modulation of value representation by social context in ... · the question whether social...

7
Modulation of value representation by social context in the primate orbitofrontal cortex João C. B. Azzi a,b , Angela Sirigu a,b , and Jean-René Duhamel a,b,1 a Centre de Neuroscience Cognitive, Centre National de la Recherche Scientique, 69675 Bron, France; and b Département de Biologie Humaine, Université Lyon 1, 69622 Villeurbanne, France Edited by Michael E. Goldberg, Columbia University College of Physicians, New York, NY, and approved December 19, 2011 (received for review July 19, 2011) Primates depend for their survival on their ability to understand their social environment, and their behavior is often shaped by social circumstances. We report that the orbitofrontal cortex, a brain region involved in motivation and reward, is tuned to social information. Macaque monkeys worked to collect rewards for themselves and two monkey partners. Behaviorally, monkeys discriminated between cues signaling small and large rewards, and between cues signaling rewards to self only and reward to both self and another monkey, with a preference for the former over the latter in both instances. Single neurons recorded during this task encoded the meaning of visual cues that predicted the magnitude of future rewards, as well as the motivational value of rewards obtained in a social context. Furthermore, neuronal activity was found to track momentary social preferences and partners identity and social rank. The orbitofrontal cortex thus contains key neuronal mechanisms for the evaluation of social information. decision making | social cognition | neurophysiology C onverging sources of evidence from lesion, electrophysiologi- cal, and neuroimaging studies show that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) plays a key role in motivated behavior (see, for ex- ample, refs. 1 and 2). The OFC has been shown to contain a rep- resentation of various natural reinforcers, both appetitive (3) and aversive (4), and to be involved in encoding the subjective value of stimuli (5, 6). This nding has led to the conjecture that a common neural-reward currency might exist, which the brain could use to evaluate the cost and benets of different options during decision making (7, 8). Obviously, decision making is a process that must integrate a large number of parameters and one such parameter lies in the fact that primates, like many other species, are inherently social beings. Social cues from the environment and internal drives, such as concern for others, social comparison, or perceived status, have a strong impact on our behavior and on the value we assign to objects or actions. Several studies have contributed to dening the contours of a social braindedicated to the processing of socially relevant stimuli and to the regulation of emotional and behavioral responses in a social context (9). Logically, this cerebral network shows considerable overlap with brain structures involved in mo- tivation and value-based decision making, including the OFC. In monkeys, damage to the OFC causes social-interaction decits, such as a decrease in communicative facial expressions, reduced responses to threatening or afliative gestures, and impaired de- velopment of maternal bonding (10). In humans, damage to the OFC is associated with personality changes and socially in- appropriate behavior (1113), and with impairments in the ex- pression of social emotions, such as attachment, fear, and aggression (14, 15). Notably, it has been suggested that the OFC is involved in valuation mechanisms in social context and contributes to decision making based on social reputation and trust (16), and in the generation of emotions, such as anticipated regret (17, 18). Somewhat surprisingly, little information is available on the ne-scale neuronal processing of social information and its in- uence on valuation mechanisms. In the present study we asked the question whether social variables are represented and can modulate value encoding by the OFC. Results We recorded single OFC neurons in two monkeys who were trained on a simple visual discrimination task in which they could earn rewards for themselves and for two passive monkey partners physically present in the testing room (Fig. 1). Two main blocks of trials were run (Fig. 2A). In the nonsocial block, only the active monkey earned reward, in the form of a small, medium, or large drop of water. A different visual shape was associated with each reward outcome. These self-onlytrials served to identify reward- value sensitive neurons. In the social block, medium-sized reward trials to self-only were intermixed with jointreward trials, where both the monkey and a predesignated partner earned a medium- sized reward. This block served to test the hypothesis that reward value is inuenced by the social context and to establish whether this inuence is reected in reward prediction activity by OFC neurons. Because access to uid was only allowed when in the laboratory and for a xed period, the best way for the monkey to maximize uid intake was to respond correctly on all trials for as long as it was allowed to work. Under such circumstances, per- formances were not expected to show large variations across re- ward conditions, but where present, were taken as an indicator of the incentive value of the different conditions. Not surprisingly, in the nonsocial block the monkeys worked signicantly better for large than for small rewards (P < 0.01 for monkeys Mo2 and Mo4) (Fig. 2B), thus exhibiting a straightfor- ward relation between reward size and motivational value. In the social block, monkeys were on average more willing to work when they were the sole reward recipient than when rewards were granted jointly to the monkey and a partner (P < 0.01 for both monkeys). Note that the amount of water earned by the working monkey was constant across the different conditions of the social block (i.e., the reward was not divided between the monkey and her partner). This nding suggests that the active monkeys per- ception of its own reward was somehow devalued by the con- comitant reward given to the partner (further information on behavioral performance in the social block is presented in SI Ex- perimental Procedures, Behavior and Fig. S1). To check that, in the social block, the lower performance on joint-reward trials was related to the social context and not merely to the perceived loss of a potential reward, a control experiment was run on one of the monkeys. Self-only and joint-reward trial blocks were conducted with the monkey facing partner 1 on one side and an empty monkey chair equipped with a reward dispenser on the other side. On joint trials with the empty chair as partner,after the monkey responded to the dimming of the cue, a drop of water came out of the sipper tube but no one was there to collect it and it simply dripped to the oor. In this task conguration, the proportion of correct responses was signicantly reduced on true joint trials, but not on empty-chair trials (Fig. S2), indicating that Author contributions: J.C.B.A., A.S., and J.-R.D. designed research; J.C.B.A. performed re- search; J.C.B.A. and J.-R.D. analyzed data; and J.C.B.A., A.S., and J.-R.D. wrote the paper. The authors declare no conict of interest. This article is a PNAS Direct Submission. 1 To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: [email protected]. This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10. 1073/pnas.1111715109/-/DCSupplemental. 21262131 | PNAS | February 7, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 6 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1111715109 Downloaded by guest on April 5, 2020 Downloaded by guest on April 5, 2020 Downloaded by guest on April 5, 2020

