monique rathbun v. scientology: csi state supreme court petition

8/20/2019 Monique Rathbun v. Scientology: CSI state supreme court Petition

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No. 15-0966

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

STEVEN GREGORY SLOAT, ED BRYAN, CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY

INTERNATIONAL, DAVID J. LUBOW, AND MONTY DRAKE,

Petitioners,

v.

MONIQUE RATHBUN,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review from the

Third Court of Appeals at Austin, Texas

No. 03-14-00199-CV

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

Douglas W. AlexanderState Bar No. 00992350

[email protected]

Nicholas Bacarisse

State Bar No. [email protected]

ALEXANDER DUBOSE

JEFFERSON & TOWNSEND LLP 515 Congress Avenue

Suite 2350

Austin, Texas 78701-3562Telephone: (512) 482-9300

Facsimile: (512) 482-9303

Thomas S. LeatherburyState Bar No. 12095275

[email protected]

Marc A. Fuller


VINSON & ELKINS LLP

Trammell Crow Center2001 Ross Avenue

Suite 3700

Dallas, Texas 75201Telephone: (214) 220-7792

Facsimile: (214) 999-7792

George H. Spencer, Jr.State Bar No. 18921001

[email protected]

CLEMENS & SPENCER

112 E. Pecan Street, Suite 1300San Antonio, Texas 78205

Telephone: (210) 227-7121

Facsimile: (210) 227-0732

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

FILED

15-0966

2/19/2016 7:38:14 AM

tex-9194603

SUPREME COURT OF TE

BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE,


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IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

PETITIONERS: Steven Gregory Sloat, Ed Bryan, Church ofScientology International, David J. Lubow,

and Monty Drake

Counsel for Petitioner Church of

Scientology International before

this Court:


[email protected] Nicholas Bacarisse

State Bar No. 24073872

[email protected]

ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON& TOWNSEND LLP

515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350Austin, Texas 78701-3562

Telephone: (512) 482-9300Facsimile: (512) 482-9303

Trial and Appellate Counsel for

Petitioner Church of Scientology

International:

Thomas S. Leatherbury


Marc A. FullerState Bar No. 24032210

[email protected] & ELKINS LLPTrammell Crow Center

2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: (214) 220-7792

Facsimile: (214) 999-7792

George H. Spencer, Jr.


CLEMENS & SPENCER 112 E. Pecan Street, Suite 1300

San Antonio, Texas 78205-1531Telephone: (210) 227-7121

Facsimile: (210) 227-0732


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Ricardo G. Cedillo

State Bar No. [email protected] J. Huron


Les J. Strieber IIIState Bar No. 19398000

[email protected] DAVIS, CEDILLO & MENDOZA, I NC.

McCombs Plaza, Suite 500755 E. Mulberry Avenue

San Antonio, Texas 78212Telephone: (210) 822-6666

Facsimile: (210) 822-1151


Petitioner Steven Gregory Sloat:

Jonathan H. Hull


[email protected] EGAN BURRUS

401 Main Plaza, Suite 200 New Braunfels, Texas 78130

Telephone: (830) 625-8026

Facsimile: (830) 625-4433


Petitioner Monty Drake:

Gary D. Sarles

State Bar No. [email protected]. Paul Dunagan


SARLES & OUIMET 370 Founders Square

900 Jackson StreetDallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: (214) 573-6300

Facsimile: (214) 573-6306


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Petitioner David J. Lubow:

Stephanie S. Bascon

State Bar No. [email protected] OFFICE OF STEPHANIE S.

BASCON, PLLC297 W. San Antonio Street

New Braunfels, Texas 78730Telephone: (830) 625-2940

Facsimile: (830) 221-3441


Petitioner Ed Bryan:

Jonathan H. HullState Bar No. 10253350

[email protected] EGAN BURRUS

401 Main Plaza, Suite 200 New Braunfels, Texas 78130

Telephone: (830) 625-8026

Facsimile: (830) 625-4433


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RESPONDENT: Monique Rathbun (pro se)

501 SunsetIngleside on the Bay, Texas [email protected]

Former Trial and Appellate

Counsel for Respondent:(Motion for Withdrawal of

Counsel for Respondent granted by the Court February 12, 2016)

Ray B. Jeffrey


A. Dannette Mitchell (deceased)State Bar No. 24039061

JEFFREY & MITCHELL, P. C.2631 Bulverde Road, Suite 105

Bulverde, Texas 78163Telephone: (830) 438-8935

Facsimile: (830) 438-4958

Marc F. Wiegand


[email protected] WIEGAND LAW FIRM, P.C.

434 N. Loop 1604 West, Suite 2201San Antonio, Texas 78232

Telephone: (210) 998-3289

Facsimile: (210) 998-3179

Elliott S. Cappuccio

State Bar No. [email protected] Sara Hyman


Etan Z. TeppermanState Bar No. 24088514

[email protected], CAPPUCCIO, PULLEN& BENSON, LLP

2161 N.W. Military Hwy., #400

San Antonio, Texas 78213Telephone: (210) 222-9494

Facsimile: (210) 892-1610


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................................. 2

Index of Authorities .................................................................................................. 8

Statement of the Case .............................................................................................. 12

Statement of Jurisdiction ......................................................................................... 13

Issues Presented ...................................................................................................... 15

Reasons to Grant ..................................................................................................... 16

Statement of Facts ................................................................................................... 19

A. The Parties .......................................................................................... 19

B. CSI retains Drake and Sloat to investigate reported trademark

infringement by the Rathbuns and thefts involving Marty. TCPA§27.005(b)(2) (covering a “party’s exercise of…the right to

petition”). ............................................................................................ 20

C. Defendants Bryan, Lubow, and other Scientologists protest andcreate a series of videos criticizing and countering Marty’s anti-

Scientology activities and his efforts to establish an independent

church under the name “Scientology.” ............................................... 23

D. Plaintiff’s claims include allegations of conduct that the trial

court struck for lack of evidence and in which Defendants deny

involvement, which would not be covered by the TCPA. ................. 26

Summary of Argument ........................................................................................... 27

Argument................................................................................................................. 28

I. The court of appeals erred in holding that, at the TCPA’s first step, acourt must “favor[] the conclusion that [the plaintiff’s] claims are not

covered.” ....................................................................................................... 28

II. The court of appeals erred in failing to differentiate among the differentclaims and various defendants. ..................................................................... 31

Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................................ 36


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Certificate of Service .............................................................................................. 38

Certificate of Compliance ....................................................................................... 39

Appendix


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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bilbrey v. Williams,

02-13-00332-CV, 2015 WL 1120921 (Tex. App.—Fort WorthMar. 12, 2015, no pet.) ........................................................................................ 13

Cheniere Energy, Inc. v. Lotfi,449 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) .......... 13, 17, 29

City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Invs., LLC ,

214 Cal.App.4th 358 (2013) ............................................................................... 28

Cruz v. Van Sickle,

452 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) .............................. 34, 35

Deaver v. Desai, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 14-14-00683-CV, 2015 WL 9275751 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 3, 2015, n.p.h.) .............................................. 14

Entravision Commc’n Corp. v. Salinas, No. 13-13-00702-CV, 2015 WL 9434695 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi Sept. 30, 2015, no pet.) ........................................................................... 13

ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman,

464 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. filed) ....................................... 13

Graham v. Roder ,5 Tex. 141 (1849) ................................................................................................ 30

Hicks v. Grp. & Pension Adm’rs, Inc.,

473 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, no pet.) ............................. 14

I-10 Colony, Inc. v. Lee, No. 01-14-00465-CV, 2015 WL 1869467 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Apr. 23, 2015, no pet.) ....................................................................... 14

Jardin v. Marklund ,

431 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ................... 13


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Johnson-Todd v. Morgan, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 09-15-00210-CV, 2015 WL 6521546 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Oct. 29, 2015, n.p.h.) ............................................................. 14

KBMT Operating Co. v. Toledo,

434 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. granted) ............................ 13

In re Lipsky,

411 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, orig. proceeding) ................... 14

In re Lipsky,460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) ............................................................13, 16, 28, 34

MacGregor Med. Ass’n v. Campbell,

985 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1998)................................................................................. 30

Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd.,

416 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) ........... 29, 30

Neyland v. Thompson, No. 03-13-00643-CV, 2015 WL 1612155 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr.

