Mobilizing traditional family values: acomparative analysis of decision-making

processes in the Swiss cantons

Michelle Beyeler, University of Zurich∗

Paper to be presented at the 4th European Conference on Politicsand Gender (ECPG), 2015 June 11-13 Uppsala, Sweden.

Introduction

What are the effects of state institutions such as federalism, direct democ-racy or consensus democracy on gender equality? The question is inves-tigated in this paper based on a policy agreement that had to be ratifiedin all Swiss cantons. The comparative study on subnational units demon-strates that the effects of formal decision-making institutions strongly de-pend on the configuration of two other factors. These are, firstly, prevailingnorms concerning gendered role models and state intervention as well as,secondly, political mobilization of these norms. Other factors, such as thedirection of the public campaign, the configuration of power or the degreeof adaptational pressure are less relevant to explain the pattern of accep-tance or rejection of the policy proposal.

The policy reform at stake concerns an intercantonal agreement on schoolharmonization (HarmoS) issued in 2007 that had to be ratified by the Swisscantons in the subsequent years. The ratification processes have startedin 2008 and by the time of writing 15 cantons are signatories, in 7 can-tons the proposal has been rejected in a cantonal referendum and in 4 can-tons, the parliaments have not yet formally decided. While gender equalitynever was at the core of this policy reform, some aspects of the agreement

∗Mail to: michelle.beyeler@uzh.ch. Office Address: Bern University of Applied Science,Social Work, Hallerstrasse 10, CH-3012 Bern +41 31 848 36 48

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targeted work-care-reconciliation. Most importantly, the signing cantonshad to commit themselves to start obligatory school for 4-year-olds (i.e.two years of Kindergarten for all children), to offer regular school hours(Blockzeit) and also to offer after-school care depending on the demands ofthe parents.

This particular policy reform constitutes an ideal case for the compar-ative investigation of institutional and campaigning effects. There are 26political units that all had to independently take a decision on whetherto ratify or not this policy proposal. Although the decision making pro-cesses took place in different institutional venues and at different points intime, all cantons decided on exactly the same policy reform. Containing theanalysis to the cantonal decision-making processes regarding the nationalschool harmonization project allows to systematically compare political de-bates on the same issue in different contexts and to investigate how thesevarious contexts affected the final policy decision.

I show that through the public campaigns on the issue, the opponentsmanaged to reframe it from an unspectacular and mostly technical matteraiming at more compatibility between the different cantonal school sys-tems to a highly ideological subject about the wider role of the state andthe family. But only in cantonal contexts where the discursive opportu-nity structures (Koopmans und Statham, 1999a, 228) were favorable to thefamily-responsibility frame, i.e. in those contexts with conservative soci-etal attitudes regarding the role of the family and the state in educatingand raising children, the reframing has lead to a rejection of HarmoS.

In the next section, I lay out the proposed analytical perspective. Section3, provides information on data and operationalizations. Section 4 gives anoverview on the HarmoS policy reform and ratification processes as wellas an explanation of decisions taken in the different cantons. Section 5 willconclude.

Policy decision in the context of federalism and directdemocracy

Political decision-making processes are complex, they take place in par-ticular settings and depend on a variety of different factors such as polit-ical decision-making procedures, power constellations and political cam-

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paigns. To understand how these different factors interact and affect thefinal policy decision contributes to answer the question about how insti-tutional settings affect policy-making. After a brief discussion of feministpositions about the effects of institutions on policies, an analytical modelis developed which structures the following comparative analysis of theHarmoS ratification process in Switzerland.

Institutional effects on gendered policies

The effects of political institutions, in particular federalism, on gender equal-ity is an often discussed issue (eg. Banaszak, 1996; Banaszak und Weldon,2011; Chappell und Curtin, 2013; Franceschet und Piscopo, 2013; Vickers,2013). Federal Switzerland is often cited as an example of a country, wherestrong federalism lead to problematic outcomes for gender equality, e.g. thevery late introduction of female suffrage. Federalism, together with directdemocracy, is also considered a central reason for the comparatively poordevelopment of work-care-reconciliation policies in this country (Thoenen,2010). This argument is backed by a recent policy decision: Due to thecantonal veto, a new constitutional article proposing a greater role for thefederal state in the domain of family and reconciliation policies (family ar-ticle), has been rejected in 2013. While a majority of the voters (54 percent)were in favour of the new article, the proposal failed to get the requiredsupport by a majority of the cantons.