Upload: others

Post on 27-Mar-2020

0 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Modulation of value representation by social context in ... · the question whether social variables are represented and can modulate value encoding by the OFC. Results We recorded

Modulation of value representation by social contextin the primate orbitofrontal cortexJoão C. B. Azzia,b, Angela Sirigua,b, and Jean-René Duhamela,b,1

aCentre de Neuroscience Cognitive, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 69675 Bron, France; and bDépartement de Biologie Humaine, UniversitéLyon 1, 69622 Villeurbanne, France

Edited by Michael E. Goldberg, Columbia University College of Physicians, New York, NY, and approved December 19, 2011 (received for review July 19, 2011)

Primates depend for their survival on their ability to understandtheir social environment, and their behavior is often shaped bysocial circumstances.We report that the orbitofrontal cortex, a brainregion involved in motivation and reward, is tuned to socialinformation. Macaque monkeys worked to collect rewards forthemselves and two monkey partners. Behaviorally, monkeysdiscriminated between cues signaling small and large rewards,and between cues signaling rewards to self only and reward toboth self and another monkey, with a preference for the formerover the latter in both instances. Single neurons recordedduring thistask encoded the meaning of visual cues that predicted themagnitude of future rewards, as well as the motivational value ofrewards obtained in a social context. Furthermore, neuronal activitywas found to track momentary social preferences and partner’sidentity and social rank. The orbitofrontal cortex thus contains keyneuronal mechanisms for the evaluation of social information.

decision making | social cognition | neurophysiology

Converging sources of evidence from lesion, electrophysiologi-cal, and neuroimaging studies show that the orbitofrontal

cortex (OFC) plays a key role in motivated behavior (see, for ex-ample, refs. 1 and 2). The OFC has been shown to contain a rep-resentation of various natural reinforcers, both appetitive (3) andaversive (4), and to be involved in encoding the subjective value ofstimuli (5, 6). This finding has led to the conjecture that a commonneural-reward currency might exist, which the brain could use toevaluate the cost and benefits of different options during decisionmaking (7, 8).Obviously, decision making is a process that must integrate

a large number of parameters and one such parameter lies in thefact that primates, like many other species, are inherently socialbeings. Social cues from the environment and internal drives, suchas concern for others, social comparison, or perceived status, havea strong impact on our behavior and on the value we assign toobjects or actions. Several studies have contributed to defining thecontours of a “social brain” dedicated to the processing of sociallyrelevant stimuli and to the regulation of emotional and behavioralresponses in a social context (9). Logically, this cerebral networkshows considerable overlap with brain structures involved in mo-tivation and value-based decision making, including the OFC. Inmonkeys, damage to the OFC causes social-interaction deficits,such as a decrease in communicative facial expressions, reducedresponses to threatening or affiliative gestures, and impaired de-velopment of maternal bonding (10). In humans, damage to theOFC is associated with personality changes and socially in-appropriate behavior (11–13), and with impairments in the ex-pression of social emotions, such as attachment, fear, andaggression (14, 15). Notably, it has been suggested that the OFC isinvolved in valuation mechanisms in social context and contributesto decision making based on social reputation and trust (16), andin the generation of emotions, such as anticipated regret (17, 18).Somewhat surprisingly, little information is available on the

fine-scale neuronal processing of social information and its in-fluence on valuation mechanisms. In the present study we askedthe question whether social variables are represented and canmodulate value encoding by the OFC.

ResultsWe recorded single OFC neurons in two monkeys who weretrained on a simple visual discrimination task in which they couldearn rewards for themselves and for two passive monkey partnersphysically present in the testing room (Fig. 1). Two main blocks oftrials were run (Fig. 2A). In the nonsocial block, only the activemonkey earned reward, in the form of a small, medium, or largedrop of water. A different visual shape was associated with eachreward outcome. These “self-only” trials served to identify reward-value sensitive neurons. In the social block, medium-sized rewardtrials to self-only were intermixed with “joint” reward trials, whereboth the monkey and a predesignated partner earned a medium-sized reward. This block served to test the hypothesis that rewardvalue is influenced by the social context and to establish whetherthis influence is reflected in reward prediction activity by OFCneurons. Because access to fluid was only allowed when in thelaboratory and for a fixed period, the best way for the monkey tomaximize fluid intake was to respond correctly on all trials for aslong as it was allowed to work. Under such circumstances, per-formances were not expected to show large variations across re-ward conditions, but where present, were taken as an indicator ofthe incentive value of the different conditions.Not surprisingly, in the nonsocial block the monkeys worked

significantly better for large than for small rewards (P < 0.01 formonkeys Mo2 and Mo4) (Fig. 2B), thus exhibiting a straightfor-ward relation between reward size and motivational value. In thesocial block, monkeys were on average more willing to work whenthey were the sole reward recipient than when rewards weregranted jointly to the monkey and a partner (P < 0.01 for bothmonkeys). Note that the amount of water earned by the workingmonkey was constant across the different conditions of the socialblock (i.e., the reward was not divided between the monkey andher partner). This finding suggests that the active monkey’s per-ception of its own reward was somehow devalued by the con-comitant reward given to the partner (further information onbehavioral performance in the social block is presented in SI Ex-perimental Procedures, Behavior and Fig. S1).To check that, in the social block, the lower performance on

joint-reward trials was related to the social context and not merelyto the perceived loss of a potential reward, a control experimentwas run on one of the monkeys. Self-only and joint-reward trialblocks were conducted with the monkey facing partner 1 on oneside and an empty monkey chair equipped with a reward dispenseron the other side. On joint trials with the empty chair as “partner,”after the monkey responded to the dimming of the cue, a drop ofwater came out of the sipper tube but no one was there to collect itand it simply dripped to the floor. In this task configuration, theproportion of correct responses was significantly reduced on truejoint trials, but not on empty-chair trials (Fig. S2), indicating that

Author contributions: J.C.B.A., A.S., and J.-R.D. designed research; J.C.B.A. performed re-search; J.C.B.A. and J.-R.D. analyzed data; and J.C.B.A., A.S., and J.-R.D. wrote the paper.