7, 2015, no pet.) .................................................................................................. 29

Reyna v. Baldridge,

No. 04-14-00740-CV, 2015 WL 4273265 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio July 15, 2015, no pet.) .......................................................................... 13

San Jacinto Title Servs. Corp. of Corpus Christi, LLC v. Kingsley

Props., LP,452 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, 2013 pet. denied) ...................... 14

Serafine v. Blunt ,

466 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.) ........................14, 16, 18, 29

Shipp v. Malouf ,439 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) .............................. 34, 35

Sierra Club v. Andrews Cty.,418 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013), rev’d on othergrounds, 463 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2015) ......................................................... 13, 14


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Sloat v. Rathbun, No. 03-14-00199-CV, 2015 WL 6830927 (Tex. App.—Austin

Nov. 6, 2015, pet. filed) ................... 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35

Souza v. Tessmer ,

No. 04-15-00153-CV, 2015 WL 4932567 (Tex. App.—SanAntonio Aug. 19, 2015, no pet.) ......................................................................... 14

Tatum v. Hersh, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 05-14-01318-CV, 2015 WL 9583494 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Dec. 30, 2015, n.p.h.) ...................................................... 13, 17, 29

Tervita, LLC v. Sutterfield ,

No. 05-15-00469-CV, 2015 WL 9257035 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec.18, 2015, n.p.h.) ............................................................................................ 14, 18

Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,

133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) .............................................................................. 30

Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill,177 Cal.App.4th 1049 (2009) ............................................................................. 32

Whisenhunt v. Lippincott ,

416 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013), rev’d on othergrounds, 462 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2015) ............................................................... 13

Whisenhunt v. Lippincott ,474 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no. pet.) ..................................... 14

Statutes

26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3) ................................................................................................ 19

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE §27.001 ................................................................... 32

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE §27.001(4)–(6) ....................................................... 29


TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE §27.003 .................................................12, 17, 27, 31

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM CODE §27.005 ..................................... 13, 15, 16, 25, 28, 31

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE §27.006(a) ........................................................ 30, 32


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TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE §27.011(b) .............................................................. 28


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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: Monique Rathbun sued Petitioners—four individual

Defendants and Defendant Church of ScientologyInternational—alleging intentional infliction of emotionaldistress, invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private

facts and intrusion on seclusion, and tortious interference withcontract. Defendants moved to dismiss the action under the

Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) because the actionwas “based on, relate[d] to, or … in response to” Defendants’

“exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or rightof association.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE §27.003(a).

Trial Court: Hon. Dib Waldrip, 207th Judicial District Court, Comal

County, Texas.

Trial Court’s

Disposition:

Judge Waldrip denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thecourt concluded that the TCPA’s bodily-injury and

commercial-transaction exemptions rendered the Actinapplicable, and awarded attorney’s fees against

Defendants. App. 2.

Court of Appeals: Third Court of Appeals, Austin; Justice Field joined by JusticePemberton and Justice Puryear. Sloat v. Rathbun, No. 03-14-00199-CV, 2015 WL 6830927 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 6,

2015, pet. filed).

Court of Appeals’

Disposition:

Affirmed trial court’s denial of motion to dismiss; reversedaward of attorney’s fees. “[V]iew[ing]the pleadings in the

light most favorable to [the non-movant] Rathbun; i.e.,favoring the conclusion that her claims [were] not

predicated on protected expression,” id. *3, and withoutdistinguishing among the various Defendants or the various

causes of action, held that Defendants “failed to

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence” “thatthe TCPA applies to this case,” id. *9 (emphasis added).


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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has conflicts jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal for the

following reasons:

• Two courts of appeals (Houston First and Austin) have held that, in making

the step-one determination of whether the TCPA applies, §27.005(b), the

pleadings and affidavits should be “view[ed] … in the light most favorable

to the non-movant.”1 Conversely, all other courts to consider the issue have

applied a “neutral, plain-language” review. The Dallas court did so explicitly;2

the others have done so implicitly.3

1

Cheniere Energy, Inc. v. Lotfi, 449 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (emphasis added); Sloat v. Rathbun, No. 03-14-00199-CV, 2015 WL 6830927, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Austin Nov. 6, 2015, pet. filed) (same).

2 Tatum v. Hersh, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 05-14-01318-CV, 2015 WL 9583494, at *5 n.4 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Dec. 30, 2015, n.p.h.).

3 See, e.g., Entravision Commc’n Corp. v. Salinas, No. 13-13-00702-CV, 2015 WL 9434695, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 30, 2015, no pet.) (applying a neutral, “de novoreview”); Reyna v. Baldridge, No. 04-14-00740-CV, 2015 WL 4273265, at *2 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio July 15, 2015, no pet.) (same); Bilbrey v. Williams, No. 02-13-00332-CV, 2015 WL

1120921, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 12, 2015, no pet.) (same); ExxonMobil Pipeline Co.v. Coleman, 464 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. filed) (same); KBMT Operating

Co. v. Toledo, 434 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. granted), disapproved on

other grounds by In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015); Jardin v. Marklund , 431 S.W.3d 765,770 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (same); Sierra Club v. Andrews Cty., 418

S.W.3d 711, 715 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 463 S.W.3d 867

(Tex. 2015) (per curiam); Whisenhunt v. Lippincott , 416 S.W.3d 689, 695–96 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2013) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 462 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2015).


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• The courts of appeals4 —including the Austin court5 —have consistently

conducted a claim-by-claim analysis of the TCPA’s application, to decide

whether the Act applies in cases where the non-movant’s lawsuit is based on

both covered and non-covered conduct. Contrary to this precedent and its own

prior opinions, the court of appeals held that any allegations of non-covered

conduct preclude the Act’s application to the entire suit, without

differentiation between claims or defendants. Rathbun *7–8.

4 Tervita, LLC v. Sutterfield , ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 05-15-00469-CV, 2015 WL 9257035, at *2(Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2015, n.p.h.) (considering whether “each cause of action pleaded by”

the plaintiff is covered by the TCPA); see also Deaver v. Desai, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 14-14-

00683-CV, 2015 WL 9275751, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 3, 2015, n.p.h.)(finding TCPA applied to some claims but not others); Johnson-Todd v. Morgan, ___ S.W.3d ___,

No. 09-15-00210-CV, 2015 WL 6521546, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 29, 2015, n.p.h.)

(separately considering TCPA’s application to different claims); Souza v. Tessmer , No. 04-15-

00153-CV, 2015 WL 4932567, at *1 & n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 19, 2015, no pet.)

(considering TCPA motion related only to a single cause of action); Whisenhunt v. Lippincott , 474S.W.3d 30, 38–39 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no. pet.) (noting trial court’s grant of movant’s

TCPA motion only as to specific claims); I-10 Colony, Inc. v. Lee, No. 01-14-00465-CV, 2015WL 1869467, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 23, 2015, no pet.) (considering

TCPA’s application to plaintiff’s fraud claim, but not her partition claim); Hicks v. Grp. & Pension

Adm’rs, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 518, 530 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, no pet.) (consideringTCPA’s application to specific claims); Sierra Club, 418 S.W.3d at 716 (requiring movant to prove

that “both” of the plaintiff’s claims were covered by TCPA (emphasis added)); In re Lipsky, 411

S.W.3d 530, 542–43 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, orig. proceeding) (separately considering thedifferent movants and claims at step one), denying mandamus, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015); cf.

Serafine v. Blunt , 466 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.) (Pemberton, J.,

concurring) (“In distinguishing between these alternative protected and unprotected factual basesunderlying the Blunts’ tortious-interference claim, the Court implicitly resolves, and correctly so,the so-called ‘mixed-claim’ issue under the TCPA....”); San Jacinto Title Servs. Corp. of Corpus

Christi, LLC v. Kingsley Props., LP, 452 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, 2013 pet.

denied) (referring to the TCPA’s “expansive” definition of “legal action”).

5 See Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 360 (considering whether different factual theories are covered byTCPA).