Still, institutions do not determine policy outcomes. Policy dynamicstend to vary widely by policy domain (Verloo et al. 2011, 67; McBride andMazur 2010, 248). Moreover, institutions do not operate in a political vac-uum and other factors such as political mobilization, prevailing structuresas well as political party strategies do play a role in explaining policy vari-ation (Mahon und Brennan, 2013). Banaszak und Weldon (2011) argue thatbesides formal institutions, i.e. constitutional rules, it is primarily the infor-mal institutions, i.e. prevailing norms abut gender hierarchies, that play animportant role in understanding institutional policy effects. According totheir framework, both types of institutions may develop in a disconnectedmanner and it is during these periods of contradiction that opportunitiesarise for political actors and social movements to push for policy reforms.

Their model can be applied to analyze the Swiss case in various ways(Beyeler, 2014). One way through wich federalism affects gender equality

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is to focus on diverging developments in subnational units. Informal in-stitutions (i.e. gender norms and practices) might not develop evenly ina society. Especially in societies characterized by cultural-linguistic, socio-economic and political heterogeneity such as Switzerland, large variationbetween different regions is possible. In issue fields, where subnational en-tities diverge largely on informal institutions and also have the possibilityto set up their own formal regulations, informal and formal institutions arelikely to develop as relatively connected at the subnational level, leadinghowever to a growing disconnect between the different subnational enti-ties. An it is in this context, that the policy case that will be discussed in theremainder of this paper provides interesting insights.

Modeling the policy decisions

Analyzing policy making in the Swiss institutional context, means to in-clude at least two major institutional characteristics of this country.1 Thefirst institution is federalism – and for the case discussed here – the insti-tutional rule of cantonal autonomy in particular. The Swiss federation iscomposed of 26 cantons of highly unequal size.2 Article 3 of the Swiss fed-eral constitution grants the same strong autonomy to every canton regard-less of its size. The cantons are allowed to choose their internal organizationthemselves as long as they respect certain principles such as the democraticsystem and the rule of law. The constitution also emphasizes the principleof subsidiarity, meaning that all policies that are not explicitly assigned tothe central level are automatically in the competence of the cantons, whichmay hand them over to the municipalities.

The second important institution is direct democracy. At the nationallevel, every constitutional amendment is subject to a compulsory referen-dum. Furthermore, once the parliament has accepted a new bill, by collect-ing 50,000 signatures, opponents of the bill can demand a vote on the bill(optional referendum). There exists also the instrument of the popular ini-tiative. By collecting 100,000 signatures social groups hold the possibility

1A third important institutional characteristic of Switzerland besides federalism and di-rect democracy is consociationalism, which is however partially based on the other twoinstitutions and is not explicitly included in the argument in this paper.

2In 2014 Zurich, the largest canton, had almost 1.4 million inhabitants, which is aboutninety times more than the smallest canton, Appenzell Innerrhoden.

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of proposing a new constitutional article that must be brought to the polls.All Swiss cantons also have established direct democratic procedures, withsome variance regarding the type of direct democratic instruments as wellas the thresholds for using these instruments in the different cantons.

Federalism and public referenda can be considered as important con-straints on central political decision-making, which has been shown for thecase of social policy for instance by Obinger (1998) or Armingeon (2001) orgender equality (Beyeler, 2014; Senti, 1994).

The policy case analyzed here has to be considered in the context ofthese two institutions. The principle of cantonal autonomy is the reason,why each canton was able to decide on its own. Direct democratic decision-making procedures are a necessary condition for observing the kind ofcampaign effects discussed. These two formal political institutions, how-ever, are not central variables in the proposed explanatory model. Rather,they should be considered as preconditions for the kind of argument putforward.

The more central factor is, what Banaszak and Weldon (2011, 268) label’informal institutions’. These informal institutions reflect prevailing or dom-inant values regarding gender hierarchies in the political units. The term’institution’ rather than values is used in order to emphasizes the struc-tural nature of such socially sanctioned norms. Alternatively, one mightalso seek of discursive opportunity structures, which has been introduced byKoopmans und Statham (1999a, 228) to denote the presence of relativelystable constellations of prevailing institutions and ideas in a specific con-text.

In the case of gender hierarchies in Switzerland, I consider it impor-tant to distinguish between two dimensions. While the principle of le-gal equality between women and men has been firmly established in val-ues and practice, the principles of dual-earning/dual-caring, envisaginga more equal division of labor and care work between women and menhave not. The model of a woman being a mother and housekeeper thatunburdens her husband from unpaid domestic work is still widely expe-rienced. Particularly in the more rural regions and German speaking can-tons, women living with a partner and dependent children are expected tostrongly cut down on paid work. These are the same regions where alsoanti-statist and anti-centralization sentiments have a strong basis among

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voters (Beyeler, 2014).Besides the discursive opportunity structure, the next very central fac-

tor are successful public campaigns by supporters and opponents of the pol-icy. A campaign is successful when it manages to get attention and provokefurther public debates. Using direct democratic instruments is a meansfor social groups to become heard in public (Höglinger, 2008; Kriesi undWisler, 1996). Research shows that political campaigns, such as those inthe wake of a direct democratic decision, are in general not able to ma-nipulate voters. Rather, they activate predispositions and thereby mobilizethose who are poorly interested in or neutral regarding the issue at stake.Furthermore, campaigns strengthen predispositions (Le Duc, 2002; Nadeauet al., 2008; Kriesi, 2011).