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.1To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: [email protected].

This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1111715109/-/DCSupplemental.

2126–2131 | PNAS | February 7, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 6 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1111715109

Dow

nloa

ded

by g

uest

on

Apr

il 5,

202

0 D

ownl

oade

d by

gue

st o

n A

pril

5, 2

020

Dow

nloa

ded

by g

uest

on

Apr

il 5,

202

0

Page 2: Modulation of value representation by social context in ... · the question whether social variables are represented and can modulate value encoding by the OFC. Results We recorded

reward devaluation in the context of this task is specifically inducedby the social context through a process of social comparison.

Neural Encoding of Value for Rewards Obtained in a Social Context.Single-unit recordings were carried out in the OFC. The maincriterion that was applied to select a neuron for recording wasthat it exhibited a clear visual responsiveness. Task-relatedresponses were found in 163 of 213 recorded neurons, mostlylocated within area 13 of the OFC (see Fig. 1B for verification ofrecording locations). These cells exhibited statistically significantdischarge activity related to at least one task event: partner des-ignation, reward-cue presentation, manual response to cue dim-ming, reward delivery (Table 1). The present report focuses oncue-related activity. Sixty neurons showed such activity in bothnonsocial and social trial blocks and thus allowed us to analyzereward-value signals in both contexts.Let us first consider the nonsocial block: the majority of cue-

responsive neurons were modulated by reward size and fell inone of two main categories: (i) up-modulated cells, showing

a monotonic increase in firing rate with predicted reward size (n=29/60, 48%) and (ii) down-modulated cells, showing a monotonicdecrease in firing rate with predicted reward size (n=23/60, 38%).Such neurons have been reported consistently in the OFC and aregenerally interpreted as describing the motivational value of an-ticipated rewards (5, 19–21). The remaining neurons (n = 8/60,13%) showed complex, nonlinear firing patterns to the threereward sizes.Because these OFC neurons also responded to the reward in-

struction cues in the social block, it was possible to test the hy-pothesis that cue-related activity encodes the motivational value ofexpected rewards when motivation is conditioned by the socialcontext. Following the behavioral results, we predicted that if one’sown reward is devalued by a partner’s concomitant reward, thenthis diminished value should be reflected in the firing pattern ofmotivation-coding neurons. This result is indeed what we found.Up-modulated cells responded more strongly to the cue an-nouncing a self-only reward than to cues indicating that rewardswould be jointly obtained, in close correspondence to the behav-ioral pattern (Fig. 3A). Down-modulated cells responded witha weaker discharge for self-only than for joint rewards (Fig. 3C).Population activity for the cells that responded to the reward cuein both the nonsocial and the social blocks are shown in Fig. 3B(up-modulated n = 29, nonsocial block P < 0.04, social block P <0.002) and Fig. 3D (down-modulated n= 23, social block P < 0.05,nonsocial block P < 0.03). It can be observed that precue activitylevel is higher in the social block, in particular, in Fig. 3D. This

Bar Grasp

Partner

Onset

CueOnset

DimOnset

PartnerReward

ActorReward

A

B

Mo M2 o4

los

mos

moslos

Fig. 1. Task description and localization of recording sites in the OFC. (A)Typical joint-reward trial sequence in which a monkey responds to a visualinstruction by releasing a manual lever to obtain a reward for itself and fora predesignated partner. The shape of the reward cue specifies the trial’sreward contingency. The arrow above the panels indicates the steps that areomitted on self-only reward trials. (B, Left) Drawing of a coronal sectionthrough the left frontal lobe of monkey Mo2 at the level indicated on thelateral view. Marks left by two electrode tracks are visible on the enlargedNissl-stained picture. (Scale bar, 1 mm.) At the level shown in this drawing,area 13 is roughly bounded laterally by the fundus of the lateral orbitalsulcus (LOS) and medially by the fundus of the medial orbital sulcus (MOS).(Right) Coronal view of anatomical MRI scans of monkey Mo4 showing therecording chamber position. A special grid with five holes in the central rowfilled with omega 3 and spaced 3-mm apart was inserted in the chamber,serving as reference to identify the position and angle of electrode trackswith respect to the underlying cortical tissue.

0

20

40

60

80

100 ** * *

*

A

B

C

*

Tria

l Sta

rt

Leve

r tou

ch

Dim O

nset

Leve

r Rel

ease

[Par

tner

Rew

ard]

Actor

Rew

ard

-10

0

10

Cue O

nset

H-eye (deg)

Rewarded Subjects

-10 0 10

V-e

ye(d

eg)

Trial events sequenceFixation/degree

0 25 50 75 100

Fig. 2. Behavioral performance. (A) Reward configurations on nonsocialand social trial blocks. (B) Mean percent correct responses of monkeys Mo2(n = 47 sessions) and Mo4 (n = 45 sessions) as a function of reward size in thenonsocial block, and for joint and self-only reward conditions in the socialblock (asterisks and horizontal lines indicate significant pair-wise compar-isons, P < 0.01). (C) Distribution of eye fixations over the workspace fordifferent task epochs (combined data from Mo2 and Mo4). On joint-rewardtrials, monkeys briefly looked at the designated partner’s face before fixingtheir eyes on the visual cue. Right after responding to dimming of the cue,they shifted their gaze back to the partner’s face, thereby anticipating thedelivery of the partner’s reward. On self-only reward trials, the monkeyskept looking at the screen until their own reward was delivered.

