morale and its measurement

Morale and Its MeasurementAuthor(s): Henry DurantSource: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Nov., 1941), pp. 406-414Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2769290 .

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MORALE AND ITS MEASUREMENT

HENRY DURANT

ABSTRACT Morale is the relationship of a group to a given end. In the present situation it is

likely that the specific factors affecting morale are not the same in any two countries. While it is difficult to find measurable indices of civilian morale, such indices may be selected and used. The Ministry of Information in Britain has used the public-opinion survey for measuring morale as well as the more detailed methods used by Gallup. A study made by Paul Lazarsfeld and associates suggests the possibility of using the panel method as a technique of inquiry for ascertaining morale under war conditions.

Morale is the relationship of a group to a given end. The end is always set by an authority-by the management of the corporation in the case of industrial morale, by the military authorities for the army, and by the government for its civilian subjects. Assuming that the end is desired firmly and determinedly by the authority itself, the problem of morale then becomes the extent to which the authority's followers or subordinates will also strive to achieve that goal. The greater the homogeneity of the group and the closer the identity of the leaders with the led, the fewer will be the problems encountered in maintaining high morale. The more heterogeneous the group and the greater the social distance separating those giving the orders from those at the receiving end, the more likely it is that low morale will ensue in times of stress. Unity can be enhanced by the provision of good material conditions of all kinds. Unity can also be augmented by ideological means, the history of the group being a very important weapon in the ideological armory. In practice, of course, factors of both kinds-material and ideological-operate together, it often being possible to offset any deterioration in the former by a greater emphasis upon the ideological factors. One of the outstanding problems in maintaining morale is determining the lengths to which this substitution can be carried.

The separate spheres of society, military, industrial, and civilian, are today more closely interrelated than ever before. Civilians are literally in the front lines and must, while carrying on their everyday jobs, experience some of the hazards which it is the duty of the sol-

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MORALE AND ITS MEASUREMENT 407

dier to face. This is only one aspect of the interrelatedness and by no means the most important. In the last war the efforts of one industrial worker behind the lines sufficed to equip two or three sol- diers at the front. Today each soldier, as a result of the greater fire power required, the greater complexity of armaments, and the enormous increase in mechanization, absorbs the efforts of approxi- mately four civilian workers. The most successful British general of this war, General Wavell, puts at the head of all military problems that of supply, which is simply a method of underlining an army's dependence upon its civilian base. A modern army is unable to maintain itself for a single day without the highly skilled and highly or- ganized efforts of its whole civilian population. Any disturbance of civilian efforts will, therefore, rapidly react upon the military situation; the connection is close and direct. A deterioration in the supply situation will lead to a deterioration of the military position, and there is little hope of escape from these consequences.

A similarly close connection exists in the realm of morale, but the interactions between the different morale sections are by no means so automatic or so direct. A military defeat will produce its impact on the state of mind of the civilian population, but whereas in one nation gloom and dispiritedness may ensue, in another a military setback will become the spur to even greater efforts. Hitler, it is certain, can maintain himself only by a succession of military vic- tories. The most dispassionate observers seem to agree that the re- action of the German population to a defeat would be negative and exceedingly severe. In Britain, on the other hand, events have shown that an impairment of morale does not follow upon defeat. "Blood, sweat, and tears" was the only promise made by Churchill when he took office; while successes have been recorded in some areas, the situation in others has definitely worsened. Yet Churchill has retained his popularity, and British morale today stands very high.

Differences of this kind in national reactions and the implications of these differences are very important in the measurement of morale. They imply that there is no universal correlation applicable to all countries between morale and the factors affecting it-that me- thodologically, therefore, it does not suffice to plot the curve of the