The explanatory model includes two other factors, which can be con-sidered as ’controls’ or alternative explanations. The first is the size of theopposing coalition, which is generally considered an important determinantof voting outcomes (i.e. Kriesi, 2005, chapter 3). The larger the opposingcoalition, the lower we expect the support for the policy proposal to be.The second is adaptaional pressure: Although all cantons have to decide onthe same issue, there is variation regarding the degree of change that is re-quired in case of ratification. The basic idea of the harmonization act is toreduce cantonal variation in compulsory school. For most issues, the actproposes a middle way between the different existing cantonal solutions.Ratification of the act requires larger changes in some cantons than in otherones and therefore the degree of adaptational pressure varies between can-tons. Looking at the ’misfit’ between the current policy and the policy solu-tion proposed by an intergovernmental has been proposed as a concept inthe Europeanization literature (e.g. Börzel und Risse, 2000; Radaelli, 2000).This concept can be transformed to the policy case studied here by defin-ing the degree of adaptational pressure as the level of misfit between theinter-cantonal agreement on the one hand and the cantonal policies at theother. If adaptational pressure is low the expectation is that the proposalwill be less controversial, will generate less opposition and in the end alsogets support more easily.

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Methods

The study is based on a mixed methods design, combining case studymethods with a media content analysis as well as a macro-level compar-ative analysis on cantonal support rates.

Support for HarmoS in the cantons

Due to the differences in the ratification processes in the Swiss cantons, itis not possible to measure the support level with a single indicator that hasthe same meaning for all processes. Instead I rely on separate measures.For the cantons that decided at the polls, the indicator considers the shareof supportive votes. For those cases, where the parliaments decided and noreferendum has taken place, we cannot know how supportive the voterswould have been, in the case of a successful referendum. We only knowhow much support the agreement got in parliament. We calculated theshare of supportive votes as a percentage of all votes supporting or rejectingthe agreement (cf. column two in table 3 in the appendix). For the cantonof Jura the exact number of votes has not been reported in the protocol ofthe cantonal parliamentary assembly.3

Two cantons that have decided at the Landsgemeinde, also here the exactcounting of the votes is not known. According to the protocols of the as-semblies it was a large majority that supported HarmoS in Glarus, whereasin Appenzell Innerrhoden the new education law, which was anticipatingthe changes needed by HarmoS, was rejected by a large majority. Since theexact number is not clear, I use a rough estimate of 70 percent respectively30 percent to quantify the expression ’large majority’. Admittedly such es-timates are problematic, but the point estimates allows to include the twocases in the scatter plots and therefore to use the cases to illustrate the ar-gument and to give us some ideas about the placement of the cantons inrelation to the others.

3According to the secretariat of the parliament of the canton Jura the exact number ofvotes is not known because the decision had been so clear and there were only about 1 to 3votes against the agreement.

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Cantonal referendum campaigns

A Political Claims Analysis (PCA) is used to measure the public debates.This method has been developed to capture public debates in the contextof political mobilization (Koopmans und Statham, 1999b) and applied forinstance to study public debates on migration policies (Koopmans et al.,2005; Giugni und Passy, 2006), on European politics (Koopmans, 2007), onanti-globalization (Beyeler, 2013) as well as differences in political debatesbetween the German and the French speaking part of Switzerland (Tresch,2008). We extend this method, originally aiming at measuring politicalclaims making in the public sphere, to include advertisements and lettersto the editor.

The PCA-data has been collected for those cantons where a referendumhas taken place. Data has been coded from cantonal newspapers publishedin the four weeks before the vote and including two days after the vote.For each canton the regional daily newspaper with the highest subscrip-tion rate has been chosen. From these papers we collected all advertise-ments, letters to the editor and articles that were concerned with HarmoS.Following the coding scheme of political claims analysis, the unit of analy-sis in the PCA are not articles or speech acts but instances of claim-making -shorthand ‘claims’ defined “as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere thatconsists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands” (Koopmanset al., 2005, 24). The original coding procedure has been extended to media-related campaign activities such as letters to the editor and ads. Letters andadds have been counted as particular instances of claims making.