Azzi et al. PNAS | February 7, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 6 | 2127

NEU

ROSC

IENCE

PSYC

HOLO

GICALAND

COGNITIVESC

IENCE

S

Dow

nloa

ded

by g

uest

on

Apr

il 5,

202

0

Page 3: Modulation of value representation by social context in ... · the question whether social variables are represented and can modulate value encoding by the OFC. Results We recorded

difference is in part because some of these neurons had a visualresponse to faces at the time of partner designation (see below).However, baseline firing rate of the neurons between trials wasalso higher in the social than in the nonsocial block both at thesingle unit (compare e.g., in Fig. 3C, the medium-blue rasters inthe nonsocial and in the social blocks) and population levels (Fig.S3). This global activity change might signal a heightened state ofarousal in the social block reflecting the monkey’s knowledge thatthe partners would be receiving water, and perhaps also, the per-ception of some subtle change in the behavior of the partnersthemselves. To test whether activity levels before the cueaccounted for the differences between reward conditions in thesocial block, we ran separate analyses of covariance on the up-modulated and down-modulated populations, using mean activityduring the 500-ms period before cue onset as a covariate. Theeffect of joint-reward cues remained significant when the varianceassociated with the precue activity, was accounted for in bothneuronal subpopulations [up-modulated: F(2,81) = 4.48, P < 0.02;down-modulated: F(2,63) = 3.80, P < 0.03].

To quantify the relation between cell discharge activity in thetwo blocks, we computed for each neuron a modulation index forthe reward size effect in the nonsocial block and for the reward-sharing effect in the social block (SI Experimental Procedures, DataAnalysis). The two indices were significantly correlated (r = 0.57,P< 0.02) (Fig. 4). Therefore, neuronal populations that respond topredicted reward size, through excitatory or inhibitorymodulation,do not merely report the expected quantity of reward but the moti-vational value assigned to it. In keeping with the notion that mo-tivation is a complex multivariate construct (22), the present re-sults suggest that its neural representation in the OFC integratesthe influence of socially based factors—in addition to intrinsicproperties—on the motivational value of rewards.In studies of choice behavior, OFC neurons are found to show

range adaptation and encode rewards in relative terms, their firingrate scaling to the preference between food items (5) and to therange of offered reward values (23, 21). A similar phenomenon isobserved here when comparing the response to the identical out-come in the nonsocial and social blocks. The cue response to themedium self-only reward in the social block for the up-modulated

Table 1. Neuronal response counts

Partner designation Cue onset Bar release Partner reward Actor reward Total

Mo 2 19 53 41 25 15 153Mo 4 12 34 15 19 10 90Total 31 87 56 44 25 243

Of 213 total recorded neurons, 163 OFC cells (89 and 74 neurons recorded in Mo2 and Mo4, respectively) hadcomplete datasets and activity associated to at least one task event. A given cell could respond to more than oneevent. Column totals represent the number of cells that responded to a given event. Row totals correspond tothe number of significant responses.

**

*

**

**

**

= = = = = & = &

Non-social Social

P1 P2

n=29

n=23

10 s

p/s

100 ms

A

B

C

D

cell T060

cell T145

A A A

small medium large A+P1 A+P2A-200 0 200 400 600 8000

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Nor

mal

ized

Firi

ng R

ate

Time (ms) *

*

Fig. 3. Single-unit and population activity of OFCneurons in the nonsocial and social blocks. (Left threepanels in A and C) Examples of single units with, re-spectively, up-modulated and down-modulated re-sponses as a function of reward size; (Right threepanels) Activity of the same two neurons in the socialblock. (B and D) Normalized spike density curves andmean discharge rate for the neuron population fromwhich the corresponding single-unit examples aredrawn. The thick horizontal bar below the spike den-sity curves in B indicates the time window used forcomputing all statistical tests on mean population ac-tivity (Right). The asterisks and thin black or blue hor-izontal lines indicate significant pair-wise comparisons(P < 0.01).

2128 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1111715109 Azzi et al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by g

uest

on

Apr

il 5,

202

0

Page 4: Modulation of value representation by social context in ... · the question whether social variables are represented and can modulate value encoding by the OFC. Results We recorded

cell population is higher (or lower for the down-modulated cellsubset) than the response to the same medium reward in thenonsocial block. Thus, the motivational value of a given rewardoffer is influenced by the social context and this socially adjustedvalue is reflected in the level of OFC activity, as it is in the mon-keys’ behavior (Fig. 1B, middle bars, Left and left bars, Right).