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factors. Expressed in other words, while in one country the factor curves may fall and the total morale curve fall with them, in another country the factor curves may also fall, but the total morale curve may remain a straight line or even rise. It is necessary, therefore, in measuring morale, to use a technique which gives results independ- ently of the factor curves. We may go still further in the emphasis upon the differences in national reactions: it is likely that the specific factors affecting morale are not the same in any two countries. It is interesting to compare the memoranda, Morale in China, and Morale Factors in Collapse of France, I940. Both are issued by the Committee for National Morale and both are excellent pieces of analysis. But there their similarities end. In the case of France attention is directed toward the following causes of bad morale among many others-political tension, public violence, repudiation of existing regime by large bodies of citizens, exaggerated individual- ism, general passivity, demographic factors, and susceptibility to panic and despair. In the analysis of China's morale, however, we find a discussion of such factors as dependence on American and British aid, the relations of the "return to the coast" school with the "new hinterland" school, the price of grain, the absence of medical facilities, and the treatment of Manchurian troops by the central government.

The enumeration of these differences indicates that morale is a function of the economic situation, the character of the social and political groups within a country, their relations to each other, the degree of political organization and consciousness, the military situation and the relationships with other countries, and of a body of recollections and beliefs which have emerged from a country's history. An illustration may illuminate the importance of the country's history. Reference was made above to the high standard of Btitish morale, both absolutely and relatively to the atmosphere in Germany, and at the same time it was pointed out that this good state of British morale cannot be explained simply by reference to the objective circumstances. Part of the explanation will be found in Britain's history. Since Henry VIII successfully defied the pope and Elizabeth's fleet defeated the Spanish Armada, England has not once been completely beaten in a war, with the exception of the American Revolution. England has not experienced a full-scale in-



MORALE AND ITS MEASUREMENT 409

vasion since William I conquered the country in Io66, and hence there is no dread-either acquired or retained from personal experiences-of the enemy appearing and oppressing the land. For most Britishers the possibility simply does not exist that their country might be beaten. The world is a place where the British always get off to a slow start in a war but, once started, their military ma- chine and their navy may grind slowly but they grind exceeding small. The world has been like that for nearly four hundred years, and there is no reason to believe that it will change at the present time. That is the way the ordinary Britisher argues.

The German, however, remembers the heavy defeat suffered in I9I8, up to that time the most complete military defeat, measured in terms of territory, men, and materials lost, ever suffered by any country. He remembers the depression of the early I930's, which Britain, comparatively speaking, escaped. He remembers the years of sacrifice prior to the present war and he remembers his leaders' promises that that war would be of short duration. But it has lasted two years, and early in I94i Hitler talked of "if the war goes into I942." If, therefore, the German surveys the war to date and finds his country's forces occupying most of Europe, he is nevertheless sobered by recalling that in I9I8 much the same position did not stave off defeat. While the Germans are oppressed by the ghosts of the past, the British are supported by the genius of their history.

The study of national morale, therefore, becomes a historical, political study to which individual psychology, with its somewhat formal, general categories, can contribute little and to which psy- chiatry has but slight relevance. The collective population of a country as a unit of study belongs to a different class of objects from a human being. The analogy of a society or a community as a man may throw light on certain aspects of its workings; it is important to remember that it is only an analogy. The first attempt to measure morale was also a successful attempt, and a description of the methods employed will reveal that in plotting the curve, reference was made only to objective, sociological factors, and subjective, psycho- logical factors did not enter into the picture at all.

Newton D. Baker, the secretary of war during the first world war, insisted that all the varied information being received in the United States concerning the state of morale in Germany be reduced to



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quantitative form. The work, undertaken by the War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence, resulted in the first morale curve ever plotted. The main curve was the state of civilian morale. The subsidiary curves were: (i) variations in Germany's military position, (2) sinkings by U-boats, (3) the food situation in northern Germany, (4) the degree of political unity, and (5) the state of Austria-Hungary.

Germany's morale is arbitrarily standing at ioo% in August, I914. Zero, for the same line, is taken to be the point at which the effective majority of the German people will refuse longer to support the war. The degree of movement of this line is determined mainly by a consideration of the deflections of the secondary lines which represent the forces exerting the greatest influence on the German state of morale.c

This explanation is given on the chart itself by those responsible for plotting the curves. None of the sources is cited except that No. i, sinkings by U-boats, is said to be "based on monthly reports of tonnage sunk." Presumably No. 3, dealing with the food situation, was restricted to northern Germany because it is there that the big cities are found, and it is from there that most information would be coming out by means of visitors, neutral seamen, and so on.

