REGISTRY of PROPERTYArts. 708-711 NCC

ANTONIO GONZALEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. FELICIANO BASA, JR., and PILAR LOPEZ DE BASA, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. 48695

This is an appeal from a decision of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila instructing the register of deeds of Manila to register a certain project of partition in its entirety as requested by the appellee and not in a mutilated form as requested by the appellants.

It appears that in the matter of the estate of the deceased Amalia Arcega y Alfonso Vda. de Basa, case No. 50872 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Pilar Lopez de Basa, as administratix; Feliciano Basa, Jr., as sole and universal heir, and Antonio Gonzalez, as creditor and attorney of the estate, presented to the court a project of partition jointly signed by them and asked that it be approved. The said document consists of several clauses. Clause 2 contains an inventory of the properties left by the deceased, and clause 3 contains a list of all the obligations of the estate. Among said obligations is that specified on page 22, letter (d), as follows:

Said project of partition was approved by the court "en todas sus partes" in an order dated January 12, 1938.

Thereafter Feliciano Basa, Jr., thru his present attorney Mr. Benedicto M. Javier, procured from the clerk of court a certified copy of said project of partition in a modified or mutilated form in that page 22 thereof, which we have copied above, was omitted at the express request of Attorney Javier. The certification of the clerk of court, dated June 18, 1941, reads in part as follows:

I, L. PASICOLAN, Clerk of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify that the attached documents, consisting of 26 pages, are true and correct copies of "LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION" dated March 16, 1937, "PROYECTO DE PARTICION" dated December 29, 1937, except the entire page 22 thereof, and the letter "d" in parenthesis and the words "de la clausula tercera" appearing on page 24, which letter "d" represents the said entire page 22; the "ORDER, dated January 12, 1938, and the "ORDEN" dated February 12, 1938.

The elimination of the aforementioned page 22, and the letter "d" and the words "de la clausula tercera" has been expressly requested by Attorney Benedicto M. Javier.

That certified copy, together with the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title covering the real properties adjudicated to Feliciano Basa, Jr., was presented to the register of deeds of Manila for registration with a view to the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificates of title in the name of Feliciano Basa, Jr., free from the mortgage lien in favor of Antonio Gonzalez. The latter, upon learning thereof, objected to the registration of the project of partition as thus mutilated and requested the register of deeds, in lieu thereof, to register the certified complete copy of said document which he then and there presented with a view to the annotation of the mortgage in his favor of the certificates of title to be issued in the name of Feliciano Basa, Jr. The register of deeds refused to accede to said request of Attorney Gonzales on the ground that Attorneys Javier & Javier, representing Feliciano Basa, Jr., refused to grant him authority to annotate said mortgage on the certificates of title to be issued in the name of Basa, and that since a mortgage is presumed to be a voluntary transaction between the parties he had no authority to make such annotation without the consent of both parties. Thereupon Attorney Gonzalez submitted the matter to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila in consulta under section 200 of the Administrative Code, with the result already indicated at the outset.

Both parties have filed lengthy briefs entirely out of proportion to the nature of the question involved. The appellants oppose the registration of the complete certified copy of the project of partition and try to justify their presentation to the register of deeds of said document in a mutilated condition by alleging (1) that they are not indebted to Attorney Gonzalez in the sum of P25,250 or any part thereof; (2) "that in the remote even that they have signed any contract of indebtedness for any amount in favor of Attorney Antonio Gonzalez, the same was without consideration and they have been deceived in signing it without being first aware of its contents. insofar [inasmuch ] as Attorney Antonio Gonzales is their "compadre" and formerly enjoyed their absolute confidence"; and (3) that the mortgage obligation in question was inserted in said project of partition by Attorney Antonio Gonzalez without their knowledge and consent.

In deciding to comply with the request of the appellants for the registration of the project of partition as mutilated, over the objection of the appellee, who tendered a complete, certified true copy of the same document, the register of deeds of Manila impliedly conceded to them the right to repudiate and annul an obligation evidenced by said document against the will of the obligee and without judicial intervention. That is obviously wrong. It is precisely his duty to see to it that a document presented for registration is regular and in due form. The mutilated certified copy was irregular on its face and should have been rejected by him. In fact his authority in the premises goes no father than this. He has no authority to inquire into the intrinsic validity of a document based upon proofs aliunde. If he had no authority to inquire into the truth of appellant's allegation as to lack of consideration for the mortgage in question, much less was he authorized to assume the truth of such allegation without any investigation. The project of partition in question of partition in question, having been signed by the parties and approved by the court, is presumed to be valid and is acceptable for registration in its entirety. Neither of the parties may alter it without the consent of the other and the approval of the court.

The reasoning of the register of deeds that, inasmuch as a mortgage is a voluntary transaction, he had authority to register it without the consent of both parties, is fallacious. He confuses the execution of a mortgage with its registration. It is the execution of the mortgage that is voluntary. Once a mortgage has been signed in due form, the mortgagee is entitled to its registration as a matter of right. By executing the mortgage the mortgagor is understood to have given his consent to its registration, and he cannot be permitted to revoke it unilaterally. The validity and fulfillment of contracts cannot be left to the will of one of the contracting parties (article 1256 of the Civil Code).

In the last analysis, the case is as if Feliciano Basa, Jr., had presented to the register of deeds a certified complete copy of the project of partition with the request that the register of deeds take into consideration only the rights, and ignore the obligations, evidenced by said document. It is the same as if a buyer of real property who mortgaged the property bought to secure the payment of the purchase price, had presented the combined deed of sale and mortgage to the register of deeds with the request to transfer the title to him without annotating the mortgage thereon. Is the register of deeds authorized to comply with such request? No reasonable person would so contend; and yet that is what the register of deeds of Manila proposes to do in the present case.

Feliciano Basa, Jr., claims the right to have the properties of his deceased mother transferred to his name by the register of deeds in virtue of the adjudication contained in the project of partition which was duly approved by the court; but that adjudication was made expressly subject to the mortgage obligation in question. Basa certainly cannot invoke and at the same time repudiate the said document. If he wants to annul the mortgage stipulated in said project of partition and secure a clean title to the property adjudicated to him, he should first procure the annulment by appropriate judicial action before presenting said document for registration. He cannot arrogate to himself the right to annul said mortgage or to amend the court's order approving the project of partition "in all its parts."

The questions of fact raised by appellants in this proceeding concerning the alleged lack of consideration for the mortgage in question and the circumstances under which they signed the project of partition, should be litigated in an appropriate judicial action and not in this consulta, wherein the only question that may properly be determined is whether the register of deeds should accept for registration a certified mutilated copy or a certified complete copy of the project of partition in question. Needles to say, the decision on this question cannot affect the right of the appellants to attack the validity of the mortgage in question in an appropriate separate action.Benin v. Tuason (57 SCRA 531)Facts:The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of LaLoma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who inturn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely,and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvestedtherefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyedon March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of thelands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownershipover said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their housesthereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.

