mobilizing the ottoman nation during the balkan wars (1912–1913): awakening from the ottoman dream

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2005 12: 156War In HistoryEyal Ginio

Awakening from the Ottoman DreamMobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913):

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War in History 2005 12 (2) 156–177 10.1191/0968344505wh316oa © 2005 Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd

Mobilizing the Ottoman Nationduring the Balkan Wars

(1912–1913): Awakening fromthe Ottoman Dream

Eyal Ginio*

The Balkan wars (1912–13) represent, together, the first total war of theOttoman state. During this conflict, the Ottomans endeavoured to enlist allits citizens into the war effort. The aim of this study is twofold. First, toexplore Ottoman propaganda and the set of symbols it employed to pro-mote patriotism and cohesion among soldiers and civilians. Second, byusing memoirs written by army officers, contemporary press articles, litera-ture produced by and for non-Muslims, theatre plays, etc., it will dwell uponthe responses from below to this propaganda, and the reactions of the dif-ferent groups inside Ottoman society to the mobilization, to the war and tothe military disaster.

The Balkan wars (1912–13) can, together, be regarded as the first‘total war’ of the Ottoman state, a military confrontation that

brought about the relative fracture of long-established boundaries anddichotomies within Ottoman society: soldiers versus civilians, Muslimsversus non-Muslims, men versus women. At this crucial point they wereall required to be present – in body or soul – at the various fronts, be itin the trenches of Çatalca or in the neighbourhoods of besieged Edirne.1

In theory, all able-bodied men – regardless of religious beliefs – were

* An earlier version of this paper was read at the workshop ‘The Ethnic Break-up of theOttoman Empire’ directed by Resat Kasaba, Fikret Adanir and Sarah Abrevaya-Stein atthe Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies – the Mediterranean Programme,Florence, 21–25 March 2001. I would like to thank the directors of the workshop andthe participants for their stimulating comments and suggestions. I would like also tothank the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at theHebrew University of Jerusalem for financial support for the research upon which thisarticle is based.

1 For a general history of the two Balkan wars, see R.C. Hall, The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913:Prelude to the First World War (London and New York, 2000). For a detailed description ofthe Ottoman army during the Balkan wars, see E.J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: TheOttoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913 (Westport and London, 2003).

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liable for mobilization. Although the number of enlisted non-Muslimswas relatively low, apparently in some combat areas they made up alarge portion of the units.2 According to one assessment, following the conquest of Edirne, the Bulgarians detained over 42 500 soldiers,of whom 14 000 were Ottoman Greeks, Bulgarians or Jews and 28 500were Muslims.3 Those who were not enlisted were encouraged to con-tribute financially to the war effort and to volunteer for civil organiza-tions that assisted the state. The Red Crescent (Hilâl-i Ahmer) was themost obvious institution through which civilians could channel theirpatriotic enthusiasm and show their attachment to the state in time ofsevere crisis.4

Women were encouraged, for the first time, to take active part in thewar effort. To be sure, their contribution was channelled towards specificdomains in the rear: bringing relief to the destitute and the war victims –refugees, wounded soldiers or families of conscripts – and demonstrat-ing in the streets their longing for peace. They were supposed to use theirinnate feminine and maternal skills to assist those in need. Nevertheless,an outcome of their patriotic efforts was that they created nascentwomen’s movements and took part in public missions away from theirhomes.5 Indeed, Arthur Marwick demonstrates that one of the charac-teristics of total wars is the participation of hitherto underprivileged

2 Even though non-Muslims were liable for recruitment from as early as 1856, militaryservice remained a theoretical option for them until 1909. Only in October 1909, underthe new regime of the CUP, was compulsory conscription, irrespective of religion,enforced for the first time. Even if the numbers of non-Muslim recruits remained low,an important boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims was breached. Furthermore,under the new recruitment laws larger portions of the Muslim population becameliable for conscription as a result of losing their previous exemption (the Muslimpopulation of the capital, Istanbul, for example). The new network of railways –however poor and ineffective – enabled the state to bring recruits from distantprovinces. Consequently, the Ottoman army assumed the character of a conscriptionarmy. Nevertheless, Zürcher, relying on British consular reports, argues that thislegislation remained only symbolic, as only 5% of those liable to serve actually joinedthe army. On the Ottoman new conscription system, see E.J. Zürcher, ‘The OttomanConscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844–1918’, in E.J. Zürcher, ed., Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925 (London and New York, 1999), pp. 79–94.

3 R. Kazanclgil, Haflz Raklm Ertür’ün Anllar lndan Balkan Savaslnda Edirne Savunmasl

Günleri (Edirne, 1986), p. 100. However, it should be noted that this figure is given in a specific context. The author compares the sacrifice and the severe lot of the Muslimsoldiers to the fortune of their non-Muslim counterparts. While 13 000 soldiers werekilled or injured during the siege, 28 500 Muslim soldiers were taken prisoner by theBulgarians; the 14 000 non-Muslim soldiers, according to the author, were promptly set free by the occupying Bulgarian army.

4 The scale of contributions to the Red Crescent is shown clearly in the yearbook of theOttoman Red Crescent for the years 1329–31 malî (1913–15). See Osmanll Hilâl-i AhmerSalnamesi (Istanbul, 1331 [1915]).

5 E.L. Fleischmann, ‘The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern Middle East, 1900–1940’, in M.L. Meriwether and J.E. Tucker, eds, A Social History of Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East (Boulder, 1999), p. 103;F.M. Göçek, ‘From Empire to Nation: Images of Women and War in Ottoman PoliticalCartoons, 1908–1923’, in B. Melman, ed., Borderlines: Genders and Identities in War andPeace, 1870–1930 (New York and London, 1998), pp. 47–72.

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groups in the community.6 The active role of non-Muslims and womencan be seen as a similar phenomenon in Ottoman society.

Furthermore, the war enabled the state and its agents to reach largeportions of the population. The fast-developing press brought the war,with its images of cruelty and mayhem, to homes all over the Ottomanstate and beyond. The state used additional modes of communicationand propaganda to win citizens over and to ensure their loyalty, motiv-ation and readiness to make sacrifices. Communicating the roar of thefighting and the suffering it generated was meant to promote the sharedcause among all Ottomans. Against all this background, the Balkanwars can be seen as the first true war in the name of and for the bene-fit of the ‘Ottoman nation’. It relied on the assumption that the differ-ent religious and ethnic groups inhabiting the Ottoman state could be united under the vague ideology of a secular multi-ethnic Ottomannationality – Ottomanism.

Yet, when the guns were silenced, the various ethnic and religiousgroups inhabiting the Ottoman state found themselves much moreestranged and divided than before. The debacle of the first Balkan warproved to many Ottomans that the experiment of a secular multi-national ideology had completely failed; that in their hour of need thedifferent segments of the state clung to their own interests. Old bound-aries inside Ottoman society re-emerged stronger than before. Theincompetent Ottoman performance on the battlefield broadened thegaps within the Muslim population as well. This paper aims to depictthe Balkan wars from this perspective: the attempt to mobilize theOttoman nation, its eventual failure, and the effect of this military routon the state’s collective identity.

Questions of collective identity and loyalty existed before the Balkanwars in an atmosphere that could be described as fluid. Sometimesloosely defined, yet not necessarily contradictory, trends competed witheach other: Ottomanism versus different national ideologies coincidedwith a debate over the position of Islam in each of these trends. For yearsthe Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the political group thatheld sway during most of the second constitutional period (1908–18),was portrayed as a regime that encouraged Turkish nationalism andimposed Turkification on the non-Turkish population. Subsequentlyestranged Arabs turned to Arab nationalism.7 However, Feroz Ahmaddemonstrates in his seminal book on the CUP that its leaders adheredto the ideology of Ottomanism and understood it as the only way to safe-guard the Ottoman state. They believed that by granting all Ottomansthe same rights and by demanding the fulfilment by them of the same

6 On the participation of underprivileged groups in the war effort as a mechanism forsocial change, see A. Marwick, ‘Problems and Consequences of Organizing Society forTotal War’, in N.F. Dreisziger, ed., Mobilization for Total War (Waterloo, 1981), pp. 3–21.