Coding involved information on the actor (who made the claim) as wellas the position towards Harmos (positive, negative, neutral). For a num-ber of cantonal debates also arguments, i.e. the justifications used by theclaimant, have been coded. The coding lists were closed, but we addedsome codes in the argument variable, after having coded the first set ofnewspapers. This allowed to recode some of the arguments that have beenput in the ‘others’ category in the first coding round.

A direct democratic campaign has different dimensions and we there-fore also measure different forms of campaign activity. First, we look at thecampaign of the political actors. Here we consider political claims in thepublic sphere. Second, we also consider advertisements as the most obvi-ous mobilization strategy of political actors. Following Kriesi (2005) we use

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two measures ‘intensity’ and ‘direction’. Intensity considers the frequencyand the size of total ads in the four weeks up to the vote. It is measuredby adding all ads multiplying by their share of one newspaper page. Di-rection is measured by multiplying the ads by their size, i.e. as a share ofone newspaper page and with ‘-1’ for ads against HarmoS and “+1” for adsin favor of HarmoS. A third measure of the public campaign are the battlesfought in the correspondence columns. Here we look at the number and di-rection of letters to the editor. This measure is somewhat more problematicthan the other two since the newspapers devote different amounts of spacefor these letters and have different internal policies about how to select theletters. One may distinguish between two approaches: Either the selectionis based on criteria concerning the author of the letter, i.e. a preferencefor letters of subscribers and residents or the main focus lies on roughlyreflecting the pro/contra proportion of the received letters. Therefore theletters are interesting sources of information, but now should not use themas indicators for the strength or direction of public campaigns.

Other factors

As a proxy for the informal institutions, i.e. the broader societal attitudesregarding the role of the family and the state in educating and raising chil-dren, cantonal voting outcomes of the referendum on maternity insurance(2004) are used. Similar to the HarmoS debate, the opponents accentuatedthe state’s increasing exertion of influence on the upbringing of children, anargument culminating in the term Staatskinder (Année Politique 2004, 198).

To measure the degree of adaptational pressure the changes in the entrydate to compulsory schooling has been used. Each canton has specified acut-off date to decide on the entrance to compulsory school. This issue hasbeen, the most controversial one in the debate on HarmoS. Adaptationalpressure is measured by counting the number of month by which this cut-off date has been changed.

As an indicator for variations in configurations of power, the cantonalelectoral strength of the parties opposing HarmoS is used. The percentageof votes for each party in the most recent elections previous to the cantonalballot - respectively parliamentary decision on HarmoS was considered.Data on the electoral strength of parties in cantonal elections is providedby the federal statistical agency (BFS). Since in the cantons Graubunden

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and Appenzell Ausser Rhoden the cantonal parliament is appointed in ma-joritarian elections, the electoral support of parties in these cantons is notderived from the percentage of votes but the proportion of parliamentaryseats. Here data stems the badac-database (IDHEAP, 2011). For AppenzellInner Rhoden the electoral support of parties cannot be measured, sincethere are no parties elected in parliament and hence no vote-share of theparties is available. The indicator for oppositional parties considers foreach canton electoral strength of the parties that opposed the agreement inthe referendum campaign or in parliament. These are besides the SVP, anddepending on the canton, the Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland(EDU), the Swiss Democrats (SD) and the Freedom Party of Switzerland(FPS).

Comparative analysis of decision making on HarmoS

In multi-lingual Switzerland, the main responsibility for education is withthe cantons. Especially at the level of pre-school and compulsory schoolthe Swiss central government has very little say. Still, in 2006 the Swisselectorate accepted by a majority of 86 percent of the voters a revised con-stitutional article for education. Among other issues, the new article on ed-ucation required cantons to harmonize compulsory schools. In particularthey had to jointly define key nationwide parameters regarding school en-try, the goals of the educational levels, their duration and structure, as wellas the transitions between the different educational levels (Art. 62 Abs. 4BV).

To realize these harmonization tasks, the cantons relied on the SwissConference of Cantonal Ministers of Education (EDK). The EDK is an inter-governmental organization, where the highest decision-making body is theplenary assembly of the 26 cantonal ministers of education. In June 2007 theplenary assembly unanimously passed an intercantonal agreement on theharmonization of compulsory schooling the so called HarmoS concordat.If at least ten cantons ratify the agreement it would become legally bindingfor the signatories.4 By the time of writing this article, the agreement hasbecome effective and fifteen cantons are signatories.

4Interkantonale Vereinbarung über die Harmonisierung der obligatorischen Schule(HarmoS), Art. 16.