Evidence for Social Preference? Performance on joint-reward trialsdid not, on average, depend onwho the partner was, whether it wasthe dominant member of the social group (partner 1, Mo1) or thepartner who could procure rewards on the monkey’s “day off”(partner 2: Mo2 for Mo4 and Mo4 for Mo2). This finding couldsuggest that the monkey did not clearly associate the joint-rewardcue to a specific partner, but this is clearly not the case. Eye-movement records (Fig. 2C) show that although the monkeyslooked exclusively at the center of the screen until the dimming ofthe cue, following lever response their gaze anticipated the rewardoutcome.On self-only trials, themonkey kept looking at the screencenter until the delivery of its own reward. On joint-reward trials,the monkey gazed at the future reward recipient, well beforedelivery, and never looked at the other partner. The absence, onaverage, of a clear social preference, might thus suggest thatmonkeys were aware of which of the two partners would berewarded but had no particular incentive to favor one over theother. Another possibility is that social preferences existed butwere fluctuating and masked by session-to-session variability. Wetherefore examined behavioral data from the social block andreassessed the corresponding single-unit activity to test whetherneuronal modulations associated with reward prediction trackedthe monkeys’ social biases. We identified sessions in which therewas a significant difference in the proportion of rewards procuredto partner 1 and partner 2 (χ2 test, α-level set at P < 0.05). Asocial-preference effect was present in one-fourth of the sessions(23 of 92), and in the majority of cases (18 of 23, 78%) we foundthat the monkeys were selectively biased against partner 1 and infavor of partner 2. The reason for this finding is unclear. It couldindicate a greater reluctance to procure rewards to a dominantmonkey than to a lower ranking one. Another possibility is thatmonkeys Mo2 and Mo4, who acted as each other’s partner 2,might have been displaying a form of differed reciprocity but weresomewhat disinclined to share with the monkey who could never

reciprocate. Whichever is the correct explanation, the fact thata systematic behavioral preference was present in some of thesessions allowed us to search for its neural correlates in the OFC.The neuronal population illustrated in Fig. 3 was therefore

sorted according to performance on individual recording sessions,distinguishing between sessions in which partner 2 was preferredover partner 1 and sessions in which no preference or the oppositepreference was found. The results are presented in Fig. S4 andshow selectively enhanced responses to the partner 2 cues onsessions in which it is the preferred partner, but no such en-hancement on sessions in which no behavioral bias is present.Thus, cue-related activity on joint-reward trials reflected the cur-rent social preference of the monkeys performing the task.

Neural Activity in the OFC Unrelated to Motivational Value. In ad-dition to neurons that directly encode motivational value of jointrewards, we found other cells in the OFC that showed cue ac-tivity related to the social context of the task. These cells enco-ded the identity of the rewarded individuals in the social block,and responded selectively or maximally to one of the threeconditions: self-only reward (n = 8), joint reward with partner 1(n= 8), joint reward with partner 2 (n= 10). The remaining cellsresponded indiscriminately to the three conditions (n = 2) (Fig.S5). However, because these cells showed no reward size-relatedmodulation in the nonsocial block, they cannot be considered ascarrying a motivational value signal. It is probably more accurateto interpret the significance of these responses as encoding theidentity of the reward recipient specified by the cue. Thus, al-though one subpopulation of cue-responsive neurons conveys themotivational value of rewards (“what this reward is worth tome”), extending this role to socially influenced value, anothersubpopulation carries the social context information (“who isgetting a reward”), which is needed for value computation.A social dimension was also represented by a class of OFC

neurons that discharged when themonkeys gazed at their partner’sface at the onset of joint-reward trials. These cells were modulatedby facial identity (Fig. 5A). Surprisingly, the distribution of theseface-sensitive neurons was strongly biased, with a large majority ofcells responding preferentially to the face of partner 1 (partner 1 n=22, partner 2 n = 4, no difference n = 5, χ2 = 19.9, P < 0.0001),a phenomenon that accounts for the large difference visible in thepopulation responses (Fig. 5B). It is highly unlikely that sucha difference could result from a sampling bias. One possible ex-planation is that the monkeys attended more and directed theirgaze longer to partner 1, the dominant monkey, than to partner 2.We therefore computed the amount of time the monkeys spentlooking at each face in the 500-ms interval between partner des-ignation and fixation of the central target. MonkeyMo2 showed nogazing bias (respectively 122 and 110 ms for partner 1 and partner2, t test P = 0.60) but monkey Mo4 showed a nonsignificantpreference for looking at partner 2 (respectively 120 and 154 msfor partner 1 and partner 2, t test P = 0.06).An alternative explanation for the stronger representation of

partner 1 is that face neurons in the OFC encode social status. Weapproached this issue using our limited dataset by quantifying thehierarchical position of each monkey in the colony using obser-vations of their natural social interactions (SI Experimental Pro-cedures, Animals). We then examined cell-population activityseparately for each of the recorded monkeys and related it to thesocial rank of their respective partners (Fig. 5B). Monkey Mo2’spartners wereMo1, the highest-rankedmember of theminicolony,and Mo4, the lowest-ranked member. Population activity for cellsrecorded from monkey Mo2 showed a large difference betweenthe high- and low-status partners (P < 0.001). In contrast, monkeyMo4’s partners were Mo1, the highest-status monkey, and Mo2,who was ranked lower but close to Mo1. In this monkey, pop-ulation activity showed only a small difference between the twopartners (P < 0.04). Pooling the mean population responses fromthe two monkeys and plotting these against measured social ranksuggests that the activity of OFC face-selective neurons encode theperceived social rank of an individual relative to the observer (Fig.

-0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4

Reward Size Modulation-0.4

-0.2

0.2

0.4

Soci

al C

onte

xt M

odul

atio

n

Fig. 4. Relationship between reward size and social context modulation.Modulation indices of general form (a − b)/(a + b) were computed for all cellsexhibiting cue-related response in the nonsocial and social block (SI Experi-mental Procedures, Data Analysis). For indicative purposes, indices of 0.11,0.20, and 0.33 correspond to activity differentials of 25%, 50%, and 100%,respectively (regression r2 = 0.329, P < 0.02).

Azzi et al. PNAS | February 7, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 6 | 2129

NEU

ROSC

IENCE

PSYC

HOLO

GICALAND

COGNITIVESC

IENCE

S

Dow

nloa

ded

by g

uest

on

Apr

il 5,

202

0

Page 5: Modulation of value representation by social context in ... · the question whether social variables are represented and can modulate value encoding by the OFC. Results We recorded

5 C and D). Obviously, a more rigorous test of this hypothesiswould necessitate a broader set of exemplars of faces of monkeyswith different social ranks.