7 See, for example, Z.N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Delmar, NY, 1973), p. 82. On the development of Turkish nationalism until the 1908 revolution, see D. Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism (London, 1977).

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duties under the vague umbrella of Ottomanism, regardless of ethnicorigins or religion, this ambition could be realized.8 Furthermore,Ahmad regards the military debacle of the Balkan wars as a watershedthat brought about the scuttling of Ottomanism and its replacementby Pan-Islam and Turanist nationalism.9 In addition, the Balkan warsput an end to the political strife between the CUP and the self-labelled‘Liberals’, a conflict that characterized the first years of the second con-stitutional period. The CUP was able to use the impending threat oflosing Edirne to perform a counter-coup in January 1913 and to grasppolitical power.10

Rashid Khalidi, for his part, argues that the CUP turned to Turkishnationalism only following the debacle of the First World War. It is truethat the regime adopted some aspects that could imply Turkish nation-alism: most of the inner circle of its leadership overwhelmingly con-sisted of Turks, and consequently the nominations of Turkish officialscould have been seen as part of a policy directed against non-Turks; itspolicy of centralization favoured Istanbul over the traditional urban cen-tres of the Middle East; and some CUP officers apparently shared latentTurkish national sentiments. However, the official commitment toOttomanism prevailed throughout the period. In a similar manner mostof the Arabic-speaking population – with all the differences between thebustling littoral cities and the more conservative cities of the interior –remained politically attached to the sultan as the Muslim caliph.11

Following Hasan Kayall, I will argue that during and following theBalkan wars the CUP moved from secular Ottomanism to what can bedescribed as ‘Islamic Ottomanism’.12 However, in the areas where exter-nal encroachment was a feasible and menacing option, the Muslim popu-lation opted reluctantly to establish a national state based on ethnicity(Albania) or territory (Batl Trakya, or Western Thrace). This was seen asthe only option that would save them from foreign occupation and yetwould be acceptable in the emerging new world of nation states.

I. Mobilizing the Ottomans: The SymbolsThe significance of loyalty and motivation in times of war is obvious.Warfare and military service represent intensive and crucial meetingpoints between the individual and the collective.13 It is in such decisive

8 F. Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics,1908–1914 (Oxford, 1969), pp. 22–23.

9 Op. cit., p. 154.10 A. Kansu, Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908–1913 (Leiden, 2000), pp. 409–41.11 R. Khalidi, ‘Ottomans and Arabism in Syria before 1914: A Reassessment’, in R. Khalidi

et al., eds, The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York, 1991), pp. 55–57.12 H. Kayall, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire,

1908–1918 (Berkeley, 1997).13 E. Ben-Ari and E. Lomsky-Feder, ‘Introduction: Cultural Constructions of War and the

Military in Israel’, in E. Ben-Ari and E. Lomsky-Feder, eds, The Military and Militarism inIsraeli Society (Albany, 1999), pp. 1–34.

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circumstances that unequivocal, yet wide-ranging messages are essentialto stimulate motivation among soldiers and civilians. Concepts andrepresentations of collective identity are not purely products ofwartime, yet it is then that they become fundamental and thereforereceive much emphasis and clearer definitions. According to Marwick,‘War is an enormous emotional experience, during which loyalty towardsone’s own group, or those with whom one comes to identify in wartime(one’s trade union, the working class, other women, the entire nation),intensifies, as does hostility to “out groups” (principally of course, theenemy).’14 Accordingly, the Balkan wars required the embracing ofwidely accepted identities. The Ottomans had to give comprehensibleand meaningful replies to such questions as: who are we? And who arethe others? The ongoing war necessitated the invention and adoptionof symbols that would be meaningful to all sections of Ottoman soci-ety. Following the coup d’état of January 1913, the CUP established theCommittee for National Defence (Müdafaa-yi Milliye Cemiyeti), a cen-tralized organ that aimed to organize and to spread propaganda amongthe civil population and to mobilize it for the war effort.15 The commit-tee nominated individual representatives to convey patriotic messagesto the non-Muslim population as well.16

In addition, the Ottomans availed themselves of new modes of masscommunication, primarily the printed press.17 Ottoman military highcommanders and politicians gave abundant interviews to local and for-eign correspondents alike; they allowed and even encouraged thepresence of war correspondents on the front lines and in Istanbul.Even though news reports were made under rigid censorship restric-tions and threats of possible suspension, journalists provided readersall over the world with visual and written descriptions of the violenceat the front and the suffering of the civil population.18 The local satir-ical press played an important role by presenting a patriotic standthrough explicit caricatures.19

The press was the most efficient mode of transmitting news and propa-ganda to the whole empire. Other modes of Ottoman propagandaincluded military, religious and civilian ceremonies, theatre productions,stamps and even greetings cards. What were the main symbols used bythe Ottomans to prompt Ottoman patriotism among its citizens?

The Ottoman authorities had to have recourse to common symbolsthat would be attractive to large and diverse target groups. Under the

14 A. Marwick, ed., Total War and Social Change (New York, 1988), p. xvi.15 Ahmad, Young Turks, p. 124.16 El Tyémpo, 3 Feb. 1913.17 On the development of the Ottoman press before the Balkan wars, see P.J. Brummett,

Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911 (Albany, 2000).18 For testimony on the reporters’ conditions of work at the front, see Y. al-Busta- n�-, Ta`rl-kh

Harb al-Balqa-n al-Ù-la- bayna al-dawla al-Á-liyya wal-Ittiha-d al-Balqa-nl- al-muàllif min al-Bulga-rwal-Sirb wal-Yu-na-n wal-Jabal al-Aswad (Cairo, 1913), pp. 197–205.

19 T. Heinzelmann, Die Balkankrise in der Osmanischen Karikatur: Die SatirezeitschriftenKaragöz, Kalem und Cem, 1908–1914 (Istanbul, 1999), pp. 193–256.

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second constitution regime, a new set of symbols had to be acquired.Certainly the Ottoman dynasty had to play an important part in thesemessages; however, unlike in the Hamidian period (1876–1908), theimage of the incumbent sultan played a minor role in the images ofthe Balkan wars.20 Instead, the authorities highlighted the dynasty’s for-mer sultans, especially those who had led their troops to victories in theBalkans, from the fields of Kosovo to the gates of Vienna.21

The victorious sultans of the past thus became part of the commonheritage of the Ottoman nation. This use of the past matches the officialdiscourse about the war’s causes and aims. The war was depicted andenvisioned through the prism of Ottoman patriotism. In the variousspeeches delivered to the soldiers and the citizens, high officialsemployed terms implying Ottoman identity: ‘the Ottoman nation(millet)’, ‘the Ottoman fatherland (vatan), ‘the national mission’, ‘thesacred obligation towards the Ottoman motherland’, and so on.22 Use ofIslamic symbols was limited. The local press was well aware of the omis-sion of Islamic symbols. Yu- suf al-Busta-nl-, writing in Cairo in October1913, pointed to a major difference between the proclamations of warmade by the four kings of the Balkan states and that given by theOttoman caliph; while the former emphasized the religious aspect oftheir war, the sultan refrained from describing the war as religious.The sultan was described as merely referring in his speeches to theglory of the Ottomans’ forefathers and their braveness, and instruct-ing his soldiers not to harm civilians.23

Indeed, jihad (holy war)24 was not proclaimed against the quarrelsomeBalkan states. This omission was not a coincidence; the Ottomans madean effort to depict themselves as struggling for a noble national cause.Ottoman writers, in contrast, described their foes as fighting in the nameof fervent and obsolete religious zeal that went back to the MiddleAges. The crusaders were often mentioned as a historical precedent forthis kind of aggression. In an era of nation states and national ideologies,accusing the other side of waging a religious war was meant to underminethe enemy’s cause – at least in the west. In a war in which the Ottomansdesperately needed the support of Christian powers, declaring a jihad,understood in Europe as representing Muslim fanaticism, could onlyharm their cause.