HELD:It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successorsin interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs basetheir claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint ontheir being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934.In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931. It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffsbase their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint ontheir being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In CivilCase No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of landdescribed in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their beingthe heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and PascualPili (along with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs, of EliasArguments: Court had no jurisdiction because the applicant did not republish the changes made in their application for the technical description of the lands.

The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.11The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice.12But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary.13In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.14AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF HINIGARAN, movant-appellee, vs. ESTANISLAO YULO YUSAY, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-13313 April 28, 1960This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Hon. Jose S. de la Cruz, presiding the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to register a mortgage executed by Rafael Yulo in favor of the movant covering Lot No. 855, Pontevedra Cadastre, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4979.

The records disclose that on July 20, 1952, Rafaela Yulo executed in favor of the movant a mortgage for P33,626.29, due from her, her mother, sisters, brothers, and others, which amount she assumed to pay to the movant. A motion was presented to the court by the movant demanding the surrender of the owner's duplicate certificate of title that he may annotate said mortgage at the back of the certificate. Estanislao Yusay, a part owner of the lot, opposed the petition on the ground that he is owner of a part of the property in question; that the granting of the motion would operate to his prejudice, as he has not participated in the mortgage cited in the motion; that Rafaela Yulo is dead; that the motion is not verified and movant's rights have lapsed by prescription. Finally it is argued that his opposition raises a controversial matter which the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon. Margarita, Maria, Elena and Pilar, all surnamed Yulo, joined the oppositor Estanislao Yusay, raising the same objections interposed by Yusay.

The existence of the mortgage is not disputed, and neither is the fact that the mortgagor Rafaela Yulo is part owner of Lot No. 855 of the Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra. The oppositors do not dispute that she is such a part owner, and their main objection to the petition is that as part owners of the property, the annotation of the mortgage on the common title will affect their rights.

The court held that even if the ownership of the deceased Rafaela Yulo over the portion of the lot in question and the validity of the mortgage are disputed, such invalidity of the mortgage is no proof of the non-existence of the mortgage nor a ground for objecting to its registration, citing the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. Maxima Tinoco Vda. de Cruz, et, al., 95 Phil., 818; 53 Off. Gaz., 2804.

In his Brief before this Court, counsel for appellants argue that the mortgage sought to be registered was not recorded before the closing of the intestate proceedings of the deceased mortgagor, but was so recorded only four months after the termination of said proceedings, so that the claim of movant has been reduced to the character of a mere money claim, not a mortgage, hence the mortgage may not be registered. In the first place, as the judge below correctly ruled, the proceeding to register the mortgage does not purport to determine the supposed invalidity of the mortgage or its effect. Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract or instrument.

The registration of a lease or mortgage, or the entry of a memorial of a lease or mortgage on the register, is not a declaration by the state that such an instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in land; it is merely a declaration that the record of the title appears to be burdened with the lease or mortgage described, according to the priority set forth in the certificate.

The mere fact that a lease or mortgage was registered does not stop any party to it from setting up that it now has no force or effect. (Niblack, pp. 134-135, quoted in Francisco Land Registration Act, l950 ed., p. 348.)

The court below, in ordering the registration and annotation of the mortgage, did not pass on its invalidity or effect. As the mortgage is admittedly an act of the registered owner, all that the judge below did and could do, as a registration court, is to order its registration and annotation on the certificate of title covering the land mortgaged. By said order the court did not pass upon the effect or validity of the mortgage these can only be determined in an ordinary case before the courts, not before a court acting merely as a registration court, which did not have the jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged effect or validity.Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositors-appellants. So ordered.

SAJONAS VS. CA G.R. No. 102377

July 5, 1996

FACTS: The Sajonas couple are before us, on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying inter alia to set aside the CAs decision, and to reinstate that of the RTC

On September 22, 1983, spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal.

On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.

Meanwhile, it appears that Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed a Civil Case for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the compromise agreement, Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the court granted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City. Pursuant to the order of execution a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On the same date, defendant sheriff Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of the TCT of the subject land.

When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4, 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as scheduled.

On January 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer. Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint in the RTC of Rizal, against Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from TCT No. N-109417. The court a quo stated, thus:

It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction that actual notice of an adverse claim is equivalent to registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim annotated on the title of the Uychocdes.

On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs (Sajonas) are buyers in good faith of the property of the spouses Uychocde even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors, the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of any indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said property or that the same is involved in a litigation between said spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any bad faith must be established by competent proof.

Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the CA assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The appellate court reversed the lower courts decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title. The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents theory when it ruled:

The above staled conclusion of the lower court is based on the premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days from the date of registration. However, under the provisions of Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of its registration.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE.

HELD: ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent CA dated October 17, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby REINSTATED. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.

The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the TCT still in force when private respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title, considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated ? (Pilares argues that the adverse claim ceases to have any legal force and effect (30) days after August 27, 1984 pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529) (referring to the adverse claim of the Sajonas) In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:

The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads:

After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property.To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long time to complete payments on their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by the inscribed adverse claim.

In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the TCT No. N-79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon the execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners

NOTES:1. Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other dates pertinent thereto.

2. Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title, but nevertheless he is bound by the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure

3. A subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale.

4. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect

1. As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject property, the same should be made to rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the appellate court, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at the time of the sale of the property by the latter in their favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscientious advantage of another, Thus, the claim of the private respondent that the sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondent, nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes properties or that the same was involved in any litigation between said spouses and the private respondent. While it may be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established by competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.

6. At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of registered land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and all prior claims, liens an encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in the ACT as having been reserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile and nugatory.

ANTONIO PIERO, JR., EMMA BERNAD (assisted by her husband Norberto Bernad) and FORTUNATO PIERO, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SEGUNDO M. REYES, in his capacity as the Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga del Norte, MARIANO D. PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy Public Lands Inspector, NICANOR ALASAAS, EUSEBIO CAMANSI and TOMAS SUMALPONG, respondents. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SEGUNDO M. REYES, in his capacity as the Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga del Norte and MARIANO D. PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy Public Lands Inspector, respondents-appellants. G.R. No. L-36507June 14, 1974

Appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in its Civil Case No. 1128, granting the writ of prohibition prayed for by appellees against the appellant Director of Lands, the Provincial Land Officer of the same province and other subordinate officials who, by order of said director, had initiated an investigation of alleged fraud claimed to have led to the issuance of the Free Patents and corresponding Certificates of Title to the said appellees.

This appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on February 20, 1973, the decision of the trial court being based exclusively on a stipulation of facts as follows:

1. That Antonio Piero, Jr., and Emma Piero Bernad are residents of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte; while Fortunate Piero is presently a resident of Negros Oriental;

2. That the identities of Lots Nos. 5790, 5792 and 2532, all of Pls- 100, situated at Napuyan, Dapitan, Zamboanga del Norte, are submitted (sic); .

3. That Lot No. 5790, Pls - 100 is covered by Free Patent No. V-63411 issued January 30, 1957 in favor of Antonio Piero, Jr., and Lot No. 5792 Pls - 100 is covered by Free Patent No. V-63420 issued on January 30, 1957 in favor of Emma Piero Bernad, and that Lot 2532 is applied for by Fortunato Piero under Homestead Application No. V-66441 approved as of January 2, 1953, but up to the present no Patent has as yet been issued; .

4. That Lot 2532 was formerly part of PSU - 111118, a private survey executed by Surveyor Calixto Sudiacal in 1939 for Fortunato Piero and that by subsequent survey executed by the ECA, Psu-111118 was subdivided into smaller lots, one of which is now Lot 2532; .

5. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63411, Original Certificate of Title No. D-5349 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of Antonio Piero, Jr., on October 17, 1957; .

6. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63420, Original Certificate of Title No. P-5312 was issued by Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, in favor of Emma Piero on October 17, 1957; .

7. That on August 8, 1958, the Director of Lands issued an order directing the investigation of the protest of Eusebio Camansi, against the patented application of Antonio Piero Jr., a copy of said order being found on page 14 of the expediente; and that on March 24, 1959 the Director of Lands thru the Chief Legal Division directed the Provincial Land Officer at Dipolog, to investigate the protest of Nicanor Alasaas against the patented application of Emma Piero Bernad, a copy of said order is also being on page 15 of the expediente;

8. That as regards Lot 5790 Pls - 100 the protest of Eusebio Camansi has been given due course against the claim of Antonio Piero Jr., which protest has been investigated and terminated, Antonio Piero Jr., being represented by his counsel Atty. Jesus Sarmiento;

9. That Nicanor Alasaas filed his protest dated February 27, 1958 and subscribed on March 11, 1958, before Notary Public, G.R. Dalmacio, Jr., a copy is hereto attached as Exhibit A; and that the protest of Nicanor Alasaas has been investigated by Atty. Mariano D. Palermo, investigator of the Bureau of Lands, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte on August 30, 1959;

10. That with respect to Lot 5792 the same has already been investigated and regarding Lot 5790 the investigation has already been terminated but no decision has as yet been issued;

11.That with respect to the claim of Tomas Sumalpong against the application of Fortunato Piero an investigation was conducted on August 21, 1959 but neither Fortunato Piero nor counsel appeared; that when the said case was rescheduled for October 30, 1959, Atty. Jaime T. Hamoy counsel for Fortunato Piero filed a motion for postponement on the ground that said counsel had a Criminal Case to attend to in the Justice of the Peace Court of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, after which the hearing was rescheduled for December 28, 1959; that in said hearing counsel for Fortunato Piero for the first time attacked the authority of the investigation on the alleged ground that under the Revised Administrative Code only the Director of Lands and Chief of Section of said Office can order investigation of land conflicts; that up to the present no resolution of that issue has as yet been made; and that no written motion bearing on the same ground interposed before the investigator was ever raised before the Director of Lands;

12. That pursuant to a letter of Atty. Candido Pa. Sumalpong as counsel for Tomas Sumalpong under date of July 28, 1959, protesting against the above-mentioned homestead application of Fortunato Piero which letter was addressed to the Director of Lands thru the Provincial Land Officer at Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, the said Provincial Land Officer in the first indorsement dated July 22, 1959 addressed to Deputy Public Lands Inspector, Mariano D. Palermo, directed the investigation of the case until the said case is terminated for disposition under the provision of Land Administrative Order No. 13-3 that the said first indorsement was the sole authority for the investigation of the claim of said Tomas Sumalpong against the homestead application of Fortunato Piero that as above stated the investigation of the claim of Tomas Sumalpong was not terminated because counsel for Fortunato Piero attacked the authority for the said investigation;

13. That in connection with the separate petition of the respondents, Nicanor Alasaas, Eusebio Camansi and Tomas Sumalpong against the application of the petitioners the same respondents were required by the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands in a letter dated September 4, 1959 to file a sworn protest and pay the protest fee within a period of thirty days from the receipt of the said letter, otherwise the respondents claim will be dismissed and disregarded without further notice; that a copy of said letter is hereto attached as an integral part of this stipulation of facts as Exhibit "B"; that there is no showing that respondents complied with the said letter nor is there any showing that the claim of the respondents are already dismissed (that is as of this date); that on December 18, 1959 the petitioners, thru counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the alleged protest but up to the present no resolution on has ever been made; that as shown by this letter of September 4, 1959 which was addressed to Antonio Mabulay, Annex "B" respondents Tomas Sumalpong, Nicanor Alasaas and Eusebio Camansi were not given copy of this letter, and that the motion of counsel for the "Dismiss the Protest" (sic) does not show that respondents Tomas Sumalpong, Eusebio Camansi and Nicanor Alasaas were ever furnished a copy of said motion;

14. That the Director of Lands was actually served with summons on January 20, 1960 as shown by the return of the City Sheriff of Manila, which return appears on page 25 of the record of this case;

15. That for all matters not covered by this stipulation of facts parties agree to ask for a date for the reception of evidence.

We hold the appeal to be meritorious. In the light of the facts disclosed in the foregoing stipulation, We reiterate Cebedo vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12777, May 22, 1961, 2 SCRA 25, wherein We held that it is not only the right but the duty of the Director of Lands to conduct the investigation of any alleged fraud in securing a free patent and the corresponding title to a public land and to file the corresponding court action for the reversion of the same to the State, if the facts disclosed in the course of such investigation should so warrant. Consequently, prohibition cannot be issued to enjoin such an investigation despite the existence of a Torrens title.

Indeed, it is to be clarified that Section 91 of the Public Land Act leaves no other alternative to the Director of Lands. The provision reads thus:

SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purpose of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings.Underlying this section and providing its justification is the Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution of 1935, in force during the material dates of the events herein involved, declaring that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain . . and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State...." And under Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, "the scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation." Accordingly, the right to acquire disposable lands from the State through any of the means provided for in the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act 141, must necessarily be subject to the reservation expressly made in above quoted Section 91 to the effect that "the statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any ... title ... issued on the basis of such application" and that "any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto 1 produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted."