From spring, I9I8, the main curve was falling sharply; it was not far from zero when the revolutions actually started in Austria and Germany. Accordingly, this attempt to measure morale may be regarded as successful in its outcome. Certain points should be made on the methods employed. The two curves most closely resembling each other in shape are the main morale curve and the one indicating Germany's military position, suggesting that the military situation was the chief determinant of civilian morale. At one point, however, in April, I9I8, the military situation curve remained a straight line while the morale curve began to drop sharply. A similar drop is not to be found in any of the subsidiary curves, and the conclusion is in- escapable that the shape of the main curve at this point was determined by information other than that appearing in the subsidiaries. This indicates the main weakness of the method-that addi-

1 George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in I9i8 (Stanford University, I938), pp. 192-93. All the detailed information concerning the chart comes from Bruntz, and it is due to his efforts that the chart was made available to the public.



MORALE AND ITS MEASUREMENT 4II

tional and different information had to be secured to check whether, in fact, the main curve was moving in accordance with the subsidiaries. There was, that is to say, no fixed relationship between the main curve and its subsidiaries. This was true of Imperial Germany over time and it is true today when we compare Nazi Germany and Great Britain.

Does this mean that any attempts to measure morale simply by reducing ready-made social phenomena to quantitative form must be abandoned? The question cannot be answered directly since the results of any attempts which are now being made cannot be published till after the war. Some comments might be ventured. Fail- ure is almost certain if reliance is placed on independent, objective facts such as food supply or the number of bombs dropped by the enemy on the home population. These factors must pass through and into people's consciousness before they express themselves as an effect on the state of morale. That consciousness may reflect them in this fashion or that; there is no mechanistic, automatic impact holding constant in all instances. Can we find measurable aspects of civilian behavior which may be used as morale indexes? Theo- retically, we can, practically, they are not easy to name and they are probably still harder to isolate satisfactorily during the special circumstances of wartime.

Strikes-their frequency, extent, and duration-offer one possibility. The experience in Great Britain during the last war shows that prohibiting strikes does not stop them. Strikes are also pro- hibited during the present war; some have occurred, but they have been slight in scope. Industrial output is another possible index, but corrections would have to be made for variations in supply of materials, changes in managerial skills, alterations in hours, dilution by unskilled labor, and other such factors. Nevertheless, these corrections are practicable, and this index ought to be of considerable value. Variations in the convictions for drunkenness or drunken driving should also prove useful, subject to corrections for instances, not infrequent in present Britain, where there is a shortage of beer or spirits, and for other such influences as changes in police pro- cedure. Statistics of other forms of crime, especially crimes against property, such as housebreaking and robbery, should prove en-



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lightening, but in every instance great care must be exercised in drawing deductions from the statistics collected. In spite of all the pitfalls, it is believed that reliable results could be achieved with the use of such material, and the outcome of such research would be intensely interesting. Have any new techniques been developed since World War I to measure the morale of the home population? The Nazis keep a very careful check on the state of their civilian morale. All the local leaders must make periodic reports, giving the replies to specific inquiries sent from regional and other headquarters. A very large number of persons are engaged in reporting the nature and contents of overheard conversations, using restau- rants, public vehicles, factories-all places where people congregate -for gathering the material. A large amount of systematic sounding of public opinion is done by "controlled" conversations, i.e., the in- vestigator introduces deliberately a number of topics on which he wants the other person's views, making a mental note of the answers received. From the results of a large-scale experiment made under the most difficult conditions in Germany just prior to the war, it can be said that this method gives completely dependable results, and that the persons questioned remain entirely oblivious of the fact that they have been "interviewed."

All the information is collected centrally, but whether it is reduced to quantitative form and, if so, how, is not known. There are grounds for believing that the reports made to headquarters are realistic. Thus just prior to the outbreak of the war Hitler told British Am- bassador Henderson that at the time of Munich, September, I938, the German people were not wholeheartedly behind him-Hitler, and that therefore he would not have risked a general war. He went on to say that he was satisfied that he now had the support of the people and that he was determined to solve the Polish question by force, if necessary.

