moral diversity

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Moral Diversity as an Argument for MoralRelativismGilbert BarmanPrinceton University

At some point long ago, people first became awareof moral diversity. They discovered that members ofdifferent cultures often have very different beliefsabout right and wrong and often act quite differentlyon their beliefs. This discovery of differences soonsuggested to some thinkers that there can be no singleabsolute truth about morality and that what is rightor wrong must always be what is right or wrong inrelation to one morality or another.Other thinkers , anti-relativists, have alwaysreplied that moral diversity is not proof of moralrelativism. Some customs are simply wrong. Wherethere are legitimate differences in custom, there arealways differences in circumstance. Indeed, differ-ences in custom are themselves differences in circum-stance that can effect what is right or wrong withoutentailing moral relativism. You do not need to be amoral relativist to recognize that in England it iswrong to drive on the right, whereas in France it isnot wrong t o drive on the right. And as far as dif-ferences in moral opinion are concerned, they no moreestablish moral relativism than differences in opinionas I write this paper about whether fusion has occuredin a jar in Utah establish "fusion relativism. 1

But this reply misses the point. Moral relativistsdo not argue that moral relativism follows from moraldiversity. Rather, they argue, moral relativism is(part of) the most plausible explanation of the rangeof moral diversity that actually exists.In fact there are two related kinds of moral diver-sity-diversity in moral opinion and diversity in moralactions. In what follows, I will argue that thes emoral diversities provide some support for two relatedforms of moral relativism, a relativism of values anda relativism of reasons.I will start by being more specific about moralrelativism and by comparing moral relativism withother sorts of relativism: the uncontroversial way inwhich something can be "good forw one person and notanother, relativistic physics, and relative adjectives

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l i k e " t a l l . " I w i l l i n d i c a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u nd erwhich re la t iv i sm i s a p l au s i b l e h y p o t h es i s and I w i l la r gu e t h a t t h e s e c o n d it i o n s a r e m e t i n m o r a l i ty .

Then I w i l l d i s c u s s some c o m p l i c a t i o n s . One i st h a t m o ra l d i f fe r e n c e s i n vo lv e d i f f e r e n c e i n a t t i t u d e ,w hi ch c a n l e a d t o a k i n d of " m or a l b a r g a i n i n g . " Iw i l l n o t e a s p e c i a l s o r t of r e l a t i v i s m a b ou t t h e m o ra lr e a s o n s a p e rs on c an ha ve t o a c t i n o ne o r a n o t h e rway. Finally, I w i l l s ug ge st t h a t t h e r e a r e a t l e a s ttw o k i n d s of m o r al r e l a t i v i t y , w hic h m i gh t b e c a l l e d' a ge n t r e l a t i v i t y " and " c r i t i c r e l a t i v i t y . ' '1. Uncontroversial Evaluative Relativity

Suppose Tom has be t on a ho rse t h a t r un s w e l l i nt h e r a i n an d Sue h as b e t on a h o r s e t h a t d o es n o t r u nw e l l i n t h e r a i n , t h en r a i n i s good f o r Tom an d badf o r Sue . Th i s i s an uncontrovers ial example of evalu-a t i v e r e l a t i v i t y . The r a i n i s good i n r e l a t i o n t oTom's g o a l s an d bad i n r e l a t i o n t o Su e ' s .

I n t a l k i n g a b o u t t h i s , you d o n o t h av e t o a lw a yss p e l l o u t t h e r e l a t i o n e x p l i c i t l y . I f Max h a s b e t ont h e same h o r s e a s Su e, h e can si mp l y s ay , "T h i s r a i ni s bad," meaning t h a t it i s bad f o r th e two of them.

I n s a y i ng " T h i s r a i n i s bad ," he means ( r ou gh ly )t h a t it i s bad fo r h imse l f and h i s aud ience ; no t j u s tt h a t it i s bad fo r h imself . When you speak t o o t he rs ,th e remark , "Th i s r a in i s bad" i s not normal ly equ iva-l e n t t o "T his r a i n i s bad f o r me." I f you t e l l some-one e l se t h a t s o me t h i n g t h a t h a s h ap p en ed i s b a d ( o rgood ), you mean (roug hly) th a t it i s bad (o r good) i nr e l a t i o n t o c e r t a i n g o a l s, p ur po se s, a im s, o r v a l u e st h a t you t a k e y o u r se l f t o s h a r e w i t h yo ur a u d ie n c e.I f Mary knows t h a t Tom has be t on a h ors e t h a t r un sw e l l i n t h e r a i n a nd s h e h a s b e t on a h o r s e t h a t d o e sn o t ru n w e l l i n t h e r a in , it would normally be incor-r e c t f o r he r t o t e l l Tom, sim ply, "Th is r a i n i s bad."Such a r emark w ou ld b e o v e r l y s e l f - ce n t e r ed . I n t h eab se nc e of some more o r less c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d q u a l i-f i c a t i o n , e v a l u a t i v e r em a rk s a r e u nd e r s to o d f ro m apo in t o f view t h a t i s presumed t o be share d by spe ake r

y o u r s e l f ,s r a i n i s.e w i t h o u ta l l y . I t


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might be bad for them taken collectively. If th eother school's football team plays better in the rain,"This rain is bad" might mean "This rain i s bad forour side. "