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ISSUES PRESENTED

Briefed Issues:

1. In making the step-one determination of whether, under

TCPA §27.005(b), the movant has “show[n] by a preponderance of the evidence”

that “the legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise

of: (1) the right of free speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association,”

should the court

•

“favor[] the conclusion that [the plaintiff’s] claims are not predicated on

protected expression,” as the court of appeals held?

or

• view the evidence in the “neutral” manner used by other appellate courts?

2. Did the court of appeals err by holding that allegations of non-covered

conduct made generally against all defendants render the TCPA inapplicable to all

defendants and claims in a lawsuit?

Unbriefed Issues:

3. Did the trial court err in holding that the “commercial transaction”

exemption to the TCPA, §27.010(b), applies here?

4. Did the trial court err in holding that the “bodily injury” exemption to

the TCPA, §27.010(c), applies here?


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REASONS TO GRANT

In In re Lipsky, this Court analyzed step two of the TCPA’s burden-shifting

analysis: whether the non-movant has “‘establish[ed] by clear and specific evidence

a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.’” 460 S.W.3d

579, 592 (Tex. 2015) (quoting TCPA §27.005(c)).

This petition asks the Court to analyze step one of the inquiry: whether the

movant has “show[n] by a preponderance of the evidence” that “the legal action is

based on, relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise of: (1) the right of free

speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association.” TCPA §27.005(b).

This standard has proved elusive. Rathbun *3 (“As for a trial court’s

determination of what the factual bases for a ‘legal action’ are, the standards

governing our review are less clear.”). As one of the panel members observed in

another case:

The Act is rather murky regarding the factual aspects of this

‘preponderance of the evidence’ inquiry and how appellate courts areto review any such determinations by trial courts.... I can only hope that

some justice of the Texas Supreme Court might be listening and find

this writing of some assistance in this or another of the TCPA cases thatare beginning to crowd its docket.

Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 369, 394 (Pemberton, J., concurring).

The TCPA is a crucial tool for protecting First Amendment rights. But the

Act’s step-one “preponderance-of-the-evidence” inquiry has confused and divided

intermediate courts of appeals; it will continue to do so until this Court intervenes.


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To illustrate, both the Houston First and Austin courts of appeals “view the

pleadings and the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

movant.” Cheniere Energy, Inc. v. Lotfi, 449 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (emphasis added); Rathbun *3 (going beyond

Cheniere Energy and holding that movant must show that all conduct on which suit

is based is covered).

In contrast, recently the Dallas Court of Appeals, while acknowledging

Cheniere’s and Rathbun’s deferential approach, applied a “neutral, plain-language

review.” Tatum v. Hersh, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 05-14-01318-CV, 2015 WL

9583494, at *5 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 30, 2015, n.p.h.) (emphasis added).

Numerous other cases implicitly take the same tack. Statement of Jurisdiction, at 13

n.3.

No less important, this case presents the question of how and when the Act

applies to “mixed claims”: lawsuits or causes of action that are based on covered

activity, even if some subpart of the case involves activity not covered by the Act.

At step one, the Act directs the court to determine whether a “legal action” is

based on covered conduct. TCPA §27.003(a)–(b). Prior to the Austin Court’s

decision, every Texas court to consider the question—including the Austin Court—

had understood this language to require, at a minimum, a claim-by-claim analysis of

the Act’s application. The most recent of these decisions makes this clear:


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Under the TCPA, a “legal action” includes not only a “lawsuit” but alsoa “cause of action.” TCPA §27.001(6). In reviewing the trial court’s

ruling, we consider whether [movant] has established that each causeof action pleaded by [nonmovant] “is based on, relates to, or is in

response to”[movant’s] exercise of its right to petition or right ofassociation.” TCPA §27.003(a).

Tervita, LLC v. Sutterfield , No. 05-15-00469-CV, 2015 WL 9257035, *2 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2015, n.p.h.) (emphasis added) (dismissing one claim and

portion of another, and remanding remaining causes of actions to trial court); see

also Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 360 (analyzing at step one by factual theory).

Pejoratively characterizing Defendants’ “attempted use of the TCPA as a

shield to protect the type of conduct alleged in this case,” Rathbun *8 n.10

(emphasis added), the Austin Court parted ways with Dallas and its own Serafine

precedent. But coverage under the Act does not equate to protection in the sense of

immunity from suit; rather, it shifts to the plaintiff the burden to produce evidence

supporting her claims. Thus, the court of appeals’ acknowledgment that Plaintiff’s

suit was based in part on covered conduct, id. *4–6 (pre-litigation and filmmaking

activities), should have satisfied the Act’s first step and shifted the burden.

Instead, the court concluded that because a portion of the petition alleged non-

covered conduct, the Act was wholly inapplicable. Id. *7–8. In doing so, the court

never confronted the analytically distinct legal and factual circumstances among the

defendants or the causes of action addressed to each. Id.


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This Court should grant review to resolve these conflicts with respect to this

relatively young, but already much-litigated, Act.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Parties

Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) oversees the ecclesiastical

activities of Scientology churches. CR1:78. The IRS recognizes it as a tax-exempt

church under 26 U.S.C. §170(b), whose purpose and activities are, as statutorily

mandated, “exclusively” charitable and religious. 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3);

CR10:1223–24. Religious Technology Center (“RTC,” not a petitioner in this

proceeding), also recognized as a tax-exempt church, owns the Scientology

trademarks (in furtherance of its “exclusively” religious purpose and activities) and

is the ecclesiastical authority overseeing the orthodox application of the faith.

CR1:78. RTC delegates to CSI responsibility for investigating and prosecuting

misuse of Scientology trademarks and service marks. CR1:148.

Monty Drake is a non-Scientologist private investigator. Gregory Sloat is a

non-Scientologist former Deputy U.S. Marshal who was employed by a private

investigator in this case. Ed Bryan and David Lubow are Scientologists who

protested, filmed, and produced documentaries about the actions of Marty Rathbun

and his wife, Monique.


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Plaintiff Monique Rathbun was never a Scientologist. She is the wife of a

former Church official, Marty Rathbun, who was removed from his position in 2003,

and left the Church a year later. In 2009 he began an aggressive and defamatory

public attack in all media on the Church and its leadership in an attempt to create a

schism and establish his own version of “Independent Scientology,” using

Scientology intellectual property. Plaintiff joined him in these efforts. Her lawsuit is

based upon acts undertaken by Defendants to counter the vicious public attacks,

principally by her husband, and to protect the Church’s intellectual property rights.

B. CSI retains Drake and Sloat to investigate reported trademark

infringement by the Rathbuns and thefts involving Marty. TCPA

§27.005(b)(2) (covering a “party’s exercise of…the right to

petition”).

In 2009, CSI learned of a Craigslist posting by Marty, which promised:

“Scientology counseling: thoroughly trained on all levels of Scientology spiritual

counseling. Reasonable rates.” CR1:149. Marty also created a blog offering

“Independent Scientology” services. Id . It is undisputed that Marty never acquired

rights to the Scientology trademarks and was never authorized to use them.

CR10:1206; CR1:18.

“Scientology spiritual counseling” refers to a religious practice called

“auditing,” which seeks to elevate participants to higher states of spiritual awareness.

Id . Scientology auditing, too, is protected through trademarks held by RTC. Only

licensed ministers, groups or churches may use the name “Scientology” or deliver


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these services. Marty’s advertisement and unlicensed “Independent Scientology”

services infringed on RTC’s trademarks. CR1:149-150; 152-153.

Marty’s wife, Monique, also performed auditing services out of the Rathbuns’

home/office. She, like Marty, used an e-meter, a Scientology religious artifact that

is reserved, by trademark and scripture, for use only by licensed and authorized

ministers. CR1:149, 150; RR3:173–177.

In response to Marty’s Craigslist and blog posts, CSI’s general counsel

retained Drake to investigate the reported infringements. Drake has investigated

hundreds of cases involving intellectual-property violations in the United States and

abroad. CR1:152-153; CR2:298. A licensed private investigator, Drake did what he

customarily does in such cases: lawful surveillance, including taking still

photographs and videos. CR2:299–300.