DiscussionSeveral brain areas contain neurons that carry reward information,including the midbrain dopaminergic nuclei, basal ganglia, andseveral cortical areas (24, 25). It has been proposed that onecharacteristic of the OFC is its capacity to encode reward value ina common neural currency (23). This capacity is a usefulmechanismin decision making when one needs to choose between disparatealternatives, like different kinds of food, and between alternativesthat are complex and require combining several positively andnegatively weighted attributes, as in most real-life situations. Socialinformation is one such attribute and it can possess a finite value, asshown in a behavioral study in which monkey observers could “pay”for access to social information by renouncing to a certain amountof juice reward (26). In the present study, we show that social in-formation weighs on the valuation process that takes place in theOFC, and that it is expressed in neurons describing the valueassigned to joint and self-only rewards.Social comparison provided the monkey with a means to eval-

uate its own reward. When it expected to acquire a given rewardsize for itself but also that a monkey partner would receive anidentical reward, the monkeys’ motivation, as measured throughits correct response rate, was reduced to a level corresponding toa smaller reward size in the nonsocial block. This finding suggeststhat the knowledge that the partner would obtain a reward hada value that was in a sense “subtracted” from the intrinsic value of

the monkey’s reward. One possible explanation for such behavioris an adversity to the inequity inherent in the temporal order ofrewards. The delay between lever release and delivery of reward tothe active monkey was the same for all reward conditions; hence,the temporal discounting of the rewards was objectively constant.However, the fact that the partner received its reward first mighthave generated a perceived inequity. Our results are neverthelessconsistent with other studies, where this explanation may not ap-ply. A behavioral experiment related to our own, but using a directpreference response, also found that monkeys more often choosea reward to self-only than a reward to both self and anothermonkey (27). Furthermore, observations made on a large animalcolony showed that when a macaque can choose, by pulling on oneof two slides, between granting food access to itself only or to bothitself and a partner sitting in an adjacent compartment, altruisticbehavior is not exhibited systematically (28). Prosocial choices aregenerally directed by high-ranking individuals toward low rankingones, and almost exclusively in favor of kin partners. The lower inthe social hierarchy and the more distant the kinship, the moreegoistical monkeys behave toward others (see SI ExperimentalProcedures, Working for No Reward? for further evidence of lack ofaltruism in this type of experimental paradigm).

The monkeys’ lower motivation to work for joint rewards isencoded through reduced activity in one class of neurons, the firingrate of which is a direct function of reward value, and throughenhanced activity in another class of neurons, the firing rate ofwhich is an inverse function of reward value. A further analysisindicates that OFC neurons may also track social preference byshowing enhanced activity when joint rewards are obtained withthe session’s preferred partner. This finding argues for a motiva-tional-value representation in the OFC that integrates the in-fluence of social context on goal-directed actions. Such mecha-nisms would be well suited to play a role in evaluation processestaking place during social comparison (29, 30), and in emotionssuch as regret, envy, or gloating, which influence our decisionmaking (31, 32).In the present study, the animal’s choice was between accepting

and declining a reward offer. Declining an offer had a cost in termsof access to fluid and should happen only if the expected benefitdoes not justify the expenditure of attentional andmotor resourcesneeded to generate the operant response. The relationship be-tween the behavior and the neuronal responses that we measuredin theOFC thus reflect themotivational value of individual rewardoutcomes. Subjective preferences were inferred indirectly bycomparing the proportion of accepted offers for each individualoption. This aspect is a limitation of our study, compared withexperiments that use forced-choice paradigms, and thus allowcomputations of neural functions of decision value (5, 23, 27).Nevertheless, the fact that the reward-size effects that we found inthe OFC are qualitatively similar to those reported in decision-making studies suggests that the present results do capture someaspect of subjective value. In fact, there is good evidence thatidentical conclusions about the effects of reward value on behaviorcan be drawn from a single cue or a choice task (21).Although value-encoding is a salient feature of OFC function

(3), this is by nomeans its only function and we found other classesof neurons that were intermingled with reward-value sensitiveneurons. Macaque monkeys have a cognitive representation ofidentity and spontaneously associate corresponding faces andvoices of familiar conspecifics (33). Visual responses to faces havebeen reported in the macaque OFC (19) and a prefrontal face-specific zone has been identified in macaques at a location con-sistent with our recording sites using functionalMRI (34). Here wereport that neurons responding when monkeys look at the face ofother group members are not merely selective to facial features,but describe the identity of individual faces. The fact that an en-hanced response to the high-status partner’s face was found inboth of the recorded monkeys is consistent with a possible neu-ronal representation of social rank. Although this conclusion mustawait further evidence, because the social group we studied wasquite small, it is quite plausible given that one well-known

C

10 s

p/s

100 ms

A

B

Mo2Mo4

**

P2 P2P1P1

n=12 n=19

Social Status Score

Mo2(P2) Mo4(P2)Mo3Mo1(P1)

cell T074 cell P108

−6

−4

−2

0

2

4

6

Social Status Score

Mea

n Fi

ring

Rate

Mo4(P2)

Mo1(P1)

Mo2(P2)

-200 0 200 400 600 8000

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

-4 0 4

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Nor

mal

ized

Firi

ng R

ate

Time (ms)

08

Stat

us S

core

D

10 s

p/s

100 ms

Fig. 5. Face-selective responses of OFC neurons. (A) Single unit from mon-keys Mo4 (Left) and Mo2 (Right). Both cells respond more strongly to P1 thanP2 (Left: P1= 62.4 sp/s and P2= 52.5 sp/s; Right: P1= 24.8 sp/s and P2= 9.5 sp/s).(B) Respective normalized population spike density curves and mean dis-charge rate. (C) Social status score of the four members of the colony (SIExperimental Procedures, Animals). (D) Relationship between face-selectivemean population activity and social status score (regression r2 = 0.937, P <0.002). Color codes correspond to the same individuals in the differentpanels. (Conventions as in Fig. 3, asterisk and horizontal lines indicate sig-nificant pair-wise comparisons, P < 0.05 or better).