20 On images of power during the Hamidian period, see S. Deringil, The Well-ProtectedDomains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (Londonand New York, 1998).

21 See, for example, the speech given by the incumbent sultan Mehmet Resat to thedeparting soldiers: A. Andonyan, Balkan Savasl, new edn, trans. Z. Biberyan (Istanbul,1999; previous edn, Istanbul, 1913), pp. 228–29.

22 See, for example, the declaration given by Nâzim Pasa, the war minister, to theOttoman soldiers at the beginning of hostilities. Quoted in Andonyan, Balkan Savasl,pp. 237–38.

23 Al-Busta- n�-, Ta`rl-kh Harb al-Balqa-n al-`U-la- , pp. 69–70.24 On the meaning and use of jihad in modern times, see R. Peters, Islam and Colonialism:

The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (The Hague, 1979).

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The belligerent proclamation of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria to hispeople with the onset of hostilities served to justify the thesis of theOttoman and the Muslim press around the world of a religious warwaged against Muslims.25 The Ottomans spoke about innate hatred ofthe Balkan states towards the Muslims. They used terminology that waswell known to the potential European audience: Bulgarian atrocitieswere described as such ‘that by comparison the Inquisition’s crueltycould be labelled as compassion’.26 The local Muslim press devotedmuch space to descriptions of mosques being converted into churchesand of despondent Muslims being forcibly baptized. The local Jewishpress in Ladino used these allegations of religious persecutions todemonstrate the shared destiny of Muslims and Jews in the hands ofmedieval and modern crusader Europe.27

The Ottomans searched for fresh symbols and images that wouldmatch the patriotic approach. The new array of symbols employed bothmilitary and civil representatives. They were the product and the pil-lars of the new wartime ‘patriotic culture’ that was designated to mobilizethe masses.28 Contemporary writings disclose two groups of symbols thatrepresented the Ottoman side in the Balkan wars: the grandeur of indi-vidual soldiers and the determination of the civil population in theface of enemy attack. Both groups were united in the sagas of three citiesthat endured a long siege: I

.skodra (Shkoder, by the Montenegrins),

Yanya (Ioannina, by the Greeks) and Edirne (by the Bulgarians). Of thethree, Edirne turned out to be the most outstanding symbol of theBalkan wars. Its imperial significance as the first historical Ottomancapital in Europe, the grandeur of the city’s architectural heritage andits proximity to Istanbul contributed to the city’s distinguished posi-tion among the symbols of war. The agonies of this strategic city, whichendured a long siege before succumbing to the Bulgarian army inMarch 1913,29 were transmitted to the Ottoman population in variousmodes and through various written and iconographic representations.

25 A Turkish translation of his declaration can be found in Andonyan, Balkan Savasl, pp. 436–37.

26 See quotation in Ahmet Halaçoglu, Balkan Harbi S lraslnda Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri(1912–1913) (Ankara, 1995), p. 32.

27 See, as examples, ‘Una kruzada moderna’, El Tyémpo, 21 Oct. 1912; ‘La yamáda alfanatísmo relizyóso éca por los estados balkanikos’, El Tyémpo, 23 Oct. 1912; ‘Las kruzadasy los Gi�yos’, El Tyémpo, 25 Oct. 1912. On the circulation and impact of the Judeo-Spanishpress, see S. Abrevaya-Stein, ‘Creating a Taste for the News: Historicizing the Judeo-Spanish Periodicals of the Ottoman Empire’, Jewish History XIV (2000), pp. 9–28.

28 On the term ‘patriotic culture’, see H. F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia during WorldWar I (Ithaca and London, 1995).

29 For a detailed description of the siege, see R. Kazanclgil, Haflz Raklm Ertür’ünAnllar lndan Balkan Savaslnda Edirne Savunmasl Günleri (Edirne, 1986); N. Çagan, ‘BalkanHarbinde Edirne’, in U. I

.gdemir, ed., Edirne – Edirne’nin 600: Fethi Ylldönümü Armagan

Kitabl, 2nd edn (Ankara, 1993), pp. 197–213. There are also two diaries written byEuropeans who stayed in the city during the siege: G. Cirilli, Journal du siège d’Andrinople(impressions d’un assiégé) (Paris, 1913); P. Christoff, Journal du siège d’Andrinople: notesquotidiennes d’un assiégé (Paris, 1914); S. Tanvır Wastı, ‘The 1912–13 Balkan Wars and theSiege of Edirne’, Middle Eastern Studies XL (2004), pp. 59–78. See also note 54 below.

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The glory of Edirne was embodied in the male character of MehmetSükrü Pasa, commander of the city. The suffering of the civil popula-tion was personalized in the figure of a woman, dressed in traditionalgarb, accompanied by her young children.30 The Selimiye mosque, themajor architectural feature of Edirne, served as the main symbol of theimperial glory that was in peril. In addition to press reports, the dramaof beleaguered Edirne spread around the state through other modesas well. Theatres staged plays that unambiguously portrayed scenes fromEdirne to the audience. The producer Melikzade Fuat presented hisplay Edirne Müdafaasl yahut Sükrü Pasa (‘The Defence of Edirne orSükrü Pasa’) with scenes of the Bulgarian siege, starvation inside thebesieged city, the aerial bombardment – apparently the first air raids everlaunched on a civil population – the Bulgarian atrocities and thebeloved ones who departed for combat.31

A greetings card designed for the coming festival of Ramazan pro-vides another example. Clearly illustrating the agony of the city’s resi-dents and calling the potential observer to act swiftly, it includes a briefwritten message, ‘Edirneyi Unutma’ (‘Do not forget Edirne!’). Twomajor symbols were selected to express the tormented city in the card:the Selimiye mosque and the figures of a despondent woman and hersmall children. The woman is holding a baby in her arms; another smallchild is clutching her clothes, while a third is looking in vain for foodin the barren soil. The picture is framed by a drawing of a metal chainthat encloses the city, and the woman in a prison. Only one of herhands, outstretched in a gesture begging for alms and assistance, isable to break through the thick chains.32

Indeed, Edirne became the main symbol of the war: the city turnedout to be one of the major issues at the London peace conference nego-tiations. The need to protect the city’s Ottoman future was also the mainreason for a violent takeover by the CUP officers on 23 January 1913.33

The Ottomans endeavoured to emphasize the equal suffering of allOttomans – Muslims, Greeks, Jews and Armenians – at the hands ofthe Bulgarians in order to win European sympathy with regard to thecity’s political future. Non-Muslims were recruited to present theOttoman entitlement to regain Edirne during the peace conference.34

The recapture of Edirne in July 1913, during the brief second Balkanwar, induced the Ottoman authorities to highlight the city again, thistime as a symbol of their victory. A national holiday was proclaimed inthe entire Ottoman state; special trains were dispatched from the cap-ital in jovial expeditions. Leading political and military personalities,

30 See Kazanclgil, Haflz Raklm Ertür’ün Anllarlndan, appendix.31 M. Fuat, Edirne Müdafaasl yahut Sükrü Pasa (Izmir, 1329 malî [1913]). Quoted in N. Akl,

Türk Tiyatro EdebiyatlTarihi, vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1989), p. 212.32 See note 30.33 For a description of the coup d’état and its causes, see Ahmed, Young Turks, pp. 92–120.34 T. Blylklloglu, Trakya’da Millî Mücadele, vol. 1, new edn (Ankara, 1992; 1st edn, 1956),

pp. 71–72.

