monalisa 2.0 – activity 1.3 report on maritime...

MONALISA 2.0 - REPORT ON MARITIME ACCIDENTS 1

MONALISA 2.0 – Activity 1.3

Report on Maritime Accidents

Document No: MONALISA 2 0_D4.4.1


Disclaimer:The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the author. The European Union is notresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformationcontainedtherein.


Contents0. Summary ....................................................................................................... 41. Existing databases. ...................................................................................... 52. Database. Queries. ....................................................................................... 6

2.1. Main database ........................................................................................... 72.2. Flag States ............................................................................................ 162.3. Ship flag-Accidents ............................................................................... 182.4. Queries. ................................................................................................ 20

3. Accidents chosen for further analysis ................................................... 1023.1. Passenger ship casualties .................................................................. 103

3.1.1. COSTA CONCORDIA ................................................................. 1053.1.2. SEWOL ....................................................................................... 1073.1.3. DOÑA PAZ .................................................................................. 1113.1.4. BULGARIA .................................................................................. 1143.1.5. SPICE ISLANDER ....................................................................... 1153.1.6. MV SHARIATPUR 1 .................................................................... 1163.1.7. ESTONIA ..................................................................................... 117

3.2. Boats with immigrants on board .......................................................... 1203.3. Non-passenger ship casualties ........................................................... 122

3.3.1. AEGEAN SEA ............................................................................. 1223.3.2. AMOCO CADIZ ........................................................................... 1243.3.3. ANDROS PATRIA ....................................................................... 1263.3.4. BRAER ........................................................................................ 1273.3.5. CASTILLO DE BELLVER ............................................................ 1293.3.6. CASTOR ..................................................................................... 1313.3.7. ERIKA .......................................................................................... 1323.3.8. EXXON VALDEZ ......................................................................... 1373.3.9. MSC FLAMINIA ........................................................................... 1413.3.10. HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE ........................................... 1443.3.11. MSC NAPOLI ............................................................................ 1473.3.12. NEW FLAME ............................................................................. 1523.3.13. OLIVA ........................................................................................ 1563.3.14. PRESTIGE ................................................................................ 1593.3.15. ROKIA DELMAS ....................................................................... 1773.3.16. SEA EMPRESS ......................................................................... 1803.3.17. SOLAR 1 ................................................................................... 1903.3.18. STOLT VALOR .......................................................................... 1923.3.19. TK BREMEN ............................................................................. 1943.3.20. TORREY CANYON ................................................................... 1983.3.21. URQUIOLA ................................................................................ 201

4. Conclusion. ............................................................................................... 203


0. Summary

ThepresentdocumentisareportonmaritimeaccidentsbasedonadatabasecarriedoutintheframeoftheMonalisa2.0project.This report makes a summary of the most remarkable maritime accidents throughout historybased on the database elaborated withmaritime accidents from 1900 to 2013 (annex to thisdocument).This document intends to help users of the database to obtain the best of the tool aswell asmakingananalysisof some remarkableconclusionsgot fromthedatabase, suchas locationofaccidentsbyyear.A selection of remarkable accidents is carried out pointing out some of the details of theaccident.Thatselectionisdividedintothreeparts:

a) Passengershipcasualties.b) Boatswithimmigrantson-board.c) Non-passengershipcasualties.


1. Existing databases.

Inordertosupportwhatisreportedinthisdocument,adatabaseoftheaccidentsoccurredfrom1900until2013hasbeenelaborated.Theresearchcarriedoutandthesubsequentstudyofthedatabaseofmarineaccidentshasbeenmaderegardingthetypeofconsequenceofthecasualty:lossoflives,pollution,seriousinjuries,total lossoftheship,shiprenderedunfit toproceedorshipremainsfit toproceed;thecauses:less serious, seriousor very serious; the typeof ship: cargo ship, fishingvessel,passenger ship,service ship, inland waterway vessel, recreational craft, navy ship, submersible, wig, others orunknown. Amongthesetypesofship, ithasalsobeen identifiedthetypeof load incase it isacargoship,thetypeoffishingvesselitcanbe,etc.,sothatwehavealltheinformationpossibleavailable.Therearealsoavailabledataaboutdateofthesinkingoraccident,coordinatesoftheplacewhereit happened, investigation reports elaborated and their dates, deadweight of the accident,analysismade,IMOidentificationnumbersofthevessels.To elaborate this database, the information has been extracted from the Global IntegratedShippingInformationSystem(GISIS)oftheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO).


2. Database. Queries. The database of the ship accidents has been elaborated in Access format, in order to easequerying any fields contained in it tomake a quick search of casualties determined by specificparameters.

Thedatabaseisveryusefultoelaboratestatisticsinordertoavoidthepossiblecausationsandbepreparedforthenecessarymitigationsoffuturecasualties.

Inthisdatabasetherearethreedatatablesnamedasfollows:

- “Maindatabase”- “Flagstates”- “Shipflag-Accidents”

Afirstexplanationofthesedatatablesisprovidedinthefollowingparagraphs.


2.1. Main database

Thefirstonecontainsthemostpartofthe informationaboutthecasualties,which includesthefields:

IMOReference Coordinates(secondsLong)Numberofshipsinvolved Coordinates(E/W)Name(Ship1) LocationIMOnumber(Ship1) NumberofInvestigationReportsName(Ship2) NumberofAnalysesIMONumber(Ship2) InitialEventName(Ship3) SummaryofEventsIMOnumber(Ship3) ShipTypeName(Ship4) Consequences(Lossoflife)IMONumber(Ship4) Consequences(Pollution)FlagStatea Consequences(Seriousinjuries)FlagStateb Consequences(Totallossoftheship)FlagStatec Consequences(Shiprenderedunfittoproceed)IncidentDate&Time Consequences(Shipremainsfittoproceed)Typeofcasualty GrossTonnageCoordinates(degreesLat) ClassificationSocietyCoordinates(minutesLat) DeadweightCoordinates(secondsLat) CargoCoordinates(N/S) PersonsOnboardCoordinates(degreesLong) InvestigationReportDateCoordinates(minutesLong) AnalysisDate


Shotofthedesignviewofthedatabase,whichshowssomeofthefieldsindicatedpreviously1

1 The language of the program is per default in Spanish, meaning Nombre del campo: Field name; Tipo de datos: data type, which can be text, number, autonumber, date/time, Yes/No, etc.


Thisdesignviewshowsallthefieldsthecurrentdatatablehasandthetypeofdata,butitgivesnoinformationaboutthecasualties.Itwouldbeusefulonlyforaquicklookofthefields,sotheusercanquestionhimselfaboutwhichfieldshebelievesare important formakingaquery,andalsomakechangesifnecessary.

Thedatabaseitselfwouldbethefollowingshots:


ThefieldswithnodatainitrespondtocasualtieswhichhaveNulldataforthatfield.Forexample,ifwearesearchingforaparticularcasualtywithaparticular“Investigationreportdate”wewouldonlyhavetousethetool“Search”andfillthefieldwiththedatewearelookingfor.Incasewedonotknow theexactdatewhen the report tookplace,wecould select the fieldmentioned,andfilterthedataavoidingNulldata.

In thisexample,wehavefilteredthedatabase frommorethan8.000casualties, to2.030. Ifweadded one more filter, such as regarding the type of casualty, or the consequences of theaccidents,wecouldbetterdelimitthedata,makingthesearchmucheasier.

Hereisashot(8677entries):

2

Resultingin(2030entries):

2 (Vacías): Empty cells (Null data); Aceptar: accept; Cancelar: cancel


Anotherfilterwecouldusetodelimittheentrieswehaveisthetypeofcasualty.Regardingthetypeofaccident, lessserious,seriousorveryserious,wecanmakethelistofcasualtiesshorter.Weimaginethatwearelookingforthecasualtytype:“lessserious”,wefollowthesamestepsasearlier:


Aswecansee,wehavereducedthelistto183entries,whicharefarmoreuser-friendlythanthewholedatabase.

Todothisfiltering,weshallhavesomepreviousdataofthecasualtyorgroupofcasualtieswearestudying,whichwillserveustomakethelistshorterandthesearchquicker.


2.2. Flag States

Thisdatatableconsidersthefollowing:

- Flagoftheship- Countryoftheship- Continent

Toillustratethis,hereisoneshotofthedesignviewofthetableandanotherofpartofthetableitself.

This table does not give us information about the casualties directly, but we can use it as areference to search an accident or group of accidents which occurred in a specific country orcontinentthroughitsflag.


2.3. Ship flag-Accidents

Usingthepreviousdatatables(maindatabaseandFlagstates),wehavebeenabletoelaborateathirdoneincludinginit:

- Flag- Country- Continent- Numberofaccidents(regardingtheprevious)

Thishelpsusdetermininginarapidwaythenumberofshipcasualtiesthattookplaceinaspecificcountryorcontinent.

Ashotofthedatatable:

Ifwewouldwanttoknowthenumberofaccidentsoccurredinaspecificcountry,wewouldonlyhavetosearchitinthelist.

Otherwise,ifwewouldwanttoknowthenumberofaccidentsoccurred,forexample,inEurope,wewouldhavetousethefilter:


This filter shows the number of accidents in the different countries belonging to Europe. Tocalculatethenumberofaccidents inEurope inastrictway,wewouldhavetouseanothertooldifferentfromthefilterwehaveusedsofar:Thequery.

2.4. Queries.


Thequeriesareveryusefulindatabases.Theyallowustoselectthefieldsweconsiderimportantfor the study, imposing criteria and even calculating when it comes to numbers (data type).FollowingthepreviousexampleofthenumberofaccidentsoccurredinEurope,wecandothis:

1. Createaquery2. Selectthedatatableandthefieldsinittoconsider3. Imposethecriteria4. Executethequery

The first step is tocreate thequery,andchoosing the tables inwhichare thedatawewant toanalyze.

3

3 Tablas: tables; Consultas: Queries; Ambas: Both; Agregar: Add; Cerrar: close; Campo: field; Orden: sort;


We have to select the table or tables we need to determine howmany accidents occurred inEurope.Todoso,wecouldchoosethetable“Shipflag-Accidents”.

Onceselectedthedatatablefromwewanttoextractthedata,choosethefields:

Firstwehavechosenallthefieldsinthetabletoillustratewhathappensdoingso:

Mostrar: show; Criterios: criteria


Weobtain thesamedata tableas theone in“Ship flag-accidents”.This isbecausewehavenotimposedsomecriteriatodelimitormakethelistshorter.Weshallcomebacktothedesignviewofthequery,andimposethecriteria“Europe”forthefield“continent”.

Resultingin(asearlier):


Nothinghaschangedwithrespecttothepreviouswayoffilteringdatasofar.Butthesequerieswillallowtheusertodothefollowing,whichregardingourexampleis:

- Weactivatethetab“Totals”(∑)andselecttheoption“sum”inthefieldNumberofaccidents.

- Executethequery.TheresultwouldbethetotaloftheaccidentsoccurredinEurope:

Conclusion:thenumberofaccidentsinEuropeamountto2661.

Thisqueryhasbeencreatedfromonesingletable.Itisthesimplestwaytomakequeries,andisveryuseful for calculatingdata like theone in theexampleas longaswehaveall thedataweneedinonetable.Thiscouldbeotherwise,lyingthedataweneedforthequeryinseveraltables.

Tocreateaquery,thetableswhichwewilluseforitmustberelatedtoeachother.Thismeansthatinthemaindatabase,thereisorareoneormorefieldswhichwillcorrespondtooneormorefieldsoftheothertablesinvolvedinthequery.


Anotherwaytomakequeriesisthroughthe“Querywizard”.Asanexample,wewanttocalculatehowmanyaccidentshavehappenedregardingtheshiptype.

Todoso,weusetheoption“findduplicates”inthequerywizard,andchoosethetableandthefieldwhereshiptypeis.


4

Whenwepressthefinishbutton,weobtaindirectlythequery:

4 Finalizar: finish


Conclusion:Wecaneasilyseehowmanyaccidentshaveoccurreddependingontheshiptype.

All the querieswemake should respond to the criteria and parameters considered in order tostudythedata.

Thesamewaywehavedeterminedthenumberofaccidentsregardingthetypeofshipsinvolved,wecouldalsodeterminetheaccidentsbythetypeofcasualty(lessserious,serious,veryserious):

Ifwe,asanewexample,wanted tocountnotonly thenumberofaccidents regarding theshiptypeanditsflag,butalsothoseinwhichacollisiontookplaceasinitialeventandhappenedtheconsequence“lossoflives”,wewouldhavetodoasnext:

- Querywizardàfindduplicates(asearlier)- Selectfromthetable“Maindatabase”thefieldnamed“Consequences(lossoflives)”.Next.


-

Inthenextwindow,wewillbeaskedifwewishthequerytoshowanyfieldsbesidesthosewithduplicatedvalues. In thiscasewechooseFlagstate,shiptypeand initialevent,yet ifweforgetdoing this,wewouldalwayshave thepossibilityof changing the criteriaof thequery from thedesignview.


Wewillobtainthis:


Wehavealreadythefieldsrequiredforthequery,butwehavetomodifytheparametersinordertoobtainwhat is beenaskedbefore:Numberof accidents regarding the ship typeand its flag,thathavesufferedcollisionasinitialeventandinwhichhappenedtheconsequencelossoflives.

Wegotothedesignview:

Weselectthetab“totals”inordertoestablishthecriteriawearelookingfor.

First, in criteria for ship type, we will type “Not null” in order to obtain only the data of theaccidentswheretheshiptypeisknown.


Second,wewillreselectfromthetablethefieldshiptype,sowecanchoosein“totals”theoptionCOUNT.Thiswillmakethat thedataof theshiptypewillnotberepeatedandshowhowmanyaccidentsofeachtypeofvesselare.

Last, in criteria for the field Initial event, we type “collision”, and deselect the box of the line“show”. This will make the field initial event disappear from the query table, which is notimportantbecauseweknowallthedatawillcorrespondtotheinitialevent“collision”.

Obtaining:


Thisresultshowstheconsequencelossoflivespositiveandnegative,amountingtoatotalof289entries. As we said before, queries are supposed to simplify the data in order to make thedatabaseeasiertostudy.Toreducethenumberofentrieswehaveobtained,andasrequestedintheexamplewehaveproposed,we selectonly theaccidents inwhich the consequence lossoflivestookplace,meaningasinpositivevalueinthedatabase.

Thereareacoupleofwaystodothis,wecanchoosetofilterthedatawiththetoolweusedatthebeginningoftheseexplanations,orwecangotodesignview,andnotonlymodifythecriteria,butalsohidethefieldasininitialevent,becausewewouldalreadyknowthatitdidcauselossoflives.

Wedeselecttheboxfor“show”andexecutethequery,obtaining:


Wehavereducedthelistto54entries.54casualtiesthatcomplywiththefollowing:

- Theconsequence“lossoflives”occurred.- Thetypeoftheshipisknownandcontainedinthemaindatabase- Thecasualtywascausedbytheinitialevent“collision”

Asanotherexample,we couldask thedatabase to show thenumberof accidents inwhich theconsequencepollutionispositive,showingthecargotheshipcarriedandthetypeofvessel.

Todothis,wecreateanewqueryandselectthefieldspollution(twice),cargoandtypeofshipasinthefollowingscreenshot:

Wemodifythecriteriainordertoobtainatablewiththeparameterswewish.

First,inthefieldconsequenceswetype“True”inthecriteriablankanddeselectthebox“show”.


Thesecondfieldforconsequencesshouldhavethetotalsparameterfilledwith“count”.

Thefieldthatcorrespondstothecargo:Notnull.Soweobtainonlythedataoftheaccidentsofwhichwehaveknowledgeofthecargo.Weleavethefieldfor“shiptype”asitcomesperdefault.

Ifweexecutethequery,whatweobtainis:


In this case, we could easily count the number of total accidents that depend on the criteriacausedpollution and known cargo, because there are fewentries. But ifwehadan amountofentriesthatwouldmakethecalculationmorecomplex,wecoulduseadifferentquery.

5

These criteria that we have chosenwill allow us to obtain a query with just one number: thenumberofaccidentsinwhichpollutionhappenedandthecargoisknown.

5 Verdadero: true; Dónde: Where


Wecancheckwiththeotherquerythatthedatafitwiththisresult,meaningasinsummingallthenumberoftheentriesinthepreviousone,weobtain29casualtiesunderthesecriteria.

Anotherusefulquerycouldbethenumberofcasualtiesregardingtheclassificationsocieties.Withthe tool “find duplicates” that we have used earlier in this document, we could obtain thefollowing:


Alotofqueriescanbecreatedwiththisdatabase.Thecriteriaandparameterseachreaderuseswilldependonthetypeofstudyoranalysishewantstocarryoutwithit.Theonlythingthat isnecessaryisaskingwhatwewanttoknow,whatwearelookingfor.

Anotherwaytoanalyzethedatacouldbethroughthecoordinatesoftheaccident,meaningasinentering in the database the coordinates of the areawewant to study in order to obtain thenumberof casualtiesoccurred,or the typeof vessel itwasor the fieldof thedatabasewearelookingfor.

Example:AttheEnglishChanneltherewere123casualties.

AttheRedSea(SuezCanal):16Casualties


Herethecriteriachosenhavebeenthefieldslocationandshiptype,butwecouldchooseanyofthefieldscontemplatedinthedatabasedependingontheneedsfortheanalysisorstudy.

Wehaveelaboratedwithallthedataavailablethefollowinganalysis.

FrequencyofCasualties

v Generaldistribution

Westudythedistancebetweenterminals.Figure1.1:Frequencyofdistances.

Figure1.1

v DifferencesbetweentheTypeofCasualty.Figure1.2.


(a) Lessserious

(b) Serious


(c)Veryserious

Figure1.2

Casualtiesinmaps

v Casualtiesfrom1900to2014Alllocatedcasualtiesfrom1900to2014inFigure2.1.


Figure2.1

v Detailedcasualtiesbyyearfrom1980

Ø Year1980

(a) Lessserious

(b) Serious


(c) Veryserious

Ø Year1981

(a) Lessserious


(b) Serious

(c) Veryserious


Ø Year1982

Ø Year1983


Ø Year1984


Ø Year1985


Ø Year1986


Ø Year1987


Ø Year1988


Ø Year1989


Ø Year1990


Ø Year1991


Ø Year1992


Ø Year1993


Ø Year1994


Ø Year1995


Ø Year1996


Ø Year1997


Ø Year1998


Ø Year1999


Ø Year2000


Ø Year2001


Ø Year2002


Ø Year2003


Ø Year2004


Ø Year2005


Ø Year2006


Ø Year2007


Ø Year2008


Ø Year2009


Ø Year2010


Ø Year2011


Ø Year2012


Ø Year2013


Ø Year2014


3. Accidents chosen for further analysis Theaccidentschosenforthischapterareassumedasthemostimportantbecausetheyhadsuchalargenumberofvictims,ortheenvironmentalconsequencesweresoharmfulthatthestandardsandlegislationhadtobechangedtofaceuptothem.First,Casualtieswhichinvolvealargenumberofvictimswillbeanalyzed.Thevesselschosenforthispurposeareallpassengerships,suchasferriesorcruises,andthelistoftheonestakenintoaccountforthistaskisthefollowing:

- CostaConcordia- Sewol- DoñaPaz- Bulgaria- SpiceIslander- MVShariatpur- Estonia- Boatswithimmigrants

Ontheotherhand,afurtheranalysisofthemostimportantvesselcasualtiesinthelasttwentyyears,concerningthechangesthathavebeenmadebecauseoftheseinnational,EuropeanorinternationalLegislations.Twenty-threeshipshavebeenchosenandtheseare:

- AEGEANSEA- AMOCOCADIZ- ANDROSPATRIA- BRAER1- CASTILLODEBELLVER- CASTOR- ERIKA- ESTONIA- EXXONVALDEZ- FLAMINIA- HERALDFREEENTERPRISE- NAPOLI- NEWFLAME- OLIVA- PRESTIGE- ROKIADELMAS


- SEAEMPRESS- SEWOL- SOLAR1- STOLTVALOR- TKBREMEN- TORREYCANYON- URQUIOLA

3.1. Passenger ship casualties

This chapter compiles a few examples of passenger ship casualties which are consideredimportantduetotheamountofvictimsinvolved.

Inthefollowingmapthereareindicatedthemostrecentferriesaccidents,includingthosewhicharenotsorecent,but thatareconsidered important for this taskdueto thenumberofvictimstheycaused.


3.1.1. COSTA CONCORDIA Shewas an international passenger cruise built in 2006 by FINCANTIERI BOATYARDS SPA.WithItalianflag,shehadapassengercapacityof3.780peopleandreachedamaximumspeedof21,5knots.

ThedepartureofthevoyagewasfromthePortofSavona,callingatToulon,Barcelona,PalmadeMallorca, Cagliari-Palermo and Civitavecchia. The arrivalwas expected back in Savona, but thedestinationwasnotreached.

The 13th of January 2012, at 21:45, in the Tyrrhenian Sea, next toGiglio Island, the Shipmadecontactwiththeleftpartoftheaftcausingabreachonthehullandthesubsequentblackout.

ThemeteorologicalconditionsatthatmomentwereroughseaNE4andwindof17knotsE-NE.