The Rathbuns used their house to conduct infringing activities. Drake rented

a house across the cul-de-sac from the Rathbuns’ house in Ingleside-on-the-Bay,

Texas. Drake believed continual film surveillance of the home’s exterior was likely

to expose the Rathbuns’ unauthorized infringement of Scientology’s trademarks.

CR26:3142–43. Anything the camera could see, a person could also see from the

street. CR26:3143. Drake never directed surveillance inside the Rathbuns’

home/office. Id . Drake occasionally followed Marty’s car to determine with whom


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he was meeting. CR2:300. The Rathbuns were not aware of Drake’s presence until

2012. CR1:39.

Concurrently, the Church’s lawyers performed legal research, reviewed work

product, and drafted a complaint regarding the Rathbuns’ trademark infringement

that Drake was investigating. CR33:4007–08.

In April 2010, as a result of his monitoring activity, Drake reported to Church

counsel that John Brousseau had arrived at the Rathbuns’ home/office. Days before,

Brousseau had stolen from RTC computer files containing proprietary information.

RTC reported Brousseau’s theft and his subsequent meeting with Marty to law

enforcement. CR10:1204-1205.

Shortly thereafter, Marty published a blog post encouraging Church staff to

steal Church documents and records. He stated he would “personally guarantee

[them] protection.” CR1:153. A few weeks later, Daniel Montalvo, a staff member

at Bridge Publications, Inc., the Church’s publishing facility in Los Angeles,

furtively removed five hard drives containing proprietary and confidential

information from that facility. Marty was in the car when another ex-Scientologist

picked up Montalvo and the stolen goods. CR1:153–54. Bridge filed a complaint

with the Los Angeles Police regarding this theft, and the resulting report referenced

Marty’s involvement. CR25:3016.


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Drake’s surveillance continued until late 2012. CR1:39. In December 2012,

the Rathbuns moved to Bulverde, Texas. RR3:178. In early 2013, the Church’s

counsel hired another licensed investigator who in turn retained non-Scientologist

Sloat. Sloat installed three low-resolution cameras on property he rented adjacent to

the Rathbuns’ Bulverde house to photograph the driveway and nearby roadway. Like

Drake, Sloat was trying to document Marty’s administration of trademark-infringing

“practice[s] similar to Scientology.” CR2:302-03.

C.

Defendants Bryan, Lubow, and other Scientologists protest andcreate a series of videos criticizing and countering Marty’s anti-

Scientology activities and his efforts to establish an independent

church under the name “Scientology.”

In 2009, Marty began a world-wide campaign against his former church and

its leadership. He posted videos to that end on the Internet, wrote and self-published

books, and maintained an Internet blog that attacked his former church and its

ecclesiastical leader, David Miscavige. CR1:151-52. Rathbun posted a document

entitled “31 Factors,” purportedly modeled on Martin Luther’s “95 Theses.” Id. He

compared Mr. Miscavige to Hitler, and called for the destruction of the Church of

Scientology. CR1:152; CR2:203; CR27:3223, 3270-75, 3278-81. Rathbun also

appeared on national and international television programs, repeating his attacks

against the Church and its leadership, and sat for interviews with international,

national, and local newspapers. CR1:150-51.


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As a direct result of Marty’s actions, in early 2011, several Scientologists,

including John Allender, Joanne Wheaton, Richard Hirst and Defendants Bryan and

Lubow, resolved to document, protest, and communicate to Scientologists and to the

public by video and film Marty’s efforts to establish a rival “Independent Church of

Scientology.” They also sought to expose and refute Marty’s attacks on the Church.

CR2:281.

Lubow, Allender and Warlick embarked to protest at Marty’s home/office and

film a documentary about him. The film would utilize footage of protesters outside

the premises. The working title for the documentary was “The Story of a Squirrel.”

Id. “Squirrel” is a Scientology term depicting a person who delivers altered and

unauthorized versions of Scientology services. CR1:150. The protesters adopted the

name “Squirrel Busters.” CR1:110, 155; 2:287.

The Squirrel Busters began their protests and filming outside the Rathbuns’

home/office during April 2011, and continued intermittently until September 2011.

During the filming, the Squirrel Busters had numerous verbal encounters with

Rathbun and plaintiff in public areas, in the course of which they debated, often in

mutually argumentative terms, Rathbun’s anti-Scientology activities. CR2:290.

Plaintiff testified about the Squirrel Busters “doing their videos with pictures

and, you know, unflattering stuff about us and saying stuff…[t]heir response was

that they were doing a documentary. They would be out there with these cue


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cards…and they would have scripts of whatever it was that they wanted to harass us

about….” RR3:126–27. Plaintiff’s counsel then played a passage on which the

Squirrel Busters, in his words, “were getting these scripts and they were reading

them on camera in front of your house” including “negative things about you.” Id.

at 127. Plaintiff also testified that the Squirrel Busters passed out magazines to local

residents containing their message. RR3:147. She also alleged they “would approach

us in a golf cart with up to six cameras trained on us as they hurled insults and rude

questions relating to Scientology.” CR48:5556 (emphasis added). Plaintiff claims

the Squirrel Busters were active whenever the Rathbuns left their house, CR38:4506,

and that it went on for 199 days, RR3:201.

Defendants do not deny the presence of the Squirrel Busters outside of

Plaintiff’s home/office. In fact they assert it was their right to protest there in

response to Marty Rathbun’s years-long attacks on their Church. The Squirrel

Busters’ protests and filming activities were religiously motivated and were

peaceful, if at times heated. CR2:280-281, 294; 26:3150. Their activities, which

Plaintiff conceded never involved assault or trespassing, RR3:200, included attempts

to question the Rathbuns about Scientology and their anti-Scientology activities.

CR48:5556. They produced documentary videos which were uploaded to YouTube.

CR26:3156.


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D. Plaintiff’s claims include allegations of conduct that the trial court

struck for lack of evidence and in which Defendants deny

involvement, which would not be covered by the TCPA.

In addition to allegations about investigators and Squirrel Busters, which

involve “the right to petition” and “the right to free speech” under TCPA §27.005(b),

Monique alleged conduct not covered by the TCPA, in which Defendants denied

involvement. CR33:4011; CR38:4480. These allegations were stricken by the

trial court, yet nevertheless relied on by the court of appeals as forming the

basis of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

Thus, Plaintiff alleged that “Defendants” sent her a sex toy at her job and that

“Defendants” sent flowers to a female co-worker along with a “romantic” message

purporting to be from Plaintiff. CR1:39. Plaintiff admitted to speculating about who

sent either the sex toy or the flowers. RR3:207. Accordingly, the trial court struck

those allegations from her affidavit. CR38:4506–07. Plaintiff also alleged that

“Scientology websites have published…false claims that [Plaintiff is] a sex pervert”

or “a man who has had a secret sex-change operation.” CR1:39. After Plaintiff

produced no evidence of such websites, the trial court likewise struck those

allegations from her affidavit. CR55:6317.

The trial court ultimately denied all of the Defendants’ TCPA motions on the

grounds that the Act’s commercial-transaction and bodily-injury exemptions

rendered the Act inapplicable. App. 2. The court of appeals did not reach that issue.


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Instead, “favoring the conclusion that [Plaintiff’s] claims [were] not predicated on

protected expression,” and without distinguishing among the various Defendants or

the various causes of action, it held that Defendants “failed to demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence” “that the TCPA applies to this case,” Rathbun

*3, *9.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should resolve the split among the courts of appeals about what

standard governs analysis of the pleadings and evidence under the first step of the

TCPA’s burden-shifting procedure. The Dallas Court of Appeals’ “neutral” standard

honors the statute’s plain language: at step one, the “legal action” should be liberally

viewed as “based on, relate[d] to, or...in response to the [movant’s] exercise of”

enumerated rights. TCPA §27.003(a). In contrast, the approach articulated by the

court of appeals here—under which courts “favor[] the conclusion that [the non-

movant’s] claims are not predicated on protected expression”—would gut the Act

by allowing a plaintiff to plead around its application. This case illustrates the point.

The court of appeals’ flawed approach led it to rely upon allegations in the Plaintiff’s

complaint that the trial court found to be so unsubstantiated that it struck them from

the record.