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The ratification processes

The ratification processes differed between the cantons. In most cases, it’sthe cantonal parliament that decides on membership in the concordat andthen citizens may collect signatures to call for an optional referendum. In 21of the 26 cantons, the bill was accepted by the parliaments. In three cantons,the bill did not pass in the parliamentary vote or the decision has beensuspended or postponed. Two cantons do not have a regular parliament:In the canton of Glarus and Appenzell Innerrhoden the Landsgemeinden, i.e.assemblies of the voters, had to take the decision. In Glarus, the assemblyhas accepted HarmoS with a large majority. In Appenzell Innerrhoden theLandsgemeinde rejected by a large majority a new school law that wouldhave implemented the HarmoS requirements.

Three of the 21 parliaments that passed the law argued that the bill isso important that it should be decided at the polls and therefore subjectedit to a mandatory referendum (Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Solothurn andBaselland). In the reminding 18 cantons, the bill was subject to the optionalreferendum. In six cantons the parliamentary decision went completely un-challenged. Signature collections to ask for a referendum took place in 11cantons and succeeded in 10. Furthermore, in one canton (Schaffhausen),opposition to the bill only formed after the deadline for asking for a refer-endum has already terminated. Here the opponents tried to countermandthe decision by using the instrument of a popular initiative. Popular voteshave therefore taken place in 14 cantons. Seven votes were won by theopponents of HarmoS and seven by the supporters.5

The ratification process and the support rates in the different institu-tional venues (parliaments, Landsgemeinden and public votes) are sum-marized in Figure 1. (More information is given in the appendix, Table 3).

The ratification process was marked by some notable developments.When it was first adopted by the cantonal ministers of education, HarmoSwas not controversial. The ministers although representing many differentparties unanimously effected a compromise. This elite consensus also pre-dominated in most parliamentary ratification debates. The Swiss PeoplesParty (SVP) is the only large party that finally became a strong opposi-tional player. Some cantonal sections of the SVP supported the agreement

5This number includes the popular initiative in Schaffhausen that would have termi-nated the canton’s membership, but failed with 48 per cent of votes.

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Figure 1: Timeline of decisions in the ratification process

in parliament and only became opponents during the referendum cam-paign. This was the case for instance in the canton of Bern. In the cantonof Thurgau the SVP even supported the pro camp during the referendumcampaign.

First serious opposition against HarmoS became visible in spring 2008in Luzern, when opponents, mainly the cantonal section of the SVP andsome concerned parents, successfully called for a referendum. The oppo-nents argued that the entry date to compulsory schooling proposed by theHarmoS concordat is too low. This argument was emphasized by a vot-ing poster that showed the scared faces of two small children with tearsin their eyes promoting the slogan “Schulzwang für 4-Jährige? EinheitsschuleHarmoS Nein.” (Compulsory education for 4-year olds? Say no to the uni-form school HarmoS.). After an intense campaign the voters rejected theHarmoS agreement by over 60 percent of the votes.

The victory in Luzern seems to have motivated the opponents in othercantons. After intense campaigns also the electorate in Thurgau and Graubun-den rejected HarmoS, although the agreement was supported by very large

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majorities in the parliaments. Especially in the canton of Thurgau the rejec-tion was a surprise, since the the SVP officially fought for and not againstHarmoS. The cantonal minister of education, who was in charge of defend-ing the proposal, was a member of the SVP. An official campaign againstHarmoS would have been a campaign against the ‘own’ minister.

Some months later, in the canton of Bern, again the HarmoS support-ers which were in a clear majority in parliament (90 percent), almost lostthe referendum. The electorate only accepted HarmoS by a small major-ity of 51 percent. The campaign has been won manly due to support inthe larger cities and in the French speaking part of the canton. The rural,German-speaking part of the canton again rejected the agreement by clearmajorities. On the other hand, the voters in St. Gallen and Zurich, whereparliamentary support had been lower and the SVP officially rejected theagreement, did not follow the opponents and accepted HarmoS.

In April 2009 the cantonal parliament of Schwyz rejected ratificationby two thirds of the votes, manly because the Christian Democrats (CVP)voted together with the SVP against joining the concordat. The CVP fac-tion argued that although there is a need for harmonization, the concordatis going too far and the decision-making authority in educational policyshould remain with the canton and its citizens.6

The effects of the referendum campaigns

The big puzzle regarding the cantonal HarmoS ratification processes cer-tainly is, why an issue that has been so uncontroversial and consensualamong the elites in the beginning became so conflictive in the end? Themajor reason, I argue, was a successful reframing of the issue by the op-ponents. With their cantonal campaigns a reform that was deemed to beunspectacular and mostly technical by the EDK and the cantonal minis-ters of education could be turned into an ideological issue about the roleof the state and the family in child care. Catchwords like children of thestate (‘Staatskinder’), loss of self-determination and bureaucratic reform un-derline this anti-state position. The headline of a frequent ad used by theopponents was “Kindheit verstaatlichen” (socializing childhood).