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as well as eminent representatives of the imperial family, joined therejoicing crowds on the train platforms and on board. Interestingly, thesejourneys were perceived as religious pilgrimages – hac.35 The Ottomanpostal authorities issued in 1913 a series of Edirne stamps to commem-orate the recapture of the city. Here again the Selimiye mosque wasselected to symbolize the liberated city.36

The army was another major source for patriotic icons. The Ottomansproduced symbols that could represent the Ottoman nation as one unitedidentity. Panayot Saliferi can serve as an example. He was an OttomanGreek soldier from the 3rd bölük (regiment), 2nd orta (company), whotook part in the battle of Lüleburgaz. When turmoil afflicted his unit, hedid not lose his nerve: rather, he grabbed the unit’s flag from its bewil-dered holder and charged forward, vigorously waving the Ottomanstandard. In so doing, he saved the honour of his unit. Eziz Hasan, thecommander of the brave soldier’s division, recounted this anecdote to thepress to counter allegations that the Christian soldiers had betrayed theirMuslim comrades. The military commander asserted that all Ottomansoldiers – Christians and Muslims alike – devotedly served their Ottomanstate. Furthermore, he declared, one of the salient facts of the war was thecommitment of the Christian soldiers to defend their country, whileother Christian subjects contributed to the war effort from the rear.37

The Greek flag-waving soldier represents one of the new symbols ofthese wars. The image of the brave non-Muslim was played up in theOttoman press to bolster the notion of shared loyalty among all the mem-bers belonging to the ‘imagined’ Ottoman nation. Nor was praise forpatriotic activities limited to soldiers. In the Muslim press Christian andJewish leaders were credited – albeit in small numbers – with volunteer-ing to work in the Red Crescent or taking part in ad hoc organizationsthat contributed to the war effort. The Jewish press responded to thesereports with enthusiasm and extolled the brave deeds of individual Jewishsoldiers. Interestingly, it also reported – quoting Jewish newspapers pub-lished in the Balkan states – the gallantry of Jewish soldiers in the enemyarmies. The Jewish press itself was puzzled by its own interest in the hero-ism of Jews fighting among the enemy ranks. Some reporters interpretedthis as testimony for the devotion of Jews to their different states andfor their rejection of Zionism. Others understood it as a confirmationof Jewish solidarity that existed alongside their Ottoman patriotism.38

35 For a survey of these celebratory ceremonies, see, for examples: al-Jarl-da, 30 July 1913.36 Some of these stamps can be found on the Internet at Andrinople Stamps, retrieved 25

Oct. 2004, from http://www.tughranet.f2s.com/edirne/andstmps.htm. The Balkan wars were a turning point for Ottoman stamp design, as the prohibition of pictorialpresentation was lifted. See D.M. Reid, ‘The Symbolism of Postage Stamps: A Source for the Historian’, Journal of Contemporary History XIX (1984), pp. 223–49.

37 ‘Al-Junu- d al-Masl-hiyu- n fi al-Jaysh al-´Uthma-nl-’, al-Muqattam, 6 Feb. 1913. See other casesof Christian bravery in battle and willingness to contribute money well beyond thedonor’s financial means: al-Muqattam, 2, 4 Dec. 1912.

38 See, for example the editorial article of El Meserret (Izmir) in which the author perceivedthe Jews’ enrolment into the different combating armies as an explicit failure of Zionism:‘El Patriotísmo Gudío en las Gérras de los Balkanes’, El Meserret, 19 Nov. 1912.

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The Hamidiye battleship served as another prominent symbol of theBalkan wars. Amid the devastating debacles of the first Balkan war, theadventures of the Hamidiye, under the command of Rauf Bey (laterOrbay), were a unique source of pride and accomplishment. The suc-cessful bombardment of the Bulgarian harbour of Varna, the sinkingof the Greek auxiliary cruiser Makedonya, and the Hamidiye’s elusivejourneys between the major port towns of the Mediterranean fosteredpride that the Ottomans hoped to use in their favour.39 Probably oneof the very first Ottoman films was produced in honour of the victoriouswarship,40 and a commemorative stamp was issued.41 During the courseof the war, the Hamidiye moored in many eastern Mediterranean ports.These stopovers, ostensibly made only for taking in coal, were exploitedfor propaganda directed at Ottoman – mainly Arabic – and Egyptianaudiences. Thus, for example, the Egyptian journal al-Muqattam reportedthe enthusiasm of the crowds when the battleship arrived in Haifa.Ordinary people volunteered to help the porters load the battleship,and the captain gave the luckiest among them the honour of beinginvited aboard, where they were told of the ship’s adventures whenattacking the Greek enemy.42

The local Ottoman audience was mainly exposed to symbols takenfrom the military and civilian spheres that represented and exalted theOttoman army and the Ottoman nation as a whole. However, a differ-ent assortment of symbols was presented to another important audi-ence: Muslims all over the world.

II. Mobilizing the Muslim ÜmmetOne of the prominent outcomes of the Balkan wars was the mobil-ization of Muslim public opinion all over the world. Although thisunprecedented solidarity occurred beyond the Ottoman borders, itemphasized the role of Islamic identity and further bolstered it.Therefore, a brief review of its manifestations is pertinent to our dis-cussion of the formation of identities during and immediately afterthese wars.

The solidarity of the Muslim community (Ümmet) is obviously not atwentieth-century invention. In the modern era the Russo-Ottoman war(1877–78), followed by the Greco-Ottoman war of 1897, had alreadyproved the vitality of Islam as a mobilizing force that financially and

39 On the battles of the Hamidiye, see A. Cemaledin Saraçoglu, Gazi Hamidiye’nin Sanll

Maceralarl (Istanbul, 1960); A. Büyükturgul, ‘Balkan Savaslnda Deniz Harekatl ÜzerineGerçekler (1912–1913)’, Belleten XLIV (1980), pp. 717–52; E. Mütercimler, DestanlasanGemiler: Hamidiye, Yavuz, Alemdar, Nusrat (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 13–84.

40 Burçak Evren mentions a documentary on the cruiser Hamidiye as one of three filmsthat were made before 1914. However, no copy of this film has survived. See B. Evren,‘Les premiers pas (1895–1923)’, in M. Basutçu, ed., Le cinema turc (Paris, 1996), p. 66.

41 Reid, ‘Symbolism of Postage Stamps’, p. 234.42 ‘Al-Mudarra´a Ha-midiyya f�- Hayfa- ’, al-Muqattam, 6 March 1913.

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morally supported the Ottomans’ war effort.43 However, here again, thedevelopment of modern modes of communication transformed thesesolidarity sentiments into actions. Thus, for example, Muslims from dis-tant places, such as remote Indian villages, could read about the war’scourse a few days after its actual events, gather contributions for the wareffort and deliver the donations to their destination in a reasonabletime.44 Scenes from the Balkan wars reached all parts of the Islamic worldthrough the written words of the press. Christian aggression – as theBalkan wars were presented in the Muslim press – was overwhelminglyunderstood as a religious offensive against the caliph and accordinglyas aggression against the whole Muslim world. An illustrative example isa short article published in the Royal Asiatic Quarterly Review. Its author,Shah Mohammad Naimatullah, patiently explains to his British audience(‘the eastern people do not take religion as lightly as the Western’) thecauses for the Muslim Indians’ interest in the Balkan conflict:

The Sultan of Turkey is the servant of the two holy places of Meccaand Medina. It is this privilege that entitles him to call on everyMuslim, wherever he may be living, to help him when the honour ofthese places are at stake … Every Muslim … wishes to see him strongand powerful enough to successfully resist opposition. It is for thisreason that the enemy of Turkey is looked upon as his own enemyby every Mussulman.45

Contributing cash and goods for refugees and opening up publicsubscriptions to finance charity for victims of the war were widespreadactivities in many parts of the Muslim world.46 Muslims were called tooffer prayers in the mosques for the Ottomans’ decisive victory.47 Again,Egypt and India appear to have been the most ardent in their assistancethrough their Red Crescent institutions. They delivered medical aidand established military hospitals at the fronts. Following the retreat ofthe Ottoman army from Salonica, Egyptian vessels used their neutralposition and evacuated Muslim refugees and wounded soldiers whocrowded together in the city’s port seeking safe passage to destinations

43 For the war of 1877–78, see A. Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans andBritain (1877–1924) (Leiden, 1997), pp. 64–88; for the war of 1897, see B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London and New York, 1961), pp. 336–37.