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The Court should also grant review to correct the court of appeals’ refusal to

differentiate among the claims and Defendants. Lumping Defendants together and

applying the court of appeals’ hyper-deferential standard of review collectively to

all causes of action ensures that Defendants—against whom Plaintiff cannot even

articulate a legitimate claim—remain subject to continuing defense of a suit that the

Act bars.

ARGUMENT

Because this case involves diverse defendants and mixed claims, it is the ideal

vehicle for clarifying the analysis under step one of the TCPA’s burden-shifting

procedure for determining whether a “legal action” should be dismissed. See

TCPA §§27.005(b) (step one: movant’s burden), (c) (step two: non-movant’s

burden), (d) (step three: movant’s burden).

I.

The court of appeals erred in holding that, at the TCPA’s first step, acourt must “favor[] the conclusion that [the plaintiff’s] claims are not

covered.”

“The TCPA’s purpose is to identify and summarily dispose of lawsuits

designed only to chill First Amendment rights, not to dismiss meritorious lawsuits.”

Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 589. The TCPA accomplishes this goal through its three-step

burden-shifting procedure, which strikes a balance between defendants’ First

Amendment guarantee and plaintiffs’ ability to seek compensation for demonstrable


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injuries. TCPA §27.002. The TCPA must be “construed liberally to effectuate [this]

purpose.” Id. §27.011(b).

The Act’s core is steps two and three: at those phases, the court must

determine whether a lawsuit implicating First Amendment activities is sufficiently

meritorious to proceed. Step one, by contrast, asks merely whether this analysis

should be performed at all. Cf. City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Invs., LLC , 214

Cal.App.4th 358, 371 (2013) (“The first step only determines whether [the Act’s]

procedural protection applies; the second step...addresses whether there is sufficient

merit to the claims at issue to allow the litigation to proceed.”).

The statute incorporates capacious definitions of covered conduct.

See §27.001(4)–(6); see also Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 357 n.1 (referring to TCPA

definitions as “expansive”); id. at 375–76 (Pemberton, J., concurring) (referring to

range of conduct covered by TCPA as “vast[]”). Several courts of appeals have thus

applied a neutral approach or otherwise assumed the truth of the movant’s facts at

step one. See, e.g., Tatum, 2015 WL 9583494, at *8; Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 360

(accepting truth of movant’s evidence at step one); Neyland v. Thompson, No. 03-

13-00643-CV, 2015 WL 1612155, at *4 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 7, 2015, no

pet.) (same); see also Statement of Jurisdiction.

In contrast, two courts—including the court of appeals here—have applied an

indulgent standard favoring the non-movant. That standard originated in Cheniere


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Energy, which held that a court at step one must “view the pleadings and evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” 449 S.W.3d at 214.

Cheniere Energy’s standard of review was wrong for three reasons. First, it

relied solely on Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd.,

which involved only the step-two burden. 416 S.W.3d 71, 80–81 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).

Second, Newspaper Holdings adopted a standard utilized in reviewing

jurisdictional pleas, id., which has its roots in a long-standing policy favoring

jurisdiction, Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex.

2004); see also Graham v. Roder , 5 Tex. 141, 141 (1849) (“In doubtful cases all

intendments are in favor of the jurisdiction.”). Moreover, Miranda concerned

whether a fact was uncontested, and therefore binding pre-trial, or was contested,

and therefore reserved for the fact-finder’s post-trial determination. 133 S.W.3d at

227–28. A court considering a TCPA motion, however, cannot wait for coverage

disputes to be resolved at trial without rendering impotent the Act’s protections.

Coverage must be resolved at step one.

Third, and most fundamentally, Cheniere Energy’s approach would negate

the TCPA by making it standard practice for plaintiffs to evade the Act’s protections:

by including any allegation of conduct not covered by the TCPA, plaintiffs would

ensure that their lawsuit was insulated from a TCPA challenge. The Legislature did


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not intend such a result. Cf. MacGregor Med. Ass’n v. Campbell, 985 S.W.2d 38, 40

(Tex. 1998) (plaintiff cannot evade application of Medical Liability and Insurance

Improvement Act by pleading claim under DTPA).

The indulgent approach contradicts the Act’s plain language, which requires

courts to consider not only the plaintiff’s allegations but also “supporting and

opposing affidavits.” TCPA §27.006(a) (emphasis added). If the legislature had

meant for courts to consider only plaintiffs’ facts, it would not have directed courts

to consider both parties’ evidence; it cannot have meant for courts to consider but

automatically disregard movants’ evidence.

Furthermore, the court of appeals exacerbated Cheniere Energy’s error. It not

only viewed the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, it “favor[ed] the conclusion that

[Plaintiff’s] claims [we]re not predicated on protected expression.” Rathbun *3

(emphasis added).

This startling holding requires trial courts to ignore the Act’s command that

it be construed liberally. It in fact requires courts to assume that the Act doesn’t

apply and to accept as true any allegation that some part of the underlying conduct

was not covered by the TCPA. That interpretation thwarts the Act’s text and purpose.

II.

The court of appeals erred in failing to differentiate among the different

claims and various defendants.

Several anti-SLAPP motions were filed in this case. CR3:341 (CSI); CR3:337

(Drake); CR5:582 (Sloat and Bryan joining CSI); CR5:587 (Lubow). Though their


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motions were heard together, each Defendant had a right to individual consideration.

TCPA §27.003(a); §27.005(b). Yet the court of appeals lumped all the Defendants

together, collectively referring to them as “the Scientology Defendants” more than

50 times, Rathbun *1–9, though Drake and Sloat are not even Scientologists.

Similarly, Monique asserted four causes of action. The Act’s broad definition

of “legal action” requires that the court consider the Act’s application as to each of

these causes of action. TCPA §27.001(6).

Until this case, the courts of appeals have uniformly analyzed whether each

cause of action is covered by the TCPA, refusing to hold that a whole lawsuit is or

is not covered by the Act. See supra at 16–17 (addressing Tervita and Serafine).

Disregarding the unbroken precedent recognizing the Act applies on a claim-by-

claim basis, the court of appeals held, in essence, that any allegation of non-covered

conduct overcomes evidence of covered conduct, precluding the TCPA’s application

as to all conduct, all claims, and all defendants. Rathbun *8.

Monique’s suit against Drake illustrates the flaw in the court of appeals’

undifferentiated approach. Plaintiff alleges that Drake surveilled her home/office

from across the cul-de-sac. CR1:56. Her affidavit offers nothing more. CR48:5553.

Drake’s affidavit testified that his surveillance investigated Marty’s trademark

infringement and theft. CR2:299. As the statute required, TCPA §27.006(a), the trial

court considered and accepted this evidence. CR56:6420–21, 6430.


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Drake’s surveillance was pre-petition activity—based on Drake’s work, CSI

had prepared a trademark-infringement suit against Marty. Although CSI decided

against filing that suit, a criminal complaint was filed with law enforcement based

in part on information learned from Drake’s surveillance. See Tichinin v. City of

Morgan Hill, 177 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1068 (2009) (holding that California’s anti-

SLAPP statute covers non-communicative pre-litigation activity, even if suit is never

filed, because such activity “intrinsically facilitates the exercise of free speech”).

Under either Tervita’s or Serafine’s granulated approach to mixed claims, the suit

against Drake would have been deemed covered, and the burden would have shifted

to Plaintiff to attempt to establish a prima facie case against him.

While it acknowledged that Drake conducted pre-litigation activity, the court

of appeals ignored Plaintiff’s pleadings and affidavit to conclude that her “suit is not

based on the Scientology Defendants’ attempts to discover facts related to Marty

Rathbun’s alleged” trademark infringement. Rathbun *8. Rather, the court focused

on Plaintiff’s general allegations about harassment and her salacious, stricken

allegations about a sex toy. Id . *7–8. But Monique’s own lawyer referred to Drake’s

surveillance as a basis for her harassment claim. RR11:88–91.

By ignoring the specific evidence of covered conduct and focusing solely on

unspecific allegations of non-covered conduct, the court of appeals concluded that

Drake could not use the Act to defend against Monique’s suit. This was error.


