MONROY VS CA

FACTS: Petitioner was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas Rizal when he filed his certificate of candidacy as representative of the First District of Rizal in the forthcoming elections. Three days later, petitioner withdrew his candidacy, which the COMELEC approved. However, Del Rosario, vice mayor of Navotas, took his oath as a Municipal Mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon filing his certificate of candidacy.

CFI: Petitioner was deemed resigned upon filing his COC and ordered to reimburse salaries received in favor of Del Rosario.

CA: Affirmed in toto.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner is deemed a de facto officer from the moment he assumed Del Rosario’s entitlement to the office of Municipal Mayor, and thus, not required to reimburse salaries to the latter.

HELD: Yes and it is the general rule that the rightful incumbent of a specific lawful office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure though he entered into the office with goodfaith and under color of title, which applies to this case. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at risk and must account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.

LASTIMOSA CASE

FACTS: Gloria Lastimosa is the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. On 1993, she and the Provincial Prosecutor were ordered by the Ombudsman to prosecute an attempted rape case against Mayor Illustrisimo. However, the two failed to do so. Hence, an administrative complaint was filed against them. In the meanwhile, they were both placed under preventive suspension.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist in the prosecution for attempted rape against the person of the Mayor.

2. Whether Ombudsman has the power to punish them for contempt.3. Whether the Ombudsman has power to discipline petitioners through preventive suspension.

HELD:

1. Yes, the Ombudsman has the power. It has been Petioners’ contention that the Ombudsman lacks jurisdiction of the case since the offense committed was not in relation to public office. This contention is without merit. The power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers, is without regard as whether the acts or omission complained of were related to the performance of his duty. It is enough that the act was committed by a public officer, for the Ombudsman to have jurisdiction.

2. Yes. Under the Ombudsman Act, Office of the Ombudsman has the power to punish for contempt. Consequently, her refusal to file an information for attempted rape constitutes defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process or command of the Ombudsman; thus making her liable for indirect contempt.

3. Yes. Neither there is any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioners should day be found guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination or neglect of duty, nor the Ombudsman power to place them under preventive suspension. As provided for by Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary powers over all appointive and elective officials of the government except those who may only be removed by impeachment. Moreover, it can preventively suspend any official if in his discretion, the guilt is strong, and the charges include dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or the charge would warrant removal from office, or the respondent’s continued stay in office may any way prejudice the case filed against him. Such preventive suspension is not constituted as penalty but as a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. Thus, notice and hearing is not required. Further, such suspension can last long up to 6 months.