Practice(London: Heinemann, 1974),44.15. Ibid.16. E. P. Thompson, Anopenletter o LeslekKolakowski n ThePovertyof Theory London:
MerlinPress, 1980),232, 156.17. Poverty., 148.18. Poverty., 148, 150, 156.19. Habermas,Knowledgeand Human Interests Boston: Beacon Press, 1971),310.20. Cf. T. A. McCarthy, A theory of communicativecompetence, Philosophy of the Social
Sciences,3 (1973), 135-56.21. Habermas, Theoryand Practice,32-37. 22. Reflections,xvi.23. P. Gay, The Enlightenment:An Interpretation.Vol. II - The Science of Freedom(New
York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1969),84.24. J. Bentham, The Principlesof Moralsand Legislation(West Drayton: Hafner, 1965), 1.
25. Sumner, Folkwa s, 45. 26. Political Power,39, 188.27. Political Power, 146ff;Social Origins,521. 28. Reflections, 1-13.29. Injustice,376-81; Social Origins, 103-4. It is worth noting that E. P. Thompson is also
preparedto engage in the history-game n which we suppose that A did not happenand B(which did not happen)did. He also occasionally explores alternativepossible futures interms of a similarlogic. Poverty, 46, 71-2.
30. See, for example, B. Moore, Therelation betweensocial stratificationand social control,Sociometrv,5 (1942), 230-50.
31. B. Moore, The new scholasticism and the study of politics, World Politics, 1 (1953),122-38.
32. C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination(London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1959).33. Political Power, 186-8.34. H. Marcuse,Erosand Civilization(London: Sphere Books, 1969).
35. Political Power, 180.It is fascinatingto contrast Moore'sapproachin theseessayswiththecritical remarks on Marcuse's work made by Habermas. See, especially, J. Habermas,Towardsa Rational Society (London: Heinemann, 1971),81-90.
36. Political Power, 107-8. 37. Political Power, 108. 38. Political Power, 196.39. On chartermyths see Notes on the processof acquiringpower n Political Power,2ff.
See also B. Moore, The influence of ideas on policies as shown in the collectivization ofagriculture n Russia, AmericanPolitical Science Review,41 (1947), 733-43.
40. In some of his recent work, John Dunn is attempting to apply a corrective to distortedperceptions of communist regimes in the early 1980s. Discussing the rangeof politicalpossibilities which makeup the Marxisttradition,he sees theprocessof determinationofwhich possibilitiesare in fact actualisedin the future(and which possibilitieshave alreadybeenactualised inthepast)as historicaland mediatedbythe beliefsandjudgmentsof humanagents, severallyand in groups, and not as theoreticallypre-guaranteedand controlled by
eitherpurelymaterial actors or thestrictlogical or political implicationsof a systemof falsebelief. This approachcoincides in some respectswiththat adopted by Moore in the 1950swith respect to the Soviet Union. J. Dunn, Totalitariandemocracy and the legacy ofmodern revolution: explanation or indictment?, paper delivered to the Fifth AnnualMilleniumConference,London School of Economics, November 1982,7-8.
41. On tendenciestowardsbureaucracyand tradition in the Soviet Union, see D. Lane, Politicsand Society in the USSR, revised edition (Oxford: MartinRobertson, 1978),275, 279, 370,422, 507; C. Lane, The Rites of Rulers(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1981),passim.
42. Social Origins,429. 43. Social Origins,29.44. The precedingparagraph ontains a highlycondensed version of a discussionwhich is set out
at greaterlength in D. Smith, The historicalsociology of BarringtonMoore:discoveringfacts and values n T. Skocpol, ed., Visionand Method in HistoricalSociology (New York:
CambridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming).
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45. The similarities ust noted must not disguise two differencesbetween the two books beingdiscussed. Moore makes much more creative use of the comparative method than does
Thompson. Furthermore, whereas Thompson tends to pay more attention to humanmotivations thanstructuralconstraints Mooretendsto have theopposite bias. Both writershave compensated or these biases in other works. E. P. Thompson, The Makingof theEnglish WorkingClass(Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1963).
46. Onthecriticalresponseto Social Origins, eeSmith, BarringtonMoore,25-9; J. M. Wiener,Review of reviews, Historyand Theory,15(1976), 146-75.
47. T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions:A ComparativeAnalysisof France,Russia andChina New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979).Fora critiqueof Skocpol, see Smith,BarringtonMoore, 158-63.
48. Social Origins,102-5, 149-54. 49. Social Origins,427. 50. Reflections,5.51. Reflections,26-7, 29. 52. Reflections, 79-83, 93. 53. Reflections, 103, 151, 172.54. The essays are entitled Of predatory democracy: the USA and Some prospects for
predatorydemocracy.
55. Reflections,84.56. Reflections, 84-7. These remarks introduce a discussion by Moore of the part which
universitiesmayplayindevelopingrationalcriticism.This discussionmaybecomparedwithHabermas'scomments on the role of the universityin a democracy. Reflections,91-103;Habermas, Theuniversity n a democracy:democratizationof theuniversity, n TowardsaRational Society (London: Heinemann, 1971), 1-12.
57. Reflections,32-9, 47.58. Reflections,22;seealso B. Moore, Thesocietynobody wants:a look beyond Marxismand
Liberalism, n B. Moore and K. H. Wolff, eds., The CriticalSpirit: EssaYs n Honour ofHerbert Marcuse(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
59. Reflections,52-6. 60. Injustice,especially 15,461-2, 506-10. 61. Injustice,458-505.62. Injustice, 166, 190, 205, 208, 216, 224, 253, 269, 273, 285, 298, 351. See also J. M. Wiener,
Working-classconsciousness in Germany, 1848-1933, Marxist Perspectives,5 (1979),
156-69.63. Sumner, Folkways, 70. 64. Injustice,11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 35-6.65. It may be found, for example, in Moore's doctoral thesis whichjuxtaposed facts about
thirty-six societies, ranging from the Aztecs to YankeeCity, in order to discover thestatisticalrelationshipbetweenaspectsof social stratificationandsocialcontrol. Moorelater
recognisedthe inadequacyof this applicationof statisticalmaterials.Indeed,in Injusticehe
displays considerable virtuousity in integrating statistical data with data on forms ofconsciousness. See Smith, BarringtonMoore, 44-6; Injustice, 173ff, 212ff, 227ff, 257ff,276ff, 328ff, 400ff.
66. See, for example, Q. Skinner, Meaningand understanding n the historyof ideas, Historyand Theory,8 (1969), 3-53.
67. Injustice,474.68. P. Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism(London: New Left Books, 1980),33;
R. J. Bernstein,TheRestructuring f Social and PoliticalTheory London: Methuen,1979),224.
69. Injustice,376-97. 70. Soviet Politics, 196-7; Injustice,397.
Theoryand Society 13(1984) 151-176
0304-2421/84/$03.00 ? 1984ElsevierScience PublishersB.V.