However, w e cannot simply equate the implicitlyrelative remark, "This rain is bad," with the explic-itly relati ve remark, "This rain is bad for us." T osee this, cons ider a situation in which Mary has beton a horse that does not run well in the rain and shethinks, incorrectly, that Tom has also bet o n thathorse.Suppose Tom has bet on th e horse that runs well in th erain, but Mary does not realize this. If in thi scontext she says to Tom, "This rain is bad for us,"then it is clear how to evaluate her remark. What shesays is simply false, since it is not the case thatth e rai n is bad for th e two of them. But if insteadshe were t o say to Tom, "This rain is bad," then it isfar from clea r that what she says is false. Herremark t o Tom presupposes shared interests or outlook.If that presupposition is incorrect, we do not normal-ly try to assign truth or falsity to her remark. Soin certain circumstances there is a difference between"This rain is bad" and "This rain is bad for us."'2. Moral relativism

Whether something is good or bad can be relative t oa person o r group of people; something may be good forsome people, bad for others, indifferent t o yet oth-ers. Moral relativism says that the same is tr ue ofmoral values and moral norms. According t o moralrelativism whether something is morally good, right,or just is always relative to a set of moral stand-ards, a certain moral point of view.

Moral relativism holds that there are various moraloutlooks with different standards of right and wrong.These moral outlooks may differ with respect t o therelative weight given to liberty versus equality, o rto general welfare versus the development of art andscience. They can also differ with respect t o th eextent of th e moral community: some people restrictthe moral community to family and friends; oth erswould include all people of a certain race or caste orcountry; some would include all people of whatev errace or class; others would also count animals and

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even plants as part of th e moral c ommunity t o beprotected by the moral rules.

Moral relativism denies that one of thes e moralframeworks can be singled out as the true morality.

Moral relativism is not a claim about meaning. Itdoes not say that speakers always intend their moraljudgments to be relational in this respect. Clearly,moral absolutists do not intend their moral judgmentst o be interpreted as relational judgments of t hissort. Moral relativism is not a thesis about everyspeaker' intentions, it is a thesis about how thingsare, or, rather about how things aren't Moral rela-tivism claims that there is no such thing as absolutegood, absolute right, or absolute justice. There isonly what is good, right, or just in relation to thisor that moral framework.

We can compare moral relativism with Einstein'stheory of relativity in physics. According to Ein-stein's theory, physical magnitudes, like mass,length, or temporal duration, are relative to a frameof reference. Two events can be simultaneo us withrespect to one frame of reference and not simultaneouswith respect to another. In saying this, Einstein'stheory does not make a claim about speakers' inten-tions. It does not claim that speakers intend to bemaking relational judgments when they speak of mass orsimultaneity. The claim is, rather, that there is nosuch thing as absolute simultaneity or absolute mass.There is only simultaneity or mass with respect t o oneor anothe r frame of reference. What someone mighttake t o be absolute magnitudes are really rela tivemagnitudes: magnitudes that are relative t o thatperson's frame of reference.

Imagine a difference of opinion about whether anevent E precedes another F. According to Einstein'stheory of relativity, there may be no answer t o thisquestion: in relation to one framework E precedes Fwhile in relation to a different framework E does notprecede F.

Similarly, consider a moral disagreement aboutwhether we are right to treat animals as we do, rais-ing them for food, for example. Moral relativ ismholds that there may be no answer to this question: inrelation to one moral framework it may be permissibleto raise animals for food and in relation to a differ-ent moral framework it may not be permissible to raise


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animals for food. What someone take s to be absoluterightness would then only be rightness in relation tothat person's moral framework.

Moral relativism does not claim that moral differ-ences by themselves entail moral relativism, any moretha n Einstein claimed that differences in opinionabout simultaneity by themselves entailed relativisticphysics. We have to consider what differences ther eare or could be and why this might be so. How are wet o explain th e sorts of moral differences that actual-ly occur? Can we seriously suppose that the re is ananswer to th e question about the justice of our treat-ment of animals that is independent of one or anothermora l framework? What is th e best explanation ofdifferences in thi s and other areas of seeming intrac-tability?

