modernization theory revisited: does a grand theory of...
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Modernization Theory Modernization Theory Revisited: Does a Grand Revisited: Does a Grand Theory of Theory of InglehartInglehart and and
WelzelWelzel Really Bring Human Really Bring Human Development? Development?
Fumihiko SAITO
Ryukoku University
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Revised version of modernization Revised version of modernization theory and its critiquestheory and its critiques
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. Modernization, cultural change, and democracy : the human development sequenceCambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
History counts in shaping the History counts in shaping the country positionscountry positions
Religion
Colonial experiences
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
ContributionsContributions
Taking culture into consideration: Democracy cannot be “implanted.”
Democracy is more than just a institutional change. It needs a shift in values held by individuals.
Modernization is not the same with Americanization.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Critique 1Critique 1
Orientation and Methodology
The grand theory is welcomed?– This sounds very deterministic.
So what is new as a “revised version of modernization theory”?– Modernization changes modernity: “reflexivity”
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Critique 2Critique 2
Uneasiness from the experiences of Area Studies– E.g. Is Africa the opposite of Japan?
– No explanation given to “unexplainable countries” of developing world: India and Nigeria.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Critique 3Critique 3
Negative aspects of modernization and individualization– Environmental degradation by economic
growth
– Personal/social alienation: divorce, collapse of communities, social disintegration, etc.
Is democratization universal? Asian values vs. Western values?
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Another Interesting StudyAnother Interesting StudyJoseph Henrich et al. eds. 2004 Foundations of human sociality : Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies
Oxford : Oxford University Press – The subsequent slides are adopted by Henrich et al
(http://www.hss.caltech.edu/roots-of-sociality/phase-i/presentations).
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
CulturallyCulturally--evolved social behaviorevolved social behavior
Evolution of societal complexity: how humans got from small-scale foragers to complex nation states is fundamentally about solving problems of coordination, cooperation and bargaining.If humans are heavily reliant on imitation and social learning, then cultural transmission will have solved these problems in different ways in different places--multiple stable equilibria.One whould expect to observe differences in behaviors among social groups related to cooperation, fairness & punishment.How to measure? Economic Experiments.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Au, Gnau
Lamalera
Mapuche
AchuarOrmaHadza
Sangu
Mongols,Khazaks
Zimbabwe
Machiguenga
TsimaneAche
Cross-Cultural Experimental Economics Project
MichiganLos Angeles
ZürichKansas City
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Camisea, southeastern Peru
Machiguenga
•independent families•cash cropping•slash & burn•foraging
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
HadzaHadzaTanzaniaTanzania
Hunter-gatherers
Egalitarian
Acephalous
Bands: 20–30 people
Periodic contact with agriculturalists
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Their Main FindingsTheir Main Findings
Low UG rejection rates: proposers’ offers are not rational, given frequency of irrational respondersBut, there are also places where people reject fair offers, even hyper-fair offersSex, age, and wealth do not explain within group variation (a couple of weak exceptions)Intermixing and adjacent populations have distinct game behaviorsGame results seem to generally reflect economic life in these places—in many cases (not all)
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
Explaining the betweenExplaining the between--group group variationvariation
The research team has ranked ordered the 18 societies according to their degree of market integration (dependence), privacy (can people be alone), anonymity (anonymous roles and transactions), and the payoffs to cooperationThey regressed mean UG offers on these variables and found that the best model involves market integration and payoff to cooperation
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
InterpretationsInterpretations1) Experiments tap core characteristics of individuals
related to fairness, reciprocity, trust, cooperation. People acquire these generalized dispositions as a consequence of growing up in a specific place.
2) Humans don’t have core propensities or values related to fairness, reciprocity, etc. They have different sets of rules for how to behave in specific situations, which are cued by context. The game structure cues whatever real life context is closest..
3) Could be culturally-transmitted information processing differences. ‘East Asians’ reason differently from Americans.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
ContributionContribution
Brought experimental economics into the real settings in non-Western environment.
The comparative study shed light on varieties of “rational reactions.”
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
CritiqueCritique
A lot depends on methodological soundness.
Comparative studies (piling case studies) vs. in-depth ethnographic studies: trade-off.
This kind of field is too new.
F Saito at Hiroshima Univ 2007.2.9.
My Conclusions?My Conclusions?
Normative values do matter. Some are culturally specific, but can be transmitted.
Rationality is not a mono-dimensional.
Perhaps Grand Theory is tempting, but …
Globalization does not make the world “flat”?