Theconsequenceswerethetotallossoftheshipandlossoflivesbeingthebalanceofvictimsof32 people dead or missing and 157 injured with 20 needing for admission to hospital.According to the reportelaboratedby the InvestigativeBody (IB),on thewhole,human factorscharacterizedthiscasualty.Thisreportsays:

“Distractions, errors and violations canbe established as the elementswhich characterized thehumanfactorsasrootcausesintheCostaConcordiacasualty.

Both distractions and errors (in all terms of slips, lapses andmistakes) weremade during theMaster’sperformancebeforethecontact,accordingtothepreviousdetailedanalysis.Distractionsanderrors(inalltermsasslips, lapsesandmistakes,aswell)weremadeduringtheBridge Team performance (all the Bridge Team involved) before the contact, according to the


previous detailed analysis.[…] It is worth to point out the following: - both delay andmistakeregarding the Hotel Director (he did not cover his duty scheduled by the procedures, omittingfirstlyhisfundamentalroleonboard);-delayandmistakebysomeDeckOfficersbelongingtotheemergencyStaffafterthecontact(theydidnotcovertheirexactlyrole,despitetheywereactivein supporting theemergencyhandling;however, theiractions/reactionswere influencedby theabsenceoftheMasterwho,carryingouttheaboveerrors,didnotcoordinateandgoverned-atallasresultedbytheVDRconversations-theemergency).”


3.1.2. SEWOL WhenSewolbeganheroperationsonMarch15,2013,shebecamethefourthshiptobeoperatedbythecompany,andthesecondtobeplacedinitsroute.Shemadethreeroundtripsperweekfrom Incheon to Jeju, each 400 kilometres (250mi) voyage taking 13.5 hours to complete. OnFebruary2014,SewolpassedavesselsafetyinspectionbytheSouthKoreanCoastGuard.Shehadmadetheroundtripatotalof241timesuntilthedayoftheincident.

Asof17April,theROKCoastGuardconcludedthatan"unreasonablysuddenturn"tostarboard,occurredbetween8:48and8:49a.m.(KST),wasthecauseofthecapsizing.AccordingtotheCoastGuard, the sudden turn caused the cargo to shift to the left, causing the ship toexperienceaninclinationandtoeventuallybecomeunmanageableforthecrew.Overloadingandnotproperlysecuringcargowerealsoseenasdirectcauses.TheMVSewolwascarrying3,608tonsofcargo,morethanthreetimesthelimitof987tons.Theoverloadingwasalsopreviouslynotedbyanoff-dutycaptainandthefirstmate.Accordingtotheoff-dutycaptainoftheSewol,theshipownersignored his warning that the ship should not carry so much cargo because she would not bestable.


TheSewolwascarryingonly580tonsofballastwater,much lessthantherecommended2,030tons;thiswouldmakethevesselmorepronetolistandcapsize.

The disaster raised questions about the regulation of shipping in South Korea. Shipping isregulated by the Korean Shipping Association, which is also an industry trade group, whichexperts consider a likely conflict of interest. In addition, government regulators outside theAssociationfrequentlymovetojobsaspartoftheassociationaftertheirgovernmentservice.YunJong-hwui, a professor at KoreaMaritime andOceanUniversity notes thatwhile South Koreanregulationsarestrong,theyareoftenpoorlyenforced.

Name Date LocationSEWOL 16April2014 SouthKorea

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtSouthKorean 1994 146m 22m 6.26m

Accidentarea YellowSea Causeofaccident CapsizeCargo Vehicles,containers

andpax(Max:1000tonnes)

Capacityfortransport 921pax,180vehiclesand154containers(Max+2600tonnes)

Lossoflife 296deceased Shiptype Ferry


With the informationavailable, it seems that theoverloadand the lackofproper loadsecuringwereseenasdirectcausesoftheaccident.TheMVSewolwascarrying3,608tonsofcargo,morethanthreetimesthelimitof987tons.Theoverloadingwasalsopreviouslynotedbyanoff-dutycaptainandthefirstmateLeeSang-yunproposedalsooverloadingasacause.Accordingtotheoff-dutycaptainoftheSewol,theshipownersignoredhiswarningthattheshipshouldnotcarrysomuchcargobecauseshewouldnotbestable.

Description.

TheMVSewolcarrying3,608tonsofcargo,2,600tonsmorethanallowed.

According to the Coast Guard, it seems that there was a shift of cargo to the ship's side thatproducedalist.

ItseemsthatcertainoperationsperformedonshipstabilityworsenedsincetheSewolhadonly580tonsofballastwater,substantiallylessthantherecommended2,030tons,bottonplacedinthe vessel,whichwouldmake the shipmore likely to heel and capsize. The crewhad pumpedhundreds of tons of ballast water from the bottom of the ship in order to accommodate theadditionalloadillegal.Thelossofballastwaterfromthebottomoriginatedtheliftofthecenterofgravity and lossof righting armand consequently lossof restoring force. This fact is consistentwith the statements of the crewof the ferrywho stated that the lackof restoring forcewas acauseofthedisaster.

Theheelingmomentcausedbycargoshifting,andelevationthecenterofgravitybyeliminationballastwaterfromthebottomofthevesselcausedbothalossofstabilitythattheshipcouldnotovercometherightingmomentandcapsized.

With theaccident informationavailable tous todaywehavenoanswer to the following issuesbelowreferentstothecrewandtheirperformance,emergencyplans,theshipandcargo.Nor,inviewof the resultsof the investigation, sufficientknowledge for theapplicationof the relevantarticlesoftheConventiononLimitationofLiabilityisavailable.

• AboutthecrewDegrees,coursestakenandprotocolsfollowedduringtheaccidentonthefieldofinformationandnotification.

a)Checkingaptitudeofthecaptain,officersandtherestofthecrew.

Compliance with the STCW Convention. Section 2 Requirements for qualifications. AnalyzecomplianceParties:

Titles STCW; Titles and general requirements for each one; other qualifications required andaccordingtothefunctionsperformedonboardandtheshiptype(passengerships).


b)Informationandnotificationoftheaccident.

CommunicationsaccordingtoInmarsat

• AboutEmergencyPlans:A.852(20)Guidelinesonthestructureofanintegratedsystemofemergencyplansonboard

A.865 (20) Minimum training requirements to be satisfied by designated crew to provideassistancetopassengersinemergencysituationsonboardpassengerships

SOLAS.ChapterIIIRules19.Withregardtotraininganddrillsforemergencies.

SOLAS.Chapter IIIRule20.Regarding the functionalavailability,maintenanceand inspectionoflifesavingappliancesandarrangements.:

SOLASChapter.Rule15.MaintenanceIVradioinstallations

SOLASChapter.I.Rule11.Maintainingtheconditionstestedintherecognition

• Ontheseaworthinessconditionsoftheshipandcargostowage:STABILITY.Subdivisionandstabilitycriteriacompliance.

ItwillanalyzecompliancewiththeprovisionsofChapterII-1ofSOLASPartBandB-1-Subdivisionandstabilityofpassengershipsandcargointactanddamagedconditions.

FREEBOARD.Additionallycheck if thedraftof thevesselcorrespondedwith themaximumdraftallowedintheareawheretheaccidentoccurred.

CheckthatthevesselmettheconditionsofassignmentoffreeboardProtocolof1988relatingtotheInternationalConventiononLoadLines,1966.

SpecialattentiontoopeningsandclosuresonthefreeboarddeckorunderthesamereferredtoRules18andfollowingoftheProtocoltobepaid.

CheckwhetherthecargounitsandcargotransportunitscarriedonorunderdeckwerestowedandfastenedinaccordancewithResolutionA.714(17)asamended.

Check that the loading,unloadingand stowageofbulk cargoeshave followed theCodeof SafePracticeavailableResolutionA.862(20).AmendedbyMSC238(82)

• Additional tools in order to obtain better informationon the ship, its cargo and its defeat thatprovideIMO.AIS(Automaticidentificationsystem-IMO)

LRIT(Long-rangeidentificationandtracking-IMO)


3.1.3. DOÑA PAZ

TheMVDoñaPazwasaPhilippine-registeredpassengerferrythatsankaftercollidingwiththeoiltankerMTVectoronDecember20,1987,withanestimateddeathtollof4,386peopleandonly24survivors.

Doña Paz was traveling from Leyte Island to the Philippine capital of Manila. The vessel wasseriously overcrowded,with at least 2000passengers not listedon themanifest. In addition, itwasclaimedthattheshipcarriednoradioandthatthelife-jacketswerelockedaway.ButofficialblamewasdirectedattheMTVector,whichwasfoundtobeunseaworthy,andoperatingwithoutalicense,lookoutorqualifiedmaster.

Atthetimeofitssinking,theDoñaPazwassailingtherouteofManila→Tacloban→Catbalogan→Manilaandvice-versa,makingtripstwiceaweek.

OnDecember20,1987,at06:30,PhilippineStandardTime,theDoñaPazleftfromTaclobanCity,Leyte, for theCityofManila,witha stopover atCatbaloganCity, Samar. Thevesselwasdue inManilaat04:00thefollowingday,anditwasreportedthatit lastmaderadiocontactataround20:00.Ataround22:30,PhilippineStandardTime, the ferrywassituatedatDumaliPoint,alongtheTablasStrait,nearMarinduque.Asurvivor latersaid that theweatheratseathatnightwasclear,buttheseawaschoppy.


Whilemostofthepassengersslept,theDoñaPazcollidedwithMTVector,anoiltankerinroutefromBataantoMasbate.TheVectorwascarrying8,800USbarrels(1,050,000l;280,000USgal;230,000impgal)ofgasolineandotherpetroleumproductsownedbyCaltexPhilippines.

Uponcollision,theVector'scargoignitedandcausedafireontheshipthatspreadontotheDoñaPaz.

Survivorsrecalledsensingthecrashandanexplosion,causingpaniconthevessel.Oneof themrecountedthattheflamesspreadrapidlythroughouttheship,andthattheseaallaroundtheshipitselfwasonfire.Anothersurvivorclaimedthatthelightsonboardhadgoneoutminutesafterthecollision,thattherewerenolifeveststobefoundontheDoñaPaz,andthatallofthecrewmenwere running around in panic with the other passengers and that none of the crew gave anyorders normade any attempt to organize the passengers. It was later said that the life jacketlockershadbeenlocked.Thesurvivorswereforcedtojumpofftheshipandswimamongcharredbodies in flamingwatersaround the ship. TheDoñaPaz sankwithin twohoursof the collision,whiletheVectorsankwithinfourhours.Bothshipssankinabout545meters(1,788ft)ofwaterintheshark-infestedTablasStrait.


InFebruary1988thePhilippineNationalBureauofInvestigationstated,onthebasisofinterviewswithrelatives,thattherewereatleast3,099passengersand59crewonboard,giving3,134on-boardfatalities.

InJanuary1999apresidentialtaskforcereportestimated,onthebasisofcourtrecordsandmorethan 4,100 settlement claims, that there were 4,341 passengers. Subtracting the 24 survivingpassengers, and adding 58 crew gives 4,375 on-board fatalities. Adding the 11 dead from theVectorcrew,thetotalbecomes4,386.

Giventheestimateddeathtoll,TimemagazineandothershavecalledthesinkingoftheDoñaPaz"thedeadliestpeacetimemaritimedisasterofthe20thcentury".


3.1.4. BULGARIA Thiscasualtytookthe livesof122peopleaboardtheRussiancruiseshipMVBulgariawhenshesunk in lessthaneightminutesat01:59PMMoscowtime(09.58GMT)onJuly10,2011ontheVolga river near the village of Syukeyevo in the Kansko-Ustinovsky district of the Republic ofTatarstanduringastorm.

Bulgaria,withareported201peopleaboard,hadlife-raftsfor120passengers,andtwolifeboatsfor 36 crew, as well as 165 life-vests for adults and 12 for children, far short of the requiredlifesavingequipmentrequiredduringthedisaster.Theshipwaslicensedfor120aboard.

The death count stands at 122 dead, 79 rescued. Of the 35 crew members aboard, only 23survived.

TheBulgaria'sradioman,RinatGabitdinov,saidhewasunabletosendanS.O.S.messagebecausethevesselhadlostallpower,includingageneratorthathadshutdownbeforewaterfloodedtheengineroom.


3.1.5. SPICE ISLANDER On 10 September 2011, at 21:00 local time (19:00 UTC), the MV Spice Islander I sailed fromUnguja, themain island of the Zanzibar archipelago, for Pemba Island to the north. The ship'sofficialcapacitywas45crewand645passengers,but itwasreportedtobeheavilyoverloaded.Aroundfourhoursafterdeparture,SpiceIslanderIsankbetweenZanzibarandPemba.

Theship is thought tohavecapsizedafter losingenginepower.Of thoseonboard,around620were rescued,withat least40of themsuffering serious injuries. Inaddition topassengers, theferrywasbelievedtohavebeentransportingcargosuchasrice.

Earlynewsreportsclaimedthattheferrywascarryinganestimated800peopleatthetimeofhersinking, and by 12 September, it was reported that over 240 bodies had been recovered.However,on14October, theTanzaniangovernmentconfirmedthatthevesselhad in factbeencarrying around 3,586 passengers, of whom 2,764 were unaccounted for. In an investigativereport published on 19 January 2012, these figures were revised downward, with 2,470passengers,203confirmeddead,and1,370missing.

Eightmonthslater,anotherdisastertookplacewhenonJuly18,2012,thevesselMVSKAGITsanknearChumbe Islandwhile in ferryservice inTanzania.AfterdepartingDaresSalaambound forUnguja Island (Zanzibar)withmore than250peopleonboard, the ship struggled in rough seasandsankapproximately10kilometers(6.2mi) fromUnguja.At least146wererescuedwhileasmanyas 150were stillmissing after adayof rescueoperations.[4] Early reports attributed thedisaster to high winds and overloading of passengers. The ship was certified for a maximumcapacityof250yetofficialssaidithad290aboardatthetime.


3.1.6. MV SHARIATPUR 1 TheMVShariatpur1wasadoubledeckferrythatcapsized inMarch2012aftercollidingwithacargoshiponBangladesh'sMeghnaRiver,killing147people.

First reports confirmed 30 people were dead and dozens missing after the ferry which wascarrying 200 people collided with a cargo ship. The ferry capsized on the Meghna in theMunshiganjDistrictneartheBangladeshicapitalDhakaandsankinabout70foot(21m)ofwater.

Theferryhadbeencarryingabout200passengers,althoughtheexactnumberisuncertainastheferry was not carrying an accurate passenger list. 35 survivors were pulled from the water, afurther40swamtoshore.Intotal112bodieswererecoveredfromthesunkenshipbydivers.Theboatwasrecoveredforsalvageandafurther4bodieswerefoundfloatingdownriver.Therescueoperation was called off. After 110 bodies had been recovered a further 61 people remainedunaccountedfor,butthefinaldeathtollwaslaterplacedat147.


3.1.7. ESTONIA On28September1994thepassenger ro-roshipEstoniasuddenlycapsized inaseverestorm inthenorthBalticSeaandsankwiththelossofmorethan850lives.Accordingtothefinaldisasterreporttheweatherwasrough,withawindof15to20meterspersecond(29to39knots;34to45mph),force7–8ontheBeaufortscaleandasignificantwaveheightof4to6meters(13to20feetcomparedwiththehighestmeasuredsignificantwaveheightintheBalticSeaof7.7meters

The official report indicated that the locks on the bow door had failed from the strain of thewavesand thedoorhad separated from the restof thevessel, pullingajar the rampbehind it.Whenthevisorcameofftheboat,therampthatprotectedthecardeckontheothersideofthevisor dropped. Thewater flooded the car deck, destabilized the ship and began a catastrophicchainofeventsthatplungedtheEstonia(SimilarproblemsalsosanktheHeraldofFreeEnterprisein1987andtheMVPrincessVictoriain1953).

It is thedeadliest shipwreckdisaster tohaveoccurred in theBalticSea inpeacetime,being thebalanceof137survivorsand852victims.

Name Date LocationEstonia 28September1994 Sweden

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtEstonian 1980 155,43m 24.21m 5.55m

PROCEEDINGS UNDER IMO On4October1994(i.e.fivedaysaftertheincident),aproposaltoestablishapanelofexpertstolook into all aspects of ro-ro safety was put forward by Mr. W.A. O'Neil leading to a SOLASConference,whichwasconvenedintheshortesttimepossible,inNovember1995andsucceededintheadoptionofaseriesofamendmentsandnewregulations incorporated intheConventionapplicabletobothnewandexistingro-ropassengerships(andtootherpassengerships).Furtherwork recommended by the same conference (e.g. on AIS, VDRs, passenger evacuation/escaperoutes,etc.)hasnowallbeencompleted.

It is, however, important to recall that there had been a considerable amount of work with adirectbearingonro-ropassengerships'safety,whichIMOhadconcludedevenpriortothelossof

Cargo Passengers andvehicles

Cause of theaccident

Capsizingforinstabilityduetowateringress


theEstonia.Forexample,the"SOLAS90"standardandtheadoptionoftheISMCodein1994haditsrootsinconcernsoverro-ropassengershipconstructionalandoperationalsafety.

TheimpactoftheEstoniaincidentwastoaccelerateacomprehensivereviewofallaspectsofro-roferrysafety,includingsearchandrescuerequirements.

TheMaritimeSafetyCommittee (MSC),whichmet from5 to9December1994,establishedthepanelofexperts,whichreportedtotheMSCinMay1995.TheIMOAssembly,meetingforits19thsession inNovember1995, adopted five resolutionsdirectly relating to safetyof roll on-roll offpassenger ships. The Assembly was followed immediately by the SOLAS conference on ro-rosafetywhichadoptedaseriesofregulationsintendedtoensurenorepeatoftheEstoniaincident,includingstabilityregulationsapplicabletobothnewandexistingro-ropassengershipsaswellasoperationalrequirements,suchasthatforanestablishedworkinglanguage.Theconferencealsoadopted12resolutionsrelatingtofutureworkanditissafetosaythat,10yearslater,alloftheworkhasnowbeencompleted.

The expert panel's reports and recommendations were considered by a Steering Committee,whichwasestablishedtoco-ordinatetheworkof thepanelofexperts, inAprilandthenbythefullMSCatits65thsessioninMay1995.

• 19thIMOAssembly-November1995-adopted:

A.792(19)Safetycultureinandaroundpassengerships.

A.793(19) Strength and securing and locking arrangements of shell doors on ro-ro passengerships.

A.794(19)Surveysandinspectionsofro-ropassengerships.

A.795(19)Navigationalguidanceandinformationschemeforro-roferryoperations.

A.796(19)Recommendationsonadecision-supportsystemformastersonpassengerships

• SOLASConference1995

Theconferenceadopteda seriesofamendments toSOLAS,basedonproposalsput forwardbythe Panel of Experts on the safety of roll on-roll off passenger ships which was established inDecember1994followingthesinkingoftheferryEstonia.

Themostimportantchangesrelatetothestabilityofro-ropassengershipsinChapterII-1.

TheSOLAS90damagestabilitystandard,whichhadappliedtoallro-ropassengershipsbuiltsince1990,was extended to existing ships in accordancewith an agreedphase-in programme. Shipsthatonlymeet85%of the standardhad to comply fullyby1October1998and thosemeeting97.5% or above, by 1 October 2005. (The SOLAS 90 standard refers to the damage stability


standard in the 1988 (October) amendments to SOLAS adopted 28October 1988 and enteringintoforceon29April1990.)

The conference also adopted a new regulation 8-2, containing special requirements for ro-ropassenger ships carrying400passengersormore.This is intended tophaseout shipsbuilt toaone-compartment standard and ensure that they can survivewithout capsizingwith twomaincompartmentsfloodedfollowingdamage.

AmendmentstootherChapters intheSOLASConvention includedchangestoChapter III,whichdealswith lifesavingappliancesandarrangements, includingtheadditionofasectionrequiringro-ropassenger ships tobe fittedwithpublicaddress systems,a regulationproviding improvedrequirements for life-saving appliances and arrangements and a requirement for all passengerships to have full information on the details of passengers on board and requirements for theprovisionofahelicopterpick-uporlandingarea.

Other amendments were made to Chapter IV (radiocommunications); Chapter V (safety ofnavigation) - including a requirement that all ro-ro passenger ships should have an establishedworkinglanguage-andChapterVI(carriageofcargoes).

The conferencealsoadopteda resolutionwhichpermits regional arrangements tobemadeonspecialsafetyrequirementsforro-ropassengerships.