44 See a description of Shah Naimatullah published in his article ‘Recent Turkish Eventsand Moslem India’, The Royal Asiatic Quarterly Review, new ser. II (1913), pp. 241–48. ForMuslim Indians’ activity in support of the Ottoman state during the Balkan wars, seeÖzcan, Pan-Islamism, pp. 146–67.

45 Naimatullah, ‘Recent Turkish Events’.46 The Egyptian and Ottoman press was packed with reports on Muslims’ contributions

to the Ottoman state. See, as one example, a report that Muslim Indians decided toabstain from sacrificing sheep during the feast of Immolation. Instead they chose tosend the saved sums of money to the Ottoman state and the Ottoman Red Crescent. Al-Muqattam, 30 Nov. 1912.

47 See, as an example, a religious legal opinion (fatwa-) concerning the appeal of theshaykh of al-Azhar. He asked Muslim religious persons to read from al-Bukha- r�-,requesting God to give the Ottomans victory. The inquirer asked if this appeal was not a forbidden innovation. See al-Mana-r, 26 Jan. 1914.

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such as Izmir, and beyond.48 In Egypt special attention was given to thewell-being of Muslim refugees from Kavala, the Macedonian native cityof the Khedival family.49 Muslim students in British universities, whooriginated mainly from India and Egypt, were another significant groupthat volunteered to assist the Ottoman state with medical aid, as well asserving as a pressure group in European centres of power.

The Ottomans encouraged these manifestations of solidarity. Thecentrality of Ottoman official representatives is well evidenced in theyearbook of the Red Crescent. An important fragment of its activityabroad was administered and channelled through the local represen-tatives and their wives.50 Their appeals were made in the name of Islam.Only seldom were Ottoman national slogans used. This was done, appar-ently, by the few non-Muslim representatives of the Ottoman stateabroad.51 One example mentioned in the Istanbul Jewish press was theinitiative of Nissim Roditi Bey, the general Ottoman consul in Antwerp,Belgium. He organized a special prayer in the local synagogue for thevictory of the Ottoman army. He also set up a special committee, includ-ing Ottoman Jewish, Christian and Muslim people living in Antwerp, tocollect contributions for the Red Crescent.52

The Balkan wars demonstrated the strength of Islamic solidarity intime of crisis. In comparison with the Ottomans’ failure on the battle-field, the mobilization of Muslim solidarity was perceived to be, and pro-claimed, an Ottoman achievement and a potential trend for the future.

III. Perceptions of FailureThe Ottomans articulated two sets of symbols during the Balkan wars.One was aimed at local and western audiences and accordingly elab-orated the notion of a patriotic war intended to safeguard the futureof the Ottoman nation and motherland. The other was largely aimedat a Muslim audience, especially those who lived outside the OttomanEmpire. In this case the wars were portrayed as religious wars wagedagainst the Muslim faith. Within a few weeks after the first war had begun,the dimensions of the critical defeat became very clear to the Ottomans.A public discussion ensued around this military collapse and its causes.People began to look for remedies, for new directions. One of thedebated issues was the set of symbols with which the Ottoman soldiershad marched into battle.

48 Halaçoglu, Balkan Harbi Slraslnda, pp. 57–58.49 Op. cit., p. 55.50 See, for example, the case of South Africa: Osmanll hilâl-i Ahmer Salnamesi, p. 395. See

also Ahmet Uçar, Güney Afrika’da Osmanlllar (Istanbul, 2000), pp. 328–33.51 On non-Muslims in the Foreign Ministry before 1908, see C.V. Findley, Ottoman Civil

Officialdom (Princeton, 1989), pp. 254–81.52 ‘En la Kolonía Gudía Ottomana de Anversa’, El Tyémpo, 1 Nov. 1912. According to the

Red Crescent yearbook, he was able to collect 4735 gurus. Osmanll hilâl-i AhmerSalnamesi, p. 399.

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It is almost impossible to determine the mental state of the Ottomansoldiers and ordinary Ottomans during and after the war. While one canargue that the soldiers explicitly demonstrated their opinions with theirfeet – large-scale desertion was one of the central aspects of this war53 –more profound testimonies have not yet been found. The virtual absenceof letters or diaries written by low-ranking soldiers and ordinary civil-ians,54 due to the low rate of literacy,55 increases our reliance on jour-nalists’ reports and memoirs written by the army commanders.56

The traumatic events of the Balkan wars prompted some of their senior participants to publish their diaries and to expose their experi-ence of war. These memoirs, written during and immediately after thewar, are less prone to retrospection. They reveal a profound debateabout the validity of the symbols and about the future character ofOttoman identity. The contemporary Egyptian press – more so thanthe Ottoman press – can provide us with additional attentive and variedreferences. ‘The capital of Arab journalism’ came of age during theperiod under discussion. Being outside the Ottoman state’s effectiveboundaries, the Egyptian press was left to develop relatively unim-peded and without the stringent restrictions of Ottoman censorship.57

Yet, as is clear from the Egyptian press’s standpoint during the Balkanwars, the Egyptians sensed themselves as being bound to the Ottomanstate and even more so to the Ottoman caliph. They accused the Balkancoalition of waging religious war. Thus, for example, the Egyptian jour-nalist Yu- suf al-Busta-nl- argued that instilling resentment against theOttoman state in the hearts of Christian Balkan people had become aholy religious command (fardan muqaddasan), a detestation that babiesabsorb with their mothers’ milk.58 The Egyptian journal al-Mana-r called

53 See, for example, a description given by Süleyman Pasa, the commander of the Dramareserve unit, on the large-scale desertion of his soldiers: H. Tehsin, I

.zhar-i Hakikat:

Selânîk Esbab-i Sukutu Hakklnda Vesaik ve Müretteb Sekizinci Kul Ordusu Esbab-i I.nhizaml

(Istanbul, 1329 malî [1913]), pp. 46–48.54 A significant exception is a diary written by a Jewish schoolteacher, Angèle Guéron, who

experienced the war in Edirne. Parts of her diary were published by A. Levy, ‘The Jewsof Edirne during the Balkan Wars according to the Diary of a Jewish Schoolmistress’,Hamizrah HeHadash XXXIX (1997–98), pp. 16–45 [in Hebrew].

55 For a discussion of this methodological problem with regard to the First World War, seeE.J. Zürcher, ‘Between Death and Desertion: The Experience of the Ottoman Soldier inWorld War I’, Turcica XXVIII (1996), pp. 235–57. François Georgeon estimates thepercentage of literacy among all the Ottoman population about 1914 as between 10 and 15%. See Georgeon, ‘Lire et écrire à la fin de l’empire ottoman: quelquesremarques introductives’, Revue du monde musulman et de la méditerranée LXXV–LXXVI(1995), pp. 161–79.

56 On the importance of the Arabic press to the study of public opinion, see, for example,R. Khalidi, ‘´Abd al-Ghani al-´Uraisi and al-Mufid: The Press and Arab Nationalism Before1914’, in M.R. Buheiry, ed., Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890–1939 (Beirut, 1981), p. 61. On the memoirs genre as a source for the experience of Ottoman soldiers, see Y. Yanlkdag, ‘Ottoman Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914–22’, Journal of ContemporaryHistory XXXIV (1999), pp. 97–109.

57 A. Ayalon, The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History (New York and Oxford, 1995), pp. 51–52.

58 Al-Busta- n�-, Ta rl-kh Harb al-Balqa-n, p. 33.

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the Balkan wars al-Harb al-Balqa-niyya al-Sall-biyya (‘the crusades war ofthe Balkans’) that aimed to expel Muslims from Europe.59 Some news-papers retained permanent reporters in Istanbul, and the Balkan warsremained ‘the main story’ for most of the time. I have tried to selectnewspapers that present different points of view: al-Muqattam (namedafter a range of hills near Cairo), a daily newspaper with a pro-Europeanleaning,60 al-Jar l-da (‘The Newspaper’), the organ of the national Egyptianmovement,61 and al-Mana-r (‘The Lighthouse’ or ‘Minaret’), which pre-sented the voice of modernists – those who believed that Islam, inter-preted in light of contemporary developments, was the exclusive solutionto modern challenges.62

All the Ottoman and Egyptian sources describe the outcome of thefirst Balkan war in the most apocalyptic terms found in the Turkish-Arabic vocabulary: felâket (‘disaster’, ‘catastrophe’), inhizam (‘defeat’),maglubiyet (‘defeat’) and glrdab (‘maelstrom’) are the principal key-words that recur in Ottoman writings on the Balkan wars. In Arab jour-nals we find parallel terms such as nakba fa-tika (‘disastrous calamity’).They all describe the war as a major watershed in the history of theOttoman nation; a complete catastrophe that could be repaired only ifthe Ottoman state could draw the right conclusions; a very last warn-ing before the Ottoman state collapsed and disintegrated.