Here I should emphasize that moral relativism doesnot identif y what is right in relation to a givenmoral framework with whatever is taken t o be right bytho se who accept that framework. That would be likesaying Einstein's theory of relativity treats tw oevents a s simultaneous with respect to a given coordi-nate system if people at rest with respect t o thecoordinate system believe the events are simultaneous.

Moral relativism does not offer an a nalysis ofrightness in term s of what people take t o be right,nor does moral relativism per se offer an analysis ofrightness in any other terms. Moral relativism is nomore c ommitted to providing an analysis of rightnessth an mora l absolutism is. Some defenders of moralabsolutism tak e rightness to be unanalyzable. Defend-ers of moral relativism can also take rightness to beunanalyzable. Just because something is a relationdoes not make it analyzable.Some defenders of moral relativism do offer ananalysis of rightness just as some defenders of moralabsolutism offer an analysis of rightness. For exam-ple, th ere are absolutist and relativist ideal observ-er theories. A relativistic theory of thi s sortsays, roughly, that an act is right in relation t o agiven moral framework if it would be favoured byimpar tial spectators who began by accepting thatframework and who came to know and appreciate all therelev ant facts. Notice that in such a theor y actsmight be wrong with respect to a given moral frameworkeven though they were approved of by those who accept-

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ed that framework, since increased knowledge andappreciation of the facts can lead people who initial-ly accepted the framework to change their attitudes.

But I hope this reference to a relativistic idealobserver analysis is not misleading. Just by itselfmoral relativism is not committed to that or any otheranalysis of rightness.

It makes sense to appeal to relativism under t hefollowing conditions. We envision certain differencesof opinion about the application of an absolute notionlike absolute simultaneity or absolute goodness,differences that we cannot see how to resolve. We cansee how these differences might arise because of th ediffering salience of certain relations. Simultaneitywith respect to one's own reference frame might bemuch more salient than simultaneity with respect toanother. Goodness with respect t o one's own mora lframework might be much more salient than go odne sswith respect to a different moral framework. Thi ssuggests that it may be an illusion that an abso lutenotion of goodness or simultaneity has any applica-tion, an illusion that arises through confusing theabsolute notion with a salient instance of the rela-tive notion.

There is no question of demonstrative proof in anissue of this sort. Consider whether Senator Bradleyof New Jersey is tall. Bradley was previousl y aprofessional basketball player. Carl, who thi nks ofBradley in relation to other members of his old bas-ketball team denies that Bradley is tall. Dora whoinstead thinks of Bradley in relation to other UnitedStates Senators asserts that Bradley is tall. Carland Dora differ as to whether Bradley is tall. Butneither is mistaken. Bradley is tall for a senatorand not tall for a professional basketball player.Tallness is a relative matter. Although I see nodemonstrative proof of the relativity of tallness, t oaccept this relativity is much more plausible tha nsupposing that there has to be a real diff erenc ebetween Carl and Dora such that at least one of themmust be mistaken.

Similarly consider moral disagreements over theproper treatment of animals, disagreements over abor-tion, and disagreements over the relative value ofequality and liberty. Moral relativism off ers anexplanation of why such differences of moral opin ion


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are often so intractable: they are intractable be-cause there is no more a fact of the matter in thesedisputes th an there is a fact of the matter as towhether widely separated events are simultaneous or ast o whether Bradley is tall. To be sure, the re arealternative explanations of the seeming intractabilityof thes e moral differences, for example, th e sheerdifficulty of th e issues involved, th e possibilitythat some people are ignoring relevant data or failingto appreciate certain arguments. But to point to otherpossible explanations does not rule out the relativis-tic explanation. Each person has to decide for him-self how plausible he takes these competing explana-tions to be.3 . Human nature

Suppose that an absolutist ideal observer theory iscorrect and that all normal people who are fully andvividly informed of all th e relevant facts will ap-prove the same actions, no matter what initial moralframeworks they accept. This might simply be a genet-ic fact about people, given human nature as it hasresul ted from evolution. In that case, we couldimagine people with a different genetic "nature" whoin certain cases would approve of different actionseven when they were vividly aware of all the relevantfacts.

Would that be a kind of moral relativism? This isa purely terminological question of no substantiveinterest. There would be a relativity to human naturebut no further moral relativity.