2130 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1111715109 Azzi et al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by g

uest

on

Apr

il 5,

202

0

Page 6: Modulation of value representation by social context in ... · the question whether social variables are represented and can modulate value encoding by the OFC. Results We recorded

characteristic of social organization in macaque societies is thematrilineal hierarchy that exists between families and is inheritedfrom mothers to daughters (35). Awareness of one’s social rankand of the rank of other members of the group has importantadaptive value (access to shared resources, protection againstcompetitors), and it is not surprising that female monkeys incaptivity also exhibit strict dominance relationships. Computationof social status by the OFC might be a prerequisite for strategicadaptation of behavior to the social context, a process in which themore lateral portion of the prefrontal cortex has been implicated(36).In conclusion, we show that the activity of area 13 neurons is

modulated in a manner that could mediate social comparison anddecision-making in a social context. How pervasive such propertiesare within the network of areas that have been linked to the pro-cessing of reward, motivation, and emotions is unclear. Neuro-imaging data suggest a possible topography related to the degreeof abstractness and to the valence of reinforcers within in thehuman OFC (37). Although social modulations of neuronal ac-tivity were observed throughout the portion of area 13 that wasexplored in the present study, it would be interesting in the futureto explore possible functional homologies between the two species.Other regions that are functionally related to theOFC, particularlythe insula (38) and the anterior cingulate cortex (39, 40), have alsobeen implicated in these functions. Further work is needed to

characterize more precisely the nature of social information pro-cessing in these different brain structures.

Experimental ProceduresThe monkeys who participated in the experiments were all females, housed ina hierarchically organized colony of four animals. Monkey Mo1, the dominantmember of the group, served as one of the passive partners. Monkeys Mo2 andMo4 performed the task and also served as each other’s passive partner (des-ignated as partner 2) on alternate sessions. Briefly, rewards could be earned byfixating a visual cue appearing on a horizontal screen placed in full view of thethree monkeys, and releasing a hand-held lever within 400 ms of cue-dimming.No rewardwas distributed if themonkeybrokefixation or released the lever tooearly or too late. The cue’s shape specified the reward condition. In the nonsocialblock, only the active monkey was rewarded and the cue predicted the size ofthe upcoming reward. In the social block, the cue specifies whether the currenttrial was a “self-only” trial, in which the active monkey earned a medium-sizedreward (33%), or a “joint” trial, in which both the active monkey and eitherpartner 1 (33%) or partner 2 (33%) earned a medium-sized reward.

Further details on the behavioral and electrophysiological methods arepresented in SI Experimental Procedures.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Jean-Luc Charieau and Fabrice Hérant forexpert animal care; Véronique Sgambato-Faure for histological assistance;and Léon Tremblay for helpful discussion. This study was funded by theCentre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Human Frontier Science Pro-gram RGP0056/2005-C (to A.S. and J.-R.D.); and Agence Nationale de laRecherche BLAN-SVSE4-023-01 (to J.-R.D.).

1. Rolls ET, Hornak J, Wade D, McGrath J (1994) Emotion-related learning in patientswith social and emotional changes associated with frontal lobe damage. J NeurolNeurosurg Psychiatry 57:1518–1524.

2. Plassmann H, O’Doherty J, Rangel A (2007) Orbitofrontal cortex encodes willingnessto pay in everyday economic transactions. J Neurosci 27:9984–9988.

3. Rolls ET (2000) The orbitofrontal cortex and reward. Cereb Cortex 10:284–294.4. Morrison SE, Salzman CD (2009) The convergence of information about rewarding

and aversive stimuli in single neurons. J Neurosci 29:11471–11483.5. Tremblay L, Schultz W (1999) Relative reward preference in primate orbitofrontal

cortex. Nature 398:704–708.6. Sescousse G, Redouté J, Dreher J-C (2010) The architecture of reward value coding in

the human orbitofrontal cortex. J Neurosci 30:13095–13104.7. Montague PR, Berns GS (2002) Neural economics and the biological substrates of

valuation. Neuron 36:265–284.8. Kim H, Shimojo S, O’Doherty JP (2010) Overlapping responses for the expectation of

juice and money rewards in human ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Cereb Cortex 21:769–776.

9. Blakemore S-J (2008) The social brain in adolescence. Nat Rev Neurosci 9:267–277.10. Machado CJ, Bachevalier J (2006) The impact of selective amygdala, orbital frontal

cortex, or hippocampal formation lesions on established social relationships in rhesusmonkeys (Macaca mulatta). Behav Neurosci 120:761–786.

11. Bechara A, Tranel D, Damasio H (2000) Characterization of the decision-makingdeficit of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions. Brain 123:2189–2202.

12. Moll J, Zahn R, de Oliveira-Souza R, Krueger F, Grafman J (2005) Opinion: The neuralbasis of human moral cognition. Nat Rev Neurosci 6:799–809.

13. Forbes CE, Grafman J (2010) The role of the human prefrontal cortex in social cog-nition and moral judgment. Annu Rev Neurosci 33:299–324.

14. Strenziok M, et al. (2009) Developmental effects of aggressive behavior in maleadolescents assessed with structural and functional brain imaging. Soc Cogn AffectNeurosci 6:2–11.