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Similarly, Monique pleaded that “the Squirrel Busters’ operations is an

important basis of this lawsuit,” CR10:1270, incorporating these allegations into

each of her claims, CR10:1274 – 75. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel told the trial court

that the Squirrel Busters’ activities represented “a dramatic change in the level and

intensity of what [Plaintiff was] experiencing.” RR3:105. Plaintiff’s counsel later

emphasized that Plaintiff’s complaint encompasses “the whole campaign, pre-

Squirrel Busters, during Squirrel Busters, after Squirrel Busters.” RR12:225.

In determining whether the Act covered the Squirrel Busters’ activities, the

court of appeals ignored the evidence, including Monique’s admissions,

demonstrating that the Squirrel Busters’ regular presence outside the Rathbuns’

home/office, which indisputably contained elements of covered activity, was the

basis for much of the lawsuit. Rathbun *5–6. Instead, the court of appeals, using its

highly deferential standard, concluded that Monique’s lawsuit was based solely on

alleged conduct it considered non-covered, which Monique asserted generally

against all of the Defendants. Id. *6.

Importantly, the court of appeals held contrary to the Dallas Court. That court

has held that non-covered conduct cannot be separated from the covered context in

which it arose, even if the plaintiff sues only for the non-covered conduct. Shipp v.

Malouf , 439 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (“We agree

with Shipp that the entire communication—not just the allegedly defamatory


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portion— and the surrounding circumstances must be considered in determining

whether the lawsuit relates to Shipp’s exercise of his right of free speech.” (emphasis

added)), disapproved on other grounds, Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579; see also Cruz v.

Van Sickle, 452 S.W.3d 503, 514 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (same). By

failing to view the non-covered conduct in the context of Defendants’ substantial

and undisputed covered activities, the Austin Court erred.

Perhaps most egregiously, the court of appeals zeroed-in on Plaintiff’s most

inflammatory allegation: that “the Scientology Defendants sent a sex toy to

[Plaintiff] at her workplace.” Rathbun *5. But this sex toy scenario was rank

speculation, and the trial court struck the allegation from her affidavit:

CR38:4506–07. The court of appeals’ conclusion thus relied on evidence the trial

court struck, while ignoring evidence the trial court credited regarding the Squirrel

Busters’ activities. CR38:4504–05.

In fact, the court of appeals went a step further, placing an additional burden,

unmoored in precedent or statute, on Defendants to explain how each of Plaintiff’s


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allegations against them were covered by the statute. Rathbun *7 (faulting

Defendants for failing to “explain how” certain activities “constitute[d] conduct

covered by the TCPA”). Contra, Shipp, 439 S.W.3d at 438; Cruz, 452 S.W.3d at

514. This, too, was error.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

Since its passage five years ago, the TCPA has perplexed courts,

commentators, and parties. This case reflects that confusion.

This Court should grant this petition to clarify the step-one analysis under the

TCPA; reverse in part the court of appeals’ judgment, hold that Monique Rathbun’s

claims are covered by the TCPA and no exemption applies, and remand to the court

of appeals for a determination of whether Rathbun met her step-two burden; or,

alternatively, reverse and remand to the court of appeals for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Douglas W. Alexander


[email protected]

Nicholas Bacarisse


ALEXANDER DUBOSEJEFFERSON & TOWNSEND LLP

515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350Austin, Texas 78701-3562



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Thomas S. LeatherburyState Bar No. [email protected]

Marc A. FullerState Bar No. 24032210

[email protected] & ELKINS LLP

Trammell Crow Center2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700

Dallas, Texas 75201Telephone: (214) 220-7792

Facsimile: (214) 999-7792

George H. Spencer, Jr.State Bar No. 18921001

[email protected]

CLEMENS & SPENCER

112 E. Pecan Street, Suite 1300San Antonio, Texas 78205-1531


COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER CHURCH OF

SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On February 19, 2016 I electronically filed this Petition for Review with the

Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing system, which will

send notification of such filing to the following (unless otherwise noted below).

Monique Rathbun501 Sunset

Ingleside on the Bay, Texas 78362

[email protected]

(served by e-mail and certified mail)

Respondent

Gary D. SarlesState Bar No. 17651100

[email protected]

O. Paul DunaganState Bar No. 06202700

[email protected] & OUIMET 370 Founders Square

900 Jackson StreetDallas, Texas 75202Telephone: (214) 573-6300

Facsimile: (214) 573-6306

Attorneys for Petitioner Monty Drake

Jonathan H. HullState Bar No. 10253350

[email protected]

Ashley B. Bowen


R EAGAN BURRUS401 Main Plaza, Suite 200

New Braunfels, Texas 78130Telephone: (830) 625-8026

Facsimile: (830) 625-4433

Attorneys for Petitioners

Steven Gregory Sloat and Ed Bryan

Stephanie S. Bascon

State Bar No. [email protected] OFFICE OF STEPHANIE S. BASCON, PLLC297 W. San Antonio Street

New Braunfels, Texas 78730

Telephone: (830) 625-2940

Facsimile: (830) 221-3441

Attorneys for Petitioner David J. Lubow

/s/ Douglas W. Alexander

Douglas W. Alexander


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INDEX

Tab Item

1. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE §27.003

2. Trial Court’s Order

3. Court of Appeals’ Opinion and Judgment


5.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE §27.010

6.


7.


8.




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APPENDIX 1


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§ 27.003. Motion to Dismiss, TX CIV PRAC & REM § 27.003

© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated

Civil Practice and Remedies Code (Refs & Annos)

Title 2. Trial, Judgment, and Appeal

Subtitle B. Trial Matters

Chapter 27. Actions Involving the Exercise of Certain Constitutional Rights (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 27.003

§ 27.003. Motion to Dismiss

Effective: June 17, 2011

Currentness

(a) If a legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to a party's exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or

right of association, that party may file a motion to dismiss the legal action.

(b) A motion to dismiss a legal action under this section must be filed not later than the 60th day after the date of service of the

legal action. The court may extend the time to file a motion under this section on a showing of good cause.

(c) Except as provided by Section 27.006(b), on the filing of a motion under this section, all discovery in the legal action is

suspended until the court has ruled on the motion to dismiss.

Credits

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), § 2, eff. June 17, 2011.

Notes of Decisions (37)

V. T. C. A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 27.003, TX CIV PRAC & REM § 27.003

Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature

End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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APPENDIX 2


44/92

1 5 0 N . S e g u i n , S u i t e 317

N e w B r a u n f e l s , T e x a s 78130

8 3 0 - 2 2 1 - 1 2 7 0

F a x 8 3 0 - 6 0 8 - 2 0 3 0

D I B WAL DRI P

P R E S I D I N G J U D G E

4 3 3 R D JU D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T

C O M A L C O U N T Y

C A U S E N O . C 2 0 1 3 - 1 0 8 2 B

M O N I Q U E R A T H B U N ,

P L A I N T I F F

D A V I D M I S C A V I G E , R E L I G I O U S

T E C H N O L O G Y C E N T E R , C H U R C H

O F

S C I E N T O L O G Y I N T E R N A T I O N A L ,

S T E V E N G R E G O R Y S L O A T , M O N T Y D R A K E ,

D A V E L U B O W A/K/A D A V I D J . L A B O W , A N D

E D B R Y A N ,

D E F E N D A N T S

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

2 : =

m

l

a

SI

S

I N T H E D I S T | C « C O U R T

2 0 7

T H

J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T

3 3

G 3

C O M A L C O U N T Y , T E X A S

A N T I - S L A P P M O T I O N S O F A L L D E F E N D A N T S F I N D I N G S O F F A C T A N D C O N C L U S I O N S

O F L A W R U L I N G

DENYING

A L L A N T I - S L A P P M O T I O N S T O D I S M I S S

F I N D I N G S O F

F A C T

1. D e f e n d a n t C h u r c h o f S c i e n t o l o g y I n t e r n a t i o n a l

( CSI ) ,

by a nd th rough i t s

a g e n t s o r c o n t r a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g D e f e n d a n t s D a v i d L u b o w , M o n t y D r a k e a n d G r e g S l o a t,

unde r took ex tens ive su rve i l l a nc e o f P l a in t i f f a nd he r husba nd ove r a c o l l e c t ive pe r iod o f

more tha n fou r years—possibly s ix . M on ty D r a ke a c tua l ly beg a n the inves t iga t ion o f

M a r k R a t h b u n i n 2 0 0 7 .