3.2. Boats with immigrants on board

- Boat with Congolese Refugees Sinks: A boat with more than 300 Congoleserefugees on board travelling from Uganda to the Democratic Republic of Congo sank in LakeAlbert,whichisbetweenthetwonationsinMarch222014.Atleast250peopledied,beingmanyofthemchildren.- LampedusaMigrant Shipwreck: An unnamed vessel carrying about 500migrantssank near the Italian island of Lampedusa in October 3 2013. Most of the victims were fromEntrea, Somalia, andGhana. The ItalianCoastGuardmanaged to rescue some150people, butmorethan360perished.OnApril,6,2011(Italy),near150SomalirefugeesfromLibyaandEritreadisappearedafterthesinkingoftheirshiponthesamearea.- South Sudan FerryDisaster:Anestimated200-300womenand children trying toescape from the deadly infighting in South Sudan died, when the overloaded ferry they weretravelling in, capsized in January 14 2014. The accident occurred in theWhiteNile River in thecountry’snortheast.Allpassengersonboardwerecivilians.- On June, 17, 2003 (Italy), therewas a shipwreck on the South of Sicily of a shipcarryingimmigrants,fromLibya,witharesultof67victimsandmissing.- OnOctober,19,2003(Italy),83immigrantsdiedordisappearedduetoashipwreckoppositeSicilycoasts.- OnDecember,20,2009(Turkey),near70immigrantsdiedinMarmaris(SouthwestTurkey)duetothesinkingoftheirship,inwhichtheyweretryingtoreachGreece.- On April, 15, 2004 (Italy), 80 Immigrants, from Libya, deceased because of theshipwreckinSicilyoftheirvessel.

ESTONIA

On28September1994thepassenger ro-roshipEstoniasuddenlycapsized inaseverestorm inthenorthBalticSeaandsankwiththelossofmorethan850lives.Accordingtothefinaldisasterreporttheweatherwasrough,withawindof15to20meterspersecond(29to39knots;34to45mph),force7–8ontheBeaufortscaleandasignificantwaveheightof4to6meters(13to20feetcomparedwiththehighestmeasuredsignificantwaveheightintheBalticSeaof7.7meters


The official report indicated that the locks on the bow door had failed from the strain of thewavesand thedoorhad separated from the restof thevessel, pullingajar the rampbehind it.Whenthevisorcameofftheboat,therampthatprotectedthecardeckontheothersideofthevisor dropped. Thewater flooded the car deck, destabilized the ship and began a catastrophicchainofeventsthatplungedtheEstonia(SimilarproblemsalsosanktheHeraldofFreeEnterprisein1987andtheMVPrincessVictoriain1953).

It is thedeadliest shipwreckdisaster tohaveoccurred in theBalticSea inpeacetime,being thebalanceof137survivorsand852victims.


3.3. Non-passenger ship casualties

3.3.1. AEGEAN SEA Name Date LocationAegeanSea 3December1992 Spain

Flag Dateofbuilt Length WidthGreek 1973 261.02m 40.67m

Accidentarea LaCoruna,Galicia Causeofspill GroundingQuantitytransported

79,000tonnes Typeofpollutant Lightcrudeoil

Quantityspilled 67,000tonnes Shiptype Oiltanker

On3December1992,theGreekorecarrierAegeanSeawasenteringtheharborofLaCorunaat5am,asaheavystormwasbrewing,whenshewassteeredoffcourseandranaground.Shebrokeintwoandburstintoflames.Thebowsankfiftymetersdeepandthesternremainedvisible.

Apart froma fewhundred cubicmeterswhichwere successfully pumpedout of the stern, thewhole cargo spilled out. However a large part burnt in the fire orwas dispersed in the sea. Inorder to fight pollution, large clean-up operationswere set up both on and off shore. Floatingboomswereusedtocollectsome5,000m³ofoil/watermix,whichwasthentreated.Operationsalso involvedmanual cleaning of the shoreline, in which some 1,200m³ of sand and polluteddebriswerecollectedandthenburnt.

Morethan300kmofshorelinewasaffected,intheareahitadecadeearlierbytheUrquiolaspill.Thiszone is importanttothefishing industryand isparticularlyabundant inshellfish.Therearenumeroussalmonandturbotfarms,bivalvepurificationfacilitiesandmusselcultivationareas.Inanattempttopreventtheconsumptionofproductsfromtheareaaffectedbythespill,regionalauthorities(laConselleriadePesca,MarisqueoeAcuiculturadelaXuntadeGalicia)introducedabanonfishingandonthesaleofallseafoodfromthearea.

As the situation returned tonormal, thevariousbans in theaffectedareaweregradually liftedbetween January and September 1993 and despite a certain amount of reluctance on theconsumers'behalf about thequalityof theproduce, the industrygradually returned tonormal.However,thisspillaffectedmorethan4,000fishermen,shellfishharvestersandfishfarmers.

AclaimsofficewasopenedinLaCoruñashortlyaftertheincidentbytheIOPCFund(InternationalOil Pollution Compensation Fund) and the Spanish Government. It received more than 900


compensationclaimsfromindividuals, firmsandcooperatives, totalingnearly300millioneuros.Having little confidence in the possibility of amicable agreements, most claimants not onlyopened discussion with the claims office, but also entered into legal proceedings. This sloweddownthecompensationprocessandtheSpanishGovernmenthadtoadvancecompensationstomostfishermenandshellfishharvestersin1993.Afirstjudgmenttookplacein1996,followedbyanappealjudgmentin1997.

The captain and the harbormasterwere pronounced jointly responsible for the accident. As aresult, the owner of the vessel (along with the IOPC Fund) and the Spanish Government (theharbormaster'semployer)wereequallyliable.

The majority of the tourism, fishing and fish farming claims were gradually settled. But theshellfishharvesters'claimsremainedlitigious.In2000,theship-owner,hisinsurer,theIOPCFund,theGovernmentandtheGalicianauthoritiesreachedanagreementforthepaymentofaquarteroftheremaining320millioneurosclaimed.SimilarlytotheHavencase(Italy),adecree-lawhadto be passed by the Spanish Parliament before the final agreementwas signed on 30October2002. TheSpanishGovernmentwasboundby this agreement to take full responsibility for anyremainingclaims.

Pumpingoperation.Source:Cedre


3.3.2. AMOCO CADIZ Name Date LocationAmocoCadiz 16March1978 FranceFlag Dateofbuilt Length WidthLiberian 1974 334m 51mAccidentarea Portsall, North

FinistèreCauseofspill Damagetoship

Quantitytransported

227,000tonnes Typeofpollutant crudeoil


On 16March 1978, the oil tanker the Amoco Cadiz, transporting 227,000 tonnes of crude oil,sufferedafailureofhersteeringmechanism,anddespitetheeffortsofthecrewofaGermantugboatandtwounsuccessfultowingattempts,ranagroundonPortsallRocks,ontheBretoncoast.Theentirecargospilledoutasthebreakerssplitthevesselintwo,progressivelypolluting360kmofshorelinefromBresttoSaintBrieuc.

WreckoftheAmocoCadizatPortsall.Photo:J.LeFevre(Cedre)

This was the largest oil spill caused by a tanker grounding ever registered in the world. Theconsequencesofthisaccidentweresignificant,anditcausedtheFrenchGovernmenttoreviseitsoilresponseplan(thePolmarPlan),toacquireequipmentstocks(Polmarstocks),toimposetrafficlanes in the Channel and to create Cedre. The French Government, along with the localcommunities affected, prosecuted the Amoco Company in theUnited States. After 14 years of


complexproceedings,theyeventuallyobtained1,257millionfrancs(190millioneuros),lessthanhalfoftheclaimedamount.

Theaccident

Onthemorningof16March1978,theoiltankerAmocoCadiz,enroutefromthePersianGulftoRotterdamwith227,000 tonnesofcrudeoil,drifted towards theBretoncoast inaheavystormafterafailureofhersteeringsystem.AGermantugboatattemptedtoassistthetanker,howeverthe situation was difficult and the first towrope, thrown at 1:30 am, broke three hours later.Despitealltheeffortsmadebythecrewsofbothships,theAmocoCadizranagroundat10pmnear the small port of Portsall.Many tankswere broken in the accident and the first oil slicksquicklyreachedthecoast.Thebiggestoilslickeverseenduetoastrandedtankerhadjustbegun.Within twoweeks, theentirecargohadspilledout into theseaand,draggedby thewindsandcurrents,pollutedmorethan300kmofcoastamongthemostbeautifulandnaturalofEurope.Seethingwith rage, inhabitants of damaged communities started a desperate fight against thisdisaster.TheFrenchmediadiffusedapocalypticimagesofanimmenseoilslickwhichshockedthenation.

DriftoftheAmocoCadiz


3.3.3. ANDROS PATRIA Name Date LocationAndrosPatria 31december1978 Spain

Flag Dateofbuilt Length WidthGreek 1970 323.71m 48.21m

Accidentarea offthecoastofLaCoruna,Galicia

Causeofspill Explosion

Quantitytransported

210,000tonnes Typeofpollutant Iranian heavy crudeoil


OnDecember31,1978astrongseawave,duetothestormthatwastakingplaceontheNorthAtlanticarea,openedacrack inher side21metersabove thewaterline,while the shipwas30milesonthenorthofSisargasislands.Thentherewasanexplosionandafire,sothecaptain,hiswife,achildofthemand31crewmembersabandonedtheship,leavingonly3peopleonboardwhichwereeventuallytheonlysurvivors.

Theexplosionoccurredintheporttanknumberthree,andmorethan50,000Tofoilwerespilledintothesea,butthewindandcurrentcoursesatthetimemeantthattheGaliciancoastwasonlypartiallyaffected.Oncethetugsarrived,toavoidthedangeroftheoilspilltotheGaliciancoast,itwasorderedtotowoffshorethewreckedvessel,withtheintentionofrepairingthebreachinthehull,becauseAnglo-Frenchauthoritiesforbadethevesseltocross,intheconditionsinwhichshewas,thewatersoftheEnglishChannel.

LikeFranceandBritain,neitherPortugalnorSpainallowedtheentryofthevesselinitswatersforfearofcontamination.

Subsequently, it was agreed tomake a transfer of the oil that remained in the tanks into theEnglish tanker "British Promise" in the south of the Azores since British and Americanmeteorologicalstudiespredictedgoodweatherandcalmseainthearea.Oncelightened,shewascarriedtoLisbonforrepairing,butgiventheseriousdamageshesufferedfinallythechoicewasscraping.

To fight against pollution, the Spanish Navy spread dispersants on two major oil slicks, partlybroken up by natural wave action. A small amount of pollution was observed on the coast,measuringapproximately100m.


3.3.4. BRAER Name Date LocationBraer 5January1993 Scotland

Owner Flag Dateofbuilt Length WidthBRAERCorp. Liberian 1975 241.51m 40.06m

Accidentarea Southern tip of theShetlands

Causeofspill Grounding

Quantitytransported

84,500tonnes Typeofpollutant Crudeoil


Onthenightof4January1993,whilesailinginaheavystormontheshortestbutmostdangerousroute fromNorway to Canada, the Liberian oil tanker Braer suffered engine failure due to theentrance of sea water in her bunkers. The rapid evacuation of the crew on the morning of 5Januaryandthelackofahighseatugintheareameantthattheshipcouldnotbetowed.SheranagroundwestofSumburghHead,onthesoutherntipoftheShetlandsat11:19am.Thedamagetothetankerledtothereleaseofhercargoofcrudeoil.

Heavy response equipment and specialized personnel were quickly sent to the site of theaccident,andtheresponseteamhadtocompetewithmediacrewsforthelittlehousingavailableon the island.Adverseweather conditions rendered responseoperationsat sea impossibleandlimited the onshore operations. The remaining oil therefore leaked from the vessel and wasnaturallybywaveaction.

Effectsoftheaccident

• Everymemberofthecrewwasrescuedandwasunharmed.• Spilloftheloadandfuel:Theimpactonthecoastwasreducedduetothenatureoftheloadand

thedurationofthebadweather,whichpreventedtheoperationsoffightingthepollution,buthelpeddispersingthepollutioninanaturalway.

• Thewindprojectedthepollutiontonearbyhomesandfarms.120tonsofdispersantswereused(Someownersfiledcomplaintsallegingthatthedispersantsandcrudeoilhaddamagedtheirhouses’roofs).

• Among39consideredriskyplaces,cleaningwasjustrequiredin9ofthem.More than 2,000 victims claimed compensation from the ship owner, his protection andindemnity club and the International Oil Compensation Fund. Themajority of the claims weresettledamicablywithinthethreeyeartimelimitofthefundforsuchsettlements.Theremaining


claimantsembarkedupon legalproceedings,whichweremostly settledoutof courtwithin thethree followingyears. InOctober2001the lastnegotiationscametoanend.Totalpayment forthisincidentamountedto£58.4million,outofwhich£52.2millionwaspaidbytheIOPCFund.

The incident generated considerable concern about shipping safety in the United Kingdom,leadingtoanationalinquiry,knownas(LordDonaldson'sInquiry).Thereportsubmitted,entitled"Saferships,cleanerseas",proposedseveralmajorchanges inthenationalpollutionpreventionandresponseorganizations.

Britishadministrationactions:

• Itpreservedthelivesofthememberofthecrew• Thecoastguardreactedlatewhilethevesselapproachedtothelandandthecaptainobtained

permissionfromtheshipownertogetacommercialtowingoperation.• Itfoughtthepollutionwithdispersants• British authorities imposed an exclusion zone for fishing, banned the capture and sale of all

speciesoffishandshellfish.

Conclusionoftheaccident

• Acausesoapparentlyminor:brokenventsofafueltankandthesubsequententryofsaltwaterinthefueltanks.

• TheabsenceofatugboatheightofMaritimeAuthorityandthedelayinfindingasuitabletugtowingoperationdelayedtheactionstaken.

• Morethan2,000victimsclaimedcompensationfromtheshipowner,hisprotectionandindemnityclubandtheInternationalOilCompensationFund.Thepaymentforthisincidentamountedto£58.4million,outofwhichwaspaid£52.2millionbytheIOPCFund.


3.3.5. CASTILLO DE BELLVER Name Date LocationCastillodeBellver 6August1983 SouthAfrica

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtSpanish 1978 334.02m 55.05m 3m

Accidentarea 64kmoffTableBay Causeofspill ExplosionQuantitytransported

250,000tonnes Typeofpollutant Lightcrudeoil

Quantityspilled 150,000 to 160,000tonnes

Shiptype Oiltanker

Theincident

On6August1983,theSpanishoiltankerCastillodeBellver,transporting250,000tonnesoflightcrudeoil,wasaround80kmoffTableBay(SouthAfrica)whenitexplodedandwentupinflames.

The ship was drifting off the coast and broke in two, generating a spill of 50 to 60 thousandtonnesoflightcrude.ThesternsectionoftheCastillodeBellvercapsizedandsankon7Augustindeep waters 36 km off the coast, with 100,000 tonnes of oil remaining in its tanks. The bowsectionwasthentowedawayfromthecoastandwaseventuallysunkusingexplosives.

Theaccidentareaisanecologicallyandeconomicallysensitiveareaas itharboursrichfloraandfauna.Itisalsohometoalargeseabirdpopulation.Moreover,50%ofSouthAfricanlobsterandfishlandingsarecaughtinthiszone,whichisanimportantreproductionareaforfish.

Response

The weather conditions were conducive to spill response; if this had not been the case thesituationcouldhavebeendisastrousfortheenvironment.Some230m3ofdiluteddispersantand4m3ofdispersantconcentrateweresprayedattheedgeoftheslick,preventingitfromcominglessthan32kmfromtheshore.

Impact

Prevailingwindspushedtheslickoffshore,resulting in littlecoastalpollution.Accordingtotestsconductedonsamplesofsediment,planktonandwater,noabnormalpresenceofhydrocarbonswasdetected.Furthermore,impactsonfishingandtheenvironmentwerenegligible.

ActionsfromtheSpanishandSouthAfricanAdministrations


South African authorities coordinated the search and rescue operation and established thenecessarymeasurestopreservethemarineenvironment.

Some230m3ofdiluteddispersantand4m3ofdispersantconcentrateweresprayedattheedgeoftheslick,preventingitfromcominglessthan32kmfromtheshore.

In agreementwith the insurer, the charterer and the shipowner towedoffshore the sternandsankwithexplosivecharges.

Spanishadministrationdesignatedacommissionfortheinvestigation.

Conclusionoftheaccident

The cause of the accident could not be determined. The Investigation Commission establishedlikelyhypothesisthatpointedouttoadeficientmaintenanceofthevessel,todeficientstructuralconditionsandtotheinertgassystemeffectiveness,asitwasconsideredthattherecouldbeanexplosiveatmosphereinsidethetanks.


3.3.6. CASTOR Name Date LocationCastor 31December2000 Morocco

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtCypriot 1977 - - -

Accidentarea OffNador Causeofspill DamagetoshipQuantitytransported

29,500tonnes Typeofpollutant Unleadedpetrol(gasoline)

Quantityspilled 0 Shiptype Oiltanker

On26December2000,theCypriotoiltankerCastorwasonitswayfromRomaniatoNigeriawithacargoof29,500tonnesofunleadedpetrol(gasoline)whenitencountereddeterioratingweatherconditionsoffNador (Morocco).During thenightof30December,a24mcrack formedon themaindeckofthevessel.Thecrewwasevacuatedduetotheriskgeneratedbygasolinevapors.Asalvageteam,hiredbytheowner,tookcontroloftheship.

Emergencyrepairswereperformedtoreinforcethestructure.Becauseofthenatureofthecargo,severalharborsrefusedthetanker.Consequently,fromday5to24January,theshipCastorwasmaintainedabout63kilometersfromthecoast.Theretheoperationsofinertingthetanksofthevesselandthetransferofsome6,000tonsoffueltoanothervesselwerewhatreducedtheriskofexplosion and fracture. This allowed his trip to Greece, to be scrapped in Piraeus afterdownloadingtherestofthecargotoanothervesselonthedeepseaoffthecoastofMalta.TheAmerican Bureau of Shipping subsequently discovered that the rate corrosion of Castor wasfifteen times greater than expected. Since this accident, Turkish authorities are rigorouslyinspectingalltankers,especiallythosewith"flagsofconvenience".


3.3.7. ERIKA Name Date Location

Erika 12December1999 FranceOwner ClassificationSociety P&IClub

TevereShipping(Malta) RINA SteamshipMutualunderwritingAssociation

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Draught Details on thetype

Maltese 1975 184m 10.9m Single-hulledoiltankerwith

separateballastsShipbuilding Deadweight Engine Bunker TanksKasado Dock CoLtdJapan

37,283tonnes Sulze-13,200horsepower

280tonnes 9 cargo tanks, 4ballasts

Accidentarea BayofBiscay Causeofspill DamagetoshipQuantitytransported 31,000tonnes Typeofpollutant Heavyfueloil(n6)Quantityspilled Between 19,000 and

20,000tonnesShiptype Oiltanker

Theaccident

On 11 December 1999, theMaltese tanker, Erika, loadedwith 31,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil(n°6), en route from Dunkirk (France) to Livorno (Italy) in very rough sea conditions (westerlywind,force8to9,with6mswell),wasfacedwithstructuralproblemsofftheBayofBiscay.Aftersending an alert message, then proceeding to transfer cargo from tank to tank, the captaininformedtheFrenchauthoritiesthatthesituationwasundercontrolandthathewasheadingtotheportofDonges,atreducedspeed.

Onthe12,at6:05amhesentaMayday:theshipwasbreaking intwo.ArescueoperationwasimmediatelylaunchedandthecrewwaswinchedtosafetybyFrenchNavyhelicopters,backedupbyRoyalNavyreinforcements,inextremelydifficultconditions.TheErikasplitintwoat8:15am(localtime)ininternationalwaters,aboutthirtymilessouthofPenmarc'h(SouthernBrittany).Thequantityofoilspiltatthattimewasestimatedbetween7,000and10,000tonnes.

The bow sank the following night, a small distance away from the place where the ship hadbrokenup.ThesternwastakenintowbythesalvagetugAbeilleFlandreon12December,at2:15


pm,toavoiditdriftingtowardstheFrenchislandofBelle-Ile,anditsankthefollowingdayat2:50pm.Thetwopartsofthewreckendedup10kmapartfromeachother,120mdeep.

Slickdrift

Initialaerial surveymissionscarriedoutbytheFrenchCustomsandNavyplanesreportedslicksdrifting at sea, one of which was 15 km long and estimated at 3,000 tonnes. The slicks weremovingeastwardsataspeedofabout1.2knots.

On the following days, the aerial observations highlighted a series of slicks made up of thickpatches(5to8cm)whichtendedtosplitupwhilecontinuingtodriftparalleltothecoast.On16December, small slicksofapproximately100m indiametergathered ina25km longand5kmwidezone.Asof17December,theyshowedatendencytosinkafewcentimetresunderneaththeseasurface.

The first incidencesof theoilon thecoastwerenoticed inSouthernFinistère11daysafter theaccident,on23December.Scatteredlandingscontinuedthefollowingdays,hittingtheislandsofGroixandBelle-Ileon25December,andtheVendéeregion,northoftheislandofNoirmoutier,on27December.Owingtoroughweatherconditions(windover100km/h,blowingperpendiculartothecoast)andveryhightidecoefficients,thepollutionwasthrownupveryhighontheforeshore,reachingthetopofcliffsexceeding10metres.

On 26December, 14 days after the sinking, the island of Groix, opposite Lorient,was severelyaffected and thebulkof thepollution reached thenorth and southbanksof the LoireRiver.Aviscousoillayer,5to30cmthickandseveralmetreswide,coveredpartsoftheshoreline.