The Balkan wars were not the first defeat meted out to the Ottomans.However, the sting was in their presentation as an unprecedented bit-ter military downfall: the victorious armies were not those of the power-ful European states, but a loose alliance of small Balkan states whichhad all been under Ottoman sway in the immediate past. The follow-ing lines, published in Cairo in 1921, fully portray this humiliation:

and today the Bulgarians are in the outskirts of Çatalca! What a dis-grace! You, the offspring of ´Uthma-n, the descendants of Bayezid,the children of Muhammad the Conqueror, the successors ofSulayma-n! The [ability to] rule became too extended for you andyou are not able to master its management any more! Consequentlyeven those who were your slaves only yesterday covet what youhave.63

How did the Ottomans explain this military disaster?Against the background of total defeat and confusion I found an

assortment of explanations. However, all of them assert that one of themain problems was low morale, and the lack of a clear and meaningfulideological message with well-defined aims that would unite soldiersand civilians alike. All the writers concur that the array of symbolsmentioned above was not sufficient to rouse the Ottoman soldiers. For

59 Al-Mana-r, 8 Jan. 1913.60 On al-Muqattam, see Ayalon, Press in the Middle East, pp. 56–57.61 On al-Jaı-yda, see op. cit., p. 60.62 On al-Mana-r, see op. cit., pp. 54–55.63 H. Lab�-b, Ta`rl-kh al-Masala al-Sharqiyya (Cairo, 1921), p. 111.

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example, the editor of the Turkish journal I.kdam (‘Perseverance’) won-

ders how the military commander of Salonica, Hüsayin Tehsin Pasa,could have surrendered the city with 25 000 soldiers stationed there. Howcan one explain the total absence of patriotic sentiment, bravery andmanhood among the city’s defenders, he asks.64 All writers refer to thelack of morale. But how do they perceive the notion of morale? Whatis the essence of this sentiment? Most of them conclude that secularOttomanism turned out to be a disastrous fiasco. They argue that theabsence of religious messages rendered the soldiers mediocre and apa-thetic in battle. Foreign observers as well argued that the predictedbrotherhood of all religious groups inside the Ottoman state turnedinto a complete debacle.65

Mehmut Muhtar Pasa, the commander of the Third Corps, claims tohave concluded his memoirs in the horrible days when Edirne finallycapitulated to the Bulgarian army (March 1913). His account and explan-ation of the defeat are remarkable, as he stood at the head of the east-ern front and oversaw, in desperation, the panicky retreat of his troopsfrom the Bulgarian border to the outskirts of Istanbul. His book waspublished later that year and thus is one of the first that dealt with themilitary rout.66 The contemporary importance ascribed to this book is reflected in the place it received in the Egyptian journal al-Jarl-da.The journal published a summary of the author’s main arguments –translated into Arabic – and dedicated the lead headline and the firstpage of that issue to the author’s line of reasoning.67 The book is imbuedwith scenes of failure and incompetence. The routed commander isrepeatedly searching for explanations concerning the inadequate military preparations, the poor preparation of the reserve soldiers andthe exaggerated exemptions from military service granted to studentsin religious institutions. Other hindrances are the lack of infrastructure,the politicization of the officers’ ranks, the absence of modern and adequate weapons, and the soldiers’ incompetence with the weapons attheir disposal. Mehmet Muhtar Pasa even attributes defeat to turbulentweather.

However, an alarming thought permeates all his writing: the gravelylow morale (kuvvet-i manaviye) among the Ottoman soldiers. He describesin depth the flight of his soldiers and their desertion from the battle-field. He ascribes this phenomenon mainly to what he labels as the‘abject soul’ (ezel nefs) of the reserve soldiers.68 He regards the absence

64 Quoted in ‘Asba- b al-Fashl’, al-Muqattam, 6 Dec. 1912.65 See, for example, I. Pasda, ‘A German View of the Turkish Defeat’, Fortnightly Review

XCIII (1913). Quoted in A.L. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire (1908–1923)(London and New York, 1998), pp. 73–76.

66 M. Muhtar Pasa, Üçüncü Kul Ordu’nun ve I.kinci Sark Ordu’nun Muharabati (Istanbul,

1331 hicrî [1913]). His memoirs were published in a French translation as well. See M. Moukhtar Pasha, Mon commandement au cours de la campagne des Balkans de 1912 (Paris and Nancy, 1913).

67 ‘Ra`y Mukhta- r Ba- sha- fl- Qahr al-Jaysh al-´Uthma- nl-,’ al-Jar l-da, 10 Aug. 1913.68 Muhtar Pasa, Üçüncü Kul Ordu’nun, p. 236.

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of motivation as a flaw that imbues all army ranks, a phenomenon thatstruck the Ottoman nation as a whole. Indeed, most of the time heuses the term ‘Ottoman’ in his book. Only sporadically does he strayfrom this habit and employ the term ‘Turkish’. Interestingly, this ten-dency happens in cases when he wants to elaborate on the strength andbravery of the soldiers.

Christian soldiers and civilians receive several references in his bookthat emphasize their enmity towards the Ottoman nation. Consequentlyone senses that Mehmet Muhtar Pasa actually regarded them as beyondthe borders of the Ottoman nation. Thus, for example, he suggests asa most probable possibility that the Greeks and Bulgarians who inhabi-ted K lrk Kilise (now K lrklareli) informed the Bulgarian army about theOttomans’ ongoing disorderly retreat from the front.69 Likewise, heexplains the hasty retreat towards Vize on the grounds that localChristians informed the enemy about the imminent withdrawal.70 Hefurther mentions that while preparing for action in Vize he found itdifficult to organize supplies, as Christians inhabited all the neighbour-ing villages. He claims that the villagers murdered soldiers and officerswho looked for provisions.71

Mehmet Muhtar Pasa ridicules those who argue that the absence ofmorale among the soldiers stems from the disappearance of religiousardour. He ironically ponders why he did not meet anyone who donnedthe religious turban, nor any military imams at the front.72 For him, the ref-erence group is the Ottoman nation, and morale coincides with nationalstrength. However, the Christians do not appear to be part of this col-lective. Their desertion during battle proved their treachery. He won-ders, for example, whether the desertion of the Christians enticed othersoldiers to desert. Though he acknowledges the answer is not clear, henotes that it is well known that most of the Greeks deserted to theenemy with the first retreat; during the second battle – he continues –not one Christian soldier was to be found.73

Similarly, Yüzbasl Bekir Fikri condemns the attitude of the Greekpopulation during the wars. At the time he served as a junior officer incharge of commando groups on the western front. In his memoirs,written before he was killed in action at the beginning of the FirstWorld War, he also explicitly refers to his deep distrust toward the localGreeks (Rumlar as against Yunanlar – the Greeks of Greece). Thus, forexample, he recounts that when he began to collect material for theimminent war, he assembled all the local Muslim and Christian not-ables (ileri gelen) of his Macedonian native town, Grebene (Grevenà).The local metropolitan firmly gave him guarantees, but he knew thatthe local Greeks continually co-operated with Greek irregular forces

69 Op. cit., p. 34.70 Op. cit., p. 48.71 Op. cit., p. 56.72 Op. cit., p. 237.73 Op. cit.

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(çeteler). His main concern was how to guarantee order in a regionpopulated by 18 Muslim villages as against 99 Greek villages.Consequently, on receiving the imperial order that declared the begin-ning of hostilities, he put the leaders of the local Greek population inprison as hostages.74