It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or a homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in repeated previous decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government can file an action for annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear that an action for reversion may be instituted by the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 2 It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.Nothing said above, however, should be understood as holding that the Court has found that the titles of appellees have been in fact fraudulently secured. That matter may be resolved only after the Director of Lands shall have finished his investigation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the writ of prohibition sought by appellees is denied. Costs against appellees.G.R. No. L-36402. March 16, 1987.] FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, INC., plaintiff- appellant, vs. BENJAMIN TAN, defendant-appellee.

Plaintiff-appellant:*is the owner of certain musical compositions among which are the songs entitled: "Dahil SaIyo", "Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin," "Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao Lamang" and "The Nearness Of You."*filed a complaint with the lower court for infringement of copyright against defendant-appelleefor allowing the playing in defendant-appellee's restaurant of said songs copyrighted in thename of the former.Defendant-appellee,*countered that the complaint states no cause of action. While not denying the playing of saidcopyrighted compositions in his establishment, appellee maintains that the mere singing andplaying of songs and popular tunes even if they are copyrighted do not constitute aninfringement under the provisions of Section 3 of the Copyright Law.

ISSUE: whether or not the playing and signing of musical compositions which have beencopyrighted under the provisions of the Copyright Law (Act 3134) inside the establishment of the defendant-appellee constitute a public performance for profit within the meaning andcontemplation of the Copyright Law of the Philippines; and assuming that there were indeedpublic performances for profit, whether or not appellee can be held liable therefor.

Held: NO. It has been held that "The playing of music in dine and dance establishment whichwas paid for by the public in purchases of food and drink constituted "performance for profit"within a Copyright Law." Thus, it has been explained that while it is possible in suchestablishments for the patrons to purchase their food and drinks and at the same time dance tothe music of the orchestra, the music is furnished and used by the orchestra for the purpose of inducing the public to patronize the establishment and pay for the entertainment in the purchaseof food and drinks. The defendant conducts his place of business for profit, and it is public; andthe music is performed for profit.Nevertheless, appellee cannot be said to have infringed upon the Copyright Law. Appellee'sallegation that the composers of the contested musical compositions waived their right in favor of the general public when they allowed their intellectual creations to become property of thepublic domain before applying for the corresponding copyrights for the same is correct.The Supreme Court has ruled that "Paragraph 33 of Patent Office Administrative Order No. 3(as amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled 'Rules of Practice in the Philippines PatentOffice relating to the Registration of Copyright Claims' promulgated pursuant to Republic Act165, provides among other things that an intellectual creation should be copyrighted thirty (30)days after its publication, if made in Manila, or within the (60) days if made elsewhere, failure of which renders such creation public property." Indeed, if the general public has made use of theobject sought to be copyrighted for thirty (30) days prior to the copyright application the law deems the object to have been donated to the public domain and the same can no longer be copyrighted.Under the circumstances, it is clear that the musical compositions in question had long become public property, and are therefore beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.

MANZANO v CA278 SCRA 688

The primary purpose of the patent system is notthe reward of the individual but the advancement of the artsand sciences. The function of a patent is to add to the sumof useful knowledge and one of the purposes of the patentsystem is to encourage dissemination of informationconcerning discoveries and inventions.FACTS:Angelita Manzano filed PPO an action for thecancellation of Letters Patent for a gas burner registered inthe name of respondent Melecia Madolaria whosubsequently assigned the letters patent to New UnitedFoundry and Manufacturing Corporation (UNITED FOUNDRY,for brevity). Petitioner alleged that (a) the utility modelcovered by the letters patent, in this case, an LPG gasburner, was not inventive, new or useful; (b) thespecification of the letters patent did not comply with therequirements of Sec. 14, RA No. 165, as amended; (c)respondent Melecia Madolaria was not the original, true andactual inventor nor did she derive her rights from theoriginal, true and actual inventor of the utility modelcovered by the letters patent; and, (d) the letters patentwas secured by means of fraud or misrepresentation. Testifying for herself petitioner narrated that herhusband Ong Bun Tua worked as a helper in the UNITEDFOUNDRY where respondent Melecia Madolaria used to beaffiliated with from 1965 to 1970; that Ong helped in thecasting of an LPG burner which was the same utility modelof a burner and that after her husbands separation from theshop she organized Besco Metal Manufacturing (BESCOMETAL, for brevity) for the casting of LPG burners one of which had the configuration, form and component partssimilar to those being manufactured by UNITED FOUNDRY.Petitioner presented two (2) other witnesses,namely, her husband Ong Bun Tua and Fidel Francisco.Private respondent, on the other hand, presentedonly one witness, Rolando Madolaria, who testified, amongothers, that he was the General Supervisor of the UNITEDFOUNDRY.Director of Patents Cesar C. Sandiego denied thepetition for cancellation and holding that the evidence of petitioner was not able to establish convincingly that thepatented utility model of private respondent wasanticipated.Petitioner elevated the decision of the Director of Patents to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decisionof the Director of Patents. Hence, this petition for review on

certiorari.

ISSUE:Whether the dismissal is proper where the patentapplied for has no substantial difference between the modelto be patented and those sold by petitioner.

HELD: The element of novelty is an essential requisite of thepatentability of an invention or discovery. If a device orprocess has been known or used by others prior to itsinvention or discovery by the applicant, an application for apatent therefor should be denied; and if the application hasbeen granted, the court, in a judicial proceeding in whichthe validity of the patent is drawn in question, will hold itvoid and ineffective. It has been repeatedly held that aninvention must possess the essential elements of novelty,originality and precedence, and for the patentee to beentitled to the protection the invention must be new to theworld.However, The validity of the patent issued by thePhilippine Patent Office in favor of private respondent andthe question over the inventiveness, novelty and usefulnessof the improved model of the LPG burner are matters whichare better determined by the Patent Office. The technicalstaff of the Philippine Patent Office composed of experts intheir field has by the issuance of the patent in questionaccepted private respondents model of gas burner as adiscovery. There is a presumption that the Office hascorrectly determined the patentability of the model

and suchaction must not be interfered with in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary. The rule is settled that the findings of fact of theDirector of Patents, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported bysubstantial evidence. Petitioner has failed to showcompelling grounds for a reversal of the findings andconclusions of the Patent Office and the Court of Appeals.Petition DISMISSED.

FELICIANO A. CASTRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUGENIA SORIANO DE GOMEZ, SOCORRO A. CASTRO and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO VENTENILLA, JUSTO V. SISON, SUSANA V. SISON, JOSE V. SISON, SOCORRO V. SISON DE VERA, ELIAS VENTENILLA, MARIA VENTENILLA, JUAN VENTENILLA, NIEVA VENTENILLA, GUADALUPE VENTENILLA, VICENTE VENTENILLA, ROSARIO VENTENILLA, MANUEL SORIANO, JOSE SORIANO, JR., CESAR SORIANO, OLIVA SORIANO, SOLEDAD SORIANO, CARMEN SORIANO, ANGELES SORIANO, BENJAMIN S. VlLORIA and PAZ S. VILORIA, respondents. G.R. No. L-20122 April 28, 1969

Before us for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 25234-R, dismissing the appeal from and in effect affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Registration Case No. 805, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1176.