AClaimsOfficewasopenedjointlybytheInternationalOilPollutionCompensationFund92(IOPCFund)and theShipProtectionand Indemnity (P&I)Club in theCityofLorientsoonafter theoilbegantohitthecoast.Atotalof76millionFF(11.4millioneuros)wasallocatedtocompensatingpotential victims, through the ship owner's insurance. Additional compensation was madeavailablethroughIOPCfunds,reachingupto1.119billionFF(168millioneuros),makingatotalof1.195billionFF(179millioneuros).

Initsjudgment,theCriminalCourtofFirstInstanceheldthefollowingfourpartiescriminallyliablefor theoffenseof causingpollution: the representativeof theshipowner (TevereShipping), thepresidentofthemanagementcompany(PanshipManagementandServicesSrl),theclassificationsociety(RINA)andTotalSA.

The representative of the ship-owner and the president of the management company weresentenced to pay a fine of €75 000 each. RINA and Total SA were sentenced to pay a fine of€375000each.

Regarding civil liabilities, the judgment held the four condemned parties jointly and severallyliableforthedamagecausedbytheincident.

DamageAwarded CriminalCourtofAppeal(million€)MaterialDamage 165.4Moral Damage (loss of enjoyment, damage toreputation and brand image, moral damagearisingfromdamagetothenaturalheritage)

34.1

Pureenvironmentaldamage 4.3


Total 203.8

TakingintoaccounttheamountspaidincompensationbyTotalSAfollowingthejudgmentoftheCriminal Court of First Instance, the balance to be compensated by the representative of theshipowner(TevereShipping),thepresidentofthemanagementcompany(PanshipManagementandServicesSrl)andtheclassificationsociety(RINA)was€32.5million.

MeasuresinUE

The measures already taken by the European Union to avoid tanker accidents Since thecatastropheof"Erika",whichranagroundon12December1999pollutingalmost400kmoftheFrench coastline, the European Union has made considerable progress towards improvingmaritimesafety.Theadoptionof themeasuresof theErika Ipackageandmostof thoseof theErikaIIpackagewasamajorsteptowardsputtingeffectiverulesintoplacetoincreasemaritimesafety and to counter the risks of oil spills. Thanks to these measures substandard ships andfloatingrustbucketsshoulddisappearfromEurope'swaterswithinthenexttwoyears.

‘Erika I’addressesthemostseriousgaps inthemaritimesafetyrulesrevealedbytheoil spillofDecember1999:

First, it strengthens the existing Directive on port State control. The number of thoroughinspections of ships in EU ports has been greatly increased. Over 4,000 vessels considered torepresent particular risks will be subject to mandatory structural inspections each year. Shipsrepeatedlyfoundtobeinabadconditionwillbeblack-listed,andrefusedaccesstoEUports.

Second, it strengthens the existing Directive governing the activities of classification societies,whichconductstructuralsafetychecksofshipsonbehalfofflagStates.Thequalityrequirementsforclassificationsocietieshavebeenraised.ApprovaltooperatewithintheEUwillbeconditionaloncontinuedmeetingoftheserequirementsandtheperformanceoftheclassificationsocietieswill be strictlymonitored. Failure tomeet the standardswill result in temporary or permanentwithdrawaloftheCommunityapprovaltooperateonbehalfofEUMemberStates.

Third, itbroughtforwardthetimetablefortheworldwidephasingoutofsinglehulloil tankers.Doublehulltankersofferbetterprotectionfortheenvironmentincaseofanaccident.Becauseofthis, IMO had decided that only double hull oil tankers should be constructed as from 1996.However, the gradual replacement of single hulls by double hullswas spread over a very longperiod ending in 2026. The EU insisted to accelerate this process, which the maritime worldacceptedaftertoughnegotiations.Theindustryhasfollowedquicklyanddoublehulltankersnowrepresentalmosthalfoftheworldtonnage.

The last single hull tankers will be banned from EU waters by 2015 according to the newinternationalandEUstandards(Regulation1726/2003acceleratesthevesselsbanned)


TheCommissionwillalsostepup itsmonitoringofclassificationsocietiesand,wherenecessary,proposethattheirrecognitionbesuspended.

‘ErikaII’measuresprovidethepracticalsolutionstounderpinthe"ErikaI"measures:

First,thecreationofaEuropeanAgencyofMaritimeSafety(EMSA)tomonitortheeffectivenessof EU maritime safety rules. Member States and candidate countries are under increasingpressuretoapplyanumberofnewsafetyrequirements,andtoharmonizetheir inspectionandcontrol procedures. The new agency will support their efforts by collecting information,maintainingamaritimesafetydatabase,auditingclassificationsocieties,andorganizingportstatecontrol inspections in the Member States. It will also facilitate exchanges of good practicebetweenMemberStatesandprovidetechnicalassistancetotheCommissioninallfieldsrelatingtomaritimesafetyand thepreventionofmarinepollution.Pendingadecisionby theEuropeanCouncilonthelocationoftheagency,theCommissionwillprovisionallyhostitinitsownpremisesinBrussels.

Second,aDirectivewhichestablishesanotificationsystemforimprovedmonitoringoftrafficin,or passing through, European waters. Member States will be given strengthened powers tointervenewhenthereisathreatofaccidentorpollution.ShipsinEUwaterswillberequiredtofitautomatic identification systems for the automatic communicationwith coastal authorities andvoyagedatarecorders(blackboxes)tofacilitateaccidentinvestigation.TheDirectivewillimproveproceduresfortheshareduseofdataaboutdangerouscargoes,andallowportstopreventthedeparture of ships in extreme weather conditions. It will also require each maritimeMemberStatetoestablishplacesofrefugeforshipsindistress.

Third,bydrawingattentiontopaymentofcompensationtovictimsofoilspillsandproposingtoimprovethecurrentinternationalmechanisminthisarea.TheCommissionproposedtoraisetheupper limitson theamountspayable in theeventofmajor spills in Europeanwaters (up to€1billion from the current ceilings of €200 million), and to ensure that adequate penalties areimposedonthosewhocausepollutiondamagebynegligentbehavior.

This proposal did not result to EU legislation, but has triggered a substantial revision andimprovementoftheinternationaloilpollutioncompensationsystem,theIOPCFund.


3.3.8. EXXON VALDEZ Name Date LocationExxonValdez 24March1989 USA

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtAmerican 1986 300.85 50.65 -

Accidentarea Prince WilliamSound,Alaska


Quantitytransported



Theaccident

On 24March 1989, the American oil tanker the Exxon Valdez, which had just loaded 180,000tonnesofcrudeoilatValdezoil terminal,movedawayfromtheshipping lanetoavoidmeetingwithdrifting iceblocks. The captainordered thehelmholder to switch toautomaticpilot. Lessthan30minuteslater,theshipranagroundatspeedof12knotsonBlighReef,situatedsome10mdeepinPrinceWilliamStrait,animportantfishingarea.

Thegroundingdamaged11ofthe18tanksandcaused38,500tonnesofcrudeoiltobespilled.More than 7,000 km2 of oil slicks polluted 800 km of coasts (2,000 km including all the smallislandsandinlets).

ThecityofValdezhadalreadybeentraumatised25yearsearlierbyadevastatingearthquake.Thewholecitywasentirelyrebuiltandbecame,in1976,amajorcrudeoilport.

This spill of 38,500 tonnes of crude oil made the Exxon Valdez the vessel responsible for thelargestoilspillthattheUShadeverexperienced.

ThisspillwasahugeshockfortheUnitedStatesandtheExxoncompany,whohadneverimaginedsuchadisasterpossible.


Inthetopleft-handcornertheExxonValdez.Onthewholephoto,theoilslickcomingfromthisoiltanker(SourceCedre)

Response

During 1989, 11,000 people were employed by Exxon to clean up the damage as quickly andefficiently as possible. Tens of thousands of volunteers and unprecedentedmeansweremadeavailable (1,400 ships,85helicoptersand1,100people) to save seabirdsandmammalsand tocleantheshoreonebeachafteranother.

In1990,1,100peoplecontinuedclean-upoperations.Thisworkforcewascostly;Exxonpaideachworker1,000dollarsperweek.

Bioremediation, the acceleration or promotion of natural breakdown processes by micro-organisms,wasused.Thereductionintheamountofoilcoveringthesurfacestreatedwasthreetimesmorequickly.Thistechniqueisthereforerecommendedforclean-up.

Exxon’sexpenses

By1st June1989,3monthsafter theoil tankergrounded, theexpenses incurredbyExxonhadreached 135millionDollars. They had increased to 300millionDollars by 1st July 1989 and byearly2006hadreachedalmost2.5billionDollars.

Theseexpenseswerenot invain,as3yearson,500of the800kmofoiledcoastlinehadbeencleaned.Despitethisprogress,residualpollutionregularlycontinuedtoaffectcertainspeciesandthe consequences of the 1989 incident onwildlifewere undoubtedly considerably higher thanindicatedby the initial report,whichmadereference to250,000seabirds,2,800ottersand300sealsdirectlyaffectedbytheoilfromtheExxonValdez.


In1991,anagreementbetweentheFederalGovernmentofAlaskaandExxonestablishedatotalbill of 1.15 billion Dollars divided as follows: a criminal plea agreement of 150million Dollars,criminalrestitutionof100millionDollarsfortherepairofdamagecausedbythespillandacivilsettlement to the value of 900 million Dollars paid by Exxon’s civil liability. In 2004, afternumerouslegalstrategies,Exxonwascondemnedtopay4.5billionDollarsofpunitivedamages.Thecompanyappealedonthissentence.

Consequencesofthedisaster

Thisdisaster resulted in the"doublehull"amendmentof6March1992beingpromulgatedandvotedinforallvesselsbuiltafter6July1996(MARPOLconvention,rule13F).

LegalproceedingswereinitiatedagainstExxonbytheAmericanCivilService,severalassociationsandindividuals.Exxoninturntookactionagainstitsinsurers.

Inthecourtcases,manyaccusationsweremadeagainsttheExxonValdezcaptain,suchasalcoholconsumption before embarking the ship, insufficient supervision of the crew, automatic pilotengagedtoosoonanddangerousattemptstoleavetheplacewheretheshipranaground.

Environmentalimpacts

Tenyearsafterthedisaster,themortalityrateofcertainspeciesoreggsstillremainedabnormallyhigh,althoughno linkwith the shipwreckingof theExxonValdezcouldbeclearly confirmedbyexperts.

Theprocessofaffectedpopulationsregainingtheirnaturalbalancemayhavebeendelayedbythepersistenceofpocketsoffreshoilburiedinthesediments.

ReactionsafteraccidentofEXXONVALDEZ:

USA: Approval of the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), which ordered theimmediatephaseoutinU.S.watersofsingle-hulledtankers.

IMO:Thisdisasterresultedinthe"doublehull"amendmentof6March1992beingpromulgatedandvotedinforallvesselsbuiltafter6July1996(MARPOLconvention,rules13Fand13G).

Regulation13FrequiredallnewtankerscontractedonorafterJuly6in1993of600DWTormoremustbebuiltwithdoublehull(thedesigndependsofDWT).13Falsospecifiesthatotherdesignsmay be accepted as alternative to double hull, such as to incorporate a so-called “mid-deck”underwhichthepressurewithinthecargotankdoesnotexceedtheexternalhydrostaticwaterpressure.

Regulation 13G applies to existing crude oil tankers of 20,000 DWT and above and producttankers of 30,000 DWT and above. TheMARPOL Protocol of 1978 required segregated ballast


tanksonallnewtankersof20,000DWTandaboveand itwasapplicable in1982,andaimedtobansinglehulltanker.Theregulation13Gwasamendedinasequenceissummarizedbelow.OnJuly6,1993cameintoforcesomeamendmentstoMARPOL73/78adoptedbytheIMOonMarch6, 1992. Regarding the existing single hull oil tankers delivered after 1 June 1982, or thosedelivered before June 1, 1982which had been adapted tomeet the requirements ofMARPOL73/78onsegregatedballasttanksandtheirprotectivelocation,thedeadlineisatmost2026.

TheApril27,2001,atits46thsession,theMEPCadoptednewandimportantamendmentstotheRegulation 13G of the Protection Committee of the IMOMarine Environment in which a newacceleratedremovalofoilisintroducedsinglehull.Thefinaldateforsinglehulloiltankersshouldbephasedoutistheanniversaryofthedateofdeliveryoftheshipinaccordancewithaschedulestartingin2003until2007forCategory1tankersandupto2015forthecategories2and3.

UE:ThefirstEUregulationtodealwithdoublehulledoiltankersandsegregatedballasttankswasadoptedNovember21,1994andwentintoforceonJanuary1,1996.Regulation2978/9473hadasitsobjectivetopromotetheuseofenvironmentallyfriendlyoiltankersto,fromandwithinEUports.After theErikaandPrestigeaccidents, theEU forced theacceleratedphaseoutof singlehulltankersbyRegulations417/2002and1726/2003.


3.3.9. MSC FLAMINIA Name Date LocationMSCFlaminia 14July2012 InternationalwatersFlag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtGerman 2001 300m - 14.5mAccidentarea South-west of the

EnglishchannelCauseofspill Explosion/fire

Quantitytransported

2,876containers Detailsontype 6750TEU,singlehull

Charterer MSC (MediterraneanShippingCompany)

Shiptype Containership

Theincident

On14July2012,inthemiddleoftheAtlanticOcean,aviolentexplosion(whosecauseremainsasyetunexplained)occurred inholdn°4of300metre-longcontainer shipMSCFlaminia,en routefromCharleston(US)toAntwerp(Belgium)with2,876containersonboard.

Acrewmemberwhowasattemptingtoextinguishthefirecausedbythisexplosionwasreportedmissing.Asecondseamandiedfromhisinjuries.ThreeotherinjuredcrewweretakentoAzores,while another ship transported the rest of the crew (German, Polish and Filipino nationals) toSouthampton(England).

Asecondexplosionoccurredfourdays later,on18July.Thefireragedfor9daysandspreadtotwootherholds.

Thecontainership,abandonedbyitscrew,waslistingby11°duetothedisplacementofthecargoand the filling of the holdswith the extinguishingwater. The superstructure, engine room andsteeringsystemwereunaffectedbythefire.

Thenumberofcontainersthathadfallenoverboardwasunknown.

Inmid-October,athirdcrewmemberdiedfromhisinjuries.

Response

BeforeconsideringlettingtheMSCFlaminiaenteraEuropeanport,expertsinspectedthevesselto ensure that there were no further fire or explosion hazards in the containers and that thestructuresweresufficientlysolidtowithstandtowing,despitetheintensityoftheexplosionsandfire.


Afteraperiodspentininternationalwatersduringwhichthefirewasbroughtundercontrolandstabilityrestored,permissionwasissuedon19AugustfortheshiptobetakentoBritishwaters.

ThesalvageandtowingoperationsprivatelyorganisedbytheGermanshipownerwerecarriedoutbyDutchcompanySMIT.

TheMSCFlaminiawastowedbytheFairmountExpedition,assistedbytheAnglianSovereign,onchartertotheUKMaritimeandCoastguardAgency,andItaliantugCarloMagno.

On23August,theshiparrivednearLizardPointwhereitunderwentanin-depthinspectionbyaninternationalteamtodeterminewhetheritwassafetotowthevesseltoGermany,itsFlagState,whichhadofferedrefugetothevessel.

Delayedbyadverseweatherconditions,theMSCFlaminiaanditstugssetoffonthemorningof3September, passing through the Channel towards the Pas-de-Calais and then on toWilhelmshaven.

DuringthejourneythroughFrenchterritorialwaters,theconvoywasaccompaniedbytheFrenchState-charteredtugAbeilleLanguedoc. InDutchwaters,theDutchvesselArcaaccompaniedthestrickenvessel.

On 9 September 2012, theMSC Flaminia arrived in the German port ofWilhelmshaven.Workbeganonthevesselafortnightafteritsarrival.Oncetheextinguishingwaterhasbeenremoved,thecargowillneedtobeunloadedandtheshiprepaired.

MSCFlaminiaatberth,September2012©Havariekommando


MapshowingthepositionoftheMSCFlaminia-Clicktoenlarge-©MaritimeBulletin


3.3.10. HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE

Name Date LocationHeraldofFreeEnterprise 6March1987 Belgium

Flag Date ofbuilt

Length Width Draught Shipyard

British 1980 131.91m 22.19m 5.72m SchichauUnterweser,Bremerhaven,Germany

Accidentarea PortofZeebrugge Cause ofspill

Loading/unloading

Quantitiestransported

46.6tonnesofdangerouschemicals:19.9tonnesoftribasicleadsulphate+5.5tonnesoftoluenedi-isocyanate+7.8tonnesofpaintwastes+5tonnesofhydroquinone+5tonnesofleatherpaint+400kgofdilutedcyanidesolutions+260kgofliquefiedandpressurizedgases

TypeofPollutants

over100differentdangerouschemicalsincluding:tribasicleadsulphate,toluenedi-isocyanate,paintwastes,hydroquinone,leatherpaint,dilutedcyanidesolutions,13typesofliquefiedandpressurizedgases(suchaschlorinetrifluoride,hydrogenbromide…)

Shiptype Passengership Detailsontype

CarFerry

Owner Compañía Naviera S.A.,Athens,Greece

Operator TownsendThoresen,GreatBritain

On6March1987,theBritishcarferryHeraldofFreeEnterprisewasleavingtheportofZeebrugge(Belgium)whilethedoorswerestillopenduetoanofficer’scarelessness.Waterrushedinsidetheshipwithaflowrateof200tonnesperminute.Destabilizedbythevolumeofwaterandbytheslidingofvehiclesonherleftside,theferrycapsizedandsank10mdeepneartheport.

Operationswere carried out to rescue the crew and the passengers. The other prioritywas torecoverthecargowhichwasmadeupof46.6tonnesofvariousdangerouschemicals.


Inthisshipwrecking,about200peopleweredrowned,andseveralcontainers,drumsandbottlesof chemicals were lost at sea. It remained difficult to assess the environmental hazard thedangerouscargoconstituted,becausesolittlewasknownofthetoxicityofmostofthechemicalsformarineorganisms.Moreover,animportantfactortotakeintoconsiderationwasthefactthatoncereleasedintothemarineenvironmentmanychemicalsreactordegradetoformpotentiallytoxicsubstances.

Firstly, a simplified scenariowasused toquicklydetermine theextentof the seaarea inwhichconcentrations considered lethal formarine organisms could be reached. Then, environmentalmonitoringwasperformedinordertoensurethesafetyofpersonnelinvolvedinoperationsandalsotoassesstheextentandimpactofapossiblespillinthemarineenvironment.

Refloatingtheferrytook52daysandrepresentedamajortechnicalachievement.Althoughonlyhalfofthedangerouscargowasrecovered,environmentaldamagewaskepttoaminimum.

PROCEEDINGS UNDER IMO ShortlyaftertheHeraldofFreeEnterprisedisasterin1987,theUnitedKingdomcametoIMOwitharequestthataseriesofemergencymeasuresbyconsideredforadoption.

The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) adopted the first package of amendments to theInternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in April 1988, including a newregulationrequiringindicatorsonthenavigatingbridgeforalldoorswhich,ifleftopen,couldleadtomajor flooding of a special category space or a ro-ro cargo space, aswell asmeans such asmonitoring to detect water leakage. Another new regulation required monitoring of specialcategory and ro-ro spaces to detect unduemovement of vehicles in adverseweather, fire, thepresenceofwaterorunauthorizedaccessbypassengerswhilsttheshipisunderway.

Another amendment dealt with provision of supplementary emergency lighting for ro-ropassenger ships. The amendments entered into force on 22 October 1989, 18 months afteradoption,theminimumtimeperiodallowedunderSOLAS.

FurtheramendmentswereadoptedinOctober1988ataspecialMSCsessionrequestedandpaidforby theUnitedKingdom.Theamendmentsadoptedentered into forceon29April 1990andhavebecomeknownasthe"SOLAS90"standard,relatingtothestabilityofpassengershipsinthedamagedcondition. In fact,workondeveloping this standardhadbegun following theaccidentinvolving the EuropeanGateway,which had capsized following a collisionwith another ship in1982,andendeduplyingonhersideinrelativelyshallowwaterwithonlyfiveliveslost.

Theamendmentappliedtoshipsbuiltafter29April1990andstipulatedthatthemaximumangleofheelafterfloodingbutbeforeequalizationshallnotexceed15degrees.


FurtheramendmentstoSOLASwereadoptedbytheMSCinApril1989,alsoenteringintoforceon1February1992.Themost importantdealtwithopenings inwatertightbulkheads inpassengerships. From 1 February 1992 new ships have had to be equippedwith power-operated slidingdoors, except in specific cases, whichmust be capable of being closed from a console on thebridge in not more than 60 seconds. All watertight doors must be kept closed except inexceptionalcircumstances.

InMay 1990, new amendments relating to the subdivision and damage stability of cargo ships(including freight-only ro-ro ships) were adopted, applying to ships of 100 metres or more inlength built after 1 February 1992. The amendments were based upon the so-called"probabilistic"conceptofsurvival,originallydevelopedthroughstudyofdatarelatingtocollisionscollectedbyIMO.

At its 16th Assembly in October 1989, IMO adopted resolution A.647(16), Guidelines onManagementfortheSafeOperationofShipsandforPollutionPrevention.