15. Willis ML, Palermo R, Burke D, McGrillen K, Miller L (2010) Orbitofrontal cortex lesionsresult in abnormal social judgements to emotional faces. Neuropsychologia 48:2182–2187.

16. Shamay-Tsoory SG, Tibi-Elhanany Y, Aharon-Peretz J (2007) The green-eyed monsterand malicious joy: The neuroanatomical bases of envy and gloating (schadenfreude).Brain 130:1663–1678.

17. Camille N, et al. (2004) The involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex in the experienceof regret. Science 304:1167–1170.

18. Coricelli G, Dolan RJ, Sirigu A (2007) Brain, emotion and decision making: The para-digmatic example of regret. Trends Cogn Sci 11:258–265.

19. Thorpe SJ, Rolls ET, Maddison S (1983) The orbitofrontal cortex: Neuronal activity inthe behaving monkey. Exp Brain Res 49:93–115.

20. Hikosaka K, Watanabe M (2000) Delay activity of orbital and lateral prefrontal neu-rons of the monkey varying with different rewards. Cereb Cortex 10:263–271.

21. Kobayashi S, Pinto de Carvalho O, Schultz W (2010) Adaptation of reward sensitivityin orbitofrontal neurons. J Neurosci 30:534–544.

22. Berridge KC (2004) Motivation concepts in behavioral neuroscience. Physiol Behav 81:179–209.

23. Padoa-Schioppa C, Assad JA (2008) The representation of economic value in the or-bitofrontal cortex is invariant for changes of menu. Nat Neurosci 11:95–102.

24. Martin-Soelch C, et al. (2001) Reward mechanisms in the brain and their role in de-pendence: Evidence from neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies. Brain ResBrain Res Rev 36:139–149.

25. Salzman CD, Paton JJ, Belova MA, Morrison SE (2007) Flexible neural representationsof value in the primate brain. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1121:336–354.

26. Deaner RO, Khera AV, Platt ML (2005) Monkeys pay per view: Adaptive valuation ofsocial images by rhesus macaques. Curr Biol 15:543–548.

27. Chang SWC, Winecoff AA, Platt ML (2011) Vicarious reinforcement in rhesus mac-aques (Macaca mulatta). Front Neurosci 5:27.

28. Massen JJM, van den Berg LM, Spruijt BM, Sterck EHM (2010) Generous leaders andselfish underdogs: Pro-sociality in despotic macaques. PLoS ONE 5:e9734.

29. Brosnan SF, De Waal FBM (2003) Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature 425:297–299.

30. Yamagishi T, et al. (2009) The private rejection of unfair offers and emotional com-mitment. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:11520–11523.

31. Shamay-Tsoory SG, Tomer R, Goldsher D, Berger BD, Aharon-Peretz J (2004) Impair-ment in cognitive and affective empathy in patients with brain lesions: Anatomicaland cognitive correlates. J Clin Exp Neuropsychol 26:1113–1127.

32. Bault N, Coricelli G, Rustichini A (2008) Interdependent utilities: How social rankingaffects choice behavior. PLoS ONE 3:e3477.

33. Sliwa J, Duhamel J-R, Pascalis O, Wirth S (2011) Spontaneous voice-face identitymatching by rhesus monkeys for familiar conspecifics and humans. Proc Natl Acad SciUSA 108:1735–1740.

34. Tsao DY, Schweers N, Moeller S, Freiwald WA (2008) Patches of face-selective cortexin the macaque frontal lobe. Nat Neurosci 11:877–879.

35. Waal F (1989) Peacemaking Among Primates (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,MA).

36. Fujii N, Hihara S, Nagasaka Y, Iriki A (2009) Social state representation in prefrontalcortex. Soc Neurosci 4:73–84.

37. Kringelbach ML, Berridge KC (2009) Towards a functional neuroanatomy of pleasureand happiness. Trends Cogn Sci 13:479–487.

38. Sanfey AG, Rilling JK, Aronson JA, Nystrom LE, Cohen JD (2003) The neural basis ofeconomic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Science 300:1755–1758.

39. Behrens TEJ, Hunt LT, Rushworth MFS (2009) The computation of social behavior.Science 324:1160–1164.

40. Rudebeck PH, Bannerman DM, Rushworth MFS (2008) The contribution of distinctsubregions of the ventromedial frontal cortex to emotion, social behavior, and de-cision making. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 8:485–497.

Azzi et al. PNAS | February 7, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 6 | 2131

NEU

ROSC

IENCE

PSYC

HOLO

GICALAND

COGNITIVESC

IENCE

S

Dow

nloa

ded

by g

uest

on

Apr

il 5,

202

0

Page 7: Modulation of value representation by social context in ... · the question whether social variables are represented and can modulate value encoding by the OFC. Results We recorded

Correction

NEUROSCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCESCorrection for “Modulation of value representation by socialcontext in the primate orbitofrontal cortex,” by João C. B. Azzi,Angela Sirigu, and Jean-René Duhamel, which appeared in issue6, February 7, 2012, of Proc Natl Acad Sci USA (109:2126–2131;first published January 23, 2012; 10.1073/pnas.1111715109).The authors note that on page 2126, left column, lines 6–10 of

the abstract, “Behaviorally, monkeys discriminated between cuessignaling small and large rewards, and between cues signalingrewards to self only and reward to both self and another monkey,with a preference for the former over the latter in both in-stances,” should instead appear as “Behaviorally, monkeys dis-criminated between cues signaling large and small rewards, andbetween cues signaling rewards to self only and reward to bothself and another monkey, with a preference for the former overthe latter in both instances.”

www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1201821109

4020 | PNAS | March 6, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 10 www.pnas.org