Table 1 shows the direction of the advertisement campaign, the letters

6Proceedings of the Schwyzer Kantonsrat from April, 22nd, 2009 (available formhttp://www.sz.ch/documents/april_09_pv.pdf, last accessed December 1, 2009.

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to the editor as well as the presentation of the public debate in the editorialpart of the newspapers. Positive values indicate, that more claims, adds orletters have been coded with supporting statements, negative values standfor a dominance of the oppositional camp.

The direction of the advertisement campaign is largely unconnected tothe voting outcomes. In Lucerne and Thurgau, for instance, despite of thestronger pro campaign voters rejected HarmoS, while in Bern, Fribourg andSt. Gallen, the proposal was accepted.

The letters to the editor, which may be considered an indicator for thedirection of the public debates in the wider public, shows somewhat morecorrespondence between the public debates in the media and the votingoutcomes. In cantons that supported the agreement at relatively high lev-els, Zurich and St. Gallen, we observe a neutral or slightly positive positionin the letter campaigns. In Thurgau in particular, the battles were foughtin the correspondence columns. In this canton the political elite was unitedand the referendum was largely based on outsiders. We found a total of95 letters published in the four weeks up to the vote, meaning that almostevery day a couple of letters on the issue have been printed. The corre-spondence columns were not only used by the public but also relativelyoften by political actors. Even a parliamentary committee, wrote a letterto justify its position and to counter the verbal attacks and to ‘correct’ the‘mistakes’ disseminated by the opponents. Given that the letters to the ed-itor are strongly affected by editorial choices, this indicator is however notfurther analyzed.

The claims of political actors reported in the newspapers all displaymore support than opposition. This is due to the fact, that the referendawhere in any case fought against the government and the parliamentarymajority. Interestingly, the strength of the partisan opposition to HarmoS,in terms of its voters shares, was not reflected in the public debate. AsFigure 2 illustrates the political debates were largely uncorrelated to theconfiguration of power. Excluding the special case Thurgau, where no offi-cial partisan opposition has formed, one might even see a slight tendencythat the political debate became more supportive the stronger the oppo-sitional camp was. In Bern and Zurich, for instance, despite the relativestrong position of the SVP, the supporting parties clearly dominated thepublic debate. There is a rationale to explain such a pattern: if political

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Table 1: Mean position towards HarmoS in different

Canton Advertisement Letters to the editor Political actorsBE 0.04 -0.26 0.47ZG -0.78 -0.09 0.44LU 0.13 -0.06 0.43FR -0.34 0.10 0.37TG 0.20 -0.09 0.36ZH 0.07 0.00 0.35NW 1.00 -0.05 0.33UR -0.61 0.13 0.33SG -0.02 0.10 0.27SO 0.76 -0.04 0.24GR 0.65 0.13 0.08AR 0.42 0.18 0.07BL 0.54 -0.15 0.07Note: For each category the mean position towards HarmoS (-1 ’clear op-

position’ -0.5 ’tends towards opposition’ 0 ’unclear, neutral’ 0.5 ’tends to-

wards support and 1 ’clear support’) is displayed. ’Political actors’ in-

cludes the actors that would be considered in a classical PCA, i.e. all actors

that are given a voice in the news articles as well as journalists when they

utter a political position. See Tppendix Table 4 for information on newspa-

pers and number of cases. Source: Own calculations.

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Figure 2: Strength of the partisan opposition and direction of the politicalcampaign (PCA-Data)

actors expect the outcome of the vote to be close, they are ready to investmore in the campaign (cf. Kriesi 2005).

There is no clear relationship between the strength of the supportiveside and the outcome of the vote (cf. Figure 3). Nor is the adaptational pres-sure systematically related to the outcome. Whether the change in policywith regard to the schooling age was large or not, had no effect on the de-bate not on voter’s decisions. Multiple regression models, however, showthat controlled for the prevailing structures and value systems, a larger mis-fit had a significant negative – although relatively small – effect on the vot-ing outcome.

For part of the cantons also the framing of the HarmoS issue has alsobeen coded. Table 2 shows summary categories of the arguments that havebeen used in six newspapers. The arguments have been classified accord-ing to their function in the debate, i.e. whether they support the HarmoSagreement or whether they are directed against the project. Note that sup-porters and opponents may use both types of frames. For instance someonemay raise positive and negative arguments and then come to the conclusion

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Figure 3: Strength of the partisan opposition and support rates for HarmoS

that overall the agreement should be supported.Comparing the arguments of the supporters and the opponents, sup-

porters tend to stress the technical non-ideological issues while the oppo-nents frame the issue as an ideological one and emphasize the need to re-strain state influence and activity. The supporters refer to benefits for thecantonal education systems such as more efficiency, quality, transparencyand better compatibility. The supporters also keep saying that not much ischanged and that the cantons and municipalities still have discretion andflexibility. Only a small minority of the arguments is addressing positionsthat could be classified as more values based such as the equalization ofchances and the support for working parents.