The original application for registration and confirmation of title was filed by Alejandra Austria on June 6, 1948, covering 10 parcels of land situated in the barrios of Punglo Grande and Caviernesan, as well as in the poblacion of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. Socorro A. Castro submitted an opposition, alleging that the lands applied for had been donated to her by the applicant in 1939. On March 2, 1950 the Court rendered judgment finding that Alejandra Austria had been in possession of the lands in concept of owner since 1894, and consequently, by virtue of the donation, ordered the registration thereof in the name of the donee, Socorro A. Castro, subject only to the usufruct reserved by the donor in herself for the rest of her lifetime.

Alejandra Austria was the widow of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla. On March 31, 1950 a number of persons, claiming to be his heirs 2 (nephews and nieces) appeared and filed a petition to set aside the decision and the order of general default previously entered, and to have their opposition to the application admitted. Their petition was granted and the case was set for trial anew. Meanwhile, Alejandra Austria died and Socorro A. Castro was substituted in her place.

The averment of the oppositors was that the lands applied for were owned by Antonio Ventenilla; that when he died he left a will bequeathing them in usufruct to his wife Alejandra; and that upon her death they passed to the said oppositors as his heirs.

The trial court, in its decision rendered on April 4, 1959, rejected both the claims of Socorro A. Castro and of the oppositors without deciding the question of title for purposes of registration. From that decision only Socorro A. Castro appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellees did not even file a brief. On July 19, 1962 the appellate court rendered its decision dismissing the appeal, and the case was thereafter elevated to us on petition for review.

The ten parcels of land applied for may be classified into two groups. Parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, by agreement of the parties at the trial, "passed into the possession of Alejandra Austria after the death of Antonio Ventenilla 3 by virtue of the will left by the deceased Antonio Ventenilla and probated in Special Proceeding No. 237." With respect to the six other parcels (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) the parties reached no agreement. The oppositors contended that they belonged to the said deceased, while the petitioner insists that Alejandra Austria acquired them by purchase.

The issue in regard to parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10 is whether Alejandra Austria was a mere life usufructuary thereof, the naked ownership being in the oppositors, as collateral heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, or was the owner in fee simple, as residuary legatee under his will. The Court of Appeals did not make any categorical finding one way or the other on this issue, and disposed of it with this equivocal observation: "But, to say that a parcel of land passed into the possession of a person does not necessarily mean that said parcel of land formed part of the residuary legacy of said person, for it may mean that said person had usufructuary right over said parcel of land."

The question, it appears, has already been passed upon by this Court in a previous case. A brief reference to antecedent facts is necessary, as they are set forth in its decision in G.R. No. 10018, Austria v. Heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, September 19, 1956. It is there stated that the will of this deceased was admitted to probate in 1909, in Special Proceeding No. 237 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The widow, Alejandra Austria was appointed administratrix of the estate. In 1910 the collateral heirs, now oppositors, filed a petition for the annulment of the will, which petition was denied by the Court below. In the order of denial, dated October 5, 1910, it was declared: "que heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues so deducir de ellos la pension que corresponde a cada una de sus coherederos ..." That order was affirmed by this Court on appeal on January 11, 1912, G.R. No. 6620, 21 Phil. 180.

The next incident took place thirty-eight years later when, on April 22, 1950 herein oppositors filed a motion in the same testate proceeding claiming, among other things, that Alejandra Austria was merely the life usufructuary of the estate of the deceased, the naked ownership belonging to the movants; that she was no longer able to administer the properties; and that she had been disposing of them in violation of her trust; and praying that said Alejandra Austria be removed as administratrix and another appointed in her place. The trial Court denied the motion and ruled that the estate case had long since been closed. On appeal to this Court the order was affirmed (G.R. No. 10018 supra). The decision, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, ruled as follows on the issue that is pertinent to the case now before us:

We find no merit in the appeal. We agree with the lower Court that the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla had long been terminated and closed, and that the issues now raised by appellants had been settled and decided by the court's order of October 5, 1910, approving the final accounts of the administratrix Alejandra Austria declaring said administratrix the residuary legatee of all the movable and immovable properties of the estate after the payment of the shares of the oilier heirs (sister and nephews and nieces of the deceased) in the proportion of P17.52 per stripes, conditioned upon their putting up of the bond required by law (Sec. 754, Act 190).

.... Appellants also insist that appellee Alejandra Austria is not the residuary legatee of the estate of Antonio Ventenilla but only its life usufructuary. This stand has long been proven false and untenable when the Supreme Court found unmeritorious the appeal of appellants' predecessors from that portion of the Lower Courts order of October 5, 1910 denying their petition to annul the will of Antonio Ventenilla and declaring appellee entitled to all the remaining properties of the state. That appellee Alejandra Austria was the residuary legatee of the estate of the deceased is, therefore, res adjudicata and can no longer be relitigated by appellants after thirty-eight years. And as appellee had been in the possession and enjoyment of said properties all these years in the concept of owner, being the residuary legatee thereof, there is no reason nor justification for the reopening of these proceedings, the appointment of a new administrator, and the reconstitution of the last will and testament of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla.

The foregoing, considered together with the agreement of the parties at the trial of this case that the four parcels (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10) passed into the possession of Alejandra Austria by virtue of the will of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla, as well as with the testimonial evidence concerning Alejandra's continuous possession as owner thereafter, is sufficient proof of title for purposes of registration.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals side stepped the issue of ownership concerning the six other parcels (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). The documentary evidence for the appellant is that these six parcels were acquired by Alejandra Austria through purchase: Nos. 6 and 7 on January 20, 1912 (Exh. M); Nos. 5 and 8 on February 21, 1911 (Exh. N); No. 4 by virtue of the deed of sale Exh. P; and No. 9 by virtue of the deeds of sale Exh. 0, dated January 18, 1920; Exh. 0-1, dated May 3, 1924; Exh. 0-2 dated March 6, 1917; Exh. 0-3, dated Feb. 3, 1917; Exh. 0-4, dated July 13, 1913; Exh. 0-5, dated April 16, 1911; and Exh. 0-6, dated Nov. 16, 1928. The testimonial evidence confirms the long possession of those, parcels by Alejandra Austria, and after her death by Socorro A. Castro. The receipts showing the corresponding tax payments have been submitted and form part of the record.