Se e

D e p o s i t i o n o f M o n t y D r a k e a t 5 2 : 1 6 - 1 9 . H e s t a r te d

P a g e 1 of

5

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i n v e s ti g a t in g M a r k R a t h b u n f o r p o t e n t i a l S c i e n t o l o g y t r a d e m a r k v i o l a t i o n s . See Affidavi t

o f M o n t y D r a k e f 7 . ' Sc ien to log i s t D a v id L ub ow ha s l ikew ise s t a t ed tha t he i s a p r iva t e

inves t iga to r a nd f i lmma ke r a nd w a s h i red by CSI ' s a t to rney E l l io t A be l son p r io r t o 2009

to inves t iga t e Mr . R a thbun in suppo r t o f p ro spec t ive l i t i ga t ion rega rd ing a l l eged

v io l a t ions by Mr . R a thbun o f in t e l l e c tua l p rope r ty r igh t s ow ned by C SI . Se e Affidavi t of

D a v i d L u b o w

Yh

3-4 .

2 . C e r t a in o f t he a c t iv i t i e s a bou t w h ic h P la in t i ff c om pla in s w e re c ondu c ted

b y p e r s o n s c a l l i n g t h e m s e l v e s t he S q u i r r e l B u s t e r s b e g i n n i n g i n A p r i l

2 0 1 1 .

D efenda n t

C SI a dmi t s t ha t i t p ro mp ted a nd spon so red the Squ i r re l B us t e r s .

Se e

A f f ida v i t o f A l l a n

C a r tw r igh t @

T[

23 . Squ i r re l B u s t e r R ic h a rd H i r s t ind ic a t e s t ha t h i s f ir st i nvo lv eme n t

c a me a f te r he w a s no t i f i ed o f t he p ro pos ed a c t iv i t i e s w he n he rec e ived a c a ll f rom a s t a f f

m e m b e r o f t h e C h u r c h o f S c i e n t o l o g y I n t e r n a t i o n a l ( D e f e n d a n t C S I ) .

Se e

Affidavi t of

R ic ha rd H i r s t @

[̂

5 . W a n t i n g to a ss i s t S c i e n t o l o g i s t s t o d o c u m e n t M a r k

Rathbun's

p r o v i s i o n o f ' s q u i r r e l ' S c i e n t o l o g y , C S I ' s L e g a l D i r e c t o r C a r t w r i g h t a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t

CSI pro vid ed f inanc ia l a nd lega l sup por t .

Se e

A f f ida v i t o f A l l a n C a r t w r ig h t @

Tf

2 3 .

3 . In h i s dec l a ra t ion f i l ed by D e f end a n t C S I , H i r s t a dm i t s t he Squ i r re l

Bus ters inst i ga te d th e fi rs t Ing lesid e on the Ba y con fron ta t io n on th e very f irst day a t

t he R a thb un s ' f ront doo r pu rp o r t ed l y t o c on duc t a t e c hn ic a l in sp ec t io n o f M a rk

R a t h b u n ' s p r o c e d u r e a s a S c i e n t o l o g y m i n i s t e r / a u d i t o r . Se e A f f ida v i t o f R ic h a rd H i r s t @

K 10 . Th i s in i t i a l Squ i r re l B us t e r even t w a s v ideo - t a ped a nd sh ow n in c our t d i sp l a y ing

num erou s Squ i r re l B us t e r s a t t he

R a t h b u n s *

doo r w ea r ing d i s t inc t ive p rovoc a t ive t - sh i r t s

po r t r a y ing M a rk R a thb un a s a squ i r re l w i th a r ed - s l a s hed c i r c l e ove r t he dep ic t ion a n d

' Defendants CSI, Monty Drake , and David Lubo w use the same aff idavits and declarations in their

An t i -SLAP P mo t ions . Each mo t ion wi l l be re fe rred to a s Defenda n ts ' An t i -SLA P P Mot ions ,

collectively.

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s e v e r a l S q u i r r e l B u s t e r s h a d v i d e o c a m e r a s a n d m i c r o p h o n e s o f t h e i r o w n , i n c l u d i n g

som e wi t h hea d- m ou n t e d ca me r as , l ig h t s , e t c . F r o m t h i s po in t f o r war d , i t i s c l ea r , an d the

C ou r t so f in ds , t ha t f ew i f an y con f r on t a t i on s w er e c iv i l w i t h bo t h s ides e i t he r i n i ti a t i n g

o r r e c i p r o c a t i n g .

Se e

va r io u s dec l a r a t i o n s f i led e i t h e r i n su p por t o f o r i n r es po n se t o t he

A n t i - S L A P P m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s .

4. De f en d an t E d B r y an w as sen t f rom C a l i f o r n i a by t he Of f i ce o f S pec i a l

A f f a ir s ( O S A ) , a d i v i s i o n o f C S I , t o j o i n t h e S q u i r r e l B u s t e r s i n T e x a s . O n J u l y

13,

2 0 1 1 , B r y a n w r o t e :

. . . .

This is in co-ordination with OSA

Int.

They are calling the shots

an d qu i t e f r an k l y I don ' t t h in k i t i s ve r y e f f ec t i ve . T h e r epor t e r s ca m e

t o o u r h o u s e t h e o t h e r d a y a n d w e d i d n ' t t e l l t h e m v e r y m u c h . O u r

ma in g u y wen t back to d i scu ss w i t h t h em a d i f f e r en t s t r a t eg y . T h e r a t

i s g e t t i n g m o r e b r a z e n a n d y e s t e r d a y I a c t u a l l y h a d a 1 m i n u t e

comm

c y c l e w i t h h i m while he was on a walk. T h e g u y i s n u t t i e r t ha n a

f r u i t cake . He ' s g on e o f f t he deep en d .

Taking him down w ill be no easy

task See

E x h . E t o P l a i n t i f f s 2

n d

A m e n d e d R e s p o n s e t o A n t i -

S L A P P M o t i o n s t o D i s m i s s

[emphasis

added],

[rjn t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e R a t h b u n h o m e / o f f i c e , J o a n n e W h e a t o n r e g u l a r l y

p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e S q u i r r e l B u s t e r a c t i v i t ie s [ o ] v e r a p e r i o d o f s e v e r a l m o n t h s .

Se e

D e c l a r a t i o n o f J o a n n e W h e a t o n @ Iffl 3 & 6 . W hi l e do in g so , a ho u se w as

r e n t e d b y L u b o w t w o b l o c k s f r o m t h e R a t h b u n s ' h o m e / o f f i c e f o r W h e a t o n a n d

o t her S qu i r r e l B u s t e r s t o s t ag e t he i r ac t i v i t i e s f r om which a g o l f ca r t was a l so

u t i l i zed t o t r ave l back an d f o r t h .

Id .

@ [̂ 4 . T h e p a r t ic i p a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l S q u i r r e l

B u s t e r s va r i ed f r om t im e to t ime a s t hey l e f t an d r e t u r n ed a t d i f f e r en t t im es f o r

d i f f e r en t r eason s .

Id. @

14.

See also

Af f idav i t o f R i c ha r d H i r s t @ 1] 7 .

A v i d e o g r a p h e r , B a r t P a r r , w a s h i r e d b y p r i v a t e i n v e s t i g a t o r D a v e , a . k . a .

Dav id , L u bo w t o fi lm t he p r o j ec t a t o r n ea r R a t hb u n ' s o f f i ce .

Se e

D e c l a r a t i o n

Page 3 of25

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of B ar t P a r r @ IfiJ 4 & 6 . T h e p r o j e c t o c c u r r e d o v e r a p e r i o d o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6

m o n t h s .

Id. @

6 . E v iden ce i den t i f i e s , an d t he C o u r t so f in ds , t he pe r iod o f t ime

of t he S qu i r r e l B u s t e r ac t i v i t i e s a s hav in g s t a r t ed an d en ded , r espe c t i ve l y , i n Apr i l

2 0 1 1 a n d i n S e p t e m b e r

2 0 1 1 .