A view of th is sort, seeing relativity to humannature but nothing beyond that, has some plausibilityfor normative epistemology. What counts as goodevidence or good reasons in ordinary real life situa-tio ns may be fixed by a common human nature that hasresulted from evolution. (The genes of people withinferior standards of evidence may simply lose out inth e evolutionary battle for survival.) Given yourbeliefs, your innate procedures for evaluating evi-dence may determine what further things you havereaso n t o believe. We can imagine that there arepeople with different procedures who would not havereasons to modify their views in the way we do; if so,evidence would be relative to human nature but not to

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anything more.For myself, I am inclined t o accept a strong form

of moral relativism and only a weak form of evidentialrelativism. In my view, what is right or wrong is notjust relative to human nature, it also varies wi thparticular moral frameworks; but what counts as evi-dence depends only on innate mechanisms that are partof human nature. But in thi s paper I will not sayanything more about evidential relativism.4. Differences in attitude

Some people say that it is a bad strategy to takemoral relativism seriously. They say we should alwaysassume that our moral differences can be resolved byreviewing the evidence, gathering more evidence, andconsidering what conclusion is best supported by thisevidence; otherwise, we may miss an opportuni ty t oresolve our disputes. They say that, having decided adispute is not rationally resolvable in this way, wewill st op trying to resolve it, and, if we are wrongand the dispute could have been rationally resolvable,e.g. thr ough the consideration of more evidence, wewill have missed an opportunity to resolve it.

But this line of thought overlooks the cost ofwrongly thinking a dispute is rationally resolvablewhen it is not rationally resolvable. The suggestedpolicy can lead to pointless argument and, as I willexplain in a moment, it also can lead one to overlookother reasonable ways to resolve moral disputes, waysthat go beyond trying to reach conclusions o n th ebasis of the evidence.

To accept a moral framework is to have certainvalues and principles, along with various feelings andemotions. A vegetarian wants to get people to stopraising animals for food. The anti-abortionist wantsto get others to end the practice of abortion. Thesedesires will survive a decision that moral relativismapplies to these cases. That is to say: moral dif-ferences often involve practical differences that areresolved only if agreement is reached on what to do.

There can be conflicts in attitude that are notconflicts in belief. Suppose the reds and the greensare tw o competing football teams, Alice favors th ereds and Bertie favors the gr-eens. What' s good forAlice's side is not what 's good for Bertie's and they


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can agree about that. When Alice says t o herself orher teammates, "This rain is bad" (because the reds donot play well in the rain), and Bertie says to himselfor his teammates, "This rain is good" (becaus e th egreens do play well in the rain), they are not contra-dicting each other but there is still a clash ofattitudes. Bertie is expressing a favorable attitudetoward the rain and Alice is expressing an unfavorableattitude toward the rain.Similar differences in attitude may occu r whe npeople occupy different moral framework. Whereas Alicedoes not try t o convert Bertie to her side, vegetar-ians will try t o get others to become vegetarians inorder t o advance vegetarian goals.

A related t ype of difference in attitude occurs inbargaining. Consider labor-management negotiations.Labor wants a higher wage rate, management wa nts alower rate. This difference is resolved when anagreement is reached at what the rate should be. Theparties t o the bargaining then come to accept a prac-tical arrangement: they will adhere to a certain setof principles relating work and pay.

When people bargain about a wage rate or about th eprice of a house, they do not just try to show that acertain outcome is th e one best supported by th eevidence, given acceptable general principles. Theyalso make and accept various proposals and th e outcomeis influenced by t he bargaining power of t he partici-pants .

Moral disputes can also often involve a kind ofba rg ai ni ng . We can argue with others, not only byshowing how features of their moral frameworkds shouldlead them in certain directions in the light of th efacts; we can also give t hem other reasons t o modifytheir moral understandings. "If you don't do this, wewon't do that." For example, disadvantaged groups canthreat en to withhold participation in a moral frame-work unless their disadvantage is lessened or removed.Since animals cannot bargain in this way, most peopleare less likely to change their views about the treat-ment of animals than their views about racial orsexual discrimination.

This complicates the question whether we ought t oassume moral disputes are always rationally resolva-ble. It depends on what counts as a "rational resolu-tion" of a moral dispute. If moral bargaining is

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included, then it may be useful to assume (un tilproven otherwise) that a moral dispute is rationallyresolvable.Disagreement can persist even between moral rela-tivists who agree about what is right or wrong withrespect to each others' moral frameworks. This factis no objection to moral relativism, since relativismpredicts this sort of persistence: The difference thatremains is a difference in attitude that may be re-solvable through bargaining even if it can not beresolved simply by collecting evidence and pointing tomutually acceptable general principles.