The opponents on the other hand, do have little technical argumentsagainst the agreement. The only argument that could at least partially beseen as a technical is the claim that four-year old children may be too smallto be sent to the kindergarten. Frequently, the opponents refer to anti-statepositions, arguing that the agreement is bureaucratic, expensive, socialistand discriminating traditional family models. The anti-HarmoS-campaignwas clearly marked by the political program of the populist SVP. In somecontexts, for instance in Thurgau, also anti-migration arguments were used

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Table 2: Arguments used in the HarmoS media debate

PercentArguments used to support the project 50.5

Harmonization of schools is important 5.0Leads to better/more efficient/future-oriented schools 7.0Improves mobility/transparency 7.0Equalizes/enhances chances of the kids/good for kids 6.3Support of parents/mothers/child care quality 2.9HarmoS will not change that much 7.7Territorial autonomy given/flexible solutions possible 2.9The other side uses emotional, incorrect arguments 7.3Other arguments used by supporters 4.6

Arguments used against HarmoS 45.5Project goes too far 2.1Kids are too small, early schooling is not good 6.9Parental self-determination is important 5.9People should decide not bureaucrats, too bureaucratic 6.9No Staatskinder/socialist project/support traditional family 8.7HarmoS is too expensive 4.0No special treatment for migrants/preserve Swissness 3.7Preserve territorial/local autonomy 2.6The other side uses emotional, incorrect arguments 1.0Other arguments used by adversaries 3.9

Other Arguments 3.9N 1120Note: Summary categories of frames regarding HarmoS coded from different newspapersources (ads, letters to the editors, political claims in the news section) in six newspapers.

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Figure 4: The relationship between the support for HarmoS and for mater-nity insurance

to justify a rejection of the argument.

The role of discursive opportunities

The public campaigns against HarmoS have successfully reframed the is-sue from a noncontroversial, technical issue of harmonizing education intoa conflictive, ideology driven conflict over different ideals regarding stateresponsibilities and family models. Support for this argument can be gainedform correlating the support for HarmoS with the cantonal support rate fornational referenda. While there is little relationship between the generalsupport for HarmoS and support for the constitutional article that initiatedthe school harmonization project (results not shown) we find a strong cor-relation between the support for HarmoS and the cantonal share of votesin favor of maternity insurance for employed mothers see figure ).

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Only two cantons are more or less off the line, Glarus and Valais. Inthese cantons no larger public campaign on the issue has taken place andaccordingly no reframing of the issue occurred. Here the voters decidedon school harmonization, the core of the issue. Schaffhausen, before theissue was brought up again in a popular initiative at the polls, also hadvery high acceptance rate in the parliament as well. In this case, it was thedebate lead in the other cantons, that provoked the opponents to bring upthe issue again and to have it finally decided in a popular vote.

A public campaign is a necessary condition for the reframing to takeplace. In case of a reframing, the support rates of the HarmoS correspondrelatively well to the discursive opportunities: The less supportive the vot-ers are with regard to state support of working mothers, the lower the sup-port rates for HarmoS. Referendums against HarmoS have only been suc-cessful in those contexts, where the discursive opportunities were favorableto the traditional family frame. These are the contexts with conservative so-cietal attitudes regarding the role of the family and the state in educatingand raising children.

Conclusions

The degree to which the traditional family model is accepted and prac-ticed in Switzerland strongly varies between different sub-units: Whilein the more progressive cantons and the more urban municipalities fam-ilies increasingly deviate from the traditional norm, in many rural regionsand the more conservative cantons traditional family norms are still dom-inant. This disconnect becomes particularly visible in public votes on ref-erenda. Arguably, federalism and direct democracy lead to policies, whichare strongly influenced by dominant values and norms prevailing in therespective political unit. The relevant factor for explaining policy changetherefore is the pace in which social practices and norms develop. Andconnected to this, the degree to which such norms are challenged or rein-forced in public discourses and political mobilization. Focusing on the caseof a school harmonization project (HarmoS), this paper comparatively in-vestigated the political mobilization of family values in different discursivecontexts.