Upon the city’s surrender to the Greek forces, Yüzbasl Bekir Fikrireleased them, though not before giving a speech reproaching thebehaviour of their Greek compatriots (Rum vatandaslar). One can onlybe amazed at this surrealistic spectacle of a Turkish officer – whosetroops have already hastily retreated from the city – serenely lecturingthe Greek hostages on their failure to fulfil their patriotic missions; thelatter, according to his testimony, became completely confused betweenhappiness at their approaching release and a deep agony as to theirimmediate fate.75 Nevertheless, while he dismisses the Greeks as poten-tial and active traitors, he extols the bravery of individual non-GreekChristians. One example is the Vlach Dimitri Çakame, the hero of the1897 war against the Greeks, who was tortured to death by the Greeksafter refusing to retreat.76

Yüzbasl Bekir Fikri also loathed the absence of good morale andbravery among many of the Ottoman soldiers. He regarded this defi-ciency as a major hindrance stemming from the contemporary confusionof values. He emphasized the importance of Islam as crucial to Ottomanvictory on the battlefield. He argues that instilling faith in Islam was man-datory in order to foster the soldiers’ motivation to fight their enemies.No amount of weapons, soldiers or ammunition would be sufficient in the contemporary theatre of war without the existence of morale andmeaning, he states.77

The anonymous author of a booklet, titled Balkan Harbinda nedenMunhazim Olduk? (‘Why were we routed during the Balkan war?’),published in 1913, equally condemns the soldiers for their share in thedefeat.78 While the author does not exonerate the army officers for theill preparation and the shortcomings of the army, he has much to sayabout the soldiers’ morale. However, in his case the reference group isnot Ottoman soldiers, but Turkish soldiers. This author perceives thedefeat as a consequence of the lack of what can be described as nation-building among the Turks. He constructs his argument around anequation between the Bulgarian soldier, on the one hand, and theTurkish soldier, on the other. According to the author, the main dif-ference between them revolves around the conviction of the Bulgariansof their rights and their subsequent readiness to sacrifice themselves.

74 B. Fikri, Balkanlarda Kuvve-i Seyyare Kumandanl Yüzbasl Bekir Fikri (Istanbul, 1985), pp. 42–44.

75 Op. cit., p. 60.76 Op. cit., pp. 56–57.77 Op. cit., pp. 7–8.78 E., Balkan Harbinda neden Munhazim Olduk? (Istanbul, 1329 malî [1913]), p. 3.

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He assigns this devotion to an elaborated process of nation-building.Differently put, in his own words:

fifty years ago, they [the Bulgarians] were like a moving corpse. Theydid not possess any knowledge. They were a nation that did not knowabout anything except raising pigs. However, today they becameself-sacrificing thanks to the instructions of their poets, their teachersin the primary schools, and their village priests.79

He laments the lack of a ‘Turkish Vazov’80 who would instil such a patri-otic sentiment among the youth and entice them to reoccupy EasternRumeli.

This anonymous author opts for a different direction. He assumesthat only by adopting the tools of the nationalistic movements of theBalkans could the Ottoman state be safeguarded. His reference groupis the Turks and not the Ottomans. But who are the ‘Turks’? What are themembership criteria for this selected group? He does not answer thisquestion. However, his editor, I

.brahim Hilmi, who wrote the book’s

introduction and the summary (under the title of ‘the publisher’s sup-plement’), does provide us with an opinion that probably follows theauthor’s view. While he reiterates the importance of soldiers’ patrioticeducation he refers to the Muslims who live in Anatolia and Syria.81

When he utilizes the terms ‘motherland’, ‘nation’ and ‘the army’s hon-our’ he clearly envisages the Muslim soldier. When speaking of the offi-cer’s duty, he concludes: ‘the safeguarding of religion, motherland,repute – everything is entrusted to this officer’s hands. It has been evi-dent for a long time that the military spirit contains the holiness of our religion, the preservation of our motherland, the honour of ournation, and everything that military spirit implies.’ He further bewailsthe fact that ‘our motherland was trampled on by the muddy boots ofthe poorest enemies. Our brothers in religion (dindas) and compatriotswere slaughtered in their thousands, like sheep.’82 For him, Islam is anintegral and even decisive part of patriotism.

One finds a similar opinion in the writings of Egyptian authors.Equally traumatized by the Ottoman fiasco, they suggest similar rem-edies – among them the revitalization of Islam as the major spirit of theOttoman army. The main contrast between the Turkish-language writ-ings and their Egyptian counterparts is the latter’s underlining of theimportance of decentralization for the Arab provinces. The Egyptianal-Mana-r was the most unambiguous about this issue. The journal

79 Op. cit., p. 86.80 I. Vazov, author of Under the Yoke, is considered to be one of the most important of the

Bulgarian writers who advocated national liberation from the Turks. In his book heportrays the Ottoman period as enslavement of the Bulgarians under the ‘vicious’Turks. For an English translation see I. Vazov, Under the Yoke: A Novel about the Life of theBulgarian People on the Eve of the Liberation, trans. M. Alexieva and T. Atanassova (Sofia,1960).

81 E., Balkan Harbinda, pp. 92–93.82 Op. cit., p. 95.

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reproves the CUP leaders for imitating France and for assuming thatIslam would not help the Ottomans. Accordingly, CUP leaders sus-pended the obligation to pray in the army, rendering it optional. Fur-thermore, religious officers were dismissed from the army’s ranks asthe result of an assortment of false accusations. Some of the officers –the writer continues – completely rejected religious belief and becamefreemasons. The adoption of what the author describes as Ottoman patri-otism and Turkish nationalism brought about the military rout. He scornsthe Ottomans for exchanging religious devotion and the Islamic link,the basis for Ottoman victories in the past, in favour of Ottoman patri-otism and Turkish nationalism. The writer further claims:

The religious men the government send to Çatalca to preach to thesoldiers testify that it became clear to them, following examination,that the army’s defeat stems from the sentiments instilled by thepeople of the CUP in the soldiers’ souls. They told them that thearmy’s obligation is to defend the motherland after they had omit-ted from this obligation the belief that this defence is a religiouscommand, and that one who falls victim during the defencebecomes a martyr who is killed in battle and would subsequentlyenjoy a better life in the hereafter.83

However, even this journal, which adopts the most critical outlookagainst the CUP regime, does not contest the Ottoman dynasty’s rightto lead the Muslim community. The writer insists on a large array ofcrucial reforms and political reorganization; otherwise, he argues, allthe efforts of the world’s Muslims to assist the Ottomans would be tono avail. In his vision, the Ottoman state should turn its back onEurope and return to its position as a Muslim and Asiatic power. Hechallenges the Ottoman state to take precise and groundbreakingsteps, to break the European and Jewish-Zionist chains, and fullyabsorb Islam and the Khilafa. According to him, the Ottomans mustdepart from the Byzantine and corrupt Istanbul and found a new cap-ital in the heart of Asia, and establish there a new government basedon decentralization, a government that would be able to unite theArabs and the Turks into one strong nation.84

By way of contrast, among the Christian Arabs there was an attemptto focus the fault on specific Christian groups. Yu- suf al-Busta-nl- claims,for example, that the conscription of Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks wasone of the blunders that brought about the defeat. He ridiculed themilitary authorities who believed that positioning those elements inthe front line would force them into combat; when facing their co-religionists, they shot in the sky – according to their own testimonies.Furthermore, when they saw that the victory was in the hands of their

83 ‘´Ibr al-Harb al-Balqa- niyya wa-akhta- r al-Masala al-Sharqiyya’, al-Mana-r, 6 Feb. 1913.84 ‘Al-Dawla al-´Uthma- niyya’, al-Mana-r, 6 Feb. 1913. See also ‘al-Harb al-Balqa- niyya

al-Salibl-yya’, al-Mana-r, 8 Jan. 1913.