The contention of the oppositors below is that these parcels also belonged to the deceased Antonio Ventenilla. Even assuming this to be so, they would have passed to widow, Alejandra Austria, as the residuary heir under his will; and as stated by this Court in Case G.R. No. L-10018, supra, "she had been in possession and on payment of said properties all these years in concept of owner, being the residuary legatee thereof." In any event whether, as purchaser or as residuary legatee, such possession in concept of owner constituted sufficient registrable title.

The next issue relates to the donation of all the ten parcels, executed by Alejandra Austria in favor of Socorro A. Castro. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling that said donation was mortis causa and consequently void because it did not follow the formalities required of a will, pursuant to Article 620 of the old Civil Code, 4 the law in force when the donation was made on September 22, 1939.

Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. "Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation ? If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained: in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death." 5 Sometimes the nature of the donation becomes controversial when the donee's enjoyment of the property donated is postponed until after the donor's death. Manresa comments on this situation as follows:6

When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at the death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to his death, confusion might arise. To avoid it we must distinguish between the actual donation and the execution thereof. That the donation is to have effect during the lifetime of the donor or at his death does not mean the delivery of the property must be made during his life or after his death. From the moment that the donor disposes freely of his property and such disposal is accepted by the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). Until the day arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the donation, although valid when made, cannot be realized. Thus, he who makes the donation effective upon a certain date, even though to take place at his death, disposes of that which he donated and he cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another.lawphi1.nt

The donation at issue in the present case opens with the following disposition:

QUE YO ALEJANDRA AUSTRIA, la primera parte, en consideracion a los meritorios servicios y buenas atenciones que me haya prestado desde su nina y de los que todavia me esta prestando y seguira prestandome hasta mi muerte la senorita SOCORRO A. CASTRO, hija Iegitima de mi primo de Segundo grado, Sergio Castro, hago constar por la presente que expontaneamente y sin influencia de nadie cedo y traspaso en concepto de DONATION ONEROSA e intervivos a la mencionada senorita SOCORRO A. CASTRO, en compensacion a sus ya expresados SERVICIOS, los bienes que a continuacion se describen a saber.

After enumerating the properties donated, the deed of donation recites further:

Tambien hago constar que es nuestro convenio con la citada Donataria que esta Donacion se ha hecho con las condiciones siguientes, a saber:

(a) Que durante el tiempo en que todavia viviere, la donataria Socorro A. Castro, no tendra ninguna intervencion ni derecho sobre los productos de los terrenos cedidos en concepts de donacion a su favor;

(b) A mi fallecimiento la donataria pagara todos los gastos que se incurriesen por me intierro de acuerdo con mi posicion social; y

(c) Despues de mi fallecimiento la nuda propiedad y el derecho de Usufructo de todos los citados bienes arriba descritos, se consolidaran inmediatamente a favor de la Donataria Socorro A. Castro con la obligacion de destination anualmente cierta cantidad justa y suficiente de los productos de los terrenos aqui donados sitos en el barrio Caviernesan para el Sufragio de mi alma y el de mi finado esposo Dn. Antonio Ventenilla.

It is quite clear from the terms of the donation that the donor intended to and did dispose of her properties irrevocably in favor of the donee, subject only to the conditions therein expressed, one of which was that the latter would have no right to the products during the donor's lifetime. This merely indicates a reservation in herself of the usufruct over said properties, which usufruct would be consolidated with the naked ownership of the donee upon the former's death. The use of the words "se consolidaran" implied transfer of the naked ownership, with which the beneficial title would be consolidated upon arrival of the term thus fixed. In the case of Concepcion vs. Concepcion, August 25, 1952, 91 Phil. 823, this Court, construing a deed captioned as a donation mortis causa, held:

It is not sufficient to make a donation one mortis causa, requiring execution of the instrument of gift in the form and manner required for a will, that the instrument of donation states that it is mortis causa, if it can be gathered from the body of the instrument that the main consideration is not death of the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee, or his affection for the latter, and title is transferred immediately to the donee, even though the gift is conditioned to take effect after death of the donor insofar as possession and enjoyment of the property is concerned.

By virtue of the donation executed by the original owner and applicant in favor of Socorro A. Castro the latter succeeded to the properties applied for, and hence registration in the name of her Intestate Estate, represented in this case by the petitioner as administrator, is in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the lands described in the original application for registration are ordered registered as indicated above, pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act. No costs.

FRANCISCO LLENADO y ANA V. DE LLENADO, recurrentes, vs. MARIA HILVANO, recurrida. G.R. No. L-3280 August 30, 1950This is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The proven, according to the court, facts are:

The urban farm, a third of which Maria calls to your domain if full, the deceased today petenecia Gelera P. Buenaventura, owner written under the Torrens system. As Maria and sister this, call Dolores sewed take care of mother and sister. P. Ventura, (By this name was commonly known. Gelera P. Buenaventura, and the same so signed his private correspondence), in 1933 the ceded such third party as compensation and payment for services rendered by them, Exhs. C and C-1. To formalize this assignment somehow P. Ventura awarded in favor of Maria's Exh. A written in Visayan, whose translation into English says:

"Cession OF DOCUMENT OF LAND

"I, Br Gelera Buenaventura, of age and resident of Quiot, Merida, Leyte, declare AS FOLLOWS:

"That the land on Which the house of Maria sewed is standing, in Tacloban, Leyte, at MH del Pilar Street, starting from the cacao tree to the front side, I have Given it to her beginning This Day In Which I make este documento and not one of my brothers will disturb it as being heir to said land.

"I Have Given This Land in consideration of her services rendered to my mother and my sister Cristeta Gelera.

"Said Maria sewed Knew about this cession made to her and in truth she is grateful to me, and info we have signed este documento in the Presence of witness, This date 21st of November, 1938, Tacloban, Leyte.

(Sgd.) "PB Gelera

(Sgd.) "MARIA sewed."

After the death of the mother of P. Ventura, Maria administer the goods of this in Tacloban, Leyte, and how she found some difficulty with the brothers of that, I received the letters Exhs. F and G, where in the first dated July 16, 1938, Father Ventura admonished for their carelessness and tolerance to his brothers what they did, and the second from July 28, 1939, says :

"Mana Via, I will repeat to you saying that you 'are my administratix of all my belongings in Tacloban. Look after them since it is to you Whom I will leave them in case I am called by God at last. Feat my brothers Do not . because i will answer for you on anything Even to come up the house, Should they 'force to ever do it, accuse them If you see even Their shadows, drive them away,. do not let them step on the lot Because They are harmful people. I rely on you, Mana. "

Maria and her sister Dolores live in that third party claims that the estate of P. Ventura in a home that acquired by exchange in 1933 Ulrica de Luna. . ..