Certainly, the persistence of such disagreementbeyond the acceptance of relativism is no defense ofabsolutism, since it provides no reply t o the moralrelativist's case for doubting the existence of abso-lute goodness or rightness. The case against moralabsolutism depends on a judgment about the best expla-nation of the seeming intractability of certain moralissues. This case has to be addressed on its ownterms. It is not overturned by the fact that disa-greement persists in the face of the acceptance ofrelativism.5. Emotivism

There remains a possible challenge to moral rela-tivism on the side opposite to absolutism--a challengefrom emotivism. Emotivism says that moral judgmentsare better treated as expressions of attitude than ascognitive claims about certain relation^.^ The rele-vant attitudes have an important noncognitiv e oremotional aspect. Believing that it is wrong to raiseanimals for food is to be opposed to raising animalsfor food, for example, and may include being unhappythat animals are raised for food.

The issue is a delicate one, since emotivists andmoral relativists agree about many things. They agreefirst of all in rejecting moral absolutism. Theyagree that where absolutists se e moral absolute s,there are in fact only relations between moral frame-works and possible courses of action or situations.They also agree that the primary use of moral judg-ments is in relation to a moral framework tha t t hespeaker accepts so that such judgments will thereforeexpress a speaker's attitudes. How the n do they

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differ?Some would say they differ about t he meaning of

moral judgments: the emotivist says that the meaningof a moral judgment is determined by its use to ex-press a cer tain moral attitude; the moral relativistsays that the meaning of a moral judgment is deter-mined by its use to indicate that a certain relationholds between a moral framework and a possible actionor state of affairs.But, as I have emphasized, moral relativism is nota claim about th e meaning of ordinary moral judgments,just,as Einstein's theory of relativity is not a claimabout what people ordinarily means by "mass" or"simultaneous".

It might be th ought that there is an issue abouthow people who reject moral absolutism should usemoral lanaguage. Should they use moral language tomake relatio nal judgments of right or wrong that aretru e or false with respect to the relevant moralframework? Or should they use moral language in anoncognitive way, to express noncognitive attitudes,t o prescribe one or another course of action, orwhatever.

I find thi s to be a hard issue to tak e seriously.If it is possible to do either of these things, th enspeakers can do either or both.

There is no question that they can use moral lan-guage in th e first way t o make cognitive claims aboutwhat is right or wrong with respect to one or anothermoral framework. In that case, it would be natural touse moral l anguage in much th e way we now ta lk aboutrelative good or bad. In speaking of moral goodness,rightness, or justice in relation to a moral frameworkthat a speake r presupposes he shares with his audi-ence, there would normally be no need to make explicitthe relativity t o that framework. In other cases, thespeaker would have to indicate the relevant frameworkexplicitly.

Moral judgments in which the framework was notexplicitly mentioned would express moral attitudes, inthe sense that they would presuppose the acceptance ofthat framework by the speaker.

It is les s clear what it would be t o use morallanguage in the way suggested by emotivism simply toexpre ss noncognitive attitudes, so that "That ismorally wrong" would be similar in meaning to "Boo to

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that "There are familiar issues here about moral predi-

cates appearing in dependent clauses. For example,consider the remark, "It is wrong t o encourage someo net o do the wrong thing." How is the second occurrenceof "wrong" to be handled?

It might be objected that moral relativists have noway t o express their differences if these are notbased on shared values and that this shows a nonrela-tivis tic moral terminology is needed. But consid ertw o people who are bargaining over the price of ahouse. They can certainly express their difference asa difference over "what the price of th e house is tobe," which is not to say that it is a difference overwhat the price of th e house ought t o be. Similarly,moral relativists who differ over abortion can engagein moral bargaining over what th e rules conce rningabortion are to be without supposing that they arebargaining over what the rules morally ought t o be insome nonrelativisitic sense of "morally ought."6. Judgments about moral reasons

A spectator can evaluate an agent who has differentvalues from those of the spectator. The spectator mayor may not have to take the agent's values into ac-count, depending on the sort of moral j udgmen t hemakes of the agent. An interesting issue arise s formoral judgments that attribute reasons t o an agent.For example, the judgment, "Albert ought morally t ohelp out with the picnic," would normally be used t osay that Albert has moral reasons to help out with t hep i c n i ~ . ~ ther moral judgments do not a ttributereason s t o th e agents mentioned. For example, thejudgment "it is terrible that the tiger attacked th echildr en at the zoo," would not normally be us ed t osay either that the tiger had moral reasons t o refrainfrom attacking the children or that th e children hadmoral reasons to refrain from being attacked. Th ejudgment says that it was bad that th e tiger attack edth e children, not that it was bad of the tige r t o haveattacked the children, or bad of the children t o havebeen attacked.