ThepurposeoftheseGuidelineswastoprovidethoseresponsiblefortheoperationofshipswithaframeworkfortheproperdevelopment,implementationandassessmentofsafetyandpollutionpreventionmanagementinaccordancewithgoodpractice.


3.3.11. MSC NAPOLI Name Date LocationMSCNapoli 18January2007 WesternChannelShipmanager P&IClub ClassificationSocietyZodiac Maritime AgencyLtd

LondonSteamshipOwnersMutualInsuranceAssociation

BureauVeritas(1991-2002)DerNorskeVeritas(2002)

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width Draught Owner

British 1991 275.67m 38.18m 13.52m MetvaleLimited

Shipyard Deadweight Engine Cargo Bunkerfuel

Marinediesel

SamsungShipbuilding&HeavyIndustriesCoLtd(Koje,SouthKorea)1991

1991 Sulzer-51,933horsepower

2,318containers(41,730tonnes)

3,512tonnes ofIFO380

MetvaleLimited

Accidentarea North of Trégastel,Côtesd’Amor

Causeofspill Structuraldamage

Productstransported

Variousgoods Quantitytransported

41,730tonnes

Typeofpollutants Variousgoods+bunkerfueloil

Quantitiesspilled

119containersofvariousgoods+50tonnesofIFO380+150tonnesofmarinedieseloil

Shiptype Containership Detailsontype Capacity:4500TEU

Theincident

On 18 January 2007, the UK-registered container ship MSC Napoli, on passage from Antwerp(Belgium)toSines(Portugal),wascaughtinsevereweatherconditions–Beaufortforce10to11southwesterlywinds,5to10metrewaves)atthewestendoftheEnglishChannel,andsufferedacrackinthehull,bothonportandstarboardsideslevelwiththebridge.


The leaks sprung flooded themachine room and the headmechanic decided to stop themainengine. The captain immediately transmitted a distress call at around10:30 (GMT) receivedbyFalmouthMRCCandCROSSCorsen,whoworkedtogethertocoordinateresponse.

TheFrenchNavyhelicopterSuperFrelonarrivedonsiteat10:53andconfirmedthepresenceofacrackinthehull.ThevesseldevelopedatlistandtheMasterorderedthecrewtoabandonshipat11:15. The French authorities requested assistance from the British Coastguards to rescue thecrew. In the early afternoon, two Royal Navy Sea King helicopters of 771 Squadron (RNAS,Culdrose)airliftedthe26crewmembers(includingseamenfromBulgaria,Ukraine,Turkey,IndiaandthePhilippines,aswellastwoyoungBritishcadets) tosafety,rescuingthemfromtheir lifeboatsdrifting100kmnorthofOuessantIsland.

Thiswasthebeginningofanaffairwhichwastolast924days.

TheMSCNapoli(Source:FrenchNavy)

Responseorganization

This incidentwas initially a purelymaritimematter. Search And Rescue (SAR) operationswereconducted at sea, initially in the French zone of the English Channel, until the SOSREP gavedirectionsforsalvageactionsinaccordancewiththeproceduresdescribedintheMancheplanandNCP.ThesettingupofresponseunitsandtheEnvironmentGroupwerealsoinaccordancewiththeNCP.

However, with the beaching of the vessel so close to land, the incident acquired a substantial‘land’component.Similarincidentshavebeenknowntohappeninthepast.HowevertheNapoliincidentwasonamuchlargerscalewiththepotentialhazardnotbeingonlyfromtheoil,butalsofromthedangerousgoodsonboardthevessel.

Due to theperceivedpotential risk to thepublic, amajor incidentplanprocedurewas invokedundertheleadofthePolice.TherewerethereforetworesponsestructuresinvolvedintheMSC


Napoli incident:theSOSREP,withtheSCUandtheMRCformarineresponseandthePoliceandLocal Resilience Forum (LRF) for land response. Each organization structure was valid for itspurposeandbothranalmostseparately,side-by-side.

Therewasobviouslyaneedforco-operationand information flowbetweenthetwostructures,butnoneedforonetobedominanttotheother.Becausethissituationhadnotpreviouslybeenexercised, and because therewas little knowledge of themarine aspectwithin the land-basedorganizations, therewassome initial confusionabout rolesandresponsibilities.However, theseinitialproblemswererapidlyovercomeandacombinedorganizationstructurewasevolved.

Responsetooilpollution

Duringtheperiodfromthebeginningoftowinguntilthevesselwasre-floatedonMonday9July2007, it isestimatedthat50 tonnesof the IFO-380gradeand150tonnesofMDOwere lost. Inaddition,untiltheendofoperationsonthewreck,therewasfurtherlossofacombinationofoil‘residues’, consisting of lubricating oil, MDO, gas oil, some IFO-380 and bilge oil, in varyingquantitiesaccordingtothetypesofoperations.Itisestimatedthatatotalof302tonnesofoilwaslostfromtheMSCNapoliin2007.

When the MSC Napoli was beached in Lyme Bay, a significant oil pollution risk emerged.Personnel andequipment from theMCAandprivate stockpileswere rapidlymobilisedand thisequipmentwasonsitefrom20January.Furthermore,followingtheactivationoftheMancheplan,theElanandtheArgonauteremainedonsiteuponrequestbytheUKauthorities.

The area was monitored by aerial surveillance and counter pollution measures were taken toprotectsensitivesitesbythedeploymentofbooms,aroundthevesselitselfandattheriversAxeandBritasprecautionarymeasures.Nomajoroilspillhappened,butseveralminoroilspillsweredealtwithpromptlyastheyoccurredduringtheperiodwhentheoilwasbeingpumpedout.Thelargest individualoil spill occurredon23 Januaryandwasestimated tohavebeenof9 tonnes.Approximatelyonetonneofdispersantwasusedtotreatthisspilledoilatsea.

Theoilwashedupontheshoreinsmallquantitieswasoftencombinedwithdebrisfromtheburstcontainers. DRSDemolition, the contractors appointed by the ship owner’s insurers, recoveredtheoilandoilydebrisfromtheshorefordisposalatEnvironmentAgencyapprovedsites.

The MCA reported that a single fuel tank containing 200 m3 was damaged and not entirelyemptied.Itwasdecidedthattheremaining3,512tonnesofIFOand152tonnesofMDOwouldberemoved. To do so, the Forth Fisher was chartered by Smit International.Pumping operationsbeganon23rd(almosthalfofthecargowaspumpedoutovertheweekend)andcontinueddayandnight,until6Februaryfromthevarioustanksandholdsonboard. ThehighviscosityoftheIFOmeantthatithadtobe“hottapped”priortopumpingandawaterinjectionsystemhadtobeused.Diverspluggedapipe leakon25th.Thisoperationmitigated themajorpollution riskand


someof thecounterpollutionmeansweredemobilised.Only themeansneeded to respond tominor spills remainedmobilised. Thesemeasureswere occasionally reinforcedwhen refloatingthewreckandinJulywhenusingexplosives.

On the French side, in late January, ten days after the beaching of the Napoli, the pollutionreachedthenorthcoastofBrittany,wheresurveyswerecarriedoutbyagentsfromCedre’spilotresponse and training team. Patties, some with a diameter of up to a metre, and tar ballssporadicallypolluted certainbeaches in the FinistèreandCôtes-d’Armorareasover aperiodoftendaysandalong100kmofcoastline.Theoilwasmixedwithsmallplasticpacketsofchocolatebiscuits.

SuspicionsoftheNapolihavingcausedthesearrivalswererapidlyconfirmedbychemicalanalysisof the fuel oil (conducted by LASEM and Cedre) as well as by the confirmation by the biscuitmanufacturerthatthiscargohadindeedbeenonboardthevessel(250,000packetsofchocolatebiscuits).ThesearrivalsmatchedupwiththeleaksoffueloilandthelossofcontainersduringthefirstfewhoursandduringtowingwhenthevesselwasstillinthewestendoftheChannel.Dailyoverflightsdidnotpickupthesescatteredtracesatsea,withtheexceptionofa fewinfrequentpatchesofsheenwhichnaturallydispersed.Anobservationandalertnetworkwassetupthroughthemobilisationofprofessionalfishermen,lifeboatpersonnelandsemaphores.

TheFrenchPolmarlandcontingencyplanwasnotactivated.Clean-upoperationswerecarriedoutbylocalpersonnel,mainlymanually.InearlyMarch,surveysconductedjointlybyrepresentativesof a private companywhich took part in clean-up, technical experts from ITOPF (InternationalTanker Owners Pollution Federation) contracted by the shipowner and agents from Cedreconcludedthatthebeacheswerecleanandthatfurtherclean-upoperationsonrockyforeshores,wherescatteredresidualtracesofweatheroilremained,wasinappropriate.

Vigipol,thejointunionfortheprotectionoftheBretonshoreline,thenthecommunityofPerros-Guirec and the region of Brittany decided tomake a claim against the pollution of the Bretonshoreline.

Lessonslearnt

The various reports drawn up by the MCA on the entire operation, CEFAS on environmentalimpact studies, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch on the causes and circumstancessurroundingtheaccidentandDevonCountyCouncilontheonlandrepercussionsofthebeachingoftheMSCNapoliprovidealargenumberoflessonstobelearntandrecommendations.

These indications cover awide range of aspects from shipbuilding regulations, severeweathershipping rules, container ships to response organisation at sea and on land, and theircoordination,all technicalaspectsof responseboth in termsofcounterpollutionmeasuresandwreckhandlingetc.Anarticlecouldbewrittenonthisdataalone.


TheMSCNapoliaccidenttouchesuponcertainverytopicalissues:containerships,containerslostoverboard, local involvement in themanagementofmarinepollution. The conceptofplacesofrefuge was put into practice. The UK authorities made a brave decision by beaching theMSCNapolinearthecoastatanemblematicsite.Giventheship'sconditionwhichwasthreateningtosplit, this option proved to be an effective way of reducing the impact of the pollution andfacilitatingremovalandpumpingoperations.Thelocalcommunitieswereinformedandinvolvedindecision-making,forinstanceforcertainsiteprotectionmeasures.Theywereconfrontedwiththeconceptofplacesofrefugeinpractice,withthefearoftheirenvironmentbeingsacrificed.

Finally,theefficientcooperationestablishedthroughtheMancheplanandtheBonnAgreement,aswellassupportthroughthemobilisationofpersonnelandequipment,areworthyofnote.

TheMSCNapoli(source:FrenchNavy)


3.3.12. NEW FLAME Name Date LocationNewFlame 12August2007 Gibraltar

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtPanamanian - - - -

Accidentarea OffEuropaPoint Causeofspill CollisionQuantitytransported

- Typeofpollutant Bunkerfueloil

Charterer - Shiptype Bulkcarrier

The Panamanian flagged bulk carrier New Flame collided bow to bow with the double hulledDanishoil products tanker TormGertrud1.5 kmoff EuropaPoint,Gibraltar, on themorningof12thAugust.Asa result, thebulker,whichwas carrying scrapmetal andaround700 tonnesofbunkers on board, began to sink by the bow. As the accident happened in relatively shallowwater, thevessel subsequently settledon thebottomwithbowsubmergedatadepthof30mandpartofitsdecksabovewater.

On Friday 31st August EMSA received a request for assistance from Spanish Authorities(SASEMAR).TheSpanishAuthoritiesrequestedoneoftheEMSAcontractedoilrecoveryvesselstoassistinsecuringpollutionresponsecapacityforresponseaction.Thenearestvesselavailableatthe timewas theEMSAcontracted tankerMistraBay,whichwas tasked,equippedand sent toAlgeciras Bay. The Mistra Bay has a recovered oil storage capacity of 1805 tonnes and thenecessarycargoheatingcapabilityneededtodischargerecoveredoil.

SASEMAR also requested EMSA to acquire any available satellite imagery via the CleanSeaNetservicetomonitorpossibleoilleakagefromthedamagedvessel.

In theweeks followingthecollision,780m3of fuelweresuccessfully removed fromthevessel.During theoperation, safetymeasures toprotect theenvironmentwere taken, including a 210metreboomandoil-skimmingequipmentplacedaroundthesternof thevesselandthebunkerbarge.Inaddition,oilspillresponseequipmentwasonstandby.Nooilslickwasdetectedontheseasurfaceduringtheoperation.

On22December2007,asthevesselcontinuedtoawaitremoval,itbrokeintwo.TheGovernmentofGibraltarcontactedasecondsalvagecompanywhoseteamsarrivedonsite in lateDecember2007.

On10February2008,thesternoftheNewFlamesank,causingTitanSalvage’splantoberevised.


On23March2008, thebargeBig Foot1,whichhadbeen involved inunloading the containersfromtheMSCNapoliin2007,arrivedonsitefromRotterdam.

EarlyAugust, the ship’s after sectionwas removedandplacedon thedock. Thebowwas thenremovedon3October.

The3December2009markedtheendofwreckremovaloperations.94%ofthecargoand68%ofthefragmentsofwreckhadbeenremoved. Itwasdecidedthatthefragmentsremainingontheseafloorwouldbelefttopreventcausingmoredamagethangoodtotheenvironment.

EuropeanParliamentresolutionof24April2008ontheNewFlameshipwreckanditsconsequencesinAlgecirasBay

(2009/C259E/10)

TheEuropeanParliament,

—havingregardtoArticles71,80and251oftheEUTreaty,

— having regard to its previous readings on the maritime packages and its resolutions onmaritimesafety,

—having regard to its resolutionof12 July2007ona futuremaritimepolicy for theEuropeanUnion:aEuropeanvisionfortheoceansandseas,

—havingregardtoRule103(4)ofitsRulesofProcedure,

A.whereasoneoftheprioritiesofEUlegislationisthemaintenanceofasafeandpollution-freeenvironmentfortheoceansandseas,especiallyasregardstheMediterranean,

B.whereason12August2007acollisionoccurrednearthecoastofGibraltarbetweenadouble-hulledoiltankerandthebulkcarrierNewFlameresultedinthesinkingofthelatter,

C.whereasaccidentsofthiskinddonothavethesameenvironmentalimpactasthosebetweentankers,butstillgiverisetosocialconcern,

D. whereas, as regards the New Flame, the Spanish and the UK authorities as well as theGovernment ofGibraltar have given the EuropeanMaritime Safety Agency (EMSA) informationabouttheaccident,

E.whereasSpainhashadtheanti-pollutionvesselDonIndiapositionedinthebaysince13August2007,


F.whereasbunkeringincoastalwatersdoesnotinitselfconstituteabreachofEUenvironmentallaw and could only give rise to pollution if it were handled in an unprofessional mannerdisregardingtheprotectionoftheenvironmentorinbadseaconditions,

G.whereas bunkering activities are regulated by the respective national laws applicable in thearea,

H.whereastheeventualsplitting-upofthevesselcouldnotonlypollutetheseabedandtheseabutalsodamagenearbyfishinggroundsandtourismonthecoasts,

I.whereasatpresenttheNewFlame, lyingontheseabedandcontaining42000tonnesof loadandatleast27000tonnesofscrapmetal,couldaffectwaterquality,addingtotheconcentrationin the area, unknown to the public, of heavymetals of an uncertain nature, andwhereas it isthereforedifficulttodeterminethefullenvironmentalimpact,

J.whereasnocasualtieshaveoccurredandnomajorpollutionhasbeendetected followingthecollisionbetweenthetwoships;whereas,however,environmentalthreatscouldstillremain,

K.whereasinthevicinityoftheStraitsofGibraltarthereareareasprotectedbytheNatura2000network,suchasthesiteofCommunityimportanceES6120012,knownastheFrenteLitoraldelEstrechodeGibraltar,whichisseriouslyaffectedeverydaybythebunkeringundertakentherein,

L.whereasParliament long agoadopted its amendments at first readingon the thirdmaritimepackage,containingsevenlegislativeproposals,

1. CallsontheCommissiontoforwardtoParliamentalltheinformationonthecaseofthe New Flame provided by the competent national and regional authorities, especially thatreferringtotherequestforadditionalresources,suchasanti-pollutionvesselstobeprovidedbytheCommunityaidmechanism in the fieldofcivilprotectionassistance interventions, includingaccidental marine pollution, established by Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom of 8November2007establishingaCommunitymechanismtofacilitatereinforcedcooperationincivilprotectionassistance interventions ,whichaims toplaceat thedisposalof theMemberStates,whenrequestedbythecountryaffectedbythewreck,anti-contaminationshipsoperatingundertheaegisoftheEMSA;

2. WelcomestheparticipationoftheAndalusianregionalandlocalauthoritiesonthissubject, in accordance with Parliament’s recommendations on the EU maritime policy for theparticipationoflocalandregionalauthorities;

3. Takesnote that theGovernmentofGibraltar, theUKand theSpanishauthoritiesexpressedtheirwillingnesstocollaboratewithintheForumofDialogueonGibraltar inthemost


effectivewayinordertomanagetheaccidentanditsconsequencesforthemaritimeandcoastalenvironment;

4. UnderlinestheswiftnessandefficiencyoftheEMSAinreactingtotherequestforassistance made by the Spanish authorities immediately after the accident; stresses thatParliamenthasconstantlyadvocatedincreasedoperationalandfinancialresourcesfortheEMSA,andthatmorevesselswillbeavailableforassistance inthevariousmaritimeregionsoftheEU;callsontheCommissionandtheEMSAtogivetheir full support toenvironmentalprotection inthis threatened area, in line with the environmental objectives laid down in the relevant EUlegislationandinternationalinstruments;

5. CallsontheCommission,initsroleas‘guardianoftheTreaties’,toverifywhetherthe competent authorities complied correctly with their obligations under Articles 2, 3, 6, 10,80(2), 174(1), 174(2) and 175(4) of the EU Treaty so as to avoid the catastrophe, and, ifappropriate,toadoptthenecessarylegalmeasuresthatwouldstemfromsuchanaction;

6. Encourages all efforts andmeasures that could be taken by the UK and Spanishauthorities, theGovernmentofGibraltar, theport authorities ofAlgeciras andGibraltar and allrelevantactorsinordertomanageinthemostresponsiblewayalltheactivitiescarriedoutintheBay;

7. Stresses, followingpollution theoriginofwhichstillneeds tobeclarified, thatallrelevantauthoritiesmanagingtheBayanditscoastandtheoperationstosalvagetheNewFlamemust remain extremely vigilant concerning potential opportunist and illegal emptying of fueltanksandballastwaters;

8. Underlines that the thirdmaritime package, still at the first reading stage in theCouncil,onwhichParliamentadopteditspositionmorethanayearagoandinrespectofwhichitiswillingtomoveforwardandconcludethesevenlegislativeprocedures,providestheEUwithallnecessary tools for the prevention of maritime incidents and the management of theconsequencesofsuchincidents,includinginparticularprovisionsforthemonitoringofmaritimetraffic and the investigation of accidents; insists on the need to ensure efficient cooperationbetweenneighbouringports;

9. Asks theCommission tocallon thecompetentauthorities toprovide informationconcerning the contentof the cargoand to indicatewhat theplansand time-schedulesare forremovalofthevesselfromtheBayandformonitoringtheriskofpollutionwhichcouldstemfromthecargo,andtoforwardsuchinformationtoParliament;

10. UrgestheCommissiontocallonthoseMemberStateswhichhavenotyetdonesotoratifythe2001InternationalConventiononCivilLiabilityforBunkerOilPollutionDamageandtoensureenforcementoftheEUlegislationonthissubject;


11. ReiteratesitscallontheCommissiontosubmitaproposaltoParliamentandtotheCouncilassoonaspossibleinordertoensurethatbunkeroilforenginefuelinnewshipsisstoredinsafer,double-hulltanks;

12. Reiterates its request for an EU directive on improving the quality of maritimefuels; welcomes the recent agreement within the International Maritime Organization on theintroductionofaproposalforlegislationinthisregardby1January2010;

13. Encourages the Commission to propose improvements to the legislation on theprotection of environmentally sensitive cross-bordermarine areas, including stronger (satellite)surveillanceandmonitoringofships;

14. Suggests to the Commission that it intervene with the competent national andregionalauthoritieswithaviewtoreachinganagreementonapublicperformanceprotocolinthearea of the Straits of Gibraltar and particularly in the Bay of Algeciras, similar to the existingbilateralandregionalagreementsconcludedbetweencoastalstates,whichwouldprovidemutualassistanceintheeventofamaritimepollutionincident;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission,theEuropeanMaritime

3.3.13. OLIVA Name Date LocationOliva 16March2011 Tristan da Cunha (Brasil

overseasterritory)Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width OperatorMalta 2099 225m 32m TMSBulkersAccidentarea NightingaleIsland Causeofspill GroundingQuantitytransported

60,000tonnes Producttransported Soyabeans

Typeofpollutant Heavy fuel oil(bunkerfuel)

Shiptype Bulkcarrier

Quantityspilled 1,500tonnes Owner TMSBulkersTheincident

On 16March 2011, at 4:30 am, theOliva ran aground onNightingale Island, halfway betweenArgentinaandSouthAfrica,intheSouthernAtlantic.Thebulkcarrier,enrouteforSingaporewithacargoofsoyabeans,founditselfstuckontheruggednortherncoastoftheisland.