Although the inter-cantonal agreement concerned primarily technical

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issues such as a common school entry age and an equalization of edu-cational levels, its opponents – cantonal fractions of the populist peoplesparty (SVP) – managed to reframe the issue into a highly ideological sub-ject about the role of the state and the family in the care and uprising ofchildren. While this framing went practically unchallenged in the mediadebate everywhere, its effects on voters was strongly dependent on the pre-vailing norms of a canton: In cantonal contexts, where the prevailing struc-tures were strongly favorable to the family-responsibility and anti-statistframes, HarmoS failed at the polls.

Formal reforms, especially if they have to be approved by a majority ofthe voters, require that socially sanctioned norms, i.e. the informal institu-tions that underpinned previous policy settings, have changed. Due to thefact that in the Swiss political system such changes are (partially) reflectedin voting decisions, they can be more easily identified and are likely to bemore influential than in purely representative systems. Yet, within thesecontexts scholars interested in the effects of decision-making structures ongender equality policies should probably also be attentive to the role of pre-vailing norms. There is no reason to assume that federalist decision-makingrules will determine political choices and therefore have uniform effectson gender equality policies. But – as the Swiss case suggests – federalismstructures the way in which societal changes and demands are mobilizedand transformed into policies. Only by systematic comparative investiga-tion, will we be able to identify more generally, the relevant mechanisms ofinfluence and contextual conditions.

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Appendix

Abbreviations used for the cantons

AG AargauAI Appenzell Inner RhodenAR Appenzell Ausser RhodenBS Basel-StadtBL Basel-LandBE BernFR FribourgGE GenevaGR Graubunden (Grisons)JU JuraLU LucerneNE NeuenburgNW NidwaldenOW ObwaldenSG St. GallenSH SchaffhausenSZ SchwyzSO SolothurnTi TessinTG ThurgauUR UriVS ValaisZG ZugZH Zurich

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Table 3: The HarmoS ratification process

Parliamentary Date of Referendum Voter’s Date ofsupport the session support the vote

SH 100% 29.10.2007 no, later initiative 52% 28.11.2010AI* 100% Landgem. minority 27.04.2008GL* 100% 07.11.2007 Landgem. majority 04.05.2008LU 68% 03.12.2007 succeeded 39% 28.09.2008TG 100% 19.12.2007 succeeded 48% 30.11.2008GR 92% 12.02.2008 succeeded 43% 30.11.2008SG 77% 16.04.2008 succeeded 53% 30.11.2008VD 87% 22.04.2008 noJU* 97% 23.04.2008 noNW 82% 28.05.2008 succeeded 38% 08.02.2009NE 99% 25.06.2008 noZH 66% 30.06.2008 succeeded 62% 30.11.2008BE 90% 08.09.2008 succeeded 51% 27.09.2009GE 93% 18.12.2008 noFR 100% 12.02.2009 succeeded 61% 07.03.2010TI 74% 17.02.2009 failedOW suspended 18.02.2009ZG 76% 26.03.2009 succeeded 49% 28.09.2009SZ 32% 22.04.2009VS 94% 08.05.2009 noUR 69% 13.05.2009 succeeded 31% 28.09.2009AR 80% 22.02.2010 (mandatory) 44% 13.06.2010SO 79% 10.03.2010 mandatory 58.5% 26.09.2010BS 85% 05.05.2010 noBL 64% 17.06.2010 mandatory 56% 26.09.2010AG postponedNotes: Parliamentary support denotes the percentage of yes votes on the HarmoS agreementby the cantonal legislative body. In the canton of Jura (marked by an asterisk) the exact shareof yes votes are not known because they have not been counted due to clear majorities. Voter’ssupport denotes the share of no votes in the referendum, i.e. those votes in favor of the Har-moS agreement. In the canton of Glarus, the proposal was ratified by a large majority in theLandsgemeinde. In Appenzell Inner Rhoden the Landsgemeinde rejected by a large majority anew school law that would have implemented the HarmoS requirements. This direct demo-cratic decision is legally binding and means that HarmoS will not be implemented in thiscanton.

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Table 4: Number of coded political claims, ads and letters to the editor forthe cantonal referendum campaigns on HarmoS

Canton Newspaper Political Claims Ads LettersAppenzell AR Appenzellerland 29 10 20Baselland Basellandschaftliche Zeitung 30 23 36Bern Berner Zeitung/Der Bund 17 15 25Freiburg La Liberté 31 6 15Graubunden Sudostschweiz (GR) 66 39 30Luzern Neue Luzerner Zeitung 35 27 42Nidwalden Neue Nidwaldner Zeitung 46 21 21Solothurn Solothurner Zeitung 17 29 36St. Gallen St. Galler Tagblatt 44 10 34Thurgau Thurgauer Zeitung 37 26 91Uri Neue Urner Zeitung 27 12 46Zurich Tagesanzeiger 17 13 10Zug Neue Zuger Zeitung 31 12 71

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