People can make judgments about people that resem-ble th is sort of judgment about th e tiger. Sup pos eMabel takes Hitler's actions to be a great e vil and

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a l s o b e l i ev e s t h a t H i t l e r ' s v a l u e s w e r e s u f f i c i e n t l yp e r v e r s e t h a t t h e y p r o vi de d H i t l e r w i t h no r e a s o n t or e f r a in f rom ac t in g as he ac ted . Mabel may the n viewH i t l e r a s i n some ways s i m i l a r t o t h e t i g e r . A lth ou ghs h e j u d ge s H i t l e r t o be a g r e a t e v i l , s h e may f i n dt h a t s he i s no more a b l e t o j u dg e t h a t it was wrong ofH i t l e r t o h av e a c t e d a s he a c t e d t h an t o j ud ge t h a t itwas wrong of t h e t i g e r t o have a t t a ck ed t h e ch i l d r en .

The analogy between the case of H i t l e r an d t h e c a s eof t h e t i g e r i s n o t p e r f e c t . I t may be more ap pr op ri -a t e f o r M abel t o t h i n k of H i t l e r a s an enemy. Shew i l l j ud g e t h a t H i t l e r ' s a c t i o n s a r e t e r r i b l e i nr e l a t i o n t o h e r s i d e ev en i f t h e s e same a c t i o n s a r en o t t e r r i b l e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r s i d e wi th i t sN az i o ut l o ok , j u s t a s A l i c e vie ws r a i n a s bad f o r h e rteam even i f it i s good for B e r t i e ' s team. Mabel ca nt h i n k t h a t w e n eed t o d e s t r o y H i t l e r , ou r enemy, w hi leb e l i e v i ng t h a t H i t l e r may b e j u s t i f i e d i n r e l a t i o n t oh i s own framework.

I d o n o t c l a i m t h a t M a b e l ' s v i ew o f H i t l e r i sr e q u i r e d o r e ve n t h a t it i s v er y p l a u s i b l e , o n ly t h a tit i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . I t may v e ry w e l l b e a f a l s e v ie wo f H i t l e r . I t may b e t h a t H i t l e r had s u f f i c i e n tr e a s o n s n o t t o h av e o rd e r e d t h e e x t e rm i n a ti o n o f t h eJ e w s . Su ch r ea s o n s mi g h t h av e d e r i v ed f ro m H i t l e r ' sown moral pr inciples . O r t h e r e may be p r i n c i p l e s t h a tw ould g i v e s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o ns t o a ny r a t i o n a l p e rs o nn o t t o h av e pr oc ee d ed a s H i t l e r p ro ceed ed n o ma t t e rw hat t h a t p e r s o n ' s v a l u es and s t an d a rd s .

But suppose fo r th e sake of a rgument th a t H i t l e r ' sm o ra l o u t l o o k d i d n o t r e q u i r e him t o r e s p e c t a l lp e o p l e an d d i d n o t g i v e him r e a s o n s t o r e f r a i n f ro mo r d e r i n g t h e e x te r m i n a t i o n o f t h e J e w s . F i n a l l y ,s u pp o se f o r t h e s a k e o f a rg um en t t h a t H i t l e r d i d n o th av e a s u f f i c i e n t r e a s on from an y s o u rc e t o r e f r a i na nd , i n d e ed , ha d a s u f f i c i e n t re a s o n t o p r oc e ed w i t hh i s e v i l p la ns . Then any mora l judgment th a t impl iedt h a t H i t l e r d i d h ave a s u f f i c i e n t r e as on t o r e f r a i nc o ul d n o t b e t r u e . ( I f P i s n o t t r u e a nd Q i m p l i e s Pt h e n Q i s n o t t r u e . ) So, t h e c la im t h a t H i t l e r oughtm o r a l l y n o t t o ha ve o r d er e d t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n of t h eJ e w s would n ot be t r u e , i f i n f a c t H i t l e r d i d n o t h av es u f f i c i e n t r ea so n t o r e f r a i n a nd i f t h e c l ai m t h a tH i t l e r o u g ht mo ra l ly n o t t o h av e o rd e red t h e ex t e rmi -n a t i o n of t h e J e w s i m p l i e s t h a t H i t l e r h a d s u f f i c i e n tr ea so ns t o r e f r a i n .

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Let us look at this more closely. We ca n distin-guish tw o issues. First, to what extent are therepeople who do not have sufficient reasons t o observeth e moral principles that we have sufficient reason t oobserve? Second, do certain moral judgments implythat an agent has sufficient reasons to act in acertain way?

7. Relativity about moral reasonsConsider fairly fundamental principles o f our

morality, such as rules against stealing and killing.It seems relatively easy to think of actual people whodo not observe these rules who seem otherwise rationaland well informed. Such people include succe ssfu lcriminals who do not care about people in general, whonevertheless lead enjoyable lives, and who are ablesuccessfully to escape punishment for violations ofth e principle that o ne should not kill oth er people.There are also politicians mainly interested in polit-ical power at any cost. There are people with oddmoral views, who for example take cats to have suprememoral value. Ther e are so-called socio paths andsimple egoists who are interested only in themselves.