Source:GoogleMaps

The following day, the 22 crewmembers were evacuated onto the Edinburgh with assistancefrom the shipPrinceAlbert II. Theassistance tug SmitAmandla left CapeTownwith a teamofenvironmentalexpertsonboard.

Before their arrival on 21March, theweather conditions caused theOliva to break up, on themorningof18March.Thesternsankandthebunkeroil(1500tonnesofheavyfueloil)wasspilt.Nightingale Island was hit by the pollution. The coasts ofMiddle, Stoltenhoff and InaccessibleIslandswerealsooiled.

Response

On 18March, an assessment team, led by the Administrator of Tristan da Cunha, travelled toNightingale.Anawfulscenewasreported,withoilslicksstretchingaround8milesoffshoreandallaroundtheisland.

Meanwhile,theTristanConservationTeamwerebusycleaningoiledRockhopperPenguins.

On 6 April, two experts from the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited(ITOPF)andLeFlochDépollution (LFD)arrivedon the island.Followingsurveys,aclean-upplanwasproduced.Thisplanrecommendedtheuseofhighpressurehoses(withwarmedseawater)toremovetheoildepositedatthesurfaceandincracks inrocks.Thisoilwasthenchannelledtoacollectionpointsurroundedbyboomstopreventthepollutantfromflowingbackintothemarineenvironment.Theoilwasrecoveredusing"pompom"sorbents.ThewastewasbaggedandsenttoCapeTowntobetreated.

The porous nature of the rock on this volcanic island was a challenge for clean-up. Smallquantitiesofoilhadseepedintotherockandcouldnotberemoved.Theteamscountedonthefactthattheextremewinterconditionsshouldclearthelasttracesofpollution.

Ecologicaltreat


Thisincidentthreatenedtheisland'ssensitivebiologicalbalance.Theislandsarehometoalargenumberofseabirdsand itswatersarerich incrayfishandTristanRockLobster, themainstayofTristan da Cunha's economy. Nightingale Island also hosts one of the largest colonies ofRockhopper Penguins, an endangered species. Some 20,000 penguins were threatened by thespill.TheRoyalSocietyfortheProtectionofBirds(RSPB),theSouthernAfricanFoundationfortheConservation of Coastal Birds (SANCCOB), the Tristan Da Cunha Conservation Team as well asmany volunteers did a remarkable job in rescuing the oiled birds. Staffweremobilised to feedthem,careforthemandcleanthem.

InlateApril,afterthedepartureofexpertson23April,certainshoresofNightingale,InaccessibleandMiddleIslandshadnotbeeninspectedorcleanedup.Theinaccessibilityofthearchipelago'sislands impeded the implementation of response actions. No survey of the wreck had beenconductedeither.Thereiscurrentlynoconfirmationofthestateofthecargo.BylateMay,threemonths after the arrival of the first oiled birds, 3718 Rockhopper Penguins had enteredrehabilitation.381ofthemweresafelyreturnedtosea.Thislowsurvivalratecanbeexplainedbythefactthatthebirdswereattheendoftheirmoultingcyclewhenthespilloccurred.Theywerethereforehungry,thirstyandattheirweakest.

SinkingoftheOliva


3.3.14. PRESTIGE Name Date LocationPrestige 13November2002 SpainShipmanager P&IClub ClassificationSocietyUniverse Maritime Ltd(Greece)

LondonSteamshipAssociation

AmericaBureauofShipping

Flag Dateofbuilt

Length Width Draught Owner

Bahamas 1976 243.5m - 14m Mare Shipping Inc.(Liberia)

Accidentarea Off Cape Finisterre,Galicia

Causeofspill Structuraldamage

Typeofpollutants heavy fuel oil (n°2,M100)

Quantitytransported

77,000tonnes

Shipyard HitachiZosen-MaizuruWorks,Maizuru(Japan)

Quantitiesspilled

64,000tonnes

Shiptype OilTanker Detailsontype Singlehull

Theaccident

OnWednesday13November2002,thesingle-hulledoiltankerPrestige,flyingtheBahamasflag,sentadistresscalloffshoreintheregionofCapefinisterre(Galicia,Spain).Thetanker,carrying77,000tonnesofheavyfueloilloadedinStPetersburg(Russia)andVentspils(Latvia),washeadingtoSingaporeviaGibraltar.Thevesseldevelopedareported30degreestarboardlistwhilstonpassageinheavyseasandstrongwindsandhencerequestedpartialevacuationofthecrew.

Twenty-fourofthetwenty-sevencrewmemberswereevacuatedbyhelicopterwhilethecaptain,thefirstmateandthechiefmechanicstayedonboard.Theenginewasdamagedandtheshipwentoutofcontrolanddriftedaccordingtotheweatherconditions.Aerialobservationrevealedafuelleakatsea.


Theprestigesinking(source:BSAM/Douanesfrançaises)

Allnightlong,thetugboatsRiadeVigo,AlonsodeChaves,CharucaSilveiraandIbaizabalIfromSASEMAR(SociedaddeSalvamentoySeguridadMaritima),theSpanishorganizationinchargeofsearescueandpollutioncontrol,triedtotaketheoiltankerintow.

Theemergency towing systemof the shipdidn’twork and thedifferent attempts failed. In theend,thePrestigewastakenintowbyashipfromSmitSalvageon14November.Itwastowedtothenorth-northwestallday,andthentothesouth.Onthe15th,itwastornover35metresontherightside.Onthe16th,itstowingwasturnedtothesouth-westtoavoidthePortuguesewaters.Onthe19that9am,thevesselbrokeintwo,coordinates42°15Nand12°08W,about130nauticalmilesoff theSpanishcoasts,west-southwestofCapeFinisterre.At12pm,thesternpartof thePrestigesankinto3500metresofwater.Thebowpartfollowedatabout4pm.


MapshowingmovementsofthePrestige(Source:Frenchcustoms)

Oneofthecharacteristicsofthisspillwastheweatheringprocessoftheoilthatremainedoutatseaforaconsiderableperiodoftime.Thisspillwas"unique"inmanyrespects,firstwithregardtodrift, as it was really the very first time that a spill managed to contaminate 6 countries, andweathering,nottomentionthehighlysignificanteffectoftheslickbreak-upprocessandhowthathadaneffectonthechoiceofresponsemeasuresandtechniquesoffshoreandtheninevitablyonshore.

TheoffendingoilwastrackedthroughouttheentiretimeitwasdriftinginandaroundtheBayofBiscayandthewesternmostreachesoftheEnglishChannel,thankstoFrenchandSpanishfloatingbuoys and ship-based and aerial data thatwas fed into various slick drift forecastmodels. Themain slick spilt up into so many smaller ones on account of the wind and current regimesprevailing in the area that the oil drifted seemingly forever before eventually landing on thebeachesinFranceandeventhenonlyafteraperiodofsteadywesterlywinds.

LegalProceedings

Thecourtcasebeganon16OctoberinACoruña(Spain).Afewfigures:1,500claimantsforming55 civil parties, 300,000 pages of documents, 133 witnesses, around 100 experts, 4 maindefendants:theGreekcaptainoftheoiltanker,thefirstmate,thechiefengineerandtheformerhead of the Spanish merchant navy. Some of them risk up to a 12-year prison sentence for


damage to the environment and to a protected natural area. The judges sought to assignresponsibilitytotheSpanishadministration.

Some other figures: 1,140 oiled beaches, 2,900 km of coastline affected in France, Spain andPortugalandbetween115,000and230,000deadbirds.

InFrance,17coastalcommunesintheLandesareaaffectedbythepollutionjoinedforcestoforma civil party. The Spanish state, unlike France, does not recognise environmental damages andmanyFrenchvictimscouldthereforenotmakeclaims.Theclaimantscalledfortherepairofnon-economiclosses.Inthisrespect,theyclaimed€2.8millionforLesLandes,€3.4forVendéeand€1millionforBrittany.

Twodays after it opened, the casewas adjourneduntil 13November2013. This request, fromdefencelawyerswhodisputedtheevidenceandexpertisepresented,wasacceptedbythejudge.

After 8months of hearings and eleven years to the day since the accident, the Spanish judgedelivered his verdict to A Coruña provincial court on 13th November 2013. The captain, chiefmechanic and the head of the Merchant Navy at the time were found not guilty of causingdamage to the environment and to natural protected areas. The fourth defendant, the secondofficer,isontherun.Thecourtcouldnotformallyestablishanycriminalresponsibility.Giventhatno criminal liability was found, the Spanish court dismissed the compensation claims by theFrenchandSpanishStatesfordamagesvaluedataround€4billion.

Only the captainwas found guilty of any charge, andwas sentenced to 9months in prison for"seriousdisobedienceofauthority":hehadinitiallyrefusedtohavethevesseltowedouttoseaatthetimeoftheaccident.Duetohisage,the78-year-oldwillnotservehissentence.

ThisacquittalmetwithgeneraloutrageinSpainandinthehoursfollowingitsannouncementthesocialnetworkTwitterexplodedwithfuriousreactionstowardsthecaptain,thecourtandSpanishpoliticians.Vigipol,thejointunionfortheBretonshoreline,denouncedtherulingandannouncedthatitwouldexaminethepossibilitiesofappealagainstthisdecision.

On 18th November 2013, the Spanish State announced that it was to appeal to the SpanishSupreme Court over the verdict on the exemption of civil liability. The Spanish State did notquestiontheverdictonthecaptain'scriminalresponsibility.

On22ndNovember,theFrenchStatealsolodgedanappeal,forthesamereasonsasSpain.ThecostforFrenchvictimstotalledanestimated€110million,€68millionofwhichwasbornebytheStateforpollutionresponse.

OilResponseatSea

FromNovemberthe14th,theBiscayPlan,aFranco-SpanishplanofinterventionavailableinthecaseofanaccidentintheAtlanticocean,wastriggered...


Co-ordination of the national and international fight at sea means was ensured by SASEMAR(organizationwhich isdependentontheboardofthemerchantnavyoftheSpanishMinistryofTransport)ontheSpanishareaofresponsibilityandbythe‘Préfecturemaritimedel’Atlantique’whenslicksenteredintotheFrenchareaofresponsibility.

Oil recovery operations

FromNovemberthe14th,theBiscayPlan,aFranco-Spanishplanofinterventionavailableinthecase of an accident in the Atlantic ocean , was triggered. Nautical and aerial means from theFrenchNavyandCustomswereimmediatelyputatthedisposaloftheSpanishauthorities.OtherEuropeanmeanswerealsocalledforhelp.Onthe10thofDecember,20planesandhelicopters,of which 15 Spanish and 5 European ones helped to locate the oil slicks and to guide the oil-fighting vessels. At sea, 23 Spanish and 13 European ships were involved in the recovery andlocation operations. As fast as the oil slicks scattered and broke up, then they have beencompletedbysmaller shipscoming fromthe fishermen’sguild.Onthe20thofDecember2002,two collaboration agreementswere signed between the SpanishMinistry of Transport and thefishermen’s guild of La Coruña and Lugo. The harbourmaster’s offices of each guild organizedeverydaytheworkoftheboatsandmenaccordingtotheoilslicks locatedbytheaerialmeansdeployedatthesceneoftheactionduringtheirresearch.


Aboard the Ailette, containment and recovery with the Transrec device

At the end of December, 29 planes and helicopters, of which 26 are Spanish and 3 other areforeignones,wereatwork.ThemaritimedeploymentnexttothecoastsofGaliciaandCantabriawascomposedof36ships;23Spanishand13Europeanones.Fromthe23rdofJanuary2003,theEuskadifishingfleetbroughtitsdeterminationandnumber(uptomorethan300boats/day)intoanunprecedentedoilrecoveryoperationbyfishingboats.

A command vessel complete with a helicopter was a real asset when it came to slickreconnaissance,tacticalco-ordinationandguidingresponsevesselstothesceneofoperationsfortheFrenchauthorities(PortAdmiral).

This phase of the response initiative was unparalleled andwithout precedent in the annals ofpollution response in terms of the resources used, the time scale involved and the quantitiesspilled.

It isworthmentioningthatthededicationanddeterminationoftheFrenchNavytorecovertheoil spilled by the Erika had paved the way for the Prestige response operation and the BalticCarrierincidenthadalreadyproventheneedforthiskindofoperation.ThePrestigespillandtheattendant response initiativewas technically justified and required apoolingofmanpower andequipmentattheEuropeanlevel.


TheNeuwerkanditssweepingarm,Dec.2002.SourceCCME,Germany.

Itwastheensuingfateoftheoilandhowitbehavedinthemarineenvironmentthatdictatedthechoiceoftechniques,equipmentandmaterialstocontendwithit.Therecanbenodoubtthatifspecialised resources were to be brought to bear on an ever fragmenting oil slick that wasconstantly breaking up into smaller and smaller oily patches, that manual techniques andresourcesalsohadtobefieldedastheoilspreadwiderandwiderovertheentireareaoftheBayofBiscay.

Thelearningcurve

The sea recovery phasewent ratherwell despite badweather conditions and 52000 tonnes ofemulsionwererecoveredascomparedwithonly1200tonnesduringtheErikaspill.Itisclearthatinsuchconditionsthewindowsofopportunityareshortandeitherresponseunitshavetoheadforshelterorrideoutthebadweatherandenduremuchhardshipbothforthecrewandvesselsalike.Asaresult,whenweatherconditionspermit,allresponseequipmentandsystemshavetobe very efficient in terms of deployment times, containment and recovery capacity and be asselectiveaspossiblewhenrecoveringoil.Thisrequiresreliableequipmentcapableofbeingusedondifferenttypesofoilsbyskilledcrews.AlltheresponseteamsthatdealtwiththeErikagainedagreatdealofexperiencefromtheoperation.

Fromthesafetypointofview,recoverysystemsmustonlyrequireaminimumnumberofpeoplefordeploymentespeciallyasdecksareoftenveryslipperyonaccountofthecrudeoil.Dedicatedresponse vessels will also need to have a full range of systems that contribute to ensuring apowerfulcollectioncapability(oilheatingsystem,settlingtanks,HPhotwater....)suchthatfutureresponse designs and refurbishment programmes will make a better job of integrating all therequirements for high seaoperations conductedby response vessels. Ensuring success for high


sea response operations is going to be contingent on implementing high standard responseorganisations, matching resources to the job at hand and supplying suitable and powerfulrecoverysystems.ThewaytheBasquesgearedtheirusualanchovyfishingprocedurestodealingwithoilrecoveryisanexcellentexampleofadaptability(cfcontra)

Havingvesselsonhandfromtheoutsetofanoperationassoonastheyareneededandevenifweather conditions arenot idealwillmake a difference as theywill be able tomobilise theoilwhichwillnothavespreadtoomuchandthusbeeasiertospotandpump.TheFrenchnavyvesselAilette, soon on the scene thanks to a very efficient international co-operation agreement,managedamuchbetter«score»onday1ascomparedwithhersubsequentrecoveryattempts.

A Lamor brush skimmer, Dec. 2002.


AThomseaskimmernet,Jan.2003.

First conceived of during the Erika spill and much more fully developed during the Prestigeincident,thenewtwocurtainortwophasesearecoveryconceptcameintoitsown.Thisinvolvesdeploying requisite high sea response capabilities when the oil is still far from land and thenengaginginshorevesselsandrecoverysystemsastheoilnearsthebeaches.

PumpingtheslickwithaFoilexskimmer,Nov.2003.


SupportprovidedbySYCOPOL:adaptingthelessonslearnedfromtheErikaspill.

Sycopol was approached by some of its member companies that had been contacted by thenational authorities for assistance in combating the oil pollution and cleaning up the coastlinepollutedbythePrestige.AfterrespondingseveraltimesinNovember2002onGaliciancoastlines,responseoperationsontheFrenchcoastlinestartedatthestartofJanuary2003.Fromthatpointon,allSycopolcompaniesinvolvedintheresponseeffortupuntilDecember2003hadtolearntoadapt:

Ø to the environment, first of all. They also had to get used to the different kinds of sandencountered in the field,dryorwet (tides) finegrainorcoarsegrained,ambient temperatures,10°CinJanuaryand30°CinJuly,thepollutantthatwaseitherhardorsoftwhichalsocomplicatedmattersintermsofaccesswhichwashardtofindandnoteasytonavigatesoastoshuttlemenandequipmentandevacuatetherecoveredmaterialsafterwards

Ø to the various difficulties encountered from the tourist and political points of view, requiringprioritiesthatdidnotnecessarilyhaveanyrelationshipwithpollutionresponserequirementsandtherefore involved mobilising and demobilising people and equipment which wasted time formany

Ø totheparticularitiesoftheoilspilledbythePrestigewhichbeachedallthetimeoveraspaceofanumberofmonthsandthatpollutedaverylongstretchofcoastlinewhichmeantbigvariationsinterms of manpower and equipment requirements throughout the entire response operation.Sycopol member companies had to adapt to the response organisation and the equipmentprovidedbytheauthoritiesduringthefirstfewweeksoftheeffortandthereafterhadtoadapttothezoneco-ordinationmeasuresputinplacebyregionalandlocalauthorities.

Beach clean-up (Source: Cedre)


Workcarriedoutonprivateworksites.

Thanks to the constant effort made to adapt to an ever changing environment and using anumber of techniques or equipment for the very first time on an operational scale, SycopolcompanymemberswereabletomakeadifferencetotheentireresponseoperationallalongthecoastlineandmakeacontributiontomitigatingtheeffectsofthespillontheamenitiesduringthesummerseasondespitethemassivearrivalsofFOinJuly2003.

Recruitmentofprivateresponseteams(men/days)inbothDefenceAreasin2003.


EuropeanCommunityInvolvement

Immediatelyafterthecasualtywasreported,afullcomplementofmanpowerandresourceswasmadeavailabletotheFrench,SpanishandPortugueseauthorities...

The Prestige incident occurred on 13 November 2002 as the 26 year old tanker, flying theBahamasflagwithaLiberiancrew,carrying77000tonnesofheavyFOsustainedhulldamageandspranga leakoffshoreGalicia. The tanker finallybrokeupon19November2002and sank270kmsofftheSpanishcoast.

From the outset, the Commission was in close contact with the Spanish authorities and theCommissions Civil Protection Unit provided regular situation updates to competent nationalauthoritiesofmemberstatesaswellasinsidetheCommission.

After receiving requests from Spain, Portugal and France the Community Civil ProtectionMechanism sent out eight different requests for assistance for dedicated response vessels,planes,equipmentandexpertstocombatthespill.

Thefirstrequestwassentouton14November2002andthelastonewassentouton9January2003. Immediately after the casualty was reported, a full complement of manpower andresources was made available to the French, Spanish and Portuguese authorities. France, theNetherlands, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Norway and Denmark sent their dedicated pollutionresponsevessels.

PollutioninMuxiavillageinNovember2002.(Source:Cedre)


CapeFinisterrebeachinNovember2002.(Source:Cedre)

Furthermore, in thespaceofdays,a considerableamountofboomswasmadeavailable to theSpanishauthorities(20kilometres).From17Novemberto2Decemberandinco-ordinationwiththe Spanish authorities, the Commissions Information andMonitoring Centre acquired satelliteimagery of the area as part of the provisions of the International Charter on Space andMajorCatastrophes.

Subsequently,theCommission’sJointResearchCentreatIspraconductedaninitialanalysisoftheimagery. In conjunctionwith the Spanish authorities, the Commission organised a field trip forobservers frommostmember states to visit Galicia from 24 to 27November 2002. Theyweregovernmentexperts andwere able toacquire first-handexperience for this typeof emergencysituation.

TheCommissionofferedtosendaCo-ordinationandAssessmentTeammadeupofexpertsmadeavailable by member states but the Spanish authorities declined the offer. The team’s remitwouldhavebeentohandlespecificproblemsdefinedbytheSpanishauthoritiessuchashighsearesponse, onshore response, assessment of cleaning techniques. Furthermore the CommissionofferedtosendapanelofEuropeanexpertstoassisttheSpanishScientificCommitteeinchargeof dealing with the wreck. After the spill and response operation were over the Commissionoffered to co-fund the Environmental impact and assessment Programme conducted by theSpanish authorities in Galicia with a view to assessing preventive and response measuresimplementedduringtheclean-upoperation.Thisassessmentwasnotconducted.

Slickdriftobservationsandforecast


Accurateslickdriftinformationisessentialtoefficientpollutionrecoveryatseaandresponseonthecoastline.FromNovemberthe13th,Cedreactivated itscooperationagreementwithMétéoFrance,andstartedproducingdriftforecastchartsforthePréfetMaritimeoftheAtlanticthankstotheMothymodel.AttherequestofSASEMAR,Cedrewasalsopreparingadailypositionchartof the hydrocarbons observed at sea.OnNovember the 18th, a SASEMAR engineer joined themap-makingunit situated inBrest for anurgent technology transfer. From this date, SASEMARproduceddailyapositionchartoftheobservedpollution.

OnmotivationoftheGeneralSecretariatforthesea,thedriftforecastunitwassoonturnedintoanational ‘drift’ committee with representatives of SHOM (Oceanographical and HydrographicServiceoftheFrenchnavy),IFREMERandthemaritimeprefectureoftheAtlantic.Thecommitteemembers met every day at Cedre’s to prepare a chart gathering the nautical and aerialobservations of the pollution and the drift forecast available for four days. This chart wasaccepted as the national reference. It has enabled to follow the route of the hydrocarbons, toanticipatethethreatforthecoastsandtoguidetheshipsinterveningatsea.