The British employ some- of the same methods for measuring civilian morale, but they are also able to take advantage openly of the most recent development in measuring public opinion-the public opinion survey. The Ministry of Information sets up its own unit to make surveys, sampling the population by picking names at random from the National Register. This method has all the dis- advantages arising from the necessity of interviewing a given list of



MORALE AND ITS MEASUREMENT 4I3

persons. There are indications that the Ministry may take advantage of the better known Gallup methods in surveys made on its behalt.

The important feature of opinion polls is that, by constant repe- tition of the same question, movements in opinion can be traced and thus the data for plotting a curve become available. For the purpose of such a curve several questions should be asked, the results of each acting as a check on the validity of the results of all the others. Samples of questions actually repeated many times in Great Britain may be given from the work of the British Institute of Public Opin- ion. "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Mr. Churchill as prime minister?" "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's conduct of the war?" "Do you think that we shall win this war, that it will be a stalemate, or that we shall lose it?" "Would you approve or disapprove if the government were to enter into peace negotiations with Germany now?" It will be seen that all these topics cluster round the central theme of the attitude toward the war and toward those conducting it. Hence, the results are relat- ed. If they are not, then significant tendencies may be revealed. Should it be found, for instance, that Mr. Churchill's stock is rising or remaining stable while the public becomes increasingly critical of the conduct of the war, there is a clear implication that the persons sur- rounding Mr. Churchill are losing the confidence of the public.

A great advantage of polls is that when many details are secured about the contacts cross-tabulation can be made, and the conditions operative in morale formation can be laid bare. To give an example: if, in the United States, members of a particular religious denomination are found among the noninterventionists in a much larger pro- portion than in the total population, and if it is also found that when all the members of this denomination included in the survey are sub- divided, e.g., into male and female, economic groups, and regional groups, virtually no differences emerge between these subgroups, it may reasonably be concluded that their nonintervention attitude arises from membership in this particular denomination and not primarily from any other condition.

A warning also emerges from analyzing total results into figures for subgroups. The warning can best be shown from an example. Mr. Churchill's popularity with the British public has never varied



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more than 3 per cent-from 85 per cent to 88 per cent. But this slight variation in the total results concealed the fact that among the lower income group Mr. Churchill was losing ground, while in the rest of the population he was increasing his standing. The total number saying they were satisfied with him remained relatively constant since the two movements more or less counterbalanced each other. To be realistic, therefore, any measurement of morale should not rest upon the net results for the whole country, but on the figures for the important opinion subgroups.

Can the results of opinion polls be regarded as dependable, re- membering the pressure which is exercised against expressing critical opinions? No general answer can be given to the question: it can be said that in Great Britain men and women are still prepared to voice their disapproval of the government and its measures, and that the Ministry of Information continues to use the results of opinion polls and suggests that it finds them consonant with information ob- tained from other sources.

The feasibility of using a panel for making election forecasts and for securing opinions has recently been demonstrated by Professor Paul Lazarsfeld.2 The important condition for the successful use of a panel seems to be that the interviews should form only an insignifi- cant incident in all the influences at work on the persons questioned. During the campaign preceding a presidential election the propaganda liberally poured out by the opposing parties sufficed to smother the significance of even repeated interviews of the same persons and thus to prevent any distortion in their views arising from these repeated interviews. It may well be that the stress of wartime conditions and experiences would serve the same purpose and that, accordingly, the panel could be used as a technique of inquiry for ascertaining morale under war conditions. Should this prove to be the case then panel inquiries, with the opportunity presented thereby for detailed and intimate questioning as the interviewer became better known to the contact, might prove to be the ideal form of morale investigation. As far as is known the experiment has not been made but it is one which seems very well worth while.

BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION

2 Paul Lazarsfeld and Marjorie Fiske, "The 'Panel' as a New Tool for Measuring Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. II (I938).



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