Se e

A f f idav i t o f R i cha r d H i r s t @

^

10 and

D e c l a r a t i o n o f J o a n n e W h e a t o n @

K 14.

5 . T h e i n v e s t i g a t o r s , v i d e o g r a p h e r s a n d S q u i r r e l B u s t e r s i n t e r a c t e d w i t h t h e

R a t h b u n s m a n y [ p o s s i b l y h u n d r e d s o f ] t i m e s o v e r a p e r i o d o f t h e s e s e v e r a l m o n t h s ,

u su a l l y w he n t he g o l f ca r t w as pa r ke d n ea r t he i r o f fi ce [ on a de ad- en d s t r ee t wh en ]

f il min g wa s on g o in g , o r [ wh en ] t r ave l i n g abou t t he l i t tl e t ow n .

Se e

D e c l a r a t i o n o f

J o a n n e W h e a t o n @ 1 6 . I n a d d i t i o n , p r i v a t e i n v e s t ig a t o r M o n t y D r a k e u t il i z e d

s u r v e i l l a n c e , p h o t o g r a p h i n g , v i d e o t a p i n g a n d s t a t ic c a m e r a s t o fil m a r e a s o u t s i d e t h e

R a t h b u n s ' o f f i c e / h o m e i n pa r t f rom in s ide a s ec on d ho u se r en t ed by D r ak e ac r os s t he

s t r ee t f r om t he R a t hbu n s .

Se e

A f f i d a v it o f M o n t e D r a k e @ H 9 . W i t h o u t a n y t i m e

l i m i t a ti o n , D r a k e a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t h e w a s a b l e t o o b s e r v e p e r s o n s c o m i n g a n d g o i n g

f r o m t h e R a t h b u n s ' o f f i c e / h o m e .

See Id.

F o r s e v e r a l m o n t h s , w h e n th e R a t h b u n s l ef t

t he i r home, t he S qu i r r e l B u s t e r s g r ou p appea r ed i n a g o l f ca r t t o con f r on t t he R a t hbu n s

w i t h v i d e o c a m e r a s a n d t a u n t s . Se e M a r k R a t h b u n D e c l a r a t i o n in S u p p o r t o f P l a i n t i f f s

S e c o n d A m e n d e d R e s p o n s e t o D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s

2

[̂

27 . Du e t o bo t h t h i s

c o n s t a n t s u r v e i l l a n c e a n d th e S q u i r r e l B u s t e r a c t i v i t y c i t ed a b o v e , D e f e n d a n t s k n e w w h e n

P l a in t i f f l e f t home an d when she was home a l on e du e t o he r hu sban d hav in g l e f t t he i r

r e s i d e n c e . Se e F i r s t A m e n d e d D e c l a r a t i o n o f M o n i q u e R a t h b u n i n S u p p o r t o f P l a i n t i f f 's

1

Hereinafter referred to as Mark Rathbu n Declaration.

P a g e 4 of25

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S e c o n d A m e n d e d R e s p o n s e t o D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s

3

fflf

1 1 , 11a ,

l i b , H e ,

13a,

13c, 1 5, 15a and 1 5 b . W he n he r hus ba nd w a s ou t o f t ow n , P l a in t i f f w a s v i s i t ed a t hom e

on seve ra l oc c a s ions by unknow n ind iv idua l s w ho re fused to g ive the i r na mes .

Id .

@

^

5 .

6 . B e r t Lea hy w a s a l so h i red a s a v ide ogra phe r fo r t he Squ i r re l B us t e r s

g r o u p . H e w a s t o l d b y D e f e n d a n t L u b o w t h a t L u b o w h a d t w o p r i v a t e i n v e s t i g a t o r s w h o

w ere enga ged in su rve i l l a nc e o f P l a in t i f f a nd he r husba nd a nd w ere a b le t o keep t r a c k o f

th e Plaintiff's m o v e m e n t s o n a 2 4 / 7 b a s i s . Se e D e c l a r a t i o n o f B e r n a r d B e r t L e a h y ^ 6 .

Lea hy w a s d i rec t ed by Lubow to f i lm the Squ i r re l B us t e r s t a un t ing a nd ha ra ss ing the

R a t h b u n s . Id . A l t h o u g h d e n i e d b y L u b o w

{see

D e c l a r a t i o n o f D a v i d L u b o w U 4 ) , L ea hy

dec la red to ha v e been to ld tha t t he pu r pos e o f t he Squ i r re l B u s t e r s ' m iss ion w a s to ma ke

the R a th buns l if e a l iv ing he l l a nd to t u rn the i r ne ig hbo rs a ga ins t t h em so tha t P l a in t i f f

a nd he r husba nd w ou ld be fo rc ed f rom the i r r e s idenc e .

Id .

L e a h y ' s d e c l a r a t i o n i s

c o r robo ra t ed by Lubow ' s s t a t ed de s i re t o , in-part, c r e a t e a d o c u m e n t a r y s h o w i n g

[ R a t h b u n ' s ] t r u e n a t u r e a s a v i o l e n t , f o o l i s h ' s q u i r r e l ' . D e c l a r a t i o n o f D a v i d L u b o w @ [̂

12 . A s s i s t i n g i n t h i s p r o c e s s , C S I h i r e d R a l p h G o m e z a s m u s c l e . S e e D e c l a r a t i o n o f

B e r t Lea hy @ H 6 .

7 .

N o e v i d e n c e d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t a n y o f t h e

complained-of

Squ i r re l B us t e r

o r inves t iga t ive a c t iv i t i e s oc c ur red a t a n a c tua l c hurc h , a t a miss ion , a t a p l a c e o f w orsh ip

o r du r ing a ny o the r t ype o f r e l ig ious se rv ic e o r c e remony ; r a the r , mos t o f t he a c t iv i t i e s ,

inc lud ing those c i t ed by dec l a ra n t s fo r D e fenda n t C SI , oc c ur red a t l oc a t ions de sc r ibed by

t h e d e c l a r a n ts a s t h e R a t h b u n s ' h o m e , h o u s e , b u s i n e s s / r e s i d e n c e , b u s i n e s s ,

o f f i ce , h o m e / o f f i c e , o r o f f i c e / h o m e .

Se e

various dec la ra t ions f i led e i ther in

suppor t o f o r in r e sponse to t he A n t i -SLA PP mo t ion to d i smiss .

1

Hereinafter referred to as Firs t Ame nded Dec laration of Mon ique Rathb un.

Pa ge 5 of25

3757


49/92

8 . Def en d an t s pu b l i she d i n f o r m a t ion f rom t he i r S qu i r r e l B u s t e r ac t i v i t y an d

c o n t i n u o u s s u r v e i l l a n c e o f t h e R a t h b u n s o n t h e i n t e r n e t, a d e d i c a t e d Y o u T u b e c h a n n e l ,

a n d o n a w e b s i t e , w h i c h in c l u d e d a s e c t i o n c a l l e d S p y C o m e r t h a t d i s c u s se d

i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d b y t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e o f t h e R a t h b u n s .

Se e

D e c l a r a t i o n o f B a r t P a r r @

^| 1 5 .

See also

D e c l a r a t i o n o f M a r k R a t h b u n @ 1̂ 2 8 . A l s o p u b l i s h e d w a s i n f o r m a t i o n

abo u t v i s i t o r s t o an d f rom t he R a t h bu n hom e c r ea t i n g a ch i l l i n g e f f ec t u po n M ar k

R a t h b u n a n d p o s s i b l y o t h e r s . Id.

9 . A t u n spec i f i ed t im es su bse qu en t t o 20 09 , P l a in t i f f a l so r ece ived

a n o n y m o u s a n d t h r e a t e n i n g p h o n e c a l l s , a n d s h e w a s f o l l o w e d t o a n d f r o m w o r k . See

F i r s t A m e n d e d D e c l a r a t i o n o f M o n i q u e R a t h b u n ^ 6 . S q u i r r e l B u s t e r s a n d S c i e n t o l o g y

i n v e s t i g a t o r s o r o p e r a t i v e s f o l l o w e d P l a i n t i f f t o a n d f r o m r e s t a u r

monique rathbun v. scientology: csi state supreme court petition

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