DriftforecastbasedonaMétéoFrancecomputermodeling

On its side, from December the 2nd, the Portuguese Hydrographic Institute produced a driftforecastcharteveryday.FinallyAZTI,theSpanishBasqueCountrytechnologyinstituteforfishingand food resources, contributeddaily, fromDecember the8th,a comprehensivememorandum


whichcovered thenortherncoastofSpain. Itgathereda reportandweather forecast, theslickevolution, the French drift committee forecast, its own forecast and the drift of the buoysdroppedbytheinstituteinthemidstofthemainfuelaccumulationsobservedatsea.

Anytimediscrepanciesappearedbetweenthedifferentforecastcharts.Theusedreferencedatawere compared through telephone and email exchanges, to produce the best possibleinformation, as a clear-cut demonstration of the advantages of direct cooperation betweennational institutions. The location charts and the forecast were established from aerialobservationsmadebyplanesandhelicopters,fromobservationsmadebyinterventionshipsandby the monitoring of the surface or subsurface buoys. These buoys have been implementeddirectly by SASEMAR, SHOM and AZTI or in the scope of SASEMAR/Cedre and AZTI/Cedrecooperations.

For the slick location and the guiding of the vessels towards the intervention areas, thefishermen’sguildof theBasqueCountryadapted themethod theyuse to locate fish schools.Aplanecoveredtheareabygoingbackandforthperpendicularlytothecoast,pointingoutontheGPS system the observed hydrocarbon accumulations. Then the headquarters visualized on acomputerscreen thedifferentspotsobservedand theship locationon thesceneof theaction.Next,theyonlyhadtoguidebysatellitephone,shipswhichwerethenearestoftheworkareas.

THEPRESTIGE.IMOSTATEMENT

ThePrestigeincidenthasbeenfollowedcloselybyIMOsinceeventsbegantounfoldsomedaysago.TheIMOSecretariatestablishedcontactimmediatelywiththeauthoritiesofSpainandwiththeFlagStateauthoritiesoftheBahamas.Asinanysituationsuchasthis,theprimeconcernsofIMO have been for the safety of human life and the protection of the marine environment.Despite theadverseconditions,nohuman lifehasbeen lost in this incidentandthesearchandrescue authorities of Spain deserve much credit for dealing with this matter promptly andeffectively and in accordance with the provisions of IMO instruments, in particular theInternationalConventiononMaritimeSearchandRescue.

Once assurances concerning the safety of the ship's crew had been received, the focus ofattention turned to the protection of the marine environment. The Spanish authorities wereadvised that any assistance which the Organization might be able to offer would be madeavailableontheirrequest.

Regulatoryregime


The Prestige was subject to a comprehensive regime of safety and environmental regulations,includingthoseofthemainIMOConventions,i.e.theSafetyofLifeatSeaConvention(SOLAS)andthe International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), to both ofwhichtheFlagStateoftheBahamasisaParty.

IMO'smain concernnow is to establish, as quickly and as thoroughly as possible, exactlywhatwentwronginthiscasesothattheeffectivenessoftheregulatoryframeworkthatIMOhasputinplace can be properly assessed and action taken, if need be, to rectify any weaknesses ordeficienciesidentified.UndertheprovisionsofSOLASandMARPOL,theFlagStateAdministrationis required to conduct an investigation into serious casualties. The Flag State authoritiesof theBahamasare thereforeurged toexpedite their investigation into the incident andprovide IMOwiththeirfindings,conclusionsandrecommendations.

Phasing-outofsingle-hulltankers

TherevisedMARPOLConventioncontainsatimetablebywhichsingle-hulltankerswillbephased-out in favour of double-hull ships. The Prestige was a single-hull tanker built in 1976, that isbeforetheMARPOLConvention(whichhadbeenadoptedin1973)enteredintoforcein1982.InApril2001,thePartiestotheMARPOLConventionagreedtoacceleratethetimetableforphasingoutexistingsingle-hull tankers ina revised regulation13Gof thatConvention.According to therevisedregulation,whichenteredintoforceinternationallyinSeptember2002,single-hulltankersbuiltin1976wouldberequiredtobescrappedby2005.

Surveyandinspection

Inadditiontotheirroutineannualandothersurveys,since1995alltankersandbulkcarriersagedfive years and over have been subject to a specially enhanced inspection programmewhich isintendedtoensurethatanydeficiencies-suchascorrosionorwearandtearresultingfromageorneglect-aredetected.Guidelinesonenhancedsurveysontankersandbulkcarriersarecontainedin IMO Assembly resolution A.744(18), which was adopted in November 1993 and has beensubsequentlyamended.In1994itwasgivenmandatorystatusundertheSOLASConvention.

Placesofrefuge

IntheaftermathoftheincidentinvolvingthefullyladentankerCastorwhich,inDecember2000,developedastructuralproblemintheMediterraneanSea,IMOSecretary-GeneralWilliamO'Neil


suggested that the timehad come for theOrganization toundertake, as amatterofpriority, aglobal consideration of the problem of places of refuge for disabled vessels and adopt anymeasures required to ensure that, in the interests of safety of life at sea and environmentalprotection, coastal States reviewed their contingency arrangements so that such ships areprovidedwithassistanceand facilitiesasmightbe required in thecircumstances.SeeAssemblyResolution949and950,December2003.

Followingadecisionby IMO'sMaritimeSafetyCommittee that, atpresent, the issue shouldbeconsideredfromtheoperationalsafetypointofview,theSub-CommitteeonSafetyofNavigationhaspreparedtwodraftAssemblyresolutionswhichareforapprovalbytheMSCearlynextmonth.They include a set of Guidelines which state clearly what actions should be taken by ships'Masters,coastalStatesandFlagStates incaseswhereshipsareinneedofassistance.TheyalsorecommendtheestablishmentbycoastalStatesofMaritimeAssistanceServicestobemobilizedinrelevantcases.TheyhavebeendesignedtoprovideaframeworkbywhichGovernmentswillbeabletoassesseachcaseonitsmeritsandmakethemostappropriatedecisions.

Oil-spillclean-up

As a Party to the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), Spain has established a national system for dealing with pollutionincidents,eithernationallyorinco-operationwithothercountries.TheOrganizationisawarethatthesystemisregularlytestedthroughperiodicexercises.AndalthoughSpainiswellprepared,apollution incidentof thismagnitude requires internationalassistancewhich, inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofOPRC,SpainhasobtainedfromitsfellowEuropeancountries.

Compensation

Although IMO is primarily concernedwith the safety of shipping and the prevention ofmarinepollution,theOrganizationhasalsointroducedregulationscoveringliabilityandcompensationfordamage that establish a system by which the victims of pollution caused by ships can becompensated.

LiabilityandcompensationforspillsofoilfromtankersarecoveredbytwocomplementarylegalregimesadoptedbyIMO,theInternationalConventiononCivilLiabilityforOilPollutionDamage,1992 and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund forCompensationforOilPollutionDamage,1992.


Mostrecently, in2000,theLegalCommitteeof IMOadoptedamendmentstoraisethe limitsofcompensation payable to victims of pollution by oil from oil tankers by 50.37 percent, whichwouldenterintoforcein2003.

Three years later, was approved the protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on theestablishmentofanInternationalFundforCompensationforoilpollutiondamage,1992.

Article4

1. TheSupplementaryFundshallpaycompensationtoanypersonsufferingpollutiondamageifsuchpersonhasbeenunable toobtain full andadequate compensation for anestablished claim forsuchdamageunderthetermsofthe1992FundConvention,becausethetotaldamageexceeds,or there isa risk that itwillexceed, theapplicable limitofcompensation laiddown inarticle4,paragraph4,ofthe1992FundConventioninrespectofanyoneincident.

2. (a)TheaggregateamountofcompensationpayablebytheSupplementaryFundunderthisarticleshallinrespectofanyoneincidentbelimited,sothatthetotalsumofthatamounttogetherwiththeamountofcompensationactuallypaidunderthe1992LiabilityConventionandthe1992FundConventionwithinthescopeofapplicationofthisProtocolshallnotexceed750millionunitsofaccount.(b)Theamountof750millionunitsofaccountmentioned inparagraph2(a) shallbeconvertedinto national currency on the basis of the value of that currency by reference to the SpecialDrawingRightonthedatedeterminedby theAssemblyof the1992Fund forconversionof themaximumamountpayableunderthe1992Liabilityand1992FundConvention.


3.3.15. ROKIA DELMAS Name Date LocationRokiaDelmas 24October2006 France

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtPanamanian 1985 185m - -

Accidentarea South of the island of IledeRé


Productstransported

cocoa beans, wood, 500tonnes of heavy fuel oil(IFO380)and50tonnesofmarinediesel

Shiptype containership

Detailsontype Capacity:1446TEU Owner CMACGM(France)

On24October2006,ataround4a.m.,thecontainershiptheRokiaDelmas,sufferingfromtotalenginefailure,wasdrivenashorebyastormonthesouthcoastoftheIledeRé.Thevesselwasanchored,butthesternofthevesselhitarockyoutcrop,approximately1nauticalmilesouthofCouarde sur mer. The vessel was mainly transporting cocoa beans, wood and more than 500tonnesofheavyfueloil(IFO380)and50tonnesofmarinediesel.Partofthecrewwasairliftedoffthe vessel. The commanding officer and 5members of the crew stayed onboard to assist theinterventionsquadswiththeirinvestigations.

The vessel showed a 20° list and a leak was detected. No pollution was observed. As aprecautionarymeasure, the Polmar Land Plan for CharenteMaritimewas activated. CedrewasimmediatelymobilisedandtwoadvisorsarrivedattheLaRochelleresponsecentrethatevening.The Alcyon, a salvage, rescue and oil spill response vessel left Brest with containment andrecoveryequipmentonboardtotackleanypotentialpollution,inadditiontopumpingequipment.


The container ship the Rokia Delmas grounded on 25/10/06 (Source: Cedre)

Thesameday,thefirstinvestigationsonboardshowedthatitwasimpossibletorefloatthevesselathigh tide thatevening.The followingday, thedivescarriedoutdetectedabreach20metreslongby50centimetreswide,whichconfirmedthatitwouldbeimpossibletotowthevesselinhercurrentstate.

ThePréfecturededépartementdecidedtoprotecttheoysterbedsintheareausingbooms.Thehydrocarbons floating in the tanks of the vessel were pumped out and stored on barge. Twobargesequippedwithskimmersandwitha10m³storagecapacityweredeployed.Becauseoftheproximity to thecoast combinedwith the local currents, thePréfectureMaritimeplacedadriftcommitteeonpre-alert.ThiscommitteewaslocatedinLaRochelleandwasundertheauthorityofandledbytheCedre.On30October,430m³offuelwerepumpedoutofthetanksandstoredontheAlcyon.


TheRokiaDelmassurroundedbybooms(Source:Cedre)


3.3.16. SEA EMPRESS Name Date Location ShipyardSeaEmpress 15February1996 UnitedKingdom AstillerosCádiz

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width DraughtLiberian 1993 274.30m 43.24m 15.8m

Accidentarea MildfordHavenPassage Causeofspill GroundingQuantitytransported

130,824tonnes Type ofpollutant

Lightcrudeoil

Quantityspilled 73,000tonnes Shiptype OiltankerOwner SeaTankers(Cyprus) Details on

typeSinglehull

Theincident

Ontheeveningof15February1996,aLiberianoiltanker,theSeaEmpress,withaloadof130,824tonnesofFortiescrude(lightcrudefromfieldsintheNorthSea)enroutefortheTexacorefineryinMilfordHaven,ranagroundontherocksatSaintAnn’sHeadattheentrancetoMilfordHavenBay(thislocationincludesanumberofrefineriesprovidingtheUKwith25%ofitsrequirementsinrefinedproducts).

Thiswasthesecondgroundingofatankerinthespaceof5monthsaftertheBorgaon25October1995.UnliketheBorga,theSeaEmpresshadbeenbuiltveryrecently(1993)butwasonlyasinglehull tanker. According to experts, the reason for this casualty lies in misjudgements of tidalcurrentsandacommunicationbreakdownbetweenthepilotandthecommandingofficer.


TheSeaEmpressagroundatMilfordHaven(Source:Cedre

Timelineofeventsbetween15Februaryand7March1996

After the alert, a contingency planwas implemented by the BritishMaritime and Coast GuardAgency (MCA). Meanwhile, the MPCU (Marine Pollution Control Unit) sent three DC-3s withdispersant spraying equipment andOSRL (Oil Spill Response Ltd) sent three trailerswith shoreresponseequipment,twostoragebarges,anEgmopolskimmerbargeandaHerculesC130fittedwithanADDSPack for sprayingdispersants.However, theprimeobjectivewasstill tokeep thevesselafloatandtransferthecargoasquicklyaspossible.

On the16th, the StarBergen (a30,000dwt tanker)madean initial attempt at transferring thecargoandwasassistedinthisbytugsfromLiverpoolandIreland.

On the17th,weatherconditionsworsened (40knotwinds)and theauthoritiesdecided to turnthevessel to face into thewindand the swell,with theassistanceof seven tugs. Two towlinessnapped in quick succession and the tanker ran aground yet again at 6:05 pm close to thepreviouslocation.Thetankerhadalreadylostathousandtonnesofcargosincethe15th.


TheSeaEmpressduringlighteringatHerbrandstonJetty

(Source:Cedre)

Onthe18th,theRussiancrewandtheexpertswereair-liftedoffthevesselbyaRoyalAirForceSeaKinghelicopterat5:30amduetothestorm.Windswerewesterly force8andwaveheightwas4to5metres,whichdamagedthetanker.Laterintheevening,thetankerwasrefloatedwiththeassistanceofthreetugs,theAnglianEarl,theAnglianDukeandtheDeYue,aChinesehighseatugfromFalmouth.

Overnight,theAnglianDukeandtheAnglianEarlheldthetankerfast.Seventhousandtonnesofcrudehadbeenspilledsince17February.

Onthe19th,thetankerranagroundagainat12:00pmnearChannelRock.Sixtugsmanagedtopull her off the rocks by the end of the afternoon, but she grounded again by the stern justoutsidetheChannelnearSaintAnn’sHead.Atthisjuncture,herstarboardwingandcentretankswereholed.

Of the 24 tanks on board only threewere left intact. The pumping roomwas flooded but theengineroomwasdrythusaffordingthevesselfullpropulsioncapability.

Onthe20th,ninetugsattemptedtorefloatthetankerathightide(thehighesttideofthemonth)but failed in their attempt and the situation grew steadily worse. Twenty thousand tonnes ofcrudehadbeenspilledsincethe19th.

Onthe21st,twomoreattemptsweremadeatrefloatingthetanker,oneat07:30amandanotherat9pm,with12tugsincludingafewsentfromHollandbySMIT.Thetankerwasfinallyrefloatedat10pm,afterinertgashadbeenpumpedintoherwingtanks.Althoughtheinertgasinjectionsenhancedtherefloatingoperation,theyalsocausedmoreseriousspillages,bringingthetotalto


about70,000tonnes.ThetankerwastowedovernighttoHerbrandstonJetty,adisusedoilwharfin the formerEsso refinery inMilfordHaven.Afterberthing, responderscircled the tankerwithfloatingcontainmentbooms.

Cargotransferbeganon23February,oncethehullhadbeenthoroughlyinspected,andendedon4 March after four transfer operations involving the Star Bergen and the Onward Mariner,recovering 58,200 tonnesof crudeoil in all. The tankerwas towed toBelfast for repairs on27March.

ActionundertakenbytheEuropeanCommunity

MobilisingtheCommunityTaskForce

The Civil Protection Unit of the European Community was informed by the British Authoritiesduring the evening of the 15th. Commission officialsmade immediate contact with theMPCU(Marine Pollution Control Unit) and the Community Task Force specialising in oil pollutionresponsewasputonstandby.

VesselsoftheCommunityTaskForce(Source:Cedre).

As thesituationseemed tobecomemoreandmorecriticalon the16thFebruary,arrangementsweremadetosendtwoTaskForceexpertstoWales.Theirassignmentwastocollectinformationandassistnationalauthorities.

Meanwhile,EEAdatabaseswereindicatingthataspillofpersistentoilinthisareawouldgenerateaseriousbiologicalrisk.

Startingon the16th February, theCommissiondisseminateddailyprogress reports toMemberStatesandInternationalOrganisationsincludingafactsheetdescribingsituationaldevelopmentsandactivitiesperformedbyTaskForceofficials.TheEurospillslickdriftprogramme,developedbytheCommission,wasusedextensivelytotracktheslick.


The first experts to be sent to Wales were composed of two experts from Cedre, whereas ascientist from AEA (Atomic Energy Agency) Technology was appointed co-ordinator for theEuropeanCommunity.HertaskwastoliaisewithMPCUandco-ordinatetheattendanceofotherofficialsfromMemberStatestotakethepressureofflocalauthoritiesandresponders.

Othermember States did indeed intend to send observers toWales and Hollandwas the firstcountrytodoso.Onthe18thFebruarytwoDutchandoneIrishrepresentativeteamedupwiththeirFrenchcolleagues.

Storage equipment (Source: Cedre).

Atthatpointintime,availableinformationwaspointingtothefactthatthevesselwasinseriousdangerofbreakingupgiventhestateofhercentreandstarboardwingtanksnottomentiontheverybadweather.

On the 20th, the European experts in attendance at the JRC (Joint Response Centre) werediscussing international co-operation and assistance. The French Navy offered to send tworesponsevesselswiththeTRANSRECsweepingarmrecoverysystemwhichMPCUgladlyaccepted.

Thelighteringoperationwaslengthyanddifficultbutafteracoupleofdaysofveryhardwork,theSea Empresswas finally refloated and towed toMilford Haven on the 21st. This was only thebeginningofverycomplicatedandtediousrecoveryandclean-upoperations.

On the 21st, three Swedish experts joined the team and were subsequently followed by twoItalian and one Norwegian observer. Meanwhile, the Dutch had offered and sent two vesselsequippedwiththeir«sweepingarmsystem»whichaffordedanextraresponseresourceandwasanexcellentexampleofco-operationbetweenMemberStates.

The French and Dutch observers were also taskedwith being liaison officers for their nationalauthoritiesandtheirBritishcolleagues.

As the situation steadily improved, the European Community started phasing out Task Forceinterventionasofthe4thMarch.FrenchandDutchresponsevesselsleftthesceneofoperations


andanumberofobserversalsolefttheJRC.TheTaskForce’slastobserverleftMilfordHavenonthe12thMarch

Polluted fishing vessels (Source: Cedre).

FinancialsupportfromtheEuropeanCommission

LocalAuthoritiesinWales,CornwallandDevonrequestedfinancialsupportfromtheCommissioninabidtosetupanenvironmentalmonitoringprogram.

ThiskindofactivityhadalreadybeenapprovedaftertheAegeanSeaspillin1992andtheBraerin1993.

Learningaboutpollution

Major spills such as this teach response authorities a lot and the Sea Empress has been noexception. Our British colleagues did not wait for clean-up to terminate before setting up theSEEEC (SeaEmpressEnvironmentalEvaluationCommittee) inabid tomonitor theeffectof thespillontheenvironment.

Informationflow

Theoretically, information flowshouldmirrorandsupporta responsecommandstructure.WiththeSeaEmpressspill,thecommandstructurewassetuppromptlybutinformationanddecisioncontents were routed very slowly to the Coast Guard Authority during actual operations.Furthermore, importantmessages such as those regarding « people on board »were diverselyinterpreted. Admittedly, the weather was very rough, a lot of vessels, authorities and privateorganizationswereallworkinginorfortheresponseauthority.Asaresult,slowcommunicationschannelsandmishapsinunderstandingmessagecontentcouldhavejeopardizedpersonnelsafetyandleadtothemismanagementoftheentireemergencyonthepartofthepeopleinchargeofcoordinatingtheresponseteamsandequipment.


Two solutions were advocated to resolve a number of problems such as appointing « liaisonofficers » as andwhen required by the in situ response authorities to ensure that appropriateinformationreachedthoseneedingitinadditiontoensuringthatmessagecontentwasclearandwell understood. In addition, carewas taken to ensure thatmessageswere drafted accuratelywhilstcomplyingwithIMOstandardsonalertandmessageformats.

Themedia

Theextentand thesheercomplexityof theSeaEmpressspilland the fact that itoccurredonlythree years after the Braer spill in the Shetlands were serious handicaps for them and theircontactswiththepressandthemedia.

Initialfindingshaveprovidedpointersonhowcommunicationsweremanagedduringthespill:

Ø Responseplansprovedinadequateontwoaccounts,trainedpersonnelandavailableequipmentØ APressOfficesetupinSouthamptoninanattempttorelieverespondersofmediapressurefor

informationwasquicklyspurnedbyjournaliststhathadseriousdoubtsastothecredibilityoftheinformation given to thembypress officialsworking in anoffice thatwas a longway from thescene of operations. As a result, the entire Press Office had to be relocated toMilford Havencausingseriouslogisticsproblems.