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ethnic (not religious!) brothers (ikhwa-nihim fl- al-jinsiyya), they hastenedto throw away their Ottoman headgear (atra-bl-sh) and don Europeancaps (qubbaa-t). Everyone knew, he maintains, that their Ottomanismwas a hollow concept (bi-la- mussama-). However, he endeavours to sep-arate Christians into two different groups: those who had an inde-pendent state to identify with, and those who did not. He holds that theChristians with no state of their own preferred to be integrated intoand to identify with the Ottoman state. His evidence is the conduct ofthe Armenian soldiers who demonstrated their devotion during the war;only a few betrayed the cause, although the Greeks, Bulgarians andSerbs turned to treachery.85

IV. The Future of the Ottoman IdentityIt is clear that the Balkan wars marked a watershed in these writers’ viewson the Ottoman state. The Ottoman vision of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state that relied on the secular conception of the Ottomannation had collapsed. These different authors and writers looked foranother collective identity. For most of them the direction was clear: theOttoman Muslim soldier failed in combat because of a lack of moraleand motivation. The non-Muslim soldier proved to be untruthful inbattle. To put it another way: the sultan as the national leader of allOttomans, regardless of religion, turned out to be meaningless for largesegments of the Ottoman population, while the sultan as the caliphended up as a vital symbol for Muslims everywhere.

Ostensibly, there was one exception to the latter claim: the unpre-cedented establishment, following the Balkan wars, of independentMuslim states in areas that belonged to the Ottomans – Albania and‘the Independent Government of Western Trakya’. How should theseindependence movements be understood? Albania’s independence issometimes described as another crucial nail in the coffin of the Ottomanstate: an independent movement of primarily Muslim people that vio-lated Muslim unity and caused the Ottoman state to embrace Turkishnationalism.86 However, in all the memoirs and journals reviewed forthe present study, I did not come across any such reproach for Albanianconduct during the Balkan wars. On the contrary, the Albanians wereextolled for their bravery and commitment to the Ottoman cause.

Although Albania enjoyed a renaissance in its cultural awareness(which evolved, not coincidentally, around another menace of foreignoccupation during the crisis of 1878) and endured several rebellionsagainst the CUP policy of centralization, it was only the total collapseof the Ottoman authorities in the Albanian lands that brought about

85 Al-Busta- nl-, Ta`rl-kh Harb al-Balqa-n, pp. 75–76.86 See, for example, O. Okyar, ‘Atatürk’s Quest for Modernism’, in J.M. Landau, ed.,

Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder, CO, and Leiden, 1984), pp. 46–47.

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full separation. Independence was an assertion made chiefly againstthe Balkan states and not in opposition to the Ottoman presence.87

A similar phenomenon arises from the case of the independent stateof Western Trakya. This first modern Turkish state survived less than twomonths (August–October 1913). Yet, there was enough time for its lead-ers to adopt a national flag that followed the Ottoman one, to issuestamps, to build an army that could fight an irregular war, to sign cus-toms and border agreements, and to establish – at least on paper – themajor governmental and judicial institutions.88

Here again, frail independence could not be regarded as a step takenagainst Istanbul. On the contrary, as Istanbul encouraged and supportedthis move, it should be seen as an innovative alternative adopted by theOttoman state to secure its citizens’ Ottoman and Muslim identity inthe face of the total break-up of Ottoman suzerainty and the externalencroachment of hostile powers. Cemal Pasa, at that time the governorof Istanbul, explicitly refers in his memoirs to the Ottomans’ involvementin this episode. He especially highlights the role played by the ‘specialunits’ (teskilât-i mahsusa)89 in securing the short-lived independence.90

Against the background of the successful Albanian experiment, whichreceived the support of the European powers, the government ofWestern Trakya took a similar path: a declaration of independencethat evolved around the Muslim majority in the region, and anassumption of the essential symbols and mechanisms of a state in thevague hope that the European powers would spare the local Muslimsfrom Bulgarian occupation. Even the adoption of the name ‘Trakya’ –an old term that derives from the ancient people of Thrace, well knownin Europe but not used by the Ottoman administration – can be betterunderstood against this background: if the local Muslims wanted theirclaims to be acceptable to European ears, they had to absorb their ownname from European terminology. Accordingly, these two movementsfor independence did not reflect a rejection of Ottoman rule, but ratheran understanding that an independent movement for self-determinationwas the only option for survival outside the boundaries of the ChristianBalkan states.

87 See, for example, the following quote from Ismail Kemal, one of the Albanian leadersof the independence movement: ‘When the Balkan allies declared war on Turkey andthe Bulgarian armies were in occupation of Kirk-Kilise, while the Serbs had seizedUskub, I realized that the time had arrived for Albanians to take vigorous measures forour own salvation.’ Quoted in M. Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History (London andNew York, 1999), p. 68.

88 On the short episode of the ‘independent government of Western Trakya’, seeBlylklloglu, Trakya’da Millî, vol. 1, pp. 62–93; N. Gündag, 1913 Garbî Trakya Hükümet-iMüstakîlesi (Ankara, 1987).

89 These units were under the command of Enver Pasa. They were designated to combatindigenous irredentism and separation, and to repel foreign encroachment. See P. Stoddard, ‘The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A PreliminaryStudy of the Teskilât-i Mahsusa’, unpublished PhD thesis (Princeton, 1963).

90 Djemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919 (London, 1922), pp. 49–51.

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*The Ottoman state entered the first Balkan war in the forlorn hope offighting as one nation. This notion must not be seen as an artificialinnovation without any support among non-Muslims. Çaglar Keyderconvincingly demonstrates that the idea of a constitutional regime thatprovided universal and equal citizenship and bestowed some degree ofautonomy on the various segments of Ottoman society had supportersamong non-Muslims. While some scholars, reflecting the ubiquity ofthe nation state, see the collapse of the Ottoman state as a predestinedprocess, Keyder gives the example of the ‘Constantinople Office’, anorganization founded by the powerful Greek bourgeoisie of Istanbul.Their proclaimed aim was to bolster the Greeks’ position inside theOttoman state and to transform the Ottoman state into a multi-ethnicbody in which all ‘Eastern’ people would benefit from equal rights.However, their voice was stilled with the onset of the Balkan wars.91 Theadherence of the Jewish population to Ottomanism is buttressed inseveral studies.92

The Balkan wars proved the frailty of the secular Ottoman identity.The failure of an Ottoman collective identity spelled the end of theimagined secular ‘Ottoman nation’. Nevertheless the wars emphasizedthe vitality of Islam and its fundamental linkage and potential for theOttoman dynasty. The Ottomans entered the First World War wellacquainted with this inspiration. The proclamation of jihad at the out-set of that war and the extended use of Islamic symbols in the yearsthat followed demonstrate the importance given to Islam as the majorcharacteristic of the Ottoman state. The Balkan wars brought about theawakening from secular Ottomanism, but they did not entail the dis-appearance of Ottoman ideology. Rather, the all-inclusive Ottomanismwas replaced with a more Islamic Ottomanism, an ideology from whichnon-Muslims were excluded. They were no longer regarded as trustedmembers who could contribute to the task of preserving the Ottomanstate from further internal fragmentation and foreign encroachment.For the Ottoman official mind, the experiment of absorbing non-Muslims into the Ottoman nation totally failed; the character of theunfaithful non-Muslim prevailed again in the official discourse and laterin practice as well.

91 Ç. Keyder, ‘The Ottoman Empire’, in K. Barkey and M. von Hagen, eds, After Empire:Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, andHabsburg Empires (Boulder, CO, 1997), pp. 30–44; T. Veremis, ‘The Hellenic Kingdomand the Ottoman Greeks: the Experiment of the “Society of Constantinople”’, in D. Gondicas and C. Issawi, eds, Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton, NJ,1999), pp. 181–92.

92 See, for example, F. Ahmad, ‘Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and JewishCommunities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914’, in B. Braude and B. Lewis, eds,Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (New York and London, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 425–28.

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mobilizing the ottoman nation during the balkan wars (1912–1913): awakening from the ottoman dream

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