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Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center [email protected] 22 September 2015

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Page 1: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification

(VV&C)

Paul MinerNASA Langley Research Center

[email protected]

22 September 2015

Page 2: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

• “Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful”– George Box

22 September 2015 Modeling for V&V 2

Page 3: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

Example of Useful Models

• Canonical models for designing and analyzing digital hardware introduced in the mid-1950s

– Huffman, D.A., The synthesis of sequential switching circuits, The Journal of the Franklin Institute, 257(3):161-190, 1954

– Mealy, G.H., A method for synthesizing sequential circuits, Bell System Technical Journal, 34:1045-1079, September 1955

– Moore, E.F. Gedanken Experiments on Sequential Machines, in C. Shannon and J. McCarthy, editors, Automata Studies, Princeton University Press, 1956

• These modeling abstractions underpin the digital revolution– But, ..

• “There is no such thing as digital circuitry. There is only analog circuitry driven to extremes.”

– Unknown – quoted by Kevin Driscoll• https://c3.nasa.gov/dashlink/static/media/other/ObservedFailures6.html

• For VV&C, need to consider impact when modeling abstractions no longer hold

22 September 2015 Modeling for V&V 3

Page 4: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

Role of Models in VV& C

Benefits• Explore system behavior earlier

in lifecycle• Ability to verify properties that

cannot be effectively demonstrated by test– E.g. Robust partitioning for

Integrated Modular Avionics– No memory leaks, buffer

overflows, etc.

• …

Risks• Invalid assumptions• Unstated assumptions• Tendency to conflate model with

reality• Maintaining consistency between

multiple models (with different underlying abstractions)

• Incompatibility between models– Especially design models vs.

failure models• …

22 September 2015 Modeling for V&V 4

Page 5: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

Models for Design vs. VV&C

Design• Focus on functional correctness,

desired properties, and performance

• Emphasis on average case behavior (e.g., for performance)

• Intended interactions between components & environment– Presumption that the only

interaction is through defined interfaces

VV&C• Focus on non-functional

requirements – Safety, Security, etc.

• Emphasis on worst-case behavior• Preclude adverse interaction

between components & environment

– In addition to failure propagation through defined interfaces, must also consider “out-of-band” failure modes

22 September 2015 Modeling for V&V 5

Page 6: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

Example “out-of-band” failure mode

https://xkcd.com/538/

22 September 2015

Modeling for V&V 6

Page 7: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

Questions?

Downloaded from http://xkcd.com/246/

22 September 2015 Modeling for V&V 7

Page 8: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

Backup Slides

22 September 2015 8Modeling for V&V

Page 9: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

9

• Assumed importance order- Assumed/known fault hypothesis violated

exhaustion of resources (known fault hypothesis)

- Single point of failure unknown fault hypothesis forgotten failure modeunderestimated probability of occurrence

- Fault propagation = domino effect (fault containment)

• Real occurrence frequency order- Chain or domino effect (missing fault containment)

E.g. TTP membership; shown to be a fault propagation path [Ademaj, Sivencrona]

- Single point of failure (unknown fault hypothesis) E.g. quad-redundant control system (termination of bus)[ 2003]

- Exhaustion of resources (known fault hypothesis)

"How Systems Fail"

Page 10: Modeling Issues for Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) Paul Miner NASA Langley Research Center p.s.miner@nasa.gov 22 September 2015

An assumption will remain valid only until you come to depend on it*.

22 September 2015 Modeling for V&V 10

* http://www.ece.mtu.edu/faculty/rmkieckh/Kieckhafer-top-ten.htm (version 9.1; law 4.2)