Ø There is clearly a need for a National Media Contingency Plan to deal with contacts with themediawheredutiesandobligationsareclearlysetoutinadditiontotherespectiverolesoflocalandnationalauthorities.Theplanwillindicate,interalia,whatsupportistobeexpectedfromtheoilindustry.

Ø Themediaaskedagreatnumberofgeneralquestionsonmatterssuchasexistingorganisationalstructures,responsetechniques,dispersantsandhowtousethemandsoon.Thequestionshadno relation as suchwith the spill. The reports and thedocumentsdrafted todealwith the SeaEmpressspillwillbethetemplatesfordraftdocumentsthatwillbeupdatedregularlyandhandedouttojournalistsifeveranotherspilloccurs.

Ø Decision-makersneedinformationandpicturesassoonastheycanbemadeavailable(videoorTV)andexperiencehasshownthatplentyofinformationsourcesareavailableforshoreresponsebutnotmuchonsea response.Consequently, twooptionshavebeenenvisaged:anagreementwith professional producers (public or private producers) for providing video/film footage inadditiontoprovidingresponseHQsandCrisisManagementHQswithaccesstosatcomfacilities.

Ø OfficialswillbeinrealneedoftrainingonhowtocopewithinterviewsonradioandTVsoastooptimiseperformance.

Ø Going forward, all NCPs will have to ensure that the professional media are given specialtreatment in terms of information content. Associations, activists and local populationswill bedealtwithseparately.


Ø Expertswill need toputmore thinking intohownew informationdisseminationvectors canbemasteredandparticularlytheinformationrelayedbytheInternet.Datacollection

Many sea and coastal responders have had the opportunity of acquiring a lot of valuableexperienceonspillsandasaresulthavebeenusedtokeepinga« log»ofwhatdecisionstheytook,andwhatoptionstheyenvisagedallofwhichwasusedforwritinguptheirreports.Thesnaghashoweverbeenthatnoteveryonehassystematicallyusedthesameapproachsinceresponderstendtocomefromdifferenthorizonswhereoperationalproceduresareveryvaried.Asaresult,information on the Sea Empress spill has been recorded in all sorts of media not to mentiondifferentformatsandinformationcontent.

Outside Broadcast Units (Source: Cedre).

OurBritishcolleagueshavecometotheconclusionthatthereisnowarealandurgentneedforastandardarchivalprocedureforallofthedataonspillsandthatthebestwaytostorethedataisinaGIS (Graphical InformationSystem).Discussionshavebeenorganisedwith localauthorities,oilcompaniesandITOPFonwhatinformationshouldbeacquiredandhowitshouldbestoredandprocessed.

Additionalresources


TheMPCUhascometotheconclusionthatORshaveanurgentneedofnon-technicalclericalstaffcapableofacquiringthedata,recordingit,disseminatingitasappropriateinadditiontoprovidingfulllogisticsupport.Such,apparently,wasnotthecasewiththeSeaEmpressspill.

The British Authorities have identified the need for a team of people capable of answeringquestions raised by Ministries, Parliament and the public at large. During the Sea Empressresponseoperation, theShippingPolicyDirectoratewastaskedwiththis jobandhadtoanswer103 questions from Parliament, 405 questions from Ministries and 2,700 questions from thepublicatlarge.TheBritishNCPwillundoubtedlybereworkedinabidtomirrortheroleplayedbytheShippingPolicyDirectorateintheeventofamajorspill.


3.3.17. SOLAR 1 Name Date Location

SOLAR1 11August2006 Philippines

Accidentarea Islandofguimaras Causeofspill DamagetotheshipQuantitytransported

2,000tonnes Typeofpollutant Heavy fuel oil (IFO180)

Quantityspilled 800tonnes Shiptype OiltankerOwner Sunshine Maritime

CorpDetailsontype -

Theincident

On11August2006,thecoastaltankerSolar1,charteredbyPetronCorp,wastransporting2,000tonnesofoilwhenshesankinwaters300mdeepneartheislandofGuimarasinthePhilippines.Over1,300tonnesofoilwerespilledatseaveryrapidly.Ofthe20crewmembers,18weresaved,onewasreportedmissingandonelosthislife.

Thecoastwasheavilypollutedby regular releaseofoil though leaks in thehull.The islandwasdeclaredadisasterareabytheregionalauthorities.

Logsandbuoysweredeployedbythelocalinhabitantstoprotectcertainsites.Dispersantswerespreadonthemainslick.However,adverseweatherconditionsdelayedresponseandthereforereduceditseffectiveness.

Clean-upoperationswere lengthyas theyhad tobe carriedoutpainstakingly.Natural clean-upwaseventuallychosenasthesolutioninordertopreventhumaninterventionfromdamagingtheenvironmentfurther.

Responsibilities

In September 2006, the enquiry commission set up by the government concluded that thecaptain,theshipownerandtheoperatorwereresponsiblefortheoccurrenceoftheoilspill.Theaccusationsincludedtheownerignoringregulationsonnavigability,theoilcompanyoverloadingthevesselbyaround150tonnesandanerrorofjudgementbythecaptain.

InlateSeptember2006,thedecisionwasmadetopumptheremainingoiloutofthetanks,thanksto an agreementwith the IOPC Funds for the reimbursement of theoperation. TheoperationswerecontractedbytheshipownerinFebruary2007andbeganinMarch.


TheRepublicofthePhilippinesisapartytotheCivilLiabilityConvention1992(CLC1992)andthe1992FundConvention.

The Solar 1 was registered in the Ship-owners 'Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association(Luxembourg)(Shipowners’Club).ThelimitationamountapplicabletotheSolar1underthe1992CLC is 4.51 million SDR, but the owner of the Solar 1 is a party to the Agreement forCompensation for Oil Pollution from ships small tank (STOPIA) 2006 whereby the limitationamountapplicabletothetankerincreases,voluntarily,to20millionSDR.

The Fund has paid 14.3 million pounds for claims, primarily in the areas of capture fisheries,mariculture, tourism,damagetoproperty (boats, fishinggear,beachfrontproperties,etc.),andCleanliness.


3.3.18. STOLT VALOR Name Date LocationStoltValor 16March2012 SaudiArabia

Flag Dateofbuilt Length Width Draught OwnerLiberia 2004 150m 25m 10.5m AdovelinShips

Management

Accidentarea AlJubail,PersianGulfProductstransported

430tonnesofheavyfueloil(IFO380)1.300tonnesisobutyraldehyde(IBAL)13.000tonnesmethyltertiarybutylether(MTBE)

Shiptype ChemicalTankerClassificationSociety

BiroKlasifikasi

Theincident

Onthe16thMarch,thechemicaltankerStoltValorwassailinginthePersianGulfwhenitsufferedanexplosionandafirewhichlasted5days.

Of the 25 crewmembers, 24were rescued by an American destroyerwhile onewas reportedmissing.Oncetheblazewasundercontrol theresponseteamnoticedthat4of theship's tankswereseverelydamaged.

Onthe25thMarch,afterseveralunsuccessfulattempts,atugmanagedtoestablishatowlinetodistancetheStoltValorfromthecoastline.

Theplaceofrefugeissue

TheCaptain requested authorization to access the ports of four nearby countries,Qatar, SaudiArabia,BahrainandIran.Allfourrefused.

ThetankerfinallyreceivedpermissionfromSaudiArabiatoanchorinitswatersonthe1stApril,after long negotiations led by MEMAC (Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Center).Cargo transferoperationsthenbegan,finishinguponthe29thApril.

Onthe30thJuly2012,onceallthehazardoussubstanceshadbeenremoved,Bahrainpermittedthevesseltobetowedtooneofitsportstobescrapped.


Thisincidentillustratesthedifficultyforshipownersinfindingaplaceofrefugewhenavesselisindifficulty.


3.3.19. TK BREMEN Name Date LocationTKBremen 16Dember2011 France

Flag Dateofbuilt

Length Draught Manager Owner

Malta 1982 109m 6.74m AdriyatikGemiIsletmeciligiveTicaret,Turkey

BlueAtlanticShippingLtd.,Malta

Accidentarea South of the Riad’Etel,Morbihan


Quantitytransported

150tonnesofIFO120and40tonnesofMarineDieselOil(MDO)

Typeofpollutant IFO120/MarineDieselOil(MDO)

Shipyard Busan,SouthKorea Shiptype Bulkcarrier

Theincident

On 15 December 2011, despite the strong winds forecast for the coming hours, the Maltese-registered cargo vessel TKBremen, unladen, left the port of Lorient to anchor in the shelteredwatersofGroixIsland,beforeheadingtoEngland.TheshiphadsailedfromtheUkrainetoLorient,whereithadjustunloaded5,300tonnesofsunflowermeal.

Onthenightof15to16December, thevessel,caught instormJoachim(50-60knotwinds,5-7metrewaves),attemptedtomovetoamoreshelteredareaasitwashavingdifficultyholdingitsanchor. At 00:40, it requested assistance from themaritime rescue coordination centre CROSSEtel.Asitwasmakingthismove,thevesselgroundedonthecoast2kmsouthofthemouthoftheRiad'Etel.

ThegeneralpublicfoundithardtounderstandwhythevesseldidnotstayinshelterintheportofLorientbutlegallytheMaritimeandPortAuthoritiescouldnotprohibititfromdeparting.


AnchorpointnearGroix Island that theTKBremenwasheaded for, andpointof groundingonErdevenbeach.©MarineTraffic.com

Ataround3am,the19crewmemberswereairliftedofftheshipbyaFrenchNavyhelicoptertotheLann-Bihouénavalairbase.

ThetugAbeilleBourbon,based inBrestandonstandbyatUshant Islandduringthestorm,wassentonsiteonthemorningoftheaccident.

The French maritime authorities ordered the ship owner to take the necessary measures toeliminatetherisksgeneratedbythevessel’ssituation.

On20December,followingexpertadviceonthehull'scondition,theauthoritiesdecidedthatthevesselwouldno longer sail andwouldbebrokenupon site. This costlyoperation is set to lastseveralmonths..ThecostofdismantlingthewreckandrestoringthebeachwerecoveredbytheTurkishshipowner.

Firstresponse

Onthemorningofthe16December,aslickofbunkerfuel,1kmlongby5mwide,wasdetected.The pollution affected Kerminihy beach in Erdeven, where the vessel was grounded, betweenLorientandQuiberon,aswellastheRiad'Etel,oilingtheshoresofEtel,BelzandLocoal-Mendontovaryingextents.


On29December,allleisureandprofessionalshellfishharvestingintheRiad'Etelwastemporarilybannedbytheorderof16/12/2011.Thisbanwasliftedon19thJanuary2012forprofessionals.

From16December,lighteringoperationswereconductedinitiallybytheFrenchNavy,thenbytheDutch company Smitworking togetherwith Les Abeilles International. Access to the tankswasdifficult,andseveralholesneededtobedrilled.

Systemsetuptopumpthefueloutoftheship,December2011.©Cedre.

Itisdifficulttoestimatetheexactquantityofpollutantreleasedintothewater.Nevertheless,forcomparison, the Erikawas transporting 31,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil (n°6)while TK Bremencontainedatotaloflessthan200tonnesofIFO120(IntermediateFuelOil,120cStat50°C)andmarinediesel.

Justafter3am,Cedre'sdutyengineerwasalertedbytheFrenchmaritimeauthorities.At5am,Cedre's response centre was activated and at 5:30 am two engineers were dispatched on siteuponrequestbythePréfectureduMorbihan.Athirdjoinedthemlaterintheday.

These3expertsconductedsurveysandadvisedtheauthoritiesonpollutionresponse.

BoomsfromtheSaint-NazairePolmarstockpileandtheMorbihanfirebrigadeweredeployedinthe Ria d'Etel to protect the most sensitive sites in this area classed Natura 2000. SAGEMOR(SociétédegestiondesportsduMorbihan)boomswerealsodeployedinEtelmarina.

Over the weekend, on 17 and 18 December, around 200 people from the fire brigade, civilprotectionandtherelevantlocalauthoritiescleanedupthebulkoftheoilandoiledseaweedatriskof being remobilised at themouthof the ria andonErdevenbeach. SITAwas in chargeofcollecting,transportingandtreatingwasterecoveredontheshoreline.


The response units made up of fire brigade and civil protection personnel were graduallydemobiliseduntilthe26December,whentheemergencyresponsecommandsystemwaslifted.


3.3.20. TORREY CANYON Name Date LocationTorreyCanyon 18March1967 England

Flag Dateofbuilt Length WidthLiberian 1959 297.03m 38.25m

Accidentarea ScillyIslands Causeofspill GroundingQuantitytransported



On 18March 1967, the Liberian oil tanker the Torrey Canyon, operated by a subsidiary of theUnion Oil Company of California and loaded with 121,000 tonnes of crude oil, ran agroundbetweentheIslesofScillyandtheBritishcoast.

Onday21,afteraninspection,anexplosionoccursintheenginecausedbythegasesproducedbyafuelleakinthepumpthatproducesacrackof2m2inthelineofflotation.

TheTorreyCanyonsinking

WeatherworsenedonMarch23.OnMarch26,aftertwoattemptswithfourtugstopulltheship,thiswashalvedspillingitsentirecargo.


120,000tonsofcrudeoilwerequicklyspilledofitstanks(about860,000barrels)aidedbywaveencounters,and ina fewdaysgeneratedahugeoil spill that reachedthecoastandbeachesofCornwall,IsleofGuernseyandtheFrenchcoastBritain,mainlyintheregionofTreguier.

The bays and coves of Cornwall were submerged in a black, thick, and deadly substance thatdestroyedeverythinginitspath.Over200,000birdsdiedandthefishingindustrywascompletelyruined.Neverbeforehadfacedthehumanityanaccidentatthislevelandfeatures.

The armed forceswere prepared to fight the disaster,while local authorities,with an army ofcivilians, fought tirelessly trying to save beaches and shores. The oil slick covering an area ofapproximately70kilometerslongand40kmwide.

In an attempt to tackle such a spill, all sorts of jobs, albeit improvised and arbitrary wereperformed.Thelackofexperienceinthistypeofaccidentcausedworseconsequencesthanthoseintendedtoprevent,toproceedtothedispersionof largeamountsofdetergents(15,000tons),whichjoinedthespillcausingasizablepollution,whichseriouslyaffectedfloraandwildlifeofthearea.

The authorities, aware of the enormous disaster that was taking place, and in view of theimmenseproportionsoftheoilspill,whichwouldendupinmiserytouchingeverything,madethedecisiontobombtheoilandshiptomakethemburn.

For three days in a row eight aircraft dropped 1,000 bombs, 44,000 liters of kerosene, 12,000litersofnapalmand16missiles.AcolumnofthickblacksmokethathidthesuncompletelycouldbespottedfromanywhereasifitwaslostintheendsoftheEarth,inasurprisingshow.

• IMO.-OutoftheTorreyCanyondisasteranewconventionwassignedin1969,theInternationalConventionRelatingtoInterventionontheHighSeasinCasesofOilPollutionCasualties.Itcameintoforcein1975andgivescoastalstatestherighttotakesuchmeasuresonthehighseasasmaybenecessary“toprevent,mitigateoreliminatedanger to itscoastlineor related interests frompollutionbyoilorthethreatthereof,followinguponamaritimecasualty”.

• UN.TheArticle221ofUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea

Measurestoavoidpollutionarisingfrommaritimecasualties

1. Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, bothcustomary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial seaproportionatetotheactualorthreateneddamagetoprotecttheircoastlineorrelatedinterests,includingfishing,frompollutionorthreatofpollutionfollowinguponamaritimecasualtyoractsrelating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmfulconsequences.


2.Forthepurposesofthisarticle,"maritimecasualty"meansacollisionofvessels,strandingorother incidentofnavigation,orotheroccurrenceonboardavesselorexternal to it resulting inmaterialdamageorimminentthreatofmaterialdamagetoavesselorcargo.

• EU .- In the way of protection its coast, UE ( Directive 2002/59) has approved the measuresavailabletoMemberStatesintheeventofathreattomaritimesafetyandtheprotectionoftheenvironment

Where,followinganincidentorthecompetentauthorityoftheMemberStateconcerneddeems,withintheframeworkofinternationallaw,thatitisnecessarytoavert,lessenorremoveaseriousandimminentthreattoitscoastlineorrelatedinterests,thesafetyofothershipsandtheircrewsandpassengersorofpersonsonshoreortoprotectthemarineenvironment,thatauthoritymay,inparticular:

(a) Restrict themovement of the ship or direct it to follow a specific course. This requirementdoesnotaffectthemaster’sresponsibilityforthesafehandlingofhisship;

(b)Giveofficialnoticetothemasteroftheshiptoputanendtothethreattotheenvironmentormaritimesafety;

(c) Send an evaluation team aboard the ship to assess the degree of risk, help the master toremedythesituationandkeepthecompetentcoastalstationinformedthereof;

(d)Instructthemastertoputinataplaceofrefugeintheeventofimminentperil,orcausetheshiptobepilotedortowed.

Inthecaseofashipwhichistowedunderatowageorsalvageagreement,themeasurestakenbythecompetentauthorityofaMemberStateunderpoints(a)and(d)maybealsoaddressedtotheassistance,salvageandtowagecompaniesinvolved.


3.3.21. URQUIOLA Name Date LocationUrquiola 12May1976 Spain

Flag Dateofbuilt Length WidthSpanish 1973 276.54m 39.07m

Accidentarea Entrance to LaCoruñaharbor


Quantitytransported

101,000tonnes Typeofpollutant Kuwaitcrudeoil


Theincident

On12May1976,theoiltankertheUrquiolahitashoalwhichwasnotlistedonthecharts,atLaCoruña’s harbour entrance, and damaged her hull. The vessel threatened to explode and wasthereforetowedawayfromtheport,withonlythecommandingofficerremainingonboard.

Twohourslater,theshipexplodedandthecommandingofficerwaskilled.

Anestimated101,000tonnesofcrudeoil(513,000barrels)burnedfor16hours.Nearly200kmofcoasts were affected and black smoke spread over 100 km inland. A thick black cloudmovedtowardstheSpanishtownofLaCoruñaandwasathreattopeoplewithillhealth.Monitoringoftheairqualitydetectedhighlevelsofvolatilegases.

Despitetheprecautionstaken,asecondexplosion,followedbyafire,tookplaceonthemorningof14May.Thehighwindsthefollowingdayscausedtheslickstodriftandwashuponthecoast.

Response

Response teams set up a boom to contain the oil. Dispersants were spread by tugs andhelicopters.

Considerable means were implemented: recrutement of a workforce, arrival of skimmers anddispersants and the local inhabitants were called upon to help out. The clean-up operationsprovedtobeslowandpainstaking.

Large stretches of sand were treated, with a risk of creating an imbalance in the biodiversitypresent. The pollution was treated both mechanically and manually. The use of chemicaldispersantswas soon abandonnedas it promoted the infiltrationof theoil into the sediments.


Clean-upoperationswereveryslowastheoilwasveryheavy.Alargepartofclean-upcouldonlybecarriedoutusingbucketsandspades.

Impact

Itwas estimated that 70%of the clams inRio deBurgobaywere killedbydeposits of oil. Thesame goes formussels and oysters. Flora and fauna in the affected area took several years toregainnormalgrowthpatterns(damagesestimatedat2.25millionEuros).

TheSpanishgovernmentwasheld liable for the incident.The responseexpensesandeconomiclosseswereestimatedat70millionEuros.


4. Conclusion. Themainconclusionofthisreportonmaritimeaccidentsisthatmostaccidentscouldhavebeenprevented,or at least reduced the consequences, if the adequateprotocolshadbeen followedaccordingly.

Analysing past fatal errors is the first step to avoiding them in the future, and so, reach theobjectiveofreducingthemaritimeaccidentsandtheirconsequencestotheminimum.


39 partners from 10 countries taking maritime transport into the digital age

By designing and demonstrating innovative use of ICT solutions

MONALISA 2.0 will provide the route to improved

SAFETY - ENVIRONMENT - EFFICIENCY

Swedish Maritime Administration ◦ LFV - Air Navigation Services of Sweden ◦ SSPA ◦ Viktoria Swedish ICT ◦ Transas ◦ Carmenta ◦ Chalmers University of Technology ◦ World

Maritime University ◦ The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute ◦ Danish Maritime Authority ◦ Danish Meteorological Institute ◦ GateHouse ◦ Navicon ◦ Novia

University of Applied Sciences ◦ DLR ◦ Fraunhofer ◦ Jeppesen ◦ Rheinmetall ◦ Carnival Corp. ◦ Italian Ministry of Transport ◦ RINA Services ◦ D’Appolonia ◦ Port of Livorno ◦ IB SRL ◦ Martec SPA ◦ Ergoproject ◦ University of Genua ◦ VEMARS ◦ SASEMAR ◦ Ferri Industries ◦ Valencia Port Authority ◦ Valencia Port Foundation ◦ CIMNE ◦ Corporacion

Maritima ◦ Technical University of Madrid ◦ University of Catalonia ◦ Technical University of Athens ◦ MARSEC-XL ◦ Norwegian Coastal Administration

www.monalisaproject.eu

http://www.monalisaproject.eu

monalisa 2.0 – activity 1.3 report on maritime...

Documents