Until the death of Father Ventura, which occurred in 1945, Maria has been in possession of such third party as the owner and the rest of the plot as administrator, without interruption and in a peaceful manner, and the defendants, the filling handcuff, were his tenants within this third party and paid for the land that his house occupied the monthly rent of P4.000, Exhs. B, E, E-1 and E-2; but, according filling, I stop paying those rents because

"A. Then, When Exequiel Gelera and came Told me I was the owner, then it was to him That I Have Been paying the rentals." (Tnt, p. 30)

Exequiel Gelera is one of the brothers of P. Ventura, and one of the brothers who in their Exhs this incriminating letters. F and G. Exequiel Gelera and nephews and Agustin Alejandro Gelera on July 19, 1946 sold half of that farm that belonged to P. Ventura, precisely half comprises the third part ceded as payment and rewards Maria, for Filling of spouses Francisco and Ana Vieto (Anacleta Vieto), granting favor of these the Exh. 2, in which not only asked to vacate such third party Maria but pay them rent for the land occupied by the house that she has.

It is transcribed sewed Maria had been serving the mother and sister of Father Ventura, and the same after the death of his mother, and continued serving him, as administrator of his estate until his death in 1945 is evident Maria sewed field obtained as payment for services rendered to the mother and sister of the priest, and services they pay the same donor to the death of this. The donation, therefore, has not been done only for services but also for those who continuously provide forward until the donor's death.

One could argue that the document Exhibit A donation makes no mention of the services provided to the donor by the donee. However, if the evidence shows that she has been serving the same donor before and after the donation, why we have to close your eyes to reality?

In his letter to Maria July 16, 1938, Father Ventura said:

You say that you 'do not not stop them from taking any more things there, Mana Via, this is now a great mistake of yours since someone is taking care of the house and there is one person responsible to Whom I have Entrusted Those Things. Obtaining This condition is now much the same as if there is no one living in the house and anybody can pick things without hindrance Because no one is watching.

Via Mana, the prosecutor said that you 'are the person responsible for all the things Existing until I have eaten there for them; so, without fear, even if they come to take the devil, Oppose them. . .. Needless to say, I will not go to another house to look for them since I did not entrust them to any other person but you.

xxx xxx xxx

I repeat that you 'do send a telegram to hand Siquiel (Exequiel Gelera) to return my valise With its contents without missing anything, Because there May be some documents therein, and then our relationship as brothers will be sorely Affected. . . . If he is a respectful brother have written to I Should Have and Should Have Asked me to give him my valise, and I gave shouldnt removed and carried away anything Belonging to me without my permission. (Exhibit F-1.)

In his letter of November 29, 1938, eight days after the donation granted, said:

About Those Things in the house, keep them. . .. I have nobody to give them to you but. With respect to my brothers, they 'are only good where there is something for inheritance for they' are ready, but no one cares at times of distress. At the time my mother and sister no one offered Preferred care needed a hand.

xxx xxx xxx

In closing I will This repeat: do not let any of my brothers touch my things in Tacloban. (Exh. C-1.)

In his letter of June 28, 1939, said:

I will repeat to you saying that you 'are my administratrix of all my belongings in Tacloban. Look after them.. . . . (Exh. G-1.)

If I wanted to reward the services rendered to his mother and sister, it was natural to reward the services also decided that henceforth he would lend, the more so since his brother was robbing him of his property. It is clear that in consideration of the services expected to receive it as an administrator and already rendered by him, his mother and sister, Father Ventura dono said Mary sewed ground.

We can not disregard the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Force is to declare, according to them, that the donation has been made with cause, which is not simple remunerative donation. "Donations to onerous cause shall be governed by the rules of contracts and remunerative by the provisions of this title in the part exceeding the value of a levy." (Art. 622, Civil Code.) Article 1278 of the same Code provides that "A contract will be required, regardless of the form in which they are held, provided that they attend the essential conditions for its validity."

Interpreting this article, the Supreme Court of Spain stated that "contracts are required, whatever the form in which they are held, the concurrence of the essential conditions for its validity on them, according categorically mandated by Article 1278 of the Civil Code; following from this principle, and not the validity of the extrinsic forms required by law for purposes other than the effectiveness depends only contract between the parties, which therefore can be enforced reciprocally agreed obligations , which confirms that Article 1279 does not make the effectiveness of the contract to the granting of a public deed, in cases required by law. " (Manalo against De Mesa, 29 Jur. fil., 523, 529)

In Sison against Ramos (13 Phil. Rep., 56), the Court said that "Article 1280 of the Code does not require the scope to prove the rule, stating in writing published because, under Article 2178 of with same code, all contracts, when meet the conditions of validity that expresses the 1261 produce full effect between the parties, without prejudice to their right to request and obtain public write soar under Article 1279, may not serve the lack of this requirement to any of those and at least one third to deny the existence and reality of the contract, when justified by test elements adminisbles right. "

Hence the Court of Appeals, applying the decision in the case of Manalo against De Mesa, supra , I confirm that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In that case it was stated that a donation with onerous cause is the nature and conditions of a contract and is subject to the rules of contracts and "The provisions of the Civil Code governing the form of contracts generally do not require that It stipulated between the parties it was recorded in a public deed, since it is valid and effective and produces all its consequences under the law the contract verbally and with greater reason held forth in a private document, since Article 1225 of the same code attributed to private document duly authenticated the same value as a public document among those who had subscribed and their successors . "

The Filling husbands, who have a house on the land, paid to Maria sewed, since 1933, a monthly rental of P4.This is recognition of your domain for twelve years, and only stopped when Exequiel pay Maria Gelera made them believe that it was the landowner for having inherited the Father Ventura. This pretended inheritance is unfounded. Father Ventura and ceased to be owner of the land from that in 1933 Maria ceded As proof of this domain Filling charged rent for the husbands. Maria when they had acquired in donation inter vivos , and possessing continuously for more than twelve years in living donor Father Ventura, this could not, at death, pass by inheritance to his brother and nephews that said land was not owned.

The military action that Maria was to go to the court authorized by Article 1279 of the Civil Code: granting his request for a registrable deed according to the Land Registry Act.

Uphold the original ruling, with costs against recurretes.

MACARIA CASTILLO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellee vs. URBANO CASTILLO and MARIA QUIZON, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. 7050 November 5, 1912

The subject of this suit is a parcel of agricultural land, situated in the barrio of Galamayano, municipality of San Jose, Province of Batangas, of an area such as is usually required for sowing thirty gantas of seed-rice, and described and identified by boundaries. It is taken for granted that this land belonged to Simona Madlangbayan, who died seven years ago. At the present time it is in the exclusive possession of one of the latter's children, Urbano Castillo, while there are other descendants of hers who have the same right to wit: A daughter and some grandchildren of the deceased brother of full blood of Urbano Castillo, named Pio Castillo; the daughter of a sister of full blood of the same defendant, named Alfonsa, likewise deceased; and a daughter of a half-brother of the said Urbano Castillo, named Estefano Libingting, also deceased. The descendants of these three family branches claim to be entitled to share with Urbano Castillo the ownership of the land in question, as being the only property Simona Madlangbayan had left at her death. Hence, the demand for a division, daughter figures as a defendant therein merely by default.