It is easy to think of such people who are notmotivated t o observe our moral requirements, w herethis is not because of ignorance on their part, of anyfailure to reason correctly, of weakness of will, orof any other sort of failure to appreciate reasons toobserve the requirement in question. It is difficultto see how such people could nevertheless have suffi-cient reasons t o observe the moral requirements.True, there are philosophical arguments purporting t oshow that there are reasons for such a person t oobserve one or another moral requirement, but the searguments do not seem compelling. It is hard to seewhat mistake the people mentioned would mak e inrejecting these arguments with a smile.

Considerations of particular cases sug gests thatwhat moral requirements a person has sufficient rea-sons to follow will depend on that person's principlesand values. This conclusion is further confirmed byone natural account of reasons and reasoning. Aperson's reaso ns are determined by what reas oning isavailable to the person or would be available if t heperson had more information or had certain obstacles


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to good reasoning removed. Furthermore, practicalreasoning, like other reasoning, is a kind of changein view. What conclusions are supported by practicalreasoning depends on where one starts, that is itdepends on one's initial desires, goals, intentions,beliefs, and values. If people have different enoughstarting positions with respect to their desires,goals, intentions, and values, then they will besubject to different practical reasons even given thefacts as they really are.8

This is not merely to argue for relativism aboutreasons from a speculative theory of practical reason-ing.' Relativism about reasons can also be defendedthrough considerat on of particular cases. True, adifference theory of practical reasoning like Ge-wirth' or Nagel' o ould conflict with moral rela-tivism, so it is necessary to consider those theoriesto see whether one of them is more plausible than thealternative view which supposes that one's moralreasons depend on what moral framework one accepts.11

8 . "Ought" and reasonsLet us now turn to the question whether certain

moral judgments imply that an agent has sufficientreasons to act in a certain way. Consider the follow-ing remark: "Albert ought morally to help out at theparty, although he does not have sufficient reasons tohelp out at the party." In any ordinary circumstance,this remark would be quite odd, indeed inconsistent.So, there is some reason to think that there is theimplication in question. "A ought morally to D" doesseem to imply "A has sufficient reasons to D."

It has been objected that accepting the implicationrequires rejecting a traditional philosophical ques-tion as resting on a misuse of language, namely, thequestion, "Do I have sufficient reasons to do what Iought morally to do. "12 But this objection is incon-clusive. It may be that this philosophical questionuses the phrase "morally ought" in a way that isparasitic on a more ordinary usage in which "oughtmorally" implies "has sufficient reasons."

Suppose that question is asked in another languageand it is unclear whether the words "murph globic" areto be translated as "Ought morally". He says, as itwere, "Do I have sufficient reasons to do what I murph

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globic t o do." The spectator and others in tha tsociety think that a person "murph globic" t o dosomething in roughly the same circumstanc es in whichwe think that a person ought morally t o do it. Butno one in the spectator's society think s that a personhas any reason to do what he "murph globic" t o do. Onthe other hand, members of this other society do thi nkthat a person has a sufficient reason t o do what he"gliph mornal" t o do, and that what people value inthis society is connected with what they think theygliph mornal t o do in the way that what we v alue isconnected with what we thi nk we ought morally t o do.Supposing that we continue this story sufficientlyfar, it might become clear that our "ought morally" isa better translation for their "gliph mornal" t han fortheir "murph globic." It may make sense to translate,'Do I have sufficient reasons t o do what I murphglobic to do?" as "Do I have sufficient reasons t o dowhat I ought morally to do?" only if ther e is abackground in which people take "murph globic" toimply "has sufficient reasons. l3

Of course, people can use language in whatever waythey want. If someone wants to use th e words "morallyought" both nonparasitically and in such a way thatthe re is no implication from "Jones ought morally nott o kill Ortcuttpl o "Jones has sufficient reasons t orefrain from killing Ort cut tI1 * hen fine. We may needto await some further indication of how thes e wordsare being used, but how can we object t o someone'susing words however he likes? This purely linguisticdecision cannot affect any of the su bstantive issuesof moral philosophy, as far as I can see. For exam-ple, no matter how one chooses to use th e phrase"morally ought,11 there is still th e issue w hethe rcertain demands are such that everyone has sufficientreasons t o follow them.9. Critic Relativity and Agent Relativity

We have now considered two different, if related,kinds of moral relativity. First, there is the claimthat what is morally good, right, or just is alw aysrelative t o a moral framework. Second, there is th eclaim that the moral reasons an agent has depend uponth e agent's desires, goals, aims, intentions, andvalues and, in particular, that there is enough varia-

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tion so that an agent may fail to have sufficientreasons to act on principles that a given criticendorses.