The defendant Urbano Castillo, a s the sole possessor of the land, endeavored to prove that his mother, Simona Madlangbayan, had other property which during her lifetime she disposed of to the benefit of some of the plaintiffs; but the lower court held that this allegation had not been proven, and such conclusion must be affirmed as it is well-founded and in no wise erroneous.

In the judgment rendered the claim made by the plaintiff was recognized to be valid and the property of the joint-ownership was ordered to be divided into four parts: One, for Macaria Castillo and her nephews and nieces, Juan, Clemente, Pedro Lope, Tomasa, and Maria, all surnamed Cadano; another, for Juliana Libingting; another, for Maria Quizon; and the fourth, for the defendant Urbano Castillo.

The latter entered an exception to this judgment, moved for a rehearing, excepted to the ruling denying the same, and filed a bill of exceptions, which, however, was held on file until conclusion of the trial and during the progress of the proceedings had for the division, award of shares and liquidation of fruits, which operates were all effected through commissioners and as a result thereof the court ordered: (1) That each coparcener be delivered the part of the property shown on the rough sketch made by the commissioners, to belong to him or her; (2) that Urbano Castillo pay to each coparcener, as reimbursement of fruits, P78.18; and (3) that the expense of partition be borne pro rata by all the interested parties.

When, after all this procedure, the case was brought before us on appeal, through the proper bill of exceptions, the judgment was not impugned on account of the form of division therein ordered, but merely because of the following assignments of error: .

1. Because the personality of the plaintiffs was recognized, and the amendment of the answer, impugning such personality, was disallowed.

2. Because the instrument of gift was held to be false, and the gift null and void.

3. Because an indemnity for the fruits was awarded.

With respect to the first assignment of error, it is not a principle authorized by law that heirs of legal age may not demand the division of a real property, left them by their predecessor-in-interest and held by a coheir, without first initiating special intestate proceedings during which a judicial administrator is to be appointed, who alone is vested with the personality to claim the property that belongs to the succession. On the contrary, such heirs are expressly authorized to do so, unless for the reason of there being unpaid debts, judicial intervention becomes necessary, which was not alleged as a special defense in this suit.

As much for the preceding reasons as because there was not included in the bill of exceptions the question relative to the opportune or inopportune motion presented for an amendment of the answer to the complaint, and which was denied by the lower court, such assignment of error, alleged in this instance, can neither be considered nor decided.

With reference to the second alleged error, the document declared in the judgment appealed from to be false, null and void, is one of gift which the appellant avers was executed in his behalf by his predecessor-in-interest. The finding of falsity, contained in the judgment of the lower court and based on various facts discussed by him on detail, can not be brought up in this appeal except as a question of fact, with regard to which no new matter may be introduced inasmuch as no error of fact was alleged to have been committed in weighing the evidence; and the cogent presumption of law, which can not easily be destroyed except by strong contrary evidence the only reason advanced by the appellant reenforces the old public instruments executed in conformity with the Notarial Law, (now repealed) before a notary public, by reason of their insertion in the protocol or notarial registry and the personal attestation made by that official of the proceedings and the contents of the instrument characteristic features not enjoyed by a private instrument which, executed on one date, like the one in question (January 20, 1902), appears to have been ratified on another (November 15, 1905), before a notary, but with no further authorization on the part of this official other than such act of affirmation.

And even though the said instrument were not false, the trial court declared it to be void and ineffective. The alleged gift was in fact null and void, according to the provisions of articles 629 and 633 of the Civil Code, as its acceptance by the donee was in no manner expressed in the instrument, nor was the pretended gift consummated pursuant to the provision contained in article 623 of the same code.

The appellant argues that the acceptance in writing of the gift in question, was not necessary, as it was made for a valuable consideration, and should be subject to the legal provisions governing contracts. If this alleged gift was really made, it was one of those mentioned in article 619 of the aforecited code, as being gift "which imposes upon the donee a burden inferior to the value of the gift," for Simona Madlangbayan apparently stated in the said instrument that she delivered the land to Urbano Castillo in order that he defray the expenses of her subsistence and burial, "and if perchance anything should remain from the price of the land, the surplus of the said expenses (?) is granted to him by me." A gift this kind is not in fact a gift for valuable consideration, but it remuneratory or compensatory, made for the purpose of remunerating or compensating a charge, burden or condition imposed upon the donee, inferior to the value of the gift which, therefore, may very properly to be termed to be conditional, and article 622, invoked by the appellant himself, very clearly prescribes that "gifts for valuable consideration shall be governed by the provisions of this title with regard to the part exceeding the value of the charge imposed," to say nothing of the finding of the trial court that the said instrument was false as shown by the evidence and in accordance with which the defendant did not fulfill the conditions mentioned, since he did not defray the expenses for the subsistence and burial of Simona Madlangbayan.

With regard to the third assignment of error, the appellant contends that no reimbursement of fruits should have been awarded the plaintiffs, as no demand for the same was made in complaint and he was unable to prepare evidence in the matter. The procedure had after the plaintiffs were found to be entitled to the right of coownership, was in all respect in accord with the provisions of section 191 of the Code of Civil Procedure , and so well prepared was the appellant in the second part of the trial, for presentation of evidence, that he stated himself "I do not even wish to cross-examine" (his brief, p. 10).

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered

De Luna v. Abrigo 181 SCRA 150

FACTS:

De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The

donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and

conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the

donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived the said

donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:

1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and

Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica

2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from

the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions

3) Automatic reversion in case of violation

The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a

Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the

remaining area was retained by the De Luna.

The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with

the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The

Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the

conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The

heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation

of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written contract)

HELD:

10 years

The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.

Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed

not by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions

for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply.

The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which

provides:

Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and

remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.

It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation

must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.

However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of

Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules

on prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.

ASTERIA BAUTISTA, MAXIMA LOMIBAO, FRANCISCO LOMIBAO, JOSE LOMIBAO, FELISA LOMIBAO and PAULINA LOMIBAO,plaintiffs-appellees, vs. EPIFANIO SABINIANO, in his capacity as Guardianad litemof the minors MARCELINA SABINIANO and CANDIDA SABINIANO,defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-4236 November 18, 1952This is an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in civil case No. 10516, holding that the donations made by Alberto G. Bautista in favor of Marcelina and Candida surnamed Sab