Judgments of moral relativists who accept bothclaims will be subject to two sorts of linguisticrelativity. First, consider moral judgments in whichthere is no explicit indication of the relevant moralframework. Ordinarily, these judgments will be madein relation to a framework that is presupposed to beshared between the critic and his audience. Suchjudgments illustrate critic relativity: there is arelativity to the critic's values.

Second, consider moral judgments like, "A oughtmorally to D," or, "It would be wrong of C to G I "which imply that an agent has sufficient reasons to dosomething. These judgments illustrate agent relativi-ty: there is a relativity to the agent's value's.

If critic and agent accept sufficiently differentmoral frameworks, the critic can only make certainsorts of judgments about the agent. The critic canexpress certain evaluations of the agent in relationto the critic's moral framework, like "Hitler was agreat evil." And the critic can make reason implyingjudgments in relation to the agent's morality, "Hitlerwas doing the morally right thing for a Nazi to do."But the critic cannot make reason implying judgmentsin relation to his (the critic's) morality. Thecritic will not be able to say, for example, "It wasmorally wrong of Hitler to have acted in that way," ifthe critic is a moral relativist who supposes thatHitler did not have a sufficient reason to refrainfrom acting as he did.

In judging other people, should you judge them inthe light of your values or in the light of theirvalues? It depends on what you say about them. Ifyou are simply evaluating them, your own values arerelevant. If you imply something about their moralreasons, then their values are relevant too. If youdo not accept the moral framework in relation to whichyou are speaking, then you should make explicit whatthat framework is.10. Conclusion

Let me summarize. I began with an uncontroversialcase of evaluative relativism: something being good

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for one person and not for another. Moral relativismholds that the same is true for moral goodness, right-ness, and justice. Things are morally good, right,and just only in relation to one or anot her moralframework. This relativity provides the best explana-tion of certain seemingly intractable moral disputes.

To accept a moral framework is to accept certainrules, principles, and values. One's attitudes areinvolved. Moral differences will therefore inclu dedifferences in attitude. Furthermore, moral argumentcan involve a kind of moral bargaining of a sort thathas played a role in the change of attitudes aboutracial and sexual discrimination.

A complication arises for moral judgments that haveimplications concerning an agent's reasons, since someagents may lack sufficient reasons to follow the rulesof the critic's morality. Saying that someone oughtmorally t o do something normally implies that t heperson has sufficient reasons to do it. Given thisuse of "morally ought, it may not be the case thateveryone ought morally to act in the ways favored by aparticular framework, even if "ought morall y" isunderstood in relation to that framework.


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Endnotes

1. It is unclear whether this difference in how we useand react to these sentences indicates a difference intruth conditions.2. I discuss this further with references in GilbertHarman, "Moral agent and impartial spectator, 'Lindley Lecture Universitv ~ Kansas (1986)Lawrence Kansas.3. Charles L. Stevenson, "The nature of ethical disa-greement," Facts and Values (New Haven, Connecticut;Yale University Press: 1963), pp. 1-9.4. Gilbert Harman, "Justice and moral bargaining,"Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1983): 114-131.5. Charles L. Stevenson, "Relativism and nonrelativismin the theory of value,'' Facts and Values (New Havenand London, Yale University Press: 1963).6. David Brink disagrees in "Moral Realism Defended,"in Louis P. Pojman (ed.), Ethical Theory: Classicaland Contemporary Readings, pp. 43-55. I discuss hisbject on below.7. For example, Thomas Nagel, Possibilit~aAltruism (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1970);Alan Gewirth, Reason a oralitv (Chicago, ChicagoUniversity Press: 1977); Stephen Darwall, ImpartialReason (Ithaca N.Y., Cornell University Press: 1983.)8. Gilbert Harman, Chanqe View: PrinciplesReasoning (Cambridge, Massachusetts; BradfordBooks/MIT Press: 1986).9. Contrary to what Brink says, op. cit.10. opera cit.11. I discuss relativism about reasons in greaterdetail in "Relativistic ethics: morality as politics,Midwest Studies Philosophy 3 (1978) pp. 109-121. Idiscuss ways in which these considerations might becontested in "Is there a single true morality?" inMorality, Reason and Truth, edited by David Copp andDavid Zimmerman (Totowa, New Jersey; Rowan and Little-field: 1985) pp. 27-4812. David Brink, op. cit.13. James Dreier, Moral Relativism PoliticalJustice, Princeton University Ph.D. Dissertation,1988.

